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A note on our Creative Commons licence
The authors, the editors and the publisher have collectively continued to make available 
the fifth edition of Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures under a Creative 
Commons licence. We made this carefully considered decision because we want to 
promote a better understanding of electronic evidence, and wish to facilitate the greater 
accessibility and availability of our combined scholarship. We commend the Institute 
of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, for its strong and continued support 
for academic education, learning and scholarship and the advancement of knowledge.
Free legal resources on the Internet
Most readers familiar with the common law will be aware of some of the free legal 
sources on the Internet. For the uninitiated, the World Legal Information Institute 
(http:// www.worldlii.org) is a good start. Many of the more recent cases cited in 
this book, but by no means all, are available on the various independent jurisdiction- 
specific websites that are linked to the World Legal Information Institute, which in turn 
is coordinated by the Australasian Legal Information Institute (http:// www.austlii.
edu.au), the first of its kind. Note also The Free Access to Law Movement (http:// www.
falm.info). Additional links can be found on any university library website, including 
the website of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London. It must be emphasized 
that the free sources of case law that are available are not comprehensive.
Citations of websites
Readers will be familiar with the changing nature of URLs. Every effort has been made 
to ensure, where a URL is given, that it was live at the time of publication.
References have been made to Wikipedia on the basis that this source is relatively 
accurate for information of a technical nature. Readers will be aware that these pages 
are open to being updated and changed regularly. Although it is sometimes customary 
to provide the date a page was last viewed on the Internet, it is taken as a given that 
the reader does not need this information, given the dynamic nature of the Internet.
Practitioner texts
Practitioner texts are cited without reference to the date in the body of the text. This 
is because the practitioner texts that are cited are updated each year. It is suggested 
that the reader checks the updated version of the text if they are going to rely on 
any comments, given that citation of such texts in this publication fixes the year of 
publication, but this may change between editions.
Errors and omissions
While we, our authors and the publisher have tried hard to ensure all typographical and 
other errors have been corrected, we are aware that we might have missed some. For 
this reason, we will be delighted if you let us know if you notice an error. In addition, if 
you detect any relevant case law, legislation, guidelines or reports that we have missed, 
we will appreciate it if you inform us of any helpful and pertinent materials.
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Software is reliable and robust
‘If it please your Lordship,’ Dr Huld continued, representing the defendant, Positively 
Open Limited, ‘my client is certain that their system, called EarthSkyMeet, is robust.’
Dr Huld sat down. He tilted his head slightly back, nose in the air, projecting an air 
of complacent self- satisfied certainty. Sergeant of the Lawe, Sergeant Chaucer stood 
up.
‘Your Lordship, my learned friend has made many claims about the software and 
the system used by his client in the absence of any evidence. It is my contention that 
a fair trial cannot take place unless Positively Open Limited is required to disclose the 
evidence my expert witnesses have requested.’
The judge, Marcus Fabius Quintilian, put on his spectacles and looked at the papers 
before him. ‘Well, Sergeant Chaucer,’ he said, ‘this is a long list.’
‘It is, my Lord.’
‘It is a very long list, Sergeant Chaucer.’
‘It appears so, my Lord. It comprises three lists, as my learned friend is aware, my 
Lord. The three lists have been brought into a single list, my Lord.’
‘This is your third application, Sergeant Chaucer.’
‘It is, my Lord.’
‘Well, Sergeant Chaucer, I don’t know, you know. What say you, Dr Huld?’
Sergeant Chaucer sat down with an audible sigh of exasperation. Dr Huld stood up, 
smiling.
‘As we all know, your Lordship, if there was a computer error, it is obvious the 
claimant would have been aware of it. My learned friend has not explained why 
his client did not notice the errors – if, in reality, they are errors, as he alleges. It is 
my submission that my learned friend is merely seeking to obtain more irrelevant 
information. This is just another fishing expedition, my Lord. My client’s system is 
robust. It is reliable. Indeed, as we all know, the evidential presumption is with my 
client – it is presumed to be reliable. It is for the claimant to provide evidence to 
substantiate their challenge that the system is not reliable.’
At this point Sergeant Chaucer stood up. Dr Huld did not like being interrupted.
‘Sergeant Chaucer, Dr Huld must be right.’
Dr Huld reluctantly sat down.
‘If my learned friend is correct, your Lordship, then the professors that wrote the 
article that I submitted before this hearing …’
‘Ah,’ the judge interrupted Sergeant Chaucer, ‘but we have the Law Commission’s 
recommendation from 1997. It remains in place.’
‘Well, your Lordship, if you dismiss the sage knowledge of four learned professors 
with their combined experience and knowledge, there is little I can do to persuade you, 
other than to reinforce the need for a fair trial.’
‘That’s all very well, Sergeant Chaucer, but any issues that fail to be dealt with at 
trial can be remedied at appellate level.’
‘Yes, your Lordship, but the finder of fact acts as a moral agent, and central to this 
is that the findings by a court must be justifiable and meet the demands of rationality 
and ethics.’
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‘That may be, Sergeant Chaucer, but all your client has done is contend the system 
must be wrong. As I have written, inspectio etiam ipsa saepe falsum deprendit.’
‘Alas, your Lordship, the statement you wrote in Book 5 of Institutio Oratoria, that 
“simple inspection also often reveals a forgery” is no longer relevant – especially in 
relation to digital data. My client cannot point to any evidence to say the claimant’s 
computer system might be at fault. My client knows nothing about the claimant’s 
computer system, so my client is put in an impossible position. My client’s difficulty is 
compounded, because my learned friend asserts that his client’s system is robust, yet 
he resists the disclosure of the documents we have requested. It is the absence of such 
records that suggest poor quality software and poor system management. In addition, 
my learned friend compounds the difficulty by contending the system is robust – yet 
when pressed, refuses to produce a technical witness to testify on oath that the system 
is perfect – or even to offer a definition of what he means by the word reliable.’
‘Well, Sergeant Chaucer’ the judge replied, ‘we are told that the disclosure exercise 
you are requesting is very expensive.’
‘So my learned friends contends, your Lordship, and, if I may say, without any 
evidence to support the claim that the exercise is expensive. In fact, the requests for 
disclosure are nothing more than should be expected to be produced from an efficient 
and well- run system such as EarthSkyMeet. The claimant spent vast amounts of money 
on a complex computer system that purports to be more efficient and, no doubt, with 
the intention of increasing profits. Given this, your Lordship, it is my submission that 
they must face the foreseeable consequences of being required to deliver up relevant 
evidence in the event of litigation. The claimant is an organization of some size. They 
have a department that works on litigation continuously. Litigation is a normal part of 
their business. It is a poor excuse for a powerful organization to allege that the expense 
of providing routine information relating to the IT system they use is disproportionate 
to the fairness of legal proceedings.’
Preface
Stephen
This is my last comment on the presumption that computers are ‘reliable’. This 
presumption was reintroduced into English law by the Law Commission in 1997 
without any evidence to demonstrate the truthfulness of the assertion. Judges treat 
the presumption as a legal presumption.
The presumption is not restricted to the jurisdiction of England and Wales. Many 
common law jurisdictions throughout the world include such a presumption – without 
defining it – in legislation. Lest the reader think this presumption is restricted to 
common law jurisdictions, many of the lawyers I know in what are called civil or 
administrative law systems assure me that although such a presumption does not exist 
in law, nevertheless the vast majority of judges assume that computers are reliable.
The continued relevance of the presumption has been scrutinized by the first four 
articles published in the 2020 issue of the Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature 
Law Review. A further article, published in the same journal in 2021, puts forward 
practical recommendations for judges when dealing with the disclosure or discovery 
of electronic evidence. It is sincerely to be hoped that judges will begin to treat this 
topic with the seriousness it deserves.
The ignorance relating to this topic is exacerbated when judges make comments about 
the simplicity of electronic evidence, as illustrated in Chapter 5. In this respect, the 
education of judges and lawyers in electronic evidence is essential, as argued in my 
editorial of the Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review in 2010 and in 
the commissioning and publication of two articles in 2013: Denise H. Wong, ‘Educating 
for the future: teaching evidence in the technological age’ (2013) 10 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 16 and Deveral Capps, ‘Fitting a quart into a pint 
pot: the legal curriculum and meeting the requirements of practice’ (2013) 10 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 23.
The failure to deal with these two issues by the legal profession has finally led me to 
adopt the view taken by Bertolt Brecht in the following lines from his poem ‘An die 
Nachgeborenen’ (To those born after), where he writes, from the translation by Tom 
Kuhn and David Constantine, with the assistance of Charlotte Ryland, The Collected 
Poems of Bertolt Brecht (Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2015):
Auch der Zorn über das Unrecht
Macht die Stimme heiser.
Anger, even at injustice
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Stephen and Daniel
Our aim with this revised text is to provide an accurate guide to the state of the law and 
the technology. Although the focus is on the law of England and Wales, we recognize 
that a great deal of important case law and legislation in other jurisdictions is relevant 
to the issues discussed, and for that reason the text includes references to other 
jurisdictions when appropriate.
We also acknowledge that the topic remains in flux, which requires all of the authors 
to be constantly alert to the need to refine the content of chapters to better reflect the 
purpose of the text. As we have indicated previously, we are in no doubt that the text 
will continue to evolve.
We have encouraged our authors to take a new look at the chapters they have agreed 
to update, and we thank Luciana and Allison for substantially revising the chapter on 
authentication, Nigel, Andrew and Hein for beginning the review of the chapter on 
proof, and Alisdair and Jessica for updating the chapter on encryption, including the 
citation of the case from France and a brief discussion of the position in Belgium by 
way of comparison.
We concluded that the text of the chapter dealing with the characteristics of electronic 
evidence was better divided between the introductory chapter and the chapter on 
proof and, bearing in mind the increasing use of ‘artificial intelligence’ in software, we 
decided that the time was now right to provide an introduction to the topic.
We have introduced a new chapter dealing more fully with electronic signatures. Sadly, 
the vast majority of lawyers still do not understand the topic. (Stephen can teach 
electronic signatures to a hall of lawyers in 30 seconds.) Stephen’s book Electronic 
Signatures in Law was first published by LexisNexis Butterworths in 2003, followed by 
a second edition published by Tottel in 2007, a third edition published by Cambridge 
University Press in 2012, and the fourth edition published by the Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies for the SAS Humanities Digital Library, School of Advanced Study, 
University of London in 2016. Sadly, Stephen has not been able to find a lawyer or legal 
academic willing to join him for a fifth edition with a view to taking over the entire 
text, so this book will no longer be published. With this in mind, we agreed it was 
appropriate to incorporate the relevant text on electronic signatures into this book. 










As always, I thank the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies for continuing to renew my 
Associate Research Fellowship (since 2003), which has permitted me unlimited use 
of the IALS Library and Information Services, and to those members of staff who have 
unfailingly helped me when I have not been able to find what I was looking for. In 
addition, I thank the members of staff of the library at the Honourable Society of the 
Middle Temple, who kindly helped me during the pandemic when travelling to London 
to visit the library in person was not an easy option.
Chapter 5, ‘The presumption that computers are “reliable” ’, has been modestly 
updated. I thank the following for reviewing the text:
Dr Chris Elliott, FREng, System Engineer and Barrister
Dr Michael Ellims
Dr David Jackson, CEng, MIET, FBCS, Global Technical Director, Altran 
Technologies
Peter Bernard Ladkin, Professor i.R. of Computer Networks and Distributed 
Systems, Bielefeld University and CEO of tech- transfer companies Causalis 
Limited and Causalis Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH
Martin Newby, Emeritus Professor of Statistical Science, City, University of London
Derek Partridge, Professor Emeritus, University of Exeter
Lorenzo Strigini, Professor of Systems Engineering, City, University of London
Harold Thimbleby, Professor and See Change Digital Health Fellow, Swansea 
University, Wales, and Visiting Professor, UCL, London, Emeritus Professor, 
Gresham College, London
Martyn Thomas CBE, FREng, Emeritus Professor, Gresham College, London; 
Visiting Professor of Software Engineering at Aberystwyth University, Wales
I also thank Daniel for reviewing the chapter, putting me right where I missed points 
or failed to more fully understand. I appreciate the time that each of those mentioned 
above has given to consider and enhance the text. The discussion is vastly improved 
because of their comments, observations and corrections, and I have continued to 
adopt the vast majority of their recommendations. Nevertheless, any faults are mine.
I continue to remain indebted to Dr John Mitchell of LHS Business Control Limited and 
Professor Fred Piper, now an Honorary Member of the Information Security Group, 
previously of the Department of Mathematics, Royal Holloway College, University of 
London, both of whom reviewed the technical chapters of digital signatures for the 
first edition of Electronic Signatures in Law in 2003, now incorporated into this text. 
I also thank Alan Liddle, Director, DCS Consulting and Dr Arnis Parsovs, a researcher 
at the University of Tartu, Estonia, who have kindly provided me with further helpful 
technical comments relating to digital signatures. I remain responsible for the text.
My thanks also to Daniel and Bev Littlewood, Emeritus Professor of Software 
Engineering, Centre for Software Reliability, City, University of London for their 
comments on the various versions of the vignette I worked on for this edition.
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As I step down from this text and hand over the responsibility to Daniel, I take this 
opportunity to thank the Laura Ashley Foundation (now the Ashley Family Foundation) 
for awarding me a grant of £500 in November 1986 towards the cost of travel and 
books when I was accepted by City University to take the Diploma in Law. I also thank 
the London Borough of Redbridge for providing me with a discretionary grant of 
£2,330 to enable me to take the Vocational Court for the Bar at the Inns of Court School 
of Law. This covered the cost of the course and a payment towards living expenses.
I would also like to mention that John Gregory and Thomas J. Smedinghoff each monitor 
and run mailing lists (John: e-communications law and policy, listed at the University 
of Ottawa: ulc_ecomm-l (@listserv.uottawa.ca), and Tom: American Bar Association, 
Business Law Section, Identity Management Legal Task Force) for those interested in 
matters pertaining to electronic communications and policy in general terms. I thank 
both John and Tom for their friendship over the years and for running these lists, and 
I thank all of those who have contributed to and have raised questions about policies, 
legislation and case law during the years that I have been part of these lists. I have 
benefitted from the discussions that have taken place, and I have gained insights that 
are often specific to a particular jurisdiction.
I also thank the School of Law, University of Tartu in Estonia for appointing me Visiting 
Lecturer, where I have had the privilege of teaching with Tõnu Mets on the LLM 
between 2017 and 2021, and to the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, 
for appointing me Visiting Professor to teach in January 2021.
My thanks to Burkhard, who has kindly added to his commitments by contributing to this 
text since the second edition, especially in helping to develop the intellectual framework 
for analysing electronic evidence; to Alisdair, whose knowledge of the landscape of 
criminal activity is of great help; to Andrew and Hein who have, over the years, discussed 
technology with me and kindly alleviated my ignorance when I ask what appear to be 
simple or silly questions (of course, no question is silly – it is the answer that might 
be stupid). Also to Allison, who, like me, cannot understand why the legal profession 
ignores this topic. Allison agreed to be a joint editor with me of the Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, and I thank her for her support over the years.
It has been a pleasure to work with Daniel and our fellow authors in successive editions 
of this text. I thank all of the authors, past and present, for agreeing to take part in 
exploring the nuances of electronic evidence – so relevant for today’s world. If we are 
fortunate, we meet people whom we trust to offer guidance and advice, and to improve 
our understanding of the topics we write and speak about. For me, Nicholas Bohm 
and Timothy S. Reiniger, Esq are two such people. I have always been able to approach 
Nicholas and Tim in the certain knowledge that I can rely on their sound judgment. 
I thank them both for their friendship and willingness to listen and advise.
In a similar way, I have had the great good fortune to know Daniel for many years 
now. Daniel is a friend, and I appreciate his willingness to critically explore my more 
recherché ideas over the years, and to gently correct me when I get something wrong. 
I thank him sincerely for his willingness to join me as a joint editor for the fourth and 
fifth editions, and for his commitment to take on responsibility for the text in the future.







I first wish to thank Professor Colin Tapper of Oxford University for setting me on the 
path to scholarship in evidence law. As a Rupert Cross scholar and an eternally indebted 
student of Professor Tapper, who was one of the first scholars in the Commonwealth 
to conduct a systematic examination of the issues of electronic evidence, I have always 
looked to his concise scholarship and his legal precision as guidance and inspiration 
for my own writings.
I also wish to thank my wife, Xu Le, for her patience, understanding and support as 
I worked on this text.
And finally, I wish to thank Stephen for his friendship, generosity and kindness in 
granting me the extraordinary privilege to be his co- editor, and to expand my authorial 
contributions in the various chapters of this treatise on electronic evidence. It is both a 
joy and an honour to be in the aura of Stephen’s indefatigable enthusiasm, intellectual 
acuity, receptiveness to new ideas and statesmanship that made this entire treatise 
possible. In continuing my involvement with this treatise since the first edition, I have 
personally benefited much from Stephen’s mentorship and his willingness to share his 
thoughts, his research and his scholarship with me. Although Stephen claims that this 
will be the last edition he will be involved in, I have never ruled out the possibility of 
persuading him to join me for the next. To use the words of the great Helen Keller, in 
our journey to elucidate the complexities of electronic evidence, I would rather walk 
with a friend in the dark, than alone in the light.
Joint
We thank Chris Gallavin, Professor of Law and Deputy pro- Chancellor at Massey 
University for his work for this text, having taken responsibility for the chapter on 
New Zealand from the second edition, and the lead in the chapter on hearsay for the 
fourth edition. Chris was not able to take part in this edition because of the extent of 
his commitments.
We also thank Dr George R. S. Weir, Computer and Information Sciences, University of 
Strathclyde for taking part in the third and fourth editions. Unfortunately, because of 
the lack of time during the 2020 pandemic, George was not able to continue with the 
project.
We appreciate those authors who have joined us in this edition: uniquely Professor 
Luciana Duranti has been President of the Society of American Archivists (in the late 
1990s) and the Association of Canadian Archivists (2016– 2018); Dr Nigel Wilson, 
who, as we updated the text, was appointed Director, Market Regulation, Government 
and Conveyance at Water Find Pty Ltd, and Professor Steven J. Murdoch, who is also a 
bye- fellow of Christ’s College, Innovation Security Architect at the OneSpan Innovation 
Center, a member of the Tor Project, and a Fellow of the IET and BCS (Steven was the 
expert for Mr Job, working pro bono, whom Stephen represented, also pro bono, in 
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Job v Halifax PLC (not reported) Case number 7BQ00307 (judgment published in the 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 6 (2009) 235– 245)).
We mention that Lynne Townley is a PhD candidate at City, University of London on 
the topic of The RECOGNITION and development of ‘Honour Crime’ Policy and Practice 
in England and Wales. Her supervisors are Professor Andrew Choo, City University of 
London, and Assistant Professor Mara Maligodi, Faculty of Law, Chinese University of 
Hong Kong. Jessica Shurston is a PhD candidate at Queen Mary, University of London, 
on the topic of Legal Jurisdiction and the Globalization of Evidence: A Theory of Data 
Sovereignty for Law Enforcement Access to Data across Borders. Her supervisors are 
Professor Ian Walden and Professor Julia Hörnle.
We thank all of our other authors for staying with the text and working on it, although 
their workload increased during the pandemic: Allison, Alisdair, Andrew, Burkhard 
and Hein; your continuing to take part in the book is greatly appreciated. You have 
collectively helped to make this book what we aspire it to be.
Finally, our thanks to Sandy Dutczak, the IALS Digital Projects and Publications 
Manager at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, who has seen this text through 
the publishing process, together with Lorraine Slipper (copyeditor), Jamie Bowman 
(production controller) and Robert Davies (project editor) – for which we give our 
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1
The sources and characteristics of electronic  
evidence and artificial intelligence
Steven J. Murdoch, Daniel Seng,  
Burkhard Schafer and Stephen Mason
1.1 Given the ubiquity of electronic devices and the evidence that they produce, 
lawyers are required to offer appropriate advice to clients in relation to data in 
electronic form. Trying to persuade lawyers that they need to keep up to date 
with technology is far from new.1 In 1904, judges and lawyers were urged to make 
themselves aware of photography because ‘they might otherwise accept what appears 
to be pure untouched work as reliable which was all the time outrageously worked 
on’.2 And in 1959, an academic noted that ‘hundreds of important cases involving 
disputed typewriting have been tried but there are still lawyers here and there who 
apparently have never heard of them and courthouses where a disputed typewriting 
has never been considered’.3 Although written more than 60 years ago, the statement 
is undoubtedly still true today in many jurisdictions.
1 For instance, the observations by Hallett LJ in the case of R. v Hallam (Sam) [2012] EWCA Crim 
1158, [2012] 5 WLUK 518 illustrate the failure to understand that a proper forensic investigation 
requires the use of the correct equipment, otherwise evidence will be tainted and therefore subject to 
being rejected by a trial judge – for which, see a more detailed discussion below.
2 ‘Photographs as Evidence’ (1904) 66 ALJ 17.
3 Winsor C. Moore, ‘The questioned typewritten document’ (1959) 43(4) Minn L Rev 727, 727– 728 n 3.
1.2 Electronic evidence and computer forensics are relatively recent additions to 
the means of proof in legal proceedings. Unlike many older forensic disciplines that 
were often introduced into the trial process with little or no legal debate and scrutiny, 
electronic evidence has caused considerable, and often controversial, discussion 
among legal professionals. Different legal systems have reacted in various ways to 
this new challenge.1 Some systems have introduced new legislation to specifically 
address electronic evidence. Other systems try to establish a ‘closest match’ to existing 
evidentiary concepts and have applied wherever possible existing rules analogously: for 
instance, whether electronic evidence was admissible depended on whether it was 
similar to proof by (paper) document or proof by visual inspection. Most systems 
adopt a combination of both strategies. Where new legislation is introduced, the 
emphasis is on the differences between electronic and traditional forms of evidence. 
This can prevent lawyers from utilizing their collective institutional experience in 
evaluating and interpreting such evidence, often creating a sense of confusion and 
uncertainty. Where analogous approaches are used, the emphasis is on the similarities 
between traditional and digital evidence. Although this permits lawyers to draw on 
their experience in assessing the strength of the competing narratives that are argued 
by the parties, this can result in the inappropriate application of evidentiary rules. In 
Steven J. Murdoch, Daniel Seng, Burkhard Schafer and Stephen Mason, ‘The sources and 
characteristics of electronic evidence and artificial intelligence’, in Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng 
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either case, it is important for lawyers to be aware of the distinctive characteristics of 
electronic evidence to enable them to confidently and reliably evaluate its use.
1 See Stephen Mason (ed), International Electronic Evidence (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 2008) for the outline of the following jurisdictions: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey.
1.3 Various devices are capable of creating and storing data in digital form, and 
such data may serve as evidence. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to 
the technologies, their underlying principles and the general characteristics that set 
evidence in digital form apart from evidence in analogue or physical form. The content 
of this chapter does not deal with any of these matters in depth. Neither does it aim 
to be a comprehensive review of the devices and technologies that create electronic 
evidence. Rather, the aim is to provide a broad brush introduction to the relevant 
technical issues, and to highlight features that a digital evidence professional and a 
legal professional should be concerned about when investigating electronic evidence 
and dealing with electronic evidence issues.
Digital devices
1.4 Historically, the term ‘computer’ was often used to describe almost any form of 
processing unit. Now, digital computation and storage facilities are characteristic of 
many devices that seem far removed in form and function from traditional computers. 
Such devices include games consoles, wearable technologies (such as fitness trackers 
and smart watches) and ‘smart’ domestic components (such as smart energy meters 
and automated central heating systems). Most of these digital devices share important 
features with more recognizably conventional computing devices such as desktop 
computers, laptops and computer tablets. These features are based on what is 
sometimes called an input– processing– output model:
The device receives an input of some sort, by way of a local file, sensor, mouse, 
keyboard or through a communication channel (such as a network connection).
It processes the information.
It produces an output to a display, local file or printer, for instance.
It must be able to store (and/ or relay) information.
It must be able to control what it does.
1.5 In the following, we detail the role played by the main components of digital 
devices.
Processors
1.6 The digital device contains one or more processors, each of which varies in 
the extent to which it is dedicated to a specific task. An example of a highly specific 
processer is one responsible for efficiently moving data between the network and the 
digital device, such as the network interface controller (NIC) chip. Another specific 
processor is the trusted platform module (TPM), responsible for certain tasks related 
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called the central processing unit (CPU), is not designed with any specific purpose and 
is the functional core constituent of every such device. Sitting somewhere between 
highly specialized (such as a TPM) and highly generic (for example, a CPU) is a 
graphical processing unit (GPU). As the name suggests, a GPU is designed to display 
complex and fast- moving 2D and 3D graphics. In recent years GPUs have become more 
capable and are now able to perform certain tasks more efficiently than CPUs, notably 
machine- learning tasks. Each processor is itself made up of a number of constituent 
parts. Together, these parts receive data, perform logical or arithmetic operations and 
output the results. The results are passed to another processor, a local storage facility 
or a display unit, or ‘uploaded’ via a network connection to another device.
Mobile devices
1.7 Hand- held devices are now ubiquitous. These include tablets and smartphones 
that combine personal computer functionality with telephone and camera 
capabilities. Such devices are computers, since they have one or more processors, 
memory, a keypad or mouthpiece (input), and a screen or earpiece (output). Like 
computers, hand- held devices have volatile and non- volatile memory. The non- 
volatile memory stores the system software and application software, and the user’s 
data. The volatile memory is used by software to store data that is currently being 
worked on. (A more detailed discussion of memory and storage follows.) While data 
that is stored in volatile memory will be lost when the device loses power, turning 
‘off ’ a hand- held device usually places the device in a mode that uses a small amount 
of power to retain data in volatile memory and enables it to continue with essential 
tasks. Non- volatile memory in modern devices will usually be flash memory, a form 
of solid- state memory chip that is capable of retaining content without power. Other 
types of specialist mobile device include digital music players and ebook readers 
that can use wireless technology to download large volumes of data from a main 
computer.
1.8 All these devices, together with laptop computers, are increasingly used by 
organizations as components in an extended information technology infrastructure. 
Where relevant, such devices may be investigated for electronic evidence, although 
the amount of information that can be obtained will vary. For instance, while one 
may find only a list of the most recent telephone numbers called from an ordinary 
mobile telephone, a smartphone will probably yield substantial amounts of data, 
including emails and other data from a network that might aid an investigation.
1.9 The examples given above emphasize the types of electronic evidence that can 
be revealed by means of a forensic examination, including hidden or deleted data. Only 
a highly skilled person could remove all traces of evidence on a digital device, and 
such skills are very rare. Some forensic techniques exist that can recover data even 
when it has been strictly overwritten on disk. Whether these techniques will be used 
or implemented will depend on the type and value of the data sought to be recovered.
Embedded devices
1.10 The ubiquity of the microprocessor has led to the increasing use of embedded 
devices. An embedded device or embedded system is a computer system in its own 
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right that combines a processor, memory, and input and/ or output peripheral devices 
to execute a dedicated function within a larger mechanical or electrical system. The 
three functions – processor, memory and peripheral interfaces – may in turn be 
combined into a specialized or dedicated microprocessor known as a microcontroller. 
Unlike multitasking computers, embedded devices typically handle one highly 
specialized task, but can be combined with other similar devices to form highly 
complex structures, such as the different embedded devices that together enable 
an autonomous car to drive. Embedded devices control many systems in common 
use today,1 and have consumer, industrial, automotive, home appliance, medical, 
telecommunications, commercial and military applications.2 These include, among 
other things, white electronic goods, burglar alarms, industrial robots, spectrometers 
and neutron transmission monitors,3 breath alcohol intoximeters,4 radar devices,5 
traffic control systems6 and hotel telephone call- billing systems. Consequently, any 
evidence produced using or generated by any of these devices is electronic evidence.7 
The versatility and range of these Internet of Things devices means that data from 
embedded systems is a rapidly increasing source of data.
1 Around 98 per cent of all microprocessors produced each year are used in embedded devices. See 
Michael Barr, ‘Real men program in C’, Embedded, 1 August 2009, https:// www.embedded.com/ real- 
men- program- in- c/ .
2 Embedded system (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Embedded_ system#Applications.
3 R v Wood (Stanley William) [1982] 6 WLUK 191, (1983) 76 Cr App R 23, [1982] Crim LR 667, 
[1983] CLY 636; PP v Ang Soon Huat [1990] 2 SLR(R) 246.
4 Castle v Cross [1984] 1 WLR 1372, [1985] 1 All ER 87, [1984] 7 WLUK 180, [1985] RTR 62, [1984] 
Crim LR 682, (1984) 81 LSG 2596, (1984) 128 SJ 855, [1985] CLY 3048.
5 The Statue of Liberty Owners of Motorship Sapporo Maru v Owners of Steam Tanker Statue of Liberty 
[1968] 1 WLR 739, [1968] 2 All ER 195, [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 429, [1968] 3 WLUK 65, (1968) 112 SJ 
380, [1968] CLY 1546.
6 By way of example, see Thomas Novak and Christoph Stoegerer, ‘Embedded system platform for 
safety- critical road traffic signal applications’ in Friedemann Bitsch, Jérémie Guiochet and Mohamed 
Kaâniche (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, 32nd International Conference, SAFECOMP 
2013, Toulouse, France, 14– 27 September, Proceedings (Springer 2013), 138– 145.
7 Daniel Seng, ‘Computer output as evidence’ [1997] SJLS 130, 135– 137, 173– 175.
1.11 From a forensic perspective, particularly problematic types of embedded device 
are medical or similar devices that are embedded in biological bodies, sometimes in 
humans – in the form of intelligent pacemakers – but also sometimes in other animals.1 
Both are sometimes collectively referred to as examples of the ‘Internet of Bodies’, 
in juxtaposition to the Internet of Things.2 For obvious reasons, collecting evidence 
from these devices while the host is still alive poses significant legal, ethical and 
technological challenges.
1 https:// expmag.com/ 2020/ 06/ health- tracking- implants- can- create- bionic- cows- are- humans- 
next/ .
2 Andrea M. Matwyshyn, ‘The Internet of Bodies’ (2019) 61 Wm & Mary L Rev 77.
1.12 Data from embedded devices can have a high level of forensic relevance. 
These systems regularly operate in autonomous ways and collect data (sometimes 
including video or audio data) without the need for human intervention. Furthermore, 
the user or owner will often have only very limited ways to obtain access to, delete 
or manipulate the data on these devices. If the system in which these devices are 
embedded is mobile, they will regularly generate geolocation data that can help locate 
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also pose investigative challenges;1 sometimes, knowledge of the characteristics of 
the hardware and the surrounding environment are needed to correctly access and 
interpret the data on these devices. The diversity of the types of device available and 
their proprietary nature, which will be protected by trade secrets, can make it difficult 
to establish general protocols and methods.
1 Ronald Van der Knijff, ‘Embedded systems analysis’ in Eoghan Casey (ed) Handbook of Digital 
Forensics and Investigation (Academic Press 2010), 383– 435.
1.13 Data preservation in embedded systems poses particular challenges. It will 
not always be obvious if embedded systems are switched on or off, which other 
components of a particular system they are connected to, or if those components can 
change the data on the target device. For example, carrying an object with an embedded 
device from a crime scene to a police station can cause a change in geolocation data 
through the mere act of movement. Sometimes, extraction of the device or its chips will 
be impossible or overly expensive, and sometimes it is not possible to switch off the 
device without risking harm to others (as with a traffic control system).
Software
1.14 Software consists of programs that give instructions to the digital device. There 
are three main categories of software: firmware, system software and application 
software.
Firmware
1.15 Firmware is software that is highly specialized to the component that it controls, 
and will usually be written by the same organization that produces the hardware 
component. Firmware may be stored on the component itself or may be stored as 
part of the system software and loaded onto the component when the digital device is 
switched on. Firmware is responsible for controlling the component and its interaction 
with other components that are part of the digital device.
System software
1.16 As the name suggests, system software is required for the basic operation of 
a device. The set of software programs that manage the basic operation of a digital 
device is called the operating system. The operating system controls the flow of data, 
allocates memory and manages any hardware components of the device, such as the 
display, input device(s), network interaction, etc. The operating system also permits 
the user to manage any user- specific files, enabling multiple users to share the use of 
the digital device, and acts as an interface between the hardware and the application 
software.
Application software
1.17 Broadly speaking, for more traditional computing devices such as desktop 
computers, smartphones, laptops and tablets, the application software (or ‘apps’ 
as they are also known) provides the user- facing side of the system. This is ‘special 
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computer. These include word processing, desktop publishing, web browsing, emailing, 
social networking, preparing and delivering presentations, performing complex sets 
of numerical calculations, among others. Examples of application software include 
Microsoft Word, Outlook, PowerPoint, Excel, Chrome and LibreOffice. These and other 
application programs represent the main reasons for which most people use computers 
and smart mobile devices (that is, to perform specific tasks, which are made simpler by 
means of the computer and its application software). For other digital devices, the user 
may only engage the application software through a limited range of functions, such as 
status checks on a fitness tracker or energy consumption on a smart meter.
The clock
1.18 One further component must be discussed in relation to the operation of digital 
devices: the clock. The clock serves two functions:
(1) It is a device that produces pulses of electrical signals that oscillate between 
a high state and a low state to ensure that events are synchronized and occur 
in a predictable order. The clock coordinates all the components of the device, 
including the processor and other digital circuits. Each step in any operation 
must follow in sequence, although some operations run at different speeds. All 
parts of the circuit are synchronized to the pulses of the electronic clock. The 
frequency of pulses is controlled by a phase locked loop (PLL), which, in turn is 
regulated by a quartz crystal. The speed at which the crystal oscillates, the step- 
up ratio of the PLL and the number of steps that each instruction requires will 
determine the speed at which the computer operates.
(2) Also known as a real- time clock, RTC or system clock, the clock also often 
serves to keep the time of day and date in a human sense. Larger computer 
systems synchronize their clocks with a reliable time source available over 
the Internet, using a system interface such as the Network Time Protocol. This 
allows devices attached to the Internet to synchronize their time settings (taking 
into account geographical locations and time zones) with Internet time servers. 
There are two important reasons to provide for the synchronization of time. The 
first is to ensure that events occur on time, and in the correct sequence. This 
permits events to be scheduled and enables the fact that they have occurred to 
be registered accurately. The second is to enable the retrieval of information 
concerning past events, including establishing when the events occurred and the 
sequence in which they occurred. This is only possible if accurate time stamps 
are available. Examples include the time- stamping mechanism relating to 
authentication, digital signatures and the diagnosis of faults recorded on system 
event logs. Likewise, email systems and other messaging systems generally 
time- stamp messages using Coordinated Universal Time, so that the client email 
system can display the date and time of the message using the client’s local 
time zone.
1.19 In most implementations the built- in real- time clock is powered by a battery 
and runs continuously even when the device is switched off. Devices that have lain for 
a long time without being powered on may not ‘boot up’ when they are switched on, 
because the battery has run down and may require recharging or replacing. We should 
also note that the clock in digital devices is often imprecise. Usually, the clock can be 
adjusted (and even incorrectly set) manually. This can result in the system clock being 
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slightly incorrect (through ‘drift’ in timekeeping) relative to the actual time in the local 
region. Such inaccuracy may affect uses of the clock for event scheduling and logging, 
since both aspects may depend on the time as derived from the system clock. Where 
the accuracy of time is important, the clock usually requires occasional adjustment 
to bring the time back into line with better reference sources (such as Internet time 
servers). This is a matter of some significance, since unquestioned and out- of- context 
assumptions about the accuracy or otherwise of a clock may result in a misleading 
conclusion.
Time stamps
1.20 From the perspective of electronic evidence, the system clock often plays a vital 
role in time- stamping events. For instance, the operating system uses the date and 
time settings to annotate its record of events such as the creation or modification of 
a file. In computers, such information is often referred to as file ‘metadata’ (the data 
that describes or interprets the base data), since the date and time information is 
associated with the file, but is not part of the data in the file or data that the user has 
any direct control over. Time stamps are also recorded against system events such as 
user logins, password changes and – depending on the purpose of the device – sensor- 
recorded events such as the number of steps walked by the device wearer and the 
wearer’s pulse rate. The time and date information associated with such events is 
recorded in system log files (event logs). Such logs are often an important source of 
event sequence information and afford insights on purported specific user activity.
1.21 As noted earlier, the system clock in a computer can be set by the user and 
may not be configured to maintain the correct current time (such as by using the 
Network Time Protocol). Incorrect time settings will be reflected in the date and time 
stamps subsequently recorded by the system. Obviously, this potential anomaly must 
be considered when dealing with data that is time- stamped. Since the time zone is also 
set in the system, an incorrect choice of zones may result in an incorrect current date 
or time. In addition, because of the critical role the clock plays, it features a great deal 
in electronic evidence, particularly where it is manipulated by the defendant to hide 
changes made to critical evidence.1
1 Chet Hosmer, ‘Proving the integrity of digital evidence with time’ (2002) 1(1) Intl J of Digital 
Evidence; Chris Boyd and Pete Forster, ‘Time and date issues in forensic computing – a case study’ 
(2004) 1(1) Digital Investigation 18; Malcolm W. Stevens, ‘Unification of relative time frames for digital 
forensics’ (2004) 1(3) Digital Investigation 225.
Memory and storage
1.22 In order to retain programs, output results and other data on which programs 
operate, digital devices rely on storage. There are generally speaking two forms of 
storage: primary storage and secondary storage. Primary storage is storage that is 
directly accessible by the processor. In general, this takes the form of semiconductor 
memory, such as:
(1) An internal storage chip known as random access memory (RAM).1 This chip 







8 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
(2) An internal storage chip that is capable of storing data once, but does not 
allow the data to be rewritten. Once data has been entered, this type of chip only 
allows the data to be read. This is called read- only memory (ROM).2
(3) An internal storage chip that stores data and behaves as a ROM during its 
normal operation, but permits data to be erased and replaced. This form of 
device is known as erasable programmable read- only memory (EPROM).3 A flash 
ROM is a type of EPROM.
1 Random- access memory (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Random- access_ memory.
2 Read- only memory (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Read- only_ memory.
3 EPROM (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ EPROM.
1.23 Secondary storage is storage that is not directly accessible by the processor. 
Where data on which it is stored is required, the processor will use its input/ output 
channels to obtain access to the secondary storage and transfer the required data 
into the primary storage. Unlike RAM, secondary storage is non- volatile: it retains 
its data when the device is powered down. Hard disk drives (HDDs), solid- state 
drives (SSDs) and Universal Serial Bus (USB) ‘thumb drives’ used as storage media 
are typical forms of secondary storage. They may be permanently attached to the 
computer (internal storage) or attached when required (external storage). Other 
forms of external storage may be less proximal to the computer, such as network- 
attached storage (NAS),1 tape drives or ‘cloud’ storage. Because secondary storage 
is non- volatile, the hard disk and associated offline storage media are a significant 
source of electronic evidence for a device. But the fact that primary memory such as 
RAM is volatile does not mean that its data cannot be retrieved. An experiment on 
‘freezing’ RAM chips before physical removal and transfer to a different computer 
revealed an unusual context in which it was possible to recover RAM data from the 
treated chips.2
1 Network- attached storage (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Network- attached_ storage.
2 J. Alex Halderman, Seth D. Schoen, Nadia Heninger, William Clarkson, William Paul, Joseph A. 
Calandrino, Ariel J. Feldman, Jacob Appelbaum and Edward W. Felten, ‘Lest we remember: cold boot 
attacks on encryption keys’ in Proceedings of the 17th Conference on Security Symposium (USENIX 
Association 2008); and (2009) 52(5) Communications of the ACM 91, https:// www.usenix.org/ 
legacy/ event/ sec08/ tech/ full_ papers/ halderman/ halderman.pdf.
Data storage facilities
1.24 The increasingly varied methods of storing digital data and the variety of 
storage contexts mean that locating relevant data as prospective evidence may not be a 
simple matter. Data may be stored locally on a computing device, such as on hard disks, 
DVDs or CDs, flash drives, memory sticks or micro memory devices (commonly found 
in smartphones). But data may also be stored remotely on NAS, remote networks or 
‘cloud’ facilities. Of concern to many digital investigators is the difficulty inherent in 
locating and obtaining legal access to data that is stored remotely from an individual’s 
computer.
1.25 A further level of complexity has developed since 2009 with a significant 
increase in distributed data storage. A well- known example is blockchain. In these 
approaches to data storage, distributed ledgers are maintained across a considerable 
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quality of the data and makes the storage medium particularly resilient to attacks 
directed against availability and integrity. Authenticity of the copies at each node are 
provable through computation, creating a system of ‘computational trust’ in which no 
node has priority over another. The inherent transparency of the blockchain and similar 
decentralized data storage technologies offers advantages in forensic investigations.1 
However, the use of encryption can also pose challenges. From a legal perspective, the 
decentralized nature of the storage causes similar problems to cloud computing when 
it comes to questions of applicable jurisdiction, while concepts such as computational 
trust and data replication pose further challenges to traditional evidential concepts 
such as the original/ copy dichotomy.2
1 Blockchain technology was accepted as a means of authentication in China in the case of Hangzhou 
Huatai Yimei Culture Media Co., Ltd. v Shenzhen Daotong Technology Development Co., Ltd. (2018) 
Zhe 0192 Civil Case, First Court No. 81, Hangzhou Internet Court of the People’s Republic of China, 
translated by Dr Jiong He, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2019) 16, 61– 70.
2 Joseph Ricci, Ibrahim Baggili and Frank Breitinger, ‘Blockchain- based distributed cloud storage 
digital forensics: where’s the beef?’ (2019) 17(1) IEEE Security & Privacy, 34– 42; S. Naqvi, ‘A126: 
Challenges of cryptocurrencies forensics: a case study of investigating, evidencing and prosecuting 
organised cybercriminals’ in ARES 2018: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability and Security (27 August– 30 August 2018), 1– 5, http:// www.open- access.bcu.ac.uk/ 6093/ 
1/ Challenges%20of%20cryptocurrencies%20forensics.pdf.
1.26 The common data storage contexts are summarized in the table below.








Flash/ USB No Perhaps
CD/ DVD No Perhaps
Network No Perhaps
Cloud No Typically No
Data formats
1.27 Digital data may be broadly classified into binary data, where the information 
is represented in binary form, and text data, including alpha, numeric and punctuation 
data. Text can be entered into the computer by a range of methods:
(i) The typing of letters, numbers and punctuation, mainly when using a keyboard.
(ii) Scanning a page with an image scanner and converting the image into data by 
using optical character recognition (OCR)1 software.
(iii) Using a bar code. The bar code represents alphanumeric data and is read 
with an optical device called a wand or scanner. The scanned code is converted 
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(iv) Reading the magnetic stripe on the back of a credit card.
(v) Using voice data, where a person speaks into a microphone capable of 
recording the sounds. This form of data, as well as video data, is encoded in 
binary form.
(vi) Converting from speech to text. Here, the user speaks into a microphone that 
is connected to the computer and a dedicated software application analyses the 
input signal and converts this to a textual representation of the spoken words.
1 Optical character recognition (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Optical_ character_ 
recognition.
1.28 To enable a user to view text and numbers, and to see images or hear sound, the 
binary form of the data must be converted using a code. Computers manipulate binary 
(base 2) information, but for human convenience it is more common to represent 
computer numbers in the octal (base 8) or hexadecimal (base 16) system. A range of 
codes exists to represent text data in numerical form (to enable machine processing).1 
Some of the codes in common use are the American Standard Code for Information 
Exchange (ASCII),2 Extended Binary Code Decimal Interchange Code (EBCDIC),3 
Unicode Transformation Format– 8 (UTF- 8)4 and Unicode Transformation Format- 16 
(UTF- 16).5 UTF- 8 and UTF- 16 are capable of encoding the characters standardized by 
the Unicode Consortium, including all commonly used characters in currently spoken 
languages, but the two standards differ in how text data is represented in binary form. 
Computers running Microsoft Windows commonly use ASCII and UTF- 16, and most 
others use ASCII and UTF- 8. EBCDIC is commonly found on IBM mainframe computers 
and some applications designed for such systems, particularly banking software. Tools 
are available to display binary data used in computers to enable a digital investigator 
to view features that are normally not visible to the computer user. For instance, 
documents stored in the Microsoft Word format contain application metadata that are 
normally not visible. By using certain types of software program, a digital evidence 
professional is able to view all aspects of the data and such data may reveal crucial 
information that may help an investigation.
1 Character encoding (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Character_ encoding.
2 ASCII (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ ASCII; Vinton Cerf, ‘RFC 20 – ASCII format for 
Network Interchange’ (Internet Engineering Task Force, 16 October 1969), https:// tools.ietf.org/ 
html/ rfc20.
3 EBCDIC (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ EBCDIC; J. M. Winett, ‘RFC 183 – The EBCDIC 
Codes and Their Mapping to ASCII’ (Internet Engineering Task Force, 21 July 1971), https:// tools.
ietf.org/ html/ rfc183; R. T. Braden, ‘RFC 338 – EBCDIC/ ASCII Mapping for Network RJE’ (Internet 
Engineering Task Force, 17 May 1972), https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc338.
4 UTF- 8 (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ UTF- 8; F. Yergeau, ‘RFC 3629 – UTF- 8, a 
transformation format of ISO 10646’ (Internet Engineering Task Force, November 2003), https:// tools.
ietf.org/ html/ rfc3629.
5 UTF- 16 (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ UTF- 16; P. Hoffman and F. Yergeau, ‘RFC 
2781 – UTF16, an encoding of ISO 10646’ (Internet Engineering Task Force, February 2000), https:// 
tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc2781.
Starting a computer
1.29 Every time a digital device is switched on, various components must interact 
with each other for it to begin working. This is called the start- up process or ‘booting’ 
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variously a boot loader, boot process, boot strap or initial program load. It is this 
program that enables the system to start. In general terms, this is how it works:
(1) When the system is powered on, control is first transferred to the bootstrap 
loader, bootstrap or boot loader.1 On a PC, this is sometimes known as the basic 
input and output system (BIOS),2 a small program located permanently in the 
non- volatile memory of the device.
(2) The boot loader tests the various components of the system, verifying that 
they are active and working. The results of the various tests it carries out may 
appear on the system output. The boot process can also clear local primary 
memory of all historical data and metadata. It then loads up a second- stage boot 
loader which it has found on booting the device (a non- volatile storage device) 
to continue the start- up process. On a PC, the BIOS locates the first (or default) 
secondary storage device, looks for an operating system on the storage device 
and passes control to the operating system’s boot record (a set of instructions 
starting at a specific location on the storage device).
(3) The second- stage boot loader takes control of the system. It loads and tests 
the configuration of the device before loading the operating system.
(4) Finally, the operating system will display any startup dialogue (for instance, 
the identity of the mobile telephone service provider) and, if the user is 
authorized (for instance, by providing a code), grant access to application- level 
programs. The user can then take control of the device through an application.
1 Booting (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Booting.
2 BIOS (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ BIOS.
Networks
1.30 Gone are the days when most computers stood alone on a desk. The majority 
of computers are now connected, or are intermittently connected, to other computers 
or a network. Given the trails left by the assortment of logs and files in computers, 
going online can produce electronic evidence in abundance, including the use of email, 
connection to the Internet and the websites viewed, and the transfer of files between 
computers. Other sources of electronic evidence can be obtained from server logs, the 
contents of devices connected to the network and the records of traffic activity. In many 
instances, even if a digital device has been destroyed or disposed of, relevant evidence 
may still be retrieved through the network to which the device has been connected.
Types of network
The Internet
1.31 The Internet was developed from its precursor, the ARPANET, which was created 
in 1969 to facilitate collaboration between research institutions, initially within the US 
and then later internationally. A wide range of applications have been developed to 
make use of the Internet, but the introduction of the World Wide Web in 1989, which 
provides a relatively easy- to- use way to share information, contributed to the dramatic 
growth of the Internet. When a digital device connects to the Internet, it uses a set of 
protocols called Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/ IP).1 This set of 









12 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
types of network to communicate, each with the other. A digital device connected to 
a network is referred to as a ‘host’. The device uses a modem or an NIC2 to send and 
receive information, although medium- sized and large organizations will have a Local 
Area Network (LAN)3 gateway to the Internet. Application software running on hosts 
provides services to users, building on the functionality that TCP/ IP provides. The 
network itself does not have any knowledge of what the application is doing – only the 
application software running on the hosts at the ends of the connection interprets the 
data being carried over the network. This, called the end- to- end principle, is desirable 
because new Internet applications can be created without having to request the 
permission of the organizations running the network. Similarly, application software 
need not be concerned with the details of how the network transfers data from one 
end of the communication to another, and so networks may change the way they work 
provided they still preserve the functionality that applications expect.
1 Internet protocol suite (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Internet_ protocol_ suite; 
Vinton Cerf, ‘RFC 675 – Specification of Internet Transmission Control (Internet Engineering Task 
Force, December 1974), https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc675; F. Baker, ‘RFC 1812 – Requirements for IP 
Version 4 Routers’ (Internet Engineering Task Force, June 1995), https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc1812.
2 Network interface controller (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Network_ interface_ 
controller.
3 Local area network (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Local_ area_ network.
1.32 A further component of the modern communication infrastructure is the server. 
These are hosts that run application software, but rather than providing a service 
to the individual sitting in front of the computer, they provide a range of customers 
with a service over the network, for instance hosting an organization’s web service or 
email facility. Some servers permit anyone to obtain access to their resources without 
limitation. Other servers restrict access to some resources to authorized users only, 
usually by means of a username and password. Sources of electronic evidence from 
servers include the data necessary to provide the web service hosted by the servers, 
as well as the logs recording when a user connects to a server, whether to get access to 
the Internet or to download email.
IP addresses
1.33 The purpose of an Internet Protocol (IP) address is to identify a particular 
device connected to the Internet. Each unit of data (packet) sent over the Internet 
includes the IP address of the device for which the packet is intended (the destination). 
The devices responsible for directing packets to the correct destination (routers) use 
this destination IP address to make decisions on how best to dispatch packets. Routers 
may also be responsible for filtering traffic that is not permitted and keeping logs of 
activity. Packets also contain the IP address allocated to the device that sent the packet 
(the source), to allow that packet to be replied to. IP addresses currently in use take 
one of two forms: version 4 (IPv4), for  example 198.51.100.42, and version 6 (IPv6), 
for  example 2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334. For a device to be able to 
communicate over the public Internet directly, that device needs to be allocated a public 
IP address. Each public IP address should be allocated to at most one device worldwide. 
If two or more devices are allocated the same public IP address, then problems are 
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1.34 IP addresses may also be private. Such IP addresses are allocated to devices 
which do not directly connect to the Internet. Devices allocated a private IP address 
may only communicate with the public Internet via an intermediary which has been 
allocated a public IP address. There are many devices worldwide, each allocated a 
private IP address, but packets with a source or destination IP address that is private 
should not be sent over the public Internet. Network providers also have in place 
technical and procedural controls to prevent this occurring.
1.35 There are just over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and far more IPv6 
addresses.1 To ensure that no two devices are allocated the same public IP address, IP 
addresses are distributed by a central organization: the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA). IANA delegates large groups of IP addresses to regional authorities, 
which in turn delegate smaller groups of IP addresses to network operators. For 
example, the regional authority for Europe is Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE), the 
regional authority for North America is the American Registry for Internet Numbers 
(ARIN) and the regional authority for the Asia Pacific region is the Asia Pacific Network 
Information Centre (APNIC). Information about which network operator is responsible 
for a particular group of IP address is listed in a WHOIS database maintained by 
the relevant regional authority. Public IP addresses are frequently used to attribute 
behaviour to individuals, but IP addresses identify Internet- connected devices, not 
people. There are three main ways in which one IP address can correspond to multiple 
people, all of which may occur simultaneously.
1 Specifically, 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 or approximately 3 followed 
by 38 zeros.
1.36 First, the operator of a network may allocate a given public IP address to 
different devices at different points in time. This scheme of IP address allocation is 
known as dynamic allocation. The period of time for which an IP address is dynamically 
allocated to a given device could be anything from a few hours to a few months. An 
alternative scheme of IP address allocation is static allocation, where the network 
operator allocates the same IP address to a particular device, if that is feasible. Even 
if static allocation is used, there may still be changes in which a device is allocated a 
particular IP address for operational reasons.
1.37 Second, the operator of a network may allocate private IP addresses to a group 
of devices, then connect these devices to the public Internet via an intermediary 
device with a single public IP address. From the perspective of the public Internet, 
all devices within this group will share the same IP address. This configuration is 
common for a home network: all devices within the home have private IP addresses, 
and the home router performs Network Address Translation (NAT) to allow all these 
devices to share the single public IP address allocated to the home router. In addition, 
operators of mobile networks (carriers) commonly use NAT to share a single public 
IP address between hundreds or even thousands of different customers. This scheme 
is known as Carrier- Grade NAT (CGN). CGN (sharing a public IP address between 
different customers) can be used in combination with home NAT (sharing a public IP 
address, which may itself be shared, with multiple devices using a home router). NAT is 
common for IPv4 connections because there are not enough IPv4 addresses for every 
device connected to the Internet to have its own address. IPv6 has more than enough 
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1.38 Third, a single device may have multiple users – sequentially or concurrently. 
These multiple users may be authorized by the owner of the device or may be 
unauthorized (that is, they have hacked into the computer and are using it without 
authorization). From the perspective of the public Internet, all users of a device will 
share the same public IP address that the device uses to connect to the Internet 
(directly or indirectly). Redirecting communication via another computer is known as 
proxying the connection.
1.39 In summary, a single public IP address may be used by different customers at 
different times. At any one time, a single public IP address may be used by multiple 
customers (CGN). Each customer may be sharing their IP address over many devices 
(NAT). Each device may have many users (authorized or unauthorized), at the 
same time or at different times. Consequently, attributing Internet activity requires 
consulting a wide range of stored logs, each of which have limitations in terms of the 
extent that they may be relied upon.1
1 Richard Clayton, ‘Anonymity and traceability in cyberspace’, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 
November 2005, https:// www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ techreports/ UCAM- CL- TR- 653.html.
Corporate intranets
1.40 An intranet, usually run by a large organization, is a private network that in 
principle is only available to members and employees of the organization or others with 
authorization to obtain access to and use the information contained on the network. 
The intranet may look like a smaller version of the Internet, providing websites, mail 
servers and time servers among other facilities. Usually situated within the corporate 
firewall, an intranet is built to support the internal needs of the organization, as well 
as to improve workforce connectivity and business operations. As such, it generally 
aims to keep those outside the organization from gaining access, and is usually well 
protected.
Wireless networking
1.41 A further development in this form of networking is wireless technology. One 
implementation of wireless networking is Wi- Fi1 (a mark used by the Wi- Fi Alliance), 
mainly through the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz radio bands based on the 802.11 communications 
standard.2 Another wireless technology standard, known as Bluetooth,3 is a standard for 
exchanging data between devices over short distances using ultra high frequency (UHF) 
radio waves in the 2.402 GHz to 2.480 GHz band. From an evidential perspective, logs 
exist to record the use of wireless networks, affording evidence of the use that a device 
has made of a network.
1 Wi- Fi (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Wi- Fi.
2 The number 802 is the name given to the interoperability standard developed by the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers for Local Area Networks and Metropolitan Area Networks, and Wi- 
Fi is based on 802.11, which is a subset of the 802 standard relating to wireless local area networks.
3 Bluetooth (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Bluetooth.
Cellular networks
1.42 A cellular network or mobile network is a communications network that enables 
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network is made up of a number of cell sites (base stations) within a defined geographical 
area. An individual connected to a cell site can make and receive calls over the network. 
Each cell site is connected to a central computing infrastructure, comprising telephone 
exchanges or switches, which are in turn connected to the public telephone network. This 
infrastructure processes the calls by routing them to their destination, and retains logs for 
the purpose of sending out bills, maintenance and, if necessary, carrying out investigations. 
The most recent developments in cellular technology include General Packet Radio 
Services (GPRS),1 the third generation (3G),2 the Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System (UMTS),3 the fourth generation (4G,)4 the Long- Term Evolution (LTE)5 standard 
and the fifth generation (5G) standard,6 developments that provide for faster transmission 
rates and enable applications such as mobile web access, IP telephony, gaming services, 
high- definition mobile TV and video conferencing. Many mobile service providers plan 
to introduce these new systems to replace the Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM)7 standard, which is now considered to have exploitable security flaws.
1 General Packet Radio Service (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ General_ Packet_ Radio_ 
Service.
2 3G (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ 3G.
3 UMTS (telecommunication) (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ UMTS (telecommunication).
4 4G (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ 4G.
5 LTE (telecommunication) (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ LTE (telecommunication).
6 5G (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ 5G.
7 GSM (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ GSM; H. Haverinen and J. Salowey (eds.), ‘RFC 
4186 – Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP- SIM)’ (Internet Engineering Task Force, January 2006), 
https:// www.ietf.org/ rfc/ rfc4186.txt.
1.43 A mobile telephone has several numbers that identify the device. The 
manufacturer includes an electronic serial number (ESN)1 or the International Mobile 
Equipment Identity (IMEI)2 number as a code to uniquely identify mobile devices. The 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)3 number is a unique identification 
number, usually located in the SIM card of the telephone, to identify the subscriber of a 
cellular network. To prevent the subscriber from being identified, this number is rarely 
sent. What is sent in its place is the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI),4 
which is randomly generated and assigned to the telephone the moment it is switched 
on to enable communications between the mobile device and the base station. Finally, 
the mobile identification number (MIN) or mobile subscription identification number 
(MSIN)5 is the unique telephone directory number for the mobile subscription that is 
used to identify a telephone. It is derived from the last part of the IMSI.
1 Electronic serial number (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Electronic_ serial_ number.
2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ 
International_ Mobile_ Station_ Equipment_ Identity.
3 International mobile subscriber identity (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ 
International_ mobile_ subscriber_ identity.
4 Mobility management (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Mobility_ management#TMSI.
5 Mobile identification number (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Mobile_ identification_ 
number.
1.44 To ensure the telephone company knows the correct base station to which to 
direct the call, the position of the telephone is constantly tracked when it is switched 
on. Thus, there is a broad range of electronic evidence associated with the use of a 
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of calls made and received, and the contents of text messages.1 Where a telephone is 
capable of being used in other ways, such as making micro- payments, data relating to 
such services are also capable of being retrieved.2
1 In R v Brooker [2014] EWCA Crim 1998 also cited as AG’s Ref: 071 of 2014, R v B (R C A) (2014) 
(available on the LexisNexis database), Brooker falsely accused her former partner, Paul Fensome, 
of various crimes including rape and assault. Cell site analysis determined that Brooker was not at 
various locations as she claimed. In addition, because Mr Fensome retained all of the text messages 
exchanged with Brooker, it was possible to establish that the relationship between the two was not as 
alleged by Brooker.
2 Svein Yngvar Willassen, ‘Forensics and the GSM mobile telephone system’ (2003) 2(1) Intl J of 
Digital Evidence.
Cloud computing
1.45 Cloud computing is not new. Back in the 1960s, computer bureaus would allow 
companies to rent time on a mainframe as a ‘time- sharing’ service. With the rise of 
the personal computer, which made affordable computer ownership possible, it fell 
into relative obscurity, but became popular again in the early 2000s.1 Today, cloud 
computing refers to the use of high- speed and high- capacity network access to make 
computer system resources available to users at any time and anywhere, without direct 
active management by the users – who may be individuals or corporations.2 These 
resources tend to be data storage (cloud storage), computing power and applications, 
and are provided as service models in which the cloud computing providers offer 
various ‘services’ according to different service models, such as ‘Software as a service’ 
(SaaS), ‘Platform as a service’ (PaaS) and ‘Infrastructure as a service’ (IaaS).3 By 
sharing resources among users, cloud providers bring the economies of scale to users 
and enable them to avoid or minimize the cost of putting IT infrastructure into place. 
The ‘pay- as- you- go’ model also offers users the ability to increase or reduce their use 
of the resources depending on their needs.
1 Steve Ranger, ‘What is cloud computing? Everything you need to know about the cloud explained’, 
ZDNet, 13 December 2018, https:// www.zdnet.com/ article/ what- is- cloud- computing- everything- 
you- need- to- know- about- the- cloud/ .
2 Cloud computing (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Cloud_ computing.
3 See NIST (National Institute for Standards and Technology) at https:// csrc.nist.gov/ publications/ 
detail/ sp/ 800- 145/ final#:~:text=Cloud%20computing%20is%20a%20model,effort%20or%20
service%20provider%20interaction.
1.46 When reference is made to data that is being stored ‘in the cloud’, it does not 
mean that there is no tangible form for the data. The data still has to reside on the 
servers that companies set up in their data centres or, as is predominantly the case, 
multiple data centres that are geographically distributed. This architecture is intended 
to improve the performance, resilience and reliability of cloud computing services, 
especially since the data is constantly transferred and replicated across data centres, 
thereby providing for data redundancy. It also raises issues of security, data ownership, 
confidentiality, privacy and jurisdiction,1 because resources are always available 
online (and sometimes in different geographical areas) and the service provider can 
accidentally or intentionally obtain access to the data on its servers at any time, or 
use the data for unauthorized purposes.2 This also subjects cloud service providers to 
court orders and warrants that mandate that they share information with third parties, 
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the cloud. Organizations as users have also changed the way they use the cloud,3 for 
instance combining cloud resources with on- premises resources (hybrid cloud) to 
better manage their resources. This has also affected the way electronic evidence on 
the cloud is located and collected for forensic purposes. A further discussion follows.
1 Miranda Mowbray, ‘The fog over the Grimpen Mire: cloud computing and the law’ (2009) 6(1) 
Scripted Journal of Law, Technology and Society 133, https:// script- ed.org/ archive/ volume- 6/ issue- 
61- 1- 193/ .
2 For example, see Mark D. Ryan, ‘Cloud computing privacy concerns on our doorstep’, 
Communications of the ACM (January 2011) 54(1), 36, DOI: 10.1145/ 1866739.1866751.
3 See NIST at https:// csrc.nist.gov/ publications/ detail/ sp/ 800- 145/ final#:~:text=Cloud%20
computing%20is%20a%20model,effort%20or%20service%20provider%20interaction.
The Internet of Things
1.47 While the Internet was originally conceived as a network to enable people 
to communicate with one another, today it is also being used as a network to allow 
interrelated computing devices to transfer data between each other without requiring 
human interaction or intervention. This development is referred to as the Internet 
of Things (IoT).1 In the consumer market, IoT is associated with products such as 
always- on speakers, home security systems and smart thermostats. In organizations, 
IoT has been used in the health care sector, manufacturing and logistics to enable the 
integration of sensors, trackers and other processing devices. The ubiquity of IoT has 
led to evidential discovery claims in the US being made against the companies that 
collect and store the data recorded by IoT devices.2 At the same time, the advent of 
IoT has raised serious concerns about the adequacy of security in its implementation, 
which in turn raises questions about individual privacy and the quality of the electronic 
evidence collected by such devices.
1 Internet of Things (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Internet_ of_ things.
2 For example, see Nadeem Bohsali, ‘Alexa: hear no evil’, Blog Post, Richmond Journal of Law and 
Technology, 13 February 2020, https:// jolt.richmond.edu/ 2020/ 02/ 13/ alexa- hear- no- evil/ .
The deep web and the dark web
1.48 The role of the Internet is simply to carry data from one computer to another, 
but for this to be a useful service to a user, application software must be created. 
For example, an email client allows its user to send and receive messages, and a 
web browser allows its user to view pages on the World Wide Web. Certain Internet 
applications, such as the web browser, are now considered to be a standard part of 
Internet provision. However, not all web pages can be viewed using only a web browser. 
Additional software can be used to increase the level of convenience or security for 
individuals providing or obtaining access to information. Such web pages make up the 
‘dark web’.1
1 Dark web (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Dark_ web.
1.49 One example of dark- web software is corporate virtual private networks 
(VPNs), where web pages are available only to employees. The VPN software ensures 
that only authorized individuals can obtain access to the web pages and that, through 
the use of encryption, eavesdroppers are unable to view the content of pages being 
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often associated with software designed to protect the identity of those providing the 
content of web pages. One of the most popular technologies of this type is Tor onion 
services, where website addresses end in .onion. Like a VPN, Tor onion services protect 
the content of web pages through encryption, but, unlike a VPN, Tor also hides the IP 
addresses of both the individual providing the web page and the individual obtaining 
access to the web page.
1.50 The additional level of security that Tor offers, as compared to a VPN, is 
desirable for people who want to share material censored in their country, and 
indeed Tor is used for this purpose. However, Tor onion services gained notoriety for 
enabling online marketplaces selling illicit products. When used for illegal purposes, 
the privacy Tor offers disrupts investigations of law enforcement authorities into 
the operator of the marketplace, as well as the sellers and purchasers of products. 
Cryptocurrencies are also used on such marketplaces, to reduce the risk that payments 
will be traced through the banking system.1 Tor’s security is far from perfect, however, 
and law enforcement authorities have shut down Tor onion sites participating in illegal 
activities and have discovered the identities of both the operators of the sites and their 
users. Examples include one of the first popular marketplaces for illegal drugs, The Silk 
Road, set up in 2011 and shut down by the FBI in 2013.2 Law enforcement authorities 
are rarely explicit about the methods they use to trace individuals involved in dark 
websites, but approaches undoubtedly include some combination of the following:
(1) Exploiting design flaws and security vulnerabilities in software installed 
on the computer serving the dark web pages and/ or the computers used to 
access them.
(2) Monitoring networks used by people suspected of being involved in running 
or using the website, and looking for patterns of use. Such timing patterns are not 
hidden by Tor’s encryption and so can provide information about who is using 
which service.
(3) Gathering information from the dark website and linking this activity to 
another website to which an identity can more easily be attributed.
(4) Recruiting informants involved in the running of services and inducing them 
to collect information on behalf of law enforcement authorities.
(5) Tracing flows of cryptocurrencies until they can be linked to an identity.
1 For example, see Dr Clare Jones, Associate Professor Banking and Finance Law, Bristol Law 
School, Faculty of Business and Law, University of the West of England, Bristol, ‘Digital currencies and 
organised crime update’, https:// core.ac.uk/ download/ pdf/ 323892795.pdf.
2 United States of America v Ross William Ulbricht, a/ k/ a Dread Pirate Roberts, a/ k/ a Silk Road, a/ k/ 
a Sealed Defendant 1, a/ k/ a DPR, 858 F.3d 71 (2nd Cir 2017).
1.51 The use of encryption for providing access to a website and for making payments 
increases the complexity of collecting and interpreting evidence. Some of this evidence 
will be statistical in nature and so particular care is needed when applying probabilistic 
reasoning to reach conclusions. However, the underlying principles behind attributing 
Internet activity remain the same regardless of whether a standard website or a dark 
website are used. The nature of the dark web makes it difficult to assess how it is being 
used, but while it is used for illegal activities, the normal World Wide Web is still the 
preferred option for online crime.1 The notoriety of illicit marketplaces attracts media 
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175,000 Tor onion services (as of August 2020).2 The technologies used for the dark 
web are not restricted to just providing websites. There are also dark- web equivalents 
of instant messaging networks, and file sharing.
1 In 2019, 0.2 per cent of child sexual abuse images assessed by the Internet Watch Foundation were 
hosted on onion services. See IWF 2019 Annual Report at https:// www.iwf.org.uk/ report/ iwf- 2019- 
annual- report- zero- tolerance; Chandrika Nath and Thomas Kriechbaumer, ‘The darknet and online 
anonymity’, POSTNOTE 488 (Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology, March 2015), https:// post.
parliament.uk/ research- briefings/ post- pn- 488/ .
2 https:// metrics.torproject.org/ hidserv- dir- onions- seen.html.
1.52 The dark web is frequently confused with the deep web. While it is necessary to 
use special software to obtain access to the dark web, the deep web refers to content 
that can be viewed using a normal web browser but which is password- protected or 
otherwise restricted in terms of who can view it. These pages include web mail, online 
banking, private social media pages and profiles, web forums that require registration 
for viewing and services that must be paid for to enable access (‘paywalls’), such as 
video on demand and online content.1 The deep web cannot be included in the index 
of search engines because their indexing software does not possess the passwords 
and other credentials that would allow them to obtain access to the deep web. 
Consequently, such content is less visible than that on the rest of the World Wide Web. 
Most search engines also do not include the dark web in their index, but this is because 
these search engines have made the business decision that dark web content is not 
sufficiently popular, rather than because they are not able to do so. There are, however, 
specialized search engines which can find pages on the dark web. Addresses of pages 
on the dark web can also be shared through links on standard web pages and through 
email, chat rooms or word of mouth. Content on the dark web can also be restricted 
through password protection, which would result in this content being inaccessible 
even to dark- web search engines.
1 Deep web (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Deep_ web.
Common network applications
Email
1.53 A significant amount of correspondence undertaken within organizations and 
between organizations and individuals takes the form of the exchange of email. Email 
is, essentially, an unstructured form of communication, whose content determines its 
purpose. Email is an important source of electronic evidence. However, emails should 
be treated with some discretion, because a person can conceal his identity and hide 
behind a false email address with relative ease. It is very straightforward to send an 
email that appears to come from someone other than the real source. Forging emails 
might be effortless, but email is freely admitted into legal proceedings, both criminal 
and civil.
1.54 To obtain access to email, it is necessary to interact with two different services, 
one for outgoing mail and one for incoming mail. These services may or may not be 
provided by the same server. To read email, the individual must direct the email program 
to connect to a mail server using one of a number of protocols, the most common of 
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a Proprietary Microsoft Protocol called Messaging Application Programming Interface 
(MAPI).3
1 Post Office Protocol (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Post_ Office_ Protocol; J. Myers 
and M. Rose, ‘RFC 1939 – Post Office Protocol – Version 3’ (Internet Engineering Task Force, May 1996), 
https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc1939.
2 Internet Message Access Protocol (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Internet_ Message_ 
Access_ Protocol; M. Crispin, ‘RFC 3501 – Internet Message Access Protocol – Version 4rev1’ (Internet 
Engineering Task Force, March 2003), https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc3501.
3 MAPI (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ MAPI.
1.55 The POP protocol (POP3 is the most widely used version) permits the user to 
read her email by downloading it from a remote server onto the storage facility of her 
local computer or device. Once the email has been downloaded from the server, it is 
optionally deleted from the live server, but probably not from the backup server that 
will invariably be used by the mail service provider for the purpose of recovering from 
a failure for any reason. By contrast, the IMAP protocol (IMAP4 being the most widely 
used) enables the user to leave all her email on the mail server by default. Both POP 
and IMAP protocols require a user to have a username and a password before the user 
can obtain access to the mail download service. In addition, the protocol servers may 
keep logs of who checked emails and when they were checked. The existence of logs 
will enable an investigator to look for evidence of email traffic even where a user has 
deleted all of her emails.
1.56 Outgoing email uses a different protocol called Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP),1 although MAPI also supports outgoing email. The servers supporting SMTP do 
not normally require a user to use a password. This makes it very easy for an individual 
to forge a message. However, the SMTP server may keep a log of the messages that pass 
through the system.
1 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Simple_ Mail_ Transfer_ 
Protocol; J. Klensin (ed.), ‘RFC 5321 – Simple Mail Transfer Protocol’ (Internet Engineering Task Force, 
October 2008), https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc5321.
1.57 When an email is sent from a computer, it will pass on to one of a number 
of Message Transfer Agents (MTA). The MTAs act in the same way as post offices 
handling physical mail. A local MTA will receive the email. Upon receipt, it will add 
to the top of the email message received the current time and date, the name of the 
MTA and additional information. This information is in what is called the header of the 
email. As the message passes through various MTAs, each MTA will add further date 
and time stamps to the header. The most recent information will be at the top of the 
header. Another item of information that tends to be collected in the header is the IP 
address of the computer or system connecting to the server. Technically astute users 
of email who may wish to hide their identity can send messages through anonymous 
or pseudonymous re- mailing services. When email is sent through such a re- mailing 
agent, the header information may be stripped before the message is sent on to its 
destination. However, other forms of electronic evidence are transferred during such 
a process, and it is possible for forensic investigators to attempt to find evidence that 
may be useful.1
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Instant messaging
1.58 Instant messaging (IM) is a form of online communications service that enables 
the user to transmit a variety of text, voice and image messages to other individuals 
in real time over the Internet. This form of communication is similar to a conversation 
over the telephone, but the users communicate by typing messages into the software. 
The technology also permits the user to share files. Instant messaging has become 
popular because the software implementing the service can be downloaded at no cost, 
and is easy to install and use. Popular instant messaging software includes WhatsApp, 
Facebook Messenger, WeChat, Viber, LINE and Telegram. Data from such systems is 
also increasingly used as evidence in legal proceedings.1
1 For example, see U.S. Commodity Future Trading Commission v Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F 
Supp 2d 523 (SDNY 2008); CX Digital Media, Inc. v Smoking Everywhere, Inc., 2011 WL 1102782 (SD Fla 
Mar 23, 2011).
1.59 Depending on the type of software used, the program will, when a message 
is initiated, connect the two devices, either via a direct point- to- point configuration 
or via a client– server configuration, through the ports of the devices. There are two 
significant problems with this in respect of producing reliable electronic evidence. First, 
in a client– server configuration the instant message server may not necessarily log 
such messages, which means that such conversations can be considered conceptually 
similar to conversations over the telephone. Second, the program may have a feature 
that allows for messages to pass through legitimate open ports if others are not 
available. Whether such conversations are recorded will depend on the software 
used. In an earlier variation of Instant Messaging known as Internet Relay Chat (IRC),1 
conversations take place in a similar way to a conference call. IRC is mainly designed 
for group communications, though it also allows for one- on- one communications via 
private messages. It frequently suffers from the same issues as instant messaging, in 
that the servers relaying messages are not necessarily configured to log conversations.
1 Internet Relay Chat (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Internet_ Relay_ Chat; C. Kalt, 
‘RFC 2812 – Internet Relay Chat: client protocol’ (Internet Engineering Task Force, April 2000), 
https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc2812; and ‘RFC 2813 – Internet Relay Chat: server protocol’ (Internet 
Engineering Task Force, April 2000), https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc2813.
1.60 Since instant messaging requires various intermediaries to relay the messages 
from sender to recipient, to resist the interception of the message and loss of privacy, 
many instant messaging software packages have implemented encryption. These 
implementations may vary in the level of security they provide: some implementations 
secure the messages as between users (end- to- end encryption), but others only encrypt 
the messages in transit (link encryption), which enables the service provider to gain 
access to them. This allows the service provider to implement filtering, blocking and 
other editorial features, and also enables a party to require the service provider to 
preserve or disclose evidence.1
1 For instance, see the US cases of Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v Cooper Cameron Corporation, 609 F.Supp.2d 
1090 (E.D. Cal. 2009), reconsidered in Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v Cooper Cameron Corporation, 2009 WL 
3381052; People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v Dade City’s Wild Things, Inc., 2017 WL 
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Peer- to- peer networking
1.61 As personal computers have developed, so has their capacity and power 
increased. As a result, there is less of a dividing line between a client and a server. This 
is because any host can be made a server by installing appropriate software onto the 
computer. This software then permits other clients to obtain access to the resources 
of the computer over the network. This is called peer- to- peer networking (P2P),1 and 
is often the subject of litigation regarding intellectual property, especially regarding 
the downloading of music and films without payment. For instance, in Hong Kong a 
Norwich Pharmacal2 order was granted in the case of Cinepoly Records Co Ltd v Hong 
Kong Broadband Network Ltd3 in respect of a number of IP addresses, and in the case 
of Polydor Ltd v Brown4 summary judgment was granted against the second defendant, 
Mr Bowles, for copyright infringement after a Norwich Pharmacal order was made 
against various Internet service providers whose subscribers’ IP addresses had been 
identified as being used for allegedly infringing activity. In both cases the infringers 
were identified by the Internet service providers from their electronic records of the 
IP addresses assigned to their subscribers at the date and time when the allegedly 
infringing activity was taking place.5
1 Geoff Fellows, ‘Peer- to- peer networking issues – an overview’ (2004) 1(1) Digital Investigation 3; 
Peer- to- peer (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Peer- to- peer; G. Camarillo (ed.), ‘RFC 5694 
– Peer- to- peer (P2P) architecture: definition, taxonomies, examples, and applicability’ (Internet 
Engineering Task Force, November 2009), https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc5694.
2 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1973] 3 WLR 164, [1973] 2 All ER 
943, [1973] 6 WLUK 112, [1973] FSR 365, [1974] RPC 101, (1973) 117 SJ 567, [1973] CLY 2643. See 
generally Paul Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law (9th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2019).
3 [2006] HKCFI 84, [2006] 1 HKLRD 255, HCMP 2487/ 2005 (26 January 2006).
4 [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch), [2005] 11 WLUK 760, (2006) 29(3) IPD 29021.
5 For a similar case in Denmark, see Per Overbeck, ‘The burden of proof in the matter of alleged 
illegal downloading of music in Denmark’ (2010) 7 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 87; Per Overbeck, ‘Alleged illegal downloading of music: the Danish Supreme Court provides 
a high bar for evidence and a new line of direction regarding claims for damages and remuneration’ 
(2011) 8 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 165; similar comments were made 
by Baker DJ in VPR Internationale v Does 1- 1017, 2011 WL 8179128; Thomas M. Dunlap and Nicholas 
A. Kurtz, ‘Electronic evidence in torrent copyright cases’ (2011) 8 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 171.
Social networking
1.62 The advent of Web 2.0 has seen an enormous increase in websites that permit 
users to provide their own content. This varies in type from uploaded video clips (on 
sites such as YouTube), photographs (on sites such as Flickr), personal musings in the 
form of blogs (personal Web logs), and interactive exchanges with a wider audience 
in the form of social networking sites (such as Facebook and Twitter) and their more 
business- oriented alternatives (such as LinkedIn). As social networking has increased 
in popularity, with a significant increase in participating users, several contexts arise 
in which the content of an individual’s social network contribution may constitute 
evidence. For instance, an individual may be located at a specific place by means 
of his geotagged submissions to such a site,1 and photographs uploaded to a social 
networking site often retain their geotag data and reflect the time and place at which 
they were taken. Many sites with contributions that contain such information have 
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1 Jiebo Luo, Dhiraj Joshi, Jie Yu and Andrew Gallagher, ‘Geotagging in multimedia and computer vision 
– a survey’ (2011) 51(1) Multimed Tools Appl 187, https:// doi.org/ 10.1007/ s11042- 010- 0623- y.
2 R. v Scott (Michael Lawrence) [2008] EWCA Crim 3201, [2008] 12 WLUK 671; R. v B (C) [2010] 
EWCA Crim 3009, [2010] 12 WLUK 262.
3 R. v Breakwell (Jake) [2009] EWCA Crim 2298, [2009] 10 WLUK 647.
1.63 In a different vein, data from social media can also play an evidential role in 
both criminal and civil proceedings. This is obviously the case when the social media 
contribution itself constitutes a crime or a tort, for instance defamation, copyright 
violations or incitement to terrorist offences. More indirect use of such evidence can 
establish an alibi by locating an individual at a specific time and place in the same 
way as indicated above. In child custody cases, social media data has been used to 
demonstrate that a child was regularly left unsupervised late at night during schooldays, 
and social media information has provided evidence of spousal infidelity in divorce 
proceedings.1 An individual’s social network contributions may also help to determine 
political or social prejudices that in turn shed light on the character of a trial witness. 
The evidence may be recovered from the witness’s contributions to social networking 
sites, depending on their availability and accessibility. If an individual has made such 
contributions under an alias, a digital evidence professional may be able to establish 
his true identity by matching his online contributions to the same content that is found 
on the individual’s storage media.
1 By way of example, see Lachaux v Lachaux [2017] EWHC 385 (Fam), [2017] 4 WLR 57, [2017] 3 
WLUK 67, [2018] 1 FLR 380, [2017] 2 FCR 678, [2017] CLY 984.
1.64 Finally, in addition to the content of individual contributions, the social network 
of a person can itself be of evidential value, for instance in investigations of terrorist 
organizations, criminal networks or any other situation where the law requires 
evidence of membership of a group or participation in a form of coordinated action. 
In such cases, it is increasingly common to use network analysis or similar artificial 
intelligence tools to identify structures within social media networks.1
1 Michael Chau and Jennifer Jie Xu, ‘Mining communities and their relationships in blogs: a study of 
online hate groups’ (2007) 65(1) International Journal of Human- Computer Studies 57; Stephen Kelley, 
Mark Goldberg, Malik Magdon- Ismail, Konstantin Mertsalov and Al Wallace, ‘Defining and discovering 
communities in social networks’, https:// core.ac.uk/ download/ pdf/ 209214163.pdf.
Types of evidence available on a digital device
1.65 A digital evidence professional can make a range of evidence available from a 
digital device. This section provides an outline of some of the types of evidence that 
can be gleaned.
Files
1.66 A wide range of application software is used on computers, laptops, tablets and 
mobile telephones, including programs that enable a user to send messages, prepare 
spreadsheets, databases and text documents, take digital photographs, and create 
multimedia and presentations. This data, referred to as files on the digital device 
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multimedia and presentations, and may themselves be electronic evidence. A great 
deal of data can be retrieved, depending on the method of storage, the media on which 
it is stored and the manner in which the device manages data storage.
Metadata
1.67 Metadata is, essentially, data about data. For instance, the metadata in relation 
to a piece of paper as a physical document may be:
Explicit from perusing the paper itself, such as the title of the document, the 
date, the purported name of the person(s) who wrote it, who received it and the 
location of the document.
Implicit, which includes such characteristics as the types of type (font) used, 
such as bold, underline or italic, the location of the document such as a coloured 
file to denote a particular type of document, and document labels that also act 
as pointers to allow the person using the document to deal with it in a particular 
manner, such as a confidential file, for instance.
1.68 All files, including email communications, spreadsheets, websites and word 
processing documents, will contain metadata in one form or another. In fact, a file has 
to have metadata to help the interpretation of the purpose of the digital document. 
Such data can be taken automatically from the originating application software, or can 
be supplied by the person who originally created the record. The list of information 
that is available includes, but is not limited to: when and how a document was created 
(purported time and date), the file type, the name of the purported author (although this 
will not necessarily be reliable information, because the person whom the document 
metadata names as ‘author’ might be someone entirely different from the person who 
actually wrote the document1), the location from which the file was opened or where it 
was stored, when the file was last opened (purported time and date), when it was last 
modified, last saved and last printed, the identity of the purported previous authors, 
the location of the file on each occasion it was stored, the details of who else may be 
able to obtain access to it, and, in the case of email, blind carbon copy (bcc) addresses.
1 For instance, where a document is revised on a number of occasions, on different computers and 
by different people, the name of the author will probably bear no resemblance to the authorship of 
the document. In IG Markets v Crinion [2013] EWCA Civ 587, [2013] 5 WLUK 621, [2013] CP Rep 41, 
Times, 31 July 2013, [2013] CLY 387, also known as Crinion v IG Markets Ltd, the judgment of the 
trial judge, HH Judge Simon Brown QC, was taken word- for- word from the closing submissions of Mr 
Chirnside, counsel for the claimant, written in a Word file. The trial judge adjusted the text, and the 
‘properties’ file in the Word version of the judgment indicated that the ‘author’ was ‘SChirnside’. Also, 
the person originating a document may not use a new file, but may create the document by opening an 
old file, deleting the majority of the text, then creating the genesis of the new text; further, the name 
of the author may not be accurate if the person creating the document had logged onto the computer 
using somebody else’s account, and there may be occasions when a person uses software on their own 
computer that has been installed and registered in another name – although if the metadata is correct, 
it can directly lead to a killer that has murdered a number of people over a long period of time: https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Dennis_ Rader.
1.69 Because metadata is generally created automatically by the software and 
without the knowledge of the user, it is therefore also more difficult to alter, manipulate 
or delete. Imagine that Alice writes a document on a computer. The software will 
add metadata that is associated with this document, for instance the time when the 
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records the time of the event of writing. Since it is not an intentional creation by the 
author, but an automatic, software- generated artefact that is often invisible to the user, 
she may not know about this data, and even if she did, she may not know how to alter 
or delete it.
1.70 However, it must be said that metadata is not infallible. Its interpretation 
requires making assumptions about the environment in which it was created. If the 
real- time clock on the device was not accurate (for instance, the clock in a laptop 
that has crossed time zones without being adjusted for this, or if the clock is slow, 
or has been deliberately changed), the metadata as recorded will be false. Since the 
environment can in this sense ‘lie’, informed criminals can intentionally manipulate 
the data. For instance, experienced phishing attackers who use email may not only 
forge the sender’s address in the emails they send, but may also manipulate the entire 
header to conceal the place from which the email originates. Finally, since metadata 
is the unintentional creation of information by the environment, examiners or other 
third parties who are operating in the same environment will also create metadata, 
and so potentially contaminate the evidence. A careless digital evidence professional, 
or an IT administrator of a company who is alerted to potentially illegal activity by an 
employee, can by the very act of opening and looking at the file create new metadata 
and overwrite the old (a new time when the document was created, according to the 
computer), thereby erasing potentially useful metadata about the illegal activity such 
as the actual date and time it was committed.
Types of metadata
1.71 In broad terms, there are three main types of metadata:1
(1) Descriptive metadata describe a resource for a particular purpose, such as a 
disclosure or discovery exercise. The metadata may include such information as 
title, key words, abstract and the name of the person purporting to be the author. 
To understand the history of the document more fully, it would be necessary to 
obtain information about how and when the system recorded the name of the 
purported author.
(2) Structural metadata describe how a number of objects are brought together. 
Some examples of structural metadata include ‘file identification’ (e.g. to identify 
an individual chapter that forms part of a book or report); ‘file encoding’ 
(to identify the codes that were used in relation to the file, including the data 
encoding standard used (ASCII, for instance)); the method used to compress 
the file and the method of encryption, if used; ‘file rendering’ (to identify how 
the file was created, including such information as the software application, 
operating system and hardware dependencies); ‘content structure’ (to define the 
structure of the content of the record, such as a definition of the data set, the 
data dictionary, files setting out authority codes and such like); and ‘source’ (to 
identify the relevant circumstances that led to the capture of the data).
(3) Administrative metadata, which provides information to help with the 
management of a resource. Administrative data is further divided into rights 
management metadata and preservation or record- keeping metadata.
1 For more information on metadata, see Dublin Core Metadata Initiative, http:// dublincore.org/ ; 
National Information Standards Organization, ‘Understanding Metadata’ (NISO Press 2004), http:// 
www.niso.org/ standards/ resources/ UnderstandingMetadata.pdf; Michael Day, ‘DCC Digital Curation 
Manual Instalment on Metadata’ (UKOLN v1.1 2005), https:// www.dcc.ac.uk/ sites/ default/ files/ 
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1.72 The metadata can be fundamentally linked to and be a part of the electronic 
document, be included in the systems used to produce the document, or be linked to it 
from a separate system. Metadata can be viewed in a variety of ways, one of which is to 
look at the ‘properties’ link in the application that created the document, or by using 
software specifically written for this purpose. Some metadata can also be removed 
with specialist software. This can be useful when sending files to third parties, but can 
attract additional expense if a court orders the data to be delivered up in its original 
format, as in the case of Williams v Sprint/ United Management Company.1 Before passing 
electronic spreadsheet documents in Excel form to the plaintiffs, Sprint modified the 
electronic files by, among other things, deleting metadata from the electronic files 
that included the spreadsheets, and preventing the recipients from viewing certain 
data contained in the spreadsheets by locking the value of certain cells. Sprint was 
ordered to produce the unlocked versions of the spreadsheets in the manner in which 
they were maintained, including their metadata. In his judgment, the judge discussed 
metadata and whether it formed a sufficient part of a document in electronic form for 
it to be given up to the other party.2
1 230 F.R.D. 640 (D.Kan. 2005).
2 230 F.R.D. 640 at 646– 48 (D.Kan. 2005).
1.73 A further illustration of the importance of metadata is the case of Campaign 
Against Arms Trade v BAE Systems PLC.1 On 29 December 2006, a senior officer of 
the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), Ms Feltham, sent an email containing 
privileged legal advice to the members of the CAAT steering committee using a private 
and internal email distribution list to 12 members of the steering committee and 7 
members of CAAT’s staff. A copy of the email was somehow sent to BAE Systems PLC 
(BAE). By a letter dated 9 January 2007 and received the next day, solicitors for BAE 
returned a printed paper copy of the email to CAAT’s solicitors. This was the first time 
that CAAT came to know of the leak. CAAT sought and obtained a Norwich Pharmacal 
order against BAE. In giving judgment, Mr Justice King noted that the printed email 
returned to CAAT was incomplete (because the email metadata were missing). As 
described by Mr Justice King:2
It was a redacted version of that which had come into the possession of the 
Respondent and/ or its own solicitors. All the routing information, the header 
address and so forth, which would give details of the email accounts through 
which the email had been received and sent before arriving at the Respondent 
and its solicitors, had been removed. Such removal must have been done either 
by the Respondent or by its solicitors acting on its instructions.
1 [2007] EWHC 330 (QB), [2007] 2 WLUK 617.
2 [2007] EWHC 330 (QB) at [31].
1.74 The source of the leak could be the result of only two possibilities – one of the 
authorized recipients of the email or an unauthorized interception of the email. BAE 
had objected to the order, arguing that CAAT should have investigated the authorized 
recipients and their personal electronic data to trace the source before seeking the 
order. Mr Justice King rejected this argument:
46. … Ms Feltham … explains that there was a major practical and logistical 
problem as regards access to the computers used by members of the steering 
committee. Unlike the staff they are not employees of the Applicant but 
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the Applicant. Some are members of other organizations who access emails from 
accounts and equipment owned by their employers. Some are based outside 
London. This all means that to have investigated further on the lines suggested by 
the Respondent, the Applicant would have needed access to computers to which 
the Applicant has no right of access and in any event the Applicant would have 
needed the ‘costly services of a computer expert to go on a fishing expedition for 
emails which might or might not have been sent which moreover would have 
been very time consuming.’
1.75 The unrealistic claim by BAE that CAAT ought physically to examine every 
computer to trace the route of the email fails to grasp the fundamental issue that 
electronic data knows no geographical or physical bounds. Returning the email without 
the metadata is similar to returning a letter received through the post in an envelope, 
yet refusing to deliver up the envelope. That the routing and other technical data 
available in relation to an email is ‘similar’ to the data included on an envelope is an 
understatement, because the email metadata is far more extensive than the metadata 
contained on an envelope. In this instance, Mr Justice King concluded that the order 
sought ought to be granted, although not in the terms requested.
1.76 This application illustrates the importance of the metadata associated with an 
electronic object. Documents in electronic form include metadata as a matter of course, 
and it seems unrealistic for the recipient to refuse to deliver up the full document, 
including the associated metadata, in such circumstances.
1.77 A case from the US serves to highlight how concerns relating to the preservation 
of data are viewed, as well as the relevance of metadata. In the case of Armstrong v 
Executive Office of the President, Office of Administration,1 the Executive Office of 
the President and related White House departments intended to require all federal 
employees to print out their electronic communications on paper to discharge their 
obligations under the provisions of the Federal Records Act. This was challenged by 
researchers and non- profit organizations on the grounds that this amounted to a 
destruction of federal records. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
Circuit upheld the challenge, noting that the hard copy printed version ‘may omit 
fundamental pieces of information which are an integral part of the original electronic 
records, such as the identity of the sender and/ or recipient and the time of receipt’.2
1 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
2 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) at 1277.
Social context and metadata
1.78 A significant amount of electronic data is created through communication 
between people separated by geographical, political, social and cultural boundaries. 
While the Internet has brought people previously separated by distance into 
interaction, it also creates a new form of ‘distance’ between the communicators. Some 
communication practices do not translate well to this new medium, such as facial 
expressions and tone of voice. Evidence is not created in a vacuum, however. It has 
meaning, and can be interpreted only with knowledge of the context in which it was 
created. The exchange ‘I hate you all and wish you were dead’ in a dispute between a 
teenager and his parents about cleaning a room will be interpreted by most people 
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same words found on a carefully written letter will carry a different meaning. Therefore, 
consideration has to be given to whether an email, a Twitter post or an exchange on a 
discussion forum is more similar to a letter or to a direct verbal exchange.
1.79 Consider the case of Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions.1 Paul Chambers 
was a registered Twitter user with the handle ‘@PaulJChambers’. He was due to fly to 
Belfast from Doncaster Robin Hood Airport to meet another Twitter user, identified as 
‘@Crazycolours’, on 15 January 2010.2 On 6 January 2010, Chambers became aware 
of problems at Doncaster Robin Hood Airport because of adverse weather conditions, 
and he and Crazycolours subsequently entered into the following exchange on Twitter:
@Crazycolours: I [Chambers] was thinking that if it does then I had decided to 
resort to terrorism
@Crazycolours: That’s the plan! I am sure the pilots will be expecting me to 
demand a more exotic location than NI
1 [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 WLR 1833, [2013] 1 All ER 149, [2012] 7 WLUK 933, [2013] 
1 Cr App. R 1, (2012) 176 JP 737, [2012] Info TLR 193, [2012] ACD 114, [2013] CLY 625.
2 The facts are taken from the judgment of Lord Judge LCJ in Chambers v Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin); Lilian Edwards, ‘Section 127 of the Communications Act 
2003: threat or menace?’ (2012) 23(4) Computers & Law 21.
1.80 The court noted that in the context of the bad weather, these comments from 
Chambers seemed to be a reference to the possibility of the airport closing. No reply 
from Crazycolours was produced in court. Two hours later, when Chambers found out 
that the airport had closed, he posted the following message, available to the 600 or so 
followers of his Twitter postings:
Crap! Robin Hood Airport is closed. You’ve got a week and a bit to get your shit 
together otherwise I am blowing the airport sky high!!
1.81 On 11 January 2010, five days after the comments were posted, the managers 
at Robin Hood Airport found the comments and passed what was regarded as a ‘non- 
credible’ threat (because the tweet featured Chambers’ name and because he was due 
to fly from the airport in the near future) to the airport police, who in turn referred the 
matter on to the South Yorkshire police.
1.82 The South Yorkshire police arrested Chambers on 13 January on suspicion 
of involvement in a bomb hoax while he was at work, seven days after the offending 
message was tweeted. Interviewed under caution, Chambers repeatedly asserted that 
this Tweet was a joke, or meant to be a joke and not intended to be menacing. He said 
that he did not see any risk at all that it would be regarded as menacing, and that if 
he had, he would not have posted it. In interview he was asked whether some people 
might get a bit jumpy and responded ‘yah. Hmm mmm’. Chambers was charged with 
the offence of sending by a public electronic communication network a message of a 
‘menacing character’ contrary to s 127(1)(a) and (3) of the Communications Act 2003 
and was found guilty. His appeal to the Crown Court in Doncaster was dismissed, and on 
further appeal the question was whether the words he used were a ‘menacing message 
sent through a public communication medium’ and thus in violation of s 127(1)(a) and 
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1.83 The ensuing prosecution showed just how difficult this determination can be. 
Some security officers at the airport were willing to dismiss it outright as ‘venting’, 
while others were concerned enough to inform the police. The court of first instance, 
applying an abstract, decontextualized dictionary definition of ‘menace’, convicted 
Chambers. On appeal, the members of the Court of Appeal noted, however, that 
‘[b] efore concluding that a message is criminal on the basis that it represents a 
menace, its precise terms, and any inferences to be drawn from its precise terms, 
need to be examined in the context in and the means by which the message was 
sent’.1 The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the 
appeal against conviction because it was posted as a conversation piece for Chambers’ 
followers, drawing attention to himself and his predicament. It was not addressed to 
anyone at the airport or anyone responsible for public security. The communication 
was airing the grievance that the airport was closed when the writer wanted it to be 
open, and identified the person making the ‘threat’ in ample time for it to be reported 
and extinguished.
1 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin) at [31].
1.84 For the Court of Appeal to consider the social context in which the electronic 
evidence was to be understood must be correct. The visual form in which this evidence 
appears may not be a true account of the social meaning that informed the users 
when the evidence was created. For instance, a Tweet may look like a warning, but it 
is certainly not understood as such by the participants. Since judges and jurors will 
often have very different technological experiences, it is tempting to lead sociological 
or psychological evidence on these issues, but procedural rules on admissibility may 
well prevent this.
Imaging
1.85 Any digital forensic investigation will begin by ‘imaging’ the device on which 
electronic evidence may reside. The imaging process is a non- destructive process that 
creates an exact external digital copy of any data on the device. Subsequently, all data 
investigation should be performed on the imaged copy and not on data stored on the 
original device.
System and program logs
1.86 As previously noted, many services and devices keep records or logs of activity 
for business and operational purposes. In most modern operating systems such as 
Windows and Linux, virtually anything and everything happening on and to the system 
is recorded in the form of logs in some manner. This includes information about system 
events, including the startup of applications and various classes of error messages. 
Information in the logs may help to determine, for instance, how an unauthorized 
computer user obtained access to a system with the intent of stealing information from 
the computer. It may also be possible to configure the systems log (syslog) such that 
the log messages can be sent to another networked system while retaining a local copy. 
As a result, if a hacker acquires system adminstrator privileges on a networked UNIX 
operating system,1 for instance, and wants to erase something from the local logs, he 
would not be able to erase the data from the remote logs to remove all traces of his 
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1 In UNIX- type systems, the ‘superuser’, that is the account for the system administrator, is known as 
‘root’. This account has all rights or permissions to all files and programs in all modes.
1.87 Unlike UNIX- type operating systems such as Linux and macOS, the Windows 
operating system also includes a ‘registry’. This is a store of data that contains a great 
deal of information, including a comprehensive database containing information 
on every program that is compatible with Windows that has been installed on the 
computer. It also includes information about the purported user of the computer, the 
preferences exercised by the user, information about the hardware components and 
information about the network (if it is connected to a network). The values stored 
in the registry are designed primarily to be processed by the computer, but can be 
converted to a human- readable form. An example of the type of information that the 
registry can provide to an investigator is the AutoComplete data for a user of Internet 
Explorer visiting a particular website, such as her name, address, telephone number, 
email address and passwords. In addition, it is possible to establish when the user last 
downloaded a file from the Internet, together with the first page she visited from the 
registry.1
1 Although it does not follow that a user clicked on a website address that has been recorded in a 
temporary cache file, for which see the case of State of Connecticut v Julie Amero (Docket number CR- 
04- 93292; Superior Court, New London Judicial District at Norwich, GA 21; 3, 4 and 5 January 2007). 
For an exhaustive analysis of this case, see Stephen Mason (ed.), International Electronic Evidence, 
xxxvi– lxxv.
Temporary files and cache files
1.88 When a digital device connects to the Internet, a range of information about 
its activities may be recorded and retained locally, including the websites and any 
newsgroups that have been visited, and the content that was viewed. For the purpose 
of enabling the browser to improve user experience and speed up browsing, temporary 
copies of websites that have been visited are stored in cache folders. These folders 
contain fragments of the web page, including images and text. Some browsers will 
retain more than one local file containing location information about the websites 
visited.
1.89 It is important to understand the legal consequences of temporary files and 
cache files. This is exemplified in the case of Atkins v Director of Public Prosecutions.1 
In this case, Dr Atkins, a university lecturer at the University of Bristol, Department 
of English, had browsed the Internet for indecent photographs of children and had 
saved a number of such photographs as files in the J directory of his computer. He was 
convicted of one offence of having in his possession indecent photographs of children 
on the J directory of his computer and nine other offences for the temporary files that 
his browser had placed in the cache folder. In allowing an appeal, Simon Brown LJ and 
Blofeld J held that Dr Atkins should not have been convicted of possession in respect 
of the photographs stored in the cache, because he was not aware of its existence or 
what it did, and therefore could not be said to have knowingly had possession of these 
particular photographs. The court ordered that the case be remitted with a direction 
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1 Atkins v DPP [2000] 1 WLR 1427 (QB), [2000] 2 All ER 425, [2000] 3 WLUK 213, [2000] 2 Cr App 
R 248, (2000) 97(13) LSG 42, (2000) 144 SJLB 148, Times, 16 March 2000, Independent, 17 April 
2000, [2000] CLY 993, also known as DPP v Atkins; for a US case based on similar facts with an identical 
outcome, see United States v Kuchinski 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006).
2 In Clifford v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Constabulary [2011] EWHC 815 (QB), [2011] 4 
WLUK 7, Mr Justice Mackay observed that the prosecution were fully aware of this issue, but prosecuted 
Mr Clifford in any event: a prosecution that was eventually determined to be malicious; see also Clifford 
v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Constabulary [2008] EWHC 3154 (QB), [2008] 12 WLUK 568 and 
Clifford v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Constabulary [2009] EWCA Civ 1259, [2009] 12 WLUK 16.
1.90 In addition to browser caches, Windows and UNIX systems also have paging 
file or swap space. This is an area of non- volatile storage space that is used as virtual 
memory. In the event that the applications being run on the system require more 
RAM than the system has available, low- priority applications are copied to the virtual 
memory and the RAM they are using is thereby freed for use by applications with a 
higher priority. Swap space is rarely cleaned during the normal operation of the 
system. This means that when a system needs to be forensically analysed, it is often 
the case that useful data associated with applications, which may not even be running 
at the time, can be found by analysing the content of the swap space. This can also 
apply to data that is normally stored on the standard file system in an encrypted form. 
Depending on the application and the precise circumstances, some applications may 
allow unencrypted copies of the data to be stored in the swap file.
Deleted or ‘lost’ files
1.91 File systems keep a record of where data are located on a storage medium. The 
way data are stored will differ, depending on the software and the architecture of the 
method used to allocate blocks of storage for files (the file system architecture). In 
simple terms, the location of data on a storage medium is controlled by a file system. 
For instance, the storage medium can be divided into partitions and media blocks, and 
where this is the case, the file will be stored in a particular location in a partition. 
When a file is deleted, only the system’s pointers in the filing system are deleted: the 
instruction to delete removes the pointer to the location of the file, but does not actually 
delete the file. Even where part of a file has been overwritten, it is often possible to 
recover part of the deleted file if the set of media blocks containing that file has not 
been completely overwritten. For this reason, in the majority of cases it is possible 
to recover data that has been deleted, depending on the amount of medium- writing 
activity that has been performed between the deletion of the file and the recovery 
process.1
1 Andy Jones and Christopher Meyler, ‘What evidence is left after disk cleaners?’ (2004) 1(3) Digital 
Investigation 183; ‘Deleted File Recovery’ (NIST), https:// www.nist.gov/ itl/ ssd/ software- quality- 
group/ computer- forensics- tool- testing- program- cftt/ cftt- technical/ deleted.
1.92 File systems also keep a record of those parts of the medium that are unusable 
or ‘bad’, so that no data will be written there. But a user may intentionally mark 
portions of the medium as ‘bad’ to hide substantial amounts of data in those portions. 
Such data could not be seen without the use of an appropriate media diagnostic or 
examination tool (since the operating system will automatically avoid making any use 
of these ‘bad sectors’). Alternatively, when a device that is claimed to be non- functional 
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wrongdoing on the device. This is illustrated by the case of Sectrack NV v Satamatics 
Ltd1 concerning the misuse of confidential information. One of the defendants was in 
possession of a Blackberry device, which he claimed was frozen or locked. When the 
device was ‘unlocked’, it automatically downloaded various emails that the defendant 
had received, which implicated him in the misuse of confidential information.2 Since 
this case, manufacturers of hand- held devices have developed extensive backup 
systems that permit the backing up of device data to other devices and storage facilities. 
In the future, without the use of encryption, it will be relatively difficult to delete data 
sufficiently for it to be beyond recovery.
1 [2007] EWHC 3003 (Comm), [2007] 12 WLUK 558.
2 [2007] EWHC 3003 (Comm) at [7] .
1.93 However, it does not follow that the recovered data is genuine or trustworthy 
evidence just because it is found. There are numerous contexts in which data may 
be lost or damaged, and this will affect the credibility of any resulting data that is 
recovered. Examples include the corruption or loss of original or deleted data because 
of errors in the program, and interference with the data from extrinsic sources.1 
Further, it should be observed that the reliability of the recovered data as evidence 
would also be affected by the way in which a digital evidence professional carries 
out the examination and recovery process. If the process of investigation affects the 
evidence, it will be less reliable.
1 Peter Sommer, ‘Downloads, logs and captures: Evidence from cyberspace’ [2002] CTLR 33; Eoghan 
Casey, ‘Error, uncertainty, and loss in digital evidence’ (2002) 1(2) Intl J of Digital Evidence; Caroline 
Allinson, ‘Audit trails in evidence – a Queensland case study’ (2001) 1 JILT; and ‘Audit trails in evidence: 
analysis of a Queensland case study’ (2003) 2 JILT.
Simulations, data visualizations, augmented and virtual reality
1.94 There is an increasing use of computer- generated sequences as a method of 
presenting evidence in legal proceedings. Often these are designed to predict the 
behaviour or outcome of an incident, based on mathematical models that are built 
on the well- known behaviour of natural systems in chemistry, biology, physics and 
engineering.1
1 Computer simulation (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Computer_ simulation; see 
‘Computer generated animations and simulations’ in Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of the 
legal issues and citation of relevant authorities, legal and non- legal.
Encryption and obfuscated data
1.95 Encryption has been known and used since ancient times, especially to 
protect military communications.1 But the advent of computers and the Internet has 
intensified the use of cryptography to secure information and communications. The 
underlying concept remains the same, however: since sensitive information in its 
unencrypted form may be read by people with unscrupulous motives or be exposed to 
interceptors, encryption converts the information in its unencrypted form (referred to 
as plaintext) into a form which is non- readable by unauthorized parties (referred to as 
ciphertext). Only authorized parties can decrypt the ciphertext back into its readable 
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verify who created the information and that it has not been tampered with in transit. 
The data that allows a recipient to verify the authenticity of a message is known as a 
digital signature, but this is quite separate from the legal concept of a signature.
1 John F. Dooley, History of Cryptography and Cryptanalysis: Codes, Ciphers, and Their Algorithms 
(Springer 2018), 13– 18.
1.96 Encryption and authenticity verification are achieved through the use of a third 
piece of information known as a key. There are two main types of keys in cryptographic 
systems: symmetric key and asymmetric (or public) key schemes. In symmetric key 
schemes, the key that is used to encrypt and/ or authenticate the plaintext is the same 
key used to decrypt and/ or verify the ciphertext. In other words, both the sender 
and recipient must share the same key in order to achieve secure communication. In 
asymmetric key schemes, the private part of the key is used to decrypt information 
or create a digital signature, and the public part of the key is used to encrypt the 
information or verify the authenticity of a message with a corresponding digital 
signature. Asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic systems are often combined 
to take advantage of the efficiency of symmetric cryptography and the flexibility of 
asymmetric cryptography.
1.97 For instance, the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), an extension 
of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), is used to secure communications over 
the Internet by authenticating a website, protecting the privacy of the sender and the 
recipient, and preserving the privacy and authenticity of the data exchanged while the 
data is in transit.1 The authentication aspect of HTTPS is achieved by a trusted third 
party digitally signing a server- side document (known as a digital certificate) that 
certifies that the public key is owned by the sender responsible for the website, while 
the privacy aspect of HTTPS is achieved by the encryption of the data transmitted 
between the sender and recipient using symmetric cryptography keys that are unique 
to each connection.2
1 HTTPS (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ HTTPS.
2 Transport Layer Security (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Transport_ Layer_ Security.
Artificial intelligence and machine learning
1.98 Using a definition dating back to the 1970s, artificial intelligence (AI) can, in a 
suitably technology- neutral way, be defined as ‘[The automation of] activities that we 
associate with human thinking, activities such as decision- making, problem solving, 
and learning’.1 While the term first appeared in the 1950s, interaction between law and 
AI entered the academic mainstream in the 1980s and 1990s through organizations 
such as JURIX2 and the International Association for Artificial Intelligence and Law.3 
These were the halcyon days of the ‘symbolic manipulation’ approach to AI, exemplified 
through the quest for ‘expert systems’ that contained symbolic representations of 
expert knowledge in their knowledge base, usually in the form of ‘If/ Then’ rules, and 
that were able to perform logical operations on it. Systems of that type (which are still 
around today and continue to be developed and refined) include programs that help 
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evaluate its probative weight and turn it into logically compelling arguments.4 More 
complex systems combine rule- based knowledge representation with statistical or 
probabilistic reasoners, for instance Bayesian networks, to analyse and evaluate a 
broader range of evidence types.5 While these systems help investigators to analyse 
and structure evidence, they do not generate new types of digital evidence. As a result, 
they are outside the scope of this chapter.
1 Richard Bellman, An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence: Can Computers Think? (Boyd & Fraser 
Publishing Company 1978), 3– 4.
2 http:// jurix.nl/ .
3 http:// www.iaail.org/ .
4 Ephraim Nissan, Computer Applications for Handling Legal Evidence, Police Investigation and Case 
Argumentation Volume 5 (Springer Science & Business Media 2012); Jeroen Keppens and Burkhard 
Schafer, ‘Knowledge based crime scenario modelling’ (2006) 30(2) Expert Systems with Applications 
203.
5 Floris Bex, Peter J. van Koppen, Henry Prakken and Bart Verheij, ‘A hybrid formal theory of 
arguments, stories and criminal evidence’ (2010) 18(2) Artificial Intelligence and Law 123, DOI: 
10.1007/ s10506- 010- 9092- x.
1.99 The results of approaches that started to emerge in the mid- 1990s to enable 
a way of knowledge representation and knowledge sharing that preserved more of 
the meaning, or semantics, of our knowledge are closer to being digital evidence 
generated by AI. This became of particular importance with the emergence of the 
semantic Web and its aim to establish ‘a common framework that allows data to be 
shared and reused across application, enterprise, and community boundaries’,1 one of 
the significant technologies underpinning the World Wide Web. Ontology- based legal 
AI would then try to represent the knowledge of an investigator, or the knowledge 
we have about a particular crime, by building taxonomies and classification networks. 
Such a formal ontology would, for instance, allow the software to reason about the 
information it finds on a website to determine if the text falls under the category 
of ‘committing incitement’, which in turn falls under the category of ‘committing a 
criminal offence’. Ontology- based AI systems have been used, for instance, to enable 
search engine indexing services to autonomously identify websites that host content 
that violates banking regulations or are in other ways fraudulent, or to identify 
whether a set of digital VAT receipts are likely to support a claim for VAT fraud.2 This 
part- automation of the investigative process can raise issues for the law of evidence, 
for instance how rules on searches can be analogized: whether it makes sense to 
attribute ‘reasonable suspicion’ to the software agent, or whether this resides with 
its human (police) operators, for instance. However, more recent developments in AI 
have moved beyond these ‘symbolic’ approaches to knowledge representation and 
reasoning to probabilistic or statistic approaches, using machine learning as a way to 
implement them.
1 https:// www.w3.org/ 2001/ sw/ SW- FAQ.
2 John Kingston, Burkhard Schafer and Wim Vandenberghe, ‘No model behaviour: ontologies for 
fraud detection’ in V. Richard Benjamins, Pompeu Casanovas, Joost Breuker and Aldo Gangemi (eds.) 
Law and the Semantic Web (Springer 2005), 233– 247; Dimitris Kanellopoulos, Sotiris Kotsiantis and 
Vasilis Tampakas, ‘Towards an ontology- based system for intelligent prediction of firms with fraudulent 
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1.100 Before examining machine learning in more detail, it should be noted that 
many forensic subdisciplines have relied for a long time on complex statistics software 
programs for data analysis that can no longer be verified by human experts, thus 
already creating the problem of ‘black box’ algorithms that are a main concern for 
current AI systems. Forensic DNA analysis, and in particular advanced methods such as 
low copy number DNA testing, requires complex statistical analysis that is carried out 
by computer programs.1 Similarly, forensic use of neuroimaging such as FMRI scans 
rely on complex statistical software tools that mediate between the ‘raw data’ collected 
by sensors and the visual representation of a brain for the human analyst. Even though, 
especially in the latter case, significant parts of the evidence are computer- generated, 
new evidential requirements for electronic evidence have not normally been applied 
to the use of computer technology within established forensic disciplines. To the 
extent that the accuracy and reliability of these programs has been discussed at all, 
they have been dealt with through certification and standardization, rather than a 
forensic computing analysis of individual machines and their use in an individual case.
1 Wing K. Fung, Yue- Qing Hu and Yuk- Ka Chung, ‘On statistical analysis of forensic DNA: theory, 
methods and computer programs’ (2006) 162(1– 3) Forensic Science International 17, DOI: 10.1016/ 
j.forsciint.2006.06.025.
1.101 Machine learning (ML) refers to the broad category of computational approaches 
to solving problems through applying statistical techniques to identify patterns in data, 
rather than having a developer explicitly specify detailed steps to follow. In this way, 
machine learning systems can be said to demonstrate artificial intelligence; that is, 
their approach contains some characteristics of the approach a human would take to 
carry out such a task. Machine learning works by ‘allow[ing] systems to learn directly 
from examples, data, and experience’.1
1 Royal Society, ‘Machine learning: the power and promise of computers that learn by example’ 
(April 2017) 19, https:// royalsociety.org/ ~/ media/ policy/ projects/ machine- learning/ publications/ 
machine- learning- report.pdf.
1.102 There are three main permutations of ML. First, in supervised machine learning 
the machine system is trained with data items that each have an associated label. The 
ML system learns the relationship between data items and labels and is then able to 
estimate the most likely label that should be associated with data items it has not 
encountered. For example, a ML system could be provided with many photographs 
of street signs that each have been transcribed by a human, then be tasked with 
identifying photographs of street signs encountered by a self- driving car. Second, in 
unsupervised machine learning data is not labelled. The ML system identifies patterns 
within the data items in order to group items that are similar or to summarise the 
important characteristics of the data. For example, supermarket customers could be 
grouped into categories based on their shopping habits, so as to direct advertising 
more effectively. Third, with reinforcement learning the ML system interacts with the 
physical world or a system of rules and develops a strategy that achieves a specified 
objective. For example, a robot could be given the task of reaching a point as quickly as 
possible, given access to a collection of motors and sensors.1
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1.103 Because ML is a general technique for automating useful tasks that require 
human intelligence for successful completion, the range of applications possible with 
ML are wide and varied. Law enforcement authorities such as police officers may be 
equipped with body- worn video cameras that record crucial evidence in real time1 and 
can execute automated facial recognition.2 Patrol cars are equipped with in- car cameras 
that automatically read number plates to find matches for vehicles and their owners.3 
The gathering of criminal intelligence and predictive policing are also being helped by 
advancements in ML.4 In banking, logistics, medicine, electronic commerce and other 
industries, ML systems are used in applications that range from fraud and accident 
detection to productivity improvement, from diagnostics and safety assurances to 
customization of goods and services, to enable rapid and accurate decision making.5 
For this reason, the range of evidence that is generated by ML devices is practically 
limitless. This in turn engenders a careful review of the nature of such evidence, 
including an examination of the authentication of such evidence and whether the 
admission of it in legal proceedings breaches the rule against hearsay.6
1 Ben Bowling and Shruti Iyer, ‘Automated policing: the case of body- worn video’ (2019) 15(2) Int 
JLC 140; DPP v Young [2018] EWHC 3616 (Admin), [2018] 12 WLUK 67 (accepting body- worn video as 
evidence).
2 See R. (on the application of Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales [2019] EWHC 2341 (Admin), 
[2020] 1 WLR 672, [2020] 1 All ER 864, [2019] 9 WLUK 9, [2020] 1 Cr App R 3, [2019] HRLR 16, 
[2019] ACD 122, Times, 9 December 2019, Times, 11 December 2019, [2019] 11 CLY 1389, regarding 
a challenge to privacy and data protection from police use of automated facial recognition technologies 
on body- worn videos.
3 For instance, see R. v Doyle (Hugh), R v Wood (Carl), R. v Lincoln (William) [2017] EWCA Crim 340, 
[2017] 2 WLUK 194, admitting automatic number plate recognition evidence as part of the evidence 
of the movement of accused’s cars; R. v Brown (Nico) [2019] EWCA Crim 1143, [2019] 1 WLR 6721, 
[2019] 7 WLUK 41, [2019] 2 Cr App R 25, [2020] Crim LR 71, [2019] CLY 647, admitting automatic 
number plate recognition evidence.
4 Walter L. Perry, Brian McInnis, Carter C. Price, Susan C. Smith and John S. Hollywood, ‘Predictive 
policing: the role of crime forecasting in law enforcement operations’ (Rand Corporation 2013), 
https:// www.rand.org/ content/ dam/ rand/ pubs/ research_ reports/ RR200/ RR233/ RAND_ RR233.
pdf; Patrick Perrot, Gendarmerie Nationale, Ministry of Interior, Paris, France, ‘What about AI in 
criminal intelligence? From predictive policing to AI perspectives’, European Police Science and 
Research Bulletin, Issue 16, Summer 2017, 65– 76, https:// bulletin.cepol.europa.eu/ index.php/ 
bulletin/ article/ download/ 244/ 208/ ; Albert Meijer and Martijn Wessels, ‘Predictive policing: review 
of benefits and drawbacks’ (2019) 42(12) International Journal of Public Administration 1031, https:// 
www.tandfonline.com/ doi/ full/ 10.1080/ 01900692.2019.1575664.
5 Artificial intelligence in industry (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Artificial_ 
intelligence_ in_ industry.
6 See Daniel Seng and Stephen Mason, ‘Artificial intelligence and evidence’ (2021) 33 SAcLJ 241.
Simulations, data visualizations, augmented and virtual reality
1.104 In addition to collecting and evaluating evidence, an important role of AI and 
related technologies is to help communicate complex data to the trier of facts. This 
can range from data visualization tools that, for instance, make channels of email 
communication within an alleged criminal network visible, to visual recreation of crime 
scenes or dynamic reconstructions of putative events.1 This technology is described 
using a variety of terms, including ‘computer simulations’, ’computer animation’ and 
‘data visualization’. Where the simulation allows for the creation of a three- dimensional 
sequence in which the viewer can participate, move around the computer- simulated 
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described as ‘virtual reality’ or ‘augmented reality’, the distinction being that in 
augmented reality the virtual representations of objects is also overlaid with real- 
world objects and items to alter one’s perception of the real- world environment.2 This 
can be achieved through the use of virtual reality headsets, which offer a particularly 
radical way to enable judges or jurors to ‘relive’ putative events in 3D space.3
1 The reader should read the text in this part in combination with the detailed discussion of the 
legal issues in ‘Computer- generated animations and simulations’, Chapter 2. Minhua Ma, Huiru Zheng 
and Harjinder Lallie, ‘Virtual reality and 3D animation in forensic visualization’ (2010) 55(5) Journal 
of Forensic Sciences 1227; Isabella Aquila MD, Ph.D., Matteo A. Sacco MD, Giuseppe Aquila MS, Roberto 
Raffaele MS Alfredo Manca, Giuseppe Capoccia, Fabrizio Cordasco MD and Pietrantonio Ricci MD, Ph.D., 
‘The reconstruction of the dynamic of a murder using 3D motion capture and 3D model buildings: 
the investigation of a dubious forensic case’ (2019) 64(5) Journal of Forensic Sciences 1540; see 
‘Computer- generated animations and simulations’ in Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of the 
legal issues and citation of relevant authorities, legal and non- legal.
2 Augmented reality (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Augmented_ reality.
3 Till Sieberth, Akos Dobay, Raffael Affolter and Lars C. Ebert, ‘Applying virtual reality in forensics – a 
virtual scene walkthrough’ (2019) 15(1) Forensic Science, Medicine and Pathology 41.
1.105 Factual data from an investigation is input into a forensic computer simulation 
software, which then associates the data with the ‘generic world knowledge’ in the 
knowledge base of the AI. This can then reproduce crime scenes and demonstrate how 
an alleged activity at various points in time could have taken place, while observing 
physical constraints such as gravity and other considerations.1 The jurors may then 
‘see’ how a car collided with a wall after swerving around an animal,2 or how a person 
killed the victim, so that the reconstruction matches the pathologist report about, for 
example, the trajectories of bullets and our general knowledge of human anatomy, 
behaviour of firearms or the law of optics when taking aim.3 These reproductions 
usually combine computer graphics, natural language processing, computer vision, 
motion tracking and forensic computing to turn defence and prosecution hypotheses 
into ‘observable’ stories that can then be tested.
1 G. D. Sloan and J. Talbott, ‘Forensic application of computer simulation of falls’ (1996) 41(5) 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 782.
2 Kristin L. Fulcher, ‘The jury as witness: forensic computer animation transports jurors to the scene 
of a crime or automobile accident’ (1996) 22 U Dayton L Rev 55.
3 Lars C. Ebert, Tuan T. Nguyen, Robert Breitbeck, Marcel Braun, Michael J. Thali and Steffen Ross, 
‘The forensic holodeck: an immersive display for forensic crime scene reconstructions’ (2014) 10(4) 
Forensic Sci Med Pathol 623.
1.106 While these technologies can help to communicate complex facts to laypeople 
during a trial, there are concerns about their ‘authenticity’ for evidential purposes, 
and also their potential prejudicial effect, even in cases where the reconstructions 
are as faithful as possible.1 Computer simulations do not fall easily within any of the 
existing categories of evidence because they are synthetic evidence: they are not 
contemporaneous records of the facts but are produced after the relevant events have 
occurred.2 One problem that can arise is that the reconstruction will add details that 
are neither supported by eyewitness evidence, nor by universal scientific facts from 
the AI’s knowledge base, but are default design choices made by the programmers. 
For instance, this can include choosing a colour scheme when visualizing brain activity 
from a scan, or having an intact headlight on a car directly before a crash, even though 
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design choices are salient for evaluation of the event; at others they subtly influence 
juror perception.3 Therefore, computer simulations should be seen for what they are – 
representations of opinions about facts. They should be treated as expert evidence and 
should be admitted only when reasonably required and with the judge’s permission 
to resolve the proceedings.4 While computer simulations have been admitted in both 
criminal and civil cases,5 their limited use has been permitted only as mechanisms to 
enable the disputed issues to be refined, and only when the raw data that serve as the 
source of simulations are of sufficiently high quality.6
1 The legal issues are discussed in more detail in ‘Computer- generated animations and simulation’, 
Chapter 2.
2 Moya Clifford and Katie Kinloch, ‘The use of computer simulation evidence in court’ (2007) 24 
Computer Law and Security Report 169.
3 See ‘Computer- generated animations and simulation’, Chapter 2 for relevant citations.
4 The foundational legal issues are discussed in more detail in ‘Computer- generated animations and 
simulation’, Chapter 2.
5 For example, see R. v Maloney (Gerald) [2003] EWCA Crim 1373, [2003] 5 WLUK 565; The Owners 
of the Ship Pelopidas v The Owners of the Ship TRSL Concord [1999] 2 All ER 737 (Comm), [1999] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 675, [1999] 10 WLUK 259, [2000] CLY 4677; Owners of the Global Mariner v Owners of the 
Atlantic Crusader, sub nom. Global Mariner, The, Atlantic Crusader, The [2005] EWHC 380 (Admlty), 
[2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 389, [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 699, [2005] 3 WLUK 782, [2005] 1 CLC 413, (2005) 
155 NLJ 594, [2005] CLY 3794.
6 Clifford and Kinloch, ‘The use of computer simulation evidence in court’, 173.
Transparency and explainability
1.107 Machine learning systems apply probabilistic reasoning and statistical 
techniques to solve problems. They therefore introduce the same types of error as 
in more traditional applications of statistics.1 For example, the data on which they 
are trained might not be representative of reality, and so any conclusions drawn 
may not be accurate, or the uncertainty present in the output of the system might 
not be properly interpreted. Furthermore, the complexity of machine learning 
systems introduces sources of error. With the advent of machine learning and its 
implementation in ‘artificial intelligence’ systems, concerns have been rightly raised 
as to whether autonomous or intelligent detection systems are ‘traceable, explicable 
and interpretable’2 – often referred to in short as ‘explainability’. The requirement 
for explainable autonomous or intelligent systems, reflected as the Principle of 
Transparency in the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers) rulebook 
on Ethically Aligned Design, ensures that the operation of such systems is transparent 
to a wide range of users.3 In addition, depending on the type of machine learning 
algorithms used and implemented, the degree and extent of the explainability of the 
results from such algorithms may vary greatly. Statistical multivariate regression or 
random forest models built on existing data may be more traceable, explicable and 
interpretable by virtue of their algorithmic design,4 but they may lack the requisite 
accuracy and prediction power.5 On the other hand, deep learning neural network 
models, with their higher dimensionality architectures, may produce models that have 
the necessary prediction power,6 but may suffer from issues of explicability from their 
relative opacity and an inability to generalize or deal with corner cases.7 The requisite 
level of transparency and explainability that is required to provide the foundational 
substantiation for admitting evidence produced by such systems in legal proceedings 
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1 Colin Aitken, Paul Roberts and Graham Jackson, ‘Communicating and interpreting statistical 
evidence in the administration of criminal justice: 1. Fundamentals of probability and statistical 
evidence in criminal proceedings’ (Royal Statistical Society), https:// www.maths.ed.ac.uk/ ~cgga/ 
Guide- 1- WEB.pdf.
2 IEEE, Ethically Aligned Design, Principle 4 – Transparency (March 2018), 29, https:// standards.
ieee.org/ content/ dam/ ieee- standards/ standards/ web/ documents/ other/ ead_ v2.pdf.
3 IEEE, Ethically Aligned Design, Principle 4 – Transparency.
4 For instance, see Rich Caruana and Alexandru Niculescu- Mizil, ‘An empirical comparison of 
supervised learning algorithms’ in ICML 2006, Proceedings of 23rd International Conference on 
Machine Learning (Association for Computing Machinery 2006), 161– 168, https:// www.cs.cornell.
edu/ ~caruana/ ctp/ ct.papers/ caruana.icml06.pdf; Vijay Khadse, Parikshit N. Mahalle and Swapnil V. 
Biraris, ‘An empirical comparison of supervised machine learning algorithms for Internet of Things 
data’ in 2018 Fourth International Conference on Computing Communication Control and Automation 
(ICCUBEA) (IEEE 2018), https:// ieeexplore.ieee.org/ document/ 8697476.
5 For example, see Michal Hrabia, ‘Deep learning vs. machine learning’, 8 February 2020, https:// 
towardsdatascience.com/ deep- learning- vs- machine- learning- e0a9cb2f288.
6 Decision tree learning (Wikipedia), https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Decision_ tree_ learning.
7 But see Geoffrey Hinton, Oriol Vinyals and Jeff Dean, ‘Distilling the knowledge in a neural network’, 
in NIPS Deep Learning Workshop (2015), https:// arxiv.org/ pdf/ 1503.02531.pdf; Minsuk Kahng, 
Pierre Y. Andrews, Aditya Kalro and Duen Horng Chau, ‘ActiVis: visual exploration of industry- scale 
deep neural network models’ (2018) 24(1) IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics 
http:// arxiv.org/ abs/ 1704.01942.
AI adversarial attacks
1.108 As AI systems are increasingly used, there is a need to verify that they work 
reliably and appropriately, especially when they are used in open environments which 
may expose the systems to real- world data on which they have not been previously 
trained. When this happens, a system may produce unexpected results or behave in 
an unexpected way. Where AI systems are being set to continue to ‘learn’ from their 
new environment and update their models, this may also cause a system to ‘unlearn’ 
its models and crystallize the unexpected results or behaviour as correct or expected 
responses.1
1 Royal Society, ‘Machine learning’, 112.
1.109 Considerable research is being undertaken to investigate AI systems for such 
weaknesses. Known as ‘adversarial attacks’, these generally attempt to expose AI 
systems to novel environments and track their unexpected behaviour. While ‘good’ 
adversarial attacks attempt to detect such weaknesses to increase the robustness of 
AI systems, ‘bad’ adversarial attacks may exploit such weaknesses for gain or to cause 
disruption. When evidence is generated from AI systems that have or could have been 
compromised, questions regarding the robustness, transparency and explainability of 
AI systems will be valid when authenticating or evaluating such evidence.
Defining electronic evidence
1.110 Defining what we mean by ‘electronic’ evidence is not an easy task. The type 
of evidence that we are dealing with has also been variously described as ‘digital 
evidence’ or ‘computer evidence’. All three terms express some aspects of our pre- 
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set it apart from other means of proof. However, defining what these distinguishing 
features are is far from straightforward. The rapid technological change in the field 
of information technology means that any definition narrowly tailored to the current 
state of technology faces the risk of becoming obsolete rapidly. Definitions that are 
suitably future- proof by contrast tend to be too abstract and will cut across traditional 
divisions and categories in the law of evidence. For our purpose, we will take as 
our approach the need of the lawyer to turn certain artefacts – digital objects – into 
evidence that can be used as proof in legal proceedings. Based on this, we can develop 
a workable definition that will suit most applications and purposes.
1.111 Various definitions of electronic evidence exist. These include ‘information of 
probative value that is stored or transmitted in binary form’1 and ‘information stored 
or transmitted in binary form that may be relied on in court’.2 In his treatise, Casey 
defines digital evidence as:
any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support or refute a theory 
of how an offense occurred or that address critical elements of the offense such 
as intent or alibi.3
1 Scientific Working Groups on Digital Evidence and Imaging Technology, ‘Model Quality Assurance 
Manual for Digital Evidence Laboratories’ (v3, 13 September 2012), https:// www.swgde.org/ 
documents/ published.
2 International Organisation on Computer Evidence, ‘G8 proposed principles for the procedures 
relating to digital evidence’ (2000), http:// web.archive.org/ web/ 20030207173420/ http:// ioce.
org/ G8_ proposed_ principles_ for_ forensic_ evidence.html. This definition was adopted by the US 
Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, in Electronic Crime Scene 
Investigation: A Guide for First Responders (US Department of Justice 2001) and Forensic examination of 
digital evidence: A guide for law enforcement (US Department of Justice 2004).
3 Eoghan Casey, Digital Evidence and Computer Crime (3rd edn, Elsevier 2011), 7.
1.112 Although the emphasis of this definition is on criminal investigations, it is a 
wider definition than the previous definitions, and it usefully explicates certain 
important aspects of electronic evidence. For instance, the reference to ‘data’ is 
to information that is held in electronic form, such as text, images, audio and video 
files. Also, the word ‘computer’ must be understood in its widest possible sense, and 
incorporates any device that stores, manipulates or transmits data. In addition, the 
definition implies that the evidence must be relevant and admissible, a question that 
can only be answered after we know what the electronic evidence, whether admissible 
or inadmissible, actually is. A project funded by the EU entitled ‘European Informatics 
Data Exchange Framework for Court and Evidence’ (March 2014 – October 2016)1 
set out a number of definitions of electronic evidence in ‘D2.1 – EVIDENCE Semantic 
Structure’, 1.2, and offered a definition at 1.6.1 that is strikingly similar to the one set 
out below:
Electronic evidence is any data resulting from the output of an analogue device 
and/ or a digital device of potential probative value that are generated by, 
processed by, stored on or transmitted by any electronic device. Digital evidence 
is that Electronic evidence which is generated or converted to a numerical format.
1 http:// www.evidenceproject.eu/ .
1.113 With the aim of offering a wider- ranging definition that includes civil and 
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Electronic evidence: data (comprising the output of analogue devices or data in 
digital form) that is generated, processed, stored or communicated by any digital 
device, computer or computer system or conveyed over a digital transmission 
system that has the potential to make the factual account of either party more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
1.114 This definition has three elements. First, the reference to ‘data’ includes all forms 
of evidence created, processed or stored in a device that can, in its widest meaning, be 
considered a computer.1 It is used here in a non- technical sense, meaning roughly ‘a 
gathered body of facts’. While computer scientists often distinguish between ‘data’ and 
‘programs’, this distinction is not helpful for our purposes. For instance, in a copyright 
case, if a defendant has allegedly installed an unauthorized operating system, the 
presence of the system on his computer is electronic data for our purposes.2 Second, 
the definition includes the various devices by which data can be stored or transmitted, 
including analogue devices that produce an output. Ideally, this definition will include 
any form of a digital device, whether it is a computer (as we presently understand 
the meaning of a computer), telephone systems, wireless telecommunications systems 
and networks such as the Internet, and mobile devices and embedded systems such 
as smart cards and navigation systems. Third, the definition restricts the data to 
information that is relevant to the process by which a dispute, whatever the nature of 
the disagreement, is to be decided by an adjudicator, whatever the form and level the 
adjudication takes. This part of the definition includes one aspect of admissibility –  
relevance only – but does not use ‘admissibility’ in itself as a defining criterion, 
because some evidence will be admissible but excluded by the adjudicator within the 
remit of their authority, or inadmissible for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
nature of the evidence. This could be, for instance, because of the way it was collected, 
such as in violation of privacy or in breach of legal professional privilege. However, 
the definition is limited to those items of evidence offered by the parties as part of the 
fact- finding process. This contextual, teleological aspect of the definition excludes, for 
instance, electronic documents that are created during a trial in a purely administrative 
capacity, such as email reminders of the date of the hearing sent to the parties by the 
court administrators. Of course, the very same data can become ‘electronic evidence’ if 
offered in an appeal to show that the information was not sent out in a timely fashion, 
if this is part of the complaint.
1 Excluding the human brain, which has also been compared to a computer, though this line is 
becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, especially with the increasing feasibility of human– 
computer interfaces.
2 Obviously, we also do not use ‘data’ in the way it is sometimes understood in telecommunications, 
where only digital, but not analogue, information is sometimes referred to as data.
1.115 A particularly important form of evidence in all developed legal systems is 
proof by document. Consequently, electronic documents are a particularly important 
form of electronic evidence.1 They are also a particularly good example to illustrate 
some of the pertinent characteristics of electronic evidence. Because of the importance 
of documents for our daily life, and the way we handle them as folders, documents 
and photocopies, many of the most important software applications intentionally 
mimic the ‘look and feel’ of traditional, paper- based stationery when dealing with 
electronic documents. We therefore create digital objects that are called documents 
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‘pages’ (as with some electronic readers for ebooks and ejournals), ‘put’ them in files 
and folders, and discard them in digital ‘waste paper’ baskets or trash bins. Email 
also intentionally mimics the traditional letter, from the letter icon on the inbox to 
the pencil icon for ‘writing’ a new message. This inauthentic familiarity can create 
the misleading impression that the electronic document exists somewhere on the 
computer as a single, complete whole, and maintains its structural integrity even when 
the file is closed or the computer is switched off, in the same way a paper document 
continues to exist when it is put out of sight into a folder. This overly naive view 
underestimates the differences between electronic and paper- based documents, and 
potentially also overestimates their reliability. The converse, however, can equally 
happen, where a more sophisticated user sees through the processes that intentionally 
create the appearance of a paper document and dismisses all electronic evidence as 
essentially deceptive, spurious and unreliable, rather than as a new kind of document. 
This becomes a particular problem for those jurisdictions whose evidence law has 
formal definitions of ‘document’ and proof by document, for instance the German 
Urkundenbeweis. In these jurisdictions, legal rather than factual issues can increase 
the chasm between electronic and traditional documents and bridging legislation is 
required to make electronic documents also ‘documents- in- law’.
1 William Kent, Data and Reality (2nd edn, 1stBooks 2000) for an interesting discussion of how 
humans perceive and process information, and how humans impose this outlook on data processing 
machines.
1.116 A better and more realistic approach is to acknowledge that documents in 
electronic form have particular characteristics that affect both the test for authenticity 
(or provenance), should authenticity be in issue, and the way the electronic evidence 
is secured and handled at the pre- trial stage. It is the thesis of this text that evidence in 
electronic form ought to be subject to a more rigorous mechanism than would normally 
be associated with a document extant on physical media. John D. Gregory has observed 
that the integrity of physical documents is ‘often protected fairly casually’,1 yet the 
same could not be said of documents that are created, modified, communicated, stored 
and deleted in electronic form. For instance, a forensic document examiner can analyse 
the chemical properties of the ink on a paper document to determine if more than one 
writing utensil was used, or if the composition of the ink is consistent with the time 
at which the document was allegedly created, or the material properties of the paper. 
Once the document is written, changes or alterations will also leave physical traces. 
With paper documents, we therefore have a clear understanding, routinely recognized 
in evidence law, that the original document2 and copies of it are objects with different 
physical properties. This crucial distinction becomes problematic in the electronic 
medium, where not only are copy and original indistinguishable, but the very act of 
working on ‘a’ document will also automatically and routinely create numerous copies 
on the computer without the knowledge of the author, copies that can persist and 
override earlier drafts even when the document is completed. As outlined above in the 
discussion about metadata, documents in electronic form have a number of features 
that present particular challenges that a paper carrier in the physical world does not.
1 John D. Gregory, ‘Authentication rules and electronic records’ (2002) 81 Can Bar Rev 529, 533.
2 For the meaning of ‘original’, see Steven W. Teppler, ‘Digital data as hearsay’ (2009) 6 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 7, 9 n 18; Stephen Mason, ‘Electronic evidence and the 
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and Corinne Rogers, ‘Trust in digital records: an increasingly cloudy legal area’ (2012) 28(5) Computer 
Law and Security Review 522, 527 with further references.
The dependency on machinery and software
1.117 The reader can easily read the content of a traditional document long after 
it was created with little or no additional costs; the only things necessary are good 
eyesight and a knowledge of the language in which the document is written. Data in 
electronic form by contrast is dependent on hardware and software. The data requires 
an interpreter to enable it to be rendered into human- readable form. A user cannot 
create or manipulate electronic data without appropriate hardware. Therefore, an 
electronic document should not be treated as an object ‘somewhere there’ on the 
digital device, in the same way as a paper book is in a library. Instead, the electronic 
document is better understood as a process by which otherwise unintelligible pieces 
of data that are distributed over the storage medium are assembled, processed 
and rendered legible for a human user. In this sense, the electronic document is 
nowhere: it does not exist independently from the process (software) that recreates 
it on the device (hardware) every time a user opens it on screen. If those electronic 
documents were produced in the 1990s, many thousands of the programs used to 
create them are now no longer available commercially, and even if such software 
were available, it might be impossible to load it on a modern operating system. An 
additional problem for older data is that it might be necessary to have a specific 
machine with specific software loaded in order to read the data.1 This can cause 
additional expense to a party, as in the case of PHE, Incorporated dba Adam & Eve v 
Department of Justice,2 where PHE was ordered to review information contained in 
a database, even though no program existed to enable it to obtain the information 
requested by the Department of Justice.
1 For instance, the jazz club Ronnie Scott’s, based in Soho, London, was refurbished in 2005– 2006. 
As each part of the club was renovated, so large numbers of recordings of jazz musicians and singers, 
such as Dizzy Gillespie, Ella Fitzgerald, Chet Baker, Sarah Vaughan and Buddy Rich, that had been 
recorded during live performances were discovered. Some of the recordings were made on tapes that 
could only be played on machines that were no longer in the possession of the club. Report by Bob 
Sherwood, ‘Ronnie Scott’s jazz club to release archive of the greats’ Financial Times (London, 28 June 
2006) 1.
2 139 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1991); a similar problem was considered by Vinelott J in Derby & Co Ltd v 
Weldon (No. 9) [1991] 1 WLR 652, [1991] 2 All ER 901, [1990] 7 WLUK 300, [1992] CLY 3472.
The mediation of technology
1.118 Data in electronic form must be rendered into human- readable form through 
the mediation of a set of technologies. This means differences occur in how the 
same source object is displayed in different situations. A good example common to 
all users of the Internet is that a website can look very different depending on what 
type of screen and what browser is used, among other things. As a result, there can 
be no concept of a single, definitive representation of a particular source digital 
object. This can have obvious legal repercussions. An electronic contract document 
carelessly drafted may informally refer to the ‘paragraphs’ of the document without 
enumerating them since the formatting on the author’s computer makes them plainly 
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machine with a different software program, this formatting data may be unreadable 
and the paragraphs no longer apparent. Another example can be found in the changed 
representations of emojis (ideograms used in an electronic message similar to older 
ASCII emoticons). For instance, in 2016 Apple controversially changed a ‘hand gun’ 
emoji into a ‘water pistol’ emoji. However, when a message containing this emoji is 
sent to a non- Apple device, it could appear on the recipient’s machine as a cartoon 
image of a real gun.1 If a message such as ‘bring <gun emoji> to our meeting’ or ‘retract 
that or I come with my <gun emoji>’ is sent, what was intended by the sender as a light- 
hearted joke may look like a threat for some recipients, depending on what device they 
are using.
1 Bonnie Malkin, ‘Water pistol emoji replaces revolver as Apple enters gun violence debate’ The 
Guardian (London, 2 August 2016), https:// www.theguardian.com/ technology/ 2016/ aug/ 02/ apple-  
replaces- gun- emoji- water- pistol- revolver- violence- debate.
1.119 With traditional evidence, the act of observing or analysing a crime scene 
should not be allowed to alter it – a problem commonly known as ‘contamination’. In 
contrast, with electronic evidence the mere act of starting a computer and opening a 
document changes it, for instance by altering its metadata. Different observers using 
only marginally different machinery may recreate different versions of the object in 
question, and it is not an easy issue to decide which one of them should be regarded as 
‘more authentic’.
1.120 To manage this issue, we can adopt the approach taken with eyewitness 
evidence. We know that different observers of the same event will always provide 
subtly different accounts as to what happened. Furthermore, an observer will 
unintentionally and inevitably alter his memory of the events every time he tries to 
remember them. In the same way in which we try to minimise these effects through 
appropriate protocols and procedures – for instance, processes for an identification 
line- up or the interviewing of witnesses – protocols and procedures used by the 
digital evidence professional can minimize, but not eliminate, the distortion that the 
investigation creates. This means that it is crucial to identify appropriate standards, 
protocols, benchmarks and procedures, and the relevant hardware and software to be 
used, in relation to the management and use of any item of electronic evidence.
Speed of change
1.121 Technology in operating systems, application software and hardware changes 
rapidly. As a result, data in digital form may reach a point when they cannot be 
read, understood or used with new software or hardware. For instance, a software 
company may no longer produce software that is backward compatible or ‘downward 
compatible’ (where new versions of software are able to operate with older products). 
Technical obsolescence is a major problem that affects every aspect of the legal process, 
especially because the rate of change has now become so rapid.
1.122 The incessant speed of change has another consequence, again best explained 
by contrasting electronic evidence with traditional evidence. Eyewitness identification 
evidence is one of the oldest, if not the oldest, form of evidence used in trial. Despite this, 
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little over the centuries, and legal systems regularly keep culturally obsolete concepts 
such as the oath or dock identification for their ritual value. Fingerprint evidence 
is younger, with little over a hundred years of forensic use. But since its inception, 
while the basics of the discipline have remained the same, important changes in the 
way in which we interpret fingerprint evidence have been made, as have the features 
that we look for when establishing a match. A fingerprint expert trained 90 years ago 
would probably need at least a refresher course. DNA evidence is younger still, but 
in its 30- year history there have been considerable changes in the way in which DNA 
is collected, analysed and interpreted. An expert trained in the 1980s would require 
considerable retraining to be able to deal with current technology and equipment. 
For electronic evidence, the pace of change is faster still. This makes it all the more 
difficult to keep lawyers and other non- experts briefed of the relevant developments, 
and increases reliance on experts. It also means that it is essential that an expert has 
up- to- date knowledge and receives constant training, which may be more important 
than ‘experience’ in this field. A problem related to the rapid changes witnessed is the 
horizontal diversification of software and hardware. If a DNA expert analyses a blood 
sample, she need not know in advance the age, nationality or gender of the donor. 
By contrast, the digital evidence professional needs to know, and be trained for, the 
specific type of device and software that she is asked to analyse.
1.123 The ability of those investigating crimes is also hampered, for instance, by the 
speed at which the technology changes. In particular, obtaining relevant electronic 
tools to analyse a device forensically can be difficult for two reasons: first, the tools 
needed have yet to be devised, and second because, even if they are available, such tools 
can be expensive. In the case of R. v Hallam (Sam),1 Sam Hallam’s conviction for three 
offences of murder, conspiracy to commit grievous bodily harm and violent disorder 
was quashed. One of the grounds of appeal was that Hallam was in possession of two 
mobile telephones, both of which were seized by the police. One of the telephones, a 3G 
telephone, contained evidence that suggested that Hallam’s alibi was probably correct, 
and that the memories of both Hallam and his alibi witness as to the date they were 
together were defective. Neither telephone was the subject of forensic analysis. The 
observations by Hallett LJ, delivering the judgment of the court, illustrate the lawyers’ 
naivety in the forensic investigation of the data.2 She said:
65. … For reasons which escape us [the mobile phones] do not seem to have 
been interrogated by either the investigating officers or the defence team. We 
can understand why cell site evidence in relation to the use of the phones may 
have been of limited value given the close proximity of the masts, the various 
scenes, and the homes of those involved. However, given the attachment of young 
and old to their mobile phones, we cannot understand why someone from either 
the investigating team or the defence team did not think to examine the phones 
attributable to the appellant. An analysis of mobile phone evidence played a part 
in the investigation …
67. One reason proffered for the failure to examine the phone was that in 2004 
the Metropolitan Police did not have the technology in- house to examine 3G 
telephones. However, given our limited knowledge, we would have thought that 
even a cursory check might have produced some interesting results. Further, 
it might be thought that the appellant would have alerted his defence team to 
the fact that he had taken photographs on his new phone in the days before and 
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1 [2012] EWCA Crim 1158, [2012] 5 WLUK 518.
2 This highlights the need for lawyers to ensure they are competent to practice, for which see in 
particular Denise H. Wong, ‘Educating for the future: teaching evidence in the technological age’ (2013) 
10 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 16; and Deveral Capps, ‘Fitting a quart into 
a pint pot: the legal curriculum and meeting the requirements of practice’ (2013) 10 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 23.
1.124 Because the electronic evidence in the telephone supported the defendant’s 
alibi and contradicted the eyewitness testimony, which Hallett LJ had described as 
‘rock solid’, the court concluded that this was a case of mistaken identity and acquitted 
the defendant.1
1 [2012] EWCA Crim 1158 at [77].
Volume and replication
1.125 Electronic documents are easy to manipulate: they can be copied,1 altered, 
updated, or deleted (and deleted in the electronic environment does not mean 
expunged). The integration of telecommunications and computers to form computer 
networks (such as wide area networks and the Internet) further allows for data to be 
created and exchanged in far greater volumes than had previously been possible, and 
across physical and geographical boundaries. In essence, email, instant messaging and 
Internet communications are a ‘duplicate and distribute’ technology.2 Once computers 
are networked together in this fashion, an electronic document may be transmitted 
and numerous copies distributed around the world very rapidly. By way of example, in 
AMP v Persons Unknown3 the claimant’s mobile telephone was stolen or lost. It was not 
protected with a password. A number of photographs were stored on the telephone, 
some of which were of an explicit sexual nature. Shortly after the telephone went 
missing or was stolen, digital images were uploaded on various social media websites, 
enabling others to download and share the images. Some of the social media sites 
removed the images when requested, but the images were seeded onto a Swedish 
BitTorrent node and continued to circulate. Ramsey J decided that the claimant was 
entitled to an interim injunction to prevent the distribution of the digital images, either 
by conventional downloading from a site or by downloading using the BitTorrent 
protocol. To reflect the ease with which the images could be obtained and distributed, 
the injunction was granted in the following terms:
50. I therefore grant an interim injunction in the following terms against persons 
unknown being those people in possession or control of any part or parts of the 
files listed in Schedule C to the order who are served with this order:
(1) shall immediately cease seeding any BitTorrent containing any part or parts 
of the files listed in Schedule C of this Order.
(2) must not upload or transmit to any other person any part or parts of the files 
listed in Schedule C of this Order.
(3) must not create any derivatives of any of the files listed in Schedule C of 
this Order.
(4) must not disclose the name of Claimant (or any other information which might 










The sources and characteristics of electronic evidence and artificial intelligence 47
1 The copying of large numbers of electronic documents (around 56,000) formed part of the 
allegations in Vestergaard Frandsen A/ S v Bestnet Europe Limited [2007] EWHC 2455 (Ch), [2007] 10 
WLUK 659, (2008) 31(1) IPD 31005, which is a judgment in relation to an application by the defendants 
to strike out the action on the grounds that it was vexatious and an abuse of the process; George L. Paul 
and Jason R. Baron, ‘Information inflation: can the legal system adapt?’ (2007) 13(3) Rich J L & Tech 1.
2 Social media websites and text messages sent on mobile telephones and other devices were used 
to foment rioting in the UK in 2011: R. v Blackshaw (Jordan Philip) [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, [2012] 1 
WLR 1126, [2011] 10 WLUK 465, [2012] 1 Cr App R (S) 114, [2012] Crim LR 57, (2011) 108(42) LSG 
19, Times, 25 October 25, 2011, [2011] CLY 3030.
3 [2011] EWHC 3454 (TCC), [2011] 12 WLUK 641, [2011] Info TLR 25, (2012) 156(2) SJLB 31.
1.126 The ease of communication and replication of electronic documents has 
increased the potential volume of data that need to be identified to obtain relevant 
documents pertaining to litigation or the prosecution of a criminal offence. For instance, 
as part of the Enron investigation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission made 
public a dataset corpus containing 500MB of electronic messages.1 Yet ‘traditional’ 
messages like these are a minuscule minority of all the electronic data (and potential 
evidence) that is routinely created by machines, such as monitoring and routing 
Internet traffic. In addition to the sheer volume of this data, it poses the additional 
problem that in its raw form it is not intelligible to humans – most of the data are 
instructions sent between and for use by machines. To turn them into evidence for 
legal proceedings requires a significant amount of translation or ‘sense making’ by a 
suitably qualified expert.
1 Available at the Library of Congress website: https:// www.loc.gov/ item/ 2018487913/ .
1.127 To deal effectively with this amount of data, other computer tools such as data- 
mining software will routinely be required. These methods of analysis carry their own 
problems of accuracy, reliability, prejudicial effects and so on. Link analysis software, 
for instance, can create from this data a picture of a network that shows how people 
in the company formed communication circles that can be interpreted as the core of a 
conspiracy, simply as a result of the way in which the software arranges and visualises 
the information or other design choices not supported by the actual evidence.1 On the 
other hand, other forensic disciplines routinely use scientifically validated sampling 
techniques.2 At present, there is still a tendency not to use the same sampling protocols 
for at least some types of electronic evidence, in particular the type of data that can 
in principle be assessed directly by humans. This can force witnesses, such as police 
officers, to visually inspect potentially large amounts of disturbing illegal material. 
However, some jurisdictions have begun to use statistical methods of (electronic) 
evidence collection more systematically. ‘Predictive coding’ or ‘technology assisted 
review’ uses Bayesian probability theory and ML to scan electronic documents for 
data relevant to the case, and automatically identifies ‘good candidates’ for further 
examination by humans. Used mainly in civil electronic disclosure or discovery, it 
acquired approval from the courts in 2016.3 And prosecutors, lawyers and judges have 
likewise started to use ML- driven case- tracking and management systems to manage 
case filing, information and caseloads.4
1 Cathleen McGrath, Jim Blythe and David Krackhardt, ‘Seeing groups in graph layouts’ (1996) 19(2) 
Connections 22.
2 If 300,000 suspicious pills are seized, only a small sample of them will be tested to determine if 
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‘Estimation of the quantity of a drug in a consignment from measurements on a sample’ (2002) 47(5) 
J Forensic Sci 968.
3 Pyrrho Investments Ltd v MWB Property Ltd [2016] EWHC 256 (Ch), [2016] 2 WLUK 413; Brown v 
BCA Trading Ltd [2016] EWHC 1464 (Ch), [2016] 5 WLUK 371; Clive Freedman, ‘Technology assisted 
review approved for use in English High Court litigation’ (2016) 13 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 139.
4 For instance, see Joint Technology Committee – National Center for State Courts, Introduction to 
AI for Courts, 7– 8, 27 March 2020, https:// www.ncsc.org/ _ _ data/ assets/ pdf_ file/ 0013/ 20830/ 2020- 
04- 02- intro- to- ai- for- courts_ final.pdf.
1.128 The ability to transfer evidence rapidly can also create issues relating to 
jurisdiction. Many computer users now routinely upload all their files for backup 
purposes to Internet- based providers. Business data may be processed using cloud 
computing technology. On the other hand, the automatic uploading of data also means 
that the user of a device loses control over the information she has created. It can 
become increasingly difficult to delete or rid oneself of information once it has been 
created on a device and the information is uploaded onto the cloud.
Storage and disclosure
1.129 Generally, the media upon which electronic data are stored is fragile. Electronic 
storage media is inherently unstable, and unless the media is stored correctly, it can 
deteriorate quickly without showing external signs of deterioration. It is also at risk 
from accidental or deliberate damage and accidental or deliberate deletion.
1.130 Computers, systems and digital devices now operate largely in a networked 
environment. Devices such as smartphones, computers, laptop computers, mobile 
telephones, personal digital assistants (PDAs) and tablets are linked by applications 
(facsimile transmissions, voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), email, peer- to- peer 
software and instant messaging) that run over networks (the Internet, intranets, 
wireless networking, cellular networks and dial- up). It follows that almost everything 
anybody does on a device that is connected to a network is capable of being distributed 
and duplicated with consummate ease. As a result, the same item of digital data can 
reside almost anywhere. The ramifications for lawyers and law enforcement authorities 
are obvious. The relevant document may be available, but it might not be clear where it 
resides. This affects how a criminal investigation is conducted, and how much effort a 
party to a civil case will have to devote to finding relevant documents for discovery or 
disclosure.
1.131 An early example from the US, Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC, serves to illustrate 
some of the problems faced by a large organization in locating relevant documents in 
electronic form, especially historical email correspondence. Zubulake, a director and 
senior salesperson with UBS Warburg LLC, commenced legal proceedings for gender 
discrimination when she was dismissed from her job. Among other things, she alleged 
that her manager Chapin treated her differently. She sought disclosure of UBS email 
communications to support her action.1 The parties disagreed about the extent of the 
disclosure of emails, although it was not in dispute that email was an important means 
of communicating since each salesperson received approximately 200 emails each 
day. Securities and Exchange Commission Regulations required UBS to store emails. 
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This meant that there were three possible places that relevant email communications 
could be found: in files that were in use by employees, emails archived on optical disks, 
and emails sent to and from a registered trader (internal emails were not recorded) 
that were stored on optical storage devices. Ninety- four backup tapes were identified 
as being relevant for the purposes of disclosure. UBS used a backup program that 
took a snapshot of all emails that existed on a given server at the time the backup 
was taken: namely, at the end of each day, every Friday night and on the last business 
day of the month. Because emails were backed up intermittently, some emails were 
not stored, in particular where a user received or sent an email and deleted it on the 
same day.
1 Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v UBS Warburg LLC 216 
F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
1.132 Scheindlin J determined that Zubulake was entitled to disclosure of the emails 
because they were relevant to her claim, and ordered UBS to produce all relevant 
emails that existed on the optical disks or its servers at its own expense, and from five 
backup tapes selected by Zubulake. A consulting firm restored and searched the tapes 
for US$11,524.63. Additional expenses included the time it took lawyers to review 
the emails, which brought the total cost to US$19,003.43. Some 1,541 relevant emails 
were discovered. Fewer than 20 relevant emails were found on the optical disks. In 
July 2003, Zubulake made a further application for the remaining backup tapes to 
be restored and searched. UBS estimated that the cost would be US$273,649.39 and 
applied for the costs to be shifted to Zubulake. In considering the seven- factor test 
(which is not relevant for the purposes of this particular discussion), the judge noted 
that a significant number of relevant emails existed on backup tapes, and there was 
evidence that Chapin had deleted relevant emails. Scheindlin J decided that Zubulake 
should pay 25 per cent of the cost of restoring the backup tapes, but UBS were required 
to pay all other costs.
1.133 The purpose of describing this example is to illustrate the problems that 
multinational organizations have in locating relevant evidence in electronic form. The 
nature of the distributed environment means that a range of practical problems have 
begun to emerge in determining what material needs to be disclosed or discovered to 
the other side. First, it is necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence, and then 
it is necessary to establish where the evidence is likely to be, before undertaking the 
exercise of sifting through the various sources to identify relevant documents. This 
will invariably require a party to locate where all backup tapes are situated, whether 
held on the premises, with third parties in off- site remote storage or on individual 
computers, servers, in an archive or a disaster recovery system. The types of storage 
media that will need to be identified and located include tapes, disks, drives, USB 
sticks, tablets, laptops, PCs, PDAs, smartphones, mobile telephones, pagers and audio 
systems (including voicemail), to name but a few.1 The fragility and the ubiquity of 
electronic storage has made the modern- day discovery exercise a formidable process.
1 Detective Inspector Simon Snell, Head of the High Tech Crime Unit in Devon and Cornwall, is 
reported to have indicated that criminals are using satellite navigation systems, games consoles and 
hand- held computers to try and hide their activities; see ‘Abuse images “hidden on sat- navs”’, BBC 
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Concluding remarks
1.134 This chapter provides an overview of the nature of digital evidence, and 
introduces the most important concepts and terms that are needed to understand 
the discussion in the chapters to follow. It also introduces the main components and 
aspects of digital devices that a forensic investigator has to consider. The chapter 
also reveals a tension that is inherent in technologically mediated evidence. If we 
describe digital evidence on a sufficiently high level of abstraction, the continuity with 
other, older forms of evidence becomes apparent, thereby permitting analogies with 
the existing common law rules on evidence. For instance, memory, in this sense, is 
memory, whether gathered from an eyewitness and stored in a biological medium or 
from a digital device and stored in silicon. From a legal and regulatory perspective, 
these high- level abstractions fulfil an important role – they create legal stability 
and predictability for businesses and citizens alike. However, as soon as we move 
to a higher level of detail, these similarities all but disappear. Electronic evidence is 
always technologically mediated and technology dependent. We can get data from a 
book written centuries ago needing nothing more than knowledge of the language. By 
contrast, acquiring data from an electronic storage device requires appropriate tools 
and procedures, and can therefore fail, even for systems that are but a few years old. 
This can mean that laws quickly fail to understand the nature of the technology they 
try to regulate, and therefore quickly become obsolete. This can create the impression 
that the law is constantly behind technological developments, and where parliaments 
or courts try to respond, they more often than not exacerbate the situation with poorly 
drafted laws or ill- considered rules. The challenge for lawyers and policy makers is to 
find a middle ground between stable and technology- neutral, but overly abstract and 
imprecise laws, and highly specific rules that try, but often fail, to be responsive to the 
latest technological development and therefore risk obsolescence. This first chapter 
tries to help find such a middle ground by combining high- level and abstract definitions 
and discussions of historical continuities with more technology- specific discussions, 
and demonstrating both the similarities as well as the differences between traditional 




The foundations of evidence in electronic form
Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng
2.1 By taking into account the defining characteristics of the digital world, the use 
and admissibility of evidence in digital form have largely been accomplished through 
the definition and redefinition of legal concepts in the malleable rules of evidence. 
This chapter sets out to review the rules of evidence in the categorization of, means 
of proof of, treatment of and weight given to electronic evidence. An overview of the 
issues of hearsay, the treatment of software code as the witness, the presumption that 
computers are ‘reliable’ and authentication of electronic evidence are covered in detail 
in other chapters.
Direct and indirect evidence
2.2 The purpose of adducing evidence in legal proceedings is to prove the facts in 
issue. Facts in issue can also be properly inferred from any facts that are presented. 
Where evidence is used to prove the facts in issue, it is direct evidence. Where evidence 
is used to prove facts from which the facts in issue may be inferred, it is indirect 
evidence. If the facts in issue involve proving the existence of an electronic record, the 
electronic record itself constitutes direct evidence. Direct evidence refers to evidence 
which proves the facts in issue, and indirect evidence, or circumstantial evidence, is 
defined as evidence which proves facts which are relevant to the facts in issue.
2.3 Unless the existence, character or circumstance of the generation or storage of 
an electronic record is itself a fact in issue, it is more frequently the case that electronic 
evidence is used as indirect evidence to prove certain facts from which the facts in 
issue may be inferred. For instance, if an electronic record is adduced in evidence 
to show that A owes B a debt, the electronic record as indirect evidence only proves 
that there is a record that A owes B a debt, and it is necessary to make the additional 
inference that A actually owes B a debt.
Evidence in both digital and analogue form
2.4 Although there are differences in form and format between the analogue or non- 
electronic version of an item of evidence and its electronic equivalent, if the differences 
are not material, courts will not reject electronic evidence in favour of other forms of 
evidence.
2.5 The differences may be material depending on the facts in issue: the alternative 
representations of data in digital form and in human- readable form, on a screen or 
printed piece of paper, may become significant. In the Tasmanian case of Maynard,1 
Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng, ‘The foundations of evidence in electronic form’, in Stephen Mason 
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the trial magistrate declined to admit a printout purporting to indicate the dates and 
times when the accused obtained access to data stored in the computer on the basis 
that not all of the data that were evident on the computer screen were fully replicated 
on the printout. In a motion to review, Wright J upheld the magistrate’s decision. The 
judge observed that if all the data were relevant, the prosecution could have recorded 
the data on the screen by video. In this case, it was demonstrated that the information 
recorded on the printout was incomplete and not an accurate rendition of the data, and 
it did not involve only minor format changes, as the prosecution sought to contend.
1 (1993) 70 A Crim R 133, also cited as Rook v Maynard [1993] TASSC 137, (1993) 2 Tas R 97, (1993) 
126 ALR 150.
2.6 In contrast, in People of the State of New York v Rose1 Morse J in City Court, City of 
Rochester, New York had to consider the use and admissibility of ‘computer generated 
simplified traffic information tickets’ or ‘e- tickets’. The defendants moved for dismissal 
of the charges for driving while intoxicated because the State Police had issued the 
charges in the computer- generated simplified information form rather than the multi- 
copy handwritten simplified traffic information form used across New York State. In a 
carefully reasoned judgment, Morse J set out how the system worked, and determined 
that the computer terminal used by the police generated each e- ticket with simplified 
traffic information for the defendants, printed duplicate originals of the e- ticket and 
affixed the arresting officer’s electronic signature to the e- ticket. Although there were 
minor format differences, such as the colour and the number of sides on which the e- 
tickets were printed, these differences were not sufficient to persuade the judge that 
the e- tickets conformed substantially to a paper ticket. Thus, the motion for dismissal 
was denied.
1 11 Misc.3d 200 (2005), 805 N.Y.S.2d 506, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 25526.
2.7 A similar consideration arose in Griffiths v DPP,1 where photographs taken with 
a speed camera on photographic film were admitted as evidence of a vehicle being 
driven at a speed greater than the speed limit. The evidence was also available in 
digital form, and the defence argued that the digital data should have been disclosed 
as well as the printed photographs. It was revealed that the camera technician had 
carried out a secondary check to confirm the speed of the vehicle on the digital files 
of the photographs. The judge indicated that the photographs were real evidence – 
they showed the times at which the vehicle crossed a number of pre- measured lines 
painted on the road – and that by using all this information it was possible to carry out 
the secondary check from the photographs themselves; it was not necessary to carry 
out the secondary check on the digital files. For this reason, it was held that whether 
the digital data were disclosed to the defendant or not was irrelevant.2
1 [2007] EWHC 619 (Admin), [2007] 3 WLUK 572, [2007] RTR 44, [2007] CLY 3537.
2 [2007] RTR 44 at [34].
Metadata and electronic evidence
2.8 There is a distinction between a document in digital form (and the content of 
the digital document as a printout) and the metadata logically associated with the 
document in digital form. The metadata may be relevant, either as indirect evidence in 
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For instance, when there are multiple versions of a digital document, the metadata as 
indirect evidence will enable the parties to identify the most relevant version of the 
document. On the other hand, where there is an allegation that the user manipulated the 
metadata of the file, such as its date– time stamp, to his own advantage, the correct date 
and time of the file becomes the fact in issue and the metadata is the direct evidence. In 
such a case the metadata may need to be rendered into human- readable form.
Means of proof
2.9 All direct and indirect evidence used to prove a fact in issue or a relevant fact 
takes one (or more) of the following forms: testimony, hearsay, documents and real 
evidence.
Testimony and hearsay
2.10 Testimony is the declaration (which must be admissible) in court of a person 
who actually perceived the fact in issue or facts from which facts in issue may properly 
be inferred. Thus the human perception of a computer display as narrated via oral 
testimony is admissible as evidence that a counterfeit computer game was being 
played in breach of copyright.1
1 The image on a screen can constitute sufficient evidence of data copied onto the RAM of a computer 
used to play counterfeit games to establish an offence of breach of copyright, for which see Gilham v The 
Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2293, [2010] ECDR 5.
2.11 If, however, the best that a witness can do is to depose as to what someone else 
said on the fact in issue, it will be hearsay, because it is ‘an assertion other than one 
made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings … as evidence of any 
fact asserted’.1 In the context of digital evidence, what someone else said is typically 
recorded electronically. Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls within one of 
the exceptions to the rule against hearsay. (A further treatment of this subject is found 
in Chapter 3.)
1 R v Sharp [1988] 1 All ER 65 at 68, [1988] 1 WLR 7 at 11.
Real evidence
2.12 The term ‘real evidence’ has been used in three divergent senses: (i) evidence 
from things as distinct from persons; (ii) material objects produced for the inspection 
of the court; and (iii) perception by the court (or its results) as any perceptions by 
the court (or its results) as distinct from the facts perceived,1 and is best described as 
‘Material objects other than documents, produced for inspection of the court’.2 Veronica 
Cowan considered that there is no authoritative definition of ‘real evidence’, and 
suggested that ‘where a document is tendered simply to prove the fact that a statement 
was made (and not to prove a fact stated therein), it is not properly described as “real 
evidence” ’.3
1 Hodge M. Malek (ed.), Phipson on Evidence (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018), 1.14. It was used 
in R. (on the application of O’Shea) v Coventry Magistrates Court [2004] EWHC 905 (Admin), [2004] 4 
WLUK 120, [2004] ACD 50, (2004) 101(17) LSG 30, Times, 22 April 2004, [2004] CLY 686 regarding 
computer access logs.
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3 Veronica Cowan, ‘Computer printouts – real evidence or documentary evidence?’ [1991] Crim LR 
199 at 201, discussing R v Spiby (John Eric) [1990] 3 WLUK 150, (1990) 91 Cr App R 186, Times, 16 
March 1990, Independent, 2 April 1990, Daily Telegraph, 30 March 1990, [1990] CLY 785.
2.13 To highlight the difference between real evidence and hearsay in electronic 
evidence, Professor Daniel Seng and Sriram S. Chakravarthi formulated the following 
categorizations: digital data that is stored on a device, a device that processes data, 
and a device that processes and stores data.1 The digital data is hearsay, because the 
device contains a record of human assertions. As for the second and third cases, where 
the data is produced without human intervention, it is real evidence. If the data is a 
record of human assertions, it is hearsay. Although the distinction is a clear one, it can 
be difficult to apply in practice,2 as the cases discussed below illustrate.
1 Daniel Seng and Sriram S. Chakravarthi, Computer Output as Evidence: Consultation Paper 
(Singapore Academy of Law 2003), 87– 88.
2 Seng and Chakravarthi, Computer Output as Evidence, 137– 138; a point also made by Adam 
Wolfson, ‘ “Electronic fingerprints”: doing away with the conception of computer- generated records as 
hearsay’ (2005) 104(1) Michigan L Rev 165.
Evidence in analogue form
2.14 The treatment of evidence in analogue form (which preceded the use and 
acceptance of digital computers) first received detailed treatment in the case of R v Ali 
(Maqsud), R v Hussain (Ashiq),1 where the issue was the admissibility of a tape recording. 
In admitting the evidence, Marshall J analogized tape recordings with photographs, 
and noted that just as evidence of things seen through telescopes or binoculars which 
otherwise could not be picked up by the naked eye had been admitted, the same would 
apply to devices for picking up, transmitting and recording conversations, noted, at 
[701] (emphasis added):
For many years now photographs have been admissible in evidence on proof that 
they are relevant to the issues involved in the case and that the prints are taken 
from negatives that are untouched. The prints as seen represent situations that 
have been reproduced by means of mechanical and chemical devices. Evidence 
of things seen through telescopes or binoculars which otherwise could not be 
picked up by the naked eye have been admitted, and now there are devices for 
picking up, transmitting, and recording, conversations. We can see no difference 
in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we 
must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the 
circumstances, but it does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of 
evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided 
the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly 
identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, 
we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such evidence 
should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all 
the circumstances of each case. There can be no question of laying down any 
exhaustive set of rules by which the admissibility of such evidence should be 
judged.
1 R v Ali (Maqsud), R v Hussain (Ashiq) [1966] 1 QB 688, [1965] 3 WLR 229, [1965] 2 All ER 464, 
[1965] 4 WLUK 27, (1965) 49 Cr App R 230, (1965) 129 JP 396, (1965) 109 SJ 331, [1965] CLY 796.
2.15 Shortly thereafter, Sir Jocelyn Simon P determined in The Statue of Liberty, 
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recording on a radar set of echoes of ships within its range was real evidence, even 
though it was recorded from a mechanical instrument.2 The judge considered there 
was no distinction in the manual operation of a camera by a photographer or the 
observations of a barometer operator and the equivalent operation by a trip switch, a 
clock or a dial- recording mechanism. The judge held, at [196], that ‘[t] he law is bound 
these days to take cognisance of the fact that mechanical means replace human effort’, 
and accepted that the film comprised real evidence because it recorded the information 
given out by the radar set, rejecting the submission that the evidence was hearsay.
1 [1968] 1 WLR 739, [1968] 2 All ER 195, [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 429, [1968] 3 WLUK 65, (1968) 112 
SJ 380, [1968] CLY 1546.
2 Oral evidence of the position of a ship as given by a radar set is acceptable, for which see Chen Yin 
Ten v Little (1976) 11 ALR 353, [1976] WASC 143.
Evidence in digital form
2.16 The characterization of evidence as real evidence or as hearsay becomes more 
complicated with evidence in digital form, especially when some computational 
processing is carried out. In R v Pettigrew (Stewart Douglas), R v Newark (John)1 the 
Court of Appeal held that the printout from a computer operated by an employee of the 
Bank of England was a hearsay statement. The operator fed bundles of bank notes with 
consecutive serial numbers into the machine, and the machine automatically rejected 
any notes that were defective. The machine recorded the first and last serial numbers 
of each bundle of 100 notes, and the operator also noted the first serial numbers in 
the bundle on a card as he fed them into the machine. It was the printout from this 
machine that was sought to be admitted in evidence. The purpose of adducing the 
evidence was to permit the prosecution to trace the issuance of the notes, and to link 
bank notes found in the possession of Pettigrew to a particular bundle of notes that 
had been stolen in a burglary. Counsel for the prosecution argued that the printout 
was admissible as a business record under the provisions of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1965.2 However, s 1(1)(a) required that for such a record to be admissible as evidence 
of the truth of any matter dealt with in the record, the information would have to 
be supplied by a person who had, or may reasonably be supposed to have, personal 
knowledge of the matters. The members of the Court of Appeal reached the conclusion 
that the operator did not have personal knowledge of the numbers of the notes that 
were rejected, because the machine automatically compiled the list.
1 [1980] 1 WLUK 561, (1980) 71 Cr App R 39, [1980] Crim LR 239, [1980] CLY 486; applied in R v 
Wiles [1982] Crim LR 669.
2 The Criminal Evidence Act 1995 was repealed by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 sch 7 
pt III.
2.17 While this was an accurate application of the hearsay rule, the analysis omitted 
any consideration that the printout might be considered real evidence.1 Professor 
J. C. Smith has noted that ‘the operator had personal knowledge of the first number 
of each bundle which he fed into the machine because he recorded that number on 
a card’,2 and suggested that because the operator had knowledge of the number at 
a given point in time, it was not material that he forgot it afterwards. Once the first 
number could be established, it could then be inferred that the new notes bore 
consecutive serial numbers.3 Professor Smith considered that this is not hearsay but 
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hand, Professor Colin Tapper took the view that the printout was partly hearsay and 
partly non- hearsay – the first number is hearsay and the last number and the numbers 
of the notes that were rejected were not hearsay because they were the output of the 
device.5
1 Colin Tapper, Computer Law (4th edn, Longman 1989), 375; printouts were admitted under 
the provisions of s 1(1) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 in R v Ewing (Terence Patrick) [1983] QB 
1039, [1983] 3 WLR 1, [1983] 2 All ER 645, [1983] 3 WLUK 125, (1983) 77 Cr App R 47, [1984] ECC 
234, [1983] Crim LR 472, (1983) 127 SJ 390, Times, 15 March 1983, [1983] CLY 63, although Seng 
and Chakravarthi, in Computer Output as Evidence, 90, point out that ‘the electronic records are the 
manifestation of the transaction’.
2 J. C. Smith, ‘The admissibility of statements by computer’ [1981] Crim LR 387, 388.
3 R v Pettigrew (Stewart Douglas), R v Newark (John) (1980) 71 Cr App R 39 at 42. In effect, Professor 
Smith’s point was an argument pursued by counsel for the Crown.
4 Smith, ‘The admissibility of statements by computer’, 389– 390.
5 Colin Tapper, ‘Reform of the law of evidence in relation to the output from computers’ (1995) 3 Intl 
J L & Info Tech 87.
2.18 Professor Seng considered that the views of Professors Smith and Tapper were 
both plausible: ‘The difference lies in whether the operator fed the first number into 
the machine, and whether the machine processed this number.’1 Seng continued:
the different views espoused by Professors Tapper and Smith can be resolved as 
follows: was the machine operating as a data storage device in relation to the first 
number, or a data processing device? Some form of hybrid function may also be 
possible, eg, the operator inputs the first number, which the machine records and 
then verifies against its own reading of the first number. If the machine behaved 
in this way, perhaps Professor Smith’s view is perhaps more accurate. This is all 
a question of the degree and extent of human intervention.2
1 Daniel K. B. Seng, ‘Computer output as evidence’ [1997] SJLS 139.
2 Seng, ‘Computer output as evidence’, 140.
2.19 As computers are designed to undertake a wide range of tasks, this means that 
the evidence available as output of a computer is equally as varied. A review of cases 
shows that whether electronic evidence is real evidence or hearsay turns on whether 
the evidence is characterized as being a product of a device’s processing functions or 
of its storage functions.
2.20 In R v Wood (Stanley William),1 the software in a computer that made calculations 
of chemical compositions based on spectrometer readings was considered to be a tool, 
and the printout was an item of real evidence. The basis of admitting a printout of an 
output as an item of real evidence was explained by Professor Tapper:
Evidence derived from a computer constitutes real evidence when it is used 
circumstantially rather than testimonially, that is to say that the fact that it takes 
one form rather than another is what makes it relevant, rather than the truth of 
some assertion which it contains.2
1 [1982] 6 WLUK 191, (1983) 76 Cr App R 23, [1982] Crim LR 667, [1983] CLY 636. See also the 
earlier case of R v McCarthy (Colin Paul), R v Warren (Mark Stephen), R v Lloyd (Leigh Cedric), R v Warren 
(Robert John) [1997] 11 WLUK 347, [1998] RTR 374, [1998] CLY 867 and the Singapore case of PP v 
Ang Soon Huat [1990] 2 SLR(R) 246.
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2.21 The same distinction was drawn by Professor Smith as regards the computer 
printout in R v Ewing (Terence Patrick),1 between its use as evidence to prove that a 
thing was done (money had been credited to a bank account) and as evidence that 
something was recorded as being done (the bank clerk records a payment, as opposed 
to creating the credit).2
1 [1983] QB 1039, [1983] 3 WLR 1, [1983] 2 All ER 645, [1983] 3 WLUK 125, (1983) 77 Cr App R 
47, [1984] ECC 234, [1983] Crim LR 472, (1983) 127 SJ 390, Times, 15 March 1983, [1983] CLY 63; 
see DPP v Thornley [2006] EWHC 312 (Admin), [2006] 2 WLUK 68, (2006) 170 JP 385, (2006) 170 
JPN 656, (2006) 103(9) LSG 32, [2006] CLY 3578 where a speed violation detection deterrent system, 
a prescribed device approved by the Secretary of State under the Road Traffic Offenders (Prescribed 
Devices) Order 1999, was considered.
2 [1983] Crim LR 472 (CA), 473.
2.22 The admissibility of more complex electronic evidence is illustrated in a 
case about the breath alcohol printout from a portable breath analyser device, the 
Intoximeter 3000. In Castle v Cross,1 it was determined that the printout was an item 
of real evidence and not hearsay.2 The judge compared the device to a speedometer, 
a calculator or a sophisticated tool. In this instance, the breath alcohol value in the 
printout comprised information that was produced by the Intoximeter because the data 
had not passed through a human mind. On the other hand, Kennedy J also remarked 
that ‘where a computer is used in respect of its memory function, it is possible to 
envisage where it might fall foul of the rule against hearsay’.3
1 [1984] 1 WLR 1372, [1985] 1 All ER 87, [1984] 7 WLUK 180, [1985] RTR 62, [1984] Crim LR 682, 
(1984) 81 LSG 2596, (1984) 128 SJ 855, [1985] CLY 3048.
2 The members of the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland followed this line, admitting a copy of a 
printout as being real evidence, in Public Prosecution Service v Duddy [2008] NCIA 18, [2009] NI 19.
3 [1984] 1 WLR 1372 (DC) at 1380.
2.23 In R v Spiby (John Eric),1 Taylor LJ held that there was a distinction between 
a printout as real evidence and as hearsay. Professor Smith2 noted the difference 
between the content of a printout as a mere recording of a fact, such as when data 
are processed by a computer without any human input of any description,3 and the 
content of a printout as being processed in some way by a human being. The printout 
in this case was a log of telephone calls made, which was generated by a computerized 
machine called a ‘Norex’ that monitored the telephone calls of hotel guests in order to 
work out how much to charge for telephone use. It was held to be real evidence.
1 [1990] 3 WLUK 150, (1990) 91 Cr App R 186, Times, 16 March 1990, Independent, 2 April 1990, 
Daily Telegraph, 30 March 1990, [1990] CLY 785.
2 Smith, ‘The admissibility of statements by computer’.
3 Although no computer works on this basis – the code is written in the main by human beings, 
and the code comprises the instructions to the computer, upon which basis the computer undertakes 
activities, and the computer undertakes actions based on the instructions written by human beings.
2.24 In R v Robson (Kenneth), R v Mitchell (Bernard), R v Richards (Alan),1 a printout of 
telephone calls made on a mobile telephone was adduced as evidence of the calls made 
and received in association with the number. The defence’s challenge that the evidence 
was documentary hearsay failed. Orde J held that ‘where a machine observes a fact and 
records it, that record states a fact. It is evidence of what the machine recorded and this 
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1 [1991] 2 WLUK 381, [1991] Crim LR 362, [1991] CLY 646.
2 [1991] Crim LR 362, 363; Robert Bradgate, ‘The evidential status of computer output: confusion 
compounded’ (1992) 9(2) Applied Computer & Communications Law 1; see also McDonald v R [2011] 
EWCA Crim 2933, [2011] 12 WLUK 556 where a printout of telephone calls was admitted in the 
absence of the electronic records that no longer existed. Records of calls made by a mobile telephone 
were accepted as real evidence by the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Republic of Ireland in People v 
Colm Murphy [2005] 2 IR 125 (CCA) and in DPP v Brian Meehan [2006] IECCA 104, [2006] 3 IR 468 
(CCA).
2.25 In the business context, two popular uses of computers are for the formation 
of records and the recording of the credits and debits of an account. In the latter, the 
records of computer payment transactions are considered real evidence, as Their 
Lordships made clear in R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p Levin.1 In this appeal against 
extradition, it was alleged that Levin had used a computer terminal in St Petersburg 
to gain unauthorized access to a Citibank terminal in Parsipanny, New Jersey to make 
40 fraudulent transfers of funds from the accounts of clients of the bank to accounts 
which he or his associates controlled. Printouts of screen displays of the historical 
records of computer payment transactions were adduced, and a witness gave evidence 
as to how the records were created. Lord Hoffmann took the opportunity to make clear 
the difference between a hearsay statement and evidence of a record of a transaction:
The print- outs are tendered to prove that such transfers took place. They record 
the transfers themselves, created by the interaction between whoever purported 
to request the transfers and the computer program in Parsipanny. The evidential 
status of the print- outs is no different from that of a photocopy of a forged 
cheque. 2
1 [1997] AC 741, [1997] 3 WLR 117, [1997] 3 All ER 289, [1997] 6 WLUK 335, [1998] 1 Cr App R 22, 
[1997] Crim LR 891, (1997) 94(30) LSG 28, (1997) 147 NLJ 990, (1997) 141 SJLB 148, Times, 21 June 
1997, Independent, 2 July 1997, [1997] CLY 2418.
2 [1997] AC 741 at 746; Assafa Endeshaw, ‘Admissibility of evidence and jurisdiction relating to 
online fraud’ (1998) 14(1) Computer Law and Security Report 29; Ben Fitzpatrick, ‘Computers, 
hearsay, and the status of extradition proceedings’ (1998) Web JCLI 1; Susan Nash, ‘The admissibility 
of evidence in extradition proceedings’ (1998) 2(3) E & P 198.
Documents and disclosure or discovery
2.26 In evidentiary discovery (or disclosure as it is called in England and Wales) a 
‘document’ has been construed widely in both criminal and civil proceedings.1 While 
the emphasis is on the recording of the content by the application of (usually) text 
on to (usually) paper, early decisions such as the Court of Appeal in Lyell v Kennedy 
(No. 3)2 have admitted photographs of tombstones and houses as documents for the 
purposes of discovery. In R v Daye (Arthur John),3 Darling J suggested, at [340], that the 
meaning of ‘document’ should not be defined in a narrow way:
But I should myself say that any written thing capable of being evidence is 
properly described as a document and that it is immaterial on what the writing 
may be inscribed. It might be inscribed not on paper, but on parchment; and long 
before that it was on stone, marble, or clay, and it might be, and often was, on 
metal. So I should desire to guard myself against being supposed to assent to the 
argument that a thing is not a document unless it be a paper writing. I should 
say it is a document no matter upon what material it be, provided it is writing or 
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1 For the meaning of a ‘document’, see Stephen Mason, ‘Documents signed or executed with 
electronic signatures in English law’ (2018) 34(4) Computer Law and Security Report 933; also see 
Malek, Phipson on Evidence, para 41– 02.
2 (1884) 50 LT 730; for a discussion about the status of legal resources on the Internet, including 
case reports, see Richard J. Matthews, ‘When is case law on the web the “official” published source? 
Criteria, quandaries, and implications for the US and the UK’ (2007) 2 Amicus Curiae 19, 25.
3 [1908] 2 KB 333 (KBD).
2.27 In Hill v R,1 Humphreys J held, at [332– 333], ‘that a document must be something 
which teaches you something … To constitute a document, the form which it takes 
seems to me to be immaterial; it may be anything on which the information is written 
or inscribed – paper, parchment, stone or metal.’ Likewise, statutes adopt a similarly 
broad definition of a ‘document’. Section 13 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 defines a 
‘document’ as ‘anything in which information of any description is recorded’. The same 
definition is provided in s 20D(3) of the Taxes Management Act 1970. Schedule 1 of the 
Interpretation Act 1978 does not define ‘document’, but defines writing as follows:
‘Writing’ includes typing, printing, lithography, photography and other modes of 
representing or reproducing words in a visible form, and expressions referring 
to writing are construed accordingly.
1 [1945] 3 KB 329.
2.28 Audio tapes were accepted by Walton J as a discoverable document in Grant v 
Southwestern and Country Properties Ltd,1 where a ‘document’ was defined as having 
the quality of conveying information. Television film is also considered a document,2 as 
are the output of facsimile transmissions3 and a label on a bottle containing a specimen 
of blood provided by the accused.4
1 [1975] Ch 185, [1974] 3 WLR 221, [1974] 2 All ER 465, [1974] WLUK 81, [1974] 118 SJ 548, 
[1974] CLY 2941. See also R v Senat (Martin), R v Sin (Christopher Cho Him) [1968] 3 WLUK 56, (1968) 
52 Cr App R 282, [1968] Crim LR 269, (1968) 112 SJ 252, [1968] CLY 71; R. v Stevenson (Ronald), R. 
v Hulse (Barry), R. v Whitney (Raymond), [1971] 1 WLR 1, [1971] 1 All ER 678, [1970] 10 WLUK 82, 
(1971) 55 Cr App R 171, (1971) 115 SJ 11, [1971] CLY 2264; R v Robson (Bernard Jack), R v Harris 
(Gordon Frederick) [1972] 1 WLR 651, [1972] 2 All ER 699, [1972] 3 WLUK 89, (1972) 56 Cr App R 450, 
[1972] Crim LR 316, (1972) 116 SJ 313, [1972] CLY 642.
2 Senior v Holdsworth, Ex p Independent Television News [1976] QB 23, [1975] 2 WLR 987, [1975] 2 
All ER 1009, [1975] 3 WLUK 106, (1975) 119 SJ 393, [1975] CLY 1393.
3 Hastie and Jenkerson v McMahon [1990] 1 WLR 1575, [1991] 1 All ER 255, [1990] 3 WLUK 425, 
[1990] RVR 172, (1990) 134 SJ 725, [1991] CLY 2950.
4 Khatibi v DPP [2004] EWHC 83 (Admin), [2004] 1 WLUK 531, (2004) 168 JP 361.
2.29 In Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No. 9),1 one of the earliest modern decisions on 
the point, it was held that data stored on a computer in the form of an online database 
constitutes a document for the purposes of the obligation to discover under the 
provisions of Order 24 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. In analysing this point, 
Vinelott J referred to the Australian case of Beneficial Finance Corp Co Ltd v Conway,2 
in which McInerney J held that a tape recording was not a document because the 
information is not capable of being visually inspected. Vinelott J, however, preferred 
the opposing view in Grant v Southwestern and County Properties Ltd,3 in which 
Walton J pointed out that there is no difference between recording a conversation on a 
tape recorder and in shorthand. Both are methods of recording the same conversation. 
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the mere interposition of necessity of an instrument for deciphering the information 
cannot make any difference in principle. A litigant who keeps all his documents in 
microdot form could not avoid discovery because in order to read the information 
extremely powerful microscopes or other sophisticated instruments would be 
required. Nor again, if he kept them by means of microfilm which could [not] be 
read without the aid of a projector. 4
1 [1991] 1 WLR 652, [1991] 2 All ER 901, [1990] 7 WLUK 300, [1992] CLY 3472.
2 [1970] VR 321.
3 [1975] 1 Ch 185, [1974] 3 WLR 221, [1974] 2 All ER 465, [1974] 2 WLUK 81, [1974] 118 SJ 548, 
[1974] CLY 2941; Walton J criticized the reasoning of McInerney J at 196F– 197A.
4 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No. 9) [1991] 2 All ER 901 (CA) at 906B- C.
2.30 Thus the interposition of a computer to enable the retrieval of data stored in 
the online database did not disqualify the data from being considered a document. A 
similar issue for discovery as to the meaning of ‘document’ in the context of data stored 
on a computer was discussed in Alliance & Leicester Building Society v Ghahremani1 on a 
motion to commit Naresh Chopra, a solicitor, to prison for contempt of court. Mr Chopra 
was alleged to have deliberately deleted part of a file that showed crucial transaction 
details stored on his computer in contempt of court, when investigations into possible 
mortgage fraud and negligence were being conducted into his affairs. A court order 
had directed Chopra to restrain from destroying or altering any document relating to 
the transaction, and required him to deliver up all such documents in his control. In 
the contempt proceedings, counsel argued that the word ‘document’ required there to 
be some form of visible writing on paper or other material, and because there was no 
physical document, the order had not been breached. Hoffmann J noted the comments 
of Vinelott J in Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No. 9),2 and held that ‘document’ would bear the 
same meaning in the discovery order. Taking into account the expert evidence, Hoffmann 
J concluded that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that Chopra did alter or destroy 
part of a document3 and granted the motion, although Chopra was eventually fined 
instead.4
1 [1992] 2 WLUK 256, [1992] RVR 198, (1992) 142 NLJ 313, Times, 19 March 1992, Independent, 9 
March 1992, [1993] CLY 3252.
2 [1991] 1 WLR 652, [1991] 2 All ER 901, [1990] 7 WLUK 300, [1992] CLY 3472.
3 Alliance & Leicester Building Society v Ghahremani [1992] 32 RVR 198 at 203. The amount of 
forged evidence has increased. For some examples in the context of England and Wales (this is not 
an exhaustive list), see ISTIL Group Inc v Zahoor [2003] EWHC 165 (Ch), [2003] 2 All ER 252, [2003] 
2 WLUK 476, [2003] CP Rep 39, Independent, 7 April 2003, [2003] CLY 451 for a forged document; 
Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm), [2010] 12 WLUK 346, 
(2011) 108(3) LSG 17 for a forged and backdated agreement and employment contract; Apex Global 
Management Ltd v FI Call Ltd [2015] EWHC 3269 (Ch), [2015] 11 WLUK 248 for forged emails; in 
the criminal context, see R v Brooker [2014] EWCA Crim 1998, also cited as AG’s Ref: 071 of 2014, R 
v B (R C A) [2014] EWCA Crim 1998 (this citation is available in the LexisNexis electronic database), 
where Brooker sent text messages from a second mobile telephone in her possession, claiming that 
her boyfriend had sent them (Simon de Bruxelles, ‘Trainee barrister faces jail for false rape allegations’ 
The Times, 6 June 2014, 19; Miranda Prynne, ‘Trainee barrister sentenced to three and a half years in 
prison for false rape allegations’, Daily Telegraph, 26 June 2014 (Online edition)); Islamic Investment 
Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems NV [2014] EWHC 3777 (Comm), [2014] 11 WLUK 
521, for a case of fictitious litigation; Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v Urumov (Rev 
1 – amended charts) [2014] EWHC 191 (Comm), [2014] 2 WLUK 286, in which the allegations (and 
counter- allegations) included, among other things, the forgery of the contents of a laptop and metadata 
in relation to documents; Steven Morris, ‘Barrister becomes first to be jailed for perverting justice’, The 













The foundations of evidence in electronic form 61
4 Communications by email between Nicholas Leviseur, counsel for Mr Chopra, and Stephen Mason 
dated 14 October 2006 and 23 November 2006.
2.31 There is judicial recognition that the acceptance and use of technology will 
increase the range of objects that fall within the definition of ‘document’. In R v 
McMullen,1 Linden J held that a current account ledger card printed from a computer 
was a document within the meaning of s 29(2) of the Canada Evidence Act. The judge 
commented that: ‘It is merely a new type of copy made from a new type of record. 
Though the technology changes, the underlying principles are the same.’2 On appeal, 
citing this comment, Morden JA observed that the ‘section should be considered as 
“always speaking” and “be applied to the circumstances as they arise” ’.3 The same 
view was emphasized by Buxton LJ in Victor Chandler International v Customs and 
Excise Commissioners,4 where he observed, at [55], that ‘the word “document” is not 
constrained by the physical nature that documents took in 1952, so we are entitled, 
and indeed bound, to consider the appropriate application of the concept of circulation, 
etc, of a document in the light of current practice and technology’. In this case, an 
advertisement contained in a teletext transmission was held to be a document for the 
purposes of the Betting and Gaming Act 1981. This view was reinforced by Pumfrey J 
in Marlton v Tectronix UK Holdings,5 when the judge held that a computer database, 
in as far as it forms part of the business records of a company, is a document for the 
purposes of the Civil Procedure Rules, and therefore can be disclosed. Calvert Smith J 
also concluded, in Kennedy v Information Commissioner,6 that the word ‘document’ in 
s 32 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 included information recorded in an 
electronic medium. The judge said, at [79]:
It seems clear to me that for the Act to work at all – and in particular for Section 
32 to work at all – the word ‘document’ must now mean what everybody now 
thinks it means and includes both hard and electronic copies of documents.
1 1978 CanLII 244, 42 CCC (2d) 67, 6 CR (3d) 218.
2 42 CCC (2d) 67 at 69.
3 R v McMullen 1979 CanLII 1867 (ON CA), 25 OR (2d) 301, 100 DLR (3d) 671, 47 CCC (2d) 499 (100 
DLR (3d) 671 at 676).
4 [2000] 1 WLR 1296, [2000] 2 All ER 315, [2000] 2 WLUK 990, [2001] LLR 401 (2000), 97(11) 
LSG 36 (2000), 150 NLJ 341, (2000) 144 SJLB 127, Times, 8 March 2000, Independent, 10 March 2000, 
[2000] CLY 414.
5 [2003] EWHC 383 (Ch), [2003] 2 WLUK 269, [2003] Info Tech LR 258, [2004] CLY 341; Trevor 
Mascarenhas, ‘The extent of disclosure relating to emails’, (2003) 3(2) ECL Rep 14.
6 [2010] EWHC 475 (Admin), [2010] 1 WLR 1489, [2010] 1 WLUK 285, [2010] CLY 65.
2.32 As such, a ‘document’ is a medium upon which information is stored. The 
medium may sometimes determine the admissibility of the evidence, but the 
definition of ‘document’ is considered wide enough to bring any medium into its ambit 
without causing difficulties.1 This must be correct, because if information is not stored 
on a medium, the content is not available without the medium, and therefore the 
information remains oral evidence. As Lord Milligan in Rollo (William) v HM Advocate2 
said, when he indicated that the information stored in a Sharp Memomaster 500 hand- 
held device was a document:
Unsurprisingly, the word ‘document’ in normal usage is most frequently used 
in relation to written, typed or printed paper documents. Where information 
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concerned is more readily referred to by reference to the means of storage or 
surface for storage concerned rather than as a ‘document’. Hence reference to, for 
example, machines or tapes. However, terminological emphasis in description in 
such cases on the means or surface for recording information does not deprive 
such alternative stores of information from qualifying as ‘documents’ any more 
so than, for example, a tombstone, which is expressly included in the dictionary 
definition referred to. It seems to us that the essential essence of a document is 
that it is something concerning recorded information of some sort. It does not 
matter if, to be meaningful, the information requires to be processed in some way 
such as translation, decoding or electrical retrieval. 3
1 Charles Hollander QC, Documentary Evidence (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018), 7– 13; in Taylor 
v R. [2011] 2 Cr App Rep 4, [2011] WLR 1809, [2011] 2 Cr App R 4, [2011] 1 WLR 1809, [2011] EWCA 
Crim 728, [2011] Bus LR 1011, [2011] Lloyd’s Rep FC 348, the court determined that digital data came 
within the scope of the words ‘book or paper’ in s 206(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
2 1997 JC 23, 1997 SLT 958 (HCJ).
3 1997 SLT 958, 960F- G.
Visual reading of a document
2.33 Although the meaning of ‘document’ has been construed widely, nevertheless 
it was held by the court in Darby (Yvonne Beatrice) v DPP1 that a visual reading cannot 
be a document. This must be correct. Unless the reading is stored in some way that 
enables it to be read at a later date, the reading is merely a transitory phenomenon that 
can only be captured by a person who provides original testimony by giving evidence 
about her perception.2
1 [1994] 10 WLUK 343, [1995] RTR 294, (1995) 159 JP 533 (DC), Times, 4 November 1994, [1994] 
CLY 674.
2 Owen v Chesters [1984] 11 WLUK 108, (1985) 149 JP 295, [1985] RTR 191, [1985] Crim LR 156, 
(1985) 82 LSG 443, (1984) 129 SJ 856, [1985] CLY 3054 where a police officer gave evidence of the 
reading from a breath test machine; see also (this list is not exhaustive) Denneny v Harding [1985] 10 
WLUK 291, [1986] RTR 350, [1986] Crim LR 254, [1986] CLY 2881; Mayon v DPP [1988] 2 WLUK 53, 
[1988] RTR 281, [1988] CLY 3124; Greenaway v DPP [1993] 2 WLUK 40, (1994) 158 JP 27, [1994] RTR 
17, (1993) 157 JPN 234, [1994] CLY 3978.
2.34 Oral testimony may be provided in lieu of documentary evidence. In a number 
of breath specimen cases, the defendants’ counsel have submitted that it is necessary to 
provide the printout as documentary evidence of the output recorded by the machine, 
and that substitute evidence given by a police officer as to the machine output is not 
admissible.1 In Thom v DPP,2 the printout from an Intoximeter was not produced, and 
the defence objected to testimony by a police officer as to what he had seen on the 
printout. Clarke J addressed this point as follows, at [14G]:
I can see no distinction in principle between evidence by a witness that he looked 
at his watch and read the time at, say, noon, and evidence from a witness that he 
looked at the Lion Intoximeter and that he read the proportion of alcohol in 100 
millilitres of breath as being X.
1 When radar speed meters were introduced in the late 1950s, police officers had to note down the 
reading in their notebooks, because this was the only method of recording a reading: J. M. W. McBride, 
‘The radar speed meter’ [1958] Crim LR 349.
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2.35 Likewise, in Sneyd v DPP,1 when the printout from an Intoximeter was not 
produced, the court accepted the police officer’s testimony of what he had seen on the 
printout provided by the device, rather than what he had seen on the screen. Rejecting 
the objection on the basis that the testimony was secondary evidence, Richards LJ held, 
at [32], that ‘it is well established that evidence both as to the results of the analysis 
and as to the reliability of the machine can be given either in the form of a written 
print- out or orally by the officer who carried out the procedure’. He determined 
that there was no difference between the oral evidence of the results shown on the 
printout and oral evidence of the results on the screen of the machine – both were 
not inadmissible hearsay. In R (on the application of Leong) v DPP,2 Silber J applied 
the analysis of Richards LJ, holding admissible the oral evidence of the police officer’s 
reading from a printout, at [14]: ‘Where, as in the present case, there is evidence that 
the machine is working properly, there is no reason why the police officer concerned 
cannot give admissible evidence of what he saw in the print- out.’
1 [2006] EWHC 560 (Admin), [2006] 2 WLUK 635, (2006) 170 JP 545, [2007] RTR 6, (2006) 170 JPN 
998, [2006] CLY 799.
2 [2006] EWHC 1575 (Admin), [2006] 6 WLUK 172.
Authentication
2.36 When a document is tendered as evidence of its contents, it is often 
accompanied by proof that the document ‘has some specific connection to a person 
or organization, whether through authorship or some other relation’.1 As noted by 
Austin J: ‘Authentication is about showing that the document is what it is claimed 
to be, not about assessing, at the point of the adducing of the evidence, whether the 
document proves what the tendering party claims it proves.’2 Similarly, where any 
object is tendered in evidence, an adequate foundation for admission will require 
testimony first that the object offered is the object which was involved in the incident, 
and further that the condition of the object is substantially unchanged.3
1 Kenneth S. Broun (ed.), McCormick on Evidence, vol. 2 (7th edn, West Publishing 2013), 83– 85 
(§221).
2 Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320, [118], [2005] NSWSC 
417.
3 Broun, McCormick on Evidence, 13– 16 (§213).
2.37 As is the case for any other form of evidence, electronic evidence must be 
authenticated. The authentication process for electronic evidence is even more critical,1 
and can occasionally be challenging.2 Undoubtedly the use of technology has afforded 
us convenience and efficiency. But if parties and investigative authorities choose to use 
the fruits of technology, they must also accept the need to prove the authenticity and 
integrity of the evidence produced by technology, even though the cost of such proof 
might be considered to be high. This is particularly the case where authentication 
evidence will shed light on the latent assumptions and hidden errors inherent in 
electronic evidence, which could affect the accuracy of the electronic evidence itself.
1 Seng, ‘Computer output as evidence’, 159– 166; Rosemary Pattenden, ‘Authenticating “things” in 
English law: principles for adducing tangible evidence in common law jury trials’ (2008) 12 E & P 290.
2 The challenge of proving that evidence in digital form is authentic was the subject of R v Cochrane 
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on- line with the computer age?’ (1993) 15(10) EIPR 360; see Chapter 6 on authentication for a detailed 
discussion.
2.38 Authentication evidence may also demonstrate that the errors in question 
will not have an adverse effect on the evidence itself. For instance, in DPP v McKeown 
(Sharon), DPP v Jones (Christopher),1 the clocks on the Intoximeter 3000 used to 
measure the breath alcohol values of the defendants were not accurate. For this 
reason, the defendants challenged the admissibility of the printouts from the device. 
In addressing whether the accuracy of the clocks was relevant to the accuracy of the 
printout readings, Lord Hoffmann examined the functioning of these devices and 
concluded that, for the purposes of s 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,2 
a malfunction is irrelevant unless it affects the way in which the computer processes, 
stores or retrieves the information used to generate the statement.3 On the facts, the 
clock was not part of the processing mechanism of the Intoximeter, and the convictions 
of the defendants based on the printout readings were upheld.
1 [1997] 1 WLR 295, [1997] 1 All ER 737, [1997] 2 WLUK 386, [1997] 2 Cr App R 155 (HL), (1997) 
161 JP 356, [1997] RTR 162, [1997] Crim LR 522, (1997) 161 JPN 482, (1997) 147 NLJ 289, Times, 21 
February 1997, Independent, 7 March 1997, [1997] CLY 1093; see also Jonathan S. W. Black, ‘Breath 
testing devices and computer evidence’ (1997) 141(10) SJ 236– ; C.G., ‘Computers: evidence’ (1997) 
3(3) CTLR T68; ‘Computer clock malfunction irrelevant’ (1997) 161(14) Justice of the Peace & Local 
Government Law 325; Renzo Marchini, ‘DPP v McKeown (Sharon)’ (1997) 8(2) Comps & Law 27; Philip 
Plowden, ‘Garbage in, garbage out – the limits of s.69 of the PACE Act 1984’ (1997) 61(3) Journal of 
Criminal Law 310; Gordon Cropper, ‘The evidential breath testing device as a computer’ (1997) 2(May) 
RTI 3; H. L. J. Makin, ‘PACE and the intoximeter’ (1998) 142(11) S.J. 250.
2 Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was repealed by s 60 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, although the relevant case law remains a useful authority.
3 [1997] 1 All ER 737 at 744. A study later demonstrated that breath alcohol values measured on 
the Lion Intoximeter 3000 are not affected if the machine clock is incorrect by more than four minutes: 
R. C. Denny, ‘The Intoximeter 3000 and the four minute fallacy’ (1998) 38(2) Medical Science Law 163. 
Minor typographical errors on a printout do not alter the validity of the results: Reid v DPP [1998] 2 
WLUK 401, [1999] RTR 357, [1998] Masons CLR 269, Times, 6 March 1998, [1998] CLY 897.
2.39 This does not mean that authentication evidence will always have to be 
supplied for each item of evidence. In civil proceedings in England and Wales, a party is 
deemed to admit the authenticity of a document disclosed under the provisions of Civil 
Procedure Rule (CPR) 31 unless notice is served that the party wishes the document 
to be proved at trial. Thus where the authenticity of a document is questioned, the 
party raising the issue is required to do so at an early stage of the proceedings, thereby 
providing the party submitting the document the opportunity of gathering evidence to 
prove the veracity of the document.
2.40 See Chapter 6 on authentication for a more detailed discussion.
Best evidence
2.41 The best evidence rule can be considered from two points of view. It can 
be regarded as an inclusionary rule under which whatever is the best evidence is 
admissible, thus overcoming exclusionary rules such as the hearsay rule; alternatively, 
it can be regarded as an exclusionary rule, so that anything which is not the best 
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used the rule in an exclusionary way to deny the use of copies of documents when the 
absence of the original was not satisfactorily accounted for.
1 1 Atk 22, 26 ER 15.
2.42 Reaction against this rule began in the nineteenth century,1 and by the latter part 
of the twentieth century it was recognized that the best evidence rule was no longer as 
relevant as it once was. In Kajala v Noble,2 Ackner LJ held that the rule is now confined 
to written documents in the strictest sense of the term. Echoing the robust comments 
of Lord Denning MR in Garton v Hunter (Valuation Officer),3 His Lordship said:
The old rule, that a party must produce the best evidence that the nature of the 
case will allow, and that any less good evidence is to be excluded, has gone by the 
board long ago. The only remaining instance of it is that, if an original document 
is available in one’s hands, one must produce it; that one cannot give secondary 
evidence by producing a copy. Nowadays we do not confine ourselves to the best 
evidence. We admit all relevant evidence. The goodness or badness of it goes 
only to weight, and not to admissibility … In our judgment, the old rule is limited 
and confined to written documents in the strict sense of the term, and has no 
relevance to tapes or films.4
1 Malek, Phipson on Evidence, 7– 42; see the discussion by Sargent J in the New Hampshire case of 
Howley v Whipple 48 N.H. 487 (1869) in respect of best evidence in the case of telegrams.
2 [1982] 3 WLUK 133, (1982) 75 Cr App R 149, [1982] Crim LR 433, [1982] CLY 605.
3 [1969] 2 QB 37, 44, [1969] 2 WLR 86, [1969] 1 All ER 451, [1968] 11 WLUK 46, (1969) 133 JP 162, 
67 LGR 229, [1969] RA 11, 15 RRC 145, (1968) SJ 924, Times, 15 November 1962, [1969] CLY 3017.
4 Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149 at 152; whether it is necessary to produce the original 
when a photocopy is adduced in evidence will depend upon whether the production of the original is 
relevant and necessary, for which see Attorney- General v Lundin [1982] 2 WLUK 231, (1982) 75 Cr App 
R 90, [1982] Crim LR 296, [1982] CLY 2435.
2.43 By 1990, Lloyd LJ in R v Governor Ex p Osman (No 1) observed that the best 
evidence rule had become a rule of practice or procedure.1 He also made the following 
remarks about the rule:
this court would be more than happy to say goodbye to the best evidence rule. 
We accept that it served an important purpose in the days of parchment and quill 
pens.2 But since the invention of carbon paper and, still more, the photocopier 
and the telefascimile machine, that purpose has largely gone. Where there is 
an allegation of forgery the court will obviously attach little, if any, weight to 
anything other than the original; so also if the copy produced in court is illegible. 
But to maintain a general exclusionary rule for these limited purposes is, in our 
view, hardly justifiable. 3
1 R v Governor Ex p Osman (No 1) sub nom Osman (No 1) [1990] 1 WLR 277, [1989] 3 All ER 701, 
[1988] 3 WLUK 391, (1990) 90 Cr App R 281, [1988] Crim LR 611, (1990) 87(7) LSG 32, (1990) 134 
SJ 458, Times, 13 April 1988, Independent, 15 April 1988, Guardian, 19 April 1988 Daily Telegraph, 21 
April 1988, [1990] CLY 1175.
2 It will be interesting to know how many ancient documents previously admitted into evidence 
were actually copies: A Guide to Seals in the Public Record Office (2nd edn, HMSO 1968), 30; T. F. Tout, 
‘Mediæval forgers and forgeries’ (1919) Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 208.
3 [1990] 1 WLR 277 (DC) at 308B- C.
2.44 The best evidence rule has been effectively limited to requiring a party having 
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on the document (primary evidence) not to wilfully refuse to produce the original 
document as primary evidence, and instead produce copies or substitutes (secondary 
evidence) in its place.1
1 Colin Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence (8th edn, Butterworths 1995) 748, ch XVIII, s 1: Proof 
of the contents of a document. A. The general rule. 1. Statement and illustrations of the general rule. 
This statement of the rule was removed in subsequent editions. See also R. v Wayte (William Guy) 
[1982] 3 WLUK 247, (1982) 76 Cr App R 110, CA, Times, 24 March 1982, [1983] CLY 659, where 
photostat copies of two letters were not admissible in circumstances where the party seeking to rely 
on the documents refused to produce the original letters.
2.45 Where good reasons exist for the failure to produce the original document, 
secondary evidence, even in the form of oral testimony, is permissible. This may be 
illustrated by the case of Taylor v Chief Constable of Cheshire,1 a case involving the 
inadvertent destruction of evidence. In this case, video images of the accused allegedly 
committing theft from a store were recorded on the store video recorder, and the 
manager of the store, three police officers and the lawyer for the accused later saw 
these recordings. When the case was heard, it transpired that new security officers 
had erased the recording of the video images. The magistrates permitted the witnesses 
to give evidence of what they saw on the video recording. An appeal was made that 
the best evidence – the video recording – could not be admitted because it had been 
destroyed, and that testimonial evidence of the recording was not the best evidence. 
This was rejected. Although the best evidence in this instance was the video recording, 
its unavailability did not preclude the admission into evidence of the testimony of 
those witnesses who viewed the recording. The recollections of the witnesses ought 
not to be precluded because the best evidence was not available. The evidence offered 
by the witnesses was, as pointed out by Ralph Gibson LJ, ‘direct evidence of what was 
seen to be happening in a particular place at a particular time’, and it was for the trier 
of the facts to assess its weight, credibility and reliability.2
1 [1986] 1 WLR 1479, [1987] 1 All ER 225, [1986] 10 WLUK 244, (1987) 84 Cr App R 191, (1987) 
151 JP 103, [1987] Crim LR 119, (1987) 151 JPN 110, (1987) 84 LSG 412, (1986) 130 SJ 953, [1987] 
CLY 743; P. W. Ferguson, ‘Video identification and the best evidence rule’ (1987) 51(2) Journal of 
Criminal Law 125.
2 [1987] 1 All ER 225, 230.
2.46 Since the statutory intercession of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 and the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, the best evidence rule has further taken a simplified, statutory 
form. The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Masquerade Music Ltd v Springsteen1 
suggests that the best evidence rule is hardly of any relevance. After considering the 
best evidence rule in detail and reviewing the case law extensively,2 Jonathan Parker LJ 
outlined the position with respect to the best evidence rule in the twenty- first century, 
at [85]:
In my judgment, the time has now come when it can be said with confidence that 
the best evidence rule, long on its deathbed, has finally expired. In every case where 
a party seeks to adduce secondary evidence of the contents of a document, it is a 
matter for the court to decide, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, what 
(if any) weight to attach to that evidence. Where the party seeking to adduce the 
secondary evidence could readily produce the document, it may be expected that 
(absent some special circumstances) the court will decline to admit the secondary 
evidence on the ground that it is worthless. At the other extreme, where the party 
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it may be expected that (absent some special circumstances) the court will admit 
the secondary evidence and attach such weight to it as it considers appropriate in 
all the circumstances. In cases falling between those two extremes, it is for the court 
to make a judgment as to whether in all the circumstances any weight should be 
attached to the secondary evidence. Thus, the ‘admissibility’ of secondary evidence 
of the contents of documents is, in my judgment, entirely dependent upon whether 
or not any weight is to be attached to that evidence. And whether or not any weight 
is to be attached to such secondary evidence is a matter for the court to decide, 
taking into account all the circumstances of the particular case.
1 [2001] EWCA Civ 563, [2001] 4 WLUK 239, [2001] CP Rep 85, [2001] CPLR 369, [2001] EMLR 25, 
Independent, 24 April 2001, Daily Telegraph, 17 April 2001, [2001] CLY 392.
2 [2001] EWCA Civ 563, [64]– [85].
2.47 Waller and Laws LJJ concurred. In other words, there is no automatic bar to the 
failure to admit the original document as primary evidence. Instead, when the original 
document is no longer available, a copy of the original evidence is admissible, but an 
adjudicator must consider its weight as secondary evidence.
2.48 The modern application of this rule is illustrated by Post Office Counters Ltd 
v Mahida.1 In this case, the Post Office sought to claim an alleged deficiency of social 
security benefits paid out against the defendant, the sub- postmaster general. The 
deficiency was set out in a schedule prepared by investigators of the Post Office based 
on checks conducted against the underlying dockets and foils. Subsequently, the 
dockets and foils were destroyed as part of a routine process. The trial judge accepted 
the schedule as secondary evidence and found against the defendant. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal was concerned that the secondary evidence was of insufficient weight 
to prove the precise amount of the debt claimed against the defendant. In particular, 
the Post Office as an institution could not readily be said to have discharged the burden 
of proving the precise amount of the debt when it was alleged that the defendant had 
been responsible for this loss, and had denied the defendant the opportunity to check 
those figures.2 For this reason, the very basic unfairness should have led the trial judge 
to consider that the amount of the debt was not proved, and the defendant’s appeal 
was allowed.
1 [2003] EWCA Civ 1583, [2003] 10 WLUK 601, Times, 31 October 2003, [2004] CLY 248.
2 [2003] EWCA Civ 1583 at [27].
Analogue evidence
2.49 Although the best evidence rule is now tightly confined, it applies to both civil 
and criminal proceedings.1 But as the statutory formulations of the rule in s 8 of the Civil 
Evidence Act 1995 and s 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 retain the differentiation 
between primary and secondary evidence, the ramifications are different, depending 
on whether the evidence is in analogue or in electronic form.
1 R. v Wayte (William Guy) [1982] 3 WLUK 247, (1982) 76 Cr App R 110, CA, Times, 24 March 1982, 
[1983] CLY 659.
2.50 In the physical world, primary evidence is an original document, and secondary 
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the production of the original document to prove the content in question, and the 
submission of copies is considered inferior evidence. But the fact that copies were 
made, for instance, by a reprographic process such as photocopying, will not prevent 
the copies themselves from being originals. In Miller- Foulds v Secretary of State for 
Constitutional Affairs1 regarding orders issued by Brentford County Court, Pelling J 
noted the following, at [26]:
The method of production involved copying an original draft [order] and then 
sealing the copies thus resulting. The copies, once sealed, were original orders. 
The original draft was just that: a draft. The fact that the documents that were 
sealed were produced by photocopying rather than copying out by hand the 
same document umpteen times is wholly irrelevant, in my judgment, as long as 
the document itself resulting from the copying process was sealed.
1 [2008] EWHC 3443 (Ch), [2008] 11 WLUK 517. A subsequent application before Lloyd LJ was 
rejected: [2009] EWCA Civ 1132.
2.51 The concepts of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ evidence take a different shape when 
applied to material objects that must be processed to be viewed. Consider, for instance, 
a photograph taken with a camera containing film, or a plate. The negative or the plate 
comprises the only copy of the image in reverse.1 It is the negative or plate that is the 
material upon which the primary evidence is recorded. However, few people will be 
satisfied by looking at the primary image, if only because it is not easy to view, and is 
not intended to be viewed in this form unless by means of a projector, if the primary 
image is a negative. This means that the printed image is secondary evidence. Any 
number of copies of the primary object can be made, although no printed copy will be 
an exact copy of the film or plate. This is because the processes applied and the mix of 
chemicals used in transforming the negative into a print will determine how accurately 
the photograph reflects the image, in particular the degree of contrast (that is the range 
of grey tones) captured on the negative. For example, the degree of contrast will affect 
how bruising is reproduced on the photograph: a high contrast makes the bruising 
appear darker and more dramatic, while a low contrast will lessen the effect of the 
visual image, making the bruise seem somewhat less consequential.
1 A point noted by Smith LJ in Griffiths v DPP [2007] RTR 44 at [21].
Digital evidence
2.52 In contrast to the discussion above, the range of evidence in digital form is 
vast, and it comprises not just printouts of what might be termed conventional files, 
such as copies of letters, contracts or spreadsheets. Other forms of digital documents 
include reports from computer databases, the electronic records of transactions and 
the digital store and reproduction of images, such as the scanned image of an original 
paper document. The treatment of evidence in digital form calls for different and 
occasionally difficult considerations.
2.53 First, there may be issues identifying the primary evidence of a digital document. 
In Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No. 9), Vinelott J considered the memory or database of a 
word processor or computer to be the ‘original document’,1 presumably on the basis 
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stored’.2 However, Professor Tapper disagrees, and takes the view that the printout from 
the word- processed electronic document is the original and the document in computer 
memory is the copy.3 Both views are possible. Vinelott J’s analysis is plausible – where 
the printout is generated as a physical draft to aid in the editing of the word- processed 
document. But Professor Tapper’s view could also be justified where the object behind 
the use of the word processor is the generation of the printout as the final, definitive 
version of the document. In such a case, the authentic printout may be a better form 
of evidence than the state of the document in internal memory at a later time. This 
inversion provides a good illustration of the danger of assuming that the printout may 
not be the best evidence in any given situation.
1 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No. 9) [1991] 1 WLR 652 at 658C- D.
2 [1991] 1 WLR 652 at 658C- D.
3 Colin Tapper, ‘Evanescent evidence’ (1993) 1 Intl J L & Info Tech 35, 42.
2.54 In addition, the use of a digital device need not always produce an ‘original 
document’. Where the ‘original document’ is created in digital form but is never stored 
in a more permanent, non- ephemeral manner, the ‘original’ digital ‘document’ ceases 
to exist for all practical purposes. Instant messaging is an example of evidence that 
might not be stored, which makes it analogous to an oral conversation.
2.55 The issues may be further considered with the following extended illustration. 
For instance, the original of a physical document, such as a commercial contract 
between two parties, signed by the authorized representatives of both parties and 
acknowledged as the original, is primary evidence of the content of the contract. 
Even if the contract was created on a computer, the physical document will still be 
the original document as it was signed and adopted by both parties.1 However, should 
the contract, which is subsequently acted upon by both parties, exist only in digital 
form on a computer, the primary evidence of the document will be the digital contract 
residing on an identified computer storage device such as the hard drive of a computer. 
Printing out the document on paper will provide copies in a human- readable form, 
which will in turn comprise secondary evidence of the document.2
1 The physical document might have a digital counterpart, as in Austria, for which see Friedrich 
Schwank ‘CyberDOC and e- government: the electronic archive of Austrian notaries’ (2004) 1 Digital 
Evidence and Signature Law Review 30, 32.
2 The schedule produced in R v Nazeer (Mohammed Azad) [1998] Crim LR 750, [1998] 2 WLUK 
93 cannot be considered to be hearsay or secondary evidence because it was real evidence produced 
by individuals using different sources of information (including computer records); Claire Barsby, 
‘Evidence – documentary evidence held on computer’, [1998] Crim LR 750.
2.56 Now let us take the matter one stage further. Assume the original digital file 
is accessed multiple times after the contract is executed, but its file contents are not 
altered: perhaps particular clauses are copied for other reasons. The metadata for 
the digital file may have been changed to record the action of opening and closing 
the file, even if no substantive changes are made. Although the metadata might 
have been altered, the content of the file in question has not been affected. In these 
circumstances, it might be considered that the integrity of the original digital data is 
compromised. But as the content (rather than the metadata) of the digital document 
is unchanged, the digital document remains the primary evidence, and a printout of 
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the file was opened and viewed. Metadata can be compared to a file register in the 
physical world that records the name of the person to whom the physical file was 
given, the date and time the person obtained the file, and the date and time it was 
returned: the register information does not alter the content of the statements made 
in the file (unless the person obtaining access to the file alters its contents). In such 
circumstances, the metadata does not affect the integrity of the digital data, which also 
means the secondary evidence of the file in the form of the printout remains a reliable 
reproduction of the digital file.
1 Professor Tapper expressed the contrary view, that ‘the memory holds the copy and the original is 
the printed copy’ in ‘Evanescent evidence’, 42. This is correct if the printed version is a document such 
as a contract, where the contract is subsequently signed by the parties with manuscript signatures and 
excludes reference to any other version.
2.57 Consider another example: the drafting of a contract by an external lawyer for a 
multinational company. This task will comprise a number of stages, including: liaising 
with a number of people internally with different responsibilities to produce an 
initial draft of the contract; passing it to the other contracting party for comments; 
and producing a final version to the satisfaction of both parties, after a substantial 
period of negotiation. In all probability, various versions of the draft contract will exist 
in storage devices on computers, hand- held devices and backup devices belonging 
to several companies and their employees, perhaps across different jurisdictions. If 
the contract is then printed and signed by the authorized representatives of the two 
parties, the original document will be the printed version. If there is an issue regarding 
a particular version of the contract at a particular point in the negotiations, the draft 
digital version of the contract will be original evidence because that electronic copy is 
the best evidence of that version of the contract, and a printout of that version will be 
secondary evidence.
2.58 In addition, digital documents may themselves be stored, changed, compiled 
and collated into new documents, and the new documents may be original documents 
in themselves. The Canadian case of R v Bell1 is instructional in this regard. In this case, 
the bank’s computer software processed the various transactions of its customers’ 
chequing accounts into a monthly statement for each account. Two identical copies 
of the monthly statement were printed, one for the customer and one for the bank. 
The bank retained its copy of the monthly statement, but did not retain a record of 
the transactions. The trial judge held that a copy of the statement was not admissible 
because the transaction information stored on a computer was the record, and the 
original ‘record’ as a record of the dealings of a financial institution (and its subsequent 
copy) no longer existed. On appeal, this analysis was rejected. Weatherston JA noted 
that the form in which information is recorded may change from time to time, and a 
new form in which information is recorded, such as a compilation or collection of other 
records, is equally a record of that kind of information. The court found the monthly 
statement to be such a ‘record’ that consolidated the transactions of a financial 
institution and allowed the appeal.2
1 (1982) 35 OR (2d) 164 (CA).
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Civil proceedings
2.59 The admissibility of secondary evidence in civil proceedings is governed 
by of s 8 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995, which permits the introduction of copies of 
documents into evidence for the purpose of proving the statement contained in the 
document:
8.— (1) Where a statement contained in a document is admissible as evidence in 
civil proceedings, it may be proved— 
(a) by the production of that document, or
(b) whether or not that document is still in existence, by the production 
of a copy of that document or of the material part of it, authenticated in 
such manner as the court may approve.
(2) It is immaterial for this purpose how many removes there are between a copy 
and the original.
2.60 A ‘document’ is in turn defined in s 13 as ‘anything in which information of 
any description is recorded’, and a ‘copy’ of a document as ‘anything onto which 
information recorded in the document has been copied, by whatever means and 
whether directly or indirectly’. There are two operative parts to s 8. Section 8(1)(a) 
provides that an admissible statement contained in a document may be proved by the 
production of the original document. Section 8(1)(b) provides that the same document 
may be proved by the production of a copy of that document or a material part of 
it, with the expression ‘whether or not that [primary] document is still in existence’ 
completely eviscerating the common law best evidence rule. And although s 8(1) uses 
the language of ‘a statement contained in a document’, suggesting that the statutory 
version of the best evidence rule only applies to documentary evidence used in a 
testimonial sense, a better reading is that s 8 applies to documentary evidence both 
as testimonial evidence and as real evidence. This means that s 8 will apply to the 
analogue record of the measurements of a device (the measurement constitutes the 
statement of the document)1 or the printout from an Intoximeter.
1 Such as the film in The Statue of Liberty, Sapporo Maru M/ S (Owners) v Steam Tanker Statue of 
Liberty (Owners) [1968] 1 WLR 739, [1968] 2 All ER 195, [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 429, [1968] 3 WLUK 65, 
(1968) 112 SJ 380, [1968] CLY 1546.
2.61 The admissibility of the copied document as secondary evidence is subject to 
one condition and one qualification. The condition is that, as set out in the proviso to 
s 8(1), the copied document must be ‘authenticated in such manner as the court may 
approve’, just as the primary document must be authenticated. In other words, where 
the credibility of the digital data is in question, foundation evidence, typically in the 
form of testimony, will have to be introduced and tested to determine whether the 
secondary evidence can be accepted as ‘a copy’ of the original document. The residual 
judicial control over the admissibility of secondary evidence takes the form of judicial 
prescription of the requisite authentication evidence to prove that it is an accurate and 
reliable copy of the whole or a material part of the original document.
2.62 The qualification is that, by s 8(2), the number of removes between the copy and 
the original document is statutorily deemed to be irrelevant. This detracts from the 
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of the authentication evidence as to the true accuracy and reliability of the secondary 
evidence.1
1 For a broad discussion of electronic evidence in the civil context, see ‘Electronic evidence in civil 
and administrative proceedings: guidelines and explanatory memorandum’ (adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 30 January 2019), https:// www.coe.int/ en/ web/ cdcj/ activities/ 
digital- evidence.
Criminal proceedings
2.63 The starting point for the application of the best evidence rule in criminal 
proceedings is s 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003:
133 Proof of statements in documents
Where a statement in a document is admissible as evidence in criminal 
proceedings, the statement may be proved by producing either- 
(a) the document, or
(b) (whether or not the document exists) a copy of the document or of the 
material part of it, authenticated in whatever way the court may approve.
2.64 The s 133 provisions are identical to those for civil proceedings in the Civil 
Evidence Act 1995, save for the fact that there is no mention of the number of times a 
copy is removed from the original in s 133 in the Criminal Justice Act. (It is suggested 
that the elimination of the number of removes qualification in s 133 is an improvement 
over the equivalent formulation of the best evidence rule in the Civil Evidence Act, 
in getting rid of the judicial handicap on assessment of the authentication evidence.) 
The other difference is that proof in criminal proceedings must rise to the appropriate 
standard, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution, and 
proof on the balance of probabilities in the defence case. Otherwise, it should also be 
noted that, notwithstanding the reference to ‘a statement in a document’, for the same 
reasons as outlined above in relation to the Civil Evidence Act 1995, the best evidence 
provisions should apply equally to a document as real evidence and to a document as 
testimonial evidence.1 In other words, as in civil proceedings, secondary evidence of an 
electronic document is admissible subject to authentication evidence.
1 In R v Minors (Craig), R v Harper (Giselle Gaile) [1989] 1 WLR 441, [1989] 1 All ER 208, [1988] 12 
WLUK 161, (1989) 89 Cr App R 102, [1989] Crim LR 360, (1989) 133 SJ 420, [1989] CLY 546 it was held 
that s 24, Criminal Justice Act 1988 applied only to a ‘statement in a document’ and not to real evidence. 
Section 24, like s 27, the predecessor provision to s 133, is found in Part II (Documentary Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. That notwithstanding, it could be argued that 
the holding in R v Minors (Craig), R v Harper (Giselle Gaile) should be confined to s 24 (an exception 
to the hearsay rule) and has no application to the interpretation of s 27 (a restatement of the best 
evidence rule); J. A. Coutts, ‘Admissibility of computer print- outs in evidence’ (1989) 53(4) Journal of 
Criminal Law 454; Lynne Knapman, ‘Computer printout – evidence – admissibility – procedure – s.68 
PACE 1984’, [1989] Crim LR 360; Bernard Robertson, ‘Section 69 PACE and the intoximeter’ (1989) 
153(41) Justice of the Peace & Local Government Law 653.
2.65 The effect is that while the original electronic document, if available, should 
be adduced into evidence, in practice a copy of the document tends to be adduced 
as secondary evidence. The copy may be at least one, if not two removes1 from the 
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that captures the file in its entirety, including all its attributes, such as the metadata, 
without altering the original data. (On this point, please see the detailed discussion in 
Chapter 6 on authentication.)
1 It is usually two removes from the original, if the original is considered to be the operational 
electronic document that is actively used on the computer system in question, and a copy is previously 
taken from that operational electronic document (in computer science terms, a ‘snapshot’ – the state 
of the system at a particular point in time, considering that some time would have lapsed between the 
taking of this copy and the current operational version of the electronic document), and a copy is in 
turn taken from that previous copy for purposes of preparation of proceedings.
2.66 To a certain extent, rather than question whether a document in digital form 
is an original or a copy, it might be more useful and relevant to refer to the proof of 
authenticity, or provenance, or reliability of a digital file. This is required under both 
s 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and s 8 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. This in 
turn encapsulates proof of the integrity of the content of the data. Because of the ease 
with which a digital document may be migrated from one storage device to another, 
and thereby undergo formatting and other changes, including content and metadata 
changes, it is vital to require any such changes to be documented in such a way as to 
preserve the integrity and authenticity of the copy. Thus it might be more relevant, 
when referring to digital data, to concentrate on establishing which version of the 
data is required, particularly whether the making of copies of the digital document is 
properly documented.
Admissibility
2.67 That evidence takes electronic form has not been an impediment to its 
admissibility. Judges have admitted digital records of the product of mechanical 
devices and automatic recordings, photographs,1 tape recordings,2 automated film 
recordings of the movements of a ship as traced by radar,3 microfilm,4 printouts of test 
results undertaken on a breath test machine,5 video recordings,6 computer printouts7 
and a recording of an oral statement of testamentary intentions on a DVD.8 The types 
and categories of electronic evidence are not closed.
1 R v The United Kingdom Electronic Telegraph Company (Limited) (1862) 3 F & F 73, 176 ER 33, 
where a photograph was admitted to show the nature of the surface of a highway in respect of an 
allegation of an obstruction, although photographs have to be verified on oath to be considered as 
more than mere pictures: Hindson v Ashby [1896] 2 Ch 1 (CA) 21; R. v Tolson (1864) 4 F & F 103, 176 ER 
488 where a photograph was admitted in a case of alleged bigamy to illustrate oral testimony (Willes 
J commented in his summing up to the members of the jury: ‘The photograph was admissible because 
it is only a visible representation of the image or impression made upon the minds of the witnesses 
by the sight of the person or the object it represents; and, therefore, is, in reality, only another species 
of the evidence which persons give of identity, when they speak merely from memory’ – the jury 
subsequently entered a verdict of not guilty); D. W. Elliott, ‘Mechanical aids to evidence’ [1958] Crim 
LR 5; Chris Nicoll, ‘E.D.I. evidence and the Vienna Convention’, (1995) Jan Journal of Business Law 21; 
Elliott Goldstein, ‘Photographic and videotape evidence in the criminal courts of England and Canada’ 
[1987] Crim LR 384.
2 Harry Parker v Mason [1940] 2 KB 590, [1940] 4 All ER 199, [1940] 8 WLUK 1; R v Burr and 
Sullivan [1956] Crim LR 442; R. v Ali (Maqsud), R. v Hussain (Ashiq) [1966] 1 QB 688, [1965] 3 WLR 229 
(CA), [1965] 2 All ER 464, [1965] 4 WLUK 27, (1965) 49 Cr App R 230, (1965) 129 JP 396, (1965) 109 
SJ 331, (1965) CLY 796; for an example in Scotland, see Hopes and Lavery v HM Advocate [1960] Crim 
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3 The Statue of Liberty Owners of Motorship Sapporo Maru v Owners of Steam Tanker Statue of Liberty 
[1968] 1 WLR 739, [1968] 2 All ER 195, [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 429, [1968] 3 WLUK 65, (1968) 112 SJ 
380, [1968] CLY 1546.
4 Barker v Wilson [1980] 1 WLR 884, [1980] 2 All ER 81, [1980] 2 WLUK 2, (1980) 70 Cr App R 
283 (DC), [1980] Crim LR 373, (1980) 124 SJ 326, [1980] CLY 469, in respect of the Bankers’ Books 
Evidence Act 1879.
5 Castle v Cross [1984] 1 WLR 1372 (DC), [1985] 1 All ER 87, [1984] 7 WLUK 180, [1985] RTR 62, 
[1984] Crim LR 682, (1984) 81 LSG 2596, (1984) 128 SJ 855, [1985] CLY 3048.
6 Kajala v Noble [1982] 3 WLUK 133, (1982) 75 Cr App R 149, [1982] Crim LR 433 (DC), [1982] 
CLY 605; R v Grimer [1982] 6 WLUK 204, [1982] Crim LR 674, 126 SJ 641 (CA), [1982] CLY 606; R v 
Thomas (Steven) [1986] 7 WLUK 85, [1986] Crim LR 682, [1986] CLY 594 regarding video recording of 
the route taken made in lieu of maps and still photographs; XXX v YYY and ZZZ [2004] EWCA Civ 231, 
[2004] 2 WLUK 196, [2004] IRLR 471 regarding video recording of a nanny in a home which was also 
a place of work; R v Nikolovski (1996) 111 CCC (3d), [1996] 3 SCR 1197 403.
7 R v Wood (Stanley William) [1982] 6 WLUK 191, (1983) 76 Cr App R 23, [1982] Crim LR 667 (CA), 
[1983] CLY 636 considering the results of an automated analysis; R v Sinha (Arun Kumar) [1994] 7 
WLUK 34, [1998] Masons CLR 35, [1995] Crim LR 68 (CA), Times, 13 July 1994, Independent, 1 August 
1994, [1994] CLY 1137 concerning the alteration of medical data recorded on a computer.
8 Re Estate of Wai Fun Chan, Deceased [2015] NSWSC 1107.
2.68 Evidence is admitted into legal proceedings if it is relevant to an issue in dispute, 
subject to a number of exceptions.1 It is a matter of law for a judge to determine 
whether evidence is admissible. Generally, judges are required to determine whether 
evidence is to be excluded in criminal trials far more frequently than in civil matters, 
especially where admitting the evidence might not be in the interests of justice.2 For 
instance, in R v Fowden and White3 the Court of Appeal held that a video film showing 
activities that were consistent with the acts of theft had been improperly admitted.4 
The prejudicial value outweighed its probative effect, because the witnesses who 
identified the accused knew them from a similar case of theft that occurred a week 
after the events recorded in the video film, and the defence was therefore not able to 
test the accuracy of the identification without causing prejudice and embarrassment.5
1 For a more detailed discussion, see Malek, Phipson on Evidence, ch 2 and 7– 01 to 7– 16.
2 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 78; Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 114(1)(d).
3 [1982] 2 WLUK 48, [1982] Crim LR 588, [1982] CLY 607.
4 For the US, see Nicole Chauriye, ‘Wearable devices as admissible evidence: technology is killing 
our opportunity to lie’, (2016) 24(2) Cath UJL & Tech 495; Katherine E. Vinez, ‘The admissibility of data 
collected from wearable devices’, (2017) 4 Stetson J Advocacy & L 1.
5 In R v Caldwell, R v Dixon [1993] 5 WLUK 237, (1994) 99 Cr App R 73, [1993] Crim LR 862, [1995] 
CLY 933 the members of the court considered it would be useful to have a set of procedures in relation 
to the use of video recordings for the purposes of identification.
2.69 In civil proceedings, evidence that is admissible can be excluded in accordance 
with the provisions of CPR 32.1(2), which provides a judge with the explicit general 
power to exclude evidence when in the role of managing a case:
32.1 (1) The court may control the evidence by giving directions as to – 
(a) the issues on which it requires evidence;
(b) the nature of the evidence which it requires to decide those issues; and
(c) the way in which the evidence is to be placed before the court.
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2.70 However, in adopting the argument of the appellants in Great Future 
International Ltd v Sealand Housing Corporation, Arden LJ pointed out, at [24], that 
the power ‘must be used with great circumspection for the purpose of achieving the 
overriding objective’.1 The modern tendency is to admit evidence, and then consider its 
weight, as illustrated by the comment of Cockburn CJ in The Queen v Churchwardens, 
Overseers and Guardians of the Poor of the Parish of Birmingham: ‘People were formerly 
frightened out of their wits about admitting evidence lest juries should go wrong. In 
modern times we admit the evidence and discuss its weight.’2
1 [2002] EWCA Civ 1183, [2002] 7 WLUK 689, [2003] CP Rep 3, [2003] CLY 276.
2 (1861) 1 B & S 763, 767; 121 ER 897.
Weight
2.71 The questions of weight, credibility and sufficiency of the evidence are decisions 
for the members of a jury, and for the judge where a case is tried without a jury. There 
are no fixed rules to determine what weight to give to any item of evidence. In R v 
Madhub Chunder Giri Mohunt, Birch J observed: ‘For weighing evidence and drawing 
inferences from it, there can be no canon. Each case represents its own peculiarities 
and in each common sense and shrewdness must be brought to bear upon the facts 
elicited’,1 and Lord Blackburn commented in Lord Advocate v Blantyre that ‘[t]he 
weight of evidence depends on rules of common sense’.2
1 (1874) 21 WRCr (India) 13 at19.
2 (1879) 4 App Cas 770 at 792.
2.72 When conducting a trial with members of a jury, the judge may withdraw an 
issue because the proponent has failed to adduce sufficient evidence in support of the 
claim. Furthermore, in summing up to the members of the jury at the end of the trial, the 
judge is required to provide directions on a range of issues, including, but not limited 
to: who has the burden of proof; what presumptions, if any, apply; when supporting 
evidence should be considered before putting weight on certain types of evidence; and 
to offer comments on matters including the weight of the evidence, although it must 
be made explicit that such comments are meant only to help the members of the jury 
in reaching their own decision.1 In addition, there are a number of factors set out in 
s 114(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that deal with the assessment of the weight 
of hearsay in criminal proceedings.
1 Crown Court Compendium, https:// www.judiciary.uk/ publications/ crown- court- compendium- 
published/ .
Video and audio evidence
Testimonial use in legal proceedings
2.73 In exceptional instances, video- recorded and tape- recorded evidence may be 
used in lieu of testimonial evidence. In civil proceedings, evidence may be given by 
means of a video link or any other means, subject to leave being obtained from the 
court.1 In criminal matters, it is possible to record the initial interview with children2 
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the court decides is necessary.3 Leave is required to adduce a video recording of the 
testimony of a witness in accordance with the provisions of s 27 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.4
1 Civil Procedure Rule 32.3, which is supplemented by Practice Direction 32 – Evidence Annex 3.
2 Section 35A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 was added by s 54 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991.
3 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 35A(2).
4 For further details, see the most up- to- date editions of the following practitioner texts: Archbold: 
Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell); Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (Oxford 
University Press); Archbold: Magistrates’ Courts Criminal Practice (Sweet & Maxwell).
2.74 Video- conferencing and web- conferencing technology have also made it 
possible to provide testimonial evidence from outside the court.
Identification and recognition evidence
2.75 Surveillance cameras are very much part of life in the twenty- first century, 
ever since the foundations of their use were laid in the latter decades of the twentieth 
century. Evidence of images from security cameras can be very helpful in identifying 
the perpetrators of crimes. Such evidence has been admitted in English courts, mainly 
in criminal cases.1 The widespread availability of video- recorded and tape- recorded 
evidence has opened up the possibility that such evidence may be augmented with 
more advanced techniques, and the enhancement of the sounds or images, together 
with the use of techniques such as aural identification and facial mapping, can help to 
identify the parties in a recording.
1 A list that is not exhaustive includes: McShane (Yolande Tregenna) [1977] 7 WLUK 2, (1978) 66 
Cr App R 97, [1977] Crim LR 737, (1977) 121 SJ 632, [1978] CLY 636; R v Fowden and White [1982] 
2 WLUK 48, [1982] Crim LR 588 (CA), [1982] CLY 607; R v Grimer [1982] 6 WLUK 204, [1982] Crim 
LR 674, (1982) 126 SJ 641 (CA), [1982] CLY 606; R v Dodson (Patrick); R v Williams (Danny Fitzalbert 
Williams) [1984] 1 WLR 971, [1984] 4 WLUK 121, (1984) 79 Cr App R 220, [1984] Crim LR 489, (1984) 
81 LSG 1677, (1984) 128 SJ 364, [1984] CLY 605; Stockwell (Christopher James) [1993] 3 WLUK 119, 
(1993) 97 Cr App R 260, Times, 11 March 1993, [1994] CLY 914; R v Clarke (Robert Lee) [1994] 12 
WLUK 118, [1995] 2 Cr App R 425, Times, 26 December 1994, Independent, 30 January 1995, [1996] 
CLY 1373 also known as R v Clarke (Bobby Lee); Clare (Richard), Peach (Nicholas William) [1995] 4 
WLUK 107, [1995] 2 Cr App R 333, (1995) 159 JP 412, [1995] Crim LR 947, (1995) 159 JPN 424, 
(1995) 92(17) LSG 47, (1995) 139 SJLB 117, Times, 7 April 1995, Independent, 7 April 1995, [1996] 
CLY 1378; R v Feltis (Jeremy) [1996] EWCA Crim 776, [1966] 8 WLUK 104; R v Hookway [1999] Crim LR 
750, also known as R v H (Stephen James) (A Juvenile) [1999] Crim LR 750 (CA (Crim Div)); R v Breddick 
(Christopher), also known as R v Briddick (Christopher) [2001] EWCA Crim 984, [2001] 3 WLUK 790, 
Independent, 21 May 2001; R v Loveridge (William), R v Lee (Charles Sonny), R v Loveridge (Christine) 
[2001] EWCA Crim 973, [2001] 4 WLUK 290, [2001] 2 Cr App R 29, (2001) 98(23) SJLB 120, Times, 
3 May 2002, [2001] CLY 983 – in this instance the accused were recorded by video in the court, an act 
prohibited by s 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, and the recording was also held to have infringed 
the rights of the accused under article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, neither infringement 
was held to have interfered with the right to a fair trial: Elliott Goldstein, ‘Photographic and videotape 
evidence in the criminal courts of England and Canada’ [1987] Crim LR 384; Michael C. Bromby, ‘At 
face value?’ [2003] 153(7069) NLJ Expert Witness Supplement 302; Rob R. Jerrard, ‘Police video of 
defendants in magistrates’ court for comparison with security video recording’ (2002) 75(3) Pol J 263.
2.76 Before such evidence is used, there should be a careful examination1 of the 
technology in question. A good example of this judicial scrutiny was that done by Steyn LJ 
in R v Clarke (Robert Lee),2 where His Lordship analysed the technique of facial mapping3 
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scientific techniques, noting that the techniques themselves could be fit for debate, and 
their improper use by an expert in the particular case could in turn affect the probative 
value of such evidence. It was only after the court was satisfied on these two grounds 
that the identification evidence from the application of the technique was admitted.
1 The careful examination may be done in a trial within a trial, also called a ‘voir dire’.
2  [1994] 12 WLUK 118, [1995] 2 Cr App R 425, Times, 26 December 1994, Independent, 30 January 
1995, [1996] CLY 1373, also known as R v Clarke (Bobby Lee).
3 [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 at 430F; Bromby, ‘At face value?’, 302– 304; R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658.
2.77 Issues regarding the reliability and application of these techniques are very 
much for expert evidence, depending on the nature and sophistication of each 
technique. But some guidance may be sought that stems from the best practices for 
handling electronic evidence. For instance, for evidential techniques that involve 
manipulating and enhancing digital imagery, Gregory Joseph has noted that the 
following steps must be taken before enhanced digital imagery can usefully be used:1
1. The original image needs to be properly authenticated.
2. The original image must remain intact to enable the original to be compared 
with the enhanced version.
3. The original image should be preserved in such a way that its integrity cannot 
be impugned.
4. The process of enhancement should be fully documented.
5. The process of enhancement should be carried out in such a way that the 
process can be repeated by the other party.
6. The enhanced images should be preserved in such a way that prevents them 
from being manipulated, thereby preserving their integrity.
1 Gregory P. Joseph, ‘Modern visual evidence’ (2009) 8(4) L J Seminars Press 4.
2.78 Important lessons were also spelt out regarding the use of voice recognition 
technologies and techniques for identification purposes in R v Flynn and St John.1 In this 
case, the prosecution sought to identify the two appellants as conspirators of a robbery 
through voice recognition techniques. Before the robbery, the police secretly fitted a 
listening and transmitting device to one of the vehicles it was assumed (correctly) that the 
conspirators would use for the robbery. Four police officers testified that they recognized 
the appellants’ voices from the 60 minutes of covert recording made by the device. The 
trial judge ruled admissible the evidence of the police officers and the transcripts of the 
recording, and placed the evidence before the jury. The appellants challenged the decision 
of the trial judge to admit the voice recognition evidence of the officers and the judge’s 
failure to give an appropriate direction to this evidence.
1 [2008] EWCA Crim 970, [2008] 5 WLUK 53, [2008] 2 Cr App R 20, [2008] Crim LR 799, [2008] CLY 
701; Damian Warburton and Thomas Lewis, ‘Opinion evidence; admissibility of ad hoc expert voice 
recognition evidence: R v Flynn’ (2009) 13(1) E & P 50 ; Ken Shaw, ‘The quasi- expert witness: fish 
or fowl?’, (2009) 73(2) Journal of Criminal Law 146; Jeremy Robson, ‘A fair hearing? The use of voice 
identification parades in criminal investigations in England and Wales’ [2017] Crim LR 36.
2.79 In giving judgment on appeal, Gage LJ noted that there are two categories of 
voice recognition evidence: expert evidence using either auditory analysis or acoustic/ 
spectrographic analysis, or lay listener evidence, where the lay listener as a witness 
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recognize the suspect’s voice. Such witnesses may be close relatives or friends, but 
they may also be persons who acquire such familiarity by the frequency of their 
contact with the suspect. Gage LJ also noted that suspect identification by voice 
recognition is more difficult than visual identification, that voice identification by 
experts using sophisticated auditory, acoustic and spectrographic techniques are 
likely to be more reliable than identification by a lay listener, and that the quality of 
identification by a lay listener is highly variable. In addition, research has shown that 
a confident recognition by a lay listener of a familiar voice may nevertheless be wrong, 
because while an expert is able to draw up an overall profile of the individual’s speech 
patterns, in combination with instrumental analysis and reference research, a lay 
listener’s response is fundamentally opaque because he cannot know and has no way 
of explaining which aspects of the speaker’s speech patterns he is responding to, and 
has no way of assessing the significance of the individually observed features relative 
to the overall speech profile. This makes it more difficult to challenge the accuracy of 
his evidence.
2.80 For all these reasons, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 
police officers as lay listeners had a limited opportunity to acquire familiarity with the 
appellants’ voices, and that the quality of the covert recording was poor. In contrast, 
both experts, one representing the prosecution and the other representing the 
appellants, were unable to identify the voices as being those of the appellants, further 
casting doubt on the officers’ voice recognition evidence.
2.81 While R v Flynn and St John did not close the door on voice recognition evidence, 
Gary Edmond, Kristy Martire and Mehera San Roquem suggest the following minimal 
safeguards be required before the prosecution can seek to admit voice recognition 
evidence from lay listeners:1
1. The process must be properly recorded, and the amount of time spent in 
contact with the defendant will be very relevant to the issue of familiarity.
2. The date and time spent by the police officer compiling a transcript of a covert 
recording must be recorded. If the police officer annotates the transcript with his 
views as to which person is speaking, that must be noted.
3. A police officer attempting the voice recognition exercise must do so without 
the aid of a transcript that bears another officer’s annotations of whom he or she 
believes is speaking.
4. It is highly desirable that a voice recognition exercise should be carried out by 
someone other than an officer investigating the offence.
1 For a critical analysis of this topic and the discussion of further case law, see: David Ormerod, 
‘Sounding out expert voice identification’ [2002] Crim LR 771; Gary Edmond, Kristy Martire and 
Mehera San Roque, ‘Unsound law: issues with (“expert”) voice comparison evidence’ (2011) 35(1) 
Melbourne U L Rev 52; Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, ‘Distinguishing between forensic science and 
forensic pseudoscience: testing of validity and reliability, and approaches to forensic voice comparison’ 
(2014) 54(3) Science & Justice 245; Gary Edmond, ‘Legal versus non- legal approaches to forensic 
science evidence’ (2016) 20(1) E & P 3; Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, ‘Admissibility of forensic voice 
comparison testimony in England and Wales’ [2018] Crim LR 20.
2.82 These safeguards are certainly in line with the issues raised by Gage LJ in R v 
Flynn and St John, and highlight the care with which both the parties and the courts 
must proceed when seeking to admit computer- generated and computer- augmented 
evidence, in order to safeguard the evidential process.
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Computer- generated animations and simulations
2.83 Digital visual evidence presentation systems (including digital displays, 
computer- generated graphical presentations, animated graphics and immersive virtual 
environment technology) have been used in legal proceedings in many jurisdictions. 
Such tools can be used to present evidence and illustrate hypotheses based on scientific 
data, or to depict the perception of a witness, or to illustrate what may have occurred 
(as seen from a specific viewpoint) during a particular incident. Digital reconstruction 
technology may also be applied in a court to explore and illustrate ‘what if ’ scenarios 
and questions, to test competing hypotheses and to expose any possible inconsistencies 
and discrepancies within the evidence.
2.84 Computer animations and interactive virtual simulations are potentially 
unparalleled in their capabilities for presenting complex evidence.1 The use of 
such enabling visualization technologies can affect the manner in which evidence 
is assimilated and correlated by the viewer. In many instances, visual media can 
potentially help make the evidence more relevant and easier to understand.2 In other 
cases it may be seen to be unfairly prejudicing the members of a jury.
1 Gregory P. Joseph, Modern Visual Evidence (L J Seminars Press 2009); Neal Feigenson and 
Christina Spiesel, Law on Display: The Digital Transformation of Legal Persuasion and Judgment (New 
York University Press 2009); David M. Paciocco seems to fail to have understood this serious issue 
when commenting that the introduction of computer- enhanced photographs did not require any 
special evidential foundations or relevant expert evidence: ‘Proof and progress: coping with the law of 
evidence in a technological age’, (2013) 11(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 181, 186– 187.
2 A. M. Burton, D. Schofield and L. M. Goodwin, ‘Gates of global perception: forensic graphics for 
evidence presentation’ in ACM Multimedia 2005: Proceedings of the 13th Annual ACM International 
Conference on Multimedia (Association for Computing Machinery 2005), 103 and Jeffrey Mervis, ‘Court 
views engineers as scientists’ (1999) 284(5411) Science 21.
2.85 At first glance, these computer- generated graphical reconstructions may be seen 
as potentially useful in any court, and they are often treated like any other form of digital 
evidence regarding their admissibility. In particular, they are admitted as part of expert 
testimonial evidence or as a special type of real evidence.1 However, this specific form 
of digital media warrants special care and attention due to its inherently persuasive 
nature, and the undue reliance that the viewer may place on evidence presented through 
a (potentially photorealistic) visualization medium such as this, often to the exclusion 
of the underlying evidence and the assumptions made in generating these graphical 
representations. This is often referred to as the ‘seeing is believing’ tendency.2
1 For example, see R v Clarke (Robert Lee) [1994] 12 WLUK 118, [1995] 2 Cr App R 425, Times, 26 
December 1994, Independent, 30 January 1995, [1996] CLY 1373, also known as R v Clarke (Bobby Lee).
2 Fred Galves, ‘Where the not so wild things are: computers in the courtroom, the federal rules of 
evidence, and the need for institutional reform and more judicial acceptance’ (2000) 13(2) Harv J L 
& Tech 161; Christine O. Spiesel, Richard K. Sherwin and Neal Feigenson, ‘Law in the age of images: 
The challenges of visual literacy’ in Anne Wagner, Tracey Summerfield and Farid S. B. Vanegas (eds) 
Contemporary Issues of the Semiotics of Law (Oñati International Series in Law and Society 2005); 
Richard Sherwin, ‘Visual literacy in action: law in the age of images’ in James Elkins (ed) Visual Literacy 
in Action (Routledge 2007), 179; Damian Schofield, ‘The use of computer generated imagery in legal 
proceedings’ (2016) 9 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 1.
2.86 As courts begin increasingly to use multimedia and cinematic displays, this has 
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the application of such technology. It must be questioned whether the decisions made 
in courts using such technologies are adversely affected by the manner in which the 
evidence is presented.1
1 Jonathan Chambers, ‘Shipping law – collision – responsibility for collision – expert evidence – 
admissibility of expert evidence on seamanship – nautical assessors – plotting – simulations’ (1999) 
6(1) Int M L 281; Moya Clifford and Katie Kinloch, ‘The use of computer simulation evidence in 
court’, (2008) 24(2) Computer Law and Security Report 169; Joanna Gallant and Lauren Shepherd, 
‘Effective visual communication: scientific principles and research findings’, in Samuel H. Solomon, 
Joanna Gallant and John P. Esser (eds) The Science of Courtroom Litigation: Jury Research and Analytical 
Principals (ALM Publishing 2009); Ken Fowle and Damian Schofield, ‘Visualising forensic data: 
investigation to court’ in Dr Andrew Woodward and Professor Craig Valli (eds) Proceedings of the 9th 
Australian Digital Forensics Conference (Security Research Centre 2011); Peer Watterson, ‘Appeal court 
reluctance: complex evidence, obviousness and related matters’, (2012) 7(5) JIPLP 358; David- John 
Gibbs, Stephen Emmitt, Kirti Ruikar and Wayne Lord, ‘Recommendations on the creation of computer 
generated exhibits for construction delay claims’ (2014) 30(4) Const LJ 236.
Computer- generated evidence in England and Wales:  
civil proceedings
2.87 An early occurrence of the use of computer- generated evidence is seen 
in the civil case of The Owners of the Ship Pelopidas v The Owners of the Ship TRSL 
Concord.1 In 1996 a collision took place in the Access Channel to Buenos Aires between 
two vessels: the Pelopidas and TRSL Concord. The issue for the court to decide was 
the liability for the collision and the apportionment of that liability. The items of 
computer- generated evidence submitted were two- dimensional computer- generated 
simulations of the trajectories of both vessels; these were, in effect, animated maps. 
A ‘black box’ on the Concord recorded various positioning, speed and heading data 
at 15- second intervals for the relevant collision time period. Both sides accepted the 
accuracy of the plot. David Steel J concluded that a fair apportionment of liability was 
60:40 in favour of the Pelopidas, and stated:
there is a danger of losing sight of the true value of reconstructions. Of course 
they enable the Court and the parties to have a broad bird’s eye view of the events 
leading up to collision. But their true probative value is that they may sometimes 
enable the Court to determine, not what may have happened, but what could not 
possibly have happened.2
1 [1999] 2 All ER 737 (Comm), [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 675, [1999] 10 WLUK 259, [2000] CLY 4677.
2 [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 675 at 682.
2.88 In stating the above, David Steel J was remarking on his accumulated experience 
of the usefulness of computer- generated reconstruction evidence.1 Computer simulations 
are now more frequently used in civil proceedings.2
1 Charles Macdonald QC, ‘Case note Owners of the Ship Devotion v Owners of the Ship Golden 
Polydinamos’ (1995) 4 Int ML 77, where the members of the Court of Appeal endorsed the comments 
of the trial judge respecting the use of computer simulations as evidence of a collision.
2 This list is not exhaustive: in criminal proceedings, R. v Maloney (Gerald) [2003] EWCA Crim 1373, 
[2003] 5 WLUK 565; Mitrasinovic v Stroud [2020] EWHC 914 (QB), [2020] 4 WLUK 156; others include: 
Halliburton Energy Services Inc v Smith International (North Sea) Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1715, [2006] 
12 WLUK 379, (2007) 30(2) IPD 30009; Maersk Oil UK Ltd v Dresser- Rand (UK) Ltd [2007] EWHC 752 
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Computer- generated evidence in England and Wales:  
criminal proceedings
2.89 The Court of Appeal has indicated that it favours the use of digital images in 
criminal proceedings, as indicated in R v Smith (Peter Kenneth)1 by Thomas LJ, at [61]:2
The presentation of the evidence to the jury made no attempt to use modern 
methods of presentation. The presentation to this court was similar; a large amount 
of time was wasted because of this. It was incomprehensible to us why digital images 
were not provided to the jury; the refusal of NAFIS [National Automated Finger 
Print Identification System] to permit a digital image to be supplied to the court was 
a further example of the lack of a contemporary approach to the presentation of 
evidence. The presentation to the jury must be done in such a way that enables the 
jury to determine the disputed issues.
1 [2011] EWCA Crim 1296, [2011] 5 WLUK 644, [2011] C App R 16, [2011] CLY 602.
2 See also Rosemary Pattenden, ‘Fingerprint evidence – United Kingdom’, (2011) 15(4) E & P 371; 
for New Zealand, see R v Garrett [2001] DCR 955 and R v Little [2007] NZCA 491.
2.90 Because of the critical nature of criminal trials, it is crucial that any computer- 
generated evidence that is put forward be thoroughly examined.1 The use of a jury in 
criminal cases is another important reason for assessing the relevance, accuracy and 
possible prejudicial effect of computer- generated evidence carefully. For this reason, it 
is important for defence counsel to be aware of the issues that can arise and be suitably 
prepared to test the evidence. In R. v Gardner (Trevor Elton),2 a person was killed 
during a fire in a block of flats. One of the experts who gave identification evidence for 
the prosecution used a new technique that deployed computer software to provide an 
analysis of video surveillance footage, as described by Waller LJ at [34]:3
[The expert] had developed a different technique. He had developed equipment 
to enable the images on a video surveillance film to be presented so as to extract 
as much information from it as possible. This included enhancing the film by 
computer to allow frame by frame examination, the ability to zoom in on part of 
the frame to alter the contrast and brightness to bring out detail and to run the 
film backwards and forwards. The second purpose of the equipment is to assist in 
making comparisons between one frame and another. To help in that [the expert] 
has developed three techniques. He called the first of them ‘image addition’. By 
means of his computer he takes an image from one sequence of movements and 
selects from another sequence an image of a person who displays approximately 
the same stance and is about the same distance from the camera as the first. The 
second image is superimposed on the first so the viewer can observe whether 
the two images are like one another and whether there are any differences. The 
difference, depending on what it is, may show that the images are of different 
people. The second technique is referred to as ‘image subtraction’. [The expert] 
takes the two images selected because of their comparable poses and distances 
from the camera and turns the first computerised image into a negative and 
superimposes the second on it in a positive form. The result is that the features 
which are common to both images disappear and only what is different remains. 
[The expert’s] third technique is a ‘blink comparison’ whereby he can switch from 
one image to another. When there are differences between the two they generate 
an illusion of movement so that the eye is able to pick up the differences. That 
technique also enables the viewer to see that when one image is removed an 
element which had appeared to belong to the picture which has been removed in 
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1 For an examination of the issues and case law, see Tony Ward, ‘Surveillance cameras, identification 
and expert evidence’ (2012) 9 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 42; Gareth Norris, 
‘The influence of computer generated animations on juror decision making’, (2014) 11 Digital Evidence 
and Signature Law Review 46.
2 [2004] EWCA Crim 1639, [2004] 6 WLUK 615; Andy Roberts, ‘Expert evidence: facial mapping; 
image analysis’ (2004) 68(5) Journal of Criminal Law 372; Ruth Costigan, ‘Identification from CCTV: 
the risk of injustice’ [2007] Crim LR 591.
3 The admissibility of such evidence was approved in R v Breddick (Christopher), also known as R v 
Briddick (Christopher) [2001] EWCA Crim 984, [2001] 3 WLUK 790, Independent, 21 May 2001.
2.91 Even though the defence did not have any material in relation to which they 
could cross- examine the expert witness and enable the jury to judge the accuracy of the 
expert’s analysis and assessment that the person identified in the surveillance footage 
was the defendant, the court guardedly accepted the admissibility of this evidence. In 
doing so, Waller LJ also sounded a note of caution regarding new techniques relating to 
identification. The judge quoted, at [45], the following statement of Lord Hope in Hopes 
and Lavery v HM Advocate:
If admitting evidence of this kind seems unfamiliar and an extension of 
established evidential practice, the answer must be that, as technology develops, 
evidential practice will need to be evolved to accommodate it. Whilst the courts 
must be vigilant to ensure that no unfairness results, they should not block steps 
which enable the jury to gain full assistance from the technology.
2.92 But even if juries are to be enabled to benefit from the full spectrum of 
technological evidence, they are particularly vulnerable, often more so than judges 
and coroners, to any prejudicial effect and inaccuracy of scientific animations. Perhaps 
this is because juries do not have the same level of cynicism that years of experience 
of analysing evidence has given judges and, to a lesser degree, coroners. In the case of 
R v Ore,1 Tucker J stated the defence’s apprehension regarding the admissibility of a 
computer- generated animation:
The concern which is expressed by [the defence] … is as to the impact which this 
evidence will have upon the jury and I understand that concern. [The defence] 
fears that the weight which the jury may place upon the graphic animation will 
be disproportionate to its value in the case. [The defence] fears that they may 
be distracted from concentrating as they ought to do upon the evidence to be 
given by the expert witnesses on either side and is concerned, naturally, that the 
graphic animation reproduces simply one particular side of the coin.
1 (1998, Birmingham Crown Court, unreported). Stephen Mason tried to obtain a copy of the 
transcript of the case for the first edition of this text, but the tapes were destroyed in accordance with 
the relevant retention and disposal policy (correspondence with Michael Ives of Marten Walsh Cherer 
Limited). Stephen Mason subsequently corresponded with Sir Richard Tucker, who indicated that he 
no longer had the notes of this trial, but kindly confirmed the remarks that are attributed to him as 
quoted in this text.
2.93 The concerns stated above are highly relevant and illustrate real fears about 
any computer- generated evidence. This is especially true for forensic reconstructions. 
Hence, any computer- generated reconstructions should be made as precisely and in 
as unbiased a way as possible, and their use has to be shown to be necessary.1 Their 
probative value should outweigh any potential prejudicial effect.
1 In R. v Maloney (Gerald) [2003] EWCA Crim 1373, [2003] 5 WLUK 565, a reconstruction was 
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technology that was not available at the time of trial. The members of the Court of Appeal decided, 
in the light of the opinion of the expert who undertook the simulation not being conclusive, that the 
evidence would have no effect upon the safety of the conviction, and the court did not receive it and 
dismissed the appeal. It is not clear whether Mr Adrian Redgrave, QC, who appeared for the Crown at 
trial and on the reference to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), explored the technical integrity or 
the assumptions upon which the program was prepared.
2.94 These lessons may be illustrated by the case of R v Ore, which introduced one 
of the first forensic computer- generated animations to an English criminal trial. The 
Crash Investigation and Training Unit of the West Midlands Police Service produced 
the animation. The case involved a collision between two vehicles at a junction; one 
of the drivers was killed as he pulled out in front of an oncoming vehicle. The views of 
both drivers were partially obscured by large hedges and walls around the junction.1 
Tucker J, who presided over this case, further stated in his ruling on 25 November 
1998:2
I am told that this is the first time in which it has been suggested that a jury in a 
trial such as this should be shown a computer aided animation which pictorially 
represents a reconstruction of a road traffic accident. It may be that in years 
to come such displays will be commonplace and that lawyers will marvel that 
anyone should ever have questioned their admissibility.
… I am satisfied that it would be right to admit this evidence and, indeed, wrong to 
refuse so to do, provided, as I shall try to do, that I give the jury proper directions 
as to their approach to this evidence and provided I ensure, so far as I can, that 
they do not place disproportionate weight upon it. Accordingly, I rule that the 
evidence is admissible.
1 M. Doyle, ‘Working model: helping the police with their enquiries’ (1997) CAD User 62 (no longer 
available online).
2 R v Ore (1998, Birmingham Crown Court, unreported).
2.95 A well- known example from Northern Ireland is the computer- generated 
evidence that was extensively used during the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.1 In 1972, 13 
people were killed during a peaceful demonstration. The original inquiry produced a 
report within 11 weeks of the incident, and acquitted the soldiers involved. In 1998, 
a Tribunal of Inquiry was established to reassess the events.2 Lord Saville, the chair 
of the tribunal, took full advantage of ensuing improvements in technology, and used 
a computer software system designed especially for use in the Inquiry to amplify the 
testimony of witnesses. The Northern Ireland Centre for Learning and Resources 
produced the computer- generated virtual models, which reconstructed a large area 
of Londonderry that had been extensively altered since 1972. The user was able to 
compare the same scene as it appeared at the time of the Inquiry and as it was in 1972. 
There were 80 locations stored in the system that could be explored, with specific points 
of view being recalled when switching between the representations. The system could 
also store oral evidence about location and movement, and export scenes to a mark- up 
system so that witnesses could draw on top of images. The computer software system 
that was admitted was deemed to be unbiased and accurate.
1 See The Bloody Sunday Inquiry http:// www.bloody- sunday- inquiry.org.uk/ .
2 Statement by Tony Blair, Prime Minister: HC Deb 29 January 1998, vol 305, col 501.
2.96 The Bloody Sunday Inquiry computer system was not interactive in three- 
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simulated environment with which users can interact using a computer monitor or 
specialized hardware. The computer system used for the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was 
interactive in the sense that viewers were able to view images of different scenes at 
varied times. However, the viewer was not able to move around a full three- dimensional 
virtual environment of Londonderry itself, since such a three- dimensional virtual 
model of the area did not exist. But since then, courts in England and Wales have begun 
to introduce interactive three- dimensional VR crime scene environments for a number 
of high- profile criminal cases.1 There is little doubt that, with the increasing complexity 
of criminal investigations, we will see more use of virtual environments and immersive 
virtual environments in legal proceedings.
1 Damian Schofield, ‘Playing with evidence: using video games in the courtroom’ (2011) 2(1) J of 
Entertainment Computing (Special Issue: Video Games as Research Instruments) 47.
2.97 Virtual environments possess the potential to sway juries and decision 
makers, even more so than computer animations in general. Creating an environment 
that allows viewers to take different perspectives and manipulate objects in that 
environment do indeed allow for ‘what if ’ scenarios to be played out, and could lead 
to more robust decisions. But the reconstructions of scenes in these environments 
are based on various assumptions and premises, not all of which can be elucidated or 
are transparent, or easily accessible for review by opposing experts and by decision 
makers. Analyses of computer- generated displays show that they can be extremely 
advantageous in the court, provided they are used appropriately. The consequences 
of a failure to investigate these issues cannot be underestimated, since errors, 
inaccuracies, misuse, tampering or biases within visualizations are capable of leading 
to miscarriages of justice.1
1 Marcel Worring and Rita Cucchiara, ‘Multimedia in forensics’ in Proceedings of the 17th ACM 








Daniel Seng and Stephen Mason
3.1 The much- maligned evidential rule of hearsay exclusion has been subject 
to some interesting challenges in many common law jurisdictions since 2005. An 
anathema to lawyers of the civil or administrative law system and seemingly largely 
misunderstood in its complexity by many common law lawyers, the hearsay rule has 
been supplemented in some respects and undermined in others by various legislative 
reforms in both civil and criminal proceedings. This chapter does not seek to provide 
a comprehensive exposé of the hearsay rule. However, in drawing the rule back to its 
historical foundation we will, in part, consider its relevance in the context of electronic 
evidence and attempt to demonstrate the application of hearsay to evidence in 
electronic form.
The rule of hearsay exclusion and its rationale
3.2 We begin with a traditional definition of the hearsay rule. Sir Rupert Cross 
defined the hearsay rule of evidence in these terms: ‘[A] statement other than one 
made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as 
evidence of any fact stated’.1 In offering this definition, Sir Rupert Cross intentionally 
conflates in one definition the rule against self- corroboration with the rule against 
hearsay in the narrow sense,2 to both encompass and contrast the situations where 
the witness who made the statement is either available to testify (the rule against self- 
corroboration) or unable to testify (the rule against hearsay in the narrow sense). If a 
witness’s earlier statement is sought to be admitted of the facts therein, it is at common 
law inadmissible except as an informal admission provided against that witness or as 
part of the res gestae rule.3 And where it is so admitted, it is not as evidence of the truth 
of the assertions contained in them.4 If the witness’s earlier statement is in the form 
of electronic evidence, this does not change the application of this rule, and does not 
engage the rule against hearsay.
1 Sir Rupert Cross, Evidence (5th edn, Butterworths 1979) 6, emphasis added. In his first edition, 
Phipson stated his definition of hearsay as ‘Oral or written statements made by persons not called 
as witnesses are not receivable to prove the truth of the matters stated’: Sidney L. Phipson, The Law 
of Evidence (Stevens and Hayes 1892) 117. See also the definition suggested by Charles Cato, who 
preferred to see hearsay limited to ‘unsworn utterances containing narrative assertion, where it is a 
suggestion for reform’; ‘Verbal acts, res gestae and hearsay: a suggestion for reform’ (1993) 5(1) Bond 
LR 72, 73.
2 Roderick Munday, Cross & Tapper on Evidence (13th edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 563 
(hereinafter Cross & Tapper).
3 Cross & Tapper, 563.
4 Cross & Tapper, 587.
3.3 Turning to the rule against hearsay, the most widely accepted judicial formulation 
of the rule is as follows:
Daniel Seng and Stephen Mason, ‘Hearsay’, in Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng (eds.), Electronic 
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Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as 
a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object 
of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is 
not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by evidence, not the 
truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.1
1 Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 at 969, [1956] 7 WLUK 26, (1956) 100 SJ 566, 
[1956] CLY 7051.
3.4 The hearsay rule is prompted when the testimony of a witness as to what a 
declarant said is admitted in evidence to establish its truth, but not otherwise. Hearsay 
evidence is thus subject to at least four clear vulnerabilities: belief by the declarant that X 
exists (the risk of impaired perception), justification for the declarant’s statement that ‘X 
exists’ (bad memory, ambiguity and insincerity), confirmation that the witness correctly 
heard the declarant as having said ‘X exists’ (impaired perception) and justification for the 
witness in repeating that statement (the duplicated risks of bad memory, ambiguity and 
insincerity).1 Hearsay therefore increases these risks because it has to contend not only 
with the testimony of the witness, but also with the testimony of the declarant. This is 
because the usual safeguards that apply in relation to ordinary testimony must also apply 
to second- hand evidence,2 since there is no link between the testimony of the witness and 
the declarant’s proposition that ‘X exists’ that is sought to be supported.
1 Cross & Tapper, 564. See also John H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo- American System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law (3rd edn, Little Brown 1940) para 478; Edmund M. Morgan, ‘Hearsay 
dangers and the application of the hearsay concept’ (1948) 62(2) Harv L Rev 177; Laurence H. Tribe, 
‘Triangulating hearsay’ (1974) 87(5) Harv L Rev 957; and Michael H. Graham, ‘Stickperson hearsay: a 
simplified approach to understanding the rule against hearsay’ (1982) 4 U Ill L Rev 887; Edward W. 
Cleary (ed), McCormick on Evidence (West Publishing Co 1984) para 245.
2 That is, evidence that is more than one remove from the first statement, or ‘irrespective of the 
number of intermediate communications between the original source and the testifying witness’: Colin 
Tapper, Cross & Tapper on Evidence (12th edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 552 fn 9; the authors of 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law (Report No 102, 2006) refer throughout to 
‘second- hand’ hearsay evidence.
3.5 Thus, some academics have advanced the argument that ‘[t] he basic rationale 
of the hearsay rule rests on the right of cross- examination’.1 ‘The central reason for 
the presumptive exclusion of hearsay statements is the general inability to test their 
reliability. Without the declarant in court, it may be impossible to inquire into the 
declarant’s perception, memory, narration or sincerity.’2 However, it should also be 
noted that cross- examination is only one way to test evidence: if it is the rationale for 
hearsay, evidence which is inherently reliable or which can be evaluated for reliability 
without the need for cross- examination could be admitted.3
1 Cross & Tapper, 565; James Allan, ‘The working rationale of the hearsay rule and the implications 
of modern psychological knowledge’ [1991] 44 CLP 217. On the dangers of hearsay evidence, see 
Morgan, ‘Hearsay dangers and the application of the hearsay concept’, 178– 179. On the perceived 
virtues of cross- examination, see 2 Bl Comm 373, where Sir William Blackstone stated that examination 
through ‘viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth’, 
and Matthew Hale, History and Analysis of the Common Law of England (J. Nutt 1713) 258, https:// 
constitution.org/ 1- Constitution/ cmt/ hale/ history_ common_ law.htm (cited in the US Supreme Court 
case of Crawford v Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)), where it is said that cross- examination ‘beats and 
boults out the Truth much better than when the Witness only delivers a formal Series of his Knowledge 
without being interrogated’. The Supreme Court of Canada proclaimed cross- examination as ‘the 













2 R v Khelawon [2006] 2 SCR 787, para 2.
3 Elisabeth McDonald, ‘Going “Straight to basics”: the role of Lord Cooke in reforming the rule against 
hearsay – from Baker to the Evidence Act 2006’, (2008) 39(1) VUWLR 143, 156. Focusing on the right 
of cross- examination would also mean that the rule against self- corroboration cannot be justified, and 
that out- of- court statements of witnesses are outside the hearsay rule. See e.g., New Zealand Evidence 
Act 2006, s 18(1)(b)(i) (defining admissible hearsay as including any reliable statement that is made 
by a person who is available as a witness).
The right of confrontation
3.6 A further, apparently important but ill- defined foundation of the hearsay rule 
that is related to the right of cross- examination is the right to confront an accuser as 
an essential element of the right to a fair trial. It was on this basis that the United 
States Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington held that where cross- examination 
is not possible for the testimonial statements of witnesses who have since become 
unavailable, the statements are inadmissible.1
1 Crawford v Washington 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004), 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3.7 The right to confront draws on the notion that the right to humane treatment 
and procedural integrity both feel undermined by the admission of hearsay evidence.1 
Although expressly established in the Constitution of the United States2 and in the 
European Convention of Human Rights,3 a review shows that in other common law 
jurisdictions there is no ‘right’ per se of confrontation for hearsay evidence.4 As the UK 
Supreme Court explained in Horncastle, under the common law system of trial by jury, 
the conditions relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence (including exceptions 
to the hearsay rule), combined with the trial judge’s role as gatekeeper in applying 
them and her general residual discretion to exclude prejudicial or unfair evidence from 
going before the jury, provide the appropriate assurance in guaranteeing a fair trial.5 
This greatly reduces the influence of this right as justification for the hearsay rule.
1 For discussion of the foundation of this right and its modern legitimacy, see Mike Redmayne, 
‘Confronting confrontation’ in Paul Roberts and Jill B. Hunter (eds) Criminal Evidence and Human 
Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Hart Publishing 2012), 283– 308 (the text of 
this chapter is also an LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Paper, No 10/ 2010, http:// eprints.lse.
ac.uk/ 32897/ 1/ WPS2010- 10_ Redmayne.pdf). See also Toni M. Massaro, ‘The dignity value of face- to- 
face confrontations’ (1998) 40(5) U Fla L Rev 863.
2 US Const. amend. VI (‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him’).
3 European Convention on Human Rights, article 6(3)(d). In Al- Khawaja v United Kingdom (26766/ 
05) Tahery v United Kingdom (22228/ 06) [2011] 12 WLUK 533, [2012] 2 Costs LO 139, (2012) 54 
EHRR 23, 32 BHRC 1, [2012] Crim LR 375, Times, 22 December 2011, [2012] CLY 657, it was held that 
the defendant was entitled to examine the maker of a statement admitted in evidence who was not 
called as a witness, where the statement was the sole, or at least the decisive, basis for the defendant’s 
conviction.
4 R. v Horncastle (Michael Christopher) [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 AC 373, [2010] 2 WLR 47, [2010] 2 
All ER 359, [2009] 12 WLUK 249, [2010] 1 Cr App R 17, [2010] HRLR 12, [2010] UKHRR 1, [2010] Crim 
LR 496, (2009) 153(48) SJLB 32, Times, 10 December 2009, [2010] CLY 658. The UK Supreme Court 
declined to follow Al- Khawaja and Tahery.
5 R. v Horncastle (Michael Christopher) [2010] 2 AC 373 at [41].
3.8 United States jurisprudence also suggests waning support for this rationale as 
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of which there has been or can be no cross- examination is excluded, it has also 
been held that hearsay exceptions including dying declarations and non- testimonial 
evidence such as business records and statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are 
not excluded by the Confrontation Clause.1 As the Supreme Court itself recognized, the 
right of confrontation was not absolute and exceptions to the hearsay rule are valid 
inroads on the right of confrontation.2
1 Crawford v Washington 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004) at 1367, 1376.
2 Crawford v Washington 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004) at 1377, citing U.S. v Burr, 25 F.Cas. 187 (1807) at 
193.
Hearsay and electronic evidence
3.9 For these reasons, we adopt the broader view taken by Stein that the rule against 
hearsay exists as a rule of evidence that properly allocates the risk of error. Confirmed 
risks that can be eliminated or avoided1 are part of the fundamental ‘principle of 
maximal inferential individualization’, which Stein described as follows:
(1) No adverse inference should be drawn against the defendant, unless it has 
been exposed to and survived the maximal individualized testing;
(2) This includes every practical possibility of testing the applicability of the 
inference in question to the individual defendant’s case;
(3) The defendant should accordingly be provided with appropriate immunities 
from the risk of error.2
1 Alex Stein, ‘The refoundation of evidence law’ (1996) 9(1) CJLJ 279, 326– 328.
2 Stein, ‘The refoundation of evidence law’, 326– 327.
3.10 Admitting hearsay thus denies to the party adversely affected by the evidence 
the opportunity to test all of the inculpatory arguments that transform the evidence.1 
Hearsay evidence is excluded, not because a court could not be assured of its reliability, 
but that its reliability was effectively unknowable due to, among other things, the 
absence of an ability to cross- examine. Furthermore, in the interest of fairness to 
the adversely affected party, as part of the exclusionary strategy of the principle of 
maximal inferential individualization, such a line of inquiry should not be allowed to 
begin.2 This is because admitting hearsay will expose the adversely affected party to the 
possibility of not being able to test every practical possibility of the hearsay inference 
to the proponent’s case, thereby introducing ‘value- preferences’ that threaten the 
overall coherence of the proceedings.3
1 Stein, ‘The refoundation of evidence law’, 326– 327.
2 Stein, ‘The refoundation of evidence law’, 327.
3 Stein, ‘The refoundation of evidence law’, 326 and following, would describe this as an avoidable 
risk of error in proceedings.
3.11 Based on the discussion thus far, it could be possible to conclude that electronic 
evidence will not initiate the hearsay rule because records in digital form are ‘non- 
testimonial’ and that the hearsay rule focuses only on the ‘human- centric’ nature of 
statements. This would be wrong. In fact, because of the third (and some would argue 
fourth) industrial revolution and the digital economy, ever- increasing amounts of 


















individuals alike to record, use, transform and generate information in complex ways. 
‘Our reality [is now defined] in written records, oral communications, and immersive 
experiences’ that are in electronic form.2 Global interconnectedness and reliance on 
electronic information, especially to cope with the speed of change, has led to the 
development of increasingly complex information systems that have outpaced much of 
existing jurisprudence. It follows that it is necessary to fundamentally reconsider their 
justification and underlying rationale. For the rules of evidence, the question should be 
the relevance, if any, of the rule against hearsay in relation to this shift in evidence from 
physical form to digital form. In reality, the difficult application of the hearsay rule of 
exclusion to electronic evidence has been considered to be complex and confusing.3
1 For example, see Peter Lyman and Hal R. Varian, ‘How much information?’ (2003), https:// www2.
sims.berkeley.edu/ research/ projects/ how- much- info- 2003/ printable_ report.pdf.
2 George L. Paul, ‘Systems of evidence in the age of complexity’ (2014) 12(2) Ave Maria L Rev 173.
3 Colin Tapper, ‘Reform of the law of evidence in relation to the output from computers’ (1995) 3(1) 
IJLIT 79 for a critique and suggestion that the rule should be abolished.
3.12 In this regard, a useful tool for evaluating electronic evidence under the hearsay 
rule and for sharpening the evidential analysis is, first, to classify the type of device that 
is used to produce the evidence in question:
Data processing devices can be classified into the following categories [these are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4]:
[category 1] devices which accept human- supplied input and reproduce human- 
supplied output,
[category 2] self- contained data processing devices that obtain input or take 
recordings from the environment without human intervention, and
[category 3] devices which are a hybrid of the two. 1
1 Daniel Seng, ‘Computer output as evidence’ (1997) 130 Sing JLS 173.
3.13 After identifying the device, the next step is to analyse the use that is made of 
the output of the device to determine if its use is testimonial: that is, if the output is 
tendered for the matter stated in the output as a fact, or otherwise.1
1 Notwithstanding the statutory abrogation of the hearsay rule, the analysis of whether the use of 
the evidence is testimonial remains pertinent in relation to the conditions which have to be satisfied 
for the statement to be admissible. A further discussion follows.
3.14 Category 1 relates to the use of data processing devices primarily to store and 
record content that is written or spoken by one or more persons. Category 1 devices 
operate primarily to receive human input and store that same input for subsequent 
retrieval. When such information is retrieved, most of the time it is principally used 
for the testimonial content of the human input. As an antecedent to the storage and 
recording functions of these devices, this information may be recorded, digitized, 
compressed and processed in some way before being stored on the device or some 
other platform. There may be further processing or ingestion in the form of activation 
of the device for recording, transcribing or indexing the recording to facilitate its 
retrieval.
3.15 Evidence produced by Category 1 devices is therefore generally hearsay, 
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primarily as recording devices for the evidential value of human input. Examples 
include lists of contacts and their information in mobile devices, text messages and 
email correspondence between parties – the only difference between paper- based 
documentation and such records is that their creation, capture and storage are done 
electronically. The Singapore case of Aw Kew Lim illustrates this point well.1 In this case, 
the accused were charged with the copyright offence of possession of illegally copied 
gramophone records for sale. To prove that the accused were owners of the shop that 
was searched and found to have the records in question, the prosecution tendered 
in evidence a computer printout from the official government Registry of Companies 
and Businesses that identified the name of the firm, other company registration 
information and the names and addresses of the accused as directors. The court ruled 
that the information about the names of the accused was inadmissible as hearsay. As 
the court explained, the printout contained information that was derived from some 
other source such as a database or an original document, which would be inadmissible 
hearsay, even if that printout had been correctly certified.2 To put it another way, 
the printout was admitted because it recorded the fact that ‘[the six accused] were 
directors of [company X]’. This is a hearsay use of the electronic evidence enabled by 
the recordation function of the device.
1 Aw Kew Lim v PP [1987] SLR(R) 443, [1987] 2 MLJ 601.
2 Aw Kew Lim v PP [1987] SLR(R) 443 at [9] .
Electronic evidence and real evidence
3.16 Category 2 devices (records generated by software that have not had any 
input from a human), simply put, generate evidence that is substantially the product 
of automation. Digital cameras and video recorders are the ubiquitous example of 
Category 2 devices. Fundamentally, after some form of manual setup, these devices 
work autonomously by collecting light information via digital sensors and converting 
that via digital processing into digital form. After some additional processing, depending 
on the specifications and features of these cameras and recorders, the digitized images 
or video streams are stored or recorded. When the images or videos are retrieved, they 
are used to replicate the input or environment within which these devices are situated.
3.17 English courts appear relatively sanguine in admitting ANPR (automatic 
number plate recognition) evidence, without raising any noted hearsay challenges.1 
The primary reason for the absence of challenges is that, typically, photographs and 
video recordings, such as ANPR evidence made from Category 2 devices, are not used 
‘testimonially’: they are considered real evidence. Real evidence is ‘an independent 
species of evidence as [its] production calls upon the court to reach conclusions on the 
basis of its own perception, and not on that of witnesses directly or indirectly reported 
to it’.2 The genesis for its modern application to electronic evidence may be found in Re 
The Statue of Liberty, where the issue was whether the cinematograph film recordings 
of a navigational traffic radar system were admissible to prove the movements of the 
vessels that had collided. Sir Jocelyn Simon P held that they were. His Lordship opined, 
at 195 (emphasis added):
In my view the evidence in question in the present case has nothing to do with 
the hearsay rule … It is in the nature of real evidence, which is conveniently 









‘Real evidence is evidence afforded by the production of physical objects for 
inspection or other examination by the court.’
… The law is bound these days to take cognisance of the fact that mechanical 
means replace human effort.3
1 For example, see R. v Doyle (Hugh), R. v Wood (Carl), R. v Lincoln (William) [2017] EWCA Crim 340, 
[2017] 2 WLUK 194, where hearsay challenges were raised on appeal in relation to the covert listening 
devices placed on the defendants’ cars, but not in relation to the automatic number plate recognition 
evidence as part of the evidence of the movement of those cars. Likewise, hearsay challenges were 
raised, but not in relation to the automatic number plate recognition evidence, in R. v Brown (Nico) 
[2019] EWCA Crim 1143, [2019] 1 WLR 6721, [2019] 7 WLUK 41, [2019] 2 Cr App R 25, [2020] Crim 
LR 71, [2019] CLY 647.
2 Cross & Tapper, 58.
3 The Statue of Liberty Owners of Motorship Sapporo Maru v Owners of Steam Tanker Statue of Liberty 
[1968] 1 WLR 739, [1968] 2 All ER 195, [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 429, [1968] 3 WLUK 65, (1968) 112 SJ 
380, [1968] CLY 1546, admitting as real evidence radar set recordings of nautical traffic.
3.18 It is also for this reason that the digital audio recorder is an example of either a 
Category 1 or a Category 2 device, depending on its use. From a technical standpoint, 
the analogue sound waves produced by human speech or sounds are captured by the 
microphones on such recorders, converted into digital form by the use of digital signal 
processing techniques and then further processed (for instance, compressed, tagged or 
indexed), before the digitized representation of sound is stored or recorded. Whether 
the recording made by a digital audio recorder is hearsay will depend on whether it is 
used as evidence testimonially. For instance, if Amazon Echo recordings of conversations 
were used as evidence of the incidents that allegedly took place in households being 
investigated, the recording would be an experiential reproduction of the context of the 
offences allegedly being committed.1 In other words, it is used as a surveillance tool – a 
Category 2 device. On the other hand, if the Echo is used as a dictation tool to record the 
user as saying ‘X exists’, such a use as evidence that ‘X exists’ would be testimonial and 
would be excluded as hearsay. In those circumstances, it would be a Category 1 device.
1 For example, see Michael Harrigan, ‘Privacy versus justice: Amazon’s First Amendment battle in 
the cloud’, (2017) 45 W St L Rev 91; Robert D. Lang and Lenore E. Benessere, ‘Alexa, Siri, Bixby, Google’s 
Assistant, and Cortana testifying in court’, (2018) 74 J Mo B 20; John G. Browninga and Lisa Angeloa, 
‘Alexa, testify new sources of evidence from the Internet of Things’ (2019) 82 Tex BJ 506.
3.19 But while real evidence from Category 2 devices does not amount to ‘assertions’ 
that are caught by the hearsay rule, this does not mean that such evidence is 
automatically admissible. All relevant evidence is generally considered admissible only 
if a proper foundation has been laid for its admission: this will be by way of satisfying 
the authentication requirements of the laws of evidence. A more detailed discussion 
of the authentication evidence in general and specific challenges to the reliability and 
accuracy of electronic evidence can be found in Chapter 6.
3.20 In many circumstances, the proponent of the electronic evidence, usually the 
prosecutor, would, in the absence of foundation evidence, seek to circumvent the 
requirement for foundation evidence by relying on the doctrine of omnia praesumuntur 
rite esse acta or presumption of reliability. However, this presumption is not a suitable 
substitute for authentication, particularly in relation to complex and sui generis 
devices and systems. It is often ill- appreciated that foundation evidence must also be 
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of the presumption has often been misunderstood. A more detailed discussion of the 
presumption of reliability as applied to devices that produce electronic evidence can 
be found in Chapter 5.
Testimonial and non-testimonial use of information
3.21 A large proportion of electronic evidence, however, will be evidence produced 
by Category 3 devices (records comprising a mix of human input and calculations 
generated by software). In this category, the device functions through a mix of human- 
supplied input and produces data output without further human intervention. The 
human input could be in the form of the initial calibration of such devices or their 
internal programming. These are ex facie testimonial input of some form in the absence 
of further elucidation. Even machine learning systems – the epitome of autonomous 
systems – have varying levels of reliance and dependence on human- labelled data, 
choices and configurations to enable their proper autonomous operations.
3.22 The line between Category 2 and Category 3 devices can be hard to draw: the 
difference is one of degree that represents the relative significance of the level of 
contribution of human- supplied input and pre- programmed autonomous processes 
to the eventual output, and the extent to which the testimonial input qualifies the 
(purportedly) non- testimonial use of the output. In Wood, for instance, the admissibility 
of chromatograph and spectrometer outputs as real evidence was supported by the 
oral testimony of the chemists who calibrated and operated the machines, as well as 
the programmers of the program who analysed the chromatograph and spectrometer 
outputs, leading the courts to characterize the processes of recording, processing and 
calculating the testing sample as operating without human intervention. The Court of 
Appeal in Wood, in characterizing the test results as real evidence, said:
This computer was rightly described as a tool. It did not contribute its own 
knowledge [but] merely did a sophisticated calculation which could have been 
done manually by the chemist and was in fact done by the chemists using the 
computer programmed by the [programmer] whom the Crown called as a 
witness. The fact that the efficiency of a device is dependent on more than one 
person does not make any difference in kind. Virtually every device will involve 
the persons who made it, the persons who calibrated, programmed or set it up 
… and the person who uses or observes the device. In each particular case how 
many of these people it is appropriate to call must depend on the facts of, and the 
issues raised and the concessions made in that case. 1
1 R v Wood (Stanley William) [1982] 6 WLUK 191, (1983) 76 Cr App R 23, [1982] Crim LR 667, 
[1983] CLY 636 at 27 (emphasis added).
3.23 It could be argued that the phrase ‘it did not contribute to its own knowledge’ 
(as noted above) is a misleading representation of the testimonial input of the 
chemists and programmers. When programmers set up instructions (or code) in 
devices, it is these instructions which are followed by the devices to process the input 
received. These instructions amount to conditional statements embedded in such 
devices.1 But it is clear that the effect of the supporting testimonies of the chemists 
and programmers is that it is only the non- testimonial parts of the chromatograph and 
spectrometer outputs – the analysis results – that are being relied on by the courts. In 






was produced by a chromatograph that had to be calibrated using a pre- prepared 
standard. The chromatograph was in turn coupled to a data analyser which had to be 
manually configured by following an instruction manual prior to its use to produce 
the concentration analysis. Only one of the two analysts who ran the tests testified. 
He also admitted to not following the instruction manual and making changes to the 
configuration of the analyser. Bereft of the testimony of the second analyst who ran the 
second test (two tests were run and the results averaged for the final concentration 
report), the testimony of the programmer of the data analyser, as well as the instruction 
manual, the court upheld the objection as to the admissibility of the final printout from 
the analyser. Zelling J of the South Australian Supreme Court pointed out that because 
the calibration depended on a standard prepared by somebody, the final result 
was the average of two analyses and the second person was not called, and because 
the instructions in the manual were not followed, ‘there was no overall evidence 
called from an expert as to the trustworthiness of the computer itself … under these 
circumstances the objection as to hearsay should have been sustained’.3 Likewise, in 
Holt v Auckland City Council,4 which concerned a similar setup of a chromatograph 
with a data analyser (and almost similar lack of evidence), the court held that the 
final output was ‘inadmissible as incorporating hearsay data outside the field of [the 
analyst’s] proven competence’.5
1 Steve W. Tepper, ‘Testable reliability – a modernized approach to ESI admissibility’ (2014) 12(2) 
Ave Maria L Rev 213, 231– 233. For this reason, Tepper argues that all output generated by programmed 
devices is hearsay, 238, 240.
2 (1979) 21 SASR 569.
3 (1979) 21 SASR 569 at 573.
4 [1980] 2 NZLR 124.
5 [1980] 2 NZLR 124 at 128– 129.
3.24 There is much to commend in the detailed analyses undertaken in Mehesz and 
Holt. They attempt to resolve the different components of the electronic evidence into its 
testimonial and non- testimonial components, identify the programmers as declarants 
responsible for each of the components, require each declarant to explain how she was 
responsible for her respective testimonial component, and justify the results that arise 
from each non- testimonial component. This analysis approach more accurately reflects 
the reality that modern- day devices and computers are complex systems1 subject to 
inevitable faults and errors,2 clearly part of the ‘heightened reliability and testability’ 
regime proposed by Tepper,3 and consonant with the principle of maximal inferential 
individualization advanced by Stein.4 For instance, if the contents of text messages 
and email correspondence are to be used testimonially and constitute hearsay, some 
metadata associated with such messages and correspondence, such as the date and time 
of transmission and receipt and the routing paths, would be generated by Category 2 
devices without human intervention. Such metadata is produced as a consequence of 
software code, and subject to the tests of authentication, reliability and testability, it 
could constitute real evidence and be independently admissible.
1 Paul, ‘Systems of evidence in the age of complexity’.
2 Peter Bernard Ladkin, ‘Robustness of software’ (2020) 17 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 15.
3 Tepper, ‘Testable reliability’, 247– 250 (citing in support the decision of State v Swinton, 847 A.2d 
921 (Conn. 2004) at 924, in which the Supreme Court of Connecticut declared that reliability is an 
essential precondition of admissibility).
4 ‘Maximal inferential individualization is the Stein doctrine for describing maximum testing of 
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and seeks to avoid the use of discretion and ambiguous rules in place of rules of evidence. The point 
that Stein made is that the rules operate to avoid subjecting the opponent of the evidence to ‘the 
impermissible risk of error’, which he called ‘a special kind of moral injustice’ if it is not avoided (Stein, 
‘The refoundation of evidence law’, 325– 326).
3.25 But we caution against treating the test of reliability as the ultimate aim for 
this hybridized hearsay- authentication analysis of electronic evidence. The concept of 
‘reliability’ is a value- loaded concept that varies depending on, among other things, 
the specifications of the device, the purposes to which the device has been put and 
the underlying social concepts that it seeks to protect.1 For instance, it is well known 
that devices that operate on neural networks have statistically modelled accuracy, 
precision and recall measurements of reliability. It is also well known that there are 
two estimates of such parameters: using the data on hand and using unavailable 
data. The latter obviously cannot be done (‘you do not know what you do not know’) 
and has to be an estimate. This explains why a problem or situation that occurs only 
outside normal operating parameters (called ‘corner cases’), or errors that occur in 
open environments which subject the device to situations or environments outside 
normal operating parameters, are so difficult to ascertain. That is not to say that it 
is impossible to ascertain the ‘reliability’ of devices and systems: we contend that 
unexplained and unjustified instances where the device or system is not operating as 
intended is certainly evidence of absence of reliability.
1 For which see Ladkin, ‘Robustness of software’.
3.26 Therefore, there is much to be said for treating computing systems and 
devices as ‘the witness’1 in proceedings. Just as a human witness will be subject to an 
examination as to his or her experience and qualifications, subjecting the output of 
a device to the scrutiny of the hearsay rule helps to tease out the embedded human 
assertions from the results sought to be admitted in evidence – be it the code or its 
data.2 If there is no opportunity for the human assertions to be tested – for instance, if 
the automatically produced analysis is to be relied on but the programmer who wrote 
the software that generated the analysis is not called to testify – the analysis becomes 
hearsay.3 Given that the product of devices will inevitably be based on a multiplicity 
of, and interplay between, direct and indirect human assertions, not all of which have 
been validated, let alone completely assessed for their accuracy and correctness,4 it 
will be near impossible to call all contributors of these assertions to give evidence in 
legal proceedings. Therefore, considering that these models entrench various human 
assertions and even biases, it is more apt to proceed with caution and subject such 
electronic evidence to closer scrutiny for the ‘human input’ by placing it into the 
hybrid Category 3. Of course, this closer scrutiny can be further assisted with a robust 
approach to authentication of such evidence and to a more effective stance regarding 
disclosure.
1 For which see, Chapter 4 ‘Software code as the witness’, although note the opinion of Judge Curtis 
E. A. Karnow in ‘The opinion of machines’ (2018) 19 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 136.
2 Arguments have been developed in the US that devices that generate reports as evidence of the 
accused’s commission of an offence, such as breath analysers, would entitle the accused to challenge 
them on the basis of the Confrontation Clause, as the devices serve as tools of human declarants. See 
Tepper, ‘Testable reliability’, citing Melendez– Diaz v Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310– 11, 129 S.Ct. 
2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, 321– 22 (2009), at 242– 244 in support.
3 See Mehesz v Redman (1979) 21 SASR 569; Holt v Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124.













3.27 Since the decision of Wright v Doe d Tatham,1 the law in England and Wales has 
been that implied assertions from testimonial statements are inadmissible under the 
rule against hearsay. Although difficult issues may arise in relation to distinguishing 
implied assertions from the use of such statements as grounding a relevant inference 
(which falls outside the hearsay rule),2 this position at common law was later affirmed 
by a majority of the House of Lords in R v Kearley,3 who held inadmissible, as being 
irrelevant, calls made to the defendant’s number asking to be supplied with drugs as 
proof that the defendant had intent to supply drugs, or alternatively, inadmissible as 
hearsay.
1 (1837) 7 A & E 313, 11 ER 1378.
2 See, for instance, Ratten (Leith McDonald) v Queen, The [1972] AC 378, [1971] 3 WLR 930, [1971] 
3 All ER 801, [1971] 10 WLUK 28, (1972) 56 Cr App R 18, (1971) 115 SJ 889, [1971] CLY 4587.
3 R. v Blastland (Douglas) [1986] AC 41, [1985] 3 WLR 345, [1985] 2 All ER 1095, [1985] 7 WLUK 
293, (1985) 81 Cr App R 266, [1985] Crim LR 727, [1985] CLY 578; R v Kearley [1992] 2 AC 228, [1992] 
2 WLR 656, [1992] 2 All ER 345, [1992] 4 WLUK 107, (1992) 95 Cr App R 888, [1992] Crim LR 797, 
(1992) 89(21) LSG 28, (1992) 142 NLJ 599, Times, 10 April 1992, Independent, 9 April 1992, [1992] 
CLY 852; see also Diane Birch and Michael Hirst, ‘Interpreting the new concept of hearsay’ (2010) 
69(1) CLJ 72; Greg Taylor, ‘Two English hearsay heresies’ (2005) 9(2) E & P 110. For the Australian 
context, see the comments of McHugh J in the Australian case of Pollitt v R [1992] HCA 35, (1992) 174 
CLR 558 at [21]. Similarly in New Zealand, see R v Mokaraka [2002] 1 NZLR 793 (CA).
3.28 In the context of electronic evidence, the circumstances in which the strictness of 
the rule against implied assertions at common law could apply are legion. In the digital 
economy, electronic records proliferate with an abundance of unique identification 
numbers that identify records and documents (e.g. hash numbers, login IDs, 
registration numbers), labels that identify the nature, origin, provenance or ownership 
of goods, services or other records (e.g. barcodes and QR codes on product packaging), 
dates of records and documents and the relationships or identities of persons (e.g. 
organizational unit attributes and organizational codes used for grouping accounts 
and corporate entities). In the controversial case of Myers (James William) v DPP,1 the 
manufacturer’s records, made routinely in the course of production, that identified 
the cars in question as stolen cars because they recorded identification numbers 
indelibly stamped inside the cylinder blocks, which corresponded to the numbers 
found in the cylinder blocks of the cars sold by the defendant, were held to be implied 
assertions and inadmissible as hearsay. A majority of the House of Lords reasoned 
that the cogency of the records, maintained on microfilm, depended on hearsay, as 
each witness could not prove that the records were correct or that the numbers which 
the records contained were in fact the numbers on the car cylinder when it was made 
by the unknown workmen.2 While the records in question in Myers were microfilm 
records, even if they were substituted with electronic records, the analysis at common 
law would remain the same.
1 [1965] AC 1001, [1964] 3 WLR 145, [1964] 2 All ER 881, [1964] 6 WLUK 79, (1964) 48 Cr App R 
3488, (1964) 128 JP 481, (1964) 108 SJ 519, [1964] CLY 1461.
2 [1965] AC 1001, see Lord Reid, at 1019; Lord Morris of Borth- y- Gest at 1027; Lord Godson, at 
1030. Their Lordships also considered, but dismissed, the application of the business records exception 
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3.29 The House of Lords was not unaware of the controversial nature of their 
decision, but noted that, at common law, the reliability and trustworthiness of records 
is not an exception to the hearsay rule,1 and urged legislative reform.2 However, the 
statutory treatment of the rule against hearsay is different, depending on whether 
electronic evidence is adduced in civil proceedings or in criminal proceedings. It is to 
the statutory rules against hearsay in civil and criminal proceedings and the complex 
and unique issues that arise in the treatment of electronic evidence that we now turn.3
1 For example, see Kearley, per Lord Oliver at 276; Myers, per Lord Reid at 1023– 24.
2 For the virtues or otherwise of this position, see Brenda Marshall, ‘Admissibility of implied 
assertions: towards a reliability- based exception to the hearsay rule’ (1997) 23(1) Mon LR 200; Peter 
Mirfield, ‘A final farewell to Kearley’, (2012) 128(Jul) LQR 331– 337.
3 We observe that the admissibility of the mobile telephone records and chat room records in the 
following cases does not appear to have been discussed: R v Davis [2006] EWCA Crim 1155, [2006] 
1 WLR 31300, [2006] 4 All ER 648, [2006] 5 WLUK 528, [2006] 2 Cr App R 322, [2007] Crim LR 70, 
Times, 1 June 2006, [2006] CLY 989, use of a mobile telephone; R. v Bailey (Tyrone) [2008] EWCA Crim 
817, [2008] 4 WLUK 498, evidence of a chat room.
Civil proceedings and the requirement to give notice
3.30 In England and Wales, the hearsay rule was abolished for civil proceedings 
by s 1(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. The Act applies to all civil proceedings,1 
including proceedings in the magistrates’ court.2 A party that intends to adduce 
hearsay evidence in civil proceedings is required to give the other party or parties 
notice of his intention and, should it be requested, particulars of the evidence.3 This 
requirement to give notice is not unique to England and Wales. A criticism of hearsay 
evidence said to justify the existence of a rule of exclusion is that admission of hearsay 
would amount to an unjustified element of surprise causing delay and unwarranted 
disruption in a proceeding.4 This criticism has largely been addressed through the 
power given to any other party to the proceedings, with leave of the court, to call as a 
witness the person whose hearsay evidence is relied on by the proponent but who is 
not called as a witness by the proponent, and cross- examine him on the statement.5 
It is noteworthy that pursuant to the notice, hearsay of any degree may be admitted.6 
This is especially relevant in relation to electronic records made in the course of 
manufacturing or production by various workers, who may or may not be identified, 
within the organizational hierarchy or chain of responsibility. However, the court may 
have regard to, among other things, whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay in 
estimating the weight to be given to such hearsay evidence.7
1 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 11.
2 The Magistrates’ Courts (Hearsay Evidence in Civil Proceedings) Rules 1999, SI 1999/ 681.
3 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 2.
4 See Chris Gallavin, Evidence (LexisNexis 2008) 127. The irony of this justification for the rule of 
exclusion is that argument over the application of the rule was likely to lead to more delay and greater 
expense than would otherwise have been the case.
5 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 3. See also Australia, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 68.
6 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 1(2)(b).
7 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 4(2)(c).
3.31 The Act includes a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule that are particularly 
relevant to documents stored in digital form. Published works dealing with matters 






















provisions of s 7(2) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. More distinctively, where a document 
can be shown to be part of the records of a business or public authority, the document can 
be received into evidence in civil proceedings without further proof in accordance with 
s 9, subject to certification procedures1 that may be dispensed by the court.2 Subject to 
the threshold requirement that these records must be part of a ‘business’, which includes 
any activity regularly carried on over a period of time,3 the wording of this and similar 
provisions in other jurisdictions4 means that the form a technology takes (‘records’ means 
‘records in whatever form’)5 will not prevent the admission into evidence of data stored in 
digital form.
1 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 9(2).
2 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 9(5).
3 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 9(4) (defining ‘business’). In contrast in Australia, the business records 
exception does not apply to records prepared or obtained for the purposes of conducting proceedings, 
or were made in connection with an investigation leading to criminal proceedings. Australia, Evidence 
Act 1995 (Cth), s 69(3).
4 See New Zealand Evidence Act 2006, s 20; Australia, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 69.
5 Civil Evidence Act 1995, s 9(4)(a).
3.32 Finally, it is noteworthy that s 9(3) of the Civil Evidence Act enables the absence 
of an entry in the records of a business or public authority to be proved by affidavit of 
the relevant officer of that business or authority. This addresses the problem of ‘negative 
hearsay’, in which evidential significance is attributed to the absence of the requisite 
records of a business or public authority. Of course, to enable the requisite conclusions 
to be drawn, especially in relation to electronic records or electronic databases, the 
necessary foundation evidence as to, among other things, good record- keeping practices 
must first be established.
Criminal proceedings
3.33 In England and Wales, the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 repealed 
the provisions relating to hearsay in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and by doing so, 
abrogated most of the common law of hearsay,1 substituting in its place a statutory 
regime for admitting hearsay2 and multiple hearsay.3 The operative provision is 
s 114(1), which reads:
Admissibility of hearsay evidence
(1) In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the 
proceedings is admissible as evidence of any matter stated if, but only if— 
(a) any provision of this Chapter or any other statutory provision makes 
it admissible,
(b) any rule of law preserved by section 118 makes it admissible,
(c) all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible, or
(d) the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be 
admissible.
1 Previously, where a computer recorded the numbers of various components that were fitted to 
motor cars, the printout was a hearsay statement where it was offered in evidence to prove that a 
number of components were fitted to a specific motor car: Myers (James William) v DPP [1965] AC 
1001, [1964] 3 WLR 145, [1964] 2 All ER 881, [1964] 6 WLUK 79, (1964) 48 Cr App R 3488, (1964) 
128 JP 481, (1964) 108 SJ 519, [1964] CLY 1461; Michael Hirst, ‘Hearsay, confessions and mobile 
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2 Cross & Tapper, 611.
3 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 121. Evidence from a Police Incident Log was wrongly admitted under 
s 117 at trial, but on appeal the members of the court decided that the evidence was correctly admitted 
under s 121(c): Maher v DPP [2006] EWHC 1271 (Admin), [2006] 5 WLUK 333, (2006) 170 JP 441, 
(2006) 170 JPN 780, [2006] CLY 789.
3.34 The provisions of s 114 serve as an introductory provision to the other 
provisions in that chapter. The operative scope of s 114 and the other provisions lies in 
the definition of a ‘statement’ as a representation of fact or opinion made by a person 
by whatever means, not made in oral evidence in the proceedings, but sought to be 
admissible as evidence of any matter stated.1 A matter stated is something which the 
maker of the statement intended someone (generally the recipient) to believe or to 
act upon, or to cause a machine to operate.2 Thus defined, s 114 retains the default 
exclusion of the hearsay rule in relation to statements intended to be acted on (express 
assertions), and operates to admit them in criminal proceedings within the parameters 
set out in s 114(1)(a)– (d) (although a number of common law exceptions are retained 
in statutory form by virtue of s 118(1) Criminal Justice Act 2003).
1 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 114(1) read with s 115(2).
2 Criminal Justice Act 1995, s 115(3); R. v Twist (Andrew Terence) [2011] EWCA Crim 1143, [2011] 3 
All ER 1055, [2011] 5 WLUK 320, [2011] 2 Cr App R 17, (2011) 175 JP 257, [2011] Crim LR 793, [2011] 
CLY 584.
3.35 In contrast, statements that are not intended to be acted on (implied assertions) 
fall outside the definition of a ‘statement’ as defined1 and are admissible pursuant to 
the abolition of the common law rules governing the admissibility of hearsay evidence 
in criminal proceedings.2 This has the effect of reversing the common law position in 
R v Kearley,3 but with the proliferation of records of electronic communications and the 
ubiquity of their use, it has in turn opened up new considerations regarding the scope 
of the rule as regards implied assertions and their relevance to the issues.
1 See also the definition of ‘statement’ in New Zealand: Evidence Act 2006, s 4; in Australia, Evidence 
Act 1995 (Cth), s 59(1). See also Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law (Report 
No 102, 2006) paras 7.19– 7.22, http:// www.alrc.gov.au/ publications/ 7.%20The%20Hearsay%20
Rule%20and%20Section%2060/ unintended- assertions.
2 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 118(2). See also R. v Singh (Alexander Sukadave) [2006] EWCA Crim 
660, [2006] 1 WLR 1564, [2006] 2 WLUK 590, [2006] 2 Cr App R 12, (2006) 170 JP 222, [2006] Crim 
LR 647, (2006) 170 JPN 571, Times, 8 March 2006, [2006] CLY 787, also known as R. v Singh (Alexander 
Sukadeve), R. v Singh (Alexander Sukedave), at [14].
3 As explained in R. v Singh (Alexander Sukadave) [2006] EWCA Crim 660 at [14].
Telephone calls and messages
3.36 We start with the cases that deal with the inclusion of evidence of telephone calls 
and text messages sent on mobile telephones, especially in relation to cases involving 
illegal drugs, that have caused some confusion. For instance, in R v Chrysostomou 
(Mark)1 the trial judge admitted four text messages, apparently sent to the appellant by 
someone called ‘John’ who attempted to set up a supply of drugs, as evidence that the 
appellant was a dealer in drugs. In giving judgment for the court, Aikens LJ agreed that 
the text messages were not caught by the statutory code on hearsay in the Criminal 
Justice Act on the basis that the messages were adduced, not to prove, as fact, any 
matters stated in the messages, but ‘as evidence of an underlying state of affairs, which 
















the appellant dealt with drugs and so could meet John’s demands’.2 In his commentary, 
Professor Ormerod agreed with the conclusion reached by Aikens LJ but disagreed 
with the reasoning, pointing out that the text messages were actually relied upon for 
the truth of the implied assertion contained in the message that the accused was a 
dealer in illegal drugs. This, however, did not render the message hearsay because, 
as Professor Ormerod noted,3 for a statement to be hearsay, the purpose of making 
the statement must be to cause another to believe the matter or to act on the matter 
stated,4 while ‘the purpose of the texter [“John”] was not to cause [the appellant] C to 
believe/ act on his being a dealer’.5
1 [2010] EWCA Crim 1403, [2010] 6 WLUK 547, [2010] Crim LR 942, [2011] CLY 609.
2 [2010] EWCA Crim 1403 at [28].
3 See the analysis of this precise point by Professor Ormerod: ‘R. v Bains: evidence – hearsay – 
admissibility of mobile phone text messages’, in which he cites R. v Singh (Alexander Sukadave) [2006] 
EWCA Crim 660, [2006] 1 WLR 1564, [2006] 2 WLUK 590, [2006] 2 Cr App R 12, (2006) 170 JP 222, 
[2006] Crim LR 647, (2006) 170 JPN 571, Times, 8 March 2006, [2006] CLY 787, also known as R. v 
Singh (Alexander Sukadeve), R. v Singh (Alexander Sukedave); R. v Mayers (Jordan) [2009] 1 WLR 1915, 
[2009] 2 All ER 145, [2008] EWCA Crim 2989, [2008] 12 WLUK 373, [2009] 1 Cr App R 30, [2009] 
Crim LR 272, [2009] CLY 768; R. v Leonard (Mark Alan) [2009] 4 WLUK 482, [2009] EWCA Crim 1251, 
(2009) 173 JP 366, [2009] Crim LR 802, [2009] CLY 756; R. v Fox (Craig) [2010] EWCA Crim 1280, 
[2010] 4 WLUK 461; R. v Bains (Pardeep Singh) [2010] EWCA Crim 873, [2010] Crim LR 937; regarding 
inferences to be drawn from the absence of an entry on a record, see R. v Shone (Robert Dowson) [1982] 
6 WLUK 185, (1983) 76 Crim LR 72, [1983] CLY 666; M. Khan, ‘Hearsay’ (1984) 48(1) JCL 25, 25– 27; 
Ben Fitzpatrick, ‘Criminal Justice Act 2003: hearsay provisions’ (2006) 70(5) Journal of Criminal Law 
372; Ben Fitzpatrick, ‘Criminal Justice Act 2003: hearsay – implied assertions’ (2006) 70(5) Journal of 
Criminal Law 398.
4 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 114(1) read with s 115(3)(a), (b).
5 [2010] Crim LR 942 (note), 944 (emphasis added).
3.37 In contrast, in R. v Leonard (Mark Alan) the members of the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) determined that two text messages sent by unknown people to the 
appellant on two separate mobile telephones were hearsay evidence, and should not 
have been admitted at trial in support of the case for the Crown that the appellant was 
a drug dealer (with the prosecution conceding that the evidence would not have been 
admitted following a consideration of all the factors set out in s 114(2)). The messages 
were set out as follows:
The first, timed at 10.24 on 2nd May 2008, reads:
‘Cheers for yday! Well sound gear:- S! feel well wankered today!’
The second text message was from a different phone number and was on the 
second mobile phone. It was timed at 10.51 on 6th May 2008. It read:
‘Mark, that was a proper dog cunt move mate, that joey was a £5 joey and that 
was my last £10. Thanks. I dont why I think u would not do that 2 me. I dont.1
1 [2009] EWCA Crim 1251 at [3] .
3.38 It was assumed that the content described feedback on the quality of the drugs 
purported to have been supplied (the first one positive and the second one negative). 
Professor Ormerod considered the decision by the Court of Appeal to be incorrect 
because the Crown did not rely on the content of the text messages for the truth of 
whether the quality was good or bad, or the nature of what had been supplied. The 
issue was whether the appellant was the supplier of a controlled drug, not the quality 
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the argument illustrates the absurdity of the largely arbitrary line between hearsay 
and non- hearsay statements.
1 See MK, R v [2007] EWCA Crim 3150, [2007] 12 WLUK 47, (2008) 172 JP 538, (2008) 172 JPN 
757, [2009] CLY 752, where a conversation over a telephone captured by covert recording equipment 
was not considered to be hearsay, and it was therefore admissible without having to comply with the 
statutory provisions relating to hearsay.
3.39 The Court of Appeal considered an entire set of electronic messages and their 
use in inculpating the defendants in R. v Twist (Andrew Terence),1 where the issue was 
the admissibility of text messages sent over mobile telephones as evidence against 
various defendants for a variety of offences. In determining the general approach to 
take as to whether the hearsay rules in the Criminal Justice Act applied, Hughes LJ set 
out the following approach:
i) identify what relevant fact (matter) it is sought to prove;2
ii) ask whether there is a statement of that matter in the communication. If no, 
then no question of hearsay arises (whatever other matters may be contained in 
the communication);
iii) If yes, ask whether it was one of the purposes (not necessarily the only or 
dominant purpose) of the maker of the communication that the recipient, or 
any other person, should believe that matter or act upon it as true? If yes, it is 
hearsay. If no, it is not.3
1 [2011] EWCA Crim 1143, [2011] 3 All ER 1055, [2011] 5 WLUK 320, [2011] 2 Cr App R 17, (2011) 
175 JP 257, [2011] Crim LR 793, [2011] CLY 584; note the criticism of Hirst, ‘Hearsay, confessions and 
mobile telephones’, 491– 493.
2 Hughes LJ indicated at [11] that it must be a relevant matter.
3 [2011] EWCA Crim 1143 at [17], emphasis in the original.
3.40 Hughes LJ went on, at [18], to indicate that the ‘answers to these questions will 
be case- sensitive. The same communication may sometimes be hearsay and sometimes 
not, depending on the matter for which it is relied upon and the fact which it is sought 
to prove.’1 While correct, this line of argument emphasizes the largely arbitrary nature 
of the distinction. A text message commenting on the quality of drugs bought will not 
be a hearsay statement2 (even if they could amount to an implied assertion that the 
recipient was a drug supplier, the purpose of the sender(s) did not include causing him 
or anyone else to believe that he was3) and can be adduced in support of a contention 
that the recipient actually sold drugs. However, a statement to the effect of ‘thanks for 
selling me those drugs’ will be inadmissible hearsay because it contains a statement 
that the recipient had sold drugs. An argument might be made that what was sought 
to be established was the state of mind of the maker of the message, not whether 
drugs were actually sold by the recipient of the message. Depending on the issue to be 
proved, this argument may render the statement admissible.
1 Note the criticism by Hirst, ‘Hearsay, confessions and mobile telephones’, 491– 492.
2 Assuming Leonard (Mark Alan) was decided wrongly as it was based on the concession by 
prosecution, as Hughes LJ noted [2011] EWCA Crim 1143 at [24].
3 [2011] EWCA Crim 1143 at [29].
3.41 The tests set out in R. v Twist (Andrew Terence) were considered in the case of 
R. v Midmore (Billy Nathan),1 where a WhatsApp message containing an image of a box 
















trial judge to be hearsay. The members of the Court of Appeal determined it was not 
hearsay. One commentator considered this analysis to be unsound,2 because in relation 
to the second question in Twist (the question of relevance of the statement), it does 
not appear that there was a statement of the matter sought to be proved. McKeown 
suggested that the image, taken with the caption:
appears to be little more than a straightforward implied representation that One 
Shot was capable of causing serious harm to a person’s face. Yet the court read it 
as a representation by GM to his girlfriend that he had purchased the One Shot 
with the intention of using it to cause serious injury to C by throwing it over 
her face. This surely goes too far, and exposes a risk with the Twist formula for 
identifying hearsay if it is now to be used in relation to implied representations.3
1 [2017] EWCA Crim 533, [2017] 4 WLR 107, [2017] 4 WLUK 529, [2017] 2 Cr App R 8, (2017) 181 
JP 354, [2017] Crim LR 793, [2017] CLY 512.
2 Paul McKeown, ‘Evidence: R. v Midmore’ (2017) Crim LR 793.
3 (2017) Crim LR 796.
3.42 McKeown suggested that ‘[S] ince implied representations may now potentially 
be hearsay, a question arises as to whether the Twist formula should continue to be 
followed’1 and that another approach to identifying hearsay could be as follows:
(i) What is the matter stated, i.e. what is the express or implied representation in 
the statement? Where the representation is implied, care should be taken not to 
read something into it which is not there;
(ii) Is the party seeking to admit the statement for a purpose other than as 
evidence to establish the matter stated? If so, the statement is not hearsay and is 
admissible if it is relevant, subject to exclusion;
(iii) If the party is seeking to admit the statement as evidence to establish the 
matter stated, was one of the purposes of the maker of the statement to cause 
someone to believe or act, or a machine to operate, etc. on the basis that what is 
stated is true?
If yes, it is hearsay and inadmissible unless it is relevant and can pass through a 
statutory exception, subject to exclusion. If no, it is not hearsay and is admissible 
if it is relevant, subject to exclusion.2
1 (2017) Crim LR 798.
2 (2017) Crim LR 798.
3.43 To conclude that anything inferred from a statement is not hearsay, whereas 
anything directly stated is, is to establish a distinction that dances on the head of a pin. 
The better approach is to treat all types of assertion – express or intended and implied 
or unintended – as prima facie hearsay and leave their admission to the judge on the 
basis of an analysis of a list of balancing criteria.
3.44 With the abolition of implied or unintended assertions from the scope of 
the hearsay rule, not all assertions made with the intention to communicate will be 
qualifying hearsay statements. The inadmissible hearsay assertion has to be associated 
with the object for which it is tendered in evidence in support, failing which it could 
be admissible as an implied or unintended assertion. To amplify McKeown’s point, 
to enable the admission of implied representations as to the supposed mental state 
of the maker of the statement presupposes the relevance of such mental state in the 
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statements and by pass the hearsay exclusion against express statements. Indeed 
this was the concern that was well recognized at common law.1 In the same vein, 
Professor Hirst observed that if there is nothing to prove an established relationship, 
or an incriminating response or reaction from the defendant, the assertion may be 
inadmissible, regardless of whether it is hearsay or not.2
1 R. v Blastland (Douglas) [1986] AC 41, [1985] 3 WLR 345, [1985] 2 All ER 1095, [1985] 7 WLUK 
293, (1985) 81 Cr App R 266, [1985] Crim LR 727, [1985] CLY 578, holding that statements indicating 
knowledge of a third party of the commission of a murder were irrelevant to the issue of whether the 
murder was committed by him or by the accused.
2 Hirst, ‘Hearsay, confessions and mobile telephones’, 491 fn 25, citing R. v O’Connell (William) 
[2003] EWCA Crim 502, [2003] 2 WLUK 291.
3.45 This illustrates the fundamental weakness of the rule. By excluding unintended 
assertions, there is a possibility that arbitrary limits may arise in that the difference 
between a hearsay statement and a non- hearsay statement will rest with the question 
of whether there exists an intention to communicate. The existence of an intention to 
communicate is of such little value as to render the distinction meaningless. Furthermore, 
such a distinction exposes the application of the exclusionary rule to the formulation of 
a clever submission of a lawyer in that the application of the rule might be avoided by 
classifying the statement as a reflection of the mindset of the maker as opposed to an 
intention of the maker, an approach made plausible given the ubiquity and accessibility 
of electronic devices. In such a case, no real distinguishing factor truly exists.
Representations other than by a person
3.46 Of particular relevance to electronic evidence is s 129 Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
It reads:
129 Representations other than by a person
(1) Where a representation of any fact— 
(a) is made otherwise than by a person, but
(b) depends for its accuracy on information supplied (directly or 
indirectly) by a person, the representation is not admissible in criminal 
proceedings as evidence of the fact unless it is proved that the information 
was accurate.
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of the presumption that a 
mechanical device has been properly set or calibrated.
3.47 The UK Law Commission considered the admissibility of a computer printout, 
whether it is hearsay, and whether the printout itself is relevant:
The question is, on what basis should such evidence be excluded? One view is 
that it is hearsay, because it is tantamount to a statement made by the person 
who fed the data into the machine. An alternative view is that the statement by 
the machine, properly understood, is conditional on the accuracy of the data on 
which it is based; and that, if those data are not proved to have been accurate, the 
statement therefore has no probative value at all. The question of hearsay does 
not arise, because the statement is simply irrelevant.
We believe that the latter view is closer to the truth, and that it is therefore 
unnecessary to complicate our hearsay rule by extending it to statements made 











would be safe to assume that everyone will share this view. We must anticipate 
the argument that, if such statements are inadmissible at present, that is because 
they are hearsay; that, under our recommendations, they would no longer be 
hearsay, because our formulation of the rule would apply only to representations 
made by people; and that they would therefore cease to be inadmissible.1
1 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com No 245, 
1997) paras 7.48– 7.49.
3.48 The effect of s 129 is to treat not as hearsay and as admissible representations of 
any fact made in a document emanating from a device that is adduced to prove something 
other than the truth of a statement previously entered into them by a human being.1 
They are admissible subject to proof of the accuracy of any information supplied by a 
human to such a device,2 including its proper setup and calibration.3 But as previously 
noted, the proper treatment of such representations of facts by devices or machines 
requires a proper categorization of the function of such devices, and an identification 
and subsequent characterization of the different parts of the representation, as to 
whether they emanate from the device or are made by a person or persons.
1 Cross & Tapper, 614.
2 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 129(1) proviso.
3 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 129(2).
3.49 This may be illustrated by the Australian case of Hansen Beverage Company 
v Bickfords (Australia) Pty Ltd.1 In this case, working television sets in homes were 
monitored by a meter system that recorded that a person was physically located in 
the home when he registered his presence by pressing a button when a television 
was on. This was for the purposes of establishing the size of the audience that might 
be watching a particular programme. That the evidence was produced on a printout 
and was automatically recorded by software was not at issue. It was argued that the 
evidence was not hearsay as there was no previous representation made by a person, 
as required by s 59(1) of the Australian Evidence Act 1995. Middleton J, it is suggested 
correctly, identified the evidence as hearsay because it was a representation of fact 
that a certain number of people clicked on the buttons. The judge commented:
Undoubtedly, Hansen seeks to prove the estimated audience sizes for a 
particular program derived by statistical methods from the data, but such data 
is not automatically recorded by the meters without the human intervention of 
deliberately pressing the button to show a person or persons are in the room 
where the television is on. When the people are in the room they intend to, and 
do, make the representation to assert the existence of this fact, the existence of 
which needs to be proved to form the basis of the statistical analysis. It seems to 
me that the necessary reliance by Hansen on the data derived from the sample 
homes must involve the representation … by a person that the person was in the 
room on the relevant occasion, namely when the television is operating.2
1 [2008] FCA 406.
2 [2008] FCA 406 at [125].
Body- worn camera footage
3.50 Body- worn cameras have rapidly become a normal feature of policing.1 In 
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case stated from the County Court for the Division of Londonderry, the question arose 
whether the trial judge was correct to admit the recording from a body- worn video 
camera, which documented allegations made by the complainant of assault by the 
appellant, under the hearsay provisions of the Criminal Justice (Evidence) (Northern 
Ireland) Order 2004, in particular under articles 18(1)(b) and 22(1)(4)(a). Although 
the complainant withdrew her complaint, the appellant was charged and tried of the 
offence. The complainant was not called to give evidence, because she was reconciled 
to the appellant.
1 For a general introduction, see Ben Bowling and Shruit Iyer, ‘Automated policing: the case of body- 
worn video’ (2019) 15(2) Int JLC 140.
2 [2017] NICA 30, [2017] 5 WLUK 19.
3.51 In reaching their decision, the members of the Court of Appeal in Northern 
Ireland considered the tests set out by Lord Ackner in R. v Andrews (Donald Joseph)1 
under the doctrine of res gestae exception to the hearsay rule where a conversation 
took place in such circumstances that the possibility of concoction or distortion by the 
victim could be disregarded:
1. The primary question which the judge must ask himself is – can the possibility 
of concoction or distortion be disregarded?
2. To answer that question the judge must first consider the circumstances in 
which the particular statement was made, in order to satisfy himself that the 
event was so unusual or startling or dramatic as to dominate the thoughts of the 
victim, so that his utterance was an instinctive reaction to that event, thus giving 
no real opportunity for reasoned reflection. In such a situation the judge would 
be entitled to conclude that the involvement or the pressure of the event would 
exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion, providing that the statement 
was made in conditions of approximate but not exact contemporaneity.
3. In order for the statement to be sufficiently ‘spontaneous’ it must be so closely 
associated with the event which has excited the statement, that it can be fairly 
stated that the mind of the declarant was still dominated by the event. Thus the 
judge must be satisfied that the event, which provided the trigger mechanism 
for the statement, was still operative. The fact that the statement was made in 
answer to a question is but one factor to consider under this heading.
4. Quite apart from the time factor, there may be special features in the case, 
which relate to the possibility of concoction or distortion. … The judge must 
be satisfied that the circumstances were such that having regard to the special 
feature of malice, there was no possibility of any concoction or distortion to the 
advantage of the maker or the disadvantage of the accused.
5. As to the possibility of error in the facts narrated in the statement, if only the 
ordinary fallibility of human recollection is relied upon, this goes to the weight 
to be attached to and not to the admissibility of the statement and is therefore a 
matter for the jury. However, here again there may be special features that may 
give rise to the possibility of error. … In such circumstances the trial judge must 
consider whether he can exclude the possibility of error.2
1 [1987] AC 281, [1987] 2 WLR 413, [1987] 1 All ER 513, [1987] 2 WLUK 72, (1987) 84 Cr App R 
382, [1987] Crim LR 487, (1987) 151 JPN 254, [1987] CLY 659.








3.52 In giving the judgment of the court, Weatherup LJ said, at [36]:
In the exercise of the discretion whether to exclude the evidence, the Judge 
considered each of the factors set out in Article 18(2) of the 2004 Order before 
deciding to admit the body- cam video statement of the complainant under the 
res gestae exception. The recording was stated to have strong probative value, 
there was other evidence from the two police officers as to the condition of and 
the injuries to the complainant, the recording was very important, there was 
no indication that the complainant was other than reliable, the evidence of the 
making of the recording was reliable and the complainant was unwilling to give 
evidence because of reconciliation. As to the appellant’s difficulty in challenging 
the statement and the likely prejudice arising, there was stated to be some such 
difficulty and some prejudice but not such as to render unfair the admission of 
the evidence.
3.53 The court noted, at [41], that the prosecution relied on the res gestae exception 
in order to provide support to the complainant in the changed circumstances brought 
about by the reconciliation of the parties, while seeking to deal with the alleged 
previous conduct of the appellant. The prosecution had to balance the competing 
interests when deciding to prosecute the appellant. The trial judge was correct to 
admit the recording under the statutory provisions.
3.54 The res gestae exception at common law has been expressly preserved in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003.1
1 s 118(4).
3.55 The case of DPP v Young1 has a similar set of circumstances. The complainant 
was not able to appear to give evidence. The prosecution sought the admission of an 
audio recording of a 999 call and a recording from a body- worn video camera from 
one of the police officers attending the scene. Both items of evidence overlapped, 
because the telephone line on which the 999 call was made remained open up to the 
time the police officers attended the scene, and the telephone recording contained 
identical evidence to that in the body- worn video camera recording. Both recordings 
were admitted as real evidence. No consideration was given to the tests set out in R. v 
Andrews (Donald Joseph). The defence submitted that there was no case to answer, 
given, it was argued, that the evidence was tenuous in nature, weak and vague. The lay 
magistrates accepted the submission and dismissed the case against the defendant. 
The Divisional Court quashed the decision of the justices. Lord Justice Holroyde, in 
giving the judgment, indicated, at [19]:
Having considered the evidence which was before the justices, for my part, 
I have no doubt that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction and that 
the submission of no case to answer should have been rejected. Indeed, I very 
much doubt whether the submission should ever have been made. There was 
before the justices clear evidence that Ms Robertshaw made a 999 call to the 
effect that a man was going berserk at her home. Given the speed with which 
the police officers arrived on the scene and the overlap of recordings to which 
I have referred, there could be no realistic doubt but that the man concerned 
was the respondent. There was then a clear audio recording from which, in my 
view, a reasonable bench, properly directed, undoubtedly could find that the 
999 call recorded an assault actually taking place with the victim of that assault 
uttering cries of pain against a background of sounds of physical exertion by the 
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to the justices to allow the submission of no case to answer. Whether at the 
conclusion of all the evidence they would have convicted is of course a separate 
matter. The issue they had to determine, and in respect of which in my judgment 
they fell into error, was whether a reasonable bench, properly directed, could 
properly convict.
1 [2018] EWHC 3616 (Admin), [2018] 12 WLUK 76.
Business and other documents
3.56 In this regard, it is useful to start with a review of the cases that considered s 24 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. This provision, concerning the admission in criminal 
proceedings of business and other documents, was the predecessor provision to s 117 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In Brown v Secretary of State for Social Security,1 the 
Secretary of State adduced evidence of statements from computer records by way of 
two witnesses where the identity of the persons who supplied the information could 
not be established. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the two statements 
were inadmissible because they did not comply with the terms of s 24. Section 24 was 
written to enable business documents to be admissible without the need to call the 
maker where the documents formed part of records about which the maker could not 
be expected to know anything in detail, and which were created in the course of trade or 
business. The members of the Divisional Court, Balcombe LJ and Collins J, agreed that 
the statements were not admissible under s 24(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 ‘as 
there was no evidence that it was impossible that the makers of the statements would 
have no recollection of the matters referred to in their statements’.2 In comparison, 
the members of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in the case of R. v Derodra 
(Kishor),3 rightly it is suggested, admitted the contents of a police ‘CRIS’ report, which 
was a computerized record of incidents of crime under s 24. In this instance, the person 
who reported the crime to the police – the lodger of the appellant – could not be found 
to give evidence of his complaint. It was the statement of the lodger that was to be 
relied upon testimonially, not that of the police officer who made the relevant entry.4
1 [1994] 11 WLUK 283, [1995] COD 260, Times, 7 December 1994, [1994] CLY 904.
2 [1995] COD 260 at 262.
3 [1999] 5 WLUK 342, [2000] 1 Cr App R 41, [1999] Crim LR 978, Independent, 10 June 1999, 
[1999] CLY 873.
4 R. v Derodra (Kishor) [1999] 5 WLUK 342, [2000] 1 Cr App R 41, [1999] Crim LR 978, Independent, 
10 June 1999, [1999] CLY 873; note the criticism by Roderick Munday, ‘Section 24 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988: the great escape’ (1999) 7 Arch News 5.
3.57 In Vehicle and Operator Services Agency v George Jenkins Transport Limited,1 
the prosecution had to prove that certain commercial drivers had failed to properly 
record their journeys with the tachographs in their vehicles, and had worked beyond 
the number of hours that were permitted without the prescribed rest periods or 
breaks. To discharge this burden, the prosecution sought to put in evidence a number 
of drivers’ time sheets pursuant to s 24. On a preliminary point, the trial judge ruled 
them inadmissible and dismissed all charges against the defendants. The prosecutor 
appealed, and the appeal raised a number of issues regarding the interpretation of 
these provisions. First, the provisions in s 24, described by Mackay J at [10] as ‘criteria 
or gateway’ provisions,2 must be satisfied before the second issue is addressed, that 
is whether the documents in question can be admitted in evidence. Mackay J quoted3 















Section 24 deals with the statements in a document and makes such statements 
admissible of any fact of which direct oral evidence would be admissible if 
two conditions are satisfied. The wording of condition (ii) demonstrates that 
Parliament anticipated that courts would draw inferences as to the personal 
knowledge of the person supplying the information of the matters dealt with. 
The purpose of section 24 is to enable the document to speak for itself; the 
safeguard being the two conditions and the other statutory provisions applicable, 
for example in the case of a statement made for the purpose of a criminal 
investigation, one of the requirements of section 23(2) or the requirements of 
section 23(3) have to be fulfilled.4
1 [2003] EWHC 2879 (Admin), [2003] 11 WLUK 528, Times, 5 December 2003, [2004] CLY 3852.
2 R. v Foxley (Gordon) [1995] 2 WLUK 75, [1995] 2 Cr App R 523, [1995] 16 Cr App R (S) 879, [1995] 
Crim LR 636, Times, 9 February 1995, Independent, 3 April 1995 [1995] CLY 918.
3 [2003] EWHC 2879 (Admin) at [24].
4 [1995] 2 WLUK 75, [1995] 2 Cr App R 523 at 536F– G, [1995] 2 Cr App Rep 523, [1995] 16 Cr App 
R (S) 879, [1995] Crim LR 636, Times, 9 February 1995, Independent, 3 April 1995, [1995] CLY 918.
3.58 In this instance, Mackay J and Kennedy LJ agreed that the documents satisfied 
the criteria provisions, and were admissible and self- proving in evidence.1 Kennedy 
LJ also noted the criticisms that Professor Smith made of the decision in R. v Foxley 
(Gordon), although it was observed that a further analysis of another case2 by Professor 
Smith was capable of applying to the case in hand if it was adjusted slightly.3
1 [2003] EWHC 2879 (Admin) at [30], [34].
2 R. v Ilyas (Mohammed); R. v Knight (Paul) [1996] 5 WLUK 330, [1996] Crim LR 810.
3 [2003] EWHC 2879 (Admin) at [34].
3.59 Section 24 is succeeded by s 117 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Section 117(1) 
to (5) reads:
Business and other documents
(1) In criminal proceedings a statement contained in a document is admissible as 
evidence of any matter stated if— 
(a) oral evidence given in the proceedings would be admissible as evidence 
of that matter,
(b) the requirements of subsection (2) are satisfied, and
(c) the requirements of subsection (5) are satisfied, in a case where 
subsection (4) requires them to be.
(2) The requirements of this subsection are satisfied if— 
(a) the document or the part containing the statement was created or 
received by a person in the course of a trade, business, profession or other 
occupation, or as the holder of a paid or unpaid office,
(b) the person who supplied the information contained in the statement 
(the relevant person) had or may reasonably be supposed to have had 
personal knowledge of the matters dealt with, and
(c) each person (if any) through whom the information was supplied 
from the relevant person to the person mentioned in paragraph (a) 
received the information in the course of a trade, business, profession or 
other occupation, or as the holder of a paid or unpaid office.
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(4) The additional requirements of subsection (5) must be satisfied if the 
statement— 
(a) was prepared for the purposes of pending or contemplated criminal 
proceedings, or for a criminal investigation, but
(b) was not obtained pursuant to a request under section 7 of the 
Crime (International Co- operation) Act 2003 (c. 32) or an order under 
paragraph 6 of Schedule 13 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (c. 33) 
(which relate to overseas evidence).
(5) The requirements of this subsection are satisfied if— 
(a) any of the five conditions mentioned in section 116(2) is satisfied 
(absence of relevant person etc), or
(b) the relevant person cannot reasonably be expected to have any 
recollection of the matters dealt with in the statement (having regard 
to the length of time since he supplied the information and all other 
circumstances).
3.60 The provisions of s 117, dealing with the business document exception, are very 
wide and permit the admission into evidence of multiple hearsay,1 although the various 
foundational conditions set out in s 117 must be satisfied. In R. v Humphris (Andrew 
James),2 the Crown sought to adduce evidence of the appellant’s previous convictions 
under s 117. For that purpose, they relied on a statement of Police Officer Grimes, 
who retrieved relevant records from the Essex Police computer facility, the contents 
of which were in turn derived from staff of the Essex Police Force, who acted under a 
duty to record information and who either had or may reasonably be supposed to have 
had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the records. These records were 
attached to Police Officer Grimes’ statement. Section 117 provides certain conditions 
that must be fulfilled before evidence can be admitted. The defence accepted that 
the provisions of s 117(2)(a) were complied with, but argued that for each record of 
the appellant’s previous conviction, s 117(2)(b) required the statement to have been 
obtained from each complainant as the relevant person, rather than the police officer 
who recorded the information. Although Lord Woolfe upheld the conviction of the 
appellant, he agreed and held that the necessary foundations for the admissibility of 
the evidence were not properly laid.
1 A point made by Professor Tapper, when he indicated that some electronic information will be 
collated from other statements, thus constituting multiple hearsay: Colin Tapper, ‘Electronic evidence 
and the Criminal Justice Act 2003’ (2004) 10 CTLR 161; an example would be proving the links of the 
continuity of evidence between the withdrawal of cash from an ATM to demonstrating the entering of 
the transaction in the customer’s account.
2 [2005] EWCA Crim 2030, [2005] 7 WLUK 538, (2005) 169 JP 441, (2005) 169 JPN 718, Times, 
19 September 2005, [2006] CLY 813; for a similar point, also see Maher v DPP [2006] EWHC 1271 
(Admin), [2006] 5 WLUK 333, (2006) 170 JP 441, (2006) 170 JPN 780, [2006] CLY 789.
3.61 Where a document is put in under the provisions of s 114 and s 117, care must 
be taken over any content that is hearsay.1 In addition, the trial judge must ensure 
that the members of the jury understand the purpose of admitting the document. 
In R. v Horncastle (Michael Christopher),2 there was an email statement made by an 
ISP which identified the appellant and his address as being the possible holder of an 
email account suspected to have been used to send abusive images of children. The ISP 








holder impersonating the appellant. The prosecution adduced this email to show the 
address of the place (the appellant’s home) where the police raid took place, but not to 
prove the fact that the account was that of the appellant or used by the appellant. (In 
fact, no evidence of abusive images of children was found on the appellant’s computer, 
although there was evidence that the appellant’s lodger had used the email account.) 
No directions were given by the trial judge as to the limited purpose for which the ISP’s 
email was adduced. On appeal, Thomas LJ held that the judge’s failure to explain the 
use was a material misdirection, as the jury could have used the ISP’s email to link the 
appellant to the email account. The appellant’s appeal was allowed and his conviction 
was set aside.
1 For an example of where a printout from the Police National Computer was correctly admitted into 
evidence, all of the conditions under s 117 having been met, see R. (on the application of Wellington) v 
DPP [2007] EWHC 1061 (Admin), [2007] 5 WLUK 5, (2007) 171 JP 497, (2007) 171 JPN 868, [2007] 
CLY 836.
2 [2009] EWCA Crim 964, [2009] 4 All ER 183, [2009] 5 WLUK 566, [2009] 2 Cr App R 15, (2009) 
153(21) SJLB 28, Times, 3 June 2009, [2009] CLY 761; note also DPP v Leigh [2010] EWHC 345 (Admin), 
[2010] 2 WLUK 136, where the prosecution did not rely on a record for the purpose of establishing the 
veracity of any of the matters recorded.
Judicial discretion to include hearsay
3.62 Notwithstanding the other routes of admissibility in s 114(1), one particularly 
wide1 route is to admit hearsay evidence ‘in the interests of justice’ under s 114(1)(d),2 
subject only to the conditions in s 114(2).
1 For example, see R. v Humphris (Andrew James) [2005] EWCA Crim 2030, [2005] 7 WLUK 538, 
(2005) 169 JP 441, (2005) 169 JPN 718, Times, 19 September 2005, [2006] CLY 813.
2 R. v Xhabri (Agrol) [2005] EWCA Crim 3135, [2006] 1 All ER 776, [2005] 12 WLUK 182, [2006] 1 
Cr App R 266, 20 BHRC 233, Times, 10 January 2006, [2006] CLY 788; however, note the commentary 
(and references to other relevant articles): Billal Malik, ‘The hearsay rule under the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003: R v Xhabri (Agrol)’ (2006) 10(4) E & P 316; Tom Worthen, ‘The hearsay provisions of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003: So far, not so good?’ [2008] Crim LR 431; Roderick Munday, ‘Athwal and 
all that: previous statements, narrative, and the taxonomy of hearsay’ (2010) 74(5) JCL 415; Michael 
Stockdale and Emma Piasecki, ‘The safety- valve: discretion to admit hearsay evidence in criminal 
proceedings’ (2012) 76(4) JCL 314.
3.63 Careful consideration needs to be made of the provisions of s 114(2) regarding 
evidence in digital form when it is obtained from the Internet and where the evidence 
relating to the material, such as its authorship and ownership of the website from 
which it originates, is not known, as in the case of R. v Bucknor (Ashley Dwayne).1 In this 
case, the trial judge admitted evidence found by the police on BEBO (https:// www.
bebo.com), consisting of 46 separate website ‘pages’. The material included a number 
of photographs of Bucknor that he had taken of himself after he had left prison. The 
photographs had been placed on the page by someone in such a manner as to portray 
Bucknor as a member of the Organised Criminals (OC) gang. There was a hyperlink 
to a YouTube page that portrayed the OC gang as violent. The YouTube page was also 
shown to the jury in the form of a DVD. The prosecution did not have any evidence of 
the IP address from which the material was uploaded. The trial judge admitted the 
evidence as part of the background to the case, but on appeal the appellant argued that 
the judge failed to give a sufficient direction regarding the ownership of the website 
in question. The members of the Court of Appeal agreed with the submission. The 
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the material was representing as fact or opinion that Bucknor was a member of the OC 
gang. In considering the issues set out in s 114(2), Hooper LJ, giving the judgment for 
the court, said that the judge ought to have considered the reliability of the maker of the 
statement (sub- paragraph (e)), whom the judge failed to identify.2 Failing to identify 
the maker meant that it was not obvious how many levels of hearsay were involved. 
The judge also failed to consider the reliability of the statement that the appellant was 
a member of the OC. Hooper LJ concluded:
44. Furthermore it seems to us on the facts of this case that the judge should have 
considered how reliable the statement was. He should also have asked whether 
the prosecution could call the maker of the statement and if not why not.
45. In our view the judge did not approach section 114 as he should have done. 
In any event, as we have said, his direction to the jury invited them to reach 
conclusions which no reasonable jury could have reached. 3
1 [2010] EWCA Crim 1152, [2010] 5 WLUK 731.
2 [2010] EWCA Crim 1152 at [42]– [43].
3 [2010] EWCA Crim 1152 at [44]– [45].
Judicial discretion to exclude hearsay
3.64 A trial judge also has the ability to refuse to admit a statement in accordance 
with s 126(1)(b) where ‘the court is satisfied that the case for excluding the statement, 
taking account of the danger that to admit it would result in undue waste of time, 
substantially outweighs the case for admitting it, taking account of the value of the 
evidence’.1
1 A similar provision exists in s 8, New Zealand Evidence Act 2006.
3.65 The Law Commission described the necessity of this judicial discretion as the 
power to exclude superfluous hearsay evidence. The concern is not with evidence 
that is wholly irrelevant, but evidence which has some relevance, yet ‘where the 
probative value of the evidence is so slight that almost nothing is gained by admitting 
it’.1 Although this discretion is intended to be exercised only in exceptional cases, the 
existence of the discretion serves as an important counterweight to address concerns 
about the expansionary rules for the admission of barely relevant hearsay evidence.2
1 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com No 245, 
1997) para 11.18.
2 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com No 245, 
1997) para 11.18.
Concluding observations
3.66 Almost everybody now uses digital data, whether this interaction is by way of 
the ether – a terminal linked by software to a server located in an unknown location – 
or from a physical device. Software code has become part of the everyday fabric of the 
majority of people. This means we are all, wittingly or unwittingly, assessing electronic 
evidence every day: from whether to trust that incoming email from an unknown 















3.67 The digital world is now awash with evidence: direct statements over the 
Internet; communications between telephones and other devices; messages made by 
a known author, anonymously or by somebody who cannot be traced. Every day we 
are dealing with the multiplicity of direct and indirect assertions (whether factually 
accurate or not), in the form of statements by one person or relayed, correctly or 
incorrectly, by others, and the interplay between them and the reality of the physical 
world. For the first time, we are all assessing evidence every day.
3.68 This chapter seeks to demonstrate the importance for lawyers to be aware of 
the dangers of admitting hearsay evidence and the need to distinguish between the 
various hearsay representations and ‘representations’ made by devices that may be 
embedded in electronic evidence. The identification of the nature of the device that 
stored or produced the electronic evidence and the testimonial or non- testimonial use 
that is made of the evidence remain important steps for determining the admissibility 
and relevance of the evidence, even in a statutory regime for admitting hearsay. It is 
only with a careful understanding of the nuances of both the hearsay rules as well 
as the nature of electronic evidence that the principle of testing the evidence can be 
observed, to ensure that any rational inference from evidence admitted against the 
defendant is objective and fair, and that the law, in its quest to establish the truth of 
what is contained in the statement, has indeed been true to itself. 
4
Software code as the witness
Stephen Mason
4.1 The aim of this chapter is to illustrate how software code can affect the 
examination and introduction of electronic evidence in legal proceedings. The topic 
is considered in the context of software code as the ‘witness’. It is important to 
understand how software can affect an assessment of the truth in any given set of facts, 
and software code can be written deliberately to deceive.1 Failure to appreciate this 
can lead to unfairness in legal proceedings and incorrect decisions.
1 See the example of Volkswagen AG, Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America, Inc, described in 
detail in Chapter 5; for the US, see the excellent article by Andrea Roth, ‘Machine testimony’ (2017) 126 
Yale LJ 1972.
4.2 A digital computer is like a mechanical device, where switches replace gears, and 
the switches are miniaturized. However, it is impossible to build a mechanical device 
that reflects the functionality of a modern digital computer, because such a device 
would require both a machine built on a colossal scale and the use of materials beyond 
the strengths or machine tolerances of what is possible to manufacture mechanically. 
To complete the picture, physical digital devices, as indicated in Chapter 1, cannot 
work without the software written by programmers and the input by users.
4.3 It follows that electronic evidence could be treated as a joint statement that is:
(i) partly made by the person inputting data (such as typing an email or word 
document, inserting a PIN, filling in forms over the Internet – in essence anything 
a person does when interacting with a device), and
(ii) partly made by the hundreds of programmers who are responsible for writing 
the software that produces the data.
4.4 For this reason, there is an argument, as proposed by Steven W. Teppler, that 
all forms of evidence in digital form remain hearsay,1 because software code conveys 
information.2 Teppler3 gives us the example of United States Patent Office Number 
5,619,571, which includes some uncompiled source code that contains the following 
lines of code in the application:
ptrFIXUP  fixupBase  =  NULL; // Base pointer for fixups
ptrFIXUP  fixupMap  =  NULL; // pointer used to ‘walk off of base’
FIXUP  IVFixup;    // ISII Verification fixup
memset(&IVFixup,0,sizeof(FIXUP));
// Allocate a buffer to build the IFD  (If this fails, we are F’d)4
1 Assistant Professor Andrea Roth points out, in ‘Machine testimony’ (2017) 126 Yale LJ 1972 at 
1980, that ‘the hearsay rule itself could not easily be modified to accommodate machines, given its 
focus on the oath, physical confrontation, and cross- examination’. This must be right.
Stephen Mason, ‘Software code as the witness’, in Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng (eds.), Electronic 
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2 Steven W. Teppler, ‘Testable reliability: a modernized approach to ESI admissibility’ (2014) 12(2) 
Ave Maria Law Review213.
3 Steven W. Teppler, ‘Digital data as hearsay’ (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 7.
4 U.S. Patent No. 5,619,571 (issued Apr. 8, 1997), 17– 18, lines 10– 14.
4.5 What this comment indicates is an acknowledgment of the possibility of a 
weakness in the software code that has been written, not that the software code is or 
will be at fault. In this regard, it is useful to understand more fully the nature of source 
code. For instance, Svein Willassen explains the complex nature of software as follows:
Software is written as source code. The source code is written by the 
programmer, by entering instructions in an editor. The sequence of instructions 
defines the function of the program, such as taking input from the user, 
performing calculations, showing output on the screen and so on. This source 
code is then usually compiled into an executable program (an executable file 
causes a computer to perform tasks in accordance with the instructions), which 
is distributed to the users of the program. The source code cannot be derived 
completely from the executable program.1
1 Svein Yngvar Willassen, ‘Line based hash analysis of source code infringement’ (2009) 6 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 210.
4.6 In the Australian case of Computer Edge Pty Limited v Apple Computer Inc,1 
Gibbs CJ offered the following explanation of the various parts of a computer program:
A computer program is a set of instructions designed to cause a computer to 
perform a particular function or to produce a particular result. A program is 
usually developed in a number of stages. First, the sequence of operations which 
the computer will be required to perform is commonly written out in ordinary 
language, with the help, if necessary, of mathematical formulae and of a flow 
chart and diagram representing the procedure. In the present case if any writing 
in ordinary language (other than the comments and labels mentioned below) 
was produced in the production of Applesoft and Autostart, no question now 
arises concerning it. Next there is prepared what is called a source program. The 
instructions are now expressed in a computer language— either in a source code 
(which is not far removed from ordinary language, and is hence called a high 
level language) or in an assembly code (a low level language, which is further 
removed from ordinary language than a source code), or successively in both. 
Sometimes the expression ‘source code’ seems to be used to include both high 
level and low level language. In the present case, the source programs were 
written in an assembly code, comprising four elements, viz.:
(a) labels identifying particular parts of the program;
(b) mnemonics each consisting of three letters of the alphabet and 
corresponding to a particular operation expressed in 6502 Assembly 
Code (the code used);
(c) mnemonics identifying the register in the microprocessor and/ or the 
number of instructions in the program to which the operation referred 
to in (b) related; and
(d) comments intended to explain the function of the particular part of 
the program for the benefit of a human reader of the program.
The writing has been destroyed, although it is possible to reconstruct the 







114 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
The source code or assembly code cannot be used directly in the computer, and 
must be converted into an object code, which is ‘machine readable,’ i.e. which can 
be directly used in the computer. The conversion is effected by a computer, itself 
properly programmed. The program in object code, the object program, in the 
first instance consists of a sequence of electrical impulses which are often first 
stored on a magnetic disk or tape, and which may be stored permanently in a 
ROM (‘read only memory’), a silicon chip which contains thousands of connected 
electrical circuits. The object code is embodied in the ROM in such a way that 
when the ROM is installed in the computer and electrical power is applied, there 
is generated the sequence of electrical impulses which cause the computer 
to take the action which the program is designed to achieve. The pattern of 
the circuits in the ROM may possibly be discerned with the aid of an electron 
microscope but it cannot be seen by the naked eye. Obviously, the electrical 
impulses themselves cannot be perceived. However the sequence of electrical 
impulses may be described either in binary notation (using the symbols 0 and 
1) or in hexadecimal notation (using the numbers 0– 9 and the letters A– F), and 
it is possible to display the description on the visual display unit of the computer, 
and to print it out on paper. And, as has been said, it is also possible to reconstruct 
the mnemonics in the source code. It will have been seen from this account that 
a program exists successively in source code and in object code, but the object 
code need not be written out in binary or hexadecimal notation in the process of 
producing and storing the program.2
1 [1986] F.S.R. 537.
2 [1986] F.S.R. 537 at 541– 542.
4.7 The term ‘source code’ is also the subject of a commentary in the case of Ibcos 
Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd1 by Jacob J:
The program the human writes is called the ‘source code.’ After it is written it 
is processed by a program called a compiler into binary code. That is what the 
computer uses. All the words and algebraic symbols become binary numbers. 
Now when a human writes he often needs to make notes to remind himself of 
what he has done and to indicate where the important bits are. This is true of life 
generally and for programmers. So it is possible to insert messages in a source 
code. A reader who has access to it can then understand, or understand more 
readily, what is going on. Such notes, which form no part of the program so far 
as the computer is concerned, are called ‘comments.’ They are a kind of side- 
note for humans. In the DIBOL and DBL programs with which I am concerned, 
a line or part of a line of program which is preceded by a semi- colon is taken 
by the complier as a comment. That line is not translated by the compiler into 
machine code. The program would work without the comment. It follows that 
although computers are unforgiving as to spelling in their programs, they do not 
care about misspelt comments in the source code. If a line of operational code 
(a ‘command line’) is modified by putting a semi- colon in front of it, it ceases 
to be operational. The computer treats the code as a mere comment. Computer 
programmers sometimes do this with a line which pre- exists when they no 
longer want that line, but are not sure they may not need it in the future. Or, if the 
programmer thinks he may want to add a feature to his program in the future he 
may put in a comment allowing for this. He is unlikely in the latter instance to put 
in detailed code only to comment it out. A general note will do.
Source code, being what humans can understand, is very important to anyone 
who wants to copy a program with modifications, for instance to upgrade it. It 
is the source code which shows the human how it all works, and he or she will 
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Software houses not surprisingly normally keep their source code to themselves 
and confidential.2
1 [1994] 2 WLUK 353, [1994] FSR 275, [1998] Mason CLR Rep 1, [1995] CLY 854.
2 [1994] FSR 275 at 286.
4.8 There is a distinction between the code written by programmers that provides 
instructions to the computer and the comments made by the programmer writing the 
code. If the software code is inaccurate, or if an instruction written by a programmer 
acts on information or a further instruction that is incorrect, then the code will probably 
fail to instruct the computer in the way the programmer intended. However, comments 
by a programmer that do not form part of the instructions cannot necessarily be 
considered to be part of the code.
The classification of digital data
4.9 The starting point for this analysis is an attempt at classifying software code as 
digital data. To this end, Professor Ormerod, the commentator in a report on the case of 
R. v Skinner (Philip),1 suggested there were three questions to consider for every type 
of digital data:
(i) Who or what made the representation.
(ii) Whether the representation was hearsay or not.
(iii) Whether the evidence is authentic.2
1 [2005] EWCA Crim 1439, [2005] 5 WLUK 506, [2006] Crim LR 56.
2 David C. Ormerod, ‘Evidence: information copied from one website to another’ [2006] Crim LR 56.
4.10 In Elf Caledonia Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd, Lord Caplan noted the 
following:
The defenders suggested that there are three categories of use for computers. 
They can be used to record data without the need of human intervention. The 
Spectra- Tek programme was described as being of this type. It was said that 
what this programme prints out may be regarded as real evidence. However 
Counsel had to concede that even this type of computer exercise depends on the 
reliability of the material programme. Unless it is properly programmed it will 
not store and regurgitate facts accurately …
Another category of computer use was said to be where data is recorded by 
the computer and the data is put in manually. Thus Piper would regularly send 
information to the beach and this would be entered in the computer system. It 
was accepted that to prove this material would involve some hearsay evidence 
unless the persons who entered the material in the computer were led as 
witnesses. However the defenders did not explore just what evidence would 
be required in the situation under consideration. In general it seems to me that 
there must be many cases where it would not be practicable to lead the person 
who generated the data and the person who fed it into the computer so that there 
must be some practical limits as to what proof can be expected in this kind of 
computer evidence.
It was submitted that the third type of computer situation is where the computer 
is used by experts to carry out calculations or simulations. It was claimed that 
in this kind of situation the general rules relating to expert evidence should 
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one factor is in- putted wrongly. The kind of computer models used by experts 
of course generally requires more than normal discrimination and judgment 
in the selection of in- put material. Thus the expert will have to prove how the 
input material was arrived at and the justification for selecting what was put in. 
However I am not sure that the three categories of computer exercise referred 
to by the defenders’ Counsel can be distinguished quite as neatly as he attempts. 
Even in a simple office system distorted results will arise if the proper material 
is not fed into the computer. Thus it was argued that the first requirement in 
considering computer evidence given by an expert is to consider the input. That 
may be so but it cannot be exclusive to expert computer evidence. Of course it 
was said that the best evidence of in- put and out- put material is in the print- outs 
of such material.1
1 [1997] ScotCS 1, 898– 900, sub nom Elf Enterprise Caledonia Ltd v London Bridge Engineering 
Limited [1997] ScotCS 1, 2.
4.11 Based on this categorization, Professor Ormerod noted that some types of 
computer- generated representations do not infringe the hearsay rule.1 If a computer 
carries out the instructions of the program that has been written by humans to create 
such data, it may be right to suggest that such data are probably accurate without the 
need to test whether they are correct. But if the time as noted by a clock on a camera 
linked to an ATM is to be offered into evidence to link the accused to the murder of the 
person whose card was used in the ATM, then the time as data will have to be adduced 
as to its truth, as in the case of Liser v Smith,2 and there will be a need to validate the 
clock, and verify the time and date set by a human being.3
1 Although he accepted that s 129 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 may need to be considered. For a 
commentary on s 129, see John R. Spencer, Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Proceedings (Hart Publishing 
2008) ch 3.
2 254 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2003).
3 Colin Tapper, ‘Reform of the law of evidence in relation to the output from computers’ (1995) 3 Intl 
J L & Info Tech 79, 85 fn 44.
4.12 To the same end, Professor Smith distinguished between the types of 
representation that the code in a device can make,1 and argued that where the 
computer is instructed to perform certain functions, many of which are performed 
in a mechanical way (such as the addition of the time and date on an email), in such 
circumstances the computer is producing real evidence, not hearsay. In illustrating 
the point he was making, Professor Smith gave a number of examples where evidence 
is not hearsay.2 One example was that of Six’s thermometer (commonly known as a 
maximum minimum thermometer), which he referred to as an instrument and not 
a machine. This is correct. The thermometer provides three readings: the current 
temperature, and the highest and the lowest temperatures reached since it was last 
reset. A human being can give evidence of his observation of the precise location of the 
mercury against the scale at a given time and date. The witness might be challenged as 
to the truthfulness of his recollection without calling into question the accuracy of the 
instrument. Such evidence will not be hearsay. Alternatively, the precision of the scale 
on the thermometer might be open to scrutiny, in which case it will be necessary to 
have the instrument tested by an appropriately qualified expert.3
1 J. C. Smith, ‘The admissibility of statements by computer’ [1981] Crim LR 387.
2 Smith, ‘The admissibility of statements by computer’, 390.
3 This was also discussed by Penelope A. Pengilley, ‘Machine information: is it hearsay?’ (1982) 
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4.13 Further examples considered by Professor Smith included a camera that records 
an image, a tape recorder that records sound and a radar speedmeter that records the 
speed of a vehicle. In 1981, each of these machines was mechanical in construction, 
with the exception of the radar speedmeter, which also incorporated components 
that were instruments. None of the examples involved devices controlled by software 
written by human beings. Although it is possible to alter the image from a camera or 
the sound from a tape recording, or for a human being to lie about the reading from a 
radar speedmeter, nevertheless the evidence from such devices would not be hearsay.
4.14 In respect of software, Professor Smith indicated that a programmer may make 
mistakes (errors are common, for which see Chapter 5 on ‘reliability’), but mistakes 
can also be made when deciding the scale on a thermometer. He went on to suggest 
that ‘[t] his consideration goes to weight rather than admissibility. In any event it 
certainly has nothing to do with the hearsay rule.’1
1 Smith, ‘The admissibility of statements by computer’ 390. One answer to this issue has been 
proposed by Professor Pattenden – that s 129(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 be replaced ‘with 
a single test of admissibility for all factual representations that are not in substance the statement 
of a person but “machinespeak”, that is, those whose content is the outcome of creating machine- 
processing’: Rosemary Pattenden, ‘Machinespeak: section 129 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003’ [2010] 
Crim LR 623, 636– 637. Professor Pattenden discusses the conflicting opinions relating to s 129(1) in 
detail.
4.15 Professor Seng proposed an analysis in 1997:
Computers which are used as data processing devices can be classified into the 
following categories: devices which accept human- supplied input and produce 
output, self- contained data processing devices which obtain input or take 
recordings from the environment without human intervention, and a hybrid of 
the two.1
1 Daniel Seng, ‘Computer output as evidence’ [1997] SJLS 130, 173.
4.16 Steven Teppler also accepted that it is possible to categorize data into three 
types, treating digital data as hearsay:
(i) The memorandum ‘created’ by a human.
(ii) Digital data generated in part with human assistance.
(iii) Digital data generated without a human being.1
1 Teppler, ‘Testable reliability’, 235– 240.
4.17 Teppler has also suggested that a ‘fourth potential category, for which there 
has been no judicial analysis, has recently emerged as a consequence of computer 
programs that “listen and respond” to questions in natural language and with a “voice” 
that closely mimics a “real” human’.1 Arguably, this category fits into category three, for 
which see below.
1 Teppler, ‘Testable reliability’, 235.
4.18 The authors of Archbold have also divided digital data into three categories:
(i) Where the device is used as a processor of data.
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(iii) Where there is data recorded and processed by software that has been 
entered by a person, directly or indirectly. 1
1 Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell), 9– 11, 9– 14.
4.19 It is proposed that the three categories outlined by Professor Seng, Steven 
Teppler and the authors of Archbold be slightly amended to read as follows:
(i) Content written by one or more people (that is, where the device is used as a 
processor of data).
(ii) Records generated by the software that have not had any input from a human.
(iii) Records comprising a mix of human input and calculations generated by 
software.
Each of these categories is discussed below.
Category 1: Content written by one or more people
4.20 Records of electronic content that are written by one or more people include 
email messages, word processing files and instant messages. Unless the author of the 
software has included instructions to alter the content of the text that has been typed 
in by a human, the only function of the device is to store the information that has been 
input by the human being. However, Teppler suggests that all computer- generated 
information is hearsay of some sort, and that the data generated by an email program, 
for instance, remains hearsay because:
the receiving computer is carrying out the stated intent or declaration of 
some person who instructed the computer to make the assertion on his or 
her behalf (e.g., a programmer) to carry out some request (and provided that 
certain conditions are met) that the receiving computer was told by the sending 
computer as agent for that person, which in turn was requested by a statement 
or declaration of the person or sender.1
1 Teppler, ‘Testable reliability’, 240.
4.21 Conceptually this must be right, but the status of the instructions issued by 
the software code at the material time is rarely relevant. This category, artificial as it 
might appear to be, enables content that was input by the maker of the statement to be 
separated from content made by the author of the software program – in the same way 
that the printed notepaper with the name of the person or organization, together with 
other information such as address and telephone number, is created by the printer, but 
is distinct from the content of the letter.
4.22 The content of the software program will not be relevant unless there is a 
dispute as to what data were entered, when and where they were entered, and by 
whom. In such circumstances, the relevant witnesses can be called to give oral evidence 
to determine the truth, failing which a suitably qualified digital evidence practitioner 
might be called to give evidence about the metadata associated with the document to 
help ascertain answers to these technical questions.
4.23 By way of example, consider whether a letter typed into a computer is a 
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author printed the document and then read the contents to verify the text, the author 
authenticates the text. Given this set of facts, the computer is a mere tool. Where the 
author does not read the printout, the document remains computer output.1 Professor 
Seng suggests that ‘it is difficult to see how reading what is clearly a computer- 
produced document converts it into one not produced by a computer. The printout 
remains clearly a document produced by a computer operated as a data storage 
device.’2 Professor Smith indicates that the person can authenticate the text after it has 
been printed. This does not mean that the act of authentication takes away the fact that 
the document was created on and remains stored on the device. This distinction can be 
important, as in the case of electronic wills. The court must establish whether, in the 
absence of the testator authenticating the will, the testator actually wrote the will and 
intended it to be their last will and testament. In such cases, it might also be necessary 
to give consideration to both the content written by the human and the software code 
that makes up the metadata.
1 R. v Shephard (Hilda) [1993] Crim LR 295 (note), 297– 298.
2 Seng, ‘Computer output as evidence’ 178 – Professor Seng begins his discussion (at 177) by asking 
whether word- processed documents are computer output or recorded computer output.
4.24 Professor Tapper pointed out that computers include such facilities as spell 
checkers, calculators and automatic paragraph numbering, among other tools. This 
suggests that a word file (such as a letter) is processed computer output.1 In his 
discussion, Professor Smith also discussed the same document being produced by a 
human typing on a typewriter. If the text – for the sake of illustration, a letter – is written 
by hand, or typed on a typewriter, or typed into a computer, the resultant content will 
be the same, other than the type of print, typeface and such like used, although the 
author might cause the data to remain stored on the device if it was a computer.2 The 
person writing the letter by hand or on a typewriter might use a dictionary to check 
their spelling in the same way that spelling can be checked on a computer using the 
spell checker. Whether the letter is written by hand, typed on a typewriter or on a 
computer, the letter will then be complete when printed (in the case of the computer) 
on paper. The method used to record words on paper must be irrelevant, providing 
that the only evidence to be relied upon is the text that is recorded on the paper. If 
other factors are in issue, such as the purported author of the document, then clearly 
an examination of the digital data might be instructive. Professor Seng takes issue 
with Professor Smith’s characterization that the evidential quality of a letter changes 
immediately when a recipient reads it, without taking into account any characterization 
of its source. In such a case, where the computer is behaving as a storage device, the 
rebuttable presumption is that the code operating to make it behave as such is reliable, 
and issues as to authentication of this code do not enter the evidential analysis, 
generally speaking. But there can be other software errors, for which see Chapter 5 on 
the ‘reliability’ of computers.
1 Tapper, ‘Reform of the law of evidence in relation to the output from computers’, 86– 88.
2 A point made by Professor Seng, ‘Computer output as evidence’, 178.
4.25 The Law Commission in their report1 noted that the ‘present law draws a 
distinction according to whether the statement consists of, or is based upon, only 
what the machine itself has observed; or whether it incorporates, or is based upon, 
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did not apply to tapes, films or photographs, or to documents produced by machines 
that automatically record an event or circumstance.3 This was because the court is not 
being asked to accept the truth of an assertion made by any person, and the evidence 
is real evidence, not hearsay.
1 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com No 245, 
1997).
2 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com No 245, 
1997) para 7.43.
3 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com No 245, 
1997) para 7.44.
4.26 That humans generally have control over a computer system is demonstrated 
in the case of Ferguson v British Gas Trading Limited,1 in which the members of the 
Court of Appeal rejected arguments submitted that letters sent out automatically by a 
computer were not the fault of British Gas. Computers only work on instructions given 
to them, and it followed that a person in British Gas, or authorized by British Gas, must 
have instructed the computer to initiate the letters in question. In this case, British Gas 
sent letters to the claimant that the court held were capable of amounting to unlawful 
harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. In the words of 
Jacob LJ: ‘British Gas says it has done nothing wrong; that it is perfectly all right for it 
to treat consumers in this way, at least if it is all just done by computer.’2 Jacob LJ went 
on to indicate that he did not follow the reasoning of Martin Porter QC, counsel for 
British Gas, that ‘[as] the correspondence was computer generated … [the harassed 
victim] should not have taken it as seriously as if it had come from an individual’.3 
Jacob LJ noted that computers operate on instructions given to them: ‘real people are 
responsible for programming and entering material into the computer. It is British 
Gas’s system which, at the very least, allowed the impugned conduct to happen.’4 
Likewise, Sedley LJ roundly rejected the pathetic excuse offered by British Gas:
One excuse which has formed part of British Gas’s legal argument for striking out 
the claim, and which has been advanced as incontestable and decisive, is that a 
large corporation such as British Gas cannot be legally responsible for mistakes 
made either by its computerised debt recovery system or by the personnel 
responsible for programming and operating it. The short answer is that it can 
be, for reasons explained by Lord Justice Jacob. It would be remarkable if it 
could not: it would mean that the privilege of incorporation not only shielded its 
shareholders and directors from personal liability for its debts but protected the 
company itself from legal liabilities which a natural person cannot evade. That is 
not what legal personality means.5
1 [2009] EWCA Civ 46, [2010] 1 WLR 785, [2009] 3 All ER 304, [2009] 2 WLUK 206, (2009) 106(8) 
LSG 18, (2009) 153(7) SJLB 34, [2009] CLY 3959.
2 [2009] EWCA Civ 46 at [5] .
3 [2009] EWCA Civ 46 at [21].
4 [2009] EWCA Civ 46 at [21].
5 [2009] EWCA Civ 46 at [51].
Category 2: Records generated by the software that have not  
had any input from a human
4.27 Examples of records generated by software controlling a computer without any 
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and diagnostics, number plate recognition software,1 automatic connections made by 
telephone switches and the records of such calls made for billing purposes,2 records of 
ATM transactions, machine translation,3 and objects connected to the Internet, known 
as Internet of Things.4 In one case, Antonio Boparan Singh was convicted of dangerous 
driving. Part of the evidence adduced by the prosecution included evidence from the 
event data recorder (EDR) – a device fitted to the airbag system of his vehicle. The EDR 
established that a force equivalent to 42 mph was lost in one- fifth of a second in the 
crash. This information helped the police to put Singh’s speed at around 72 mph.5
1 https:// www.police.uk/ pu/ advice- crime- prevention/ automatic- number- plate- recognition- 
anpr/ ; for judicial consideration of automatic number plate recognition, see R. v Jackson (Royston) 
[2011] EWCA Crim 1870, [2011] 7 WLUK 643; Attorney General’s Reference (Nos 114 and 115 of 2009) 
[2010] EWCA Crim 1459, [2010] 6 WLUK 549; R. v Najib (Amaar) [2013] EWCA Crim 86, [2013] 2 
WLUK 290; R. v Khan (Imran); R. v Mahmood (Amjed Khan); R. v Kajla (Jaspal) [2013] EWCA Crim 2230, 
[2013] 12 WLUK 57, [2014] Crim LR 520; R. v Welsh (Christopher Mark) [2014] EWCA Crim 1027, 
[2014] 5 WLUK 740. Interestingly, the absence of challenges to ANPR evidence in the English courts 
could be attributed to the fact that, for the large part, the defendants or the parties have admitted to 
the accuracy of such evidence and so no real dispute arises: see [125], Makdessi v Cavendish Square 
Holdings BV ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, [2016] AC 1172, [2015] 3 WLR 1373, [2016] 2 
All ER 519, [2016] 2 All ER (Comm) 1, [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 55, [2015] 11 WLUK 78, [2015] 2 CLC 686, 
[2016] BLR 1, 162 Con LR 1, [2016] RTR 8, [2016] CILL 3769, Times, 23 November 2015, [2016] CLY 
437, also known as Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi, El Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings 
BV; also D (A Child) (Fact- finding Appeal), Re [2019] EWCA Civ 2302, [2019] 12 WLUK 409, [2020] 2 
FCR 15, [2020] 7 CL 90, also known as M v X BC, at [32]. Even so, when a discrepancy arises in relation 
to ANPR evidence, as in the case of A (Death of a Baby), Re [2011] EWHC 2754 (Fam) [66] and [69], 
where there was testimonial evidence to corroborate the drivers’ testimony as to their movements and 
contradict the ANPR evidence, the independent verifiability of the vehicular movements coupled with 
the lack of authentication of the ANPR evidence led the court to exercise its discretion and choose to 
draw no conclusions from the ANPR evidence [158].
2 Rosemary Pattenden, ‘Authenticating “things” in English law: principles for adducing tangible 
evidence in common law jury trials’ (2008) 12 E & P 273, suggests that ‘self- generated output’ can 
be categorized into two sub- divisions: output that contains no input from human thought, and output 
that draws directly or indirectly on information fed into the device by a person: 297; Julian Fulbrook, 
‘Deadly distractions: mobile telephones and transport litigation’ (2018) 2 JPI Law 89, in which he cites 
Eyres v Atkinsons Kitchens & Bedrooms Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 365, [2007] 4 WLUK 369, (2007) 151 SJLB 
576, Times, 21 May 2007, [2007] CLY 2955.
3 Nicole E. Crossey, ‘Machine translator testimony & the confrontation clause: has the time come for 
the hearsay rules to escape the stone age?’ (2020) 12 Drexal L Rev 561.
4 David Caruso, Michael Legg and Jordan Phoustanis, ‘The automation paradox in litigation: the 
inadequacy of procedure and evidence law to manage electronic evidence generated by the “internet 
of things” in civil disputes’ (2019) 19 Macquarie LJ 157.
5 Mark Cowan, ‘Crime files: picking up the pieces on Midland roads’ Birmingham Mail (Birmingham, 
6 October 2010); an insurance company used data recorded from telematics technology installed in a 
motor vehicle to disprove 31 claims involving seven accidents over five months: Oliver Ralph, ‘Black 
box data expose £500,000 driver fraud’ Financial Times (London, 11 June 2016) 4; James Wade, 
‘Emerging technologies in collision investigation’ (2016) 4 JPI Law 220; Amelia Murray, ‘A £90,000 
bogus car insurance claim – and how the fraudsters were caught by their telematics box’, The Telegraph, 
13 January 2018, https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/ insurance/ car/ 90000- bogus- car- insurance- claim- 
fraudsters- caught- telematics/ .
4.28 It does not follow that the automatic communications that occur between 
software code are accurate. For instance, the records from a telephone service provider 
might be admitted to show that calls were made and received,1 but it does not follow 
that the same records can be used as a basis for showing that a SIM card used in a 
mobile telephone, and purportedly its user,2 were at a particular location or moved 
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1 For an analysis in the context of New Brunswick, Canada, see Her Majesty the Queen v Dennis James 
Oland 2015 NBQB 244 (third ruling); Her Majesty the Queen v Dennis James Oland 2015 NBQB 245 
(fourth ruling) and the observations by David M. Paciocco, ‘Proof and progress: coping with the law 
of evidence in a technological age’ (2013) 11(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 181, which 
in turn are disputed in Ken Chasse, ‘Guilt by mobile phone tracking shouldn’t make “evidence to the 
contrary” impossible’, http:// www.slaw.ca/ 2016/ 10/ 04/ guilt- by- mobile- phone- tracking- shouldnt- 
make- evidence- to- the- contrary- impossible/ .
2 Cell site analysis was the subject of discussion in R. v Jackson (Royston) [2011] EWCA Crim 1870, 
[2011] 7 WLUK 643; Reg Coutts and Hugh Selby, ‘Safe and unsafe use of mobile phone evidence’ (Public 
Defenders Criminal Law Conference, Sydney, March 2009), http:// www.publicdefenders.nsw.gov.au/ 
Documents/ safeunsafemobilephones.pdf, recommend that defence lawyers pay particular attention to 
the explanation of cell site analysis set out by Blaxell J in The State of Western Australia v Coates [2007] 
WASC 307, [211]– [220]; R. P. Coutts and H. Selby, ‘Problems with cell phone evidence tendered to 
“prove” the location of a person at a point in time’ (2016) 13 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature 
Law Review 76.
3 Michael Cherry, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Manfred Schenk, Aaron Romano, Naomi Fetterman, 
Nicole Hardin and Arnie Beckman, ‘Cell tower junk science’ (2012) 95(4) Judicature 151, 151– 52; 
Aaron Blank, ‘The limitations and admissibility of using historical cellular site data to track the location 
of a cellular phone’ (2011) 18(1) Rich J L & Tech 10; Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr, ‘Scientific fact or junk 
science? Tracking a cell phone without GPS’ (2014) 53(1) Judges’ J 37; Graeme Horsman and Lynne R. 
Conniss, ‘Investigating evidence of mobile phone usage by drivers in road traffic accidents’ (2015) 12 
Digital Investigation S30, S37; Alex Biedermann and Joëlle Vuille, ‘Digital evidence, “absence” of data 
and ambiguous patterns of reasoning’ (2016) 16 Digital Investigation S86, S94; for the case of Phuong 
Canh Ngo, see R v Ngo [2001] NSWSC 1021 (the sentence); R v Ngo [2003] NSWCCA 82 (appeal against 
conviction); David Patten (Judicial Officer Conducting Inquiry), Report to the Chief Justice of New South 
Wales (The Hon J J Spigelman AC) of the Inquiry into the Conviction of Phuong Canh Ngo for the murder 
of John Newman (14 April 2009), http:// www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ practice_ notes/ nswsc_ pc.nsf/ 6a64
691105a54031ca256880000c25d7/ f1ef2541db38ae82ca25759b00052606/ $FILE/ Report_ Phuong_ 
Ngo_ 140409.pdf; Phuong Canh Ngo – Application under Part 7 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 
[2010] NSWSC 981 (hearing after Report published).
Category 3: Records comprising a mix of human input and 
calculations generated by software
4.29 An example of records comprising a mix of human input and calculations 
generated by software is that of a financial spreadsheet program that contains human 
statements (input to the spreadsheet program) and computer processing (mathematical 
calculations performed by the spreadsheet program). From an evidential point of view, 
the issue is whether the person or the software created the content of the record, and 
how much of the content was created by the software and how much by the human. 
It is possible that the quality of the software acts to undermine the authenticity of 
the data, which may in turn affect the truth of the statement tendered in evidence. 
The algorithms in spreadsheet programs are good examples of where the software 
code affects the truth of the statement. For a more detailed analysis, see Chapter 6 on 
authentication.
4.30 Professor Pattenden suggests that ‘most representations of fact require human 
intervention at some point’,1 which must be right. The Law Commission report also 
indicated:
By contrast, the law does sometimes exclude evidence of a statement generated 
by a machine, where the statement is based on information fed into the machine 
by a human being. In such a case, it seems, the statement by the machine is 
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1 Pattenden, ‘Machinespeak’, 633.
2 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com No 245, 
1997) para 7.46.
4.31 This comment distinguishes between information fed into a machine (the 
word ‘computer’ is not used, but the word ‘machine’ is presumably meant to include 
a computer or computer- like device) and the instructions contained in software code 
written by human beings that are essential for a device to work. Where a person inputs 
information into a computer, and that information is to be relied upon as to the truth of 
the statement, then the person should give oral evidence of this action. In contrast, the 
software code that might be used to transform the raw data into information that can 
be used is not necessarily relevant, depending on the purpose for which it is adduced 
in evidence. To this end, the Law Commission1 compared the cases of R v Wood (Stanley 
William)2 and R v Coventry Justices, Ex p Bullard.3 In Wood, the evidence of the analysis 
by a computer of tests carried out by chemists was not considered to be hearsay 
because the chemists gave oral evidence of the results of the tests. The calculations 
performed by the computer were carried out under the instructions of the person who 
wrote the software code. The chemists were able to give oral evidence of the results 
of the tests they performed, but the computer software carried out the actual analysis. 
The calculations relied upon the software code, which was created by a human being 
(in this case, a Mr Kellie). The software analysed the data in accordance with the 
instructions given to it by Mr Kellie. The computer was not capable of analysing the 
data without the software code. The chemists gave oral evidence of the results of 
the computer program. This means that the truth of the content of the output of the 
computer was predicated upon the software code created by Mr Kellie.
1 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com No 245, 
1997) para 7.47.
2 [1982] 6 WLUK 191, (1983) 76 Cr App R 23, [1982] Crim LR 667, [1983] CLY 636.
3 [1992] 2 WLUK 233, (1992) 95 Cr App R 175, [1992] RA 79 [1992] COD 285, (1992) 142 NLJ 383, 
Times, 24 February 1992, Independent, 26 February 1992, Guardian, 11 March 1992, [1992] CLY 2058; 
‘Print- Out Inadmissible as Hearsay’ (1993) 57 JCL 232.
4.32 In comparison, the computer printout in R v Coventry Justices, Ex p Bullard 
included a statement that a person was in arrears with his community charge. This 
was held to be inadmissible hearsay because the content of the printout contained 
information that had been put into the computer by a human, and the printout had not 
been properly proved. The Law Commission, agreeing with the result, would propose 
a similar analysis as follows:
An alternative view is that the statement by the machine, properly understood, is 
conditional on the accuracy of the data on which it is based; and that, if those data 
are not proved to have been accurate, the statement therefore has no probative 
value at all. The question of hearsay does not arise, because the statement is 
simply irrelevant.1
1 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com No 245, 
1997) para 7.48.
4.33 In Mehesz v Redman,1 Zelling J concluded that the output of an auto- lab data 
analyser was hearsay, given that the analysis relied on software where the writer of the 
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responsible for the modifications had not been called either. A similar decision was 
made in Holt v Auckland City Council,2 where evidence of the analysis of the amount of 
alcohol in a blood sample was excluded by the New Zealand Court of Appeal because 
the truth of the statement tendered was predicated upon the software code written 
by a programmer who was not called to give evidence, which meant there was a gap 
in the continuity of proof. In contrast, in Wood, the oral evidence of the results of the 
tests were read out by the chemists from printouts from the computer (which was real 
evidence), and if the results were to be challenged for their accuracy, then the integrity 
of the software program might need to be tested.
1 (1979) 21 SASR 569.
2 [1980] 2 NZLR 124.
4.34 The instructions written by a human in the form of software code can, 
depending on the circumstances, be just that: instructions to the machine to perform 
a particular task. This is illustrated in the case of Maynard.1 An item of software, called 
a trace, had been written to ascertain whether a particular employee was obtaining 
access to private information in a computer system, and if so, to record the time and 
date that the employee viewed the data. The employee was subsequently prosecuted. 
The magistrate refused to admit the evidence of the printout of the trace data, partly 
because he considered the record of the time and date to be hearsay. On appeal, 
Wright J rejected this analysis. The person who wrote the code gave evidence at trial, 
both as to the reason for writing the code and as to how it worked. The judge was of the 
following opinion:
it seems to me that once the trace was applied to the respondent’s log- on 
identification, the process then undertaken by the trace was entirely mechanical 
in that the peregrinations through the database by that computer user was 
automatically traced through the system and were recorded and stored ready for 
retrieval in report form as soon as the trace print- out was called for.2
1 (1993) 70 A Crim R 133, sub nom Rook v Maynard (1993) 126 ALR 150.
2 (1993) 70 A Crim R 133 at 141.
4.35 Wright J then went on to illustrate the separate steps:
Although much more complex in its operation than the following description 
suggests, the process, stripped to its essentials, involved (a) The implementation 
of the trace program and its attachment to the respondent’s log- on identification. 
This was a human function proved by direct evidence from Mr Poulter [the 
person who wrote the code]. (b) Once attached, the trace followed the log- on 
identification number and the user and (c) when the user tapped into or called 
up a particular file from the database, the trace was able to store details of this 
event in its memory for subsequent retrieval.1
1 (1993) 70 A Crim R 133 at 142.
4.36 There was no evidence that suggested that the trace program modified any 
other programs in the computer, and if there were any such failings, the program 
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Challenging the code to test the truth of the statement
4.37 One of the most frequently mounted challenges to evidence in digital form is the 
admissibility of the output from breath- testing devices. Such challenges are attempted 
across jurisdictions, but the legislation put in place usually provides that where a device 
is authorized by an appropriate authority, judges do not have the power to require the 
prosecution to reveal the software code, or refuse to because, it is claimed, the defence 
do not provide sufficient evidence to support the challenge that the device might not be 
reliable.1 However, in State of New Jersey v Chun the Supreme Court in New Jersey in the 
United States ordered the software of a new breath- testing device – the Alcotest 7100 
MK111- C – to be reviewed in detail and tested for scientific validity.2 After extensive 
testing, the court concluded that the Alcotest, using New Jersey Firmware version 3.11, 
‘is generally scientifically reliable’, but ordered modifications to enable its results to be 
admitted into legal proceedings.3 The analysis of the source code indicated that there 
was a fault when a third breath sample was taken, which could cause the reading to 
be incorrect, and the court saw fit to order a change in one of the formulae used in the 
software. This is a significant decision because the court accepted, albeit implicitly, 
that the software that controlled the device, written by a human, was defective. This 
in turn meant that had the code not been remedied, the data relied upon for the truth 
of the statement would be defective and therefore this would affect the accuracy and 
truthfulness of the evidence.
1 Peter Hungerford- Welch, ‘Disclosure: DPP v Walsall Magistrates’ Court’(2020) 4 Crim LR 335; DPP 
v Walsall Magistrates’ Court DPP v Lincoln Magistrates’ Court [2019] EWHC 3317 (Admin), [2019] 12 
WLUK 61, [2020] RTR 14, [2020] Crim LR 335, [2020] ACD 21, [2020] 5 CL 43; R. (on the application 
of DPP) v Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court [2017] EWHC 3719 (Admin), [2019] 1 WLR 2617, 
[2017] 7 WLUK 154, also known as DPP v Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court.
2 194 N.J. 54, 943 A.2d 114; an application authorizing the discovery of source code used in the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test equipment failed for procedural reasons in State of Florida v Bjorkland, 
924 So.2d 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).









The presumption that computers are ‘reliable’
Stephen Mason
5.1 This chapter considers the common law presumption in the law of England 
and Wales that ‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume 
that mechanical instruments were in order at the material time’. The Law Commission 
formulated this presumption in 1997.1 The concept of ‘judicial notice’2 is also 
considered in this chapter.
1 The Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics ((Law Com 
No 245, 1997), 13.13. The Law Commission has an influence beyond the jurisdiction of England and 
Wales, for which see two cases from the Supreme Court of India, Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer [2014] INSC 
658 (18 September 2014), where Kurian J said: ‘It is relevant to note that Section 69 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (PACE) dealing with evidence on computer records in the United Kingdom 
was repealed by Section 60 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999. Computer evidence 
hence must follow the common law rule, where a presumption exists that the computer producing 
the evidential output was recording properly at the material time. The presumption can be rebutted 
if evidence to the contrary is adduced’ (correct pagination not available in the pdf version). In Arjun 
Panditrao Khotar v Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020 SCC OnLine SC 571) Ramasubramanian J outlined 
the discussions in the Law Commission paper, but failed to consider any of the recent scholarship on 
this topic.
2 Halsbury’s Laws (5th edn, 2015) vol 12, paras 712– 723.
5.2 The reasons given by the Law Commission for the introduction of this 
presumption make it clear that the words ‘mechanical instruments’ include computers 
and computer- like devices – even though computers and computer- like devices are 
not mechanical instruments. Judges have, although not exclusively, used the term 
‘reliable’ in relation to computers, and lawyers have also bypassed the use of the word 
‘reliable’ by using the word ‘robust’. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the 
introduction of a presumption of ‘in order’ or ‘reliability’ or ‘working properly’ in 
relation to mechanical instruments generally, and to explain why the term ‘reliable’ in 
relation to computers and computer- like devices is not accurate, although we now have 
definitive evidence from computer scientists that the words ‘reliable’ and ‘robust’ as 
used by lawyers and judges have been exposed as not having the meaning attributed to 
them by the legal profession.1 It must be emphasized that the examples of the failure of 
computers and similar devices discussed in this chapter are provided to demonstrate 
the problems that occur, and do not represent the totality of illustrations that could 
be used, nor the volume of errors that have occurred or will occur in the future. It is 
suggested that judicial notice be taken of these examples, particularly because they 
contradict the presumption that computers are ‘reliable’.2
1 Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bev Littlewood, Harold Thimbleby and Martyn Thomas CBE, ‘The Law 
Commission presumption concerning the dependability of computer evidence’ (2020) 17 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 1; Peter Bernard Ladkin, ‘Robustness of software’ 
(2020) 17 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 15; Michael Jackson, ‘An approach to 
the judicial evaluation of evidence from computers and computer systems’ (2021) 18 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 50.
Stephen Mason, ‘The presumption that computers are “reliable” ’, in Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng 
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2 For instance, problems with the century date change problem continue to afflict technology, 
and in 2038 the problem will occur again, because epoch time on Unix is stored as a 32- bit integer, 
which will run out of capacity at 3.14 am on 19 January 2038, for which see Chris Stokel- Walker, ‘A 
lazy fix 20 years ago means the Y2K bug is taking down computers now’, NewScientist Technology, 
7 January 2020, https:// www.newscientist.com/ article/ 2229238- a- lazy- fix- 20- years- ago- means- 
the- y2k- bug- is- taking- down- computers- now/ ; Professor Martyn Thomas, ‘What really happened 
in Y2K?’, Gresham College lecture, 4 April 2017, https:// www.gresham.ac.uk/ lectures- and- events/ 
what- really- happened- in- y2k.
The purpose of a presumption
5.3 The aim of a presumption, which allocates the burden of proof, is to alleviate 
the need to prove every item of evidence adduced in legal proceedings, to reduce 
the need for evidence in relation to some issues and to save ‘the time and expense 
of proving the obvious’.1 In an appeal before the Supreme Court of South Australia, 
Travers J explained the rationale in the case of Barker v Fauser2 regarding the accuracy3 
of the readings of a weighbridge:
It is rather a matter of the application of the ordinary principles of circumstantial 
evidence. In my opinion such instruments can merely provide prima- facie 
evidence in the sense indicated by May v. O’Sullivan [(1955) 92 CLR 654]. They 
do not transfer any onus of proof to one who disputes them, though they may, 
and often do, create a case to answer. Circumstantial evidence is something 
which is largely based upon our ordinary experience of life … It is merely an 
application of this principle to our ordinary experience in life which tells us of the 
general probability of the substantial correctness of watches, weighbridges and 
other such instruments. If they are instruments or machines of a type which we 
know to be in common use our experience tells us that this is suggestive of their 
substantial correctness. Experience also tells us that they are rarely completely 
accurate, but usually so substantially accurate that people go on using them, and 
that subject to a certain amount of allowance for some measure of incorrectness, 
they act upon them.4
1 Holt v Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124, per Richardson J at 128.
2 (1962) SASR 176.
3 The words ‘accurate’, ‘precision’ and ‘correctness’ are often used interchangeably in the everyday 
sense, but they have different meanings in their technical use. I owe this observation to Professor 
Martin Newby.
4 (1962) SASR 176 at 178– 179.
5.4 This explanation justifies the rationale for the presumption that mechanical 
instruments were in order at the material time. However, it appears that this 
presumption exists on the basis of expediency. In admitting evidence from a mechanical 
instrument or similar device, judges have not justified the presumption on the basis of 
relevant scientific evidence, but have substituted for it concepts such as ‘common use’, 
‘ordinary experience’ or ‘substantial correctness’.
5.5 Consider the accuracy of a watch. Just because a watch has passed tests of 
accuracy at one moment in time does not preclude its mechanical parts from failing 
subsequently. In Cheatle v Considine, Travers J put the discussion of the accuracy of 
mechanical instruments into its overall context:
My view on the subject of such instruments is that reliance on them is basically 
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watches, speedometers, or even hearing aids, seems to be some circumstantial 
proof that all these things do provide some aid or assistance to those who use 
them, otherwise they would not go on using them. They are not necessarily 
accurate, and indeed, probably, most of such instruments on being properly 
tested would reveal some degree of inaccuracy. But I think in the absence of 
contrary evidence, they are to be regarded as some proof.1
1 Cheatle v Considine [1965] SASR 281 at 282.
Presumptions and mechanical instruments
5.6 The presumption that scientific instruments work properly has a long history.1 
For instance, scales benefit from the presumption.2 Timing devices also take advantage 
of the presumption. In Plancq v Marks,3 in an appeal against conviction for driving a 
motor car in excess of the speed limit of 20 mph, the evidence of the police officer 
was challenged. The stopwatch used by the police officer was produced in court. The 
appeal focused on the ground that the police officer gave opinion evidence as to the 
speed of the vehicle. This appeal was dismissed on the basis that the police officer was 
merely giving oral evidence of the actions of the stopwatch, which did not constitute 
the giving of opinion evidence. The real issue was whether the police officer was telling 
the truth.
1 R. P. Groom- Johnson and G. F. L. Bridgman (eds), A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (12th edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell 1931), 167, in which the working accuracy of certain scientific instruments, such 
as watches, clocks, thermometers, aneroids and anemometers, among other ‘ingenious contrivances’, 
was recognized in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
2 Giles v Dodds [1947] VLR 465, [1947] ArgusLawRp 53; (1947) 53 Argus LR 584.
3 (1906) 94 LT NS 577.
5.7 Arguments that a watch used to prove that the defendant was speeding ought to 
be tested have been ignored,1 as in the case of Gorham v Brice.2 The Lord Chief Justice 
dismissed the appeal against conviction for driving a motor car in excess of the speed 
limit of 12 mph without considering the point. In comparison, the members of the 
Divisional Court in Melhuish v Morris3 allowed an appeal against speeding because 
the speedometer of the police vehicle had not been tested for accuracy.4 The court in 
Nicholas v Penny5 subsequently overturned this decision. Lord Goddard CJ commented:
The question in the present case is whether, if evidence is given that a mechanical 
device, such as a watch or speedometer – and I cannot see any difference in 
principle between a watch and a speedometer – recorded a particular time or a 
particular speed, which is the purpose of that instrument to record, that can by 
itself be prima facie evidence, on which the court can act, of that time or speed.6
1 In communication with the author, Professor Lorenzo Strigini, Professor of Systems Engineering 
School of Mathematics, Computer Science and Engineering, Department of Computer Science, City 
University of London, points out that, from an engineering point of view, testing that a watch is accurate 
enough now (which usually implies that it was accurate until now, unless it has been repaired) is an 
inexpensive enough exercise that not doing it seems a dereliction of duty.
2 (1902) 18 TLR 424.
3 [1938] 4 All ER 98, [1938] 10 WLUK 7; see also ‘Evidence in speed limit cases’, The Journal of 
Criminal Law (1937) 1(2) 181.
4 Evidence that the accused did not exhibit the usual signs of being intoxicated can indicate that a 
machine is not working properly: R. v Crown Prosecution Service Ex p. Spurrier [1999] 7 WLUK 431, 
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Spurrier. Police officers can conduct physical tests to ensure a speedometer is working accurately, for 
which see Mohammed Aslam Pervez v Procurator [2000] ScotHC 111.
5 [1950] 2 KB 466, [1950] 2 All ER 89, 66 TLR (Pt. 1) 1122, [1950] 5 WLUK 20, (1950) 114 JP 
335, 48 LGR 535, 21 ALR2d 1193, (1950) 94 SJ 437, [1947– 51] CLY 9158, also known as Penny v 
Nicholas; 66 Law Quarterly Review (1950) 264, 441; in the South Australian case of Peterson v Holmes 
[1927] SASR 419, Piper J asked, at 421, ‘If [appears as “It” is in the report, but this must be a mistake] 
the speedometer be tested by stop- watches and measured distances, what about the accuracy of the 
watches and the chain measure?’; ‘Proof of excessive speed’ (1950) XIV(4) The Journal of Criminal 
Law 360.
6 [1950] 2 KB 466 at 473.
5.8 The judge went on to suggest that because the defendant was accused 
of exceeding the speed limit by 10 mph, it ‘would be a considerable error in the 
speedometer if it were as much out as that’.1 Such a comment was not intended, it is 
suggested, to create a presumption that such devices are reliable, especially as Lord 
Goddard CJ commented that ‘the justices need never accept any evidence if they do 
not believe it, or feel that for some reason they cannot accept it’.2 A similar issue arose 
in the case of H. Gould and Company Limited v Cameron,3 where the pressure in the 
tyres of a heavy motor vehicle was tested in July and found to be over the legal limit. 
The instrument used to test the tyre pressure had itself been tested in March of the 
previous year, and in August in the year following the reading. The defence argued 
that the instrument might have developed an error after being tested in March. It was 
known and accepted that, at certain pressures, the device would be in error of 1 lb over 
a range of tests between 70 lb and 100 lb. This error had been taken into account in 
this case. Northcroft J said:
In a case such as this, where of necessity, a mechanical device must be used 
to ascertain the pressure within the tyres, it is sufficient, I think, to show that 
the instrument is used correctly, and that, from its nature and history, it may 
reasonably be relied upon by the Court. The history of this instrument and the 
description of its use satisfies me that the learned Magistrate was justified in 
accepting it, as I do, as a reliable test on this occasion.4
1 [1950] 2 KB 466 at 473.
2 [1950] 2 KB 466 at 742. In R v Amyot (1968) 2 OR 626, Clare Co.Ct.J accepted the use of a stop- 
watch to measure the time a vehicle took to travel between marked points on a highway, where the 
police officer had personally checked the distance between the markings using a cyclometer and made 
the observations with the stop- watch in an aircraft.
3 [1951] NZLR 314.
4 [1951] NZLR 314 at 316 (40– 45).
5.9 The observations by Shadbolt DCJ in the New South Wales case of Re Appeal of 
White1 put the matter into perspective when hearing an appeal for exceeding the speed 
limit, where he noted, at 430:
Courts have been generally loath to be wearied in seeking proof of some absolute 
measure or requiring it in cases such as this. It is not possible for every child to 
check his wooden ruler with the standard metre in Canberra nor every grocer 
his scales with the standard gram. Most of us accept the ruler’s accuracy and the 
weight of the grocer’s scales.
1 (1987) 9 NSWLR 427.
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Judicial formulations of the presumption that 
mechanical instruments are in order when used
Judicial notice
5.11 There are a number of reasons for the doctrine of judicial notice:1 to 
expedite the hearing of a case where obvious facts do not need proving; to promote 
uniformity in judicial decision making and to prevent the possibility of a decision 
which is demonstrably erroneous or false.2 Brett JA summed up the concept in R v 
Aspinall: ‘Judges are entitled and bound to take judicial notice of that which is the 
common knowledge of the great majority of mankind and of the greater majority of 
men of business.’3 In the High Court of Australia,4 Isaacs J emphasized the guiding 
principle of the doctrine:
The only guiding principle – apart from Statute – as to judicial notice which 
emerges from the various recorded cases, appears to be that wherever a fact is 
so generally known that every ordinary person may be reasonably presumed to 
be aware of it, the Court ‘notices’ it, either simpliciter if it is at once satisfied of 
the fact without more, or after such information or investigation as it considers 
reliable and necessary in order to eliminate any reasonable doubt.
The basic essential is that the fact is to be of a class that is so generally known as 
to give rise to the presumption that all persons are aware of it.5
1 See Law Commission New Zealand, Evidence Law: Documentary Evidence and Judicial Notice: A 
Discussion Paper (Preliminary Paper No 22, 1994) Chapter IX for a nuanced consideration of the topic; 
Hodge M. Malek (ed), Phipson on Evidence (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018),  chapter 3.
2 Christopher Allen, ‘Case comment: judicial notice extended’ (1998) E & P 37, 39; David M. 
Paciocco, ‘Proof and progress: coping with the law of evidence in a technological age’ (2013) 11(2) 
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 181, 188– 189; Evidence (Interim) [1985] ALRC 26 [969]; Law 
Commission New Zealand, Evidence Law: Documentary Evidence and Judicial Notice: A Discussion Paper 
(Preliminary Paper No 22, 1994), [259].
3 (1876) 3 QBD 48 at 61– 62.
4 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149, [1917] VLR 392, 23 ALR 165, 1917 WL 15976, [1917] HCA 26.
5 (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153.
5.12 The practical approach was considered in Commonwealth Shipping 
Representative v Peninsular and Oriental Branch Service1 by Lord Summer:
My Lords, to require that a judge should affect a cloistered aloofness from facts 
that every other man in Court is fully aware of, and should insist on having proof 
on oath of what, as a man of the world, he knows already better than any witness 
can tell him, is a rule that may easily become pedantic and futile.2
1 [1923] AC 191, (1922) 13 Ll L Rep 455, [1922] 12 WLUK 85, also known as Peninsular & Oriental 
Branch Service v Commonwealth Shipping Representative.
2 [1923] AC 191 at 211.
5.13 The doctrine of judicial notice is restricted to very clear knowledge,1 and it can 
be more severe in its effect than a presumption, as noted by Susan G. Drummond:
It is a manoeuvre that forecloses further evidence. The judge operates, in this 
case, as a virtually unlimited authority with limitations imposed only from 
within the legal hierarchy. Judicial notice can only be contested on appeal 
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of judicial notice were not present (the fact was not notorious, the sources to 
establish the fact were not indisputable ...). As judicially noticed matters operate 
in the domain of fact, not law, they have no precedential value.2
1 For discussions on the confusing treatment of this doctrine, see G. D. Nokes, ‘The limits of judicial 
notice’ (1958) 74 LQR 59 and Susan G. Drummond, ‘Judicial notice: the very texture of legal reasoning’ 
15 No 1 Can JL & Soc’y 1.
2 Drummond, ‘Judicial notice: the very texture of legal reasoning’, 4.
5.14 Given that it appears as if this doctrine has been extended to electronic evidence 
in Canada, this observation by Drummond illustrates the importance of ensuring 
judges more fully understand the nature of the world in which they now live. Thorson 
JA discussed judicial notice in R. v Potts before the Ontario Supreme Court, Court of 
Appeal:
Judicial notice, it has been said, is the acceptance by a court or judicial tribunal, 
without the requirement of proof, of the truth of a particular fact or state of 
affairs that is of such general or common knowledge in the community that proof 
of it can be dispensed with.
…
Thus it has been held that, generally speaking, a court may properly take judicial 
notice of any fact or matter which is so generally known and accepted that it 
cannot reasonably be questioned, or any fact or matter which can readily be 
determined or verified by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned.1
1 1982 CarswellOnt 56, [1982] OJ No 3207, 134 DLR (3d) 227, 14 MVR 72, 26 CR (3d) 252, 36 OR 
(2d) 195, 66 CCC (2d) 219, 7 WCB 236, at [15].
5.15 In R. v Find,1 before the Supreme Court of Canada, McLachlin CJC, at [48], held 
that the threshold for judicial notice is strict:
Judicial notice dispenses with the need for proof of facts that are clearly 
uncontroversial or beyond reasonable dispute. Facts judicially noticed are 
not proved by evidence under oath. Nor are they tested by cross- examination. 
Therefore, the threshold for judicial notice is strict: a court may properly take 
judicial notice of facts that are either: (1) so notorious or generally accepted 
as not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons; or (2) capable of 
immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of 
indisputable accuracy.
1 2001 CarswellOnt 1702, 2001 CarswellOnt 1703, 2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 SCR863, [2001] SCJ No 
34, 146 OAC 236, 154 CCC (3d) 97, 199 DLR (4th) 193, 269 NR 149, 42 CR (5th) 1, 49 WCB (2d) 595, 82 
CRR (2d) 247, JE 2001– 1099, REJB 2001– 24178.
5.16 The concept of ‘notorious’ is considered in Phipson:
the concept covers matters being so notorious or clearly established or susceptible 
of demonstration by reference to a readily obtainable and authoritative source 
that evidence of their existence is unnecessary. Some facts are so notorious or so 
well established to the knowledge of the court that they may be accepted without 
further enquiry.1
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5.17 The judge can conduct her own research, and the United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit reached conclusions regarding automatic programs in this way, as in U.S. 
v Lizarraga- Tirado, where Kozinski CJ said:
Because there was no evidence at trial as to how the tack and its label were put on 
the satellite image, we must determine, if we can, whether the tack was computer 
generated or placed manually. Fortunately, we can take judicial notice of the 
fact that the tack was automatically generated by the Google Earth program. By 
looking to ‘sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned’ – here, the 
program – we can ‘accurately and readily determine [ ] ’ that the tack was placed 
automatically. See Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Specifically, we can access Google Earth 
and type in the GPS coordinates, and have done so, which results in an identical 
tack to the one shown on the satellite image admitted at trial.1
1 789 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2015), 1109. Although judges should be wary of reaching conclusions 
without adequate evidence, as in the case of 1475182 Ontario Inc. o/a Edges Contracting v Ghotbi, 
2021 ONSC 3477 (CanLII), where Boswell J incorrectly determined, at [50], that the unique telephone 
number linked to a cellular telephone, taken together with the International Mobile Equipment 
Identifier number ‘provide, in effect, a digital signature on every message sent by the user of that 
particular device.’
5.18 In justifying judicial notice, David M. Paciocco comments: ‘If a court could not 
rely on a notorious and incontrovertible material fact because it had not been proved, 
verdicts would not conform to reality. The repute of the administration of justice would 
be harmed.’1 Paciocco went on to illustrate his argument with the following example of 
how a brake on a motor vehicle operates:
For example when someone describes putting the brakes on in a car no- one 
offers expert testimony that the function of brakes is to slow or stop vehicles, 
that brakes are typically controlled by foot- pedals that are depressed in order to 
slow or stop the vehicle, or that brakes are depressed gently to come to a gradual 
stop and aggressively for an emergency stop.2
1 Paciocco, ‘Proof and progress’, 188– 189.
2 Paciocco, ‘Proof and progress’, 189
5.19 There is a distinction between the purpose of a brake on a motor vehicle (which 
is the fact in issue in the above illustration) and how the braking system operates (if 
the fact in issue is whether the brakes actually worked). In the example above, Paciocco 
made assumptions about how braking systems work and failed to understand the 
nature of the technology. Most braking systems in motor vehicles are controlled by 
a mix of electronic systems and software code (a fact so notorious that no citation 
ought to be required1). It is more accurate, using a high- level functional description of 
the brake system, to explain the braking technology in vehicles as involving the use of 
brakes primarily under the control of electronics or software code. The failsafe fallback 
strategy for most modern brake systems is that if the electronics or software code fails, 
the system reverts to a standard hydraulic brake system. It does not necessarily follow 
that the function is always performed correctly or as normally expected in the situation 
where the action is mediated by electronic systems. For instance, anti- lock braking 
systems (ABS), electronic stability control (ESC) and traction control are predicated 
on interactions between the engine torque output and brake control on individual 
wheels and so on (such as using data from accelerometers). This means that there is 
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not a braking event was requested, and vice versa.2 This example is far from the strict 
application of the doctrine as noted in the Supreme Court of Canada by McLachlin CJC. 
If judicial notice is extended to such an extent, then the question of whether justice is 
served by this doctrine must be carefully scrutinized.
1 Notwithstanding that it is notorious that anti- lock brake systems are partly controlled by 
software code and electronic systems, the reader can obtain more information from the Society of 
Automotive Engineers International, the open access journal Intelligent Control and Automation and 
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology.
2 I owe this point to Dr Michael Ellims; see also the following, in which it is demonstrated that 
braking systems can be controlled by hacking into the motor vehicle computer system: Chris Valasek 
and Charlie Miller, Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units (Technical White Paper, 
2014), http:// www.ioactive.com/ pdfs/ IOActive_ Adventures_ in_ Automotive_ Networks_ and_ Control_ 
Units.pdf; Dr Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek, Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle 
(2015), http:// illmatics.com/ Remote%20Car%20Hacking.pdf; Roderick Currie, Developments in 
Car Hacking (SANS Institute, 2015), https:// www.sans.org/ reading- room/ whitepapers/ internet/ 
developments- car- hacking- 36607.
A ‘notorious’ class
5.20 In the Victoria case of Crawley v Laidlaw,1 Lowe J considered, at 374, the basis 
upon which a presumption might apply – in this case regarding a scientific instrument:
I do not question that such a presumption is frequently and (in general) tacitly acted 
on by our Courts; but in my opinion it must appear from evidence before the Court, 
or from something which stands in place of evidence, e.g., judicial notice, that the 
instrument in question is a scientific instrument, before the presumption applies.
1 (1930) VLR 370.
5.21 The prosecution sought to adduce evidence from two weighing machines called 
‘loadometers’ to prove a motor truck was carrying a greater weight than that allowed 
by the regulations. The Police Magistrate who heard the case had dismissed it on the 
basis that there was no evidence to demonstrate the correctness of the instruments. 
On appeal, Lowe J concurred, holding that there was no evidence that the devices 
were scientific instruments, and there was no foundation for a presumption that the 
instruments worked properly. Emphasizing the need to establish a foundation for the 
presumption, Lowe J observed:
I do not doubt that in appropriate cases the Court will use its ‘general information 
and … knowledge of the common affairs of life which men of ordinary intelligence 
possess’ – Phipson on Evidence (6th ed.), p. 19 – and that of the nature of most, 
if not all, of the instruments mentioned in the paragraph cited from Taylor1 
would require no evidence in order to raise the presumption relied on. I think, 
too, that the Court may, if it thinks it desirable, refer to appropriate standard 
works of reference in order to inform itself of matters of the kind mentioned of, 
which it may personally be unaware. But if, after such reference, the Court is still 
ignorant of the nature of the instrument in question, no help can be got from the 
presumption relied on. Apparently the learned magistrate did not know, and I 
myself do not know, what a loadometer is. I may guess from the derivation of the 
name what the instrument is, but my guess is not evidence.2
1 Taylor on Evidence (10th edn), s 183, where the author wrote: ‘The working accuracy of scientific 
instruments is also presumed. For example, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a jury would be 
advised to rely on the correctness of a watch or clock, which had been consulted to fix the time when a 
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any liquid in which it had been immersed; a pedometer would afford prima facie evidence of the distance 
between two places which had been traversed by the wearer; and similar prima facie credit would be 
given to aneroids, anemometers, and other scientific instruments; and blood stains are every day detected 
by means of known chemical tests:’ (1930) VLR 370 at 373– 374. This quote uses the term ‘correctness’; 
others seem to refer to ‘sufficient accuracy’. A measurement instrument for a continuous quantity has 
a degree of accuracy (how close the reading is to the real value) and a degree of precision (how tightly 
spaced the points are on its scale), but its reading will not usually be exactly ‘correct’. This may have a 
bearing on how digital devices are seen. A tiny amount of damage to the mechanical mechanism of a scale 
might cause it to be slightly off the exact reading of weight, but a tiny mistake in software may change the 
response to some specific inputs substantially. I owe this insight to Professor Strigini.
2 (1930) VLR 370 at 374.
5.22 Herring CJ made comments similar to Lowe J’s in the Victoria case of Porter v 
Koladzeij.1 This case involved the review of the refusal of a Stipendiary Magistrate to 
admit evidence of an analogue device to measure the amount of alcohol in a sample of 
breath. The judge observed that certain instruments of a scientific or technical nature 
fell into a ‘notorious’ class that by general experience are known to be trustworthy.2 He 
placed a speedometer into this class. However, the evidence from the device to measure 
breath alcohol was rejected because it was not a standard device, and because the 
evidence given by the witness regarding the device was not adequate. The judge said 
that once breath analysis devices were used more often, they would become standard, 
and then judicial notice would be taken of their existence as scientific or technical 
instruments,3 although it was necessary to present relevant evidence to the court:
Where, however, the instrument in question does not fall within the notorious 
class, then his Honour made it clear that evidence must be given to establish that 
it is a scientific or technical instrument of such a kind, as may be expected to be 
trustworthy, before the presumption can be relied upon.4
1 (1962) VR 75.
2 Falling back on ‘general experience’ is dubious, because few people check the correctness of the 
instruments they might use. People routinely use imprecise instruments such as house thermometers 
and speedometers, and seldom have occasions for questioning the readings. Relying on the reading 
does not make the reading accurate.
3 The Supreme Court in South Australia refused to take judicial notice of the accuracy of the 
breathalyser in 2012: Police v Bleeze [2012] SASCF 54 at [88] and [89].
4 (1962) VR 75 at 78.
5.23 The failure to obtain such evidence can lead to scenarios such as that described 
by Thomas E. Workman below:
In Florida, one citizen was tested 13 times on one machine, by one officer, in one 
hour. These instances occur because in some situations, a machine that registers 
an error or multiple errors may finally produce a value that has the appearance 
of being a valid test. The Courts are usually unaware of the history of failures on 
the machine, and believe that the result is legitimate, when in fact [it] may not be.1
1 Thomas E. Workman, Jr, ‘Massachusetts breath testing for alcohol: a computer science perspective’ 
(2008) 8 J High Tech L. 209, 217.
5.24 In this context,1 it is relevant to consider the decision of the Supreme Court in 
New Jersey in the United States, which ordered the software of a breath- testing device to 
be reviewed in detail in the case of State of New Jersey v Chun.2 In his judgment, Hoens J 
began by stating that: ‘For decades, this Court has recognized that certain breath testing 
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instruments for determining blood alcohol concentration.’ This comment was based on 
the old technology. With the introduction of a new device, the Alcotest 7100 MK111- C, 
which was selected by the department of the Attorney General, the court agreed to test 
the scientific validity of the machine. After extensive testing, the court concluded that 
the Alcotest, utilizing New Jersey Firmware version 3.11, ‘is generally scientifically 
reliable’, but modifications were required to enable its results to be admitted into legal 
proceedings.3 The testing of the software revealed the following issues, among others:4
1. That a mathematical algorithm that corrected for fuel- cell drift did not 
undermine the reliability of the results, but it was recommended that the 
machines be recalibrated every six months to ensure fuel cells are replaced 
regularly.
2. That a specific buffer overflow error should be corrected.
3. That a specific number of documents be produced for the purposes of 
foundation of evidence, as recommended by the court.
4. That the recommendations by the defendants’ experts for reorganizing and 
simplifying the source code be considered for implementation.
1 These devices are also discussed, in the context of England and Wales, under the heading ‘The 
statutory presumption’ below.
2 194 N.J. 54, 943 A.2d 114.
3 943 A.2d 114 at 120.
4 943 A.2d 114 at 134.
5.25 The analysis of the source code indicated that there was a fault when a third 
breath sample was taken that could cause the reading to be incorrect, and the court 
saw fit to order a change in one of the formulae used in the software. Save that the 
extensive analysis of the device and the source code took some time and some expense, 
little of substance was found to be wrong with the machine. However, there are two 
significant points that arise as a result of this case: the first is that the software that 
controlled the device, written by a human, was defective, which in turn meant that the 
data relied upon for the truth of the statement was defective and therefore affected the 
accuracy and truthfulness of the evidence; and the decision by the court to intervene 
by ordering certain changes and modifications to be carried out, one of which was a 
change in a formula, meant that part of the evidence used against drivers in the future 
would be a set of instructions provided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.1
1 There is a considerable body of case law relating to challenges of breathalyser devices in the US. 
Some of the articles that discuss the position are (in addition to those already cited): Charles Short, 
‘Guilt by machine: the problem of source code discovery in Florida DUYI prosecutions’ (2009) 61 Fla 
L Rev 61, 177; Cheyenne L. Palmer, ‘DUIs and apple pie: a survey of American jurisprudence in DUI 
prosecutions’ (2010) 13 UDC L Rev 407; Aurora J. Wilson, ‘Discovery of breathalyzer source code in 
DUI prosecutions’ (2011) 7 Wash JL Tech & Arts 121; Kathleen E. Watson, ‘COBRA data and the right to 
confront technology against you’ (2015) 42 N Ky L Rev 375.
5.26 However, it is not necessary to rely on a presumption that an instrument is 
accurate or reliable in lieu of other evidence that the data produced by the instrument 
is accurate.1 For instance, a satellite navigation system was the subject of discussion in 
Chiou Yaou Fa v Thomas Morris2 before the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of 
Australia. In this case, the commander of the vessel established his position by using 
the satellite navigation system, radar and sextant. The court accepted the evidence 
that a variety of methods were used to establish the position at sea, including the 
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the accuracy of the satellite navigation system, it concluded that it was not necessary 
to determine, and therefore rely upon, the satellite navigation system as being in the 
‘notorious’ class, and accepted the radar and sextant evidence in its place.3
1 In R. v Ranger 2010 CarswellOnt 8572, 2010 ONCA 759, [2010] OJ No 4840, 91 WCB (2d) 271, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal held at [16]: ‘it is now notorious that cell phone users engaged in a cell phone 
call and travelling from point A to point B will find their cell phone signal passes from one cell phone 
tower to another at different locations along the route from point A to point B’, which led the court to 
consider that the trial judge did not err ‘in taking judicial notice that a particular cell phone was in 
a general location based on the tower that received the signal and that the path along which the cell 
phone was moving could be determined by reference to the cell phone towers that received the signal 
transmission in respect of particular calls’.
2 [1987] NTSC 20; 46 NTR 1; 87 FLR 36; 27 A Crim R 342 (8 May 1987).
3 Here are a selection of cases dealing with aerial photography, infra- red rays and images from 
satellites. International Court of Justice: Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 
ICJ Reports 1991, 31; Kasikili/ Sedudu Island (Botswana/ Namibia), ICJ Reports 1999, 1045; Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, ICJ Reports, 2001, Judgment 
(Merits), 16 March 2001; Survey of Recent Court Cases that Consider Remote Sensing Data as Evidence 
– Case Concerning Frontier Dispute, ICJ Reports 1986, 554. Permanent Court of Arbitration: Eritrea/ 
Yemen, Award 9 October 1998; Award 17 December 1999. Australia: Witheyman v Simpson [2009] QCA 
388; McKay v Doonan [2005] QDC 311; Maple Holdings Limited v State of Queensland [2001] QPEC 
056. England and Wales: Associated British Ports v Hydro Soil Services NV [2006] EWHC 1187 (TCC), 
[2006] 6 WLUK 575. Singapore: Virtual Map (Singapore) v Singapore Land Authority [2008] SGHC 42. 
USA: St. Martin v Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc., 224 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 2000), 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 
20, 01155 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 270 (aerial photography); Connecticut v Wright, 58 Conn.App. 136, 752 
A.2d 1147 (Conn.App. 2000) (computer- generated engineering map); Wetsel- Oviatti Lumber Co. Inc., v 
United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 557 (1998) (aerial photography); United States v Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 
1978) (infra- red rays); Pittson Co. v Allianz Insurance Co., 905 F.Supp. 1279 (D.N.J. 1995) rev’d in part 
on other grounds, 124 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1997) (aerial photography); Ponca Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma 
v Continental Carbon Co., 2008 WL 7211981 (digital orthophoto); Gasser v United States, 14 Cl.Ct. 476 
(1988) (aerial and satellite photographs); I & M Rail Link v Northstar Navigation, 21 F.Supp. 849 (N.D.Ill. 
1998) (satellite photography); Wojciechowicz v United States, 576 F.Supp.2d 214 (D.Puerto Rico 2008) 
(satellite photography); Lisker v Knowles, 651 F.Supp.2d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (satellite photography); 
United States v Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2003) (satellite photography); Fry v King, 192 Ohio 
App.3d 692, 950 N.E.2d 229 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 2011), 2011 WL 766583 (satellite photography); State 
v Reed, 2009 WL 2991548 (Google Earth evidence rejected); State of New Jersey in the Interests of J. B. 
A Minor, 2010 WL 3836755 (Google Earth evidence admitted); Swayden v Ricke, 242 P.3d 1281 (2010), 
2010 WL 4977158 (Google Earth images and photographs from ‘trail cameras’); Banks v U.S., 94 Fed.Cl. 
68 (2010) (satellite photography).
Common knowledge
5.27 Another justification for accepting that a mechanical instrument is in order 
when it is used is the assertion that it is a type of instrument that is commonly held to 
be – more often than not – in ‘working order’. In discussing mechanical instruments, it 
does not appear that lawyers or judges have ever concerned themselves with how the 
instrument has been maintained, or have considered the maintenance history of the 
instrument. In a case before the full court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, 
Zappia v Webb,1 the question was whether an amphometer, used to determine the 
speed of a vehicle, could be considered an accepted scientific instrument. Jackson CJ 
discussed this as follows:
It is, however, common knowledge that amphometers have been widely used in 
this State for a number of years for the purpose of checking the speed of motor 
vehicles.2 As one drives through the country, it is common- place to see large 
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in the district, and it is not at all uncommon to see a traffic inspector by the side 
of the road with his amphometer equipment set up. It is also, I believe, generally 
accepted in the community that an amphometer correctly set up and operated 
will give a reliable reading of speed, not necessarily precise, but sufficiently 
accurate for its purpose. There has not been, so far as I am aware, any general 
complaint about the use or efficiency of these machines, and there must be 
hundreds of speeding convictions each year resulting from their use.
It seems to me, therefore, that an amphometer is now a well known and accepted 
speed checking device and that judicial notice should be taken in this State of its 
use and effectiveness, in general terms.3
1 (1974) WAR 15; (1973) 29 LGRA 438.
2 Lie detectors are widely used and are scientifically shown to be useless, for which see Shane 
O’Mara, Why Torture Doesn’t Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation (Harvard University Press 2015), 
 chapter 3 ‘Can we use technology to detect deception?’; George W. Maschke and Gino J. Scalabrini, The 
Lie Behind the Lie Detector (5th edn, AntiPolygraph.org 2018), https:// antipolygraph.org/ pubs.shtml.
3 (1973) 29 LGRA 438 at 440– 441.
5.28 The Chief Justice referred to the ‘common knowledge’ of the use of amphometers 
without referring to any evidence to demonstrate that they were reliable. He also 
asserted that somehow it was generally accepted that the device would give a reliable 
reading of speed (without discussing whether the amphometer was calibrated, and if 
so, to what standard) and concluded that because he was not aware of any complaints 
about the devices, they were therefore to be considered an accepted speed- checking 
device.
5.29 In Castle v Cross,1 the prosecution relied on the presumption that mechanical 
instruments were in order when they were used. In the judgment, Stephen Brown LJ 
cited a passage from Cross on Evidence (1979)2 regarding this presumption:
A presumption which serves the same purpose of saving the time and expense of 
calling evidence as that served by the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta 
is the presumption that mechanical instruments were in order when they were 
used. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume that 
stopwatches and speedometers and traffic lights were in order at the material 
time; but the instrument must be one of a kind which it is common knowledge 
that they are more often than not in working order.3
1 [1984] 1 WLR 1372, [1985] 1 All ER 87, [1984] 7 WLUK 180, [1985] RTR 62, [1984] Crim LR 682, 
(1984) 81 LSG 2596, (1984) 128 SJ 855, [1985] CLY 3048.
2 Page 47 of the fifth edition.
3 [1984] 1 WLR 1372 at 1376H– 1377A.
5.30 The Latin tag omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta means ‘all acts are presumed 
to have been done rightly and regularly’ or ‘all things are presumed to have been done 
regularly and with due formality until the contrary is proved’. Such a presumption 
cannot operate in a vacuum, as indicated by Stephen Brown LJ’s preference for the 
above formulation in Cross on Evidence, which requires the basic fact – proof that the 
instrument be one of a kind which is common knowledge that they are more often 
than not in working order – to be established before the presumption could operate, 
as opposed to the same formulation of the presumption in Phipson on Evidence, which 
did not adopt the basic fact.1
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5.31 In this case, counsel for the Crown put forward the case that the device in 
question, a Lion Intoximeter 3000, was a sophisticated machine that depended in part 
on software code, but this did not set it in a different class from other sophisticated 
mechanical devices and instruments. The presumption stood unchallenged because 
the defence ‘argued forcefully that the potential for computer error renders the 
consideration of evidence stemming from a computer particularly sensitive and places 
it into a separate class in relation to its admissibility’.1 It is unclear from the judgment 
of Stephen Brown LJ whether His Lordship relied on the presumption in admitting the 
printout from the Lion Intoximeter 3000, because the central issue in this case appears 
to be the admissibility of the printout as real evidence.
1 [1984] 1 WLR 1372 at 1379D.
5.32 The case of Anderton v Waring1 also concerned the reading from a Lion 
Intoximeter 3000. In giving the judgment of the court, May LJ stated that the 
‘Intoximeter ought to have been assumed by the justices to have been in good working 
order unless the contrary was proved’.2 Counsel for the prosecution cited from the 
fourth edition of Cross on Evidence:3 ‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 
courts will presume that [mechanical instruments] were in order at the material time’.4 
However, the barrister omitted to continue, and cite the basic fact that ‘the instrument 
must be one of a kind as to which it is common knowledge that they are more often than 
not in working order’.5 This has to be a misapplication of the presumption, because a 
presumption cannot operate in a vacuum without the basic fact or facts. In addition, 
the manufacturers of intoximeters (and almost all forms of software) refuse to share 
their code, so there is no way to establish any such basic fact or facts – in addition to 
which, the US cases (discussed above) illustrate that such devices are not reliable.
1 [1985] 2 WLUK 274, [1986] RTR 74, (1985) 82 LSG 1417, Times, 11 March 1985, [1986] CLY 2883.
2 [1986] RTR 74 at 80F.
3 Page 47.
4 [1986] RTR 74 at 79E.
5 Cross on Evidence (6th edn, 1985), 28; Professor Tapper mentioned this omission in Colin Tapper, 
‘Reform of the law of evidence in relation to the output from computers’ (1995) 3(1) Intl J L & Info Tech 
79, 89.
5.33 A more recent reformulation of the presumption has been articulated by 
Kerr LCJ, as he then was, when he rejected the suggestion that the machine in question 
ought to be commonly known to be – more often than not – in working order. In Public 
Prosecution Service v McGowan,1 Kerr LCJ said:
In so far as the passage from Cross and Tapper suggests that for the presumption 
to operate it will always be necessary that the machine was commonly known 
to be more often than not in working order, we would not accept it. We 
consider that the presumption must be that machines such as a cash register 
are operating properly and in working order in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary. The presumption of the correct operation of equipment and proper 
setting is a common law presumption recognised by article 33(2) [Criminal 
Justice (Evidence) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004]. In the modern world the 
presumption of equipment being properly constructed and operating correctly 
must be strong.2
1 [2008] NICA 13, [2009] NI 1.
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5.34 Kerr LCJ’s deviation from the formulation of the presumption, which requires 
proof of the basic fact, is unwarranted. Furthermore, Kerr LCJ’s formulation of the 
presumption without the basic fact leads to the extraordinarily broad assumption that 
all devices and machines are operating properly and in working order, an assumption 
for which His Lordship did not cite any relevant evidence in support. In particular, 
there was nothing in the judgment to indicate what he understood by ‘equipment’, or 
how the equipment was ‘properly constructed’, nor did he provide any evidence as to 
what he meant by ‘operating correctly’ or ‘proper setting’.1
1 The assumption of correctness would be verified by recording the performance of the machine, 
just as when one constructs a quality control chart. I owe this observation to Professor Martin Newby.
Evidential foundations of the presumption
5.35 It is suggested that the correct articulation of the presumption for mechanical 
instruments is as follows:1
For a mechanical instrument (including stand- alone computers, computer- like 
devices and digital systems) to benefit from the evidential presumption that it 
was in working order at the material time, it is necessary for the party seeking 
to benefit from the presumption to adduce evidence of how the instrument in 
question works, together with change logs and release notices, changes to the 
device or system (software, physical and organizational), transaction and event 
logs, and sworn evidence that (i) the records disclosed are complete records of 
all the known defects in the device or system, and (ii) that members of staff with 
access to the device or system have not modified system data in the relevant 
period.
1 For a more detailed set of recommendations, see Paul Marshall, James Christie, Peter Bernard 
Ladkin, Bev Littlewood, Stephen Mason, Martin Newby, Dr Jonathan Rogers, Harold Thimbleby and 
Martyn Thomas CBE, ‘Recommendations for the probity of computer evidence’ (2021) 18 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 18.
5.36 This formulation is consistent with Crawley v Laidlaw1 and Porter v Koladzeij2 in 
that if the presumption is to be recognized, it is necessary for the proponent to provide 
sufficient evidence – the basic fact – to merit the introduction of such a presumption. 
It this respect, it is pertinent to note the observation by Lord Griffiths in Cracknell v 
Willis3 that ‘ “trial by machine” is an entirely novel concept and should be introduced 
with a degree of caution’.4 He went on to indicate that it would be unthinkable that 
somebody should be convicted by a machine that is not ‘reliable’, although he did not 
make it clear what he meant by ‘reliable’.
1 (1930) VLR 370.
2 (1962) VR 75.
3 [1988] AC 450, [1987] 3 WLR 1082, [1987] 3 All ER 801, [1987] 11 WLUK 62, (1988) 86 Cr App R 
196, [1988] RTR 1, (1987) 137 NLJ 1062, (1987) 131 SJ 1514, [1988] CLY 3122; work had already been 
undertaken before 1988: T. R. H. Sizer and A. Kelman (eds), Computer Generated Output as Admissible 
Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases (Heydeon & Son on behalf of the British Computer Society 1982); 
Alistair Kelman and Richard Sizer, The Computer in Court (Gower 1982).
4 [1988] 1 AC 450 at 459.
5.37 Conversely, in DPP v McKeown (Sharon), DPP v Jones (Christopher)1 Lord 
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in electronics to be able to know whether a computer is working properly’.2 This 
comment, akin to the ‘aura of infallibility’,3 is an extreme view that is contradicted by 
the evidence, and did not bear a great deal of scrutiny at the time the comment was 
made. The observation by Lloyd LJ in R v Governor Ex p Osman (No 1), sub nom Osman 
(No 1), Re4 is of a similar nature:
Where a lengthy computer printout contains no internal evidence of malfunction, 
and is retained, e.g. by a bank or a stockbroker as part of its records, it may be 
legitimate to infer that the computer which made the record was functioning 
correctly.5
1 [1997] 1 WLR 295, [1997] 1 All ER 737, [1997] 2 WLUK 386, [1997] 2 Cr App R 155 (HL), (1997) 
161 JP 356, [1997] RTR 162, [1997] Crim LR 522, (1997) 161 JPN 482, (1997) 147 NLJ 289, Times, 21 
February 1997, Independent, 7 March 1997, [1997] CLY 1093; note the comment by Harvey J in the 
New Zealand case of R v Good [2005] DCR 804 at 65 ‘that computers are not recently invented devices, 
are in wide use and are fundamentally reliable’.
2 [1997] 1 All ER 737 at 743b.
3 D. W. Elliott, ‘Mechanical aids to evidence’ [1958] Crim LR 5, 7.
4 [1990] 1 WLR 277, [1989] 3 All ER 701, [1988] 3 WLUK 391, (1990) 90 Cr App R 281, [1988] Crim 
LR 611, (1990) 87(7) LSG 32, (1990) 134 SJ 458, Times, 13 April 1988, Independent, 15 April 1988, 
Guardian, 19 April 1988, Daily Telegraph, 21 April 1988, [1990] CLY 1175.
5 [1990] 1 WLR 277 at 306H.
5.38 The judge did not indicate what evidence was before him to demonstrate that 
there was no ‘internal evidence of malfunction’. Just because a bank or a stockbroker 
will rely on computer data as part of its records, it does not follow that a judge should 
accept that such records are what a party asserts they are. Indeed, Professor Seng 
observed that such comments made by judges are ‘extravagant judicial statements … 
[that] are incomplete and are actually misleading because accurate computer output 
depends not just on the proper operation of computers, but also proper human 
use (or abuse) of computers’.1 There is a significant difference between functioning 
‘correctly’ – meaning, as intended – and being correct, namely that the intentions of the 
programmers were correct and free of any errors.
1 Daniel K. B. Seng, ‘Computer output as evidence’ [1997] SJLS 130, 167.
5.39 The ‘instrument in working order’ relies on the presumption that transitions 
between ‘being in working order’ and ‘not being in working order’ are reasonably 
rare.1 In other words, the instrument cannot capriciously alternate between giving 
correct readings and incorrect readings, with arbitrary lengths of the sequences of 
correct and of incorrect readings. These arbitrary sequences happen rapidly and often 
with software. Although there is generally a reason for these sequences – something 
in the exact values and timings of the sequences of inputs determines which outputs 
will be correct and which ones will be wrong, given the defects in the software – 
identifying the law that governs them and the software defects causing a problem may 
be impossibly time- confusing, even for well- equipped experts.
1 This moves into the confusing area of inference, implication and causality. The arguments are 
based on a conditional probability. The court wants to know that the conditional probability that the 
device is working correctly is high enough given the evidence about its provenance and circumstances. 
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How judges assess the evidence of devices controlled  
by software
5.40 When discussing the admission of evidence from devices controlled by software 
code, judges do not distinguish between a single, highly specialist device that is self- 
contained and a linked network containing any number of devices each independently 
operating on its own set of software code. As noted above, when considering cases 
dealing with specialized devices such as breath- testing machines and blood- testing 
machines, judges have used nebulous terms in the absence of scientific analysis, such 
as ‘notoriety’, ‘common knowledge’ and ‘properly constructed’. There is little evidence 
to demonstrate that proper evidential foundations have been adduced to permit 
such presumptions to be admitted. In this regard, it is useful to consider, although 
not exclusively, the case law in Australia, where these devices have been subjected to 
stricter judicial analysis.
5.41 The Southern Australian case of Mehesz v Redman1 concerned the method of 
analysing a blood sample. At trial, the Special Magistrate categorized the blood sample- 
testing device as a scientific instrument with the presumption that it was in the category 
of a ‘notorious’ instrument whose accuracy is presumed. On appeal, Zelling J rejected 
this on the basis that the device was not a mere calculator, although the interpretation 
of the data was a result of its software program. There was no evidence to demonstrate 
that the machine was accurate or reliable. The appellant was tried a second time, 
convicted again and appealed to the Supreme Court once more. This appeal was 
referred to the full court.2 The main argument of counsel for the appellant related to 
the evidence tendered by the prosecution regarding the analysis of a blood sample, in 
that the evidence relied on the use of two instruments (a gas chromatograph and the 
‘Auto- lab system 4B’ data analyser) whose accuracy had not been established. King CJ 
rejected the submission that the Auto- lab was an instrument that could not be relied 
upon because there was no evidence as to the ‘correctness’ of its software program. 
He said:
The courts do not require such evidence. If the instrument is so well known that 
its accuracy may be assumed as a matter of common experience, the Court is 
entitled to presume its accuracy without evidence.3
1 (1979) 21 SASR 569.
2 Mehesz v Redman (no 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244.
3 (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 247.
5.42 Proof of the accuracy of a particular instrument will ‘ordinarily be proved by 
those who use and test it’, and the results obtained are acceptable in evidence ‘provided 
that the expert witness has himself formed an opinion that the methods used are apt to 
produce the correct result’.1 Notwithstanding the inability of the operator of a machine 
controlled by software code to demonstrate the accuracy or otherwise of the code that 
he does not control and has no ability to alter, this proviso is important. (White J also 
made a similar point.2) This means that the operator of such a machine ought to be 
able to assess when the machine produces results that are not expected, even if the 
operator is not able to establish why those results are wrong. If a machine produces 
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the software code) might not be reliable. In such circumstances, it will be necessary to 
have the machine tested before it is relied upon for future analysis.
1 (1980) 26 SASR 244, King CJ at 248.
2 (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 254.
5.43 Dealing with the submission that the prosecution failed to provide proper 
foundations for the Auto- lab analyser, White J set out the conditions that must be fulfilled 
before evidence will be admitted regarding the measurements of scientific instruments:
1. If the instrument falls within the class of instrument known as notorious 
scientific instruments, the court will take judicial notice of its capacity for 
accuracy, so that the operator merely proves that he handled it properly on the 
particular occasion.
2. If the instrument is not a notorious scientific instrument, its accuracy can be 
established by evidence: (a) that the instrument is within a class of instrument 
generally accepted by experts as accurate for its particular purpose; (b) that the 
instrument, if handled properly, does produce accurate results: ((a) and (b) must 
be established by expert testimony, that is, by experts with sufficient knowledge 
of that kind of instrument; and upon proof of (a) and (b), a latent presumption of 
accuracy arises which allows the court to infer accuracy on the particular occasion 
if it is proved) – (c) that the particular instrument was handled properly and read 
accurately by the operator on the particular occasion; ((c) can be established by 
a trained competent person familiar with the operation of the instrument, not 
necessarily the type of expert who proves (a) and (b)).
3. Where the actual accuracy of the measurement can be inferred from all of the 
proved circumstances, it is not necessary to rely upon the presumption arising 
from (a) and (b), proof of which is superfluous.1
1 (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 251– 252, original emphasis.
5.44 At the second trial, the prosecution called evidence from Professor Northcote, 
Chairman of the School of Mathematics and Computers at the Institute of Technology 
in South Australia, and an expert in mathematics, physics and computers. He gave 
evidence about the workings of the Auto- lab from his reading of the manufacturer’s 
manual and his understanding of the content of the manual. He was not able to read the 
software code, because the manufacturer had sealed the program against inspection, 
tampering and modification. Although Professor Northcote was not an expert in 
relation to the Auto- lab, the members of the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court 
were of the opinion that both Professor Northcote and Mr Vozzo, who gave evidence 
at both trials, were sufficiently qualified to give evidence, even though neither witness 
had access to, nor any knowledge of, the software code. The Chief Justice also stated: ‘It 
is sufficient that the expert who uses it is able to say that it is an instrument which is 
accepted and used by competent persons as a reliable aid to the carrying out of the 
scientific procedures in question and that he so regards it.’1 He also prayed in aid the 
observations of Wigmore on Evidence2 to support this comment:
(2) Scientific instruments, formulas, etc. The use of scientific instruments, 
apparatus, formulas, and calculating- tables, involves to some extent a dependence 
on the statements of other persons, even of anonymous observers. Yet it is not 
feasible for the professional man to test every instrument himself; furthermore 
he finds that practically the standard methods are sufficiently to be trusted. 
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the user may neither have seen the object with his own eyes nor have made the 
calculations and adjustments on which the machine’s trustworthiness depends. 
The adequacy of knowledge thus gained is recognized for a variety of standard 
instruments.3
1 (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 247.
2 (3rd edn), Volume 2, paragraph 665a.
3 (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 247, original emphasis.
5.45 In this case, the court emphasized that there was evidence other than the 
trustworthiness of the software code that enabled the evidence from the machine to 
be admitted as being accurate. White J set out the following analysis of the problem:
The only defect in the expert evidence of Dr. Northcote and Mr. Vozzo, if defect 
it be, was their lack of direct knowledge of the internal operations of the sealed 
instrument. They relied upon what the manufacturer said about its operation. 
The extreme position would be that only the expert actually supervising the 
manufacture of the instrument in the United States of America could prove 
(a) and (b). I do not think that the rules relating to expert evidence encourage 
that kind of extreme position. Quite apart from questions of expense and delay 
in the administration of justice, the Court is entitled to rely upon evidence of 
measurements made by instruments which reputable scientists accept as 
accurate, whether those scientists have direct knowledge of the reasons for 
the instrument’s accuracy or not, provided they have knowledge that the 
instrument’s measurements are accurate according to a known standard, or are 
accepted as accurate by reputable scientists.1
1 (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 253. Most of these arguments fall short when applied to a large- scale 
system. In all of the examples where the subject of discussion is notionally a scientific instrument, 
there is always the possibility of treating it as a black box and testing its calibration with standard 
inputs, just like the weights and measures inspector turning up with a box of standard weights. These 
instruments essentially have a single input and output, and could be fully characterized experimentally. 
As soon as this very simple conceptual model does not fit, many other considerations come into play. 
Primarily that there is no longer the possibility of exhaustively examining all circumstances and factors 
determining behaviour. I owe this observation to Professor Martin Newby.
5.46 By implication, the court concluded that it would be extreme to establish the 
reliability of a software controlled device in a court of law by analysing the software 
code – the very software code that controlled the device and provided the evidence. 
The court considered that evidence from the operator of the device was sufficient for 
the trial court to assess the accuracy of the evidence. The appeal was dismissed.
5.47 Given these comments, it is understandable that the court reached the 
conclusions it did in Mehesz v Redman (no 2). At issue was a self- contained device 
that was used by trained operators with suitable qualifications. On the basis that 
the readings from such devices were, at any time, not within the expected range, 
the suitably trained and qualified operators were expected to use their professional 
judgement to verify the reliability of the device before submitting the evidence for 
legal proceedings. In such a case, the court would not require the software code to be 
challenged.
5.48 The case of Bevan v The State of Western Australia1 illustrates the approach 
taken when considering the admission of evidence from computers and computer- 
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telephone data in the form of text messages downloaded by a computer software 
program. An investigating police officer carried out two separate downloading 
operations using two separate tools, Cellebrite and XRY. At the beginning of the trial, 
counsel for the accused objected to the text messages being received into evidence. The 
trial judge held that the text messages were admissible. Questions were raised as to 
the reliability of the software and of the officer’s correct use of it. The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the trial judge erred in law in admitting the text messages into evidence. 
This was because the officer did not explain the process of how he downloaded it in 
any detail at trial: it was the first time he had used the relevant software, and he did 
not have any formal training in its use. When considering the rebuttable presumption 
at common law as to the accuracy of ‘notorious’ scientific or technical instruments, 
Blaxell J said that ‘when evidence from a new type of scientific instrument or process is 
adduced for the first time, there must be proof of its reliability and accuracy’.2 He went 
on to say that:
When specific evidence of the accuracy of a new instrument is required, this need 
not come from the manufacturer. It is sufficient that the expert who uses it can 
say that it is an instrument which is accepted and used by competent persons as 
a reliable aid in the carrying out of the scientific procedure in question, and that 
he so regards it.3
1 [2010] WASCA 101.
2 [2010] WASCA 101 at [30].
3 [2010] WASCA 101 at [31].
5.49 Blaxell J approved of the observations by White J1 in Mehesz v Redman (no 2) as 
noted above. He continued:
To the above principles I add the obvious comment that a court will not be 
satisfied that an instrument was ‘handled properly’ on a particular occasion, if it 
does not understand what was required of the operator for this to be so. Detailed 
evidence as to the workings of the instrument need not be given … However, it 
is necessary that there be sufficient evidence for the court to apprehend what it 
was that the operator had to do in order to ensure an accurate result.2
1 Mehesz v Redman (no 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 at [251]– [252].
2 Bevan v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 101 at [33].
5.50 In essence, Blaxell J is saying that if the user of a smartphone can give evidence 
to demonstrate that he can use the smartphone, it follows that he is sufficiently 
knowledgeable to give evidence indirectly that the software code that controls the 
device is ‘working properly’, ‘reliable’ or ‘accurate’. It is as if the software programs 
that form the device are irrelevant. Additionally, no attempt was made to define how 
software code can be determined to be ‘working properly’, ‘reliable’ or ‘accurate’.
5.51 In Bevan v The State of Western Australia, the Court of Appeal heard a second 
appeal in the same case after a re- trial.1 The same argument arose regarding the 
method of downloading the data from the mobile telephone. There was a trial within 
a trial concerning the evidence of Detective Tomlinson. (Buss J referred to him as 
a First Class Constable, and set out his qualifications.2) Counsel for the appellant 
conceded that the witness was qualified to operate the equipment used to perform the 
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the download material and the reliability of the material itself. In cross- examination, 
Detective Tomlinson explained he did not hold a certificate in relation to the Cellebrite 
and XRY software packages, but that he had been shown how to use them on about ten 
occasions. The following exchange took place regarding how the software worked:
Q. Can you tell me how the Cellebrite package actually works.
A. I don’t understand the question.
Q. How does it work? Explain to me, a layman, who knows nothing about 
Cellebrite, how it works.
A. It extracts data from a telephone.
Q. How? How does it do that?
A. It uses software.
Q. And how does that software work?
A. I couldn’t tell you.
Q. What about the XRY?
A. The same.
Q. If you don’t know how it works, how can you say its [sic] reliable?
A. You’d have to ask the manufacturer.
Q. Okay. I’m asking you. How can you say its [sic] reliable.
A. I can’t.
Q. You can’t. And, in fact, on one occasion that you used it in relation to the Nokia, 
it was unsuccessful.
A. Yes, that’s right.3
1 [2012] WASCA 153.
2 [2012] WASCA 153 at [18]– [21] and [105].
3 [2012] WASCA 153 at [20]; the last question and answer is at [106(g)].
5.52 In deciding to allow the evidence before the members of the jury, the trial 
judge said:
The workings of the instrument need not be given and it seems to me that in 
this case the notes of the experienced officer, the evidence that this software is 
regularly used by him establishes the level of accuracy and in his notes at the 
time that he was – successfully used the program seems to me to meet the tests 
... He was a trained, experienced and competent operator and the software was 
operated properly and, in those circumstances, in this case I think this evidence 
is admissible and I will allow it to be given by the qualified expert.1
1 [2012] WASCA 153 at [21].
5.53 Pullin and Mazza JJA agreed the trial judge did not err in overruling the objection 
to the tendering of the text messages. In essence, because Detective Tomlinson was 
qualified as an expert, he could testify about the performance of the machines and the 
software. It was inferred that as an expert (in the opinion of the court), he considered 
the process to be accurate, and that because he had performed such actions previously, 
the actions undertaken on this particular occasion were properly performed – even 
though the user of the program will not know that it was giving inaccurate results.1 
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or whether there were any problems with the software he used.2 Pullin JA said: ‘His 
evidence provided sufficient assurance that the results produced by the machines 
were reliable and accurate, because he (a trained operator of the machines) observed 
them to be so.’3 But it does not follow that any operator of an electronic device will be 
able to detect if the device was malfunctioning in any way. As noted by Eric Van Buskirk 
and Vincent T. Liu:
There is a general tendency among courts to presume – without the benefit of 
meaningful assurance – that forensic software can be trusted to yield accurate 
digital evidence. As a judicial construct, this presumption is unjustified in that it 
is not tailored to separate accurate results from inaccurate ones.4
1 As in the case of the death of Casey Marie Anthony in 2011, for which see Craig Wilson, ‘Digital 
evidence discrepancies – Casey Anthony trial, 11 July 2011’, http:// www.digital- detective.net/ digital- 
evidence- discrepancies- casey- anthony- trial/ ; Tony Pipitone, ‘Cops, prosecutors botched Casey 
Anthony evidence’, Clickorlando.com, 28 November 2012, http:// www.clickorlando.com/ news/ cops- 
prosecutors- botched- casey- anthony- evidence; Jose Baez and Peter Golenbock, Presumed Guilty: Casey 
Anthony: The Inside Story (BenBella Books, updated edition 2013), 46, 180– 183, 211, 346– 348, 365, 
368– 371, 400, 426– 428; Jess Ashton and Lisa Pulitzer, Imperfect Justice: Prosecuting Casey Anthony 
(William Morrow 2011), 105, 239, 277, 291– 292, 298, 315.
2 [2012] WASCA 153; the rationale is set out at [66] and [67].
3 [2012] WASCA 153 at [67].
4 Eric Van Buskirk and Vincent T. Liu, ‘Digital evidence: challenging the presumption of reliability’ 
(2006) (1) Journal of Digital Forensic Practice 19, 20, original emphasis.
5.54 They suggest there are two approaches to resolve the problem in the abstract of 
the paper:
One is through the proper application of scientific jurisprudence to questions 
of digital evidence and the other is through some combination of certain broad 
market and social corrections.
5.55 The important question is:
If the device was malfunctioning, how would the operator know?
5.56 More significantly, the question should be:
How would the malfunction manifest itself, if at all, and in a form evident to the 
operator?
5.57 In addition to which, it is necessary to allow for human factors: such as whether 
an operator focusing on getting a job done has the cognitive capacity to notice errors. 
It is well known that errors cause ‘interference’, which makes them very hard to recall 
even if they were noticed – that is, noticing and interpreting the error requires a 
different sort of thinking than doing the main task, so it interferes and makes it harder 
to do either properly.
5.58 In the minority, Buss J considered that none of the relevant basic facts and 
circumstances were proven. The judge considered the applicable legal principles in 
detail. He cited the relevant case law, and also extracts from The Science of Judicial 
Proof (3rd edn, 1937, para 111) by Professor Wigmore:
Professor Wigmore enunciated three fundamental propositions applicable to 
evidence based on the use of a mechanical or scientific instrument constructed 
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1. The type of apparatus purporting to be constructed on scientific 
principles must be accepted as dependable for the proposed purpose by 
the profession concerned in that branch of science or its related art. This 
can be evidenced by qualified expert testimony; or, if notorious, it will be 
judicially noticed by the judge without evidence.
2. The particular apparatus used by the witness must be one constructed 
according to an accepted type and must be in good condition for accurate 
work. This may be evidenced by a qualified expert.
3. The witness using the apparatus as the source of his testimony must be 
one qualified for its use by training and experience (§220).1
1 [2012] WASCA 153 at [111]– [129], original emphasis.
5.59 The judge continued:
Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn Rev, Vol III, 1970) §795 states the requirements 
for the admissibility of evidence based on the use of scientific instruments, as 
follows:
What is needed, then, in order to justify testimony based on such 
instruments, is preliminary professional testimony: (1) to the 
trustworthiness of the process or instrument in general (when not 
otherwise settled by judicial notice); (2) to the correctness of the 
particular instrument; such testimony being usually available from one 
and the same qualified person.1
1 [2012] WASCA 153 at [112], original emphasis.
5.60 And logically, as Professor Thimbleby has indicated,1 (3) the appropriateness 
and correctness of the use of the instrument as used in the particular case.
1 In reviewing this chapter for the fifth edition, for which my thanks.
5.61 Buss J rejected the evidence of the constable, partly because he was not 
qualified to comment on the software and because the ‘machines/ software’ were 
not so well known that their accuracy may be assumed as a matter of common 
experience.1 Evidence was required to demonstrate their accuracy. It followed that the 
State had to produce evidence from a suitably qualified expert of the trustworthiness 
of the machines and software in general, and of the correctness of the particular 
instruments for the purposes of downloading data from mobile telephones.2 Arguably, 
had the State produced sufficient evidence to convince a judge of the accuracy of the 
machines and software, it would not have been necessary to reply on the presumption. 
Notwithstanding this observation, the approach by Buss J is to be preferred. His brother 
judges appear to accept the astonishing conclusion that not having any knowledge of 
how a device works is irrelevant to the results of the analysis. In their approach, the 
work of software programmers is immaterial. Software code is not germane when 
determining causation. If this approach were accepted, no longer would decisions in 
legal proceedings be based on relevant evidence.
1 This is a criterion that ignores how often people trust something that is untrustworthy simply 
because they are never tempted to challenge its results and scrutinize them with sufficient rigour to be 
able to tell whether they are correct.
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5.62 Contrast this decision to a similar set of facts discussed by the United States 
Court of Appeals, First Circuit in the case of U.S. v Chiaradio.1 The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) used a software tool called LimeWire, a commercially available 
peer- to- peer file sharing program that enables users to transmit files to and from other 
members of the LimeWire network. The FBI adapted this software for the purposes of 
investigations into abusive images of children. It was called ‘enhanced peer- to- peer 
software’ or EP2P. The software adapted by the FBI differed from LimeWire in three 
principle respects: (1) the software permitted downloading from only one source at a 
time, thus ensuring that the entire file was available on the computer of the accused; 
(2) in the commercially available version, LimeWire responds to a search term by 
displaying the names of the available files, file types, and the file sharers’ IP addresses, 
whereas EP2P displays the same data and the identity of the Internet Service Provider 
(ISP), together with the city and state associated with the IP address sharing a 
particular file, and (3) EP2P was modified so that an agent could easily compare the 
hash value of an available file with the hash values of confirmed videos and abusive 
images of children.
1 684 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2012).
5.63 The defence requested discovery of the source code at an evidentiary hearing 
before the District Court. The application was refused. The purpose of the request was 
to determine whether the reliability of the technology could be credibly challenged; 
the defence argued that the inability to examine the source code prevented the accused 
from mounting such a challenge. The District Court denied the motion to compel 
discovery of the source code and the Appeal Court agreed with the District Court. Agent 
P. Michael Gordon testified that the software had no error rate; he demonstrated how 
the results of an investigation could be independently verified, and that the software 
had never yielded a false positive. The court considered that this alone provided 
sufficient evidence of the reliability of the tool. The defence also cited the lack of a peer 
review, but the Appeal Court indicated that the Daubert1 factors were not a definitive 
checklist, and there was a sound explanation for the absence of peer review:
The record shows that the source code is purposely kept secret because the 
government reasonably fears that traders of child pornography (a notoriously 
computer- literate group) otherwise would be able to use the source code to 
develop ways either to evade apprehension or to mislead the authorities. This 
circumstance satisfactorily explains the absence of any peer review.2
1 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), 113 S.Ct. 2786.
2 684 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2012) at 278.
5.64 The evidence in this example enabled the court to resist the discovery of the 
source code on the basis that the software was proven to be ‘reliable’ in respect of 
the specific purposes for which it had been developed, although it is not clear what 
evidence of its correctness, if any, was offered.1 That no errors (for example there were 
no false positives) are found does not mean that there are none.
1 See People v Collins, 49 Misc.3d 595, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015), 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 25227 
(evidence based on a forensic statistical tool (FST) excluded on the basis that the device was not 
generally accepted in the DNA scientific community); a number of judges have declined to follow this 
decision – one of the most negative is Schwartz J in People v Carter, 50 Misc.3d 1210(A), 36 N.Y.S.3d 
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entitled to a Frye hearing because the FST is not new, novel or experimental), although note the order of 
Caproni J in United States v Johnson, Case No. 1:1- er- 00565- VEC (S.D.N.Y. 7 June 2016) (order granting 
request for subpoena for disclosure of FST source code), https:// www.courtlistener.com/ recap/ gov.
uscourts.nysd.446412.57.0.pdf.
Mechanical instruments and computer- like devices
5.65 The discussion in this chapter focuses on software code that provides 
instructions. In the case of firmware, which is software that is incorporated into 
hardware, the absence of visible programs does not mean that software is absent: the 
commentary in this chapter applies equally to this form of implementation of software.
The nature of software errors
5.66 It can be said that a computer can be both ‘reliable’ (but not infallible) and yet 
perform functions without the authority or knowledge of the owner or software writer. 
This may be when the code executes in a way, because of a strange or unforeseen 
conjunction of inputs, which neither the owner nor the writer had imagined. For 
instance, one Jonathan Moore designed and produced forged railway tickets that were 
accepted by ticket machines controlled by computers. It took a ticket inspector to 
notice subtle differences in the colour and material of the ticket, which led to his arrest 
and prosecution for forgery.1
1 Tom Pugh, ‘IT expert sentenced for rail ticket forgery’, The Independent (London, 2 October 2009).
5.67 It is important to understand that programmers are aware of the limitations of 
their software, as famously articulated by Ken Thompson:
You can’t trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from 
companies that employ people like me.) No amount of source- level verification 
or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code.1
1 Ken Thompson, ‘Reflections on trusting trust’ (1984) 27(8) Turing Award Lecture, Communications 
of the ACM 761; Donald MacKenzie, Mechanizing Proof Computing, Risk and Trust (MIT Press 2004), 
299, fn 1.
5.68 These comments are decidedly relevant, given that Thompson demonstrated 
how to create a C program fragment that would introduce Trojan horse code into 
another compiled C program by compromising the C compiler. Thomas Wadlow 
explained this process as follows:
For example, when compiling the program that accepts passwords for login, 
you could add code that would cause the [first] program to accept legitimate 
passwords or a special backdoor password known to the creator of the Trojan. 
This is a common strategy even today and is often detectable through source- 
code analysis.
Thompson went one step further. Since the C compiler is written in the 
Cprogramming language, he used a similar technique to apply a Trojan to the 
C compiler source itself. When the C compiler is compiled, the resulting binary 
program could be used to compile other programs just as before; but when the 
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from clean, uncompromised source code, the backdoor- password Trojan code 
is inserted into the binary, even though the original source code used was 
completely clean. Source- code analysis [of the login program] would not reveal 
the Trojan because it was lower in the tool chain than the login program.1
1 Thomas Wadlow, ‘Who must you trust?’ (2014) 12(5) acmqueue Security 2.
5.69 The description could have continued. The Trojan, as described above, remains 
easily detected: there is one in the source code of the compiler and one in the object 
code of the compiler. In Thompson’s scheme, he went one step further: modify the 
compiler to insert the compiler’s Trojan. Now the source code Trojan in the compiler 
(which inserts the Trojan into the login) can be removed. Furthermore, as Thompson 
points out, you can now remove all trace of the Trojan in all source code. There is now 
no readable evidence of any Trojan attack.1
1 My thanks to Professor Thimbleby for this point.
5.70 Just because a person is in physical control of a computer or shop cash till,1 
it does not follow that she will be aware whether it is working ‘reliably’, ‘properly’, 
‘consistently’, ‘correctly’ or ‘dependably’.2 As indicated above, even the writer of the 
software will not be in such a luxurious position. It therefore follows that the following 
comment by Kerr LCJ was not correct:
In the modern world the presumption of equipment being properly constructed 
and operating correctly must be strong. It is a particularly strong presumption in 
the case of equipment within the control of the defendant who alone would know 
if there was evidence of incorrect operation or incorrect setting.3
1 Stephen Castell, ‘Letter to the editor’ (1994) 10 Computer Law and Security Report 158 pointed 
out that the observation by Lord Griffiths that a till was a ‘computer … of the simplest kind’ was, even 
at the time, an assumption that did not reflect the truth: at 387D, R. v Shephard (Hilda) [1993] AC 380, 
[1993] 2 WLR 102, [1993] 1 All ER 225, [1992] 12 WLUK 273, (1993) 96 Cr App R 345, (1993) 157 
JP 145, [1993] Crim LR 295, (1993) 143 NLJ 127, (1993) 137 SJLB 12, Times, 17 December 1992, 
Independent, 21 January 1993, [1993] CLY 636; Allison Nyssens, ‘The law of evidence: on- line with the 
computer age?’ (1993) 15(10) EIPR 360.
2 The use of the word ‘dependability’ is a global concept that subsumes attributes of reliability, 
availability, safety, integrity and maintainability, and ‘reliability’ provides for continuity of correct 
service: Algirdas Avižienis, Jean- Claude Laprie and others, ‘Basic concepts and taxonomy of dependable 
and secure computing’ (2004) 1(1) IEEE Transactions on Dependable & Secure Computing 11, 13.
3 Public Prosecution Service v McGowan [2009] NI 1 at [20]; it is acknowledged that many standards 
in the safety critical community require some element of proof in the tools they use, such as evidence 
that the supplier tracks and corrects defects, for instance.
5.71 That software code is imperfect and remains so may be illustrated by the 
comments of an early pioneer in computing, the late Professor Sir Maurice V. Wilkes 
FRS FREng:
By June 1949 people had begun to realize that it was not so easy to get a program 
right as had at one time appeared. I well remember when this realization first 
came on me with full force. The EDSAC was on the top floor of the building and 
the tape- punching and editing equipment one floor below on a gallery that ran 
round the room in which the differential analyzer was installed. I was trying 
to get working my first non- trivial program, which was one for the numerical 
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the EDSAC room and the punching equipment that ‘hesitating at the angles of 
the stairs’ the realization came over me with full force that a good part of the 
remainder of my life was going to be spent in finding errors in my own programs. 
Turing had evidently realized this too, for he spoke at the conference on ‘checking 
a large routine’.1
1 Maurice V. Wilkes, Memories of a Computer Pioneer (MIT Press 1985), 145. For the EDSCA room, 
see https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ EDSAC.
5.72 This observation has been repeated many times since.1 Programmer errors are 
caused by a mix of novelty (applying software to previously unsolved problems) and the 
difficulty of the tasks software is required to perform, including their magnitude and 
complexity.2 And the errors reach back. Programmers use programming languages, and 
the languages are themselves subject to errors; there are errors even if the programmers 
are somehow perfect and ensure there are no errors, because other programmers further 
back will have left errors. This is why software has always been released in new versions: 
primarily to correct previously unknown (or ignored) errors.
1 The reader might wish to begin with the following, which is only one of many articles by many 
eminent people: Les Hatton, ‘Characterising the diagnosis of software failure’ (2001) 18(4) IEEE 
Software 34.
2 B. Littlewood and L. Strigini, ‘Software reliability and dependability: a roadmap’ in A. Finkelstein 
(ed.), The Future of Software Engineering, State of the Art Reports given at the 22nd International 
Conference on Software Engineering (ACM Press 2000), 177– 188.
5.73 To address this problem, the approach of many of the existing software 
safety standards is to define requirements for and put constraints on the software 
development and assurance processes.1 Using the taxonomy of the provision of 
services, Algirdas Avižienis and colleagues have defined a ‘correct service’ as one 
where the service implements the system function. Its failure is an event that occurs 
when the service does not do what the function provides. This deviation is described 
as an ‘error’. For instance, if the function when using an ATM is to dispense the correct 
quantity of cash, and the ATM dispenses the correct amounts of cash, then there is a 
correct service, and the service is carried out in accordance with the function. If the 
amount of cash withdrawn from an ATM is greater or less than the amount keyed in, or 
no cash is provided, this is a service failure that can be an error or fault. The authors go 
on to say:
Since a service is a sequence of the system’s external states, a service failure 
means that at least one (or more) external state of the system deviates from the 
correct service state … In most cases, a fault first causes an error in the service 
state of a component that is a part of the internal state of the system and the 
external state is not immediately affected.
For this reason, the definition of an error is the part of the total state of the 
system that may lead to its subsequent service failure.2 It is important to note 
that many errors do not reach the system’s external state and cause a failure. 
A fault3 is active when it causes an error, otherwise it is dormant.4
1 Professor John McDermid and Tim Kelly, ‘Software in safety critical systems: achievement and 
prediction’, 2(3) Nuclear Future 34; Peter Bernard Ladkin, ‘Duty of care and engineering functional- 
safety standards’ (2019) 16 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 51.
2 Although this permits everything to be an error.
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4 Algirdas Avižienis and others, ‘Basic concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing’, 
13, original emphasis; for additional discussions on this topic, see John Rushby, ‘Critical system 
properties: survey and taxonomy’ (1994) 43(2) Reliability Engineering and System Safety 189, and 
MacKenzie, Mechanizing Proof Computing, 337, fn 16.
5.74 For instance, an ATM might provide a receipt that £100 has been withdrawn, 
but does not dispense the money. Given this set of facts, clearly a fault has occurred. 
One reason might be that the sensors or the software code (or both) in the machine 
failed to detect the lack of movement of cash. The bank might provide a printout of 
the machine’s internal functioning that shows the purported balance of cash held in 
the machine before the transaction, and again after it. This proves very little. In the 
New York case of Porter v Citibank, N.A.,1 a similar set of facts occurred. The customer 
used his card, but no money was dispensed. Employees of the bank testified that on 
average machines were out of balance once or twice a week. From the point of view of 
evidence, the information on the printout is restricted to a single transaction. For the 
bank to prove that the machine actually dispensed £100 (and therefore the customer 
is lying), it is necessary for the bank to balance the ATM and report the results for the 
material time. The overall balance might indicate that it had gone down by £100. But 
the report might be inaccurate. This is because of a number of associated variables, 
such as (this is not an exhaustive list): there are multiple layers of outsourcing, the 
fact that people cover up mistakes and the fact that people rely on other people to 
be diligent in dual- control tasks (whatever they are). Equally, if the machine happens 
to overpay someone else by £100, the error will cancel out the previous error and 
the end result might not have been detected by human intervention either. Human 
cross- checks may suggest that everything appears correct, but the system is failing 
repeatedly. A further reason for the machine to be in error is that a third party may 
have successfully inserted code to bypass the software in the machine, leaving the thief 
to recover the cash after the customer left the scene.2
1 123 Misc.2d 28, 472 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct. 1984).
2 Stephen Mason, ‘Debit cards, ATMs and negligence of the bank and customer’, (2012) 27(3) 
Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 163; Maryke Silalahi Nuth, 
‘Unauthorized use of bank cards with or without the PIN: a lost case for the customer?’ (2012) 9 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 95; Stephen Mason, ‘Electronic banking and how courts 
approach the evidence’ (2013) 29(2) Computer Law and Security Review 144.
5.75 For all these reasons and more, it is difficult to show that a computer is working 
‘properly’, even for highly skilled professionals.1 Part of the problem is that computers 
fail in discontinuous ways (they cannot fail slightly), which is a characteristic of discrete 
complexity, unlike most mechanical devices.
1 There is a technique called code verification, where code functionalities are verified as 
mathematical properties. But this process is time- consuming and limited, although it is faster then 
fixing a problem later. I owe this observation to Professor Seng.
Why software appears to fail
5.76 People across the world increasingly depend on computers and computer- 
like devices for mundane uses such as recording (cameras and recorders on mobile 
telephones), for critical uses such as lifesaving devices that control delicate medical 
equipment in hospitals and for important infrastructural uses such as systems for the 
supply of gas, electricity and fuel, underground trains,1 buses2 and financial software 
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1 The railway trains on the Jubilee Line of the London Underground were being replaced with new 
trains from 2011. Many of the new trains failed and left passengers stranded for hours because of 
software failures: Dick Murray, ‘Computer crash caused Jubilee Line “meltdown” ’, Evening Standard 
(London, 9 November 2011) 11; this problem was also included in one of the series of six programmes 
by the BBC entitled The Tube that was broadcast during the spring of 2012. This is merely one example 
from across the world.
2 A software problem meant that a new model of the London bus had to be run with its distinctive 
rear platform shut: ‘New Routemaster bus starts running on London roads’, BBC News, 27 February 
2012, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ uk- england- london- 17173625.
5.77 In the light of the ubiquitous nature of software, it is important to be aware that 
software code can function as intended by the programmer, but it can also be the cause 
of failure. Alternatively, software code may fail to function in the way the programmer 
intended, or it might continue to function but undertake actions that the programmer 
did not originally intend or instruct the device to undertake. Problems can occur for a 
number of reasons, such as where software code has a mistake, or because of improper 
installation, or because the people hired to undertake the work were not sufficiently 
qualified.1 A range of consequences might follow, such as the failure of air traffic control 
systems2 and lost baggage from baggage handling systems in airports,3 preventing 
couples from obtaining mortgages because of incorrect records,4 dispensing more 
cash than is recorded via faulty software in ATMs,5 miscalculating assets in family 
cases,6 and causing injuries and deaths.7 The increasing complexity of software and 
interconnections act to exacerbate the problems that occur.8
1 Robotic Vision Systems, Inc. v Cybo Systems, Inc., 17 F.Supp.2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
2 Leonard Lee, The Day the Phones Stopped: the Computer Crisis – The What and Why of It, and How 
We Can Beat It (Donald I. Fine, New York 1991),  chapter 7; Independent Enquiry, NATS System Failure 
12 December 2014 – Final Report (13 May 2015), paras ES7– ES10, https:// www.caa.co.uk/ WorkArea/ 
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=4294974241.
3 Michael Schloh, Analysis of the Denver International Airport Baggage System (Submitted: 16 
February 1996 Advisor: Daniel Stearns) (Computer Science Department, School of Engineering, 
California Polytechnic State University 1996), http:// www5.in.tum.de/ ~huckle/ schloh_ DIA.pdf; 
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Andrew R. Goetz and Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Denver International Airport: 
Lessons Learned (McGraw- Hill 1997); The Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector 
General, Lessons Learned from the August 11, 2007, Network Outage at Los Angeles International Airport 
(Redacted) (OIG- 08- 58, May 2008); House of Commons Transport Committee, The Opening of Heathrow 
Terminal 5, Twelfth Report of Session 2007– 08: Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written 
Evidence (Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 22 October 2008; HC 543, published on 3 
November 2008).
4 Nicole Blackmore, ‘Npower’s error cost us our mortgage’, The Daily Telegraph, Your Money 
(London, 10 May 2014) 1, 3.
5 Tim Stewart, ‘Huge queues as Tesco cash machine gives customers “free money” ’, London Evening 
Standard (18 August 2009), http:// www.standard.co.uk/ news/ huge- queues- as- tesco- cash- machine- 
gives- customers- free- money- 6702682.html; for other examples, see Stephen Mason, When Bank 
Systems Fail: Debit Cards, Credit Cards, ATMs, Mobile and Online Banking: Your Rights and What To Do 
When Things Go Wrong (2nd edn, PP Publishing 2014).
6 Owen Bowcott, ‘Revealed: divorce software error hits thousands of settlements’, The Guardian 
(London, 17 December 2015).
7 Donald MacKenzie, ‘Computer- related accidental death: an empirical exploration’ (1994) 21(4) 
Science and Public Policy 233.
8 For instance, consider the widespread effect that the power outage in August 2019, partly because 
of software failures, had on England: Office of Rail and Road, Report Following Railway Power Disruption 
on 9th August 2019 (3 January 2020); Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, GB Power 
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Classification of software errors
5.78 The word ‘bug’ is a term commonly used in the information technology industry 
to describe a variety of issues.1 When a technician uses this term, it can have a number 
of meanings.2 Professor Thomas offered his view at a lecture he gave in 2015:
Different researchers and authors may describe faults as ‘flaws’, ‘errors’, ‘defects’, 
‘anomalies’ or ‘bugs’ but they will almost always mean functional faults, which 
cause the software to crash or to give the wrong results.3
1 It must be emphasized that there are a number of definitions of technical terms, but they are 
not dealt with in any detail in this text. For an insight as to how ‘bugs’ are dealt with in a contract 
between commercial entities, see GB Gas Holdings Limited v Accenture (UK) Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 
912, [2010] 11 WLUK 260, [2011] 1 Costs LO 64, [2011] CLY 269 and Kingsway Hall Hotel Ltd v Red Sky 
IT (Hounslow) Ltd [2010] EWHC 965 (TCC), [2010] 5 WLUK 106, (2010) 26 Const LJ 542, [2011] CLY 
2777; in the software world, a ‘bug’ is also known as an undocumented feature, for which see David 
Lubar, ‘It’s Not a Bug, It’s a Feature!’ (Addison- Wesley Publishing Company 1995).
2 The members of the team responsible for writing the following report did not use the term ‘bug’ 
when they meant ‘error’: Willis H. Ware (ed), Security Controls for Computer Systems: Report of Defense 
Science Board Task Force on Computer Security – RAND Report R- 609- 1 (Published for the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense) R- 609- 1, Reissued October 1979.
3 ‘Should we trust computers?’, lecture given at Gresham College, 20 October 2015, http:// www.
gresham.ac.uk/ lectures- and- events/ should- we- trust- computers.
5.79 Lay people, not without some justification, consider the term ‘bug’ to be a cloak 
that hides the correct meaning, namely that what is being described is an error, flaw, 
mistake, failure or fault in a software program or system.1 Drawing from the work of 
Professor Ladkin, it is possible to classify most software errors into the following non- 
exhaustive categories:2 human errors in coding and software development; software 
design or specification errors; unintended or unanticipated software interactions, 
input data flaws and deliberate errors caused by operators or hackers remotely.
1 Causes of failure can also be categorized into human error, environment (including power outages 
or A/ C failure), network failure, software failure and hardware failure: Bianca Schroeder and Garth 
A. Gibson, ‘A large- scale study of failures in high- performance computing systems’ (2010) 7(4) IEEE 
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 338.
2 Peter B. Ladkin, On Classification of Factors in Failures and Accidents (Report RVS- Occ- 99- 02), 
https:// rvs- bi.de/ publications/ .
Human errors and biases in the software code
5.80 Notwithstanding the best software development tools that catch and identify 
coding errors, human errors in writing software code account for a large number of 
software errors. This problem is going to be exacerbated, given the increasing size of 
written codes. An example of human error in software code is that of Mariner I, the 
spacecraft that was sent to Venus and launched on 22 July 1962. The software code 
indicated that the booster had failed, and the rocket was destroyed on command from 
the control centre. In fact, the rocket was behaving correctly and it was the computer 
system on the ground that was at fault, partly because of a defect in the software and 
partly because of a hardware failure. The error in the software arose because the 
person who wrote the software failed to include an overbar in the guidance equations.1
1 Peter G. Neumann, Computer Related Risks (Addison- Wesley 1995), 26– 27 (‘Here R denotes the 
radius; the dot indicates the first derivative – that is, the velocity; the bar indicates smoothed rather 
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track data incorrectly, leading to the erroneous termination of the launch’); see also the explanation by 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration report NSSDC ID: MARIN1, http:// nssdc.gsfc.nasa.
gov/ nmc/ spacecraftDisplay.do?id=MARIN1; for more detail on computers and the space age and an 
analysis of accidents (including this example), see Paul E. Ceruzzi, Beyond the Limits: Flight Enters the 
Computer Age (MIT Press 1989).
5.81 Two further examples are the Clementine mission and the Ariane 5 failure. 
The Clementine mission was a joint project between the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization and NASA. After the spacecraft left lunar orbit, a malfunction in one of 
the onboard computers on 7 May 1994 caused a thruster to fire until it had used up 
all of its fuel, leaving the spacecraft spinning at about 80 rpm with no spin control. 
The spacecraft remained in geocentric orbit and continued testing the spacecraft 
components until the end of mission.1 In the case of the Ariane 5 rocket failure in 1996, 
the disintegration of the rocket 40 seconds after launch was due to a software failure – 
because, in the words of Professor Les Hatton, ‘the programmers had arranged the 
code such that a 64- bit floating point number was shoe- horned into a 16- bit integer’.2 
As pointed out by Professor Ladkin, ‘Code was reused from the Ariane 4 guidance 
system. The Ariane 4 has different flight characteristics in the first 30 seconds of 
flight and exception conditions were generated on both inertial guidance system (IGS) 
channels of the Ariane 5.’3
1 Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Lessons Learned from the Clementine Mission 
(National Academy Press 1997), http:// ntrs.nasa.gov/ archive/ nasa/ casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/ 19980041408.
pdf.
2 Les Hatton, ‘Ariane 5: A smashing success’ (1999) 1(2) Software Testing and Quality Engineering 
14; Ariane 501 Inquiry Board report (4 June 1996), http:// esamultimedia.esa.int/ docs/ esa- x- 
1819eng.pdf and https:// www.ima.umn.edu/ ~arnold/ disasters/ ariane5rep.html; Charles C. Mann, 
‘Why software is so bad’, (2002) Technology Review 38(b); Derek Partridge, The Seductive Computer: 
Why IT Systems Always Fail (Springer 2011), 99, fn 6.
3 Peter B. Ladkin, The Ariane 5 Accident: A Programming Problem? (Article RVS- J- 98- 02), https:// 
rvs- bi.de/ publications/ .
5.82 Human bias has also begun to be more fully understood, especially when 
analysing systems marketed as artificial intelligence, usually developed with a 
form of machine learning.1 Hidden biases and flawed datasets are, in all probability, 
normal.2
1 State v Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017); Danielle Keats 
Citrona, ‘Technological Due Process’ (2008) 85 Wash U L Rev 1249 – noting that the automated public 
benefits systems of Colorado, California and Texas mistranslated codified eligibility requirements 
and erroneously distributed or withheld public benefits; Kenneth A. Bamberger, ‘Technologies of 
compliance: risk and regulation in a digital age’ (2010) 88 Tex L Rev 669 – software designers have 
created compliance and risk management software with automation biases to favour corporate self- 
interest; Kathleen E. Watson, ‘Note, COBRA data and the right to confront technology against you’ 
(2015) 42 N Ky L Rev 375, 381; Susan Nevelow Mart, ‘The algorithm as a human artifact: implications 
for legal [re]search’ (2017) 109 Law Libr J 387; Christian Chessman, ‘A “source” of error: computer code, 
criminal defendants, and the constitution’ (2017) 105 Cal L Rev 179 – for corrections in this article, 
see Duncan A. Taylor, Jo- Anne Bright and John Buckleton, Commentary, ‘A “source” of error: computer 
code, criminal defendants, and the constitution’ (2017) 8 Frontiers in Genetics 1; Molly Griffard, ‘A 
bias- free predictive policing tool?: an evaluation of the NYPD’s Patternizr’ (2019) 47 Fordham Urb 
LJ 43; Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson and Arvind Narayanan, ‘Semantics derived automatically from 
language corpora contain human- like biases’ (2017) 356(6334) Science 183; Jieyu Zhao, TianluWang, 
Mark Yatskar, Vicente Ordonez and Kai- Wei Chang, ‘Men also like shopping: reducing gender bias 
amplification using corpus- level constraints’ in Proceedings of the 2017 Conference on Empirical 
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www.aclweb.org/ anthology/ D17- 1323.pdf; Anupam Chander, ‘The racist algorithm?’ (2017) 115 Mich 
L Rev 2013; Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High- Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish 
the Poor (St Martin’s Press 2018); Caroline Criado Perez, Invisible Women: Exposing Data Bias in a 
World Designed for Men (Chatto & Windus 2019).
2 In her book Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens 
Democracy (Broadway Books 2016, 2017), Cathy O’Neil demonstrates that software applications are 
written by human beings (mostly men), with choices as to how the software code is written, often 
on the basis of prejudice, misunderstanding and bias. Software writers define their own reality and 
then use it to justify the results. In writing software code, programmers routinely lack data for human 
behaviour, which means they substitute data from dubious statistical correlations that discriminate 
and whose use might even be illegal. For details of the case law cited, see ‘Book Reports’ (2017) 14 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 95. For an early example of software that was 
written and produced biased results because of the bias of the programmer, see Stella Lowry and 
Gordon Macpherson, ‘A blot on the profession’ (1988 March) 5 British Medical Journal 657, https:// 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/ articles/ PMC2545288/ ; Anders Eklund, Thomas E. Nichol and Hans 
Knutsson, ‘Cluster failure: why fMRI inferences for spatial extent have inflated false- positive rates’ 
(2016) 113 Proc Natl Acad Sci 7900. For software bias that promotes male over female vocal artists, 
see Andres Ferraro, Xavier Serra and Christine Bauer, ‘Break the loop: gender imbalance in music 
recommenders’ in CHIIR ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 Conference on Human Information Interaction 
and Retrieval (Association for Computing Machinery 2021) 249, https:// dl.acm.org/ doi/ pdf/ 10.1145/ 
3406522.3446033.
Failure of specification
5.83 The problem might not be in the software code, but with the specification,1 such 
as with the loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter spacecraft in 1999. On this occasion, the 
failure resulted from not using metric units in the coding of a ground software file. The 
thruster performance data used in the software application code entitled SM_ FORCES 
(small forces) was in Imperial units instead of metric units.2 Roy Longbottom, Head of 
the Large Scientific Systems Branch of the Central Computer Agency, observed that:
When the software is first written and assembled, as for hardware, it usually 
undergoes a series of design quality assurance tests to ensure that the specification 
is met on facilities, performance and on physical source requirements. It is again 
fairly easy to check out the broad facilities provided but impossible to forecast 
and test for all possible modes of operation, combinations and sequences. One 
difference with hardware is that, the writing of comprehensive tests3 for the 
software is often regarded as an overhead, whereas for hardware, comprehensive 
tests are written as a natural process for identifying constructional defects on 
all new equipment and for overcoming long term reliability problems. So, when 
software is first delivered, it is almost certain that the design will not be quite 
correct or some coding errors will be present.4
1 For an example of the failure of a properly structured agreement that included what the customer 
wanted from the software; see South West Water Services Ltd v International Computers Ltd [1999] 6 
WLUK 427, [1999] BLR 420, [1999– 2000] Info TLR 1, [1998– 99] Info TLR 154, [1999] ITCLR 439, 
[2001] Lloyd’s Rep PN 353, [1999] Masons CLR 400, [2000] CLY 870. In Co- Operative Group (Cws) Ltd. 
(Formerly Co- Operative Wholesale Society Ltd.) v International Computers Ltd. [2003] EWHC 1 (TCC), 
[2003] 12 WLUK 646, [2004] Info TLR 25, (2004) 27(3) IPD 27023, (2004) 148 SJLB 112, Times, 19 
January 2004, [2005] CLY 42, the case failed for lack of a contract, but the judge observed, at [260], that 
‘the initial efforts of ICL to try to meet the requirements of CWS as to when software was required were 
frustrated by the failure of CWS to specify precisely what its requirements were’.
2 Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board Phase I Report (10 November 1999), https:// llis.
nasa.gov/ llis_ lib/ pdf/ 1009464main1_ 0641- mr.pdf.
3 Because of the discontinuous nature of software, the notion of a ‘comprehensive test for software’ 
does not exist, even in the high- integrity market. Testing every possible sequence of every possible 
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4 Roy Longbottom, Computer System Reliability (Wiley 1980), 71. This book may have been published 
in 1980, but remains true in the twenty- first century. Note  chapter 6 regarding faults.
5.84 It is a pervasive characteristic of software code that design will not be quite 
correct or coding errors will be present, and there will be occasions when a fault cannot 
be replicated.1 At the beginning, the attitude taken by NASA towards software code was 
to consider it of secondary importance. Although this view had changed over time, and 
a rigorous methodology has since been implemented to provide for the better control 
and development of software code, NASA has never produced error- free software code.2
1 For which see National Transportation Safety Board, Pipeline Accident Report, Pipeline Rupture and 
Subsequent Fire in Bellingham, Washington June 10, 1999 (NTSB/ PAR- 02/ 02; PB2002- 916502; Notation 
7264A, Adopted 8 October 2002), 63, https:// www.ntsb.gov/ investigations/ AccidentReports/ 
Reports/ PAR0202.pdf.
2 Nancy G. Leveson, ‘Software and the challenge of flight control’ in Roger D. Launius, John Krige and 
James I. Craig (eds) Space Shuttle Legacy: How We Did It and What We Learned (American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics 2013).
Unintended software interactions
5.85 Software code might function correctly, as intended by the programmer, but the 
interactions between individual components of the software code can be the cause of 
failure, because the designers of the system fail to account for all potential interactions. 
This is because the possible number of defects in software relates not only to the 
components (lines of code), but also to the number of ways in which they interact – the 
number of interactions increases faster than the number of components, thus making 
large systems with many components proportionally harder to get right. As the work 
of Bianca Schroeder and Garth A. Gibson demonstrates, the more complex the system 
becomes, the more likely it is that different types of failure will occur,1 and the number 
of reasons that complexity causes failure also increases.2 To put the problem into 
perspective, it is necessary to understand not the number of defects per device but 
the proportion of design decisions that contain defects.3 A typical design decision in 
software looks like this:





1 Schroeder and Gibson, ‘A large- scale study of failures in high- performance computing systems’.
2 For the same discussion in 1986, see Rudolph J. Peritz, ‘Computer data and reliability: a call for 
authentication of business records under the federal rules of evidence’ (1986) 80(4) Northwestern 
University Law Review 965, 990– 999; Stephen Mason and Timothy S. Reiniger, ‘ “Trust” between 
machines? Establishing identity between humans and software code, or whether you know it is a 
dog, and if so, which dog?’ (2015) 21(5) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 135; for a 
specific case study, see Sivanesan Tulasidas, Ruth Mackay, Pascal Craw, Chris Hudson, Voula Gkatzidou 
and Wamadeva Balachandran, ‘Process of designing robust, dependable, safe and secure software for 
medical devices: point of care testing device as a case study’ (2013) 6 Journal of Software Engineering 
and Applications 1.
3 Nobody is certain how many defects occur per lines of code or number of design decisions, but for 
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5.86 Illustrating the point with this simple example means that each design decision 
creates at least two choices for the software to handle, and further design choices will 
have to be made within the ‘do something’ bits, as well as in the ‘do something else’ bit 
as needed. One decision will have 2 choices, then as it is developed, 4, then 8, 16, 32, 64 
and so on, increasing exponentially in complexity. Very quickly the choices go beyond 
human comprehension. This demonstrates that in software, a very few decisions rapidly 
create a far more complex thing than humans can reliably analyse and about which they 
can be confident they have made the right decisions, in even a modest fraction of the 
possible cases.1 Since there are typically thousands of design decisions in the software 
for even relatively small products, there will be millions and millions of design choices, 
and hence it is easy to overlook hundreds of defects in the final products.2 An average 
defect level of one to five defects per thousand lines of code could translate into 
hundreds if not thousands of defects for devices that have several hundred thousand 
to a million or more lines of code.3 This is the typical size of most software that controls 
aircraft,4 motor vehicles and many other common systems. The user is affected by how 
often the software fails. This is because one defect may cause failures frequently, and 
another defect may very seldom cause failures.5
1 I owe this example and analysis to Professor Harold Thimbleby.
2 Hoang Pham, System Software Reliability (Springer 2000), 2; Clemente Izurieta and James 
M. Bieman, ‘How software designs decay: a pilot study of pattern evolution’, First International 
Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement (ESEM, 2007) (Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers 2009); Clemente Izurieta and James M. Bieman, ‘A multiple case study of 
design pattern decay, grime, and rot in evolving software systems’ (2013) 21 Software Qual J 289; 
Duc Minh Le, Carlos Carrillo, Rafael Capilla and Nenad Medvidovic, ‘Relating architectural decay and 
sustainability of software systems’, in 13th Working IEEE/ IFIP Conference on Software Architecture 
(WICSA 2016) (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2016); National Institute of Statistical 
Sciences, Code Decay in Legacy Software Systems: Measurement, Models, and Statistical Strategies: 
‘Over time, software code can lose quality and begin having errors and problems working properly. 
[Note: code does not lose quality on its own, but because programmers continue to alter code.] It is 
more difficult to keep changing the code and has become much more expensive as well. Eventually the 
hardware fails and there is no way to update or port the software to newer tools. Lucent Technologies, 
along with the National Science Foundation, hired NISS to look at a way to quantify, measure, 
predict and reverse or retard code decay.’ For the results, see https:// www.niss.org/ research/ 
code- decay- legacy- software- systems- measurement- models- and- statistical- strategies.
3 William Guttman, professor of economics and technology at Carnegie Mellon University, is of the 
view that the figure is nearer 30 errors per 1,000 lines of code on average: Alorie Gilbert, ‘Newsmaker: 
fixing the sorry state of software’, CNET News, 9 October 2002 (this item no longer seems to be available 
online); see also The Economic Impacts of Inadequate Infrastructure for Software Testing: Final Report 
(May 2002) prepared for National Institute of Standards and Technology by RTI Health, Social, and 
Economics Research, https:// www.nist.gov/ system/ files/ documents/ director/ planning/ report02- 
3.pdf; Herb Krasner, The Cost of Poor Quality Software in the US: A 2018 Report (Consortium for IT 
Software Quality 2018), https:// www.it- cisq.org/ the- cost- of- poor- quality- software- in- the- us- a- 2018- 
report/ The- Cost- of- Poor- Quality- Software- in- the- US- 2018- Report.pdf.
4 On 2 June 1994, Chinook helicopter ZD 576 crashed on the Mull of Kintyre. The RAF Board of 
Inquiry held the pilots to be negligent. Some considered that the installation of a Full Authority Digital 
Engine Control (FADEC) system was to blame, as described in detail in RAF Justice (Computer Weekly), 
http:// cdn.ttgtmedia.com/ rms/ computerweekly/ DowntimePDF/ pdf/ rafjust.pdf; Tony Collins, 
‘Chinook crash: critical internal memo on software flaws’, Computer Weekly, 4 June 2009, http:// www.
computerweekly.com/ news/ 2240089594/ Chinook- crash- critical- internal- memo- on- software- flaws; 
the decision of the RAF Board of Inquiry was subsequently reversed: The Mull of Kintyre Review (HC 
Paper 1348, 2011), https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ 
file/ 247259/ 1348.pdf.
5 P. G. Bishop, ‘The variation of software survival time for different operational input profiles (or why 
you can wait a long time for a big bug to fail)’ in FTCS- 23 The Twenty- Third International Symposium on 
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5.87 Consider, by way of example, the 2003 power outage that affected large portions 
of the Midwest and Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada. The outage affected 
an area with an estimated 50 million people and 61,800 megawatts of electric load, and 
power was not restored for four days in some parts of the United States. Parts of Ontario 
suffered blackouts for more than a week before full power was restored. The subsequent 
investigation indicated a number of failures, a significant one being the failure of a 
computerized energy management system, XA/ 21 EMS. This system failed to detect the 
tripping of electrical facilities. After weeks of testing and analysis, a software coding error 
was discovered. It was a subtle incarnation of a common programming error called a race 
condition,1 brought to light by a series of events and alarm conditions in the equipment 
being monitored. The race condition involved times measured in milliseconds. Mike 
Unum, manager of commercial solutions at GE Energy, explained the problem: ‘There was 
a couple of processes that were in contention for a common data structure, and through a 
software coding error in one of the application processes, they were both able to get write 
access to a data structure at the same time … And that corruption led to the alarm event 
application getting into an infinite loop and spinning.’2
1 https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Race_ condition.
2 Kevin Poulsen, ‘Tracking the blackout bug’, SecurityFocus, 7 April 2004; US– Canada Power System 
Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes 
and Recommendations (Merrimack Station AR- 1165, April 2004), https:// emp.lbl.gov/ publications/ 
final- report- august- 14- 2003- blackout.
5.88 This issue is further magnified by what are called ‘legacy’ systems. For instance, 
the computer systems used by airlines are very complex. There are a number of reasons 
for this: airlines introduced computer systems in the 1950s; as airlines merge, or take 
over other airlines, they might combine or adopt the computer systems they have 
inherited; over time, as new functions are added, this process has created systems of 
great complexity. The banking sector has the same problem. Replacing such systems is 
not an easy decision, because it would take a considerable amount of money and time, 
and it is doubtful whether any IT firm has sufficient skills and knowledge to provide all 
the software needed for a complete replacement.1
1 ‘All systems stop: why big firms like Delta find it so hard to eliminate glitches from their IT systems’, 
The Economist, 13 August 2016 (from the print edition), https:// www.economist.com/ business/ 
2016/ 08/ 13/ all- systems- stop.
5.89 Consider a practical example. The display on a screen has a meaning, and if 
that meaning is not veridical, then an accident may result. Where the moon rising over 
the horizon causes a system to interpret it as a massive ICBM launch, semantic safety 
is violated: that is, the display (it might be a warning signal or something else) was 
not veridical. This problem has been linked to the possibility that a nuclear war has 
been averted by human intervention despite computer warnings of imminent attacks 
at least twice.1
1 I owe this suggestion to Professor Peter Bernard Ladkin. For the incident where software code 
made it appear the Soviet Union had launched a nuclear missile assault on the USA, see MacKenzie, 
Mechanizing Proof Computing, 23– 24 and Eric Schlosser, Command and Control (Penguin 2014), 253– 
254; for an incident where software code made it appear there was a missile attack by the USA against 
the Soviet Union, see Ron Rosenbaum, How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III (Simon 
& Schuster 2011) 7, 225– 226, 248; Pavel Aksenov, ‘Stanislav Petrov: the man who may have saved the 
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5.90 It should be observed that the increasing use of machine- learning systems 
complicates this issue, because the software code is instructed to make further 
decisions when running, which increases the complexity. In addition, the veridicality 
of machine- learning systems, like neural nets, cannot be easily understood or verified.1 
Machine learning (ML) systems can learn (correctly or incorrectly) after they have 
been programmed: the errors they can make will typically not have been subject to 
the sort of scrutiny we expect of standard non- ML software. In particular, ML systems 
are easy to fool. There is a whole field of ‘adversarial ML’ which seeks training data to 
teach ML perverse things. One commonly quoted example is to spray STOP signs with 
innocuous- looking graffiti, and sign recognition software used in cars will read the 
STOP sign as 40 mph;2 a more recent example is to mislead the software in autopilots 
by inserting split- second images into roadside billboards.3
1 I owe this point to Dr Michael Ellims and Professor Martyn Thomas, CBE, FREng.
2 Kevin Eykholt, Ivan Evtimov, Earlence Fernandes, Bo Li, Amir Rahmati, Chaowei Xiao, Atul 
Prakash, Tadayoshi Kohno and Dawn Song, ‘Robust physical- world attacks on deep learning models’, 
CVPR 2018, https:// arxiv.org/ abs/ 1707.08945.
3 Ben Nassi, Yisroel Mirsky, Dudi Nassi, Raz Ben Netanel, Oleg Drokin and Yuval Elovici, ‘Phantom 
of the ADAS: securing advanced driver assistance systems from split- second phantom attacks’, 
https:// ad447342- c927- 414a- bbae- d287bde39ced.filesusr.com/ ugd/ a53494_ 04b5dd9e38d540 
bc863cc8fde2ebf916.pdf.
Input data flaws
5.91 There are also what are known as ‘input- data flaws’, meaning that the data 
entered into the machine was not correct, thus ensuring the information coming out 
is also incorrect – colloquially known as ‘garbage- in- garbage- out’. In a well- designed 
system, the software should check, insofar as that is possible, that the input data is not 
wrong, corrupted or unexpected, and subject the output to a warning, perhaps via the 
user interface. This is a common problem in fairly simple systems such as databases, 
even in critical uses as in the medical field.
Operational errors
5.92 Another manifestation of human error would be operational error. Professor 
Leveson observed that it is ‘often very difficult to separate system design error from 
operator error: In highly automated systems, the operator is often at the mercy of the 
system design and operational procedures’.1 The accuracy of this comment applies 
to virtually every automated system that includes computers and software code, and 
has, indirectly, caused significant loss of life. For instance, ‘user interface errors’ have 
been blamed for several aviation accidents, where the pilot as the user did not do 
anything wrong, but did not know the correct way to do what she wanted to do. Even 
in situations where people are part of a controlled and trained user community, such 
as ambulance controllers or air traffic controllers, human error rates in many tasks 
are high enough to stress systems in ways that are unpredictable. Examples of such 
situations in high stress industries are further explored in the rest of this chapter.
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The development, maintenance and operation  
of software
5.93 As general- purpose computing systems have become more powerful and 
flexible, users have devised new uses for them in ways that the systems developers 
never envisaged. This, coupled with the increase in complexity and the speed at which 
computers work, especially in modern automated systems, means that developers can 
never completely anticipate how users will use their software, or how their software 
will interact with other systems and software. Even where the developers have tested 
their systems in the ways that most users use them (and possibly fail to test them against 
less conventional methods of use), they may subsequently need to issue upgrades that 
provide more functions, or updates to remedy any defects that have been found. In 
doing so, the developers will have modified the software and its operating conditions. 
Such changes will result in new modes of operation that have not been previously 
tested, causing the users to encounter defects they have not previously experienced. 
This problem is compounded when complex operations such as banking systems are 
connected to networks and can be attacked by hackers – internal or external to the 
organization – or just simply affected by unintentional actions of third parties, such as 
making errors during recovery from backups.
5.94 While it might appear that exhaustive testing could be the answer to these 
problems, it is impractical and does not necessarily work, and there is no workable 
theory that would constitute an adequate test. Professor Thomas notes that ‘The main 
way that software developers assure the quality of their work is by running tests, even 
though computer scientists have been saying for the past forty years that testing can 
never show that software is secure or correct’.1 For even relatively small systems, the 
number of possible test cases required for comprehensive testing is enormous. It is 
also not always certain whether or not the software has passed or failed the test, and 
it is necessary to repeat the tests after all software changes. Furthermore, a single test 
case can only expose a system to a very specific set of conditions and data values. The 
number of variations is, in practical terms, unbounded because a robust test must 
consider, among other things, different data values, the number of simultaneous jobs 
running, the system memory configuration, the hardware configuration, all of the 
connected devices or systems, the operators’ actions, user errors, data errors, device 
malfunctions, and so forth. However, just because testing is a complex affair does not 
mean that testing should not be carried out.2 This is so especially when people can 
be killed or injured,3 as in the case of the sudden unintended acceleration problems 
experienced by owners of some modern motor vehicles which operate with electronic 
control systems.4 Michael Barr, in giving evidence as the expert witness for the 
plaintiffs in the trial of Bookout v Toyota Motor Corporation Case, gave the following in 
oral testimony:
[Toyota] didn’t [have] a formal safety process like the MIRSA, the big book. They 
don’t follow a recipe for making a safe system.
They also have the defect that they didn’t do peer reviews on the operating 
system code or the monitor CPU codes. And here, ultimately, it comes down 
to resources. Toyota did not put people and time behind checking up on the 
suppliers who were supplying this critical software [for their vehicle electronic 
control systems]. The operating system at the heart of this main CPU and this and 
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1 Martyn Thomas, ‘Technology, security and politics’ (2016) 25(3) SCSC Newsletter 53.
2 For which see Chris Elliott and Peter Deasley (eds), Creating Systems that Work: Principles of 
Engineering Systems for the 21st Century (The Royal Academy of Engineering 2007).
3 Matt Parker, Humble Pi: A Comedy of Maths Errors (Allen Lane 2019) – the title is hardly fitting, 
given the author refers to a total of 1,517 deaths as a result of software errors, and four deaths relating 
to the results of a lottery (at 156).
4 For safety critical systems, see B. Littlewood, I. Bainbridge and R. E. Bloomfield, The Use of 
Computers in Safety- Critical Applications (Health and Safety Commission 1998).
5 No. CJ- 2008- 7969 (Reported by Karen Twyford, RPR): examination and cross examination of 
Michael Barr 14 October 2013, 80, http:// www.safetyresearch.net/ Library/ Bookout_ v_ Toyota_ Barr_ 
REDACTED.pdf.
Developmental issues and software errors
5.95 In examining the nature of a software fault, even at a time when software was 
less complex than now, Professor Randell and his colleagues made the following astute 
observation:
A detected error is only a symptom of the fault that caused it, and does not 
necessarily identify the fault. Even where the relationship between the fault and 
the detected error appears obvious, it will be found that many other possible 
faults could have caused the same error to be detected.1
1 B. Randell, P. Lee and P. C. Treaven, ‘Reliability issues in computing system design’ (1978) 10(2) 
ACM Computing Surveys 126, 127; but as Professor Thimbleby has pointed out when reviewing this 
chapter, simple slips (including programming errors) do not stem from unmastered complexity; they 
just stem from random events.
5.96 Professor Randell also commented that ‘What is significant about software 
faults is, of course, that they must be algorithmic faults stemming from unmastered 
complexity in the system design’.1 This is a telling observation, in that the primary 
source of software errors lies in its development process. There are numerous issues in 
the development of software that will generate errors, including but not limited to the 
speed at which a developer is required to work to write proprietary software within the 
contractual time  frame, the consistent failure within the industry to provide for suitable 
quality control procedures, the creation of a climate of fear to suppress concerns 
relating to errors and safety,2 and the lack of knowledge that programmers may have 
of the domain in which the software is to work (for instance, the programmer might 
be knowledgeable about mathematics, but have no knowledge of how acceleration 
systems work in motor vehicles3). In addition, it is extremely difficult to develop good 
software without well- designed and mature engineering processes, and impossible to 
do so consistently. Such processes involve the production of essential documents that 
enable effective communication between members of the development team and those 
who will accept, install, use and modify the software. The existence of such documents 
does not guarantee that the software is of high (or adequate) quality, but the absence 
or lack of rigorous quality control is a strong indication of poor- quality software.4
1 Randell and others, ‘Reliability issues in computing system design’, 127.
2 Nancy G. Leveson, ‘Technical and managerial factors in the NASA Challenger and Columbia losses: 
looking forward to the future’, in Daniel Lee Kleinman, Karen A. Cloud- Hansen, Christina Matta and Jo 
Handelsman (eds) Controversies in Science and Technology Volume 2: From Climate to Chromosomes 
(Mary Ann Liebert Press 2008); for a legal response to this problem, see Richard Warner and Robert 
H. Sloan, ‘Vulnerable software: product- risk norms and the problem of unauthorized access’ (2012) 















The presumption that computers are ‘reliable’ 163
3 Michael Ellims, ‘On wheels, nuts and software’, 9th Australian Workshop on Safety Related 
Programmable Systems (SCS ’04) in Brisbane, 2.1, http:// crpit.com/ abstracts/ CRPITV47Ellims.html.
4 I thank Professor Martyn Thomas CBE for these observations.
5.97 In addition, unrealistic estimates of how long it will take to write and test 
software also undermine accuracy,1 which means that those responsible for writing 
software code will not have the time or resources to be comprehensive in developing 
the software.2 It is also necessary to have a comprehensive design that has been 
subjected to peer review that should precede any coding. Often, the writing of lines of 
code remains the ready and easily quantifiable measure of progress, which means that 
writing code starts much too soon, and too little emphasis is placed on good design.
1 This is just one of the problems. Frederick P. Brooks, The Mythical Man- Month Anniversary Edition 
(Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. 1995). For a comprehensive failure, see Slaughter and May, TSB Review 
An Independent Review Following TSB’s Migration to a New IT Platform ( October 2019), https://www.
slaughterandmay.com/news/slaughter-and-may-s-independent-review-of-tsb-s-2018-migration-to-
a-new-it-platform/ .
2 This is not a recent phenomenon. Even in 1976 it could be said that ‘debugging and testing often 
account for half the cost of a program’: Theodore A. Linden, ‘Operating system structures to support 
security and reliable software’ (1976) 8(4) ACM Computing Surveys 409, 410– 411 (also available as 
a US Department of Commerce National Bureau of Standards Technical Note 919, https:// csrc.nist.
gov/ csrc/ media/ publications/ conference- paper/ 1998/ 10/ 08/ proceedings- of- the- 21st- nissc- 1998/ 
documents/ early- cs- papers/ lind76.pdf); and more recently, Robert N. Charette, ‘Why software 
fails’ (2005) 42(9) IEEE Spectrum (2005) 42, http:// spectrum.ieee.org/ computing/ software/ why- 
software- fails; Partridge, The Seductive Computer; W. Wayt Gibbs, ‘Software’s chronic crisis’, Scientific 
American, September 1994, 86.
5.98 This is not to say that all software programmers are incompetent or that they do 
not wish to undertake work of a high quality. In their writings about software errors, 
Algirdas Avižienis and colleagues define ‘human- made faults’1 as including faults of 
omission, and wrong actions that lead to faults of commission. ‘Human- made faults’ 
are, in turn, divided into malicious faults and ‘non- malicious’ or guileless faults. These 
faults can be introduced during the development of the system by a developer or during 
use by an external third party. Guileless faults can be classified as faults resulting from 
mistakes, and deliberate faults that are brought about because of poor decisions – 
usually caused when choices are made to accept having less of one thing in order to get 
more of something else, for instance to preserve acceptable performance, or because 
of economic considerations. Developers who commit such faults may unintentionally 
or deliberately violate an operating procedure with or without understanding the 
consequences of their action.2
1 Avižienis and others, ‘Basic concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing’, 15– 18.
2 For instance, management in Boeing was aware that additional software added to the 737 Max, 
if not correctly dealt with by a pilot within 10 seconds, would lead to catastrophic results, for which 
see The House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure, Final Committee Report: The Design, 
Development & Certification of the Boeing 737 MAX (September 2020), 231, https:// transportation.
house.gov/ imo/ media/ doc/ 2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20
Public%20Release.pdf.
5.99 The main part of the problem is that writing software is an exceedingly difficult 
and challenging field, and the methods used by management to control quality are 
not necessarily the most competent that can be used. However, writing software 
is now getting easier. Advanced development environments generate some code 
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well in all circumstances continues to be demanding. Many amateurs have had the 
experience of being able to build software that achieves impressive effects with very 
little effort. This may well lead them to believe that because they find it easy to program 
a simple video game or puzzle- solver (whose failures do not matter and will probably 
go unnoticed), or some simple program that seems reliable enough for their personal, 
everyday use, then completely finishing or building other complex software systems 
that are correct must be just as easy.
5.100 A further barrier arises when an organization is collectively incompetent.1 This 
in turn means that inherent problems in software used in large organizations may not 
be identified for a long time. For instance, in 2003 Oates Healthcare began to use a new 
software product that was written for the company. At that time it was not known that 
the code written by the programmer was defective, in that it failed to calculate overtime 
for employees correctly. The problem was identified when a previous employee took 
legal action against the company five years after the software was implemented. As 
a result of discovering this problem, the company had to undertake two exercises. 
First, the simple solution was to write new software code to permit the program to 
begin calculating overtime correctly from the point in time that the software was 
amended. Second, because the changes to the software were not capable of affecting 
the previous calculations, the previous records had to be recalculated manually, which 
is an admission of poor programming: it would not be necessary do it manually if a 
computer could do it. Apparently there were over 10 million records that needed to be 
recalculated.2
1 As in the example of the failure of the AAS system: Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: 
Advance Automation System: Federal Aviation Administration, Report Number: AV- 1998- 113 (15 April 
1998), https:// www.oig.dot.gov/ sites/ default/ files/ av1998113.pdf.
2 Phil Simon, Why New Systems Fail: Theory and Practice Collide (AuthorHouse 2009), 7– 9.
5.101 A software project can fail partly because of a combination of the failure 
of management, an unrealistic time frame to develop the software, and a failure to 
develop and test software properly. There are many examples of such failure, and more 
importantly, some failures do not come to light until after the project is complete.1
1 Robert L. Glass, Software Runways: Lessons Learned from Massive Software Project Failures 
(Prentice Hall PRT 1998), xiii– viv; Lee, The Day the Phones Stopped; Nancy G. Leveson, ‘Role of software 
in spacecraft accidents’ (2004) 41(4) Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 564.
Increasing the risk of errors through modification of software
5.102 Software typically goes through modification cycles, called updates or upgrades, 
to fix existing errors in code or enhance or improve software functionality. One of the 
major causes of software failure is that, as software code is modified, each modification 
is capable of increasing the risk of failure. Some of the changes that are meant to fix 
errors may create another one, resulting in a greater or smaller probability of failure. 
Where a vendor releases a significant number of new features or a major redesign, 
there is typically a sudden increase in the probability of failure, after which the risk 
is reduced once further error updates begin to resolve the errors discovered, thus 
reducing the risk again over time.
5.103 It is useful to observe that when safety- related software code is modified, there 
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routine only in the case of dangerous failures, and not necessarily all failures. By way 
of example, consider the case of Saphena Computing Limited v Allied Collection Agencies 
Limited1 in which Mr Recorder Havery QC commented:
In the present case, on the other hand, once the software is fit for its purpose, 
it stays fit for its purpose. If by any chance a flaw is discovered showing that 
it is unfit for purpose (which is hardly likely after prolonged use)2 there is a 
remedy in damages against the supplier, if solvent, until the expiry of the period 
of limitation.3
1 [1989] 5 WLUK 21, [1995] FSR 616, [1995] CLY 774.
2 Professor Thomas has indicated that even in 1995 there was plenty of evidence that this was not 
correct.
3 [1995] FSR 616 at 639.
5.104 The problem with this remark is that proprietary software code can be (and 
indeed often is) affected by updates, which means it does not necessarily stay ‘fit for 
purpose’. It can also be affected by updates in other code, for instance – and quite 
commonly – in updates to the operating system on which it runs. Flaws can become 
manifest at any time, and some flaws can remain for years, which means if they are 
detected by a malicious person or state agency, they can be manipulated for purposes 
other than that which the users intend. There is a more fundamental flaw in the 
statement that ‘it stays fit for its purpose’. If the software is used unchanged for a 
different purpose, which may be no more than the original purpose but applied to 
different data, it may still fail.
5.105 This is illustrated in the Heartbleed exposé.1 Cryptographic protocols are used 
to provide for the security and privacy of communications over the Internet, such as 
the World Wide Web, email, instant messaging and some virtual private networks. 
A current protocol is called the Transport Layer Security (TLS). To implement this 
protocol, a developer will use a cryptographic library. One such library, which is open 
source, is OpenSSL. In 2011, a doctoral student wrote the Heartbeat Extension for 
OpenSSL, and requested that his implementation be included in the protocol. One of 
the developers (there were four) reviewed the proposal, but failed to notice that the 
code was flawed. The code was included in the repository on 31 December 2011 under 
OpenSSL version 1.0.1. The defect allowed anyone on the Internet to read the memory 
of any system that used the flawed versions of the OpenSSL software. It was possible for 
a hacker using this flaw to steal user names and passwords, instant messages, emails 
and business documents. No trace would be left of the attack. The attack did not rely 
on access to privileged information or credentials such as username and passwords. 
Taking into account the length of exposure, the ease by which it could be exploited, the 
fact that an attack would not leave a trace and that it is estimated to have affected up 
to two- thirds of the Internet’s web servers, this weakness was taken very seriously. On 
7 April 2014, the same day the Heartbleed vulnerability was publicly disclosed, a new 
version that applied a fix to the flaw was released.
1 Zakir Durumeric, James Kasten, David Adrian, J. Alex Halderman, Michael Bailey, Frank Li, Nicholas 
Weaver, Johanna Amann, Jethro Beekman, Mathias Payer and Vern Paxson, ‘The matter of Heartbleed’, IMC 
’14: Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference (Association for Computing 
Machinery, New York, United States, 2014), 475– 488. A more important error was discovered in GNU 
Bash in September 2014, for which see ‘Bourne- again Shell (Bash) remote code execution vulnerability’ 
(original release date 24 September 2014; last revised 30 September 2014), https:// www.us- cert.gov/ 
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5.106 Software can also be affected by changes in the environment, such as the 
operating system or other components, rather than any specific application, although 
it is necessary to distinguish between modification of software in situ and the reuse of 
software in an environment that is presumed to be similar. An example is the Ariane 5 
incident, where a malfunction arose from a changed environment and assumptions 
that were poorly understood, rather than a defect in the original development. Where 
the software is modified in situ, the environment does not change; where software is 
reused in an environment that is presumed to be similar, the software has not changed, 
but the environment has. The results in either case are that there may be a mismatch 
where there was none before.
5.107 Generally speaking, programmers who modify someone else’s code often do 
not fully understand the software, and may also be less well trained than the people 
who originally wrote it. Software can (if appropriately designed) be relied upon to 
produce verifiably correct results, but to have such a degree of certainty, it is necessary 
to be assured that the operating conditions remain identical and that nothing else 
malfunctions. Peter G. Neumann has indicated that even though the utmost care and 
attention might be devoted to the design of a system, it may still have significant flaws.1 
This was illustrated in a 1970 report edited by Willis H. Ware. The authors noted, under 
‘Failure Prediction’ within section V System Characteristics, that:
In the present state of computer technology, it is impossible to completely 
anticipate, much less specify, all hardware failure modes, all software design 
errors or omissions, and, most seriously, all failure modes in which hardware 
malfunctions lead to software malfunctions. Existing commercial machines 
have only a minimum of redundancy and error- checking circuits, and thus for 
most military applications there may be unsatisfactory hardware facilities to 
assist in the control of hardware/ software malfunctions. Furthermore, in the 
present state of knowledge, it is very difficult to predict the probability of failure 
of complex hardware and software configurations; thus, redundancy [is] an 
important design concept.2
1 Neumann, Computer Related Risks, 4; see his text generally for this topic.
2 Security Controls for Computer Systems: Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Computer 
Security – RAND Report R- 609- 1, http:// www.rand.org/ pubs/ reports/ R609- 1/ index2.html.
5.108 The authors of the report went on to observe the following in Part C, Technical 
Recommendations:
(a) It is virtually impossible to verify that a large software system is completely 
free of errors and anomalies.
(b) The state of system design of large software systems is such that frequent 
changes to the system can be expected.
(c) Certification of a system is not a fully developed technique nor are its details 
thoroughly worked out.
(d) System failure modes are not thoroughly understood, cataloged, or protected 
against.
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Security vulnerabilities
5.109 Software vulnerabilities are software errors generally hidden from view. While 
they generally cause users no harm, they may be exploited by state security services, 
malicious hackers and professional thieves for various advantages, including theft of 
personal data (to sell on), control of vulnerable systems, drug smuggling,1 blackmail 
and other forms of financial gain. The market in selling packets of software code known 
as ‘exploits’ has become significant. Legitimate businesses may sell a vulnerability 
in a software code to business and government agencies, and hackers may sell a 
vulnerability to anyone who will buy them. These vulnerabilities, particularly those 
against which there are no pre- existing defences, known as ‘zero day exploits’,2 may 
be exploited, whether legally or illegally, for criminal investigation as well as for 
the purposes of cyber espionage, including the violation of confidentiality (stealing 
information), availability (denial of service for political intimidation or blackmail) 
and integrity (corrupting information to steal from banks or to cause an embedded 
computer system to cause accidents).
1 Hackers Deployed to Facilitate Drugs Smuggling, Intelligence Notification 004- 2013, June 2013, 
Europol Public Information, https:// www.europol.europa.eu/ publications- documents/ cyber- bits-  
hackers- deployed- to- facilitate- drugs- smuggling.
2 https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Zero- day_ (computing).
5.110 To address these vulnerabilities, software vendors often, but not always, issue 
‘security patches’ regularly each month (sometimes referred to as ‘software updates’ 
to conceal the nature of the update) in recognition of the failure of their software. Yet 
these may give rise to more problems. For instance, an important security weakness 
was discovered in relation to the distribution of software patches (which, ironically, 
was put in place to address security weaknesses). This meant that attackers who 
receive the patch first might compromise vulnerable hosts who have yet to receive the 
patch.1
1 Two examples from many: David Brumley, Pongsin Poosankam, Dawn Song and Jiang Zheng, 
‘Automatic patch- based exploit generation is possible: techniques and implications’, 2008 IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008) (Oakland, IEEE 2008); Yan Wang, Chao Zhang, Xiaobo, 
Zixuan Zhao, Wenjie Li, Xiaorui Gong, Bingchang Liu, Kaixiang Chen, Wei Zou, ‘Revery: from proof- 
of- concept to exploitable’, CCS ’19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security (New York, Association for Computing Machinery 2019), 1689– 1706.
5.111 Software security vulnerabilities are particularly pertinent to businesses and 
industries that operate or rely on digital security infrastructures. For these industries, 
there are other issues to consider. The first is whether the design of the security 
protocol is robust. An example of a failure in this category is with banking systems,1 
and although a design can be modified, at best it is only possible to take a provisional 
view in respect of this point, because designs constantly change and are therefore 
liable to failure. The second is whether the security protocol is implemented properly. 
For instance, a number of ATMs were tested around Cambridge in the UK, and it was 
found that nonce generation was predictable. A nonce is supposed to be a unique object 
in a protocol, a one- time ‘security code’, but it was found that some ATMs were using 
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1 Steven J. Murdoch, Saar Drimer, Ross Anderson and Mike Bond, ‘Chip and PIN is broken’ in 31st 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (IEEE Computer Society 2010) 433– 446, https:// www.cl.cam.
ac.uk/ research/ security/ banking/ nopin/ oakland10chipbroken.pdf; Steven J. Murdoch, ‘Reliability 
of Chip & PIN evidence in banking disputes’ (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 98.
2 Megan Geuss, ‘How a criminal ring defeated the secure chip- and- PIN credit cards’, arstechnica, 
20 October 2015, http:// arstechnica.com/ tech- policy/ 2015/ 10/ how- a- criminal- ring- defeated- the- 
secure- chip- and- pin- credit- cards/ ; Mike Bond, Omar Choudary, Steven J. Murdoch, Sergei Skorobogatov 
and Ross Anderson, ‘Chip and skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre- play attack’, paper presented to 
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded System (CHES) 2012, Leuven, Belgium, September 2012, 
https:// murdoch.is/ papers/ oakland14chipandskim.pdf; Houda Ferradi, Rémi Géraud, David Naccache 
and Assia Tria, When Organized Crime Applies Academic Results: A Forensic Analysis of an In- Card 
Listening Device, https:// eprint.iacr.org/ 2015/ 963.pdf.
5.112 Furthermore, security may be associated with safety. If there is a safety- related 
system with security vulnerabilities, it is possible for the safety functions in the system 
to be deliberately subverted and give rise to a safety issue. For instance, the nuclear 
industry has developed a draft international standard for safety and security.1 The vital 
problem in this area, which nobody has solved, is that while updates of safety functions 
in code that control nuclear reactors are slow, deliberate and highly analytical, updates 
for security purposes have to be rapid, to forestall anticipated attempts via zero- day 
exploits. These two modi are obviously incompatible.
1 Caroline Baylon, with Roger Brunt and David Livingstone, Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear 
Facilities: Understanding the Risks, Chatham House Report (The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, September 2015), https:// www.chathamhouse.org/ publication/ cyber- security- civil- nuclear-  
facilities- understanding- risks.
5.113 It follows that software security vulnerabilities expose the software to 
manipulations without the authority or knowledge of the software vendor.1 Many of 
the vulnerabilities arise specifically from the errors in the original implementation. 
For instance, it might be possible for a person to control another owner’s computer 
as part of a botnet2 or enter the control system of an aircraft in flight via the in- flight 
entertainment system.3
1 The Trojan horse problem was recognized very early on, for which see Linden, ‘Operating system 
structures to support security and reliable software’, 422– 424.
2 Sanjay Goel, Adnan Baykal and Damira Pon, ‘Botnets: the anatomy of a case’, (2005) 1(3) Journal of 
Information System Security 45.
3 See Applicant for a Search Warrant in the case of Chris Roberts at the United States District Court for the 
Northern District Court of New York Case number 5:15- MJ- 00154 (ATB) dated 17 April 2015, [18]– [19], 
http:// www.wired.com/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2015/ 05/ Chris- Roberts- Application- for- Search- Warrant.
pdf; https:// assets.documentcloud.org/ documents/ 2082796/ gov- uscourts- nynd- 102002- 1- 0.pdf; Caleb 
Kennedy, ‘New threats to vehicle safety: how cybersecurity policy will shape the future of autonomous 
vehicles’ (2017) 23 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 343.
5.114 At this point, the reader might consider that such problems can be solved fairly 
easily – by the introduction of anti- virus software (this is not to imply that all attacks 
occur through the use of malicious software). But it must be understood that the 
fundamental nature of most anti- virus software limits its effectiveness – and the anti- 
virus software itself might not be error- free. A sophisticated attacker will have access 
to all types of anti- virus software, and he will program round the detection mechanisms 
and test his code against the anti- virus systems to ensure it is not detected.1 Most anti- 
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software is far from perfect. It can fail to stop some malicious software2 and should not 
be relied upon as the sole method of securing a computer.
1 J. A. P. Marpaung, M. Sain and Hoon- Jae Lee, ‘Survey on malware evasion techniques: state of the 
art and challenges’, Advanced Communication Technology (ICACT), 2012 14th International Conference, 
PyeongChang, (Global IT Research Institute 2012), 744– 749; Chandra Sekar Veerappan, Peter Loh Kok 
Keong, Zhaohui Tang and Forest Tan, ‘Taxonomy on malware evasion countermeasures techniques’, 
2018 IEEE 4th World Forum on Internet of Things (WF- IoT) (Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers 2018).
2 Daniel Bilar, ‘Known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns: anti- virus issues, 
malicious software and internet attacks for non- technical audiences’ (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 123; in 2006, Graham Ingram, the general manager of the Australian 
Computer Emergency Response Team (AusCERT), told an audience in Sydney, Australia, that popular 
desktop antivirus applications do not work: Munir Kotadia, ‘Eighty percent of new malware defeats 
antivirus’ (19 June 2006), ZDNet Australia; Michael A. Caloyannides, ‘Digital evidence and reasonable 
doubt’ (2003) 1(6) IEEE Security and Privacy 89; Dmitry Silnov, ‘Features of virus detection mechanism 
in Microsoft security essentials (Microsoft forefront endpoint protection)’ (2013) 4(2) Journal of 
Information Security 124; also see the annual ‘X- Force Trend Statistics’ by IBM Internet Security 
Systems that reinforces the position on the failure of anti- virus software, https:// www.ibm.com/ 
security/ data- breach/ threat- intelligence; the reports produced by the Anti- Phishing Working Group 
(http:// www.antiphishing.org/ ) illustrate the same problem; reports by AV- Comparatives.org appear 
to indicate that some of the best products are now very efficient, http:// www.av- comparatives.org/ ; 
see also ‘Common vulnerabilities and exposures’, https:// cve.mitre.org/ .
5.115 It is a truth universally acknowledged that the majority of hackers concentrate 
on the most widely used software and on vulnerable applications that can be found 
by using Internet search engines. The development of the Stuxnet virus illustrates 
that governments are now probably responsible for some of the most effective viruses 
that are written, although organized criminals can be equally effective.1 Software need 
only include a low number of defects to create enough vulnerabilities for hackers to 
manipulate them to their advantage. Jim Nindel- Edwards and Gerhard Steinke usefully 
sum up the position:
It would seem that after decades of software development there would be some 
assurance that software works as specified in the customer requirements. Is it 
that software vendors are unwilling to perform sufficient testing? Is it possible 
to test everything? Finding a certain number of bugs, doesn’t mean that the 
software has no more bugs. On the other hand, not finding any defects doesn’t 
mean there aren’t any defects in the software either. Perhaps there are known 
bugs, but the time and resources to fix these bugs and defects are often not 
provided and the software is released with known (but not publicly stated) bugs. 
Is it because there is a low expectation of quality? Is it even possible to get rid of 
all bugs, especially when we are integrating components from multiple sources 
and we are dependent on the software that was developed and tested by others?
Software quality assurance is a challenging task. There are many questions raised 
by software being released with defects. What are the ethical responsibilities of 
a software vendor releasing software with bugs, especially if it is system- critical 
software, but also when releasing non system- critical software?2
1 Roderic Broadhurst, Peter Grabosky, Mamoun Alazab, Brigitte Bouhours and Steve Chon, 
‘Organizations and cyber crime: an analysis of the nature of groups engaged in cyber crime’ 
(2014) 8(1) International Journal of Cyber Criminology 1, http:// www.cybercrimejournal.com/ 
broadhurstetalijcc2014vol8issue1.pdf; https:// www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/ what- we- do/ crime- 
threats/ cyber- crime; https:// www.unodc.org/ e4j/ en/ cybercrime/ module- 13/ key- issues/ criminal-  
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2 Jim Nindel- Edwards and Gerhard Steinke, ‘Ethical issues in the software quality assurance 
function’ (2008) 8(1) Communications of the IIMA article 6, 53, 54.
Software testing
5.116 Most software organizations test their products extensively, including in the 
ways that they anticipate that their customers will use them. Indeed, most software 
has become so complex that in a process called beta testing, software has been 
provided to volunteers to test before it is sold as a product. It has also been suggested 
that the problems of the composition of components in large systems can be mitigated 
by programmers reusing components in ways that they know from experience tend to 
work,1 although this view is not generally accepted.2 However, there will continue to 
be malfunctions, because many problems in hardware, software and configuration are 
only exposed when the system runs under real workloads.3 A number of issues arise in 
this respect, including the use of tools to test software fault tolerance or robustness,4 
the degree to which the testing accurately reflects the way users will actually use the 
software, the unconventional ways in which people may attempt to use the program 
and testing how the software works when connecting and communicating with 
different software and hardware. It is well known that testing software is inadequate 
for uncovering errors, because there is never enough time to cover all the cases, as 
the illustrations mentioned in this chapter vividly show. Professor Thimbleby has 
indicated that the only solutions are:
(1) a very careful approach to reasoning about the requirements that lead to the 
decisions,
(2) a mathematically rigorous way to analyse the combinations of decisions,
(3) rigorous testing, primarily to uncover whether there were flaws in steps 
(1) and (2), including in the testing process itself, and
(4) external oversight to avoid mistakes in one’s reasoning – this includes 
processes such as code review by third parties.5
1 C. A. R. Hoare, ‘How did software get so reliable without proof?’ in Marie- Claude Gaudel and Jim 
Woodcock (eds) Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1051/ 1996 (Springer 1996), 1– 17.
2 Bev Littlewood and Lorenzo Strigini, ‘The risks of software’, Scientific American 267(5), (November 
1992) 62– 75, cited by Partridge, The Seductive Computer, 205, fn 15; B. Littlewood and L. Strigini, 
‘Validation of ultra- high dependability – 20 years on’ (2011) 20(3) SCSC Newsletter, http:// www.
staff.city.ac.uk/ ~sm377/ ls.papers/ 2011_ limits_ 20yearsOn_ SCSC/ BL- LS- SCSSnewsletter2011_ 02_ 
v04distrib.pdf.
3 Schroeder and Gibson, ‘A large- scale study of failures in high- performance computing systems’, 
343.
4 Although the availability of such tools does not mean that developers use them to improve 
their systems, for which see John DeVale and Philip Koopman, ‘Robust software – no more excuses’ 
in Danielle C. Martin, editorial production, Proceedings International Conference on Dependable 
Systems and Networks (The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 2002), 145– 154; The 
Economic Impacts of Inadequate Infrastructure for Software Testing: Final Report (May 2002), Prepared 
for National Institute of Standards and Technology by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research, 
https:// www.nist.gov/ system/ files/ documents/ director/ planning/ report02- 3.pdf.
5 Personal communication with the author.
5.117 The problem with a presumption that a computer is deemed to be ‘reliable’ is 
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to test software to reflect the way the users will actually use the product. This is 
because of the large number of functions that software is required to perform and the 
unpredictability of its users.1 Professor Partridge reiterates the point that ‘no significant 
computer program is completely understood’,2 and goes further by indicating that 
systems are now so complex that humans are no longer able to deal with the problems:
We might speculate further: if the nature of computer- system complexity really 
is new and peculiar, a system characteristic that has no parallel in the natural 
world, then our evolutionary history is unlikely to have equipped us to reason 
effectively with such systems. Our genetic programs may be totally lacking in 
mechanisms that can deal effectively with discrete complexity.3
1 The rise in fraud that took advantage of the faults in software was rapidly increasing in the 1970s, 
for which see Linden, ‘Operating system structures to support security and reliable software’, 410.
2 Derek Partridge, What Makes You Clever – the Puzzle of Intelligence (World Scientific 2014), 394 
and 407 fn 22.
3 Partridge, The Seductive Computer, 192.
5.118 This weakness is now recognized by some of the organizations that produce 
devices and software. Microsoft and Apple are among a number of companies that 
have adopted a ‘bug’ bounty programme to reward professionals who test and find 
errors in the software.1 The US Department of Defense has also taken this approach, 
as has Google in respect of cryptographic software libraries.2 Yet claims that software 
code and hardware products have been independently tested does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that they can be relied upon. In his ACM Turing Lecture of 1972, 
Professor Dijkstra said this of testing:
Today a usual technique is to make a program and then to test it. But: program 
testing can be a very effective way to show the presence of bugs, but is hopelessly 
inadequate for showing their absence.3
1 Microsoft Bounty Program, https:// www.microsoft.com/ en- us/ msrc/ bounty?rtc=1; https:// 
developer.apple.com/ security- bounty/ ; Project Wycheproof, https:// github.com/ google/ wycheproof; 
HackerOne, formed by Facebook, Microsoft and Google, https:// www.hackerone.com/ .
2 DoD Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, available at https:// hackerone.com/ deptofdefense.
3 https:// www.cs.utexas.edu/ ~EWD/ ewd03xx/ EWD340.PDF; the lecture was published as an 
article: Edsger W. Dijkstra, ‘The humble programmer’, (1972) 15(10) Communications of the ACM 859.
5.119 In other words, good- quality testing might discover the failings of the developer, 
but is less capable of resolving the issues in the overall design of software: there are 
significant limits to testing.
Writing software that is free of faults
5.120 As Professor Thomas indicates, it is possible to design and develop software so 
that it is almost completely free of faults.1 Many applications are now built without the 
developer writing any code at all. The coding is done in building the tools that generate 
the code when given parameters by the developer – and this is premised on the fact 
that the software tools that generate the code are themselves error free.
1 ‘Should we trust computers?’, lecture given at Gresham College on 20 October 2015, http:// www.
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Software standards
5.121 Where an organization produces safety critical software for aeroplanes, motor 
vehicles, air traffic control or power stations, it will be necessary to conform to the 
requirements of an international standard on the functional safety of programmable 
electronic systems.1 For instance, security in the banking sector relies on certification 
standards such as FIPS- 140 Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 
(ITSEC) and the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. 
It should be noted that these schemes only focus on aspects of security, and not on 
overall functionality. It is possible to have an accredited product that implements the 
security functions well, but its business functions badly.
1 For a discussion, see the NuSAC Study Group on the Safety of Operational Computer Systems, The 
Use of Computers in Safety- Critical Applications (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1998).
5.122 The ITSEC scheme, which is no longer as active as it once was, assesses a product 
based on a document prepared by the organization that wants that product to be 
evaluated. In general terms, a document that is submitted to ITSEC describes what the 
product is designed to do, the situation in which it is intended to operate, the risks the 
product is likely to encounter and the mechanism by which the product acts to protect 
against the risks. It is for ITSEC to determine whether the claims are substantiated. 
Only the risks identified by the applicant are tested. A product is given one of seven 
levels from E0 (no formal assurance) to E6 (the highest level of confidence), with each 
level representing increasing levels of confidence. The assessment and granting of a 
position on the E scale is a judgement that a certain level of confidence has been met; 
it is not a measure of the strength of the security in place. It is important to realize that 
the organization submitting the product for evaluation sets out the criteria by which 
it will be evaluated, and it may be that this organization will not have included the 
risks associated with the use of the product by the end user. The evaluation includes 
an assessment of the confidence to be placed in whether the security features are the 
correct ones and how effectively they work. This means that a security mechanism 
might be applied correctly, but it will not be effective unless it is appropriate for the 
purpose for which it has been designed. In this respect, it is necessary to know why a 
particular security function is necessary, what security is actually in place and how the 
security is provided. It does not follow that if a product has a high E level that it will 
provide a high level of security.
5.123 The ‘Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation’ and 
‘Common Methodology for Information Security Evaluation’ comprise the technical 
basis for an international agreement called the Common Criteria Recognition 
Agreement. The manufacturer submits its product to an independent licensed 
laboratory for an assessment. The way a product is evaluated is similar to the way 
ITSEC undertakes such assessments. There are problems with this, because it creates 
a conflict of interest: there are no known examples of the revocation of licences of 
laboratories that conduct evaluations, both parties are able to subvert the process, 
and determining the name of the organization that conducted the evaluation might 
be impossible without an order for disclosure. In addition, claims will sometimes be 
made that a device has been certified when, in fact, it might only have been evaluated. 
Often, a bank will ask a judge to rely on the certification process without disclosing the 
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Journal number 04- 016794TVI- TRON, Trondheim District Court, 24 September 2004,1 
Assistant Judge Leif O. Østerbø, who tried the case, said at 121– 122 (emphasis added):
It is assumed that the standard security systems that are used are effective. 
However, according to Jørgensen, no cases have been documented that 
demonstrate [that] the implementation of the systems are secure.
The court refers in this respect to the fact that banks are subject to supervision 
and operate a comprehensive internal control work, and the witness Haugstad’s 
explanation that both the standards and the practical implementation are revised 
thoroughly and regularly. In that regard, Haugestad explained that the systems 
are subject to annual audits. The Banks Control Center (BSK), in addition to the 
major international card companies, conducts such audits.
The court does not find that there is reason to accept that the banks’ security 
systems are in doubt. Although the implementation of a system necessarily 
involves opportunities for errors, the court cannot see that this involves 
significant practical risk for customers with cards.
1 For a translation into English, see (2012) 9 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 
117; Nuth, ‘Unauthorized use of bank cards with or without the PIN’.
5.124 If the purpose of a trial is to test the evidence, should a judge assume that 
the standard security systems used by the bank were effective in the absence of any 
evidence? Should a judge accept untested assurances that audits actually take place, not 
knowing whether such audits are conducted internally or by the Banks Control Center, 
whether the audits revealed problems that might affect the systems for ATMs and PINs, 
or whether the audits were conducted by people with appropriate qualifications? 
Given the lack of such evidence, can a judge conclude that there was no reason to doubt 
the bank’s security systems could be at fault?1 For instance, it has been demonstrated 
that independent external examination continues to validate and approve devices and 
cryptographic software code that are open to failure and subversion.2
1 Ken Lindup, ‘Technology and banking’ (2012) 9 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 91.
2 Steven J. Murdoch, Mike Bond and Ross Anderson, ‘How certification systems fail: lessons from 
the Ware Report’ (2012) 10(6) IEEE Security & Privacy 40; Kim Zetter, ‘In legal first, data- breach 
suit targets auditor’, Wired, 16 February 2009 – the case mentioned in this article was Merrick Bank 
Corporation v Savvis, Inc., 2010 WL 148201 (for other references, see 2009 WL 2968844 (D.Ariz.) 
(Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (5 June 2009); 2009 WL 4823623 (D.Ariz.) (Trial Motion, 
Memorandum and Affidavit) (7 July 2009); 2009 WL 4823624 (D.Ariz.) (Trial Motion, Memorandum 
and Affidavit)) – it is not clear what happened as a result of the legal action. It is probable that the case 
was settled after the court refused to dismiss the case. Another case, a class action, was initiated in the 
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division on 24 March 2014: Trustmark 
National Bank v Target Corporation, Case No 14- CV- 2069, although it was reported that this action 
was subsequently withdrawn, for which see Jonathan Stempel, ‘Banks pull out of lawsuit vs Target, 
Trustwave over data breach’, Reuters, 1 April 2014.
5.125 Two observations are worthy of note: that standards1 regarding aviation, 
space and medical devices are usually much more prescriptive that those used in 
other domains, and even within the aviation, space and medical industries a great 
deal of commercial software is developed against no formal process model at all. The 
relevant standard for medical devices is ‘ISO 13485:2003 Medical devices – Quality 
management systems – Requirements for regulatory purposes’ (now revised by 
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for regulatory purposes’). This standard has historically placed much less focus on 
tracing the details of internal product structure than, for instance, DO- 178B, Software 
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, which is a guideline 
dealing with the safety of critical software to be used in certain airborne systems. Yet, 
although having software evaluated against standards is a laudable goal, it does not 
follow that, by conforming, errors are eliminated.2
1 The use of standards is a topic of significant debate, because it is not always certain that they work 
to improve the quality of software. By way of example, see Patrick J. Graydon and C. Michael Holloway, 
Planning the Unplanned Experiment: Assessing the Efficacy of Standards for Safety Critical Software 
(NASA/ TM - 2015 - 218804, September 2015), https:// core.ac.uk/ reader/ 42705578.
2 Timothy J. Shimeall and Nancy G. Leveson, ‘An empirical comparison of software fault tolerance 
and fault elimination’ (1991) 17(2) Transactions on Software Engineering 173; P. B. Ladkin, ‘Opinion – 
taking software seriously’ (2005) 41(3) Journal of System Safety https:// rvs- bi.de/ publications/ ; 
Harold Thimbleby, Alexis Lewis and John Williams, ‘Making healthcare safer by understanding, 
designing and buying better IT’ (2015) 15(3) Clinical Medicine 258.
Summary
5.126 In summary, faults in software and errors relating to the design of software 
systems are exceedingly common.1 And while defects in hardware have been relatively 
rare,2 they are not unknown.3 Hardware is increasingly developed using high- level 
languages similar to those used for software. Furthermore, hardware is being released 
with firmware which may be reconfigured for other purposes. In addition, hardware 
faults can also be introduced by the improper use or configuration of software tools 
designed for developing hardware, which may themselves be error- prone. Like 
software, hardware errors, too, can be exploited to cause security failures.4
1 Richard Cook, ‘How complex systems fail’, Cognitive Technologies Laboratory, University of Chicago 
(January 2002), https:// www.researchgate.net/ publication/ 228797158_ How_ complex_ systems_ 
fail/ link/ 5caf748a299bf120975f697e/ download; L. Strigini, ‘Fault tolerance against design faults’, in 
Hassan B. Diab and Albert Y. Zomaya (eds) Dependable Computing Systems: Paradigms, Performance 
Issues, and Applications (John Wiley & Sons 2005), 213– 241.
2 Such as the Pentium FDIV or ‘floating point’ error (strictly speaking, this was a software fault), 
although Intel could not fix the error other than by issuing a replacement, https:// en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/ Pentium_ FDIV_ bug. Professor Thomas R. Nicely was the first to publicize this fault: Partridge, The 
Seductive Computer, 98, fn 8.
3 Most complex integrated circuits in wide use will have published lists of ‘errata’ – for example, 
Intel publishes regular updates online.
4 For an example, see Apostolos P. Fournaris, Lidia Pocero Fraile and Odysseas Koufopavlou, 
‘Exploiting hardware vulnerabilities to attack embedded system devices: a survey of potent 
microarchitectural attacks’ (2017) 6 electronics, 52; Lucian Cojocar, Kaveh Razavi, Cristiano Giuffrida 
and Herbert Bos, ‘Exploiting correcting codes: on the effectiveness of ECC memory against Rowhammer’, 
in 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), Volume 1 (IEEE 2019), 279– 295.
5.127 Every part of a program is different, and must be independently correct. In 
the case of machines, there are two important differences: things are almost always 
continuous, and after a time the system is back where it started. When they are not 
continuous, problems always occur. For example, a wheel turns, and once it has turned, 
it is (not withstanding wear and tear) likely to be able to turn again. Each time it turns, 
it gets back to an indistinguishable state. This is called a symmetry. Symmetries are 
very general ideas. For example, if one moves a cup of coffee a foot to the left, it stays the 
same and works exactly as before. This is because the world we live in has translational 
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and so on. This means that almost all of the design decisions in mechanical devices 
‘collapse’ because of symmetries, and there is not the exponential growth of cases that 
happens in software. On the other hand, no part of a software program is the same as 
any other part. Indeed, if it was, one would ask why it was so inefficiently designed. 
Thus there are no symmetries in software that amplify the ‘how it works’ thinking that 
so readily simplifies physical design. The other advantage of physical systems is that 
where a response is expected to be continuous, it can be verified. Where continuity 
holds, interpolation tells what the behaviour for any input will be. Digital systems do 
not have this helpful property.
5.128 In particular, it might be obvious that the behaviour of a stopwatch used by a 
policeman is the ‘same’ as the behaviour of the ‘same’ stopwatch presented in court 
as evidence, or in the laboratory where it was tested. Thanks to symmetries, moving 
a watch from the roadside to the laboratory does not change it. There is no symmetry 
to justify software adduced in court behaving as it did anywhere else. Software is not 
constrained, as any physical device is, to work in the universe with all its symmetries. 
Software does not obey any of them, and thanks to human error (known and unknown) 
in its design, its behaviour cannot be taken for granted.1
1 I owe this discussion to Professor Thimbleby.
5.129 Software will continue to be unreliable. By providing a general presumption of 
reliability to software, the law acts to reinforce the attitude of the software industry 
that the effects of poor- quality work remain the problem of the end user. In many 
circumstances, because the user can himself cause errors, the industry may seek to 
pin the blame on the user, further obfuscating the true origin and source of the errors.1 
For these reasons, it is rare for a customer to take legal action against the software 
supplier, let alone attempt such an action and be successful.2
1 The various pressures are illustrated in Hechler, ‘Lost in translation?’ . David Hechler is the 
executive editor of Corporate Counsel magazine, and the American Society of Business Publication 
Editors awarded him the 2014 Stephen Barr Award for this article.
2 For example, see the English cases of St Albans City and District Council v International Computers 
Limited [1996] 4 All ER 481, [1996] 7 WLUK 443, [1997– 98] Info TLR 58, [1997] FSR 251, (1996) 15 
Tr LR 444, [1998] Masons CLR Rep 98, (1997) 20(2) IPD 20020, Times, 14 August 1996, [1996] CLY 
1218 and Kingsway Hall Hotel Ltd v Red Sky IT (Hounslow) Ltd [2010] EWHC 965 (TCC), [2010] 5 WLUK 
106, (2010) 26 Const LJ 542, [2011] CLY 2777; Alison White, ‘Caveat vendor? A review of the Court of 
Appeal decision in St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Limited’, Commentary 
1997 (3) The Journal of Information, Law and Technology JILT, https:// warwick.ac.uk/ fac/ soc/ law/ 
elj/ jilt/ 1997_ 3/ white/ #Salvage. Elizabeth MacDonald considered the position in contract, giving a 
number of examples in her article ‘Bugs and breaches’ (2005) 13(1) Intl J L & Info Tech118. National 
Air Traffic Services initiated action against Electronic Data Systems Ltd, although the outcome is not 
certain. For an appeal against an application to amend the reply and defence to counterclaim, see 
Electronic Data Systems Ltd v National Air Traffic Services [2002] EWCA Civ 13, [2002] 1 WLUK 128 –  
Professor Ladkin indicated that the software development could fail, for which see Memorandum by 
Professor Peter B. Ladkin (ATC 20) submitted to the Select Committee on Environment, Transport 
and Regional Affairs Fourth Report (ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 27 March 1998), 
http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/ cm199798/ cmselect/ cmenvtra/ 360- e/ 36082.htm.
5.130 This discussion apart, the central issue for lawyers is dealing with the 
presumption that a computer is working properly. The following summary of the 
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IT systems are everywhere, and will continue to infiltrate the lives of all of us.
We cannot easily check that an IT system is computing correctly.
IT systems all fail: sometimes immediately and spectacularly, sometimes 
unobtrusively just once in a while, and sometimes in any combination of these 
two extremes.
IT- system failures vary from production of blatantly incorrect results to failure to 
produce a desired result.
The interplay of a variety of causes means that all large IT systems are 
unmanageably complex.
IT- system complexity is discrete complexity rather than complexity based on 
continua.
If, by chance (combined with exemplary practice and much effort), an IT system 
is constructed with no possibility of failure behaviour, we can never know this.1
1 Partridge, The Seductive Computer, 9.
5.131 This poses a question for lawyers, experts and the courts: how the reliability of 
software should be reviewed in a court of law.
Challenging ‘reliability’
5.132 When seeking to challenge the underlying software of a computer or computer- 
like device,1 lawyers frequently have great difficulty in overcoming the presumption that 
a machine is working properly, although general assertions about the failure of software 
code are often made without providing any foundation for the allegations. This problem 
is compounded when a party refuses to deliver up relevant evidence, usually citing 
confidentiality as the reason for the refusal, and relying, directly or indirectly,2 on the 
presumption that a computer is ‘reliable’. In such circumstances, it is difficult to convince 
a judge to order the disclosure of relevant data.
1 Including machines controlled by software, often called ‘robots’. For examples of people killed 
by machines controlled by software, see the following illustrative articles: Stephen S. Wu, Summary 
of Selected Robotics Liability Cases (19 October 2010), https:// ftp.documation.com:8443/ references/ 
ABA10a/ PDfs/ 2_ 5.pdf; Woodrow Barfield, ‘Liability for autonomous and artificially intelligent 
robots’ (2018) 9 Paladyn, J Behav Robot 193; Emilie C. Schwarza, ‘Human vs. machine: a framework 
of responsibilities and duties of transnational corporations for respecting human rights in the use of 
artificial intelligence’ (2019) 58 Colum J Transnat’l L 232. Robert N. Williams appears to have been the 
first person to be killed by a robot machine that was the subject of legal proceedings: Williams v Litton 
Systems, Inc., 422 Mich. 796 (1985); Williams v Litton Systems, Inc., 164 Mich.App. 195, 416 N.W.2d 
704 (1987); Williams v Unit Handling Systems Div. of Litton Systems, Inc., 433 Mich. 755, 449 N.W.2d 
669 (1989), and in 1987 seven- year- old Barton Griffin was the first person to be killed because of a 
defect in a programmable read- only memory chip installed in a 2500 series Chevrolet pickup truck 
that caused the vehicle to stall. Another vehicle struck the pickup truck, killing the driver’s grandson: 
General Motors Corporation v Johnston, 592 So.2d 1054 (1992).
2 The use of the word ‘robust’ is one such device, for which see Ladkin, ‘Robustness of software’.
5.133 Yet, paradoxically, it is a well- known fact in the industry that software could 
hardly be said to be ‘reliable’, as noted by Steyn J in Eurodynamic Systems Plc v General 
Automation Ltd:
The expert evidence convincingly showed that it is regarded as acceptable practice 
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and bugs. The basis of the practice is that, pursuant to his support obligation (free 
or chargeable as the case may be), the supplier will correct errors and bugs that 
prevent the product from being properly used.1
1 (6 September 1988, not reported), QBD, 1983 D 2804 at [5.a]; also see CL & P 1988, 5(2), 8.
5.134 Professor Matt Blaze reinforces this view:
It is a regrettable (and yet time- tested) paradox that our digital systems have 
largely become more vulnerable over time, even as almost every other aspect of the 
technology has (often wildly) improved.
…
Modern digital systems are so vulnerable for a simple reason: computer science 
does not yet know how to build complex, large- scale software that has reliably 
correct behaviour.1 This problem has been known, and has been a central focus 
of computing research, since the dawn of programmable computing. As new 
technology allows us to build larger and more complex systems (and to connect 
them together over the internet), the problem of software correctness becomes 
exponentially more difficult.2 [Footnote 2 is at this point, and is reproduced 
below.]
Footnote 2:
That is, the number of software defects in a system typically increases at a rate far 
greater than the amount of code added to it. So adding new features to a system 
that makes it twice as large generally has the effect of making [it] far more than 
twice as vulnerable. This is because each new software component or feature 
operates not just in isolation, but potentially interacts with everything else in 
the system, sometimes in unexpected ways that can be exploited. Therefore, 
smaller and simpler systems are almost always more secure and reliable, and 
best practices in security favor systems [that have] the most limited functionality 
possible.3
1 It should be noted that computer scientists have invented many ways to achieve this, and some 
companies use these methods to prove mathematically that their systems cannot fail at runtime – but 
the software will be running on a computer with unreliable hardware, other firmware and software 
and user interfaces, which might mean that the program might be ‘right’, but when interacting with the 
other components, can lead to a lethal failure. Also, we need to be aware that what is being proved is not 
that the systems do what is desired, but that the systems meet a formal statement of the requirements. 
The original requirements cannot by themselves be proved to be correct, or that the formal software 
requirements meet the constraints of the real world. There are limits to what formal methods can do, 
and those limits are not widely acknowledged. B. Littlewood and L. Strigini, ‘Validation of ultrahigh 
dependability for software- based systems’ (1993) 36(11) Communications of the ACM 69, http:// 
openaccess.city.ac.uk/ 1251/ 1/ CACMnov93.pdf.
2 It is not clear whether ‘exponentially’ means that the rate of growth is proportional to the amount 
present, or whether the word is used loosely to mean ‘growing rapidly’.
3 Dr Matt Blaze, Testimony, ‘Encryption Technology and Potential US Policy Responses’ before the 
Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
House of Representatives, 114 Congress 1st session, Wednesday, April 29, 2015 (Serial No. 114– 143), 
https:// www.govinfo.gov/ content/ pkg/ CHRG- 114hhrg25879/ pdf/ CHRG- 114hhrg25879.pdf.
5.135 The late Professor Lawrence Bernstein and C. M. Yuhas also acknowledged this 
observation:
Software developers know that their systems can exhibit unexpected, strange 
behaviour, including crashes or hangs, when small operational differences are 
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sequences or exhaustion of some computer resource such as buffer space, 
memory, hash function overflow space or processor time.2
1 This is a consequence of discrete complexity, or digital complexity.
2 Lawrence Bernstein and C. M. Yuhas, ‘Design constraints that make software trustworthy’, IEEE 
Reliability Society 2008 Annual Technology Report, 3, https:// rs.ieee.org/ images/ files/ Publications/ 
2008/ 2008- 25.pdf; Ali Mili and Fairouz Tchier, Software Testing Concepts and Operations (John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 2015).
5.136 Finally, companies that write software code include a contract term in the 
software licence that makes it clear that writers of software code are not perfect. Here 
is an example:
The Licensee acknowledges that software in general is not error free and agrees 
that the existence of such errors shall not constitute a breach of this Licence.
5.137 This section aims to provide a broad outline of the problems relating to 
computers and computer- like devices experienced by different industries, and to 
illustrate the importance of software and how there may be times when the output of a 
computer may not necessarily be ‘reliable’ and is therefore not to be trusted. Software 
code should be open to scrutiny, and should not necessarily share the benefit of a 
presumption of ‘reliability’ that is incapable of being effectively challenged.
5.138 One of the problems with understanding the role of the presumption is that 
people fail to distinguish software from computer systems. Computers are merely 
devices that are remarkable in that they can be turned to do many tasks rather than 
being limited to a single purpose. In order to perform a useful purpose, they must be 
instructed by software. A computer and its software together can be taken to form a 
system. No machine is ‘reliable’ or ‘unreliable’ in an absolute sense. Machines may be 
more or less reliable. The term ‘reliable’ in everyday use is an abbreviation of what in 
technical terms is ‘reliable enough for the intended purpose’. All machines have some 
probability of failing, so none is ‘reliable’ in the sense that one can rely on it without 
any doubt, while many are reliable enough (their probability of failing to perform 
correctly at any one use is small enough) to be worth using. The problem with using 
the word ‘reliable’, as though reliability were a binary quality, is that we risk taking it to 
mean ‘reliable enough’ without allowing for the fact that what is ‘enough’ depends on 
the use to which we put the machine, or rather its outputs. For instance, a machine may 
be reliable enough to be worthwhile in everyday use, and yet not reliable enough to use 
as evidence in a specific case. The speedometer in a motor car is reliable enough to use 
as an aid for driving at reasonable speed, because this level of reliability is sufficient 
for the purpose. In such circumstances, precision is not necessary. Compare this to 
instruments in an aircraft: the same level of reliability could be catastrophic. It is not a 
matter of whether or not the instrument is ‘reliable’, but of ‘how reliable’ it is.
5.139 It follows that lay people are not aware of the inherent design faults, and 
trust their personal experience to reassure themselves that computers are ‘reliable’ 
machines. Yet lay users regularly experience problems with devices, which illustrates 
their failure to grasp that ‘reliability’ and software code are impossible to guarantee.1
1 David Harel, Computers Ltd. What They Really Can’t Do (Oxford University Press, 2003); see also 
Neumann, Computer Related Risks, and his website, which is continually updated: http:// www.csl.sri.
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Dershowitz, School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University, http:// www.cs.tau.ac.il/ ~nachumd/ 
horror.html.
5.140 Lay people are not the only people to make this mistake. This is illustrated 
by the judicial claim that computers are ‘reliable’ because in current times their use 
is widespread. Villanueva JAD made just such an assertion without providing any 
evidence to sustain his claim that computers are ‘presumed reliable’ in the case of 
Hahnemann University Hospital v Dudnick:
Clearly, the climate of the use of computers in the mid- 1990’s is substantially 
different from that of the 1970’s. In the 1970’s, computers were relatively new, 
were not universally used and had no established standard of reliability. Now, 
computers are universally used and accepted, have become part of everyday life 
and work and are presumed reliable.1
1 292 N.J.Super. 11, 678 A.2d 266 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1996), 268. See Ivars Peterson, Fatal Defect: Chasing 
Killer Computer Bugs (Random House 1996) to demonstrate the opposite.
5.141 This observation by Villanueva JAD was made in the same year as the failure of 
the software that caused the Ariane 5 rocket to be destroyed shortly after take- off.
5.142 That computers are deemed to be ‘reliable’ because they are used more 
frequently now than when they were first developed is a poor substitute for a rigorous 
understanding of the nature of computers and their software.1 However, it is accepted 
that long- term use can be an important element of justified trust in a software system. 
This comes about because there might be a long history of valuable and seemingly 
error- free use, but also because the long- term user typically gets to know the 
idiosyncrasies of the system.
1 That software is ‘reliable’ has been comprehensively demonstrated to be incorrect: Ladkin and 
others, ‘The Law Commission presumption concerning the dependability of computer evidence’; 
Jackson, ‘An approach to the judicial evaluation of evidence from computers and computer systems’.
Aviation
5.143 Errors in aviation software can have disastrous, or near disastrous, 
consequences. They can be caused by something as simple as bad coding. By way 
of example, consider the F- 22A Raptor advanced tactical fighter, which entered 
service with the US Air Force in 2005. In February 2007, 12 of these aircraft were 
flying from Hickham AFB in Hawaii to Kadena AB on Okinawa. All of the aircraft 
experienced simultaneous and total software failure in their navigational console 
when their longitude shifted from 180 degrees West to 180 degrees East. The jets 
were accompanied by tanker planes, which meant the pilots in the tankers were able 
to guide the jets back to Hawaii. Major General Don Sheppard spoke about the problem 
on CNN on 24 February 2007. The relevant part of the transcript is set out below:
Maj. Gen. Don Sheppard (ret.): … At the international date line, whoops, all 
systems dumped and when I say all systems, I mean all systems, their navigation, 
part of their communications, their fuel systems. They were – they could have 
been in real trouble. They were with their tankers. The tankers – they tried to 
reset their systems, couldn’t get them reset. The tankers brought them back 
to Hawaii. This could have been real serious. It certainly could have been real 
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was a computer glitch in the millions of lines of code, somebody made an error in 
a couple lines of the code and everything goes.
[...]
SHEPPERD: Absolutely. When you think of airplanes from the old days, with 
cables and that type of thing and direct connections between the sticks and the 
yolks [sic] and the controls, not that way anymore. Everything is by computer. 
When your computers go, your airplanes go. You have multiple systems. When 
they all dump at the same time, you can be in real trouble. Luckily this turned 
out OK.
John Roberts, CNN anchor: What would have happened General Shepperd if 
these brand- new $120 million F- 22s had been going into battle?
SHEPPERD: You would have been in real trouble in the middle of combat. The 
good thing is that we found this out. Any time – before, you know, before we get 
into combat with an airplane like this. Any time you introduce a new airplane, 
you are going to find glitches and you are going to find things that go wrong. 
It happens in our civilian airliners. You just don’t hear much about it but these 
things absolutely happen. And luckily this time we found out about it before 
combat. We got it fixed with tiger teams in about 48 hours and the airplanes were 
flying again, completed their deployment. But this could have been real serious 
in combat.
ROBERTS: So basically you had these advanced air – not just superiority but air 
supremacy fighters that were in there, up there in the air, above the Pacific Ocean, 
not much more sophisticated than a little Cessna 152 only with a jet engine.
SHEPPERD: You got it. They are on a 12 to 15- hour flight from Hawaii to Okinawa, 
but all their systems dumped. They needed help. Had they gotten separated from 
their tankers or had the weather been bad, they had no attitude reference. They 
had no communications or navigation. They would have turned around and 
probably could have found the Hawaiian Islands. But if the weather had been bad 
on approach, there could have been real trouble. Again, you get refueling from your 
tankers. You don’t run – you don’t get yourself where you run out of fuel. You always 
have enough fuel and refueling nine, 10, 11, 12 times on a flight like this where 
you can get somewhere to land. But again, attitude reference and navigation are 
essential as is communication. In this case all of that was affected. It was a serious 
problem.1
1 ‘F- 22 Squadron Shot Down by the International Date Line’, Defense Industry Daily, 1 March 2007, 
at http:// www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ f22- squadron- shot- down- by- the- international- date- line- 
03087/ ; Lewis Page, ‘US superfighter software glitch fixed’, The Register, 28 February 2007.
5.144 In practice, this means that most commercially produced software will have 
thousands of undetected defects.1
1 For software defects generally, see Brooks, The Mythical Man- Month and a discussion by Professor 
Les Hatton substantiates the broad range quoted here: Some Notes on Software Failure (Addison- 
Wesley Professional 2001). See also Nindel- Edwards and Steinke, ‘Ethical issues in the software quality 
assurance function’, article 6.
5.145 In conventional flight control, the flight control commands from the cockpit 
are conveyed mechanically through steel cables or pushrods, often servo- assisted, to 
hydraulic actuators which then physically move the aerodynamic control surfaces on 
the wings and tailplane. In ‘fly- by- wire’, the flight control commands are converted to 
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in modern fly- by- wire aircraft the actuators may also be electric). Flight control is 
completely intermediated by software code, so a more accurate description would now 
be ‘fly- by- software- code’. Besides fly- by- wire, the autopilot and flight management 
systems of even conventionally controlled aircraft are software- based. The more 
reliable and functional the autopilot and flight management systems software have 
become, the more pilots have relied on them, even to the detriment of their piloting 
skills, as demonstrated by a number of accidents and ensuing loss of life. Accidents 
involving aircraft can exhibit a series of anomalous pilot– system interactions, and 
aviation regulations and investigators, with few exceptions, tend to assign the 
responsibility for the results of those interactions ultimately to the pilots.1 This is so 
even in circumstances where it is clear that the software code and the system design 
are so faulty that a human being is not able to respond correctly – or with sufficient 
speed. In the case of American Airlines Flight 965 near Cali, Colombia, on 20 December 
1995,2 151 passengers and all of the cabin crew members died in the crash. In this 
case, a significant error occurred, as explained by Highsmith DJ:
American Airlines predicates its claims on Honeywell’s role as supplier of the 
Flight Management Computer (FMC) used on Flight 965 and Jeppesen’s role 
in furnishing the navigational database programmed into the FMC and the 
corresponding aviation charts. Without making any findings in this regard but 
simply reflecting the narrative contained in Judge Marcus’ summary judgment 
opinion, the Court notes that, on the approach to Cali, the pilots entered ‘R’ into 
the FMC, anticipating (based on the aviation charts) that this cipher corresponded 
to a beacon designated as ‘Rozo’. Instead, another beacon designated as ‘Romeo’ 
was activated. This resulted in a change of the aircraft’s heading to the east, over 
the Andes mountains. When the pilots became aware of the aircraft’s easterly 
swing, they turned back to the west, in the direction of the valley where the Cali 
airport is located. Sadly, since the aircraft had been descending during these 
directional changes, Flight 965 never made it back to the valley. It crashed into 
the side of a mountain.3
1 Bill Palmer, Understanding Air France 447 (Print edition v1.05, 2013), 179 and Safety Alert for 
Operators, issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (SAFO 
13002 1/ 4/ 13), https:// www.faa.gov/ other_ visit/ aviation_ industry/ airline_ operators/ airline_ safety/ 
safo/ all_ safos/ media/ 2013/ SAFO13002.pdf; Susan Carey, ‘American Airlines flight delays continue as 
pilot iPad app glitch is fixed’, Wall Street Journal, 29 April 2015, http:// www.wsj.com/ articles/ american- 
airline- flight- delays- continue- as- pilot- ipad- app- glitch- is- fixed- 1430335366; Alex Hern, ‘App fail on iPad 
grounds “a few dozen” American Airlines flights’, The Guardian, 29 April 2015, https:// www.theguardian.
com/ technology/ 2015/ apr/ 29/ apple- ipad- fail- grounds- few- dozen- american- airline- flights.
2 In Re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on December 20, 24 F.Supp.2d 1340 (1998).
3 At 1342 (footnotes omitted).
5.146 The critical importance of verifying the design of aviation software based on 
industry standards was noted in the Aviation Occurrence Investigation Final Report: 
In- flight upset 154 km west of Learmonth.1 In this case, a problem with the software 
controlling the aeroplane was the cause of the accident. In this investigation report, 
the authors cited text relating to software requirements from Software Considerations 
in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification,2 produced by the Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics:
DO- 178A [now DO- 178C] provided high- level guidance for the generation 
of software requirements, the verification that the resulting design met the 
requirements, and validation that the requirements were adequate. It also noted 
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... it may not be possible to demonstrate an acceptably low level of 
software errors without the use of specific design techniques. These 
techniques, which may include monitoring, redundancy, functional 
partitioning or other concepts, will strongly influence the software 
development program, particularly the depth and quality of the 
verification and validation effort ...
NOTE: It is appreciated that, with the current state of knowledge, the 
software disciplines described in this document may not, in themselves, 
be sufficient to ensure that the overall system safety and reliability 
targets have been achieved. This is particularly true for certain critical 
systems such as full authority fly- by- wire. In such cases it is accepted that 
other measures, usually within the system, in addition to a high level of 
software discipline may be necessary to achieve these safety objectives 
and demonstrate that they have been met.3
1 WA 7 October 2008 VH- QPA Airbus A330- 303 (ATSB Transport Safety Report, AO- 2008- 070).
2 (DO- 178A, SC- 152, issued on 22 March 1985 and up- dated regularly), http:// www.rtca.org.
3 At 2.3.5.
5.147 Perhaps it is not necessary to indicate that the Boeing 737 Max crashes that 
killed 346 people (189 on Lion Air Flight 610 and 157 on Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302), 
were, it appears, caused by a hardware– software interaction.1 What is pertinent is that 
the problems originated in design changes that were apparently small and presumed 
to be unlikely to make any significant difference to the system’s behaviour, and were 
intended to make the new system appear to the users like the old system.2
1 Final Aircraft Accident Investigation Report, PT. Lion Mentari Airlines, Boeing 737- 8 (MAX); PK- 
LQP 29 October 2018 (October 2019), http:// knkt.dephub.go.id/ knkt/ ntsc_ aviation/ baru/ 2018%20- 
%20035%20- %20PK- LQP%20Final%20Report.pdf; Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau Interim 
Report on Accident to the B737- 8 (MAX) Registered ET- AVJ operated by Ethiopian Airlines on 10 March 
2019 (AI- 01/ 19 9 March 2020), https:// reports.aviation- safety.net/ 2019/ 20190310- 0_ B38M_ 
ET- AVJ_ Interim.pdf; a number of internal Boeing documents about this have been released, with a 
significant number of derogatory comments about this issue made by employees: https:// archive.
org/ details/ boeingemailsocr; the US House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure provides 
a list of resources dealing with their investigation at https:// transportation.house.gov/ committee- 
activity/ boeing- 737- max- investigation; Gregory Travis, ‘How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a 
software developer’, IEEE Spectrum, 18 April 2019, https:// spectrum.ieee.org/ aerospace/ aviation/ 
how- the- boeing- 737- max- disaster- looks- to- a- software- developer; Final Committee Report The Design, 
Development & Certification of the Boeing 737 MAX (The House Committee on Transportation & 
Infrastructure, September 2020), https:// transportation.house.gov/ imo/ media/ doc/ 2020.09.15%20
FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf.
2 Joint Authorities Technical Review, Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System Observations, Findings, 
and Recommendations (11 October 2019), VI (item 4), XI (item 9), https:// www.faa.gov/ news/ media/ 
attachments/ Final_ JATR_ Submittal_ to_ FAA_ Oct_ 2019.pdf.
Financial products
5.148 In August 2006, the rating agency Moody’s gave constant proportion debt 
obligations (CPDOs) an AAA rating, which was close to making an investment in a CPDO 
free of risk.1 In comparison, a competing rating agency, Fitch, could not understand 
why such a high rating was given to such ‘investments’, because its own models put 
CPDOs at almost the grade of ‘junk’.2 It transpired that the software used by Moody’s 
for the purpose of rating CPDOs had a number of faults. A fault was found in early 2008 
that, when corrected, failed to give the AAA rating, increasing the likelihood of defaults. 
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the error was eventually corrected, other changes were made to the code to ensure the 
AAA rating continued to be assigned.3 A subsequent external investigation by the law 
firm Sullivan & Cromwell established that members of staff had engaged in conduct 
contrary to Moody’s Code of Professional Conduct.4 Moody’s subsequently received 
a ‘Wells Notice’5 from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 18 March 
2011.6 The Division of Enforcement of the SEC later issued a Report of Investigation 
into the matter.7 In a section of the Report, there was an examination of the attitude of 
the people responsible for dealing with the software error. It is revealing, and it merits 
setting out in full:
B. Rating Committee Conduct
MIS subsequently held several internal rating committee meetings in France and 
the United Kingdom to address the coding error. MIS corrected the coding error on 
February 12, 2007, but made no changes to the outstanding credit ratings for CPDO 
notes at that time. Internal e- mails show that committee members were concerned 
about the impact on MIS’s reputation if it revealed an error in the rating model. 
A January 24, 2007, e- mail from a rating committee member to the Team Managing 
Director chairing the committee stated:
In this particular case we seem to face an important reputation risk 
issue. To be fully honest this latter issue is so important that I would feel 
inclined at this stage to minimize ratings impact and accept unstressed 
parameters that are within possible ranges rather than even allow for the 
possibility of a hint that the model has a bug.
On April 27, 2007, after additional analysis, the rating committee voted not 
to downgrade the affected credit ratings for the CPDO notes. The committee 
members felt that because the CPDO notes were generally performing well there 
would be no ostensible justification for downgrading the credit ratings, absent 
announcing the coding error. In declining to downgrade the credit ratings, 
the committee considered the following inappropriate non- credit related 
factors: (i) that downgrades could negatively affect Moody’s reputation in light 
of ongoing negative media focus in Europe on Moody’s Joint Default Analysis; 
(ii) that downgrades could impact investors who relied on the original ratings; 
and (iii) the desire not to validate the criticisms of Moody’s ratings of CPDOs that 
had been made by a competitor and covered in the local media. The committee 
was comprised of senior level staff, including two Team Managing Directors, two 
Vice President- Senior Credit Officers, and a Vice President- Senior Analyst.
1 For the broader picture, see Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The 
Political Origins of Banking Crisis and Scarce Credit (Princeton University Press 2014), 266– 269.
2 The same scepticism was expressed by Richard Beales, Saskia Scholtes and Gillian Tett with Paul J. 
Davies, ‘Failing grades? Why regulators fear credit rating agencies may be out of their depth’ Financial 
Times, 17 May 2007, 13.
3 This was revealed by Sam Jones, Gillian Tett and Paul J. Davies, ‘Moody’s error gave top ratings to 
debt products’ Financial Times, 20 May 2008.
4 Sam Jones, ‘When junk was gold’ FT Weekend, 18/ 19 October 2008, 16– 22.
5 A ‘Wells Notice’ is a letter sent by a securities regulator to a prospective respondent, notifying him 
of the substance of charges that the regulator intends to bring against the respondent, and affording 
the respondent with the opportunity to submit a written statement to the ultimate decision maker.
6 Phil Wahba, ‘UPDATE 2- Moody’s says got Wells Notice from SEC’, Reuters, 7 May 2010.
7 Release No. 62802/ 31 August 2012, https:// www.sec.gov/ litigation/ investreport/ 34- 62802.htm.
5.149 Because the rating committee met in France and the UK and not in the US, 
the SEC declined to take any further action, ‘[b] ecause of uncertainty regarding a 
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5.150 Although the SEC declined to take action in this case, it did take action against 
AXA Rosenberg Group LLC, AXA Rosenberg Investment Management LLC and Barr 
Rosenberg Research Center LLC. In this instance, an employee discovered an error in 
the computer code of a quantitative investment model used to manage client portfolios. 
The employee brought the matter to the attention of senior management, but was told 
to keep quiet about the error and not to inform others about it. The error adversely 
affected 608 of 1,421 client portfolios managed by AXA Rosenberg Investment 
Management and caused US$216,806,864 in losses. Cease- and- desist proceedings 
were instituted and the respondents were jointly and severally ordered to pay a civil 
money penalty in the amount of US$25 million to the US Treasury.1
1 The order is available at https:// www.sec.gov/ litigation/ admin/ 2011/ 33- 9181.pdf.
5.151 Another example that might be considered to be mundane is that of software 
systems for the use of stockbrokers. Stockbrokers used to be regulated by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) (now by the Financial Conduct Authority), and were required 
to conduct their business in accordance with relevant legislation and the rules laid out 
by the FSA. Failure to follow the rules may have caused the FSA to take disciplinary 
action against the firm. In the case of SAM Business Systems Limited v Hedley and 
Company (sued as a firm),1 the partners of Hedley used to handle their stockbroking 
business with a system known as ANTAR, but late in 1999 they decided it might not 
work after the century date change, so they decided to buy a new product from SAM, 
a small software company whose only product was an item of software known as 
InterSet. SAM claimed this product was a ready- made package of software modules 
made by SAM for stockbrokers and others (such as banks) dealing in stocks and shares 
in administering their systems. Hedley agreed to buy the new system, but immediately 
after it went live, serious problems were apparent, many of which were fixed, some 
speedily. (The word ‘fix’ is the telling word here: a local fix within a large and complex 
piece of software often generates problems elsewhere.) Hedley continued to use 
InterSet, but problems persisted. Eventually, they decided to find another product for 
their purposes. In his judgment, Judge Bowsher QC discussed the issue of defaults in 
software:
The point has frequently been made during the trial that InterSet works well 
elsewhere (and I have received evidence from stockbrokers, Hoodless Brennan 
to that effect) and accordingly it is said, if it did not work for Hedley’s there must 
be something wrong with Hedley’s method of working. That line of argument 
has prompted me to ask, (a) if it is a tried and tested system, why when supplied 
to Hedley’s did it have admitted bugs? (b) what is the difference between a bug 
and a defect?2
1 [2002] EWHC 2733 (TCC), [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 465, [2002] 12 WLUK 550, [2003] Masons CLR 
11, (2003) 147 SJLB 57, [2003] CLY 3616.
2 [2002] EWHC 2733 (TCC) at [19].
5.152 The full nature of the problems encountered with this software that purported 
to be written for the specific purpose for which it was supplied merits setting out in 
full:
To complete the history, I must mention a document produced at my request 
as Exhibit C2. During the evidence of Mr. Whitehouse, I asked for a copy of a 
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for which no charge was made. That document had not been disclosed until I 
asked for it. It is a document of 10 pages. I have not counted each item, but there 
are about 35 items on each of the first 9 pages and 16 on the last page. According 
to the claimants, the hours worked amount to 785.25. The period of time covered 
by the document is from 4 January 2000 to 7 February, 2001. The majority of 
those items appear to be efforts to fix defects. The fact that no charge was made 
suggests that all items fall into that category. I am not going to go through all 
of that document, but I will take one example. On 12 January, 2001, there is an 
entry, ‘Analysing the problems with Hedley contract report … problem actually 
with contract form not the report’. On 15 January a temporary fix was prepared. 
On 15, 16 and 17 January over 17 hours are recorded working on this problem. 
Then on 17 January there is another entry, ‘Attempting to find the reason for 
the intermittent bad contracts. Not found yet’. On 18 January, 2001, there is 
an entry, ‘Attempting to find the reason for the intermittent bad contracts. The 
reason appears to be conflicting requirements of procedures. Needs deeper 
understanding of form’. There were then further entries for modifications to 
put the problem right on 19, 23, 24, 25 and 26 January, 2001. More work was 
done on the same problem on 5, 7, and 9 February, 2001. On 5 February, 2001, 
changes were made, ‘To prevent contracts being saved where the values do not 
add up’. Through February, 2001 there was a series of calls to deal with a problem 
with split deals commission. In mid April, 2001 there was a problem with trial 
balances. It is quite clear from that document, produced only under pressure 
during the trial, as well as from all the other evidence to which I have referred, 
that InterSet as delivered to Hedley’s was never in satisfactory working order.1
1 [2002] EWHC 2733 (TCC) at [128].
5.153 Two experts were appointed to give evidence in this case, and they signed an 
agreement which was, in fact, a schedule of defects alleged by Hedley with comments 
on each defect from SAM. This schedule of faults ran to 34 pages. Judge Bowsher QC 
offered some pertinent comments in relation to the attitude of the software supplier in 
this case:
SAM, like some others in the computer industry seem to be set in the mindset that 
when there is a ‘bug’ the customer must pay for putting it right. Bugs in computer 
programmes are still inevitable, but they are defects and it is the supplier who 
has the responsibility for putting them right at the supplier’s expense.1
1 [2002] EWHC 2733 (TCC) at [165].
Motor vehicles
5.154 Software can be manipulated to give whatever reading the writer wishes. 
Because software is presumed to be ‘reliable’, software that gives deliberate false data 
is also presumed to be ‘reliable’. It is well known that traffic lights are now generally 
controlled by software code across a network, and the code can be written in such 
a way as to break the law. Stefano Arrighetti, an engineering student from Genoa, is 
reported to have developed the T- Redspeed traffic light system in Italy. The traffic 
lights were apparently programmed to remain on amber before turning to red for less 
than the time set out in regulations.1
1 Peter Popham, ‘Smart traffic lights rigged to trap drivers’ The Independent (30 January 2009); Jacqui 
Cheng, ‘Italian red- light cameras rigged with shorter yellow lights’, Ars Technica (2 March 2009), https:// 
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5.155 The ‘sudden unintended acceleration’ incidents involving the unintended, 
unexpected and uncontrolled acceleration of modern vehicles with electronic controls 
raises the issue of the reliability of complex electronic vehicle systems.1 Consider the 
prosecution of Ann Diggles, aged 82, who was found not guilty at Preston Crown Court 
(R v Ann Diggles T20157203 before Mr Justice Fraser) for causing death by dangerous 
driving and death by careless driving when her Nissan Qashqai hit and killed Julie 
Dean, aged 53, while she was attempting to park.2 The prosecution’s case was that the 
driving of Mrs Diggles caused the accident. The prosecution relied on the evidence 
from the motor car manufacturer, as reported by the BBC:3
Takuma Nakamura, who is responsible for engine control systems development at 
Nissan, was asked by prosecutor Richard Archer: ‘Is it possible, in your opinion, for 
a malfunction in an electronic throttle to cause sudden acceleration of the vehicle?’
Mr Nakamura replied: ‘I think that’s impossible’.4
1 For a general outline of the case law in the USA, see Maria N. Maccone, ‘Litigation concerning 
sudden unintended acceleration’ 132 Am Jur Trials 305 (Originally published in 2013) (December 
2020 Update); see also Philip Koopman, ‘Practical experience report: automotive safety practices vs. 
accepted principles’ Safecom 2018, http:// safeautonomy.blogspot.com/ 2018/ 09/ automotive- safety- 
practices- vs- accepted.html; Professor Koopman maintains a list of potentially deadly automotive 
software defects at https:// betterembsw.blogspot.com/ 2018/ 09/ potentially- deadly- automotive- 
software.html.
2 ‘Driver cleared over fatal Nissan Qashqai crash’, BBC News, 7 February 2017, http:// www.bbc.
co.uk/ news/ uk- england- lancashire- 38897681; ‘Nissan cars “sped” without accelerator use, court 
hears’, BBC News, 6 February 2017, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ uk- england- lancashire- 38885809; 
‘Driver who killed woman denies mistaking accelerator for brake’, BBC News, 2 February 2017, http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ uk- england- lancashire- 38846896.
3 We only have reports from the media to rely on.
4 ‘Nissan boss denies malfunction caused fatal crash’, BBC News, 31 January 2017, http:// www.bbc.
co.uk/ news/ uk- england- lancashire- 38814890.
5.156 The expert witness for the defence was Dr Antony F. Anderson CEng FIEE. 
Dr Anderson pointed out the following:
A mechanical inspection of the vehicle was carried out. A Nissan garage, on 
the instruction of the police, downloaded diagnostic trouble codes. The police 
constable who witnessed the diagnostic testing took a screen shot with his 
camera that showed three trouble codes. Two of these were past codes of no 
significance, but one was a current U1000 trouble code. The U1000 code, as I 
understand it, signifies that there had been a CAN Bus malfunction lasting 
more than 2 seconds sometime in the ignition cycle during which the incident 
occurred. Mr Nakamura, the senior engineering manager from Nissan Japan, who 
was sent over to give evidence in the trial, implied that the trouble code was of 
no significance.1
1 Email communication with the author.
5.157 In addition to the evidence from Dr Anderson, two other women came 
forward at a late stage in the trial to give evidence that they had also had identical 
experiences. The evidence was that Mrs Diggles and the other two witnesses had 
their vehicles fully serviced in line with the manufacturer’s recommendations.1 The 
evidence put before the members of the jury is not readily available, which means it 
can only be observed that deaths and injuries appear to occur as a result of software 
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evidence, including the complexities between the software code and the mechanical 
and electronic systems.
1 Gabriella Swerling, ‘”Runaway car” driver cleared over road death’ The Times (8 February 2017), 8.
5.158 Another prominent example involves Toyota and Lexus motor vehicles, some 
of which have involved deaths of drivers and their passengers.1 Michael Barr, in giving 
expert evidence for the plaintiffs in the case of Bookout v Toyota Motor Corporation,2 
stated that:
A. The Toyota’s design actually they have an abysmal design, not just unreasonable 
in my view, but I use the word abysmal. This was actually the first chapter of my 
report I wrote because I couldn’t believe what I was seeing.
Toyota has a watchdog supervisor design that is incapable of ever detecting 
the death of a major task. That’s its whole job. It doesn’t do it. It’s not designed 
to do it.
It also, the thing it does in Toyota’s design is lookout for CPU overload, and it 
doesn’t even do that right. CPU overload is when there’s too much work in a 
burst, a period of time to do all the tasks. If that happens for too long, the car can 
become dangerous because tasks not getting to use the CPU is like temporarily 
tasks dying.
And in Toyota’s watchdog you can have any overload going up to one and a half 
seconds, which at 60 miles an hour I calculated is about the length of a football 
field, you have any vehicle malfunction for up to a football field in length that’s 
explained only because this watchdog design it [sic] bad, and because the 
processor is overloaded momentarily. And that should have been also a job of 
that watchdog supervisor. And that is one they tried to implement and they don’t 
do it well.
They also made a classic blunder, one that’s taught by professor like at 
Dr. Koopman3 to first year students in his imbedded systems class, which is, 
you don’t dedicate a hardware timer on the main CPU to periodically kick the 
hardware on the watchdog, because that will keep functioning even though vast 
portions of the software and the tasks are not rubbing because these interrupts 
are a higher priority than the tasks.
And so, that is a design that you – and I have spoken about that at many 
conferences, not doing it that way. And they do that.4
1 There are other examples. The members of a jury concluded that a cruise control malfunctioned 
on a Ford Aerostar vehicle in Cole v Ford Motor Company, 136 Or.App. 45, 900 P.2d 1059 (1995); for 
another Ford Aerostar vehicle case, in which the members of a jury concluded that a cruise control 
malfunctioned, see Jarvis v Ford Motor Company, 283 F.3d 33, 51 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1310 (2d Cir. 2002). 
Examples of conflicting evidence that is, on its face, inadequate to determine causation include: Ford 
Motor Company v Stimpson, 115 So. 3d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Belville v Ford Motor Company, 919 
F.3d 224 (2019) upholding the summary judgment decision and exclusion of expert testimony of 
plaintiffs in Johnson v Ford Motor Company, 310 F.Supp.3d 699 (2018) (consumers failed to establish 
that unintended acceleration of their vehicles was the result of the manufacturer’s electronic throttle 
control system, granting summary judgment in favour of the defendant); Kesse v Ford Motor Company, 
2020 WL 832363. See Buck v Ford Motor Company, 526 Fed.Appx. 603 (2013) where the plaintiff failed 
to produce adequate expert evidence and reliance on a report regarding unintended acceleration from 
the United Kingdom was not admitted into evidence.
2 The trial was held in the District Court of Oklahoma County State of Oklahoma before the Hon 
Patricia G. Parrish, District Judge; see also In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, 
Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation, 978 F.Supp.2d 1053, 92 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 714, 
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of a manufacturing defect and negligence, denied motion for summary judgment as to the design 
defect claim and the failure to warn claim); transcript (not proofread) of the trial 14 October 2013 
(Reported by Karen Twyford, RPR): examination and cross examination of Michael Barr, http:// www.
safetyresearch.net/ Library/ Bookout_ v_ Toyota_ Barr_ REDACTED.pdf.
3 Dr Koopman is an Associate Professor at Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering.
4 Case No. CJ- 2008- 7969, at 70– 71. Professor Philip Koopman also gave evidence in this case, and 
his assessment of the problem was similar to that of Mr Barr, for which see https:// www.usna.edu/ 
AcResearch/ _ files/ documents/ NASEC/ 2016/ CYBER%20- %20Toyota%20Unintended%20Acceleration.
pdf; https:// users.ece.cmu.edu/ ~koopman/ toyota/ koopman- 09- 18- 2014_ toyota_ slides.pdf.
5.159 Software in vehicles can also be manipulated to give the false assurance of 
regulatory compliance. In September 2015, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency issued a notice of violation of the Clean Air Act to Volkswagen AG, Audi AG and 
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.1 The notice alleged that four- cylinder Volkswagen 
and Audi diesel cars manufactured in the years 2009– 2015 included software that 
circumvented the emissions standards for some air pollutants. The State of California 
Air Resources Board had issued a separate In- Use Compliance letter to Volkswagen,2 and 
the two agencies initiated investigations based on the allegations. A software algorithm 
on certain Volkswagen vehicles switched the full emissions controls on only when the 
car detected it was undergoing official emissions testing.3 Thus the effectiveness of 
the emission control devices was greatly reduced during normal driving. This meant 
that motor vehicles met the emissions standards in the laboratory or testing station, 
but during normal operation the vehicles emitted nitrogen oxides, or NOx, at up to 
40 times the standard. Over a one- year period of operation, the emission of this extra 
pollutant by Volkswagen was estimated to have resulted in 5 to 50 premature deaths.4 
The Department of Justice subsequently filed a complaint for alleged violations of the 
Clean Air Act.5
1 For details, see https:// www.epa.gov/ vw/ learn- about- volkswagen- violations.
2 Letter from the Air Resources Board to Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, and Volkswagen Group of 
America, Inc dated 18 September 2015 reference number IUC.2015- 007 (this has been archived and is 
no longer available on the Internet).
3 It has been identified as the EDC17 diesel ECU manufactured by Bosch, for which see Moritz Contag, 
Guo Li, Andre Pawlowski, Felix Domke, Kirill Levchenko, Thorsten Holz and Stefan Savage, ‘How they 
did it: an analysis of emission defeat devices in modern automobiles’, 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security 
and Privacy (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2017), 231– 250. The authors indicate 
they found strong evidence that the defeat device was created by Bosch and enabled by Volkswagen. 
They also observed that the same device was installed in the Fiat 500X.
4 Lifang Hou, Kai Zhang, Moira A. Luthin and Andrea A. Baccarelli, ‘Public health impact and 
economic costs of Volkswagen’s lack of compliance with the United States’ emission standards’ (2016) 
13(9) International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 891; Gregory J. Thompson, 
Daniel K. Carder, Marc C. Besch, Arvind Thiruvengadam and Hemanth K. Kappanna, Final Report: In- Use 
Emissions Testing of Light- Duty Diesel Vehicles in the United States (Center for Alternative Fuels, Engines 
& Emissions, Department of Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering, West Virginia University), 15 May 
2014 http:// www.eenews.net/ assets/ 2015/ 09/ 21/ document_ cw_ 02.pdf.
5 Press release: ‘United States files complaint against Volkswagen, Audi and Porsche for alleged 
Clean Air Act violations’, Monday, 4 January 2016, https:// www.justice.gov/ opa/ pr/ united- states- 
files- complaint- against- volkswagen- audi- and- porsche- alleged- clean- air- act, including a link to the 
original Complaint; an amended Complaint was submitted on 7 June 2016 and is available at https:// 
www.epa.gov/ sites/ production/ files/ 2016- 10/ documents/ amendedvw- cp.pdf.
5.160 Manufacturers of motor vehicles are rapidly increasing the amount of 
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Semi- autonomous or fully autonomous vehicles will not provide the panacea that the 
industry constantly asserts. Vehicles controlled wholly or partially by software code 
will continue to cause accidents and kill and injure people.2 Also, because the software 
in vehicles is open to being attacked, it is far from safe.3
1 Autonomous motor vehicles have been involved in numerous accidents, mainly because of software 
failures, and a number of people have been killed and injured by motor vehicles in ‘autonomous’ mode. 
Here is a sample list of articles and websites: Francesca M. Favarò, Nazanin Nader, Sky O. Eurich, Michelle 
Tripp and Naresh Varadaraju, ‘Examining accident reports involving autonomous vehicles in California’, 
PLoS One, 2017;12(9):e0184952, https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/ articles/ PMC5607180/ ; Song 
Wang and Zhixia Li, ‘Exploring the mechanism of crashes with automated vehicles using statistical 
modeling approaches’, PLoS One 2019; 14(3): e0214550, https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/ 
articles/ PMC6438496/ ; Đorđe Petrovića, Radomir Mijailovića and Dalibor Pešića, ‘Traffic accidents 
with autonomous vehicles: type of collisions, manoeuvres and errors of conventional vehicles’ drivers’ 
(2020) 45 Transportation Research Procedia 161; for fatalities, see https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ 
List_ of_ self- driving_ car_ fatalities (although this list does not correspond to the list of lives lost when 
relating to the Tesla motor case, for which see: https:// www.tesladeaths.com/ ); for Uber, see https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Death_ of_ Elaine_ Herzberg.
2 For instance, see NTSB, Preliminary Report, Highway HWY16FH018 (Josh Brown, Florida in Tesla 
Model S) https:// www.ntsb.gov/ investigations/ AccidentReports/ Pages/ HWY16FH018- preliminary.
aspx; NTSB, Preliminary Report, Highway HWY18MH010 (Uber car crash), https:// www.ntsb.gov/ 
investigations/ AccidentReports/ Reports/ HWY18MH010- prelim.pdf.
3 Andrea Palanca, Eric Evenchick, Federico Maggi and Stefano Zanero, ‘A stealth, selective, link- layer 
denial- of- service attack against automotive networks’ in Michalis Polychronakis and Michael Meier 
(eds) Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA 2017, Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science, vol 10327, Springer); Roger Kemp, ‘Autonomous vehicles – who will be liable for 
accidents?’ (2018) 15 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 33; Michael Ellims, ‘Brake 
systems: a mind of their own’ (2021) 18 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 27; 
‘The braking system on Formula E cars is designed so that if the front brakes fail, the rear brake system 
is activated as a fail- safe. In this instance, an incorrect software parameter that meant the rear brake 
system didn't activate as intended and the fail- safe did not kick in. We have now corrected the software 
problem and demonstrated to the FIA’s satisfaction that the matter has been resolved. As a result, the 
FIA will permit all Mercedes- powered cars to race this evening’: Thomas Claburn, ‘Incorrect software 
parameter sends Formula E’s Edoardo Mortara to hospital: Brakes’ fail- safe system failed’, The Register, 
1 March 2021, https:// www.theregister.com/ 2021/ 03/ 01/ formula_ e_ bug.
Emergency services
5.161 In 1992, the London Ambulance computer- aided dispatch system failed. 
A complex set of circumstances resulted in an effective failure of the dispatching 
system, which are set out in paragraph 1996 of the Report.1 Apparently ‘the computer 
system itself did not fail in a technical sense … However, much of the design had fatal 
flaws that would, and did, cumulatively lead to all of the symptoms of systems failure’.2 
Among the contributing factors were ‘exception messages’ and ‘requests for attention’ 
which scrolled off the screen because of the large number of messages generated.3 
There is also a suggestion that one member of staff was not using the system as 
expected,4 and the problems were compounded by ‘a genuine failure of crews to press 
the correct status button owing to the nature and pressure of certain incidents’.5 This 
was so even though the individuals who used the new system were from a skilled and 
trained pool of staff, namely ambulance crews and controllers. Other problems have 
occurred since.6
1 Report of the Inquiry into the London Ambulance Service, South West Thames Regional Health 
Authority (1993) – a scanned version is available at http:// www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/ staff/ A.Finkelstein/ 
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Anthony Finkelstein and John Dowell, ‘A comedy of errors: the London Ambulance Service case study’ 
in Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Software Specification & Design IWSSD- 8, (IEEE CS 
Press 1996), 2– 4; Paul Beynon- Davies, ‘Information systems “failure” and risk assessment: the case of 
the London Ambulance Service computer and despatch system’ in G. Doukidid, B. Galliers, H. Kremar 
and F. Land (eds) Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Information Systems, Athens, 1– 3 June 
1995, 1153– 1170; Paul Beynon- Davies, ‘Human error and information systems failure: the case of 
the London Ambulance Service computer- aided despatch system project’ (1999) 11 Interacting with 
Computers 699; D. Dalcher, ‘Disaster in London: The LAS case study’ 1999 Engineering of Computer- 
Based Systems 41.
2 Report of the Inquiry into the London Ambulance Service, para 1007(x).
3 Report of the Inquiry into the London Ambulance Service, paras 4012(c) and 4023.
4 Report of the Inquiry into the London Ambulance Service, para 4025.
5 Report of the Inquiry into the London Ambulance Service, para 4009(b).
6 Kelly Fiveash, ‘London Ambulance Service downed by upgrade cockup’, The Register (9 June 
2011); Jon Ironmonger, ‘Ambulance system failure “might have led to patient death” ’, BBC News (6 
January 2017).
5.162 In 2014, an outage for 911 calls in the United States of America occurred 
because of a preventable software coding error in a 911 Emergency Call Management 
Center automated system in Englewood, Colorado, operated by Intrado, a subsidiary of 
West Corporation. This prevented non- PI- enabled long- distance assignments, which 
meant calls could not be routed to the appropriate destination.1
1 April 2014 Multistate 911 Outage: Cause and Impact Report and Recommendations (A Report of the 
Public Safety Homeland Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, October 2014, Public 
Safety Docket No. 14– 72 PSHSB Case File Nos. 14- CCR- 0001- 0007), https:// www.fcc.gov/ document/ 
april- 2014- multistate- 911- outage- report.
Medical
5.163 The widespread use of computer devices in the medical industry has also given 
rise to incidents where the reliability of devices and software has been called into 
question. The rules for approving medical devices leave a lot of scope for software 
failure. The device does not need new approval if it is ‘substantially similar’ to an 
existing approved device. This allows for errors to go unconsidered or for incremental 
changes to take the latest device far from the original design.1 Most of the ‘apps’ 
promoted on smartphones are not licensed or inherited from an ‘equivalent’ device. 
Consider the ‘Babylon health app’ – a triage chatbot that is notoriously poor and not 
approved, but would pass the examination taken by final year doctors, as noted by 
Dr Margaret McCartney:
Who’s in charge of ensuring that this app [NHS 111 powered by Babylon app] is 
safe and fit for purpose?
Knowing the staggering lack of publicly available robust testing that had 
accompanied the adult symptom checker app, I thought that perhaps Babylon 
might have done better with its paediatric one. What’s Babylon’s evidence? 
I don’t know, for it replied with, ‘we won’t be responding to your enquiry’. The 
binary nature of the chatbot means that one thing that doesn’t happen is history 
taking, in the medical sense (‘Shut up, your patient is telling you the diagnosis’). 
It has a series of yes/ no questions and short multiple choices.
Who’s in charge of ensuring that this app is safe and fit for purpose? The 
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) has said that it 
will ask Babylon to change the way it refers to the app as being ‘certified as a 










The presumption that computers are ‘reliable’ 191
this app, the manufacturer must register with the agency and self certify that 
the device meets the requirements of the regulations. The MHRA says that this 
process is purely administrative – the MHRA takes details of the types of devices 
manufactured, but it does not assess, certify, approve, or accredit devices as part 
of the CE (European Conformity) marking process.
Who else could act? The Care Quality Commission has inspected Babylon, but 
it made no mention of the reliability, or not, of the app that it uses to direct 
people to and from general practice consultations. The General Medical Council 
regulates individual doctors, not clinical devices.
We have many regulators but little proactivity, even for an app which – despite 
the small print warning us that it ‘does not constitute medical advice, diagnosis, 
or treatment’ – is being used as the front door into NHS care.2
1 For a general introduction that should be compulsory reading for all incoming ministers of health, 
see Martyn Thomas and Harold Thimbleby, Computer Bugs in Hospitals: A New Killer (Gresham College, 
6 February 2018), https:// www.gresham.ac.uk/ lectures- and- events/ computer- bugs- in- hospitals- a- 
new- killer; Dolores R. Wallace and D. Richard Kuhn, ‘Failure modes in medical device software: an 
analysis of 15 years of recall data’ (2001) 8(4) International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety 
Engineering 351; Homa Alemzadeh, Ravishankar K. Iyer, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and Jai Raman, ‘Analysis 
of safety- critical computer failures in medical devices’ (2013 July/ August) IEEE Security & Privacy, 
14; Homa Alemzadeh, Jaishankar Raman, Nancy Leveson, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk and Ravishankar K. 
Iyer, ‘Adverse events in robotic surgery: a retrospective study of 14 years of FDA data’ (2016) 11(4) 
LPoS ONE 1, https:// journals.plos.org/ plosone/ article?id=10.1371/ journal.pone.0151470; Alessia 
Ferrarese, Giada Pozzi, Felice Borghi, Alessandra Marano, Paola Delbon, Bruno Amato, Michele 
Santangelo, Claudio Buccelli, Massimo Niola, Valter Martino and Emanuele Capasso, ‘Malfunctions of 
robotic system in surgery: role and responsibility of surgeon in legal point of view’ (2016) 11(1) Open 
Med (Wars) 286, https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/ articles/ PMC5329842/ .
2 Margaret McCartney, ‘AI in medicine must be rigorously tested’, Thebmj, News and Views, 24 April 
2018, https:// www.bmj.com/ content/ 361/ bmj.k1752.
5.164 For instance, patients have been affected by an error in clinical IT software1 
and by the failure to timely correct an error,2 and one study of a hospital computerized 
physician order entry system in the USA illustrated a number of errors that the 
system was supposed to resolve, such as an increased probability of prescribing 
errors. There were 12 flaws in the interface used by humans that reflected machine 
rules that in turn did not correspond to how work was organized or the usual 
behaviour of those using the system.3 There is an increasing volume of articles on 
this topic,4 and it would appear that some, and not all, of the problems were due 
to software defects,5 but it is now very clear that software helps to kill people in 
hospitals.6
1 Alex Matthews- King, ‘GPs told to review patients at risk as IT error miscalculates CV score 
in thousands’, Pulse Today, 11 May 2016, https:// www.pulsetoday.co.uk/ news/ clinical- areas/ 
prescribing/ gps- told- to- review- patients- at- risk- as- it- error- miscalculates- cv- score- in- thousands/ .
2 Singh v Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 151 Wash. App. 137, 210 P.3d 337 (2009) where the 
manufacturer of a heart monitor was aware of and had developed a fix for the software bug as early 
as 1998, but made a calculated business decision not to issue a recall or warning to any customers. 
Monitors were patched only when sent in for repair, and so the one used during Singh’s operation had 
not been patched. The jury awarded Singh $31.75 million in compensatory damages plus an additional 
$8.35 million in punitive damages. The verdict was upheld on appeal.
3 Ross Koppel, Joshua P. Metlay, Abigail Cohen, Brian Abaluck, A. Russell Localio, Stephen E. Kimmel 
and Brian L. Strom, ‘Role of computerized physician order entry systems in facilitating medication 
errors’ (2005) 293(10 Journal of the American Medical Association 1197.
4 E. Alberdi, A. A. Povyakalo, L. Strigini and P. Ayton, ‘Computer aided detection: risks and benefits 
for radiologists’ decisions’ in E. Samei and E. Krupinski (eds) The Handbook of Medical Image Perception 
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5 Frances E. Zollers, Andrew McMullin, Sandra N. Hurd and Peter Shears, ‘No more soft landings 
for software: liability for defects in an industry that has come of age’ (2004) 21 Santa Clara High Tech. 
LJ 745; Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski, ‘E- health hazards: provider liability and electronic 
health record systems (2009) 24 Berkeley Tech LJ 1523; Paul T. Lee, Frankie Thompson and Harold 
Thimbleby, ‘Analysis of infusion pump error logs and their significance for health care’ (2012) 21(8) 
British Journal of Nursing (Intravenous Supplement) S12; Hon. John M. Curran and Mark A. Berman, 
‘Gremlins and glitches using electronic health records at trial’ (2013) 85(4) New York State Bar Journal 
20; Courtney L. Davenport, ‘Dangers of electronic medical systems’, (2013) 49(5) Trial: The National 
Legal Newsmagazine14; Timothy P. Blanchard and Margaret M. Manning, ‘Electronic medical record 
documentation: inherent risks and inordinate hazards’, in Alice G. Gosfield, (ed.), Health Law Handbook 
(Thompson Reuters 2016), 246– 297; Jayanti Bhandari Neupane, Ram P. Neupane, Yuheng Luo, Wesley 
Y. Yoshida, Rui Sun and Philip G. Williams, ‘Characterization of leptazolines A−D, polar oxazolines 
from the cyanobacterium leptolyngbya sp., reveals a glitch with the “Willoughby−Hoye” scripts for 
calculating NMR chemical shifts’ (2019) 21 Org Lett 8449, where the authors discuss a flaw in software 
that could lead to incorrect conclusions; Karam v Adirondack Neurosurgical Specialists, P.C., 93 A.D.3d 
1260 (2012), 941 N.Y.S.2d 402, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 02182 (evidence pointed to error in software), 
motion for reargument or leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied, 96 A.D.3d 1513 (2012), 945 
N.Y.S.2d 588, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04645, motion for leave to appeal denied, 19 N.Y.3d 812 (2012), 976 
N.E.2d 251, 951 N.Y.S.2d 722, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 83806.
6 Yong Y. Han, Joseph A. Carcillo, Shekhar T. Venkataraman, Robert S. B. Clark, R. Scott Watson, Trung 
C. Nguyen, Hülya Bayir and Richard A. Orr, ‘Unexpected increased mortality after implementation of a 
commercially sold computerized physician order entry system’ (2005) 116(6) Pediatrics1506; Harold 
Thimbleby, ‘Ignorance of interaction programming is killing people’, Interactions (September and 
October 2008), 52; Harold Thimbleby, Fix IT: How to Solve the Problems of Digital Healthcare(Oxford 
University Press 2021), open source at http:// www.harold.thimbleby.net/ rhbook/ book.pdf.
The Post Office Horizon scandal
5.165 Between 2000 and 2019, the Post Office1 operated a computerized accounting 
and electronic point of sale IT system called Horizon. This system was installed in 
its branch Post Offices around the country. It was not long before sub- postmasters 
and sub- postmistresses (SPMs) began experiencing balancing errors that they could 
not explain. Post Office employees did not attempt to find out why balance errors 
were occurring; they merely required the SPMs to make- up any shortfall from their 
own funds. The balancing errors ranged from small amounts to tens of thousands of 
pounds. Some SPMs would make up the shortfall, and some would not. The Post Office 
initiated a substantial number of prosecutions for theft and fraud (the Post Office itself 
is a prosecuting authority), relying on the presumption that computers are reliable.2
1 Post Office Limited is a private limited company registered in England and Wales, company 
number 02154540, incorporated on 13 August 1987. The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy holds a special share, and the rights attached to that special share are enshrined 
within the Post Office Limited Articles of Association.
2 The transcript of the trial of Regina v Seema Misra, T20090070, in the Crown Court at Guildford, 
Trial dates 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 October and 11 November 2010, His Honour Judge N. A. 
Stewart and a jury, was published in full in (2015) 12 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, Introduction 44, Documents Supplement; see also Tim McCormack, ‘The Post Office Horizon 
system and Seema Misra’ (2016) 13 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 133. In 
this case, the prosecuting barrister referred to the Horizon system being ‘robust’ – seemingly in an 
attempt to refer to the presumption that computers are reliable without actually committing to using 
the word ‘reliable’, for which see Ladkin, ‘Robustness of software’; for a discussion of the evidence 
the Post Office ought to have disclosed before trial, see James Christie, ‘The Post Office Horizon IT 
scandal and the presumption of the dependability of computer evidence’ (2020) 17 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 49. The disclosure of relevant digital data was a live issue in 
this case. The defence made a number of requests for further disclosure of the computer system. This 
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October 2010, 3C; Judge’s Ruling, Day 1 Monday 11 October 2010, 25, A– C); second application before 
HH Judge Critchlow, 7 May 2010 (Day 1 Monday 11 October 2010, 3G); third application before the trial 
judge (Day 1 Monday 11 October 2010, 15H– 16H) and fourth application before the trial judge (Day 
6, Monday 18 October 2010, 24H– 25A) – on this precise point, see Hamilton v Post Office Ltd [2021] 
EWCA Crim 577 at [204].
5.166 In response to the failure of the Post Office to consider that SPMs were not 
defrauding or stealing from the Post Office, a group of ex- sub- postmasters and sub- 
postmistresses formed the Justice For Subpostmasters Alliance (JFSA)1 in 2009 as the 
result of experiencing significant problems with how Post Office Limited dealt with 
apparent shortfalls in their accounts after the introduction of the Horizon IT system 
in 2000.2 Following years of campaigning with the support of many MPs, in 2012 the 
Post Office appointed Second Sight Support Services Limited, a firm of independent 
forensic accountants, to investigate the claims being made about the Horizon system 
and the associated issues. On 8 July 2013, Second Sight published an Interim Report 
on its findings up until that date, which led to MPs raising questions with the Minister 
for Postal Affairs in the House of Commons on 9 July 2013.3 The Interim Report 
demonstrated that there were issues that required further investigation, and in August 
2013 an Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme was established to investigate 
individual cases. The Scheme was open to both serving and ex- sub- postmasters 
and sub- postmistresses who had concerns relating to Horizon, and offered them an 
opportunity to have their cases independently reviewed and raised directly with the 
Post Office. A Working Group, comprising representatives from Second Sight, the Post 
Office and the JFSA, was established with an independent chair. The Scheme closed to 
applicants on 18 November 2013. During the 12 weeks it was open 150 applications 
were received. On 9 April 2015, the Post Office terminated the Scheme Working Group, 
and also terminated the contracts with Second Sight and the independent chairman. 
The draft of the Second Sight Report Part Two was due to be released to the Working 
Group on 10 April 2015, but the action of the Post Office prevented this from taking 
place. The second part of the Second Sight Report (version 2) eventually appeared on 
a journalists’ website.
1 The Justice For Subpostmasters Alliance, https:// www.jfsa.org.uk/ .
2 The Post Office took civil action to recover monies on an account stated (for an explanation of 
‘account states’ see Marshall below) by one of its former sub- postmasters, Mr Castleton: Post Office 
Ltd v Castleton [2007] EWHC 5 (QB), [2007] 1 WLUK 381. For a comprehensive assessment of this 
judgment, illustrating failure of the judge to accept that Mr Castleton was challenging the presumption 
that computers are reliable, see Paul Marshall, ‘The harm that judges do – misunderstanding computer 
evidence: Mr Castleton’s story’ (2020) 17 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 25. In 
Banks v Revenue & Customs [2014] UKFTT 465 (TC), [2014] 5 WLUK 335, in response to the appellant’s 
assertions that the online process for submitting tax forms was flawed, Revenue and Customs rejected 
the claim without providing any evidence, the members of the tribunal reporting, at [22], that ‘HMRC 
says that it interrogated its computer system, and found no faults’. In addition, the members of the 
tribunal stated, at [28], in the absence of any evidence to make such an assessment, that ‘It is equally 
difficult to envisage HMRC’s systems failing in such a rudimentary way’.
3 Hansard, 9 July 2013, columns 198– 209, https:// publications.parliament.uk/ pa/ cm201314/ 
cmhansrd/ cm130709/ debtext/ 130709- 0002.htm#13070952000004.
5.167 In 2015, the law firm Freeths LLP agreed to represent those ex- sub- postmasters 
and sub- postmistresses who wanted to take part in any future legal action. Therium 
Group Holdings Limited funded the litigation.1 A Group Litigation Order was 
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President of the Queen’s Bench Division. Procedural issues before the first trial were 
dealt with in the first judgment, Bates v Post Office Ltd,2 and a second judgment dealt 
with a further application by the Post Office to strike out part of the claim in Bates v 
Post Office Ltd (No 2).3 It was anticipated that there would be four trials. In the event, 
only two trials have taken place.
1 Therium Group Holdings Limited, https:// www.therium.com/ .
2 [2017] EWHC 2844 (QB), [2017] 6 Costs LO 855, [2018] CLY 376.
3 [2018] EWHC 2698 (QB), [2018] 10 WLUK 291.
5.168 The first trial concerned, in the main, the contractual position between the Post 
Office and the sub- postmasters and sub- postmistresses. The judgment is in Bates v Post 
Office Ltd (No. 3: Common Issues).1 In this judgment, the judge included a comprehensive 
introduction to the issues generally between the parties at [2] – [43]. Orders in 
respect of costs of the Common Issues trial were determined in Bates v Post Office Ltd 
(No. 5: Common Issues Costs).2 The second trial, dealing with the Horizon software, took 
place between 11 March 2019 and 22 July 2019. During the course of this trial, the Post 
Office issued an application that the judge recuse himself as Managing Judge in this 
group litigation, and stop the Horizon Issues trial so that it could be recommenced at 
some later date before a replacement Managing Judge. That application was refused, 
for which see Bates v Post Office Ltd (No. 4: Recusal Application).3 Permission to appeal 
was refused by the single Lord Justice on 9 May 2019.4 Between the end of the second 
trial and the judgment, the parties sought mediation. An agreement was reached on 
11 December 2019.5 The judge handed down his judgment in the second trial on 
16 December 2019 – a comprehensive judgment that clearly indicated that the Horizon 
system had a significant number of software errors, including the ability of employees 
of Fujitsu to enter the computers of SPMs remotely and change data without the SPM 
being aware of what was happening.6 When handing down his judgment, the judge 
indicated that he:
[had] very grave concerns regarding the veracity of evidence given by Fujitsu 
employees in other courts in previous proceedings about the known existence of 
bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system. These previous proceedings include 
the High Court in at least one civil case brought by the Post Office against a sub- 
postmaster and the Crown Court in a greater number of criminal cases, also brought 
by the Post Office against a number of sub- postmasters and sub- postmistresses.
After careful consideration, I have therefore decided, in the interests of justice, to 
send the papers in the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Max Hill QC, 
so he may consider whether the matter to which I refer should be the subject of 
any prosecution.7
1 [2019] EWHC 606 (QB), [2019] 3 WLUK 260.
2 [2019] EWHC 1373 (QB), [2019] 6 WLUK 80, [2019] Costs LR 857, [2019] CLY 431.
3 [2019] EWHC 871 (QB), [2019] 4 WLUK 150.
4 Bates v Post Office Ltd Case No: A1/ 2019/ 1387/ PTA dated 22 November 2019. The approved 
judgment will be published in a future edition of the Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review.
5 Confidential settlement deed (10 December 2019) between the claimants in the action Bates v 
Post Office Limited, Post Office Limited and Freeths LLP, https:// www.onepostoffice.co.uk/ media/ 
47518/ 20191210- glo- confidential- settlement- deed- executed- version- redacted_ - 003.pdf.
6 Bates v Post Office Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues) Rev 1 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB), [2019] 12 WLUK 208; 
during this trial, the lead counsel for the Post Office, Anthony de Garr Robinson QC, repeatedly referred 



















The presumption that computers are ‘reliable’ 195
see the discussion in Parker, Humble Pi in (2019) 16 Book Reports, Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 99– 105.
7 Approved Proceedings sent to the author, High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, No QB- 
2016- 004710, 16 December 2019, to be published in the Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature 
Law Review in 2021.
5.169 In 2015, the Criminal Case Review Commission (CCRC) began reviewing claims 
of wrongful prosecution for offences such as theft and false accounting, caused, the 
complaints allege, as a result of problems with the Post Office’s Horizon IT system. In 
2020, the CCRC referred 47 Post Office cases on the abuse of process to the Court of 
Appeal,1 and in October 2020 the government initiated a non- statutory inquiry into the 
Post Office’s Horizon IT dispute led by Sir Wyn Williams.2 The Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division heard the appeal of 42 appellants on 22, 23 and 24 March 2021 and handed 
down judgment on 23 April 2021 in which the appeals of 39 appellants were quashed.3 
The court also reached a rare determination: that the prosecutions were an affront to the 
conscience of the court.4 In delivering the judgment of the court, Holroyde LJ noted that 
the Post Office constantly asserted that the Horizon system was ‘reliable’ [20] and [125], 
‘accurate and reliable’ [68] or ‘robust and reliable’ [121]. He went on to say, at [137]:
By representing Horizon as reliable, and refusing to countenance any suggestion 
to the contrary, POL [Post Office Limited] effectively sought to reverse the burden 
of proof: it treated what was no more than a shortfall shown by an unreliable 
accounting system as an incontrovertible loss, and proceeded as if it were for 
the accused to prove that no such loss had occurred. Denied any disclosure 
of material capable of undermining the prosecution case, defendants were 
inevitably unable to discharge that improper burden.
1 R. v Hamilton [2021] EWCA Crim 21, [2021] 1 WLUK 116, [2021] 1 Cr App R 17; ‘The CCRC refers 
eight more Post Office cases for appeal – bringing total to 47 so far’, 3 June 2020, https:// ccrc.gov.
uk/ the- ccrc- refers- eight- more- post- office- cases- for- appeal- bringing- total- to- 47- so- far/ ; ‘CCRC to 
refer 39 Post Office cases on abuse of process argument’, 26 March 2020, https:// ccrc.gov.uk/ ccrc- to- 
refer- 39- post- office- cases- on- abuse- of- process- argument/ ; the Criminal Cases Review Commission’s 
process for review of convictions relating to the Post Office and Horizon accounting system (Number 
2020- 0040, 3 March 2020), House of Commons Library, https:// commonslibrary.parliament.uk/ 
research- briefings/ cdp- 2020- 0040/ ; for Scotland, see Reevel Alderson, ‘Post Office scandal: Scottish 
probe into sub- postmasters’ convictions’, BBC Scotland, 30 September 2020, https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/ uk- scotland- 54339004.
2 https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ publications/ post- office- horizon- it- inquiry- 2020; https:// 
www.gov.uk/ government/ publications/ post- office- horizon- it- inquiry- 2020/ terms- of- reference. The 
government converted the Inquiry into a statutory inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 on 1st June 
2021, Statement UIN HCWS40, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/
detail/2021-05-19/hcws40.
3 Hamilton v Post Office Ltd [2021] EWCA Crim 577, [2021] 4 WLUK 227.
4 Hamilton v Post Office Ltd [2021] EWCA Crim 577 at [66].
5.170 Not only was it factually incorrect that the Horizon system was reliable, but the 
failure to disclose relevant information meant:
[the] defendants were inevitably unable to discharge that improper burden. As 
each prosecution proceeded to its successful conclusion the asserted reliability 
of Horizon was, on the face of it, reinforced. Defendants were prosecuted, 
convicted and sentenced on the basis that the Horizon data must be correct, and 
cash must therefore be missing, when in fact there could be no confidence as to 
that foundation.1
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Banking
5.171 The presumption that computers are reliable is particularly relevant with 
regard to banking. Banks across the world have introduced very complex systems and 
networks to control the flow of transactions, many of which are no longer under the 
sole control of the banks themselves. That a bank benefits from the presumption that 
its computers and networks, including the computers and networks it relies upon over 
which it has no direct control, were in order at the material time, puts an impossible 
burden on the customer. If a customer in dispute with his bank wants to challenge 
this presumption, he will require significant knowledge of the computers, systems and 
networks operated by the bank, how they work and where the vulnerabilities might lie, 
including the results of relevant audits, both internal and external – a task well beyond 
the majority of customers, including most lawyers without the benefit of expert advice, 
which in itself is difficult to obtain.
5.172 Issues regarding the reliability of banking systems manifested themselves in 
the problems in the UK in June and July 2012 with RBS, NatWest and Ulster banks.1 On 
19 June 2012, an important item of software known as CA- 7 was updated. This software 
controls the batch processing systems that deal with retail banking transactions. It 
is used to automate large sequences of batch mainframe work, usually referred to 
as ‘jobs’. The jobs take transactions from various places, such as ATM withdrawals, 
automatic salary payments and such like, so that accounts are credited and debited 
with the correct amounts by the next morning. The software initiates jobs, and when 
one job is finished, a new job will be initiated. Accounts are processed overnight when 
the mainframes are less busy, and finish by updating the master copy of the account 
in a system known as Caustic. It appears that the update made to CA- 7 caused the files 
to run incorrectly or not to run at all for three nights. David Silverstone, delivery and 
solutions manager for NMQA, which provides automated testing software to a number 
of banks, is quoted to the effect that such problems can always be avoided if there is 
sufficient testing of the update before it is put into operational use.2 Michael Allen, 
director of IT service management at Compuware, is reported to have said:
The problem is that IT systems have become vastly more complex. Delivering 
an e- banking service could be reliant on 20 different IT systems. If even a small 
change is made to one of these systems, it can cause major problems for the 
whole banking service, which could be what’s happened at NatWest. Finding 
the root cause of the problem is probably something NatWest is struggling with 
because of the complexity of the IT systems in any bank.3
1 For detailed information, the reader is directed to the Treasury Select Committee web page on the 
Parliament website.
2 Charles Arthur, ‘How NatWest’s IT meltdown developed’, The Guardian, 25 June 2012.
3 Anna Leach, ‘Natwest, RBS: When will bank glitch be fixed? Probably not today’, The Register, 22 
June 2012.
5.173 The complexity of the problem is highlighted in an article written by Hilary 
Osborne in The Guardian in 2014, in which the issues were explained:
‘The banks do have a problem, but it’s not a new problem, and it’s not an easy 
problem to fix, which is why it’s taking so long’, says David Bannister, editor of 
Banking Technology magazine. ‘In the old days these machines just had to run 
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now they have to deal with news that is being updated throughout the day. The 
users – us – are using internet banking, ATMs, we’re spending money online. The 
reconciliation between what is going on in the background is the hard part, and 
the gulf is widening all the time.’
Ben Wilson, associate director of financial services for techUK, says some of 
the ‘legacy systems’ at banks are 30– 40 years old and were originally set up for 
branch banking, but ‘then they needed to be ATM- focussed, then there was online 
banking, then mobile banking’. He says: ‘Banks have bolted on these changes 
because it is cheaper and less risky than starting from scatch, but every time you 
bolt on a change it becomes more complex.’
As well as new banking channels, systems are also tinkered with whenever 
regulatory changes are made, and when a product is withdrawn or changed.
Jim McCall, managing director of the Unit, which works with banks and other 
companies on their mobile apps, says that while anyone now building a system 
from scratch would ‘abstract out as much as possible so [different elements] are 
not as reliant on each other’, the banks’ systems often resemble a house of cards. ‘If 
you make a change to a tiny bit of code on one thing it is like the butterfly flapping 
its wings far away and somewhere someone’s mobile app stops working’, he says.
To make things more complicated, says Colin Privett, UK managing director of 
software firm Cast, new functions are usually ‘written in different programming 
languages, on different machines, by different teams’. He adds: ‘This prevents 
a single person/ team from ever fully understanding the entire structure of a 
system. That is why when things do go wrong it can often take hours, or even 
days, to fix as teams scramble to find out where the problem lies.’1
1 Hilary Osborne, ‘Why do bank IT systems keep failing?’, The Guardian, 27 January 2014.
5.174 The effects of the CA- 7 imbroglio were considerable. In some cases people were 
left homeless after the computer problems meant house purchases fell through; others 
were stranded abroad, unable to obtain access to funds which should have been in 
their account; wages and direct debits were not paid; and it is reported that one person 
spent the weekend in prison because the computer failure meant his bail money was 
not processed.1 The problems continued into 2014.2 In December 2014, the Royal Bank 
of Scotland Plc, National Westminster Bank Plc and Ulster Bank Ltd faced a combined 
financial penalty of £42 million by the Financial Conduct Authority for breaches of 
Principle 3 of the ‘principles for businesses’, forming part of ‘the principles of good 
regulation’, which requires a firm to take reasonable care to organize and control its 
affairs responsibly and effectively with adequate risk management systems,3 and the 
Prudential Regulation Authority imposed a financial penalty of £14 million on the 
same banks for their failure to meet their obligations to have adequate systems and 
controls to identify and manage their exposure to IT risks.4
1 James Hall and Gordon Rayner, ‘RBS computer failure condemns man to spend weekend in the 
cells’, The Telegraph, 25 June 2012.
2 Emma Dunkley, ‘RBS and NatWest to plough £1bn into digital upgrade’ Financial Times, 28– 29 
June 2014, 18.
3 https:// www.fca.org.uk/ publication/ final- notices/ rbs- natwest- ulster- final- notice.pdf.
4 https:// www.bankofengland.co.uk/ - / media/ boe/ files/ prudential- regulation/ enforcement- 
notice/ en201114.pdf?la=en&hash=7483F66E5533498680F8C2CD9F34CE9C10FD5EA8.
5.175 The problem of complexity and the difficulties in understanding and maintaining 
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Real- Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system operated by the Bank of England in 2014.1 
The report stated:
133. During the 18 years since RTGS was first launched, the incremental changes 
have resulted in an increase in complexity and a system which is now more 
difficult to understand and maintain. In particular, the LSM and MIRS changes 
introduced additional functionality with an associated increase in complexity.
134. In combination with the ageing development language used to program 
RTGS, the result is a system which is more complex to support, heavily reliant on 
the skills and experience of the team to support it, and more susceptible to errors 
which take longer to diagnose. Therefore there is an increased risk of functional 
or configuration changes causing errors and if or when the system does fail it 
may take longer to resolve the issue.
1 Deloitte, Independent Review of RTGS Outage on 20 October 2014 (23 March 2015), https:// www.
bankofengland.co.uk/ - / media/ boe/ files/ report/ 2015/ independent- review- of- rtgs- outage- on- 20- 
october- 2014.pdf.
5.176 In this case, there was a design defect. The defect was mentioned at 
paragraph 151 of the report, but it had been redacted to such an extent that there 
was no meaningful text. The only information available is that a process known as 
‘Process A functionality’ was changed in April 2014 and tested in May 2014 in 
preparation for the anticipated transfer of CHAPS members, and a design defect was 
introduced at this stage. This was the cause of the failure.1
1 Independent review of RTGS outage on 20 October 2014: Bank of England’s response, https:// 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/ - / media/ boe/ files/ report/ 2015/ independent- review- of- rtgs- outage- on- 
20- october- 2014- boes- response.pdf.
5.177 Other examples include Deutsche Bank AG, where a coding error caused 
Deutsche to reverse the buy/ sell indicator for its CFD Equity Swaps in 2013. This 
meant it reported them inaccurately to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The FCA 
imposed a financial penalty of £4,7818,800 on Deutsche for failing to provide accurate 
reports in accordance with the provisions of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive.1 In 2014, the Co- operative Bank identified that statements on a number of 
loans had been issued three days late because of a software error. Under the provisions 
of s 6 of the Consumer Credit Act 2006, which inserted s 77A into the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974, it is necessary to provide an annual statement to each borrower for a fixed- 
sum credit agreement, which should set out the amount borrowed, the money paid, 
the interest and the outstanding amount. If the creditor fails to provide the debtor 
with an annual statement, the creditor is not entitled to enforce the agreement during 
the period of the failure to comply, and the debtor is not liable to pay any interest 
during the period. The bank set aside £109.5 million to refund interest payments for 
this breach of the Act.2
1 https:// www.fca.org.uk/ publication/ final- notices/ deutsche- bank- ag- 2015.pdf; Directive 2004/ 
39/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives 85/ 611/ EEC and 93/ 6/ EEC and Directive 2000/ 12/ EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/ 22/ EEC, OJ L 145, 
30.4.2004, p.1.
2 Adam Leyland and Beth Brooks, ‘The Co- operative Bank’s £400m costs bill caused by 
“programming error” ’, The Grocer, 29 March 2014, at https:// www.thegrocer.co.uk/ the- co- operative- 
group/ programming- error- to- blame- for- co- op- banks- 400m- bill/ 356022.article; The Co- operative 
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Interception of communications
5.178 In the half- yearly report in July 2015, the Report of the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner illustrated the effect that errors in software code 
had had on the interception of communications.1 Although the number of technical 
errors were low in comparison to the overall number of requests made, nevertheless 
the effect such errors had on innocent parties was significant. In paragraph 5.28, it 
was indicated that eight out of ten errors made in relation to resolving IP addresses 
to individuals related to investigations into the sexual exploitation of children or 
cases where serious concerns were raised in relation to the welfare of a child.2 The 
Commissioner commented, at paragraphs 5.29 and 5.37:
Regrettably when errors occur in relation to the resolution of IP addresses 
the consequences are particularly acute. An IP address is often the only line of 
enquiry in a child protection case (so called ‘single strand’ intelligence), and 
it may be difficult for the police to corroborate the information further before 
taking action. Any police action taken erroneously in such cases, such as the 
search of an individual’s house who is unconnected with the investigation or a 
delayed welfare check on an individual whose life is believed to be at risk, can 
have a devastating impact on the individuals concerned.
…
5.37 … The eight technical system errors led to four warrants being executed 
at premises unconnected with the investigations and in one of these instances 
an individual was arrested. In another case the error delayed a welfare check 
on a child believed to be in crisis. In one instance a person unconnected with 
the investigation was visited by police. The majority of these errors resulted 
in communications data being obtained in relation to individuals who were 
unconnected with those investigations.
1 The Rt Hon Sir Anthony May, Half- yearly Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner 
(July 2015, HC 308, SG/ 2015/ 105).
2 There is no suggestion from these examples that it was in error. The report may mean errors in 
resolving IP addresses in criminal investigations.
5.179 In his Report, the Commissioner said that the Crown Prosecution Service 
used funds provided by the government to work with vendors and the Home Office 
to develop secure disclosure systems – and although money has been spent on this 
issue, technical issues nevertheless continue to arise.1 As a result of the disclosure of 
the technical errors, the Commissioner made a number of recommendations regarding 
technical system errors:
11 Ensure that the [Communication Service Provider] CSP secure disclosure 
systems are tested sufficiently prior to implementation and after significant 
updates or upgrades.
12 Ensure there is standardisation and as much consistency as possible in 
relation to the data entry requirements on the different CSP secure disclosure 
systems.
13 Requirement for [Single Point of Contact] SPoC to inform CSP immediately if 
an error is identified which might be the result of a technical system fault (even 
where the error has been classified as a recordable error).
14 Ensure that there are regular quality assurance audits of the CSP secure 
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15 Ensure that the CSPs and system vendors are aware of the potential significant 
consequences of system errors, that the public authorities are informed of any 
systems errors immediately and the errors are fixed at the earliest opportunity.2
1 At para 5.53.
2 At para 5.40.
5.180 Technical errors continue to be reported by successive Commissioners.1
1 The Rt Hon Sir Stanley Burnton, Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner 
2016 (December 2017, HC 297, SG/ 2017/ 77), Error Investigation numbers 22– 27; The Rt Hon Lord 
Justice Fulford, Annual Report of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 2017 (January 2019, HC 
1780, SG/ 2019/ 8), Error Investigation numbers 2, 19, 20, 23, and 24; The Rt Hon Sir Brian Leveson, 
Annual Report of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 2018 (March 2020, HC 67, SG/ 2020/ 8), Error 
Investigation numbers 16– 22.
Most computer errors are either immediately 
detectable or result from input errors
5.181 Let us consider the proposition that most computer errors are either 
immediately detectable or result from errors in the data entered into the machines. 
The evidence is to the contrary: Mr Adams demonstrated that a third of software 
faults in a large IBM study took at least 5,000 execution years to appear for the first 
time (this was one of the largest studies of all time);1 Professor Les Hatton and Andy 
Roberts conducted a study that demonstrated that seismic programs developed by 
oil companies were shown to have been used for many years even though they were 
defective;2 and Nancy G. Leveson and Clark S. Turner demonstrated that between 
June 1985 and January 1987 the Therac- 25 medical linear accelerator was involved 
in massive radiation overdoses, causing the deaths of six people, while others were 
seriously injured. The detailed investigations eventually indicated that the main cause 
of the deaths was software errors. Some of the lessons gleaned from the work by Nancy 
Leveson included the following: too much confidence was placed in the software, an 
assumption by lay people that software will not or cannot fail, and engineers ignoring 
software when analysing faults, because it was assumed the hardware was at fault, 
not the software.3 In this respect, opinions have not changed since 1987.4 When 
investigating sudden unintended acceleration in some of its motor cars in the US, 
Toyota did not include software engineers in its investigations, and incorrectly ruled 
out software as the cause of the resulting deaths and injuries.5
1 Edward N. Adams, ‘Optimizing preventive service of software products’ (1984) 28(1) IBM Journal 
of Research and Development 2.
2 Les Hatton and Andy Roberts, ‘How accurate is scientific software?’ (1994) 20(10) IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering 785.
3 ‘An investigation of the Therac- 25 accidents’ (1993) 26(7) Computer 18 (note the additional 
information in Nancy Leveson, Software, System Safety and Computers (Addison- Wesley 1995)); for 
descriptions of what some of the patients suffered, see Lee, The Day the Phones Stopped,  chapter 1.
4 Simon Oxenham, ‘Thousands of fMRI brain studies in doubt due to software flaws’, New Scientist, 
18 July 2016, https:// www.newscientist.com/ article/ 2097734- thousands- of- fmri- brain- studies- in- 
doubt- due- to- software- flaws/ ; Eklund and others, ‘Cluster failure’.
5 Transcript (not proofread) of Bookout v Toyota Motor Corporation Case No. CJ- 2008- 7969 
(Reported by Karen Twyford, RPR): examination and cross examination of Michael Barr 14 October 
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5.182 Uncovering the faults in devices controlled by software used in medicine is 
now considered to be an important research area,1 and in November 2000, 28 patients 
at the National Cancer Institute in Panama were given massive overdoses of gamma 
rays partly due to limitations of the computer program that guided use of a radiation 
therapy machine. A number of patients died.2
1 Kevin Fu, ‘Trustworthy medical device software’ (Appendix D, 97– 118) in Theresa Wizemann (ed) 
Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process: Measuring Postmarket Performance and 
Other Select Topics: Workshop Report (Food and Drug Administration 2011), https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/ books/ NBK209656/ ; see also Senate Hearing 112– 92, United States Senate, Hearing on a Delicate 
Balance: FDA and the Reform of the Medical Device Approval Process, 13 April 2011, https:// www.aging.
senate.gov/ hearings/ a- delicate- balance- fda- and- the- reform- of- the- medical- device- approval- process.
2 Deborah Gage and John McCormick, We Did Nothing Wrong: Case 109 A Dissection, https:// 
edisciplinas.usp.br/ pluginfile.php/ 31797/ mod_ resource/ content/ 1/ casoCancerPanama.pdf; 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Investigation of an Accidental Exposure of Radiotherapy Patients 
in Panama Report of a Team of Experts (26 May– 1 June 2001), https:// www- pub.iaea.org/ mtcd/ 
publications/ pdf/ pub1114_ scr.pdf; Cari Borrás, ‘Overexposure of radiation therapy patients in 
Panama: problem recognition and follow- up measures’ (2006) 20(2/ 3) Rev Panam Salud Publica/ Pan 
Am J Public Health 173.
5.183 The observations by Professor Leveson will invariably remain relevant: the 
Toyota recall exercise in late 2009 and early 2010 serves to illustrate this point.1 The 
US Congressional Committee on Energy and Commerce heard evidence on this matter, 
and a report by The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NHTSA– NASA), which conducted a study into 
the problem entitled ‘Study of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles’, a revised 
version of which was published on 15 April 2011,2 concluded that it was not proven 
that faulty software caused the problems, although it was accepted that just because 
no software faults could be found did not mean that software faults did not occur. The 
methods used to investigate this matter were challenged.3
1 A number of motor manufacturers are facing similar legal actions. It was known that sudden 
acceleration occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, for which see James Castelli, Carl Nash, Clarence Ditlow 
and Michael Pecht, Sudden Acceleration: The Myth of the Driver Error (University of Maryland, Calce 
EPSC Press 2003).
2 Available at http:// www.nasa.gov/ topics/ nasalife/ features/ nesc- toyota- study.html.
3 For which see Michael Barr, ‘Firmware forensics: best practices in embedded software source 
code discovery’ (2011) 8 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 148. For an earlier 
article, see Joel Finch, ‘Toyota sudden acceleration: a case study of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration recalls for change’ 22 Loy Consumer L Rev 472.
5.184 Civil proceedings were subsequently initiated by a number of people across 
the US. In Bookout v Toyota Motor Corporation,1 Michael Barr, an expert in embedded 
software, gave evidence for the plaintiff regarding the software code in the relevant 
motor vehicles. He was also cross- examined about aspects of the NHTSA Report, 
among other issues. His evidence demonstrated that there were a significant number 
of errors in the software (referred to as ‘bugs’ in the transcript):
Q. Did you find all the bugs in the software that you reviewed?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Why not?
A. Because there is a lot of bugs, and all indications are that there are many 













202 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
code complexity and a number of global variables, indicate the presence of large 
numbers of bugs. And just the overall style of the code is suggestive that there 
will be numerous more bugs that we haven’t found yet.2
1 Case No. CJ- 2008- 7969. The trial was held in the District Court of Oklahoma, County State of 
Oklahoma before the Hon Patricia G. Parrish, District Judge.
2 Transcript (not proofread) of the trial 14 October 2013 before the Hon Patricia G. Parrish, District 
Judge (Reported by Karen Twyford, RPR): examination and cross examination of Michael Barr, 47– 48, 
http:// www.safetyresearch.net/ Library/ Bookout_ v_ Toyota_ Barr_ REDACTED.pdf.
5.185 He also demonstrated that motor cars are now largely run by software. In fact, 
motor cars have more software code than aircraft, and are prone to software recalls.1 
Drivers no longer have total control over their vehicles.2 For instance, it was explained 
how the driver is no longer in direct control of the throttle:
But the driver had always been directly in control of the air, which is directly 
related to how much power the engine has. When electronic throttle control 
comes in, you have software that is now responsible for all three of them at once. 
So you have a portion of the software, the job of which is to make the spark at 
the right time, inject the fuel at the right time and the right amount, and open the 
throttle a certain amount.
…
The software in electronic throttle control is responsible for all three things, 
which means if the software malfunctions, it has control of the engine and can 
take you for a ride. What is of particular importance is that there is another part of 
the software that is looking at the driver controls, looking at the accelerator pedal 
and cruise control - - it is looking at more than that, but that is a simplification, 
that is appropriate right now - - so there is a part of the software looking at what 
the accelerator pedal position is, is it down, is it up, how much down. Then that 
is translating that into a calculated throttle angle. And then another part of the 
software is performing the sparking and the throttle control.3
1 Robert N. Charette, ‘This car runs on code’, IEEE Spectrum, 1 February 2009 http:// spectrum.
ieee.org/ transportation/ systems/ this- car- runs- on- code; Jürgen Mössinger, ‘Software in automotive 
systems publication’ (2010) 27(2) IEEE Software 92; ‘Today’s car has the computing power of 20 
modern PCs, features about 100 million lines of code, and processes up to 25 gigabytes of data per 
hour’: Connected Car, Automotive Value Chain Unbound (McKinsey & Company, September 2014), 11. 
https:// www.sas.com/ images/ landingpage/ docs/ 3_ McKinsey_ John_ Newman_ Connected_ Car_ Report.
pdf; James Scoltock, ‘As vehicles become more reliant on software, the amount of code needed to 
run them is challenging OEMs and suppliers alike’ Eureka Magazine, 1 February 2018, https:// www.
eurekamagazine.co.uk/ design- engineering- features/ technology/ as- vehicles- become- more- reliant- 
on- software- the- amount- of- code- needed- to- run- them- is- challenging- oems- and- suppliers- alike/ 
168096/ .
2 For which see the prosecution of a driver in Switzerland driving a Tesla motor vehicle in ‘Traffic- 
Aware Cruise Control’ and ‘Autosteer’ mode: PEN 17 16 DIP, 30 May 2018, Regionalgericht Emmental- 
Oberaargau, Strafabteilung (Regional Court Emmental- Oberaargau, Criminal Division), translated by 
Thierry Burnens, (2020) 17 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 97.
3 Transcript of the trial of 14 October 2013, 53.
5.186 Mr Barr established that the motor vehicle had errors in the throttle system:
A. So the first main conclusion is that the 2005 Camry electronic throttle control, 
the software is of unreasonable quality. It contains bugs, but that’s not the only 
reason it is of unreasonable quality. And it’s otherwise defective for a number of 
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Q. As we go forward are you going to explain to us how those problems that you 
found will cause an unintended acceleration?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you mentioned the code quality metrics. What do you mean about that?
A. So the code complexity and the McCabe Code Complexity is one of the 
measures of that.1 And the code complexity for Toyota’s code is very high. There 
are a large number of functions that are overly complex. By the standard industry 
metrics some of them are untestable, meaning that it is so complicated a recipe 
that there is no way to develop a reliable test suite or test methodology to test all 
the possible things that can happen in it. Some of them are even so complex that 
they are what is called unmaintainable, which means that if you go in to fix a bug 
or to make a change, you’re likely to create a new bug in the process. Just because 
your car has the latest version of the firmware – that is what we call embedded 
software – doesn’t mean it is safer necessarily than the older one.2
1 McCabe Code Complexity has no sound theoretical basis. It is a rule of thumb. I owe this point to 
Dr Michael Ellims.
2 Transcript of the trial of 14 October 2013, 65– 66.
5.187 Mr Barr stated his overall opinion in the following terms: ‘ultimately my 
conclusion is that this Toyota electronic throttle control system is a cause of 
[unintended acceleration] software malfunction in this electronic throttle module, 
can cause unintended acceleration.’1 The members of the jury found in favour of the 
plaintiffs, and awarded damages of US$1.5 million to each of the plaintiffs. The US 
Department of Justice subsequently concluded a criminal investigation into the Toyota 
Motor Company regarding the widespread incidents of unintended vehicle acceleration 
that caused panic for Toyota owners between 2009 and 2010. It was established with 
certainty that Toyota intentionally concealed information and misled the public about 
the safety issues behind these recalls.2 It was alleged that Toyota made misleading 
public statements to consumers, gave inaccurate facts to Members of Congress and 
concealed the extent of problems that some consumers encountered from federal 
regulators. For instance, Betsy Benjaminson, a translator for Toyota, realized what she 
was translating was highly significant:
She began working on Toyota litigation in 2010. Before then, she’d been 
‘oblivious’ to the events in the U.S., she says. Slowly she began to notice ‘odd 
things’ in documents she saw in connection with her role as translator. Revised 
press releases sometimes obscured important details, she says. Emails among 
engineers ‘revealed facts that directly contradicted’ Toyota’s public statements.
Then it got worse. She read reports about runaway cars, including survivors’ 
accounts of crashes that killed their companions. She was deeply affected. 
A ‘tipping point’ came when she read a document the company had prepared 
based on complaints filed with NHTSA. ‘A summary of the injuries and deaths 
was attached’, she recalls, ‘and it was cynically titled “Souvenirs from NHTSA”.’ 
For her, that was it. ‘At that moment,’ she says, ‘I knew something was really 
wrong inside the company.’ 3
1 Transcript of the trial of 14 October 2013, 67.
2 The literature on this topic in general merits further analysis, but is beyond the scope of this chapter: 
Suzanne M. Kirchhoff and David Randall Peterman, Unintended Acceleration in Passenger Vehicles 
(Congressional Research Service 7- 5700, R41205, 26 April 2010); R. Graham Esdale Jr and Timothy R. 
Fiedler, ‘Toyota’s deadly secrets’, 46- SEP Trial 16; Finch, ‘Toyota sudden acceleration’; Molly S. O’Neill, 
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scanned images from an unidentified book), available at http:// www.suddenacceleration.com/ article- 
2/ ; Scott Elder and Travis Thompson, ‘Recent development in automobile consumer class actions’ 41- 
FALL Brief 44; Katherine Gardiner, ‘Recent developments in automobile law’ 47 Tort Trial & Ins Prac 
LJ 45; Joseph Gavin, ‘Crash test dummies: what drives automobile safety in the United States?’ (2012) 
25 Loy Consumer L Rev 86; Maria N. Maccone, ‘Litigation concerning sudden unintended acceleration’ 
132 Am Jur Trials 305; Qi Van Eikema Hommes, ‘Review and Assessment of the ISO 26262 Draft Road 
Vehicle – Functional Safety’ (SAE Technical Paper 2012- 01- 0025, 2012); David C. Vladeck, ‘Machines 
without principals: liability rules and artificial intelligence’ 89 Wash L Rev 117; Aaron Ezroj, ‘Product 
liability after unintended acceleration: how automotive litigation has evolved’ 26 Loy Consumer L Rev 
470; Antony F. Anderson, ‘Intermittent electrical contact resistance as a contributory factor in the loss 
of automobile speed control functional integrity’ (2014) 2 IEEE Access 258; Antony F. Anderson, ‘Case 
study: NHTSA’s denial of Dr Raghavan’s petition to investigate sudden acceleration in Toyota vehicles 
fitted with electronic throttles’ (2016) 4 IEEE Access 1417.
3 David Hechler refers to Betsey Benjaminson, a translator who illustrated the mismatch in evidence 
when she informed the US authorities: ‘Lost in translation?’, 79, http:// www.asbpe.org/ blog/ 2014/ 07/ 
28/ david- hechler- wins- asbpes- 2014- stephen- barr- award- for- article- on- toyotas- fatal- acceleration- 
problems/ ; the Crown Prince was having troubles with his vehicle, which the manufacturer took pains 
to resolve: David McNeil, ‘Imperial Family’s car woes sparked Toyota whistleblower’, The Japan Times, 9 
June 2013, http:// www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/ 2013/ 06/ 09/ business/ corporate- business/ imperial- 
familys- car- woes- sparked- toyota- whistleblower/ #.WJ14B- l4j8s.
5.188 In its settlement with the Department of Justice, Toyota admitted its wrongdoing 
in making such misleading statements in the Statement of Facts filed with the criminal 
information, and also admitted that it undertook these actions as an act of concealment 
as part of efforts to defend its brand. In consequence, Toyota paid a financial penalty of 
US$1.2 billion under the settlement.1
1 http:// www.justice.gov/ usao- sdny/ programs/ victim- witness- services/ united- states- v- 
toyota- corporation.
Challenging the authenticity of digital data – trial  
within a trial
5.189 Laying the evidentiary foundations for the authenticity of electronic evidence is 
discussed elsewhere in this text, but if the authenticity of evidence is raised by one of 
the parties, it is appropriate to deal with it in a trial within a trial.1 This will be a rare 
occurrence, as noted in R. v Wayte (William Guy)2 by Bedlan J:
It may be that in very rare cases, there will have to be a trial within a trial on the 
issue of the admissibility … but on such an issue, where the party producing the 
document and arguing for its admissibility contends that it is genuine … the issue 
will invariably be left to the jury.3
1 Rosemary Pattenden, ‘Pre- verdict judicial fact- finding in criminal trials with juries’ (2009) 29(1) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1.
2 [1982] 3 WLUK 247, (1982) 76 Cr App R 110, CA, Times, 24 March 1982, [1983] CLY 659.
3 (1982) 76 Cr App R 110 at 118.
5.190 In R. v Stevenson (Ronald), R. v Hulse (Barry), R. v Whitney (Raymond),1 Kilner 
Brown J was required to establish whether audio tapes were originals. After a lengthy 
and careful examination of the evidence held in a trial within a trial, it became clear 
that there was an opportunity for someone to have interfered with the original tape, 
and there was evidence that some interference might have taken place. Given the 
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Once the original is impugned and sufficient details as to certain peculiarities 
in the proffered evidence have been examined in court, and once the situation 
is reached that it is likely that the proffered evidence is not the original, is not 
the primary and best evidence, that seems to be to create a situation in which, 
whether on reasonable doubt or whether on a prima facie basis, the judge is left 
with no alternative but to reject the evidence.2
1 [1971] 1 WLR 1, [1971] 1 All ER 678, [1970] 10 WLUK 82, (1971) 55 Cr App R 171, (1971) 115 SJ 
11, [1971] CLY 2264.
2 [1971] 1 WLR 1 at 3G.
5.191 In the case of R v Robson (Bernard Jack), R v Harris (Gordon Federick),1 the 
defence raised the issue of the admissibility of the evidence of 13 tape recordings. 
The judge had to consider whether, on the face of it, the tapes were authentic in the 
absence of the members of the jury. Shaw J heard evidence in a trial within a trial from 
a number of witnesses who gave evidence of the history of the tapes, from the actual 
process of recording to the time they were produced in court. He also listened to four 
experts called on behalf of the defence, whose examination of the tapes led them to 
question their originality and authenticity. The prosecution called a separate witness 
in rebuttal. After hearing the evidence, Shaw J decided that the tape recordings were 
originals and authentic, commenting that:
My own view is that in considering that limited question [the primary issue of 
admissibility] the judge is required to do no more than to satisfy himself that 
a prima facie case or originality has been made out by evidence which defines 
and describes the provenance and history of the recording up to the moment of 
production in court.2
1 [1972] 1 WLR 651, [1972] 2 All ER 699, [1972] 3 WLUK 89, (1972) 56 Cr App R 450, [1972] Crim 
LR 316, (1972) 116 SJ 313, [1972] CLY 642.
2 [1972] 1 WLR 651 at 653H.
5.192 Professor Tapper expressed the view that this exercise should be conducted 
first by the judge, and if, on the balance of probabilities, the judge determines the 
evidence could go before the jury, it would then be necessary to cover the same ground 
again in the same way as any other question of fact that must be decided at trial.1 
On the standard of proof to be used by the judge, O’Connor LJ indicated the criminal 
standard of proof is to be used in the context of handwriting,2 and in the case of R v 
Minors (Craig), R v Harper (Giselle Gaile),3 Steyn J, as he then was, set out the opinion of 
the Court of Appeal on this matter in relation to a computer printout:
The course adopted by the judge in one of the two appeals before us prompts 
us to refer to the procedure which ought to be adopted in a case where there is 
a disputed issue as to the admissibility of a computer printout. It is clear that in 
such a case a judge ought to adopt the procedure of embarking on a trial within 
a trial.4
1 Colin Tapper, Computer Law (4th edn, Longman 1989), 370; see also Rosemary Pattenden, 
‘Authenticating “things” in English law: principles for adducing tangible evidence in common law 
jury trials’ (2008) 12 E & P 273 and ‘Pre- verdict judicial fact- finding in criminal trials with juries’ 
(2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1; in the context of s 69 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, Professor Smith commented that during a trial within a trial, if a document is tendered by the 
prosecution, the standard is beyond reasonable doubt, and if tendered by the defence, the standard is 
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2 R. v Ewing (Terence Patrick) [1983] QB 1039, [1983] 3 WLR 1, [1983] 2 All ER 645, [1983] 3 WLUK 
125, (1983) 77 Cr App R 47, [1984] ECC 234, [1983] Crim LR 472, (1983) 127 SJ 390, Times, 15 March 
1983, [1983] CLY 63.
3 [1989] 1 WLR 441, [1989] 1 All ER 208, [1988] 12 WLUK 161, (1989) 89 Cr App R 102, [1989] 
Crim LR 360, (1989) 133 SJ 420, [1989] CLY 546.
4 [1989] 1 WLR 441 at 448.
5.193 He went on to indicate that the judge should apply the ordinary standard of 
criminal proof in reaching a decision, and in the case of R. v Neville,1 the members of the 
Court of Appeal also noted that trial judges ‘should examine critically any suggestion 
that a prior computer malfunction has any relevance to the particular computer record 
tendered in evidence’.2 The decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Minors (Craig, R v 
Harper (Giselle Gaile) to require a judge to apply the ordinary standard of criminal 
proof in reaching a decision when hearing evidence in a trial within a trial overrules the 
decision of Shaw J in R v Robson (Bernard Jack), R v Harris (Gordon Federick) (in which 
he reached an opinion that the standard was on a balance of probabilities3), although 
there is much to commend the view of Shaw J when he suggested that the prosecution 
need do no more than set up a prima facie case in favour of the authenticity of the 
evidence:
It may be difficult if not impossible to draw the philosophical or theoretical 
boundary between matters going to admissibility and matters going properly to 
weight and cogency; but, as I have already said, it is simple enough to make a 
practical demarcation and set practical limits to an inquiry as to admissibility if 
the correct principle is that the prosecution are required to do no more than set 
up a prima facie case in favour of it. If they should do so, the questioned evidence 
remains subject to the more stringent test the jury must apply in the context of 
the whole case, namely, that they must be sure of the authenticity of that evidence 
before they take any account of its content.4
1 [1990] 11 WLUK 143, [1991] Crim LR 288, [1991] CLY 623.
2 [1991] Crim LR 288, 289.
3 [1972] 1 WLR 651 at 656C; this standard was agreed by counsel on both sides at 653E.
4 [1972] 1 WLR 651 at 655H– 656A.
5.194 The standard that a judge must apply in determining the admissibility of a 
videotape was considered by Cameron JA in the Canadian case of R v Penney1 before the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal in 2002. In this instance, the prosecution 
sought to adduce evidence of the killing of marine animals. The evidence comprised 
a video recording of the killing of a seal. The recording had been frequently switched 
on and off as the operator of the camera selected scenes to record. The recording was 
filmed in mini- digital format, transferred to Beta format and then to VHS format. Before 
the Crown took possession of the tape, it had been in the possession of a professional 
editing studio for several months. There was no attempt to provide for the security of 
or to restrict access to the tape. The Crown called the camera operator and the owner 
of the company for whom the camera operator worked to give evidence during the 
trial within a trial. The trial judge concluded that the witnesses were not credible 
and failed to tell the truth. He therefore refused to admit the video recording in any 
format. The Crown appealed to the summary appeal conviction court, which allowed 
the appeal. A subsequent appeal to the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal 
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judge was restored. Cameron JA addressed the issue of the standard that a trial judge 
should apply in determining the admissibility of videotape evidence, indicating that:
The issue then is whether in making this finding the trial judge was usurping 
the role of the jury (or in this case the role of the judge at trial) or was properly 
carrying out the function of the judge on determination of the admissibility of 
hard evidence.2
1 (2002) 163 CCC (3d) 329.
2 (2002) 163 CCC (3d) 329 at [40].
5.195 He went on:
[43] In my view, this consideration is really a matter of weighing prejudice 
against probative value, in much the same way that a trial judge must examine 
many other kinds of evidence.
[44] It is the question of fairness and absence of any intention to mislead that is 
really at issue in this case. The trial judge on a voir dire must determine whether 
a videotape being offered in evidence has been edited in such a way as to distort 
the truth.
5.196 Reference was made to R v Nikolovski,1 which established that where a videotape 
has not been altered or changed, and where it depicts the scene of a crime, then it 
becomes admissible and relevant evidence.2 In R v Bulldog,3 the members of the Court 
of Appeal of Alberta considered this issue, and emphasized that ‘What matters with a 
recording, then, is not whether it was altered, but rather the degree of accuracy of its 
representation’.4 In R v Penney, the judge addressed the problem of the falsification 
of evidence by pointing out that the members of a jury ‘can be expected to have, if 
not experience with, knowledge of the possibilities for manipulating the content of 
photographs and videotapes’, and concluded that the ‘standard by which the trial judge 
is to determine the question is on the balance of probabilities’.5
1 (1996) 111 CCC (3d) 403, [1996] 3 SCR 1197 403.
2 In R. v Andalib- Goortani, 2014 ONSC 4690 (CanLII), the prosecution failed to establish the 
authenticity of a digital image obtained from the Internet: the metadata had been removed, and it was 
not possible to ascertain the provenance of the image.
3 2015 ABCA 251 (CanLII); 326 CCC (3d) 385; [2015] AJ No 813 (QL).
4 2015 ABCA 251 (CanLII) at [32].
5 (2002) 163 CCC (3d) 329.
5.197 If the standard of proof of a trial within a trial is the criminal standard, it can be 
argued that the prosecution is required to prove its case twice: once to the trial judge 
and a second time before the members of the jury. Arguably, the duty of the trial judge 
is to sift the evidence sufficiently to establish whether it is to go before the members of 
the jury in cases where the authenticity of the evidence is questioned by the defence.
A protocol for challenging software in devices and systems
5.198 Should it become the norm for the defence to challenge the authenticity 
of evidence in digital form, it is suggested that consideration might be given to the 
development of a protocol to deal with such challenges:
(1) First, in criminal proceedings, the prosecution should be required to inform 
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(2) Where the prosecution demonstrates reliance is warranted (with appropriate 
evidence), it will be for the defence to warn the trial judge that it will question the 
use of the presumption, in particular the authenticity of identified aspects of the 
evidence, and to set out the grounds upon which the challenge is made.1
1 To a certain extent this might be already happening, for which see Oriola Sallavaci, ‘Streamlined 
reporting of forensic evidence in England and Wales: is it the way forward?’ (2016) 20(3) E & P 235.
5.199 Such an approach would be entirely consistent with the trial management 
procedures set out in Part 3, rule 3.3(2)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 
(as amended). If this first hurdle is overcome, then it will be for the trial judge to decide 
whether a trial within a trial is necessary, and if so, to set out the parameters, including 
the standard of proof, for which a ruling is required.
5.200 There is something missing in the suggestion noted above regarding criminal 
proceedings: there is no discussion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence the 
defence must adduce to persuade a judge to order appropriate disclosure.1 Professor 
Imwinkelried has also considered this problem,2 and has proposed a two- step process, 
the first part of which is:
Faced with competing legitimate interests, a trial judge must attempt to strike 
a rational balance. In this context, the judge could do so by proceeding in two 
steps. First, a judge should assign to the accused seeking discovery the burden of 
showing that the facts of the instant prosecution exceed, or are at the margins of, 
the validation range of the empirical studies relied on by the prosecution. More 
specifically, the defendant must convince the judge that the available studies do 
not adequately address the effect of a specified, material variable or condition 
present in the instant case. The most clear- cut case would be a fact situation in 
which none of the available studies relied on by the prosecution experts tested 
the application of the technique to fact situations involving the condition.3
1 There are profound concerns relating to the disclosure (or discovery) of evidence in both civil 
and criminal proceedings. For the USA, see Matt Tusing, ‘Machine- generated evidence’, 43 No 1 The 
Reporter 13; Katherine Kwong, ‘The algorithm says you did it: the use of black box algorithms to 
analyze complex DNA evidence’ (2017) 31 Harv JL & Tech 275; Vera Eidelman, ‘The First Amendment 
case for public access to secret algorithms used in criminal trials’ (2018) 35 Ga St U L Rev 915; Sonia 
K. Katyal, ‘The paradox of source code secrecy’ (2019) 104 Cornell L Rev 1183; Rebecca Wexler, 
’Life, liberty, and trade secrets: intellectual property in the criminal justice system’ (2018) 70 Stan 
L Rev 1343, in which the author considers the history of the trade secret privilege, uncovering 
an interesting development where it was demonstrated that Wigmore was initially hostile to the 
privilege (at 1383), but his opinion later changed. He admitted in an aside that his brother had 
suffered loss relating to intellectual piracy (at 1385); Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Susan Landau 
and Brian Owsley, ‘Seeking the source: criminal defendants’ constitutional right to source code’ 
(2021) 17(1) Ohio State Tech LJ 38.
2 Edward J. Imwinkelried, ‘Computer source code: a source of the growing controversy over the 
reliability of automated forensic techniques’ (2017) 66 DePaul L Rev 97.
3 Imwinkelried, ‘Computer source code’, 128.
5.201 Professor Imwinkelried then indicates, at 128, that ‘The judge should certainly 
not accept the ipse dixit assertion of the defense counsel that the omitted condition is 
material in the sense that its presence could affect the outcome of the test’. Providing 
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Even then the judge should not automatically require the manufacturer to furnish 
the defense with a printout or electronic version of the source code. Instead, the 
judge could give the manufacturer a choice to: either (1) allow the defense to test 
the application of the program to a fact situation including the material condition 
or variable omitted from the validation studies, or (2) provide the defense with 
the source code.
5.202 Professor Imwinkelried points out, as 129, that:
At the end of this first step, the judge is not licensing a fishing expedition of 
unlimited scope; rather, the judge is authorizing discovery designed to meet 
a discrete defense criticism of the state of the empirical record in order to 
determine whether the technique can be reliably applied to the facts in the 
pending case.
5.203 There are criticisms of this proposal. Professor Martyn Thomas has pointed 
out that an argument or proposal that depends on the outcome of testing to provide 
evidence of the correctness or of the specific, required reliability of some software 
is almost always based on erroneous or unverified assumptions.1 At the very least, it 
should always be challenged by the following questions:
(1) How many tests will be enough to satisfy the required threshold of confidence 
in the evidence?
(2) How and on what assumptions will the applicant arrive at that number 
of tests?
(3) What is the procedure to be used to test the software and to verify the test 
results?
(4) On what assumptions can this be achieved within a practical period of time?
1 Email communication between the author and Professor Thomas CBE.
5.204 The answers to these questions will either reveal a fundamental flaw or provide 
the basis for challenging the assumptions. In addition, it is not clear how ‘reliable’ a 
court requires a forensic test to be. If a forensic system was known to be right more than 
half the time and randomly wrong otherwise, the question is whether a single positive 
result will pass the on- the- balance- of- probabilities requirement for a civil case.
5.205 As all judges are only too well aware, there is a danger that the trial judge may 
be seen to usurp the functions of the members of the jury in reaching preliminary 
decisions on authenticity when conducting a trial within a trial. Marshall J, in delivering 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of R. v Ali (Maqsud), R. v Hussain (Ashiq),1 
indicated that conducting a trial within a trial should be a rare occurrence:
In the view of this court the cases must be rare where the judge is justified in 
undertaking his own investigation into the weight of the evidence, which, subject to 
proper directions from the judge, is really the province of the jury, but the court sees 
that there can be cases – but they must be rare – where the issues of admissibility 
and weight can overlay each other.2
1 [1966] 1 QB 688, [1965] 3 WLR 229, [1965] 2 All ER 464, [1965] 4 WLUK 27, (1965) 49 Cr App R 
230, (1965) 129 JP 396, (1965) 109 SJ 331, [1965] CLY 796.
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5.206 This restricted view was reinforced by the comments in R. v Stevenson (Ronald), 
R. v Hulse (Barry), R. v Whitney (Raymond)1 of Kilner Brown J:
as a general rule it seems to me to be highly undesirable, and indeed wrong for such 
an investigation to take place before the judge. If it is regarded as a general practice 
it would lead to the ludicrous situation that in every case where an accused person 
said that the prosecution evidence is fabricated the judge would be called upon to 
usurp the functions of the jury.2
1 [1971] 1 WLR 1, [1971] 1 All ER 678, [1970] 10 WLUK 82, (1971) 55 Cr App R 171, (1971) 115 SJ 
11, [1971] CLY 2264.
2 [1971] 1 WLR 1 at 4E.
5.207 Where the matter of authentication is raised, the trial judge is required to decide 
whether to conduct a trial within a trial. Where the decision is made to hold a trial within 
a trial, it will be useful for the judge to set out the scope of the hearing. In R v Robson 
(Bernard Jack), R v Harris (Gordon Federick), Shaw J said that where such a hearing takes 
place, it should be defined narrowly.1 This must be right.
1 [1972] 1 WLR 651 at 655H.
5.208 In respect of the costs of such an exercise, in R. v Saward (Steven Kevin), R. v Bower 
(Steven Kevin), R. v Harrison (Keith),1 the prosecution sought the admission of recordings 
of telephone conversations that were intercepted by the Dutch police and stored on a CD. 
The judge was invited to conduct a trial within a trial to determine whether or not the data 
recorded on the CD, transferred from a mainframe computer located in the Netherlands, 
was admissible in evidence as authentic, accurate and a reliable copy. The trial within a 
trial lasted for four days, and a number of witnesses, including British officers and a Dutch 
police officer, were called to give evidence. Lady Justice Hallett commented, at [44], on the 
costs of such an exercise:
Given the evidence available to the Crown we also have reservations about the 
profitability of the four day exercise of putting the Crown to strict proof of the 
exhibit. All of those involved in the conduct of criminal trials must be aware by now 
of the constraints upon resources and we are far from persuaded that this was a 
proper use of limited resources.
1 [2005] EWCA Crim 3183, [2005] 11 WLUK 351.
5.209 The defence drew a number of errors in the CD recording to the attention of the 
trial judge, and it was only right that this issue should be considered.
5.210 When collecting electronic evidence, the investigator needs to pay careful 
attention to the process by which the evidence was obtained, and to demonstrate the 
provenance of the evidence. In R. v Skinner (Philip),1 the defence called into question 
evidence of screen images obtained by a police constable when conducting an 
investigation into indecent photographs of children. During the trial within a trial, the 
police officer gave evidence that he had a ‘source’ for the screen images. He admitted 
entering a website that he was not prepared to identify, and could only provide limited 
information about the provenance of the material he produced for the purposes of 
the investigation: namely, images that appeared on screen that were produced in the 
form of a printout. He refused to name or identify the website he had entered. It was 
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the evidence. First, the members of the Court accepted that it was probable that the 
screen images were real evidence, because their content did not require any computer 
input, and likened the image to somebody switching on a television set. However, the 
printouts were not authenticated properly under the provisions of s 27 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, and for that reason, the trial judge should not have admitted them. 
Second, there was no public interest immunity hearing to enable the judge to decide 
whether the prosecution need not disclose or need not give evidence as to the process 
by which the screen image reached the police officer, or in the absence of a proper 
explanation, how the screen image came to be on the police officer’s computer. It was 
conceded that a public interest immunity hearing should have been requested, and in 
such circumstances the trial judge was wrong to admit the evidence.
1 [2005] EWCA Crim 1439, [2005] 5 WLUK 506, [2006] Crim LR 56.
Reintroduction of the common law presumption
5.211 The Law Commission proposed the repeal of s 69 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 and a return to the common law presumption:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume that mechanical 
instruments were in order at the material time.1
1 Section 69 ceased to have any effect under s 60 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999, and s 69 was also repealed by Schedule 6; the Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: 
Hearsay and Related Topics, 13.13; Katie Quinn, ‘Computer evidence in criminal proceedings: farewell 
to the ill- fated s.69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984’ (2001) 5(3) E & P 174; Amanda Hoey, 
‘Analysis of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, s.69 – computer generated evidence’ [1996] 1 Web 
JCLI.
5.212 The grounds for justification were set out in paragraphs 13.7 – 13.11, and are 
reproduced below with the references omitted:
The problems with the present law
13.6 In the consultation paper we came to the conclusion that the present law was 
unsatisfactory, for five reasons.
13.7 First, section 69 fails to address the major causes of inaccuracy in computer 
evidence. As Professor Tapper has pointed out, ‘most computer error is either 
immediately detectable or results from error in the data entered into the 
machine.’1
13.8 Secondly, advances in computer technology make it increasingly difficult 
to comply with section 69: it is becoming ‘increasingly impractical to examine 
(and therefore certify) all the intricacies of computer operation’. These problems 
existed even before networking became common.2
13.9 A third problem lies in the difficulties confronting the recipient of a computer 
produced document who wishes to tender it in evidence: the recipient may be in 
no position to satisfy the court about the operation of the computer. It may well 
be that the recipient’s opponent is better placed to do this.
13.10 Fourthly, it is illogical that section 69 applies where the document is 
tendered in evidence, but not where it is used by an expert in arriving at his or 
her conclusions, nor where a witness uses it to refresh his or her memory. If it 
is safe to admit evidence which relies on and incorporates the output from the 
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conversely, if it is not safe to admit the output, it can hardly be safe for a witness 
to rely on it.
13.11 At the time of the publication of the consultation paper there was also 
a problem arising from the interpretation of section 69. It was held by the 
Divisional Court in McKeown v DPP that computer evidence is inadmissible if it 
cannot be proved that the computer was functioning properly – even though the 
malfunctioning of the computer had no effect on the accuracy of the material 
produced. Thus, in that case, computer evidence could not be relied on because 
there was a malfunction in the clock part of an Intoximeter machine, although 
it had no effect on the accuracy of the material part of the printout (the alcohol 
reading). On appeal, this interpretation has now been rejected by the House of 
Lords: only malfunctions that affect the way in which a computer processes, 
stores or retrieves the information used to generate the statement are relevant 
to section 69.
1 Ladkin and others, ‘The Law Commission presumption concerning the dependability of computer 
evidence’ (commented on this citation by the Law Commission, at 3: ‘We were surprised to read Tapper’s 
suggestion that the Tapper Condition categorises “most computer error”, even allowing that he was 
writing in 1991. Reading the original paper, it seems to us as if Professor Tapper was not categorising 
“most computer error” in unqualified terms, but rather considering particular phenomena that are 
manifest in the use of one specific sort of IT system, namely systems commonly used for clerical work 
(maybe, more specifically, for legal- clerical work). The Tapper Condition does not appear to hold in 
general.’
2 It may be the case that computer technology made it increasingly difficult to comply with the 
provisions of s 69, but this is not an argument to presume that mechanical instruments were in order 
at the material time. Professor Les Hatton, in his article ‘The chimera of software quality’ 103, stated 
that:
computer programs are fundamentally unquantifiable at the present stage of knowledge, and we 
must consider any proof based on them flawed until we can apply the same level of verification to 
a program as to a theorem.
Scientific papers are peer reviewed with a long- standing and highly successful system. The 
computer programs we use today to produce those results generally fly somewhere off the peer- 
review radar. Even worse, scientists will swap their programs uncritically, passing on the virus of 
undiscovered software faults.
That the peer review process is successful is debatable – the scientific community itself has raised 
concerns about the various biases that afflict the selection and review processes of scientific 
papers and their eventual publication.
5.213 Curiously, the authors of the report did not produce any evidence to establish 
whether it is generally true in the absence of contrary evidence that ‘mechanical 
instruments were in order at the material time’. There was no evidence to demonstrate 
that software code should benefit from this assertion. There was also no discussion 
of what is meant by ‘in order’. This is an important issue, bearing in mind that the 
presumption is a presumption without the requirement of proof of a basic fact.1 There 
was a great deal of technical material in the 1970s and 1980s to demonstrate that 
software errors might not be obvious. Indeed, in 1986 Professor Rudolph J. Peritz 
noted the following (footnotes omitted):
[to] grant greater credibility to computerized records … because they have not 
been touched by ‘the hand of man’ succumbs to two delusions. First, it is the hands 
and intellects of men and women that produce computers and the programs that 
guide them. To believe that the absence of direct physical contact means that 
records are untouched betrays a naive view of electronic data processing, one 
that ignores the centrality of humans to any computer system’s functioning. 
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human reckoning … It ignores, for example, the great dangers of traceless change 
and unauthorized access, as well as the benefits of having the proponent present 
evidence to prove systemic accuracy.
…
Throughout law’s intellectual history, scholars and jurists have sought 
methodological objectivity to justify legal decision making … The jurisprudential 
lure of computer technology is a perceived absence of discretion. Once designed, 
built, and programmed, the machinery objectively executes the will of its 
creators, and thus is perceived as trustworthy. But closer scrutiny reveals, at 
best, a paradox of complete submission and complete autonomy. A computer 
performs relentlessly just as we have designed and programmed it, and in so 
doing, it is entirely independent of us. Computerized records also are treated as 
trustworthy for a second reason— because the technology is perceived as error- 
free. Moreover, even on those exceptional occasions of technological failure, we 
believe, a computer will still inform us that an error has occurred. In sum, we 
have come to believe that unacknowledged error and subjectivity are not only 
undesirable, but also indigenous to the human domain.
But experience can teach us that such idealization of technology is a mirage that 
obfuscates the overlapping horizons of humans and computers, as well as their 
distinctive characteristics. In the human drama of litigation, better attention to 
the pragmatic jurisprudence of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as to the 
thoughtful practice recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigation, can help 
to dispel such harmful illusions. The concrete result of this attention will be the 
extension to the objecting party and to the court of a fair opportunity to evaluate 
the trustworthiness of all documents generated from computerized data.2
1 Quinn, ‘Computer evidence in criminal proceedings’, 182.
2 Rudolph J. Peritz, ‘Computer data and reliability: a call for authentication of business records 
under the federal rules of evidence’, 1001– 1002; at the time of writing this article, Professor Peritz 
was a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and had worked with 
computers since 1962 as a programmer, operator, systems engineer and legal consultant. He was fully 
conversant with the errors regarding software code that occurred regularly.
5.214 In England and Wales, s 69 was subsequently repealed,1 and a similar reform 
was adopted with respect to evidence in electronic form for civil proceedings with 
the passing of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. It is suggested that the presumption, as 
set out above, that ‘mechanical instruments were in order at the material time’ 
remains far too crude an assumption to apply to computers. The authors of the 
Law Commission Report cite excellent reasons as to why the criminal law might be 
amended, but the proponents of the presumption should establish what they mean by 
the term ‘mechanical instruments were in order at the material time’ when referring 
to computers or computer- like devices. A fundamental problem is caused by the fact 
that software errors can be present (in large numbers), but not observable in use until 
a specific situation is encountered.2 For example, the ‘Shellshock’ vulnerability (CVE- 
2014- 62713) had been dormant since 1989 in a program called Bash, which was used 
in Unix systems for years.
1 By s 60 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
2 Stephen Castell, ‘Computers trusted, and found wanting’ (1993) 9(4) Computer Law and Security 
Report 155; Castell, ‘Letter to the editor’, 158 – the views expressed by Dr Castell, despite their age, 
remain valid; Student Comment, ‘A reconsideration of the admissibility of computer- generated 
evidence’ (1977) 126(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 425; George L. Paul, ‘Systems of 
evidence in the age of complexity’ (2014) 12(2) Ave Maria L Rev 173.
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5.215 Various challenges have been made in criminal proceedings as to the accuracy of 
speed measuring devices and breath analysis machines. Such devices rarely undergo a 
catastrophic failure, but they will drift from being accurate, which means a recalibration 
is necessary from time to time. Such devices continue to be the subject of challenge. 
This topic is not dealt with in any depth, because the aim of this chapter is to discuss the 
fragility of software code in particular, although the drift or wearing out of components 
can of itself be a cause of software error if the software was never designed to cope with 
the changes that occur in such circumstances.1 With rare exceptions, such challenges 
have failed. For instance, in the case of Darby (Yvonne Beatrice) v DPP2 the assertions of 
a police officer familiar with the use of such a device was held to be sufficient evidence 
to sustain the finding that the device was working correctly,3 although where the 
legislation requires the date and time at which a specimen was provided to be printed 
on the printout and the date is incorrect, the machine is not considered to be capable 
of being ‘reliable’.4 This is supported by the comments of Kourakis and Blue JJ of the 
Supreme Court of South Australia in Police v Bleeze, who stated that ‘an evidential basis 
for the presumption of accuracy of a scientific instrument, in a proper case, may be 
given by a person who, even though not a scientist with expertise in the machine’s 
technology, is properly trained in its operation’.5
1 For the early history of case law, see ‘The breathalyser’ by A Magistrates’ Clerk, (1970) 34 The 
Journal of Criminal Law 206, and for a later analysis, see C. E. Bazell, ‘Challenging the breathalyser’ 
(1988) 52 Journal of Criminal Law 177 and F. G. Davies, ‘Challenging the accuracy of the breath- test 
device’ (1988) 52 Journal of Criminal Law 280; Ian R. Coyle, David Field and Graham A. Starmer, ‘An 
inconvenient truth: legal implications of errors in breath alcohol analysis arising from statistical 
uncertainty’ (2010) 42(2) Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 101; for a discussion based on the 
USA, including an indication of the technical problems relating to fixed speed cameras, see Steven A. 
Glazer, ‘Those speed cameras are everywhere: automated speed monitoring law, enforcement, and 
physics in Maryland’ (2012) 7(1) Journal of Business & Technology Law 1.
2 [1994] 10 WLUK 343, [1995] RTR 294, (1995) 159 JP 533 (DC), Times, 4 November 1994, [1994] 
CLY 674.
3 Extensive tests have indicated that many pieces of software widely used in science and engineering 
are not as accurate as imagined (thus affecting the accuracy of the output), and whether a police officer 
who has no knowledge of software code is capable of determining such a complex point is debatable: 
Les Hatton, ‘The T experiments: errors in scientific software’ (1997) 4(2) IEEE Computational Science 
& Engineering 27.
4 Slender v Boothby [1984] 11 WLUK 234, [1985] RTR 385, [1984] 149 JP 405, [1986] CLY 2951; 
‘The paradox of the reliable device’ (1986) 50 Journal of Criminal Law 13– 15.
5 [2012] SASCF 54 at [89]; for an earlier case with evidence from three witnesses, see R v Ciantar; 
DPP v Ciantar [2006] VSCA 263.
5.216 In New Zealand, Harvey J summarized the position regarding evidence of 
mechanical or technological devices in R v Good, although no evidence was proffered 
to substantiate the assumptions built into the presumption:
(a) There is a presumption that mechanical instruments or technological devices 
function properly at the relevant time.
(b) Judicial notice will be taken of the output of a notorious or well- known 
technology. Evidence of the way in which it works to establish that it is based on 
sound scientific principles is not required.
(c) New or novel technologies will not receive judicial notice. Expert evidence is 
required to explain the operation of the technology and the scientific principles 
upon which it is based. Authority seems to suggest that problems have arisen 
when technologically based evidence has been adduced without undertaking the 
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(d) There is no rule of law which says that the reliability of the device is a 
precondition to admissibility. In either situation set out in (a) or (b) above the 
evidence is admissible – it is for the fact finder to assess weight.
(e) In some cases the presumption of accuracy of a technological device will be 
created by statute. The manner in which the technology is operated may have an 
impact upon the weight to be attributed to its output.
(f) In some cases devices may, as a result of their own processes, create a record 
which is admissible. (R v Spiby (1990) 91 Cr App R 186, (1991) Crim LR 199).
(g) However, if there is human intervention in the performance of such processes 
either at the input, output or any intermediate stage, hearsay issues may arise, 
although in some cases exceptions to the hearsay rule may apply.
(h) Whether or not there is unfairness in the process of acquiring or dealing with 
the evidence is a recognized common law ground to test admissibility and may 
be available upon the facts of each case. That is a matter primarily of human 
behaviour and is not intrinsically part of the technology.1
1 [2005] DCR 804 at [70].
5.217 Proof that computers are presumed to work properly must rest with the 
proponent. The term ‘computers’ is used solely to reinforce the point that a computer 
or computer- like device is far more sophisticated than any pure mechanical machine, 
and such devices only work because a human being has written code to allow it to 
function. No evidence has been adduced to demonstrate the accuracy of such a 
presumption. One type of computer differs remarkably from another, and each will be 
controlled by software written by different people of varying degrees of competence to 
address problems of varying degrees of complexity and difficulty.1
1 For a discussion of software and the complex issues that affect devices used by the medical 
profession, see Sylvia Kierkegaard and Patrick Kierkegaard, ‘Danger to public health: medical devices, 
toxicity, virus and fraud’ (2013) 29 Computer Law and Security Review 13; Steven Hanna, Rolf Rolles, 
Andrés Molina- Markham, Pongsin Poosankam, Kevin Fu and Dawn Song, ‘Take two software updates 
and see me in the morning: the case for software security evaluations of medical devices’ in Proceedings 
of the 2nd USENIX Conference on Health Security and Privacy (USENIX Association Berkeley, California, 
2011).
5.218 Thus the assertion that all computers are presumed to be working properly 
(whatever this means) cannot be right. It is to say that all motor cars, regardless of 
quality, are reliable – which they demonstrably are not (although it is acknowledged 
that most motor cars are generally reliable). In the view of George L. Paul, ‘Just 
because businesses rely on faulty computer programs does not necessarily mean that 
courts should follow suit’,1 although in People of the State of Colorado v Huhen Vogt J 
considered that ‘computer business records have a greater level of trustworthiness 
than an individually generated computer document’2 without providing an authority, 
other than to quote from Colorado Evidentiary Foundations3 that ‘computers are so 
widely accepted and used that the proponent of computer evidence need not prove 
those two elements of the foundation’.
1 George L. Paul, Foundations of Digital Evidence (American Bar Association 2008), 129; Gordon v 
Thorpe [1985] 10 WLUK 38, [1986] RTR 358, [1986] Crim LR 61, [1986] CLY 2950, where two experts 
gave evidence of the accuracy or otherwise of a Lion Intoximeter 3000.
2 53 P.3d 735 (Colo.App. 2002) at 737.
3 Roxanne Bailin, Jim England, Pat Furman and Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Colorado Evidentiary 
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The statutory presumption
5.219 Mention might usefully be made of the powers conferred upon the Secretary of 
State by s 7(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, by which a Minister may approve the 
use of breathalyser devices.1 The view of the courts is illustrated in Richardson v DPP,2 
in which Stanley Burnton J noted that ‘The device so approved is assumed to be an 
effective and sufficiently accurate device for the purposes of section 5(1)(a), and that is 
the end of the matter’.3 The effect is to create a statutory presumption for breathalyser 
devices. He went on to indicate that if the device and software approved in 1998 had 
since changed, that was not relevant:
On the face of it, therefore, it would seem that a device which did not include 
the Intoximeter EC/ IR Gas Delivery System, by way of example, or the software 
version of which was not UK5.23, but some significantly different version, would 
not be an approved device. It does not follow from that that every modification 
to an Intoximeter takes it out of the approval. Far from it. The alteration must be 
such, in my judgment, that the description in the schedule to the order no longer 
applies to it.4
1 ‘Approval of breath test device’ (1968) 32 The Journal of Criminal Law 255; ‘Trying times for 
breath testers’ (1969) 33 The Journal of Criminal Law 106; ‘Proof of approval of “Alcotest” ’ (1969) 33 
The Journal of Criminal Law 168; ‘Proof of approval by letter’ (1969) 33 The Journal of Criminal Law 
204; ‘Judicial notice of Alcotest’ (1970) 34 The Journal of Criminal Law 107.
2 [2003] EWHC 359 (Admin), [2003] 2 WLUK 596.
3 [2003] EWHC 359 (Admin) at [6] .
4 [2003] EWHC 359 (Admin) at [9] ; identical comments were made by Robert Goff LJ in R v Skegness 
Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte Cardy [1985] RTR 49 at 61.
5.220 In Fearnley v Director of Public Prosecutions,1 Mr Justice Field observed that:
Whilst the defence statement purports to put the prosecution specifically to 
proof that the software was UK 5.23, this did not mean that the prosecution had 
specifically to prove this matter. This is because of the general presumption that 
flows from the fact that the machine was of a type that had been approved,2 this 
being a presumption which in my view is plainly consistent with Article 6 ECHR. 
Thus, it was for the appellant to adduce some evidence that the software was 
otherwise than the specified software before the prosecution came under a burden 
to prove the software. At no stage did the appellant raise or adduce such evidence 
and therefore he can have no substantial complaint that the prosecution were 
allowed to provide specific proof of the software through the engineer’s report.3
1 [2005] EWHC 1393 (Admin), [2005] 6 WLUK 191, (2005) 169 JP 450, (2005) 169 JPN 735, Times, 
6 July 2005, [2005] CLY 729.
2 Illustrating a confusion between common law and statutory presumption.
3 [2005] EWHC 1393 (Admin) at [34].
5.221 In Kemsley v DPP,1 Buxton LJ stated the opinion of the court on this matter:
The statutory presumption as to approval of a particular device was conclusive 
as to the correctness of that device. That point does not now appear in this case, 
and should not appear in any case in the future.2
1 [2004] EWHC 278 (Admin), [2004] 2 WLUK 65, (2005) 169 JP 148, (2005) 169 JPN 239, [2005] 
CLY 874.
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5.222 In DPP v Wood, DPP v McGillicuddy,1 Ouseley J indicated that if the breath test 
device is approved, it is therefore reliable: ‘There is a common law presumption that 
the breath test device, if type approved, is reliable.’2 Alternatively, where a device is 
weighted in favour of the accused, it is not an improper use of the device.3 The same 
position is held in cases relating to speed measuring devices,4 although if the road 
markings that are placed on the road to provide a scale for the digital device to measure 
speed are not the correct distance apart, the device will give a false reading.5 This 
approach might be appropriate, given that the accused can agree to have a sample of 
blood taken, and at the same time a copy sample of the blood is provided to the accused. 
Analysis of the blood is more accurate, and the blood sample can thus be analysed 
by the police and independently by a person on behalf of the accused.6 If this option 
is taken up by the accused, the evidence is more compelling, although consideration 
must be given to the deterioration of the blood sample.7 Lord Hughes offered a further 
rationale in Public Prosecution Service v McKee Public Prosecution Service,8 where the 
appellants had their fingerprints taken at the police station using an electronic device 
called Livescan. A match was subsequently made, which the Crown relied upon at trial. 
Livescan devices were in general use in Northern Ireland from 2006 and throughout 
the period 2007– 2009 when statutory type approval was required by article 61(8B) of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989,9 although approval 
was never granted. The appeal was dismissed. Of relevance in this context are the 
remarks by Lord Hughes:
The control fingerprints taken from the appellants in the police station were not 
snapshots. The impressions which their fingers provided could be reproduced 
at any time afterwards, and would be the same. The accuracy of the Livescan 
readings, if disputed, could readily be checked independently by the appellants 
providing more samples, whether by ink and paper or by any other means, for 
examination by an independent expert.10
1 [2006] EWHC 32 (Admin), [2006] 1 WLUK 326, (2006) 170 JP 177, [2006] ACD 41, (2006) 170 JPN 
273 (2006) 170 JPN 414, (2006) 156 NLJ 146, Times, 8 February 2006, [2006] CLY 951.
2 [2006] EWHC 32 (Admin) at [2] ; also noted by Mr Justice Cresswell at [43] in DPP v Brown (Andrew 
Earle), DPP v Teixeira (Jose) [2001] EWHC Admin 931, [2001] 11 WLUK 426, (2002) 166 JP 1, [2002] 
RTR 23, Times, 3 December 2001, [2002] CLY 733.
3 Ashton v DPP [1995] 6 WLUK 298, (1996) 160 JP 336, [1998] RTR 45, Times, 14 July 1995, 
Independent, 10 July 1995, [1995] CLY 4416; for a discussion of other cases and the reverse burden of 
proof, see Ian Dennis, ‘Reverse onuses and the presumption of innocence: in search of principle’(2005) 
Dec Crim LR 901; David Hamer, ‘The presumption of innocence and reverse burdens: a balancing act’ 
(2007) 66(1) CLJ 142; P. M. Callow, ‘The drink- drive legislation and the breath- alcohol cases’ (2009) 10 
Crim LR 707.
4 Section 20 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 as amended; Griffiths v DPP [2007] EWHC 619 
(Admin), [2007] 3 WLUK 572, [2007] RTR 44, [2007] CLY 3537.
5 Bill Gardner, ‘Driver defeats speeding ticket with tape measure’, The Telegraph (London, 15 
December 2014) https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/ uknews/ road- and- rail- transport/ 11294579/ 
Driver- defeats- speeding- ticket- with- tape- measure.html.
6 Judges will not permit devices to be tested, and do not require the police to disclose details of 
the maintenance of machines. This leaves a defendant, when challenging the accuracy of a breath test 
device, the option of having their blood or urine tested, for which see Hughes v McConnell [1986] 1 All 
ER 268, [1985] 2 WLUK 235, [1985] RTR 244, [1985] CLY 3055, applying Snelson v Thompson [1984] 
10 WLUK 254, [1985] RTR 220, [1985] CLY 3058.
7 As noted by Mr Justice Newman at [8] in Dhaliwal v DPP [2006] EWHC 1149 (Admin), [2006] 3 
WLUK 459, also known as R. (on the application of Dhaliwal) v DPP; the position is similar in South 
Australia: Police v Bleeze [2012] SASCF 54, although the timing of the taking of the blood sample might 
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8 [2013] UKSC 32, [2013] 1 WLR 1611, [2013] 3 All ER 365, [2013] NI 133, [2013] 5 WLUK 542, 
[2013] 2 Cr App R 17, [2014] Crim LR 77, Times, 18 June 2013, [2013] CLY 3289, also known as Public 
Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland v Elliott.
9 1989 No. 1341 (NI 12); article 61(8B) was repealed by the Policing and Crime Act 2009 (s 26), ss 
112(1)(2), 116(6), Sch 7 para 128(2), Sch 8 Pt 13.
10 [2013] UKSC 32 at [15].
5.223 Lord Hughes rejected the analogy between the Livescan device and speed guns 
and breathalysers. The latter device records an action that cannot be subsequently 
remeasured. Unlike a breath test, the digital data comprising the impressions of the 
fingerprints were reproducible, and further tests could be carried out. For this reason, 
it is argued, it is appropriate to expect the device to produce reliable evidence, which 
in turn infers that such devices have been investigated and approved by the relevant 
authorities.
5.224 In essence, this is what the defendants tried to achieve in R v Skegness 
Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte Cardy.1 In the absence of the right to obtain discovery as it 
was then called, solicitors for the accused sought to obtain relevant documents for the 
purpose of challenging the reliability of the Lion Intoximeter 3000 device by issuing 
witness summonses. Robert Goff LJ, as he then was, described the witness summonses 
as a means to obtain the discovery of documents, which was not permitted. Correct as 
this decision was, the judge commented on several occasions2 that, in the judgment 
of the court, the documents that the defendants sought to obtain were not likely to be 
of material relevance, but failed to give any reason as to why such a conclusion was 
reached, given that some of the records that were requested included details of the 
microprocessor program and the standard operating procedures, which were highly 
relevant. The judge also indicated3 that the court had been assured (it is not clear by 
whom) that the Home Office constantly monitored the device, and that if the devices 
were not reliable, the Secretary of State would not have approved their use.4 In effect, 
the court was presuming the ‘reliability’ of such devices because the Secretary of State 
had so provided.
1 [1984] 12 WLUK 244, [1985] RTR 49, [1985] Crim LR 237, (1985) 82 LSG 929, [1985] CLY 3046; 
see also R v Coventry Magistrates’ Court Ex p. Perks [1984] 7 WLUK 215, [1985] RTR 74, [1985] CLY 
3051.
2 [1985] RTR 49 at 57F, 57J– K, 58B– C, 58J and 59A.
3 [1985] RTR 49 at 60J.
4 [1985] RTR 49 at 61F– G.
5.225 Where the defence is not given the opportunity to understand how such a 
device is constructed, and how new versions of software affect the accuracy of the 
device, defendants are not, it seems, permitted to obtain any evidence to challenge the 
‘reliability’ or ‘accuracy’ of the machine. The failure to provide for the proper scrutiny 
of electronic evidence and the emphasis on relying on the assurances of the owner 
or user of the digital device means that the ‘reliability’ or ‘accuracy’ of these devices 
cannot be readily challenged in English courts.
Challenging the presumption
5.226 To sum up the thrust of this chapter, when considering the ‘reliability’ of 
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before them to cite the technical literature regarding the ‘reliability’ of computers. They 
reach their conclusions on this issue in the absence of relevant knowledge.1 In essence, 
judges conclude that because a system or device appears to do what is expected of 
it, notwithstanding the opponent’s challenge, they are satisfied that such systems 
or devices are ‘reliable’.2 In effect, the bench has incorrectly made the presumption 
into a legal presumption that reallocates the burden of proof on the party opposing 
the presumption. It is only if the party opposing the presumption succeeds that the 
relying party is required to discharge the legal burden in relation to the ‘reliability’ of 
the machine, and therefore the authenticity or integrity and the trustworthiness of the 
evidence.3
1 For instance, see Bryan H. Choi, ‘Crashworthy code’ 94 Wash L Rev 39.
2 By way of example, see the conclusion by Walsh J in Her Majesty the Queen v Dennis James Oland, 
2015 NBQB 245.
3 For a consideration of this point, see Daniel Seng and Stephen Mason, ‘Artificial intelligence and 
evidence’ (2021) 33 SAcLJ 241.
5.227 It is possible to challenge the authenticity of electronic evidence in a number 
of ways, although many reported cases appear to indicate that a lawyer will do so on 
what might appear to be somewhat slender grounds,1 and the judge will then have 
to determine whether to conduct a trial within a trial (if a criminal case) to receive 
evidence on the point. For instance, in R. v Coultas (Kiera),2 the accused was convicted 
of dangerous driving. Evidence from the defendant’s mobile telephone indicated that 
she was probably writing a text message when she collided and killed the cyclist. 
Counsel for the defendant asserted, without any foundational evidence, that there was 
some fault in the network coverage that would demonstrate that the defendant was 
probably not writing a text message at the material time. Rix LJ accepted that if such an 
issue had been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings, it would have been a matter 
for the Crown to cover, but there was nothing about this in the defence statement and 
the issue was not relevant at appeal.3 In The People v Lugashi,4 the defence argued that 
the prosecution had, in effect, to disprove the possibility of error before digital records 
of credit card fraud were admitted. Ortega J said that the ‘proposed test incorrectly 
presumes computer data to be unreliable’,5 which does not follow. However, the 
appeal on this point was dismissed on a number of grounds, one of which was that the 
appellant did not challenge the accuracy of the information recorded in the printout.
1 Although a letter from the defence to the prosecution putting the validity of the information of 
a machine in issue is not sufficient in New Zealand: Police v Scott 30/ 5/ 97, HC Rotorua AP89/ 96 – a 
decision that must be right and probably would be followed in other jurisdictions.
2 [2008] EWCA Crim 3261, [2008] 9 WLUK 352.
3 [2008] EWCA Crim 3261 at [21].
4 205 Cal.App.3d 632 – Ortega J reviewed relevant case law up to the date of this judgment, 27 
October 1988.
5 205 Cal.App.3d 632 at 640.
5.228 The problem for the lawyer making the challenge is that only the party in 
possession of the digital data has the ability to understand fully whether the computer 
or computers from which the evidence was extracted can be trusted. The authors of the 
Law Commission paper Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics 
point out that a party might rely on evidence from a computer owned or controlled by 
a third party that is not a party to the proceedings. However, this should not prevent 
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challenges. Reed and Angel indicate that there are two broad arguments that can be 
pursued:
1. Where the party adducing the evidence does so to prove the truth of the output, 
it may be that the other party will challenge the accuracy of the statement by 
proposing that the computer, or computer- like device, exhibited faults, errors or 
other forms of failure that might have affected the integrity and trustworthiness 
of the evidence, and thus its reliability. The reliability of the computer program 
that generated the record may be questioned. In addition, there might be a fault 
with the hardware.
2. The conduct of a third party (this phrase is meant to be construed widely to 
include any person who does not have the authority to alter how a computer 
or computer- like device operates, other than the way it is intended to operate) 
generated the faults, errors or other forms of failure that might have affected 
the integrity and trustworthiness of the evidence, and thus its reliability. For 
instance, this can include a claim that the records were altered, manipulated, or 
damaged between the time they were created and the time they appear in court 
as evidence, or the identity of the author may be in dispute: the person identified 
as being responsible for writing a document in the form of a word processing file 
may dispute they wrote the text, or it might be agreed that an act was carried out 
and recorded, but at issue could be whether the person alleged to have used their 
PIN, password or clicked the ‘I accept’ icon was the person that actually carried 
out the action.1
1 Chris Reed and John Angel, The Law and Regulation of Information Technology (6th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2007), 596; the following analysis closely follows that of Reed and Angel, and the 
author is indebted to them.
5.229 The first argument was considered in the case of DPP v McKeown (Sharon), 
DPP v Jones (Christopher)1 over the inaccuracy of a clock in a Lion Intoximeter 30002 
and whether the inaccuracy of the clock affected the facts relied upon as produced by 
the device, which was otherwise in working order. The court concluded that if there 
was a malfunction, it was only relevant if it affected the way in which the computer 
processed, stored or retrieved the information used to generate the statement tendered 
in evidence. This must be right. Regarding breathalyser cases, in Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) v Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court3 Sir Brian Leveson P 
gave the judgment, and illustrated what the courts expected from the defence:
[54] … there must be a proper evidential basis for concluding that the material 
sought is reasonably capable of undermining the prosecution or of assisting the 
defence, or that it represents a reasonable line of enquiry to pursue.
55. … It is not enough to say that the defence case is that the amount drunk 
would not put the defendant over the limit or anywhere near it, and therefore 
the machine must be unreliable. What the evidence needed to do, in order to 
provide a basis for such a disclosure order was to address two critical features.
56. The first requirement is the basis for contending how the device might 
produce a printout which, on its face, demonstrated that it was operating in 
proper fashion, but which could generate a very significantly false positive 
reading, where, on the defence case, the true reading would have been well below 
the prosecution limit. The second requirement is to identify how the material 
which was sought could assist to demonstrate how that might have happened. 
Those are the two issues which arise and which the expert evidence in support 
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58. … unless the disclosure application addresses the two questions which we 
have identified, this extensive disclosure would have to be given in every case 
in which a defendant alleged that his alcohol consumption had been too low 
to sustain a positive reading, and in effect proof of reliability would always be 
required and the presumption of accuracy would be displaced.
1 [1997] 1 WLR 295, [1997] 1 All ER 737, [1997] 2 WLUK 386, [1997] 2 Cr App R 155 (HL), (1997) 
161 JP 356, [1997] RTR 162, [1997] Crim LR 522, (1997) 161 JPN 482, (1997) 147 NLJ 289, Times, 21 
February 1997, Independent, 7 March 1997, [1997] CLY 1093; Philip Plowden, ‘Garbage in, garbage 
out – the limits of s 69 of the PACE Act 1984’ (1997) 61 Journal of Criminal Law 310; for an earlier case 
where the defence challenged the accuracy of the Intoximeter printout, see Ashton v DPP, [1995] 6 
WLUK 298, (1996) 160 JP 336, [1998] RTR 45, Times, 14 July 1995, Independent, 10 July 1995, [1995] 
CLY 4416; ‘Ashton v DPP’ (1996) 60 Journal of Criminal Law 350.
2 The range of approved devices constantly alters, but the case law relating to older devices remains 
relevant. For a more detailed discussion, see the most up- to- date edition of Wilkinson’s Road Traffic 
Offences, Sweet & Maxwell.
3 [2017] EWHC 3719 (Admin), [2019] WLR 2617, [2017] 7 WLUK 154 also known as DPP v 
Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court; see also DPP v Walsall Magistrates’ Court [2019] EWHC 
3317 (Admin), [2019] 12 WLUK 61, [2020] RTR 14, [2020] Crim LR 335, [2020] ACD 21, [2020] 5 CL 
43; Peter Hungerford- Welch, ‘Disclosure: DPP v Walsall Magistrates’ Court; DPP v Lincoln Magistrates’ 
Court QBD (DC): Lord Burnett LCJ and May J: 5 December 2019; [2019] EWHC 3317 (Admin)’ (2020) 
4 Crim LR 335; for a speeding case regarding an approved measurement device, an LTi 20.20 Ultralyte 
1000, with a Ranger system to make a video record of the use of the device and its results, see R (on the 
application of DPP) v Crown Court at Caernarfon [2019] EWHC 767 (Admin), [2019] 3 WLUK 830.
5.230 Where the evidential burden has been successfully raised to challenge an 
aspect of the digital data (whether it be its integrity or reliability),1 then the persuasive 
burden will be on the party denying any error to prove the computer (normally the 
software), computer- like device or computer system is not at fault, thus demonstrating 
its reliability, integrity and trustworthiness and therefore the authenticity of the 
evidence tendered. One test is to determine how many important or critical updates 
of the software were made available and downloaded before the material time, and 
whether, if such updates were downloaded, they had a detrimental effect on the 
subsequent operation of the software. Claimants face a considerable problem with 
ATM cases because so much can go wrong, and it can be difficult to raise sufficient 
evidence to shift the burden: an outsider or a bank employee might have subverted 
the system, or a part of the system, or a hardware device forming part of the ATM 
network (or a cloned card is used) in such a way that money is stolen from the account 
of an individual.2 In such circumstances, the electronic record adduced to prove the 
transaction may be perfectly reliable – what will be at issue is how the thief subverted 
the network to steal the money. In the case of Marac Financial Services Ltd v Stewart,3 
Master Kennedy- Grant observed:
The use of computers for the recording of transactions on accounts such as the 
cash management account in this case is sufficiently well established for there to 
be a presumption of fact that such computers are accurate.4
1 As in Young v Flint [1986] 4 WLUK 218, [1987] RTR 300, [1988] CLY 3120, where the defence 
wished to cross- examine the witness respecting modifications made to the device to determine 
whether the machine ceased to be an approved device.
2 Ken Lindup, ‘Technology and banking’; Roger Porkess and Stephen Mason, ‘Looking at debit and 
credit card fraud’ (2012) 34(3) Teaching Statistics 87.











222 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
4 [1993] 1 NZLR 86, [40]. Examples of where banks have not been found to be fully in control of their 
systems include Patty v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] FCA 1072, Industrial Relations Court 
of Australia VI- 2542 of 1996; United States of America v Bonallo, 858 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1988); Kumar 
v Westpac Banking Corporation [2001] FJHC 159; Sefo v R [2004] TOSC 51; R v Clarke [2005] QCA 483.
5.231 Master Kennedy- Grant did not provide any evidence to substantiate this 
statement.
‘Working properly’
5.232 The Law Commission made comments about the presumption in Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics at 13.14:
Where a party sought to rely on the presumption, it would not need to lead 
evidence that the computer was working properly on the occasion in question 
unless there was evidence that it may not have been – in which case the party 
would have to prove that it was (beyond reasonable doubt in the case of the 
prosecution, and on the balance of probabilities in the case of the defence).
5.233 Three significant problems occur with the judicial comments on this topic: first, 
that there is no definition of what is meant by ‘working properly’. A computer might be 
working ‘properly’ but not in the way an owner expects, and a third party can instruct a 
computer to do things that the owner neither authorizes nor is aware of. Second, it will 
not always be obvious whether the reliability of the evidence generated by a computer 
is immediately detectable without recourse to establishing whether there is a fault in 
the software code.
5.234 The third problem is that the presumption asserts something positive. The 
opposing party is required to raise a doubt in the absence of relevant evidence from 
the program or programs that are relied upon. In criminal proceedings, this has the 
unfair effect of undermining the presumption of innocence – subverting any article 6 
rights under the European Convention of Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 
1998 that the accused might have – and in civil proceedings the party challenging the 
presumption must convince a judge to order up the delivery of the relevant evidence, 
including software code, if the evidence is to be tested properly.
5.235 There is no authoritative judicial guidance in relation to the meaning of the 
words ‘reliable’, ‘in order’ or ‘working properly’ in the context of digital data. It is 
possible to refer to system reliability, interpreted broadly, as a measure of how a 
system matches the expectations of the user, but this view is problematic, because 
the expectations may be mistaken and can change arbitrarily, sometimes based on 
the user’s experience. A more narrow definition is to define reliability in relation 
to the success with which a system provides the specified service.1 Professor 
Randell and colleagues illustrate the conundrum: ‘It is of course to be hoped that 
the reliance placed on a system will be commensurate with its reliability.’ Herein lies 
the rub: ‘Notions of reliance, therefore, can be as much bound up with psychological 
attitudes as with formal decisions regarding the requirement that a system is 
supposed to satisfy.’2 The authors continue:
In fact, the history of the development of computers has seen some fascinating 
interplay between reliance and reliability. The reliability of early computers 
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least until appropriate checks had been performed. Even less reliance was placed 
on the continuity of their operation – lengthy and frequent periods of downtime 
were expected and tolerated. As reliability increased so did reliance, sometimes 
in fact outdistancing reliability so that additional efforts had to be made to reach 
previously unattained reliability levels. During this time computing systems were 
growing in size and functional capacity so that, although component reliability 
was being improved, the very complexity of systems was becoming a possible 
cause of unreliability, as well as a cause of misunderstandings between users and 
designers about system specification.3
1 Randell and others, ‘Reliability issues in computing system design’, 123.
2 Randell and others, ‘Reliability issues in computing system design’, 124.
3 Randell and others, ‘Reliability issues in computing system design’, 124. That IT projects invariably 
cost more than estimated, overrun and sometimes fail to be implemented is a notorious fact. A citation 
(or citations) is not necessary.
5.236 In considering a number of examples of reliability issues, Professor Randell 
indicates that the design of software is inextricably intertwined with the other factors 
that are responsible for the failure of computer projects:1
reliability is a commodity whose provision involves costs, either direct, or arising 
from performance degradation. In theory, the design of any nontrivial computing 
system should involve careful calculations of trade- offs between reliability, 
performance, and cost. In practice the data and relationships which would be 
needed for such calculations in complex systems, are quite often unknown, 
particularly with regard to unreliability caused by residual design faults.2
1 For a more detailed treatment of the causes of the failure of projects, see Glass, Software Runways; 
Planning Report 02- 3 The Economic Impacts of Inadequate Infrastructure for Software Testing, 
prepared by RTI for the National Institute of Standards & Technology (May 2002), https:// www.nist.
gov/ system/ files/ documents/ director/ planning/ report02- 3.pdf; Charette, ‘Why software fails’, 42.
2 Randell and others, ‘Reliability issues in computing system design’, 127.
5.237 Linden pointed out that reliability ‘means not freedom from errors and faults, 
but tolerance against them. Software need not be correct to be reliable’,1 and Denning 
indicated that although ‘reliability, in the sense of error tolerance, has long been sought 
in operating system software, it has always been difficult to achieve’.2 Responsible 
practice will often include processes such as the maintenance and review of defect 
records, and testing or requalification of an upgrade before it is distributed: these 
are some of the issues about which questions can be legitimately asked by a party in 
seeking to question the presumption of ‘reliability’.
1 Peter J. Denning, ‘Fault tolerant operating systems’ 8(4) ACM Computing Services 359, 361.
2 Denning, ‘Fault tolerant operating systems’, 359.
Concluding remarks
5.238 It is proposed that the proponents of a presumption that computers and 
computer systems ‘were in order at the material time’ should state what is meant by 
such a proposition if it is to remain – if they are able to, given the notion that computers 
are ‘reliable’ has finally been exposed as erroneous.1 In Holt v Auckland City Council, 















224 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
The results depend on the manner in which it is programmed. And there is no 
basis on which the Court could take judicial notice of the manner in which this 
equipment was programmed and maintained. Evidence was necessary to justify 
reliance on the computer print out.2
1 Ladkin and others, ‘The Law Commission presumption concerning the dependability of computer 
evidence’; Ladkin, ‘Robustness of software’; Jackson, ‘An approach to the judicial evaluation of evidence 
from computers and computer systems’.
2 [1980] 2 NZLR 124 at 128 (35– 40).
5.239 It does not appear that any thought has been given to demonstrating what the 
proposition means. The Law Commission specifically commented on the contrary 
argument made by David Ormerod, now Professor Ormerod, to their proposal to repeal 
s 69. Professor Ormerod ‘contended that the common law presumption of regularity 
may not extend to cases in which computer evidence is central’.1 This comment by 
Professor Ormerod must be right.
1 Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics at 13.16.
5.240 In Scott v Baker,1 Lord Parker CJ and his brother judges rejected the argument 
of the prosecution that there was a presumption that where an alcohol measuring 
device was used by the police, it therefore followed that the device was approved by 
the Secretary of State. The Law Commission agreed that this presumption must have 
been applicable to the Intoximeter cases, and yet noted that this had not been raised in 
previous cases. They then went on, at 13.17, to state (footnote omitted):
It should also be noted that Dillon was concerned not with the presumption 
regarding machines but with the presumption of the regularity of official action. 
This latter presumption was the analogy on which the presumption for machines 
was originally based; but it is not a particularly close analogy, and the two 
presumptions are now clearly distinct.
1 [1969] 1 QB 659, [1968] 3 WLR 796, [1968] 2 All ER 993, [1968] 5 WLUK 42, (1968) 52 Cr App 
R 566, (1968) 132 JP 422, (1968) 112 SJ 425, [1968] CLY 3428; ‘Divisional court cases breath tests: 
approval of Device Scott v. Baker’ (1958) 32 The Journal of Criminal Law 151.
5.241 Professor Ormerod referred to Dillon1 for the point that the prosecution is 
not entitled to rely on a presumption to establish facts central to an offence, and it 
is essential for the prosecution to prove, on the facts of Dillon, the lawfulness of the 
prisoner’s detention by affirmative evidence.2 In his article, Professor Ormerod argued 
that where evidence in digital form is fundamental, such as in bank frauds, it will be 
necessary to require specific proof of reliability. This proposition must be correct: the 
presumption on its own cannot bear the weight of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
1 Dillon v R [1982] AC 484, [1982] 2 WLR 538, [1982] 1 All ER 1017, [1982] 1 WLUK 749, (1982) 74 
Cr App R 274, [1982] Crim LR 438, (1982) 126 SJ 117, [1982] CLY 547.
2 David Ormerod, ‘Proposals for the admissibility of computer evidence’ (1995) 6(4) Computers 
and Law 24.
5.242 In the absence of evidence that such a presumption can possibly apply to 
such complex objects as computers and computer systems, it is suggested that any 
presumption that a computer or computer- like machine is working properly be guided 
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be incorporated within the evaluation of the presumption.1 It cannot be right to infer 
‘reliability’ from reliance.
1 The Model Law on Electronic Evidence (Commonwealth Secretariat 2017) https:// thecommon 
wealth.org/ sites/ default/ files/ key_ reform_ pdfs/ P15370_ 7_ ROL_ Model_ Bill_ Electronic_ Evidence_ 
0.pdf also refers to ‘reliability’ at 2: ‘The Group agreed that system reliability is the most sensible 
measurement’, and article 7 and 7(a) provides for the presumption that the integrity of the electronic 
records system is working properly – as is normal with such pronouncements, no evidence was put 
forward to substantiate this assertion.
5.243 As it stands, the presumption places an evidential burden (in reality, as noted 
above, it is a legal burden) on the party opposing the presumption, as described by 
Tipping J: ‘The accused must be able to point to a sufficient evidential foundation 
for the suggestion that the device was unreliable in the relevant sense, before being 
entitled to have the point considered by the jury. If there is such a foundation, the 
Crown must establish reliability beyond reasonable doubt’1 and careful consideration 
ought to be given to the hurdle a party must overcome in order to meet the evidential 
burden. In this respect, the defence was correct to challenge the evidence of the CD 
which contained the intercepted recordings in R. v Saward (Steven Kevin), R. v Bower 
(Steven Kevin), R. v Harrison (Keith),2 because had the prosecution more thoroughly 
ensured the continuity of the evidence, it is possible the defence may not have had a 
legitimate objection. In Scott v Otago Regional Council, Heath J indicated that cross- 
examination of relevant points can be sufficient to put the point in issue, which must 
be right (although the cross- examination might more usefully have also considered 
questioning how many software updates were provided by the manufacturer of the 
product that corrected faults):
No evidence was offered about the reliability of the computer and software used 
to establish that they were ‘of a kind that ordinarily [do] what a party asserts 
[them] to have done’.3 Mr Reeves offered no evidence that he had used the 
programme successfully in the past and had found it to be working normally. Nor 
was there any independent evidence to explain how the computer programme 
worked and what it could reliably be expected to do. In a prosecution such as this, 
Mr Andersen’s cross- examination of Mr Reeves was sufficient to put the point in 
issue.4
1 R v Livingstone [2001] 1 NZLR 167 at [13].
2 [2005] EWCA Crim 3183, [2005] 11 WLUK 351.
3 Where the basic fact of the presumption is not satisfied, the presumption fails.
4 CRI 2008- 412- 17- 20, High Court Dunedin, 3 November 2008, [2008] Your Environment 392; 31 
TCL 48/ 8 at [33].
5.244 The Law Commission indirectly discussed ‘reliability’ at para 13.18, Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics, but only by referring to the possibility 
of a ‘malfunction’. The entire discussion seems to be predicated upon machines used to 
test the amount of alcohol a person has consumed, rather than the very much broader 
range of computers and computer- like devices that are in common use:
Even where the presumption applies, it ceases to have any effect once evidence 
of malfunction has been adduced. The question is, what sort of evidence must the 
defence adduce, and how realistic is it to suppose that the defence will be able to 
adduce it without any knowledge of the working of the machine? On the one hand 
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to produce more by way of evidence than one in his or her position could be 
expected to produce. It could therefore take very little for the presumption to 
be rebutted, if the party against whom the evidence was adduced could not be 
expected to produce more.
5.245 The comments by Lord Hoffmann in DPP v McKeown (Sharon), DPP v Jones 
(Christopher),1 in which he offered the opinion that ‘It is notorious that one needs no 
expertise in electronics to be able to know whether a computer is working properly’,2 
can be considered to be the extreme view that will not be shared by any computer 
experts – or indeed lay people. His comment is not merely dangerous but also vacuous. 
It is like saying that you do not need to know the chemistry of ink to know whether 
writing works. This is not relevant, because you can still write nonsense, regardless of 
the chemical properties of the ink. It is noticeable that paragraph 432 of the Explanatory 
Notes to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 indicated that, in respect of testimony under 
s 129(1):
This section provides where a statement generated by a machine is based on 
information implanted into the machine by a human, the output of the device will 
only be admissible where it is proved that the information was accurate.
1 [1997] 1 WLR 295, [1997] 1 All ER 737, [1997] 2 WLUK 386, [1997] 2 Cr App R 155 (HL), (1997) 
161 JP 356, [1997] RTR 162, [1997] Crim LR 522, (1997) 161 JPN 482, (1997) 147 NLJ 289, Times, 21 
February 1997, Independent, 7 March 1997, [1997] CLY 1093.
2 [1997] 1 All ER 737 at 743b.
5.246 Here the emphasis is on the accuracy of the information as an input to the 
computer, not whether the computer was working consistently, or to put it another way, 
whether the system was not working in accordance with an expectation, or the ability 
of the computer to return generally verifiably correct results. The problem is that Lord 
Hoffmann considered the issue from the opposite perspective: an assumption that the 
computer is working properly because of what the user can see, not what an unknown 
third party does not want them to see, or attempts to prevent anyone from seeing and 
understanding what else the computer is doing without the knowledge of the owner 
or user.
5.247 As a matter of admissibility, it is necessary that proof that a computer, computer- 
like device or network (comprising many computers and modes of communication) 
was ‘in order’ at the material time – indeed, in England and Wales, s 129(2) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 preserves the common law position:
129 Representations other than by a person
(1) Where a representation of any fact— 
(a) is made otherwise than by a person, but
(b) depends for its accuracy on information supplied (directly or 
indirectly) by a person, the representation is not admissible in 
criminal proceedings as evidence of the fact unless it is proved that the 
information was accurate.
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of the presumption that a 
mechanical device has been properly set or calibrated.1
1 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (Law Com 
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5.248 That software is notorious for being the subject of defects leads to a somewhat 
uneasy state of affairs. It cannot be right to presume that a machine (in particular a 
computer, computer- like device or network) was ‘in order’ (whatever that means) or 
‘reliable’ at the material time. The proponents of the presumption have not provided 
any evidence to demonstrate the accuracy of this assertion. Evidence in digital form 
is not immune from being affected by the faults in software written by human beings. 
The use of the words ‘operating properly’ illustrates the misconceptions described in 
this chapter.
5.249 The lack of any evidence to support the proposition is especially relevant in the 
light of the underlying rationale of evidence. In A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in 
the Search for Truth,1 Professor Hock Lai Ho demonstrates that the finder of facts acts 
as a moral agent, and central to this is that the findings by a court must be justifiable, 
and meet the demands of rationality and ethics.2 When read in the light of the unique 
characteristics of evidence in digital form, the rationale of the evidential process takes 
on an even more relevant role. This is because the factors and subsequent analysis 
have an added poignancy when taking into account the complexity of electronic 
evidence: the potential volumes of evidence, the difficulty of finding evidence, 
persuading the judge to order additional searches or to order the disclosure of relevant 
digital data, the ease with which electronic evidence can be destroyed, the costs of such 
exercises, the lawyer’s lack of knowledge when dealing with this form of evidence and 
the presumption that computers are ‘reliable’ or ‘working properly’. In this respect, 
the inadequacy of the procedure leading to trial brought about by an incomplete 
understanding and application of the presumption may cause unfairness.
1 Oxford University Press 2008.
2 Note the article by Louis Kaplow, ‘Burden of proof’ (2012) 121 Yale LJ 738, in which the author 
considers how robust the evidence ought to be in order to assign liability when the objective is to 
maximize social welfare.
5.250 The question is whether the presumption is to remain in its misunderstood 
form as a legal presumption. The failure of its proponents to provide evidence that 
the presumption has any basis in fact is a strong indication that it does not merit 
being in place, and any argument in favour of the proposition ought to clearly 
indicate why banking systems, manufacturers of motor vehicles, aircraft and medical 
devices – to name but a few – should be rewarded by such a presumption. In addition, 
the innumerable examples of the failure of software outlined in this chapter, and other 
failures that are constantly brought to our attention by the media, as well as the failures 
we witness ourselves in our everyday lives, act to challenge why software code should 
benefit from such a presumption. This is particularly so when evidence in digital form 
is more likely to be open to challenge, as illustrated above.
5.251 In addition, considering that the presumption is only an evidential presumption, 
the bar for raising doubts about the reliability or otherwise of a computer, computer- 
like device or network must not be placed too high.1 For instance, in DPP v Wood, DPP 
v McGillicuddy Ouseley J indicated (in respect of the Intoximeter EC/ IR):
The nature and degree of an alleged unreliability has to be such that it might be 
able to throw doubt on the excess in the reading to such an extent that the level 
of alcohol in the breath might have been below the level at which a prosecution 
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1 Sergey Bratus, Ashlyn Lembree and Anna Shubina, ‘Software on the witness stand: what should 
it take for us to trust it?’ in Alessandro Acquisti, Sean Smith and Ahmad- Reza Sadeghi (eds) Trust 
and Trustworthy Computing: Proceedings of the Third International Conference, TRUST 2010, Berlin, 
Germany, 21– 23 June 2010 (Springer- Verlag 2010), 396– 416.
2 [2006] EWHC 32 (Admin) at [36].
5.252 However, as indicated by Eric Van Buskirk and Vincent T. Liu:
The Presumption of Reliability is difficult to rebut. Unless specific evidence is 
offered to show that the particular code at issue has demonstrable defects that 
are directly relevant to the evidence being offered up for admission, most courts 
will faithfully maintain the Presumption of Reliability. But because most code is 
closed source and heavily guarded, a party cannot audit it to review its quality. 
At the same time, however, source code audits are perhaps the best single way 
to discover defects.
This difficulty gives rise to an important question: if a party cannot gain access 
to source code without evidence of a defect, but cannot get evidence of a defect 
without access to the source code, how is a party to rebut the Presumption? 
Rather than wrestle with, or even acknowledge, this conundrum, most courts 
simply presume that all code is reliable without sufficient analysis. (Footnotes 
omitted.) 1
1 Van Buskirk and Liu, ‘Digital evidence: challenging the presumption of reliability’, 20.
5.253 This view is illustrated in the case of State of Florida v Bastos,1 an appeal before 
the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, where Cope J held that source 
code for an Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test machine used in the defendants’ cases was 
not ‘material’ within the meaning of the provisions of the uniform law to secure the 
attendance of witnesses from within or outside a state in criminal proceedings. The 
judge went on to say:
However, we cannot accept the proposition that simply because a piece of 
testing equipment is used in a criminal case, it follows that the source code 
for its computer must be turned over. There would need to be a particularized 
showing demonstrating that observed discrepancies in the operation of the 
machine necessitate access to the source code. We are unable to see that any 
such evidence was brought forth in the evidentiary hearing below.2
1 985 So.2d 37 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2008). In State of North Carolina v Marino, 747 S.E.2d 633 (N.C.App. 
2013), the court refused to accept that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, 192 (2004), nor that the decision in Melendez– Diaz 
v Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310– 11, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, 321– 22 (2009) stood for the 
proposition that a defendant had a right under the Sixth Amendment to examine the Intoximeter 
source code. But see In re Commissioner of Public Safety v Underdahl, 735 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 2007) 
and State of Minnesota v Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009), where it was held that an order 
that the Commissioner of Public Safety provide Mr Underdahl with an operational Intoxilyzer 5000EN 
instrument and the complete computer source code for the operation of the device was affirmed partly 
on the basis that the State had possession or control of computer source code for the purposes of 
discovery.
2 985 So.2d 37 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2008) at 43.
5.254 The party contesting the presumption will rarely be in a position to offer 
significant evidence to substantiate any challenge1 because the party facing the 
challenge will generally (but not always) be in full control of the computer or computer 
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reinforced with any evidence will not be sufficient, for which see Burcham v Expedia, 
Inc.,3 and a theory that is ‘incredible’ should not require the court to consider the 
matter in any detail.4 The lack of evidence for raising doubts about the presumption is 
not helpful, for which see Public Prosecution Service v McGowan.5 From the perspective 
of criminal procedure, it must be right that the defence should give the prosecution 
advance notice that they intend to challenge the device, as suggested in R. v Crown 
Prosecution Service Ex p. Spurrier6 by Newman J:
As a matter of general rule, I can see no reason why the defence should not be 
taken to be required, of course on pain of paying the costs of an adjournment 
if that proves to be necessary, to give some notice in advance of the trial of the 
grounds upon which a claim that the device was defective will be advanced.7
1 For an interesting discussion that includes the burden in the context of authentication, see 
Rudolph J. Peritz, ‘Computer data and reliability: a call for authentication of business records under the 
federal rules of evidence’, 965– 1002.
2 It is becoming increasingly common for organizations and individuals to rely on third parties to 
provide computing facilities through what is termed ‘cloud computing’ by the technical community; for 
a detailed explanation, see Stephen Mason and Esther George, ‘Digital evidence and “cloud” computing’ 
(2011) 27(5) Computer Law & Security Review 524.
3 2009 WL 586513.
4 For which see Novak d/ b/ a PetsWarehouse.com v Tucows, Inc., 73 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 331, 2007 WL 
922306 affirmed Novak v Tucows, Inc., 330 Fed.Appx. 204, 2009 WL 1262947.
5 [2008] NICA 13, [2009] NI 1.
6 [1999] 7 WLUK 431, (2000) 164 JP 369, [2000] RTR 60, Times, 12 August 1999, [1999] CLY 883, 
also known as DPP v Spurrier.
7 [2000] RTR 60, 68 item (6).
5.255 The evidence of relevant audits is also of significance, such as where John 
Rusnak forged trades in a Word document and an audit failed to indicate the forgery;1 
and where Nick Leeson forged data that was not noticed by audits.2 The importance 
of audits was glaringly revealed in A and others (Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 2008).3 Following Cobb J’s judgment in E (Assisted Reproduction: Parent), Re,4 the 
HFEA (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority) required all 109 licensed 
clinics to carry out an audit of their records. It transpired that 51 clinics (46 per cent) 
had discovered ‘anomalies’ in their records, including missing forms, forms completed 
or dated after treatment had begun, incorrectly completed, unsigned and not fully 
completed forms, forms with missing pages, and even forms completed by wrong 
persons.5 Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, had this to say:
The picture thus revealed … is alarming and shocking. This is, for very good 
reason, a medical sector which is subject to detailed statutory regulation and the 
oversight of a statutory regulator – the HFEA. The lamentable shortcomings in 
one clinic identified by Cobb J, which now have to be considered in the light of the 
deeply troubling picture revealed by the HFEA audit and by the facts of the cases 
before me, are, or should be, matters of great public concern. The picture revealed 
is one of what I do not shrink from describing as widespread incompetence 
across the sector on a scale which must raise questions as to the adequacy if not 
of the HFEA’s regulation then of the extent of its regulatory powers.6
1 Siobhán Creaton and Conor O’Clery, Panic at the Bank: How John Rusnak Lost AIB $691,000,000 
(Gill & Macmillan 2002), 96– 97.
2 Nick Leeson with Edward Whitley, Rogue Trader (Sphere 2013), 117, 120– 121, 239; see also 
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(ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 18 July 1995) (HMSO 1995),  chapters 9 and 10 and 
conclusions 13.4(b) and (c) at 232.
3 [2015] EWHC 2602 (Fam), [2016] 1 WLR 1325, [2016] 1 All ER 273, [2015] 9 WLUK 234, [2017] 
1 FLR 366, [2015] 3 FCR 555, (2015) 146 BMLR 123, [2015] Fam Law 1333, [2016] CLY 928.
4 [2013] EWHC 1418 (Fam), [2013] 5 WLUK 682, [2013] 2 FLR 1357, [2013] 3 FCR 532, [2013] Fam 
Law 962, (2013) NLJ 163(7563) 19, [2014] CLY 1408, also known as AB v CD.
5 A and others (Human Fertilisation And Embryology Act 2008) [2015] EWHC 2602 (Fam), Sir James 
Munby P at [7] .
6 [2015] EWHC 2602 (Fam) at [8] .
5.256 In Bates v Post Office Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues) Rev 1,1 evidence was finally 
adduced regarding, and witnesses cross- examined upon, a Management Letter 
dated 27 March 2011 by Ernst & Young, providing, at [393] the following revealing 
information about the Horizon system:
The main area we would encourage management focus on in the current 
year is improving the IT governance and control environment. Within the IT 
environment our audit work has again identified weaknesses mainly relating 
to the control environment operated by POL’s third party IT suppliers. Our key 
recommendations can be summarised into the following four areas:
Improve governance of outsourcing application management
Improve segregation of duties within the manage change process
Strengthen the change management process
Strengthen the review of privileged access.
1 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB), [2019] 12 WLUK 208.
5.257 Fraser J emphasized the last point: privileged access. It had been alleged for 
years that employees of Fujitsu had privileged access to the entire system, and could 
log into any computer connected to the Horizon system. The judge described the 
nature of the privileged access at [389]:1
This entry was from Andy Beardmore, Senior Software and Solution Design 
Architect Application Services. The experts are agreed that the APPSUP role 
would, effectively, permit anyone who had that permission to do almost anything 
on Horizon. It was available to 3rd line support at SSC, the level at which Mr Roll 
was employed by Fujitsu. This PEAK further substantiates the evidence of Mr 
Roll and is consistent with it. APPSUP was described by Mr Parker as ‘the more 
technically correct name for a type of privileged access to the BRDB’. It is a very 
powerful permission.
1 See also [423] in the Technical Appendix to the judgment.
5.258 Employees and officers from the Post Office repeatedly denied this was possible. 
Although Mr Richard Roll, previously employed by Fujitsu, gave evidence of the fact the 
employees of Fujitsu had such privileged access, the final disclosure of the audit by 
Ernst & Young acted to corroborate his evidence.
5.259 The banking cases also illustrate the nature of the problem,1 as do the unintended 
acceleration cases. Crucially, in the US Bookout case, which was one of the high- profile 
unintended acceleration cases, Selna J ordered the disclosure of the software code.2 The 
explanation for this might be because of two significant, and rather fortuitous, factors. 
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took action by pulling the parking brake. By so doing, the right rear tyre left a 100- 
foot skid mark, and the left tyre left a 50- foot skid mark. The vehicle continued to 
speed down a ramp, across the road, and came to rest with its nose in an embankment, 
injuring her and killing her passenger and best friend Barbara Schwarz. Before she 
died, Schwarz called her husband and said ‘Jean couldn’t get her car stopped. The car 
ran away with us. There’s something wrong with the car.’3 Both the skid marks and the 
telephone call by Barbara Schwarz undermined any suggestion that the acceleration 
was due to a physical problem in the cabin of the vehicle.
1 Gerwin Haybäck, ‘Civil law liability for unauthorized withdrawals at ATMs in Germany’ (2009) 6 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 57; Mason, ‘Debit cards, ATMs and negligence of 
the bank and customer’, 163; Nuth, ‘Unauthorized use of bank cards with or without the PIN; Mason, 
‘Electronic banking and how courts approach the evidence’, 144.
2 United States of America, Central District of California, Case Protective Order In re: Toyota Motor 
Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, Case Number: 
8:10ML2151 JVS (FMOx) (2018) 15 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 98.
3 Antony Anderson, ‘Sudden acceleration, spaghetti software and trauma at the kitchen sink’ 
(2014) Expert Witness Journal (no pagination), http:// blog.copernicustechnology.com/ wp- content/ 
uploads/ 2014/ 05/ Uncommanded- Acceleration- article.pdf; ‘Sudden unintended acceleration redux: 
the unresolved issue’ (2009) 6(3) The Safety Record, http:// www.safetyresearch.net/ blog/ articles/ 
sudden- unintended- acceleration; given that the Bookout case demonstrated the claims of the plaintiff, 
the decision of Carr J to exclude a number of important expert witnesses, while permitting the expert 
witness for Ford (an employee) to give evidence, is to be questioned in Buck v Ford Motor Company, 810 
F.Supp.2d 815 (N.D.Ohio 2011).
5.260 As Professor Peritz pointed out in 1986:
Computers provide an illusory basis for shortcircuiting traditional legal processes 
because they cannot be isolated from the people that build and run them. They 
simply cannot guarantee error- free processing.1
1 Peritz, ‘Computer data and reliability’, 1000; Lynda Crowley- Smith made the same point in 
‘The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): should computer data be presumed accurate?’ (1996) 22(1) Monash 
University Law Review 166.
5.261 This is why lawyers and members of the judiciary need to understand 
two significant issues about the world in which we live now, and our reliance on 
software code. First, the evidential presumption that software code is ‘reliable’ must 
be reconsidered – or more carefully understood. The rationale used by judges that 
software code is part of a ‘notorious’ class of machines, or that the operation of 
computers and other such devices are ‘common knowledge’, must be reversed. In his 
speech Science and Law: Contrasts and Cooperation before the Royal Society in London 
on 25 November 2015,1 Lord Neuberger said that ‘scientists and lawyers each search 
for and assess hard facts from which they can establish the truth’,2 yet lawyers and 
judges rely on ‘common sense’ when many ‘well- established principles are positively 
contrary to common sense’.3 Justifications around loose notions of ‘notorious’ or 
‘common knowledge’ in respect of software programs is irrational. Justice should not 
be based on concepts with no basis in logic or science. It is necessary for lawyers and 
judges to take account of this element of irrationality that has been the law for far 
too long. To resolve the problem expeditiously, an appellate court could adjust the 
presumption by restricting it to mechanical instruments and instruments for which 
statutory presumptions exist. Thereafter, if it is treated as an evidential presumption 
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(if the term ‘reliability’ is to be used) of the software. Evidence of reliability will not 
always be required. No doubt suitable procedural mechanisms can be put in place to 
allow a party to require relevant evidence of reliability where it is challenged.
1 https:// www.supremecourt.uk/ docs/ speech- 151124.pdf.
2 Lord Neuberger, Science and Law: Contrasts and Cooperation, [9] .
3 Lord Neuberger, Science and Law: Contrasts and Cooperation, [13].
5.262 Second, judges should understand the necessity of requiring the disclosure 
of software code and relevant audits of systems, and determine whether security 
standards, if applied, have been applied properly.1 This problem has been acknowledged 
by the European Court of Justice:
In the context of disclosure of evidence, complex issues may arise concerning the 
disclosure of electronic data, which may constitute a certain mass of information 
in [the] hands of the prosecution. In such a case, an important safeguard in the 
sifting process is to ensure that the defence is provided with an opportunity to 
be involved in the laying- down of the criteria for determining what might be 
relevant for disclosure.2
1 Failures in banking systems used by millions of customers are demonstrated in Murdoch and 
others, ‘How certification systems fail’.
2 Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb) 
(31 August 2020), para 166.
5.263 A recent case in the State of New Jersey in the US illustrates that judges might 
have concluded that disclosure is essential.1 in the case of State of New Jersey v Pickett,2 
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division decided to permit the disclosure 
of the software code from a program called TrueAlle, described by Fasciale, PJAD for 
the court ‘as software designed to address intricate interpretational challenges of 
testing low levels or complex mixtures of DNA’. The court agreed the criteria a judge 
should consider when deciding to permit disclosure or discovery of software code, 
at [284] :
We hold that if the State chooses to utilize an expert who relies on novel 
probabilistic genotyping software to render DNA testimony, then defendant 
is entitled to access, under an appropriate protective order, to the software’s 
source code and supporting software development and related documentation— 
including that pertaining to testing, design, bug reporting, change logs, and 
program requirements— to challenge the reliability of the software and science 
underlying that expert’s testimony at a Frye hearing, provided defendant 
first satisfies the burden of demonstrating a particularized need for such 
discovery. To analyze whether that burden has been met, a trial judge should 
consider: (1) whether there is a rational basis for ordering a party to attempt to 
produce the information sought, including the extent to which proffered expert 
testimony supports the claim for disclosure; (2) the specificity of the information 
sought; (3) the available means of safeguarding the company’s intellectual 
property, such as issuance of a protective order; and (4) any other relevant 
factors unique to the facts of the case. Defendant demonstrated particularized 
need and satisfied his burden.
1 See also People v Williams, 35 N.Y.3d 24 (2020), 147 N.E.3d 1131, 124 N.Y.S.3d 593, 2020 N.Y. 
Slip Op. 02123 (trial court abused its discretion in permitting the admission of low copy number DNS 
evidence without a Frye hearing (Frye v United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
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5.264 A practical two- phase approach has been proposed:
Stage 1
(i) As a matter of procedure, disclosure should be given of:
(a) Known bugs in the system that have been reported, and the actions 
taken in response. This should include the disclosure of known error 
logs,1 release notices,2 change logs3 and similar documents.
(b) The party’s information security standards and processes. This 
should extend to cover logical access controls4 (including emergency 
access), security vulnerability notifications5 and security patches.6
(c) Relevant audits of systems and the management of the installation 
to provide assurance that suitable standards and processes have been 
implemented and complied with.
(d) Evidence of reliably managed records of error reports and system 
changes, including evidence to demonstrate that basic precautions, 
such as digital signatures, have been implemented to detect and limit 
accidental or deliberate corruption.
(ii) The disclosure set out above should be provided by a person authorised to do 
so by the party subject to the disclosure obligation. The party with the disclosure 
obligation should be required to undertake a reasonable and proportionate 
search for the documents and records in question. Disclosure should be 
supported by evidence confirming that a reasonable and proportionate search 
has been undertaken by a person with appropriate authority and knowledge, 
and that:
(a) The records disclosed are believed to be the records of the relevant 
standards, processes and audits, and of the known defects, security 
vulnerabilities, fixes and changes in the system.
(b) The party seeking to rely upon the evidence in question has taken 
reasonable steps to satisfy itself that access to the system is controlled 
in such a way that unauthorised and undetected amendment of system 
data, in a way that might affect the evidence in question, is prevented.7
(iii) The disclosure exercise should, where possible, be collaborative and co- 
operative between the parties, rather than adversarial. In particular:
(a) The parties should, if possible, seek to agree that the disclosed data 
is in a form that takes into account the ability of the party to whom the 
disclosure is made should be able to conveniently read/ use it.
(b) It should not be required that the party challenging the reliability 
of the data relied upon should identify the particular issue to which the 
disclosure required to be given is alleged to go.
(iv) The documents under Stage 1 will be routinely kept and easily available for a 
bespoke system professionally developed and managed. The absence of such records 
will ordinarily suggest poor quality software/ system management. For commercial- 
off- the- shelf software it should be enough to provide evidence of the particular 
version and release of the software and to disclose release documentation (usually 
publicly available from the supplier) for the relevant version and subsequent 
releases. (The latter will reveal errors in the version in question later found and 
corrected.) In either case, proportionate Stage 1 disclosure should not be onerous, 
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Stage 2
(i) If the limited disclosure under Stage 1 reveals any one or more of the following:
(a) a level of recorded defects or failures sufficiently high to provide 
grounds for questioning the reliability of the computer system from 
which the material is derived;
(b) that there exist records of specific defects or failures that provide 
grounds for questioning the evidence sought to be relied upon;
(c) that a person seeking to rely upon the evidence in question is not able 
to demonstrate that it has adequate control over the systems or data.
then the party seeking to rely upon the evidence produced by the 
computer system in question should be required to prove that none 
of the facts or matters identified under (a)– (c) above might affect the 
reliability of the material sought to be relied upon.
(ii) It is known that all large computer systems contain bugs, and that some of 
these may be ‘small’ bugs that reveal themselves rarely. This is true even for those 
systems that have been shown convincingly to be very reliable. It follows that, 
even in the case of such a reliable system, the court should have regard to the 
possibility that an apparent failure may be the consequence of a bug manifesting 
itself.8 Evidence of reliability is not evidence of the absence of software bugs. The 
court should consider what degree of doubt remains in the context of all the 
other available evidence.9
1 Records of the errors that have been reported in a system and what action was taken. This should 
include evidence of testing after each system change to ensure that the same error has not been 
reintroduced.
2 Documentation of the changes that have been made in each new release of the software, including 
identifying all the known errors that have been corrected.
3 Records of every change that has been made to the software (containing information about what 
was changed, what was affected and what the results were, together with any resulting problems), 
including by whom, when and why it was done.
4 Organizational processes and software controls that ensure data and systems can be read, 
changed, created and deleted only by people who have been properly authorized and identified.
5 Notifications of a vulnerability in a software product that could allow unauthorized access to the 
system to compromise the integrity, availability or confidentiality of an organization’s systems or data.
6 Software changes to correct security vulnerabilities, often made to software systems between 
releases of the software because an error has been detected that is too important to wait for a new 
system release to correct it.
7 The issue of remote access by a third party to Horizon branch terminals was a major issue in the 
Post Office Bates litigation. The fact that such access was possible was only conceded by the Post Office 
in January 2019. It had in fact been practised from early after the introduction of the Horizon system 
in 1999. Fraser J considered the issue to be of central importance, for which see Bates v The Post Office 
Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues) Rev 1 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB) at [990] and [991] and Hamilton v Post Office 
Ltd [2021] EWCA Crim 577 at [49]. Until 2010 no records were kept by Fujitsu of such actions.
8 For which see Ladkin and others, ‘The Law Commission presumption concerning the dependability 
of computer evidence’; Jackson, ‘An approach to the judicial evaluation of evidence from computers and 
computer systems’.
9 Paul Marshall, James Christie, Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bev Littlewood, Stephen Mason, Martin 
Newby, Dr Jonathan Rogers, Harold Thimbleby and Martyn Thomas CBE, ‘Recommendations for 
the probity of computer evidence’, 24– 25; see also The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure 
for Investigators, Prosecutors and Defence Practitioners (2020) https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ 
publications/ attorney- generals- guidelines- on- disclosure- 2020 (in force 31 December 2020) is a step 
in the right direction in respect of electronic material, for which see paras 54– 57, and in which the 
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5.265 The purpose of these recommendations is to ensure that the judicial process 
more fully comprehends the evidential reality of software code and ‘digital systems’, 
and helps to preserve fairness in legal proceedings.1
1 Colin Tapper, ‘Judicial attitudes, aptitudes and abilities in the field of high technology’ (1989) 15(3) 
and (4) Monash University Law Review 219, 228, where Professor Tapper considers the members of 
the House of Lords and Court of Appeal were unduly restrictive regarding the transient storage of a 
false password in R v Gold (Stephen William), R v Schifreen (Robert Jonathan) [1988] AC 1063, [1988] 2 
WLR 984, [1988] 2 All ER 186, [1988] 4 WLUK 121, (1988) 87 Cr App R 257, (1988) 152 JP 445, [1988] 







Luciana Duranti and Allison Stanfield
Authenticity and authentication
6.1 Authenticity is the quality of something that is what it purports to be. When 
referring to documentary materials, most definitions of authenticity refer to the fact 
that an entity, to be authentic, must have maintained not only its identity but also 
its integrity: that is, it must not have been corrupted or tampered with during the 
time between its creation and its use as a source of information or its submission as 
evidence.1 While this concept, developed in an analogue world, is easily transferable 
to digital entities, the verification and consequent declaration of authenticity – that is, 
the authentication of digital entities – has proven to be problematic. This is one of the 
reasons why an increasing number of standards and scholarly papers discuss ways of 
ensuring the continuing and verifiable authenticity of digital materials.2 For decades, 
courts and scholars have wrestled with the concept of authentication of digital evidence 
across various jurisdictions, and several notable judges have developed particular 
skills in understanding and applying the rules of evidence to digital evidence.
1 Heather MacNeil, ‘Providing grounds for trust II: the findings of the Authenticity Task Force of 
InterPARES’ (2002 January) 54 Archivaria 24.
2 Heather MacNeil, Trusting Records: Legal, Historical and Diplomatic Perspectives (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 2000), xi; Livia Iacovino, Recordkeeping, Ethics and Law (Springer 2006), 41, for 
further comments about ‘trustworthiness’. The standard of the Canadian Government Standards Board 
CGSB 74.32- 2017, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence, states that authenticity is the ‘quality 
of an entity that it is what it purports to be and that is free from tampering or corruption’, thereby 
adding the idea of integrity to that of identity. The standard of the Association of Records Managers and 
Administrators, BSR/ ARMA 19- 2019, Policy Design for Managing Electronic Messages, defines record 
authenticity as ‘The sum of the qualities of a record that establish the origin, reliability, trustworthiness, 
and correctness of its content’. The InterPARES research project terminology database, on the basis 
of a shared understanding of researchers from more than forty countries and six continents, defines 
authenticity as ‘The trustworthiness of a record as a record; i.e., the quality of a record that is what it 
purports to be and that is free from tampering or corruption’, and authentication as a ‘declaration of 
a record’s authenticity at a specific point in time by a juridical person entrusted with the authority to 
make such a declaration (e.g., public officer, notary, certification authority)’ Retrieved from https:// 
interparestrust.org/ terminology/ term/ authenticity and https:// interparestrust.org/ terminology/ 
term/ authentication.
6.2 Historically, in the classical world authenticity was linked to custody, as opposed 
to the characteristics of the object.1 For example, in ancient Rome the Tabularium, 
guarded by the quaestores, had the custody of the records produced by the organs of the 
state to ensure the messages carried within those records remained intact, and users 
had access only to copies made by public scribes. The reason for such measures was 
that those records, mostly written on wax tablets, were as fragile as records in digital 
Luciana Duranti and Allison Stanfield, ‘Authenticating electronic evidence’, in Stephen Mason and 
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form, and as easy to change or delete. Thus, trusting the records involved trusting their 
custodians.2
1 There were exceptions for some public records, such as records exhibited for public consumption 
in public places, including laws which were written on bronze, and rolls of arms which were written on 
marble.
2 Luciana Duranti, ‘Archives as a place’ (1996) 24(2) Archives & Manuscripts 242.
6.3 In medieval times, with the loss of stable, trustworthy public bodies and the 
increasing use of media more durable than wax – wood or papyrus in the form of 
parchment and paper – trust moved from the custodian of the records to the records 
themselves, which had to be capable of being creditworthy on their own. Their formal 
characteristics and their status of transmission (i.e. their degree of perfection, from 
draft to original to copy) were fundamental to establishing their authenticity.1
1 Luciana Duranti, ‘Medieval universities and archives’ (1994– 95) 38 Archivaria 37.
6.4 It was only in 1681, however, that a science was developed to assess the 
authenticity and authority of records, that is, to establish that they were what they 
purported to be, free from tampering or corruption, and capable of producing 
consequences. The science of diplomatics was developed by Dom Jean Mabillon 
to determine the identity and integrity of documents claimed to be diplomas of 
Merovingian kings, and their ability to demonstrate the land rights of the Benedictines 
of France.1 Thus, diplomatics focused on both documentary form2 and status of 
transmission, that is, the degree of perfection of a record.3 It defined an original as a 
document imbued with three qualities: primitiveness, completeness and effectiveness. 
An original is the first complete document capable of reaching the effects that it intends 
to reach – the perfect document. Then it defined both a draft and a copy in relation to 
the original: a draft precedes the original, is made for purposes of correction and is 
not intended to have consequences, while a copy, which may be of a draft, an original 
or another copy, is made for purposes of either communication or security. There may 
be several generations of drafts and several types of copies, with different degrees of 
authority, as there may be multiple originals.4
1 See Luciana Duranti, ‘Diplomatics: new uses for an old science’ (1989) 28 Archivaria 12.
2 The form of a document is defined as the ‘whole of the characteristics which can be separated from 
the determination of the particular subjects, persons, or places it is about’. Duranti, ‘Diplomatics’, 15.
3 The status of transmission of a record is shown in ‘Ontology B’: http:// www.interpares.org/ ip2/ 
display_ file.cfm?doc=ip2_ ontology.pdf.
4 Duranti, ‘Diplomatics’, 18– 21.
6.5 The science of diplomatics was the foundation of the law concerning evidence 
and proof in Europe, and was based on the fundamental assumption that the more 
authority a record has, the more believable is its content. As a consequence, the original 
was preferred to any other status of transmission, to the point that an authenticum was 
defined as ‘an original instrument or writing; the original of a will or other instrument, 
as distinguished from a copy’.1 If authenticity is by default attributed to the original 
for being the most authoritative status of transmission, then reliability of content is 
implied. Thus, the concepts of originality, authenticity and reliability were conflated 
and the ‘best evidence’ idea came into being. All of this has changed as the world has 
moved to the digital environment.
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An example: email
6.6 Emails can be stored in a number of different formats, depending upon the 
software that created them. For evidentiary purposes, it is important to obtain the item 
in the native format, the unmodified email message file, including its attachments, as 
this is the only way the identity and integrity of an email can be proven. Some older 
email repositories stored emails and attachments in a flat file structure which makes it 
difficult to retrieve and view them without specialist assistance.
6.7 Indeed, emails can be submitted as evidence for a number of purposes. The 
email, like all correspondence, may be offered to prove that the sender did, or did not,1 
communicate with another person or persons, in which case the communication, and 
not its content, may be called into evidence. It may be tendered to show the sender was 
at a particular location at a particular time, and this will be evidenced in the metadata 
showing the IP address of the computer from which the email was sent. If authenticity 
is still challenged, the sender of the email may have to give evidence of doing so. 
However, if the sender of the email denies having written it, then the party tendering 
the email will need to provide a wide array of circumstantial evidence in order to prove 
the identity of the sender.2 This may be difficult unless the party tendering the email 
can show, on the balance of probabilities, that the purported sender did send the email.
1 See for example, Greene v Associated Newspapers Limited [2004] EWCA Civ 1462, [2005] QB 972, 
[2005] 3 WLR 281, [2005] 1 All ER 30, [2004] 11 WLUK 165, [2005] EMLR 10, (2004) 101(45) LSG 31, 
(2004) 148 SJLB 1318, Times, 10 November 2004, Independent, 9 November 2004, [2005] CLY 970.
2 By way of example, see Takenaka (UK) Ltd and Corfe v Frankl [2001] EWCA Civ 348, [2001] 3 
WLUK 163, [2001] EBLR 40, [2001] CLY 1819 and BSkyB Ltd v HP Enterprise Services UK Ltd (formerly 
t/ a Electronic Data Systems Ltd) [2010] EWHC 86 (TCC), [2010] 1 WLUK 491, [2010] BLR 267, 129 Con 
LR 147, [2010] 26 Const LJ 289, [2010] CILL 2841, [2010] CLY 3421.
6.8 Although public bodies and private corporations now use record- keeping 
systems, where records of all types are organized by function and activity, and which 
are designed according to requirements established by national and international 
standards, private people and small organizations tend to keep emails stored in the 
application used by the email client where it was generated or received.1 Similarly, 
their electronic files, such as draft correspondence, spreadsheets, reports, PowerPoint 
presentations, drawings and so on, are stored in the applications where they are 
created, although this is now changing where these documents are saved and stored 
in cloud- based repositories. Sometimes these files are created using proprietary 
software, and stored in formats that can only be interpreted by that software, although 
open source software is increasingly used; however, there are now tools available that 
can obtain access to the content of proprietary files without the need to obtain the 
proprietary software.
1 For a detailed description of the characteristics of emails as digital entities, see Gianfranco 
Pontevolpe and Silvio Salza, General Study 05 – Keeping and Preserving Email, http:// interpares.org/ 
ip3/ display_ file.cfm?doc=ip3_ italy_ gs05a_ final_ report.pdf. See also Association of Records Managers 
and Administrators, BSR/ ARMA 19- 2019, Policy Design for Managing Electronic Messages.
Digital evidence compared to past paradigms
6.9 It is important to take into account the differences between analogue1 and 
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be, applied to digital evidence. Indeed, ‘evidence in digital form is paradigmatically 
different from pre- digital evidence which generally was inextricably associated with a 
medium be it paper, film, video, audiotape or some other fixed medium’.2 It is true that, 
in January 2019, the Council of Europe adopted the ‘Guidelines of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on electronic evidence3 in civil and administrative 
proceedings’,4 which provide:
Electronic evidence should be evaluated in the same way as other types of 
evidence, in particular regarding its admissibility, authenticity, accuracy and 
integrity.
1 Analogue is information written on physical material, such as a paper, parchment, stone, clay, film 
or certain types of magnetic audiotape and videotape (see CGSB 72.34- 2017, 2).
2 Judge David Harvey, ‘Digital evidence admissibility: some issues’ (17 December 2019), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3505611.
3 In the context of this chapter, the expressions ‘electronic evidence’ and ‘digital evidence’ are used 
interchangeably, although ‘electronic’ refers to the storage and means of transmission of an entity and 
‘digital’ to the discrete, binary values constituting it. See for example CGSB 74.34- 2017, 3– 4 ‘electronic 
record’ and ‘digital record’.
4 Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on electronic evidence in civil 
and administrative proceedings (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 January 2019, at the 
1335th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), 30 January 2019, CM(2018)169- add1final, https:// search.
coe.int/ cm/ Pages/ result_ details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680902e0c.
6.10 Evaluating electronic evidence in the same way as other types of evidence 
does not mean that they should be dealt with in the same way. Jokubauskas and 
Świerczyński1 have, for instance, questioned whether those guidelines already require 
revision. The authors point out the increasing use of cloud computing, particularly as a 
cross- border technology, and the increasing popularity of emerging technologies such 
as blockchain and artificial intelligence tools. This suggests that there are gaps in the 
way the law deals with electronic evidence and these should be carefully examined by 
a careful comparison with analogue evidence.
1 Remigijus Jokubauskas and Marek Świerczyński, ‘Is revision of the Council of Europe guidelines 
on electronic evidence already needed?’, (2020) 16(1) Utrecht Law Review 13. DOI: http:// doi.org/ 
10.36633/ ulr.525.
6.11 In the past, a document was understood as information affixed to an analogue 
medium1 by means of a writing instrument or an apparatus for fixing data, images 
or sound, in a form that was both objectified and syntactic.2 In legal proceedings, if a 
document is admitted into evidence, it generally contains information upon which one 
party wishes to rely as proof of an alleged fact.
1 ‘Analogue medium n., Physical material, such as paper, parchment, stone, clay, film or certain types 
of magnetic audio- and videotape, used for storage of data’, http:// www.interpares.org/ ip2/ display_ 
file.cfm?doc=ip2_ glossary.pdf&CFID=22025589&CFTOKEN=86498402.
2 Duranti, ‘Diplomatics’, 15. See also R v Daye (Arthur John) [1908] 2 KB 333 (KBD).
6.12 When a ‘document’ is not affixed to an analogue medium, but rather exists 
in an electronic form, the content, structure and form of a digital ‘document’ are not 
inextricably linked to one another, as is the case with information in analogue form. 
A digital document is composed of two parts: the stored entity (the digital component) 
and its manifested entity such as what appears on a computer screen or in other output 
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become inaccessible if not protected), yet persistent (forever there, if not purposefully 
destroyed).1 An electronic document also includes more information than is visible to 
the eye – the digital components may comprise information such as metadata and data 
about the structure of the document.
1 Luciana Duranti and Kenneth Thibodeau, ‘The concept of record in interactive, experiential 
and dynamic environments: the view of InterPARES’ (2006) 6(1) Archival Science13, http:// www.
interpares.org/ ip2/ display_ file.cfm?doc=ip2_ book_ appendix_ 02.pdf.
6.13 For example, an email, if printed, looks like a paper document and appears 
complete because one can see the header lines. If the email is tendered through 
a witness who is the author of the email, without objection, then the paper version 
of the email may be perfectly adequate to prove its contents. However, the email as 
stored by the email client may contain additional information relevant to the issues 
in legal proceedings. Although there are four types of header lines – identity header 
lines (including thread headers), transmission header lines, security header lines and 
format/ encoding header lines – only a small part of the header is typically displayed 
by email clients and is printable. Only if the email is accessed through special settings 
on the email client is it possible to see all the hidden information.
6.14 Some working groups have defined the main differences between paper (and 
other analogue media) and electronic documents. Among them, the most prominent 
is The Sedona Conference Working Group on Best Practices for Electronic Document 
Retention and Production (the Sedona Conference).1 The Sedona Conference suggests 
that such differences can be broadly grouped into six categories: (a) metadata, 
(b) volume and duplicability, (c) persistence, (d) dynamic, changeable content, 
(e) environment dependence and obsolescence, and (f) dispersion and searchability.
1 The Sedona Conference, Electronic Document Retention and Production, Working Group 1 (2002).
Admissibility and authentication
6.15 To be admissible in legal proceedings, the potential evidence needs to be relevant 
to the facts at issue in the proceedings. If it is not relevant, it is not admissible. After the 
evidence is admitted, it is open to the opposing party to challenge it by contradicting, 
undermining or explaining it. The trier of fact then determines how much weight is to 
be given to the evidence, and makes a decision accordingly.
6.16 This does not prevent both parties and the court from accepting the authenticity 
of the evidence without proof.1 Alternatively, one party may put the identity or integrity 
of digital documents in issue. In such a case the party adducing the evidence will also 
need to meet the requirement to provide suitable evidential foundations. For instance, 
in civil proceedings in England and Wales a party is deemed to admit the authenticity 
of a document disclosed under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) Pt 31 
unless notice is served that the party wishes the document to be proved at trial, as 
provided for by CPR 32.19. Notwithstanding the provisions of the CPR, the authenticity 
of documents is not, generally, challenged at such an early stage in the proceedings.2 
This is because neither party may be aware of the dispute over the authenticity of a 
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1 For a number of early cases in the US where digital images from satellites were accepted by 
agreement, see Harald Ginzky, ‘Satellite images as evidence in legal proceedings relating to the 
environment – a US perspective’ (2000) VXXV(3) Air & Space Law 114, 116.
2 Although see Gallaher International Ltd v Tlais Enterprises Ltd (Rev 1) [2008] EWHC 804 (Comm), 
[2008] 4 WLUK 504, where Gallaher gave notice that it challenged the authenticity of a large number of 
the documents disclosed by Tlais, and required Tlais to prove them, at [586]. Clarke J considered that 
some documents were neither proved nor not proved at [630], that some were not proved at [685] and 
that some were not satisfactorily proved at [862].
6.17 Reported cases appear to indicate that a lawyer will merely assert that the 
authenticity, reliability or accuracy of the evidence is not to be trusted, and the 
court will then have to determine a suitable response to the allegation raised,1 or a 
lawyer may fail to raise any specific objections as to the accuracy of the evidence.2 
For example, if an email, a web page, a social media post or any other form of digital 
evidence is admitted as evidence, the opposing party may challenge its reliability in 
order to reduce the weight to be given to the evidence by using witness testimony, 
certifications, forensic evidence and circumstantial evidence to do so.3
1 For instance, in Noble Resources SA v Gross [2009] EWHC 1435 (Comm), [2009] 6 WLUK 558, Mr 
Gross cast doubt over the reliability and (it seems) the authenticity of SMS messages, but the technical 
evidence demonstrated that it was not possible to alter an SMS message on a BlackBerry once it had 
been received or sent; note the discussion in relation to the printouts of records of telephone calls 
made by a mobile telephone in the case of State v Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600, 148– 152.
2 Olympic Insurance Company v H. D. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969).
3 Micheál O’Floinn and David Ormerod, ‘Social networking material as criminal evidence’ [2012] 
Crim LR 486 for a discussion of the approach taken in the courts in England relating to data from social 
networking sites.
6.18 The way in which electronic evidence is adduced will affect the challenges as to 
its authenticity. Generally, evidence is adduced to assert or reinforce a positive position. 
For instance, it might provide reliable information,1 act to confirm an alibi,2 or where 
there is evidence from different devices and systems in combination (CCTV, automatic 
number plate recognition system and the use of mobile telephones3 attributed to a 
particular person), act to corroborate and reinforce the evidence between the parties.4 
An example of the positive use of electronic evidence is the Application Transaction 
Counter on the chip of a debit card, which increases by one each time a transaction 
occurs, so that in the event of a disputed transaction, the counter on the card can be 
tested against the records maintained by the bank.5 Another example of the positive 
use of electronic evidence can be found in the case of City Park Co- operative Apartments 
Inc. v David Dubois.6 In this case, Spies J accepted that the code of an apartment entry– 
exit ‘key’ issued to the defendant contradicted the defendant’s affidavit evidence that 
he had been denied access to his apartment. The management of the apartment was 
able to adduce in court evidence to show that this particular entry– exit ‘key’ was used 
1,447 times in a six- month period, based on computer records of each entry or exit 
for the uniquely coded ‘key’ (which the judge questionably described as an ‘electronic 
signature’). Nonetheless, the judge’s meaning is clear: this was an example of electronic 
evidence demonstrating that the holder of a token had used the entry– exit ‘key’, thus 
showing that his affidavit evidence was incompatible with the electronic evidence.
1 A (Death of a Baby), Re [2011] EWHC 2754 (Fam), per Jackson J at [168].
2 R. v Hallam (Sam) [2012] EWCA Crim 1158, [2012] 5 WLUK 518.
3 In R. v Hamilton 2011 ONCA 399 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that evidence regarding cell 
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employees rather than experts at [259]; see also R. v Cyr 2012 CarswellOnt 16386, 2012 ONCA 919, [2012] 
OJ No. 6148, 104 WCB (2d) 1033, 294 CCC (3d) 421, 300 OAC 111; these decisions have been criticized: 
Ken Chasse, ‘Guilt by mobile phone tracking shouldn’t make “evidence to the contrary” impossible’, 
http:// www.slaw.ca/ 2016/ 10/ 04/ guilt- by- mobile- phone- tracking- shouldnt- make- evidence-  
to- the- contrary- impossible/ .
4 R. v Fagan (Taariq), R. Fergus (Michael) [2012] EWCA Crim 2248, [2012] 9 WLUK 121. Note the 
discussion of a case in Switzerland where the absence of evidence that a mobile telephone that was 
switched on at the relevant time was the topic of a paper in considering probability and graphical 
probability models: Alex Biedermann and Joëlle Vuille, ‘Digital evidence, “absence” of data and 
ambiguous patterns of reasoning’ (2016) 16 Digital Investigation S86.
5 Jerzy Kosiński, ‘A case of the customer attempting to claim their debit card was cloned’ (2016) 13 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 167.
6 [2006] OJ No. 4428 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
6.19 However, it is possible for digital data to prove a negative position (or perhaps 
be adduced as evidence of an inconsistent positive), a point made by Professor Tapper.1 
An example is a case where a number of customers of a bank report unauthorized 
ATM withdrawals, which will cause the bank to investigate whether an employee 
was responsible for the thefts. This happened in the case of United States of America 
v Bonallo,2 where computer records had demonstrated that cash withdrawals were 
made when the defendant Bonallo was in the building. It transpired that the employee 
who assumed Bonallo’s duties after his employment was terminated discovered a 
‘fraud program’ in Bonallo’s computer program library. This program was used to 
provide access to ATM computer files, and to allow him to alter transaction records, 
although it could have been used for legitimate purposes as well. This case not only 
illustrates the possibility of adducing evidence of an inconsistent positive, but also the 
care with which judges should approach assertions about ‘reliable’ computer systems 
and whether the business records exception ought to apply.
1 Colin Tapper, ‘Evanescent evidence’ (1993) 1(1) Intl J L & Info Tech35, 44– 45; Beryl A. Howell 
and Brian M. Heberlig, ‘The Lamar Owens case: how electronic evidence contributed to an acquittal 
in an explosive rape case’ (2007) 24(12) The Computer & Internet Lawyer 1; Alfano v LC Main, LLC, 
38 Misc.3d 1233(A) (2013) 969 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Table), 2013 WL 1111969 (N.Y.Sup.), 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 
50373(U) (a forensic computer examiner performed a forensic analysis of the metadata associated 
with the plaintiffs’ photographs, concluding that the photographs were taken 12 days after the 
accident); Kashmir Hill, ‘Fitbit data just undermined a woman’s rape claim’, Splinter (29 June 2015), 
https:// splinternews.com/ fitbit- data- just- undermined- a- womans- rape- claim- 1793848735.
2 858 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1988).
6.20 Although some jurisdictions deal with the issue of admissibility and 
authentication somewhat differently, it is clear that admissibility is a question of law 
for the judge and authenticity is a question of fact for the jury, or the judge alone if 
there is no jury.
6.21 For instance, in Australia, for evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant.1 
Authenticity is not a ground of admissibility pursuant to the Uniform Evidence Acts, 
so the issue does not arise when the court is considering objections to evidence.2 
When considering evidence such as social media screenshots or printouts, the judge 
will first determine whether, as a question of law, the evidence is relevant, and if 
it is, it will be admitted into evidence. The trier of fact will then determine whether 
the evidence is authentic. How the evidence is authenticated will depend upon the 
method of authentication used.3 For example, Estcourt J posits that a proponent only 
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media.4 Estcourt J was referring to the decision of Perram J in Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1)5 in relation to business records. 
However, the judge was of the view that this approach applies equally to Facebook 
evidence. Estcourt J stated:6
In a nutshell, when you tender a Facebook screenshot or printout no question 
of its authenticity arises as a threshold question. The only question at this stage 
is relevance. At no time does the judge as the judge of law determine that the 
document is or is not authentic because that is not a question for him or her. 
The question for the judge as the judge of law is only relevance. The question 
of authenticity is for him or her, after the document has been admitted into 
evidence, and that is for him or her as the judge of fact.
1 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) [2012] FCA 1355 
per Perram J at [92].
2 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) [2012] FCA 1355 
per Perram J at [92].
3 The Hon. Justice Stephen Estcourt AM, ‘Social media as evidence’, speech presented to 
New Technology and Trial Practice Workshop, Port Moresby, 18– 20 March 2019, https:// www.
supremecourt.tas.gov.au/ publications/ speeches- articles/ social- media- as- evidence/ , at 8.
4 Estcourt, ‘Social media as evidence’.
5 [2012] FCA 1355, (2012) 207 FCR 448.
6 This text, and the further text cited, is towards the end of Estcourt, ‘Social media as evidence’.
6.22 Estcourt J goes on to say:
As to the ultimate question of fact, if a person in his or her evidence denies that 
the post is his or hers, or claims that it is not genuine, then the issue will play 
out like any other disputed issue of fact. If the person denies he or she posted 
it, then that claim will be tested by cross- examination. ‘Who had access to your 
account? How was your account hacked? Who knew your password? When was 
it hacked? What about the posts either side of that post?’ If the tribunal is a judge 
alone, then he or she will decide the question of authenticity and the weight to 
be given to it.
6.23 In England and Wales, s 8 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 provides that, where 
a statement contained in a document is admissible in civil proceedings, it may be 
‘authenticated in such manner as the court may approve’. As for criminal proceedings, 
the current position is now governed by s 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which 
provides as follows:
133 Proof of statements in documents
Where a statement in a document is admissible as evidence in criminal 
proceedings, the statement may be proved by producing either– 
(a) the document, or
(b) (whether or not the document exists) a copy of the document or of the 
material part of it, authenticated in whatever way the court may approve.
6.24 The Explanatory Notes to the Act states that s 133 ‘corresponds to the position 
under section 27 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, whereby a statement in a document 
can be proved by producing either the original document or an authenticated copy’ 
and continues: ‘It is intended to cover all forms of copying including the use of imaging 
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which illustrates the need to pay careful attention to the means by which a document 
in digital form is authenticated before the court.2 The use of imaging technology is also 
a mechanism for obtaining a copy of the original data, although the actual technology 
that is used to obtain an image of data may be challenged. The number of removes 
a copy may be from the original is dealt with indirectly by reference to the meaning 
of ‘copy’, which ‘in relation to a document, means anything on to which information 
recorded in the document has been copied, by whatever means and whether directly 
or indirectly.’3 This requires the trial judge to determine how a digital document is 
authenticated, which is why guidance on the mechanisms by which authenticity is 
tested after evidence is seized can be so important.4 In essence, the move has been 
towards assessing the weight to be given to electronic evidence.
1 At paragraph 436.
2 O’Floinn and Ormerod, ‘Social networking material as criminal evidence’.
3 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 134(1) Interpretation of Chapter 2.
4 For which see article 4 of the Draft Convention on Electronic Evidence, which proposes five tests 
respecting evidence seized and subsequently submitted as evidence in legal proceedings: (2016) 13 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review S1– S11, https:// journals.sas.ac.uk/ deeslr/ 
article/ view/ 2321.
6.25 The Court of Appeal’s stance in R. v O’Connor (Damien)1 has wider implications 
on the admissibility of electronic evidence beyond its own facts. The appellant and 
several others were accused of conspiring to import heroin and cocaine into the UK 
from Belgium. O’Connor was living in Belgium at the time. The prosecution relied upon 
telephone records provided by the Belgian police in relation to a mobile telephone used 
by the leader of the conspiracy, but there was no accompanying statement from the 
Belgian telephone provider. The court concluded that it was arguable that the records, 
which were produced by the Belgian authorities and handed to the prosecution, were 
not in fact statements made by a person. Hooper LJ went on to say, at [16]:
and one concentrates on the person who interrogated the Belgium provider 
computer and obtained the data for the [alleged appellant’s] phone, and if one 
assumes that in that respect a person is making a representation for the purposes 
of section 115 [of the Criminal Justice Act 2003], then the issue has to be whether 
it is admissible under section 117 [of the same Act as a business record exception 
to the hearsay rule]. The judge held that it was.
1 [2010] EWCA Crim 2287, [2010] 6 WLUK 467, Times, 19 July 2010, [2011] CLY 608.
6.26 In Canada, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada adopted in 1997 the text of 
a Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (Canada) that proposed a reform of the traditional 
common law evidentiary requirements in light of the characteristics of electronic 
materials submitted for admissibility as evidence.1 The Uniform Electronic Evidence 
Act (Canada) subsequently became uniform law in Canada in the Canada Evidence Act 
(CEA) 1995, thereby prevailing in criminal proceedings anywhere in Canada.2 Section 
31.5 Canada Evidence Act provides:
For the purpose of determining under any rule of law whether an electronic 
document is admissible, evidence may be presented in respect of any standard, 
procedure, usage or practice concerning the manner in which electronic 
documents are to be recorded or stored, having regard to the type of business, 
enterprise or endeavour that used, recorded or stored the electronic document 
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1 See https:// www.ulcc.ca/ en/ and http:// www.slaw.ca/ 2018/ 09/ 11/ electronic- documents- in- 
civil- and- administrative- proceedings- uniform- rules/ .
2 https:// laws- lois.justice.gc.ca/ eng/ acts/ c- 5/ .
6.27 Further, s 41.2 of the Act states that it does ‘not modify any common law or 
statutory rule relating to the admissibility of records, except the rules relating to 
authentication and best evidence’. Section 41.3 goes on to provide that a ‘person 
seeking to introduce an electronic record as evidence has the burden of proving its 
authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic record 
is what the person claims it to be’. If evidence which is ‘capable of demonstrating 
authenticity is adduced and not rebutted’, it is still ultimately up to the trier of fact to 
determine whether or not the evidence is authentic, and to decide what weight, if any, 
is to be placed on that evidence.1
1 David Outerbridge and Ezra Siller, ‘The admissibility of electronic evidence’, https:// www.
lawinsider.com/ documents/ , at 10.
6.28 In summary, if a judge is satisfied, as a question of law, that evidence is admissible, 
it is then up to the trier of fact (judge or jury) to determine whether the evidence is 
authentic and what weight, if any, is to be given to the evidence. The judicial approach 
to authentication of digital data in legal proceedings is considered on a case- by- case 
basis. There are no judicial guidelines about the attributes or characteristics of digital 
data, and some commentators have provided guidance through the application of 
relevant case law in relation to different types of digital data, such as emails, websites, 
instant messages, text messages and photography.1 Judges have to make judgments 
about the qualifications of the witnesses who appear before them, and interpret the 
nature of digital data in accordance with the evidence presented.
1 Steven Goode, ‘The admissibility of electronic evidence’ (2009) 29(1) Review of Litigation 1; 
Breanne M. Democko, ‘Social media and the rules on authentication’ (2012) 43 U Tol L Rev 367; Kenneth 
N. Rashbaum, Matthew F. Knouff and Dominique Murray, ‘Admissibility of non- U.S. electronic evidence’ 
(2012) XVIII Rich J J & Tech 9; Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom and Melissa M. O’Toole- Loureiro, 
‘Authentication of social media evidence’ (2013) 36(3) American Journal of Trial Advocacy 433.
6.29 Two cases from the US and one from England and Wales serve to illustrate 
this point. In State of New Jersey v Swed,1 the defendant was convicted of obtaining 
electricity without payment, and part of the evidence comprised computer printouts 
identifying the defendant as a customer with a registered address. The defendant 
contended that there was insufficient foundation for the admission of the printouts. 
In reaching its decision, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey 
applied the six foundational requirements set out in Monarch Federal Savings & Loan 
Association v Gesner:2 personal knowledge on the part of the witness as to the act or 
event recorded was not necessary; the person called as a witness should be able to 
testify as to the type of computer used, the permanent nature of the record storage and 
how daily transactions were customarily recorded; the computer records were made 
in the ordinary course of business; the entries were made within a reasonable time 
after the transaction occurred; proof of the validity of the source of the information 
from which the entry was made was required; and the validity of the method used in 
obtaining the computer printout must be established. In each of these instances, the 
prosecution provided suitable evidence.
1 604 A.2d 978 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1992).
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6.30 In the criminal case of R v Cochrane,1 McCowan LJ, Waterhouse and Brooke JJ set 
out the following guidance in relation to electronic evidence from mainframe computers:
it was necessary that appropriate authoritative evidence should be called to 
describe the function and operation of the mainframe computer, including the 
extent to which it brought to bear information stored within it in order to validate 
a transaction and to enable an appropriate record to be made on the till roll. None 
of those matters were covered by any of the witnesses, and the judge had had to 
grapple with inadequate, and possibly, incorrect information … The Crown had 
failed to adduce adequate evidence to enable the court to properly rule that the till 
rolls were admissible evidence; and in the absence of the till rolls the Crown’s case 
could not be proved.
1 [1992] 6 WLUK 63, [1993] Crim LR 48 (CA), [1993] CLY 366.
6.31 In the context of the US, George L. Paul has indicated that ‘the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not contain a rule requiring informational records or other objects to be 
authentic. The requirement appears to be assumed’,1 and he indicates that authenticity 
is a prerequisite, because evidence must also be relevant. This observation must be 
considered to be accurate for most jurisdictions. In this part of the chapter, consideration 
is given to a number of jurisdictions and how judges have approached the authentication 
of digital data, to illustrate that comprehensive tests to demonstrate the authenticity of 
digital data are not necessary for every conceivable set of facts – an observation made by 
Erdmann J in United States v Lubich before the US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 
in which he said ‘There are numerous scenarios in which this issue will arise and we see 
no benefit in attempting to craft a “standard” test to analyze all computer data situations’.2
1 George L. Paul, Foundations of Digital Evidence (American Bar Association 2008), 39; George L. 
Paul, ‘Systems of evidence in the age of complexity’ (2014) 12(2) Ave Maria L Rev 173; for an earlier 
comment, see Rudolph J. Peritz, ‘Computer data and reliability: a call for authentication of business 
records under the Federal Rules of Evidence’ (1986) 80(4) Northwestern University Law Review 965.
2 72 M.J. 170 (2013) at 175 – the attorney for the appellant argued that the prosecution had failed 
to provide for the continuity of the evidence.
The best evidence rule
6.32 In order to circumvent forgery, the common law ‘best evidence rule’ 
established that original material be used whenever possible. This requires ‘the party 
who claims to put the contents of a writing in evidence [to] produce [the original], 
or account for its absence’.1 Each original must be attested by witnesses ‘that it 
was sealed and delivered’2 and it must be ‘the best that the nature of the case will 
allow’.3 The rule is traceable to the ancient method of trial by charter, where there 
could be no trial without the charter, and ultimately led to the requirement that 
original documents be produced in court.4 The best evidence rule was thus based on 
the premise that no evidence other than the original was admissible unless secondary 
evidence, or proof other than the original, was admissible as an exception to this rule.
1 R v Richard John Frankland (1863) Le. & Ca. 276, 169 ER 1394.
2 Doctor Leyfield’s Case (1572) 10 Co Rep 88, 77 ER 1057 at 9.
3 Steyner v The Burgesses of Droitwich (1700) Holt KB 290, 90 ER 1059; Omychund v Barker (1745) 
1 Atk 21, 49, 26 ER 15 at 33.
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6.33 In the electronic environment, as originals do not exist other than for ‘a 
nanosecond’ when they are being made or received, the best evidence rule appears 
to be inapplicable. However, one can abide by the spirit of the law, rather than by its 
letter, by focusing on the primitiveness of the document, and on its completeness and 
effectiveness.
6.34 When a digital document is saved upon its creation or receipt, it is taken apart 
and separated into its digital components. When it is subsequently retrieved, and each 
time it is viewed, a copy is generated which, though not easily distinguishable from the 
original, is never identical to it, at least in regard to metadata, as the actions of closing, 
opening and navigating attach additional information to the document. Thus, although 
an original is generated when a document is first composed or received, upon closure 
it disappears and, as a consequence, there are no originals in the digital environment. 
As a further consequence, it is impossible to preserve digital entities: we can only 
preserve the ability to reproduce them from their digital components, or, in a database, 
regenerate them from content data, form data and composition data.1
1 Duranti and Thibodeau, ‘The concept of record in interactive, experiential and dynamic 
environments’.
6.35 The fact that digital entities are capable of being reproduced in an almost 
identical fashion (at least to the human eye) poses the question of whether the original 
document rule is now redundant. Although this rule was abolished in the Uniform 
Evidence Acts in Australia, it still exists in some jurisdictions, such as Canada, and, 
without legislative acknowledgement of the true nature of digital evidence, courts 
may not be alerted to the need to consider that electronic documents that have the 
same formal presentation of the original can indeed be considered as having the same 
authority.1
1 In the digital environment it is important to distinguish formal presentation (that is what one sees 
on a screen and can print out) from technological presentation (the format of the document). Thus, a 
Word document and a PDF/ A look the same on the screen (they have the same formal presentation) 
but their stored components are different. One important difference is that a Word document is 
changeable, but has metadata that can be examined, while a PDF/ A is immutable, but has no metadata.
6.36 The absence of an original as the first complete and effective instantiation of a 
digital document does not mean that there is no one such instantiation capable of acting 
as an original, of having the authority and the force of an original, due to its degree of 
completeness: in the digital world, we refer to this as integrity. Likewise, the fact that 
every time a digital entity is recalled a new one is generated does not imply that the 
outcome cannot be what it purports to be, and that its content cannot be presumed 
reliable and accurate. This requires us to consider how the digital environment has 
separated the fundamental components of documentary trustworthiness that had 
flowed together in the seventeenth century: reliability, accuracy and authenticity.
Identity and integrity
6.37 Documentary authenticity in the digital environment is defined as the 
trustworthiness of a document – it is what it purports to be, untampered with and 
uncorrupted. Authenticity is based on the identity and integrity of a document.1 
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distinguish it from other documents. They include the names of the persons concurring 
in its creation (author, addressee, writer, originator, creator), its date(s) of creation 
(making, receipt, filing) and transmission, the matter or action in which it participates, 
the expression of its contextual relationships with other documents (classification 
code) and an indication of any attachment(s).
1 Heather MacNeil, ‘Providing grounds for trust: developing conceptual requirements for the 
long- term preservation of authentic electronic records’ (2000) 50 Archivaria 52; MacNeil, ‘Providing 
grounds for trust II’.
6.38 Integrity refers to the quality of being complete and unaltered in all essential 
respects. We have never been fussy about it – consider a document that had holes, 
was burned on a side or where the ink passed through to the verso of it. In the 
analogue environment, the same definition of integrity was used with respect to 
data, documents, records and record systems. In the digital environment, integrity 
might refer to different things. It might refer to bitwise integrity, often identified with 
data integrity, which means that the data in the document are not modified either 
intentionally or accidentally, and that the original bits are in a complete and unaltered 
state from the time of capture, in that they have the exact and same order and value. 
In a digital entity, a small change in bits means a very different value is presented on 
the screen or action taken by a program or database (by way of example, 101 is a 5, 
110 is 6 and 011 is a 3 – same bits, different order). Compromised bitwise integrity is 
revealed by digital signatures and emerging technologies such as blockchain.1 Integrity 
might also refer to duplication. When we intentionally duplicate digital entities (rather 
than doing so in the act of accessing them), we either make a copy or take a forensic 
image. A copy is a selective duplicate in that you can only copy what you see. It rarely 
includes confirmation of completeness and provides an incomplete picture of the 
digital environment. A forensic image is a bit- for- bit copy of a storage medium and 
its content, including ambient data (such as snapshots of each open file), swap space 
(virtual memory, with passwords and encryption keys) and slack space (the unused 
space which contains deleted material).2
1 See the section on technological authentication below.
2 Ambient data refers to the data saved through the process of auto- save functions included with 
office productivity programs, which write temporary snapshots of an open file to the disk at set 
intervals. Swap space is the portion of the hard disk that the system uses as extension of its RAM 
during operation. It is termed as virtual memory in the Windows world. Forensic investigators recover 
significant ephemeral data such as password and encryption keys from swap space. Slack space refers 
to the space available on a cluster even after an active file is stored in some part of that cluster. This 
arises from the fact that space is allocated in fixed cluster sizes even if the file size is less than the 
cluster size. The data present in the remaining area of the cluster is not overwritten and reflects data 
about a past file that was using the cluster, and is called slack.
6.39 When digital material is duplicated either for forensic purposes or to be 
submitted as evidence, two principles must be respected: the Principle of Non- 
interference, which means that the method used to reproduce or recreate digital 
entities does not change them, and the Principle of Identifiable Interference, which 
means that, if the method used does alter the entities, the changes are identified and 
identifiable and that information is provided about who and what introduced the 
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6.40 These conceptual changes affect authentication of digital entities. In the digital 
environment, we regard authentication as a declaration of authenticity at one point 
in time, based on either direct knowledge, material proof, inference or deduction.1 
Fundamentally, the conceptual basis for the authentication of digital material 
remains the same as for analogue material: a chain of legitimate custody for inferring 
authenticity; a digital continuity of evidence (also called chain of custody) to preserve 
information about the material and its changes, to show that specific data was in a 
particular state at a given date and time; a declaration of the author or a witness; and 
the affidavit of a digital evidence professional who bases his or her testimony on the 
trustworthiness of the system hosting the digital material, and on the procedures and 
processes controlling its maintenance and use. The latter is becoming increasingly 
relevant in some jurisdictions, such as Canada, where the idea was formally introduced 
in the late 1990s.2
1 Government of Canada Standards Board 72.34- 2017, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence, 3.
2 Luciana Duranti, Corinne Rogers and Anthony Sheppard, ‘Electronic records and the law of 
evidence in Canada: the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act twelve years later’ (2010) 70 Archivaria 95.
6.41 Thus, when considering digital evidence, an ‘original’ electronic document can 
no longer be equated with an ‘authentic’ electronic document.1 Where a law such as 
the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (Canada) shifts the focus from the best evidence 
rule, which is concerned with document integrity, to the authentication rule, which 
is concerned with its primitiveness, this is primarily due to the fact that computer- 
generated or computer- stored information may lack stability of form and content. 
Furthermore, there may be instances where, to assure its continued accessibility, a 
digital object is purposely migrated from one system to another and converted from 
one format to another to deal with technological obsolescence. It follows, therefore, 
that the ability to prove the authenticity of a digital object is not equal to proving that 
an ‘original’ exists. The issue is about trustworthiness, or the lack of it. Proving the 
authenticity of a digital object means providing sufficient evidence to convince an 
adjudicator that the object that has been retrieved is a faithful representation of what 
is claimed was the ‘original’, or a reliable representation of the object that was made by 
the originator or relied upon by the recipient and the user, or only the user.
1 Paul, Foundations of Digital Evidence, 48– 49; Steven W. Teppler, ‘Digital data as hearsay’ (2009) 6 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 7, 9 n 18; Stephen Mason, ‘Electronic evidence 
and the meaning of “original” ’ (2009) 79 Amicus Curiae 26, http:// sas- space.sas.ac.uk/ 2565/ ; Luciana 
Duranti and Corinne Rogers, ‘Trust in digital records: an increasingly cloudy legal area’ (2012) 28(5) 
Computer Law and Security Review 522, 527 with further references.
Reliability
6.42 Documentary reliability is defined as the trustworthiness of the content of 
a document as fact. Inferences can be drawn from factors such as competence (the 
authority and capacity) of the author, the completeness of the form and the control 
over the process of production of the document. On these bases, all public documents 
are considered reliable and so are all business records, which constitute an exception 
to the hearsay rule because of why they are generated and the process through which 
they are generated.1 Reliability, however, does not imply accuracy.
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6.43 Documentary accuracy is defined as the correctness and precision of the data 
in the digital entity, based on the competence of the author and the controls on content 
recording and transmission. During transmission the data in a reliable document may 
change and the document may become inaccurate.1
1 See Ontology C, http:// www.interpares.org/ ip2/ display_ file.cfm?doc=ip2_ ontology.pdf.
6.44 The concepts of integrity and reliability are also closely linked. For instance, in 
Canada, s 31.5 of the Canada Evidence Act provides as follows:
For the purposes of subsection 31.2(1), in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
the integrity of an electronic documents system by or in which an electronic 
document is recorded or stored is proven (a) by evidence capable of supporting 
a finding that at all material times the computer system or other similar device 
used by the electronic documents system was operating properly or, if it was not, 
the fact of its not operating properly did not affect the integrity of the electronic 
document and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of 
the electronic documents system.
6.45 The introduction of the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (UEEA) provides that 
the integrity of the digital material submitted for admissibility could be inferred from 
the integrity of the electronic system in which the material is stored. Therefore, if a 
litigant offering an electronic record as evidence can show that the system producing 
or storing it operates in the way it is expected to, the output satisfies the evidentiary 
requirements, regardless of its form.
6.46 The Uniform Law Conference of Canada commentary for the UEEA states:
This Act focuses on replacing the search for originality, proving the reliability 
of systems instead of that of individual records, and using standards to show 
systems reliability.
6.47 As a factor in determining the reliability of a system, s 6 of the Uniform Electronic 
Evidence Act (Canada) replaced the traditional identification of individual records by 
a witness, or other foundation evidence, with proof of compliance of the system with 
recognized records management standards, procedures, usages or practices.1 Section 
6 of the UEEA (Canada) provides:
For the purpose of determining under any rule of law whether an electronic 
record is admissible, evidence may be presented [in any legal proceeding] in 
respect of any standard, procedure, usage or practice on how electronic records 
are to be recorded or stored, having regard to the type of business or endeavour 
that used, recorded or stored the electronic record and the nature and purpose 
of the electronic record.
1 Duranti and others, ‘Electronic records and the law of evidence in Canada’, 105.
6.48 Section 6 does not apply to data generated by computers without human 
intervention, which are not considered hearsay and are admissible as real evidence – the 
UEEA provides guidance on the authentication of such evidence by a witness qualified 
to explain how the device operates, which is all that is required for admissibility.1 It only 
specifically applies to digital materials admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule 
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places great reliance on standards such as the Government of Canada Standard Board 
(CGSB) 72.34- 2017, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence, which specifies the 
characteristics of a system that operates in the way it is expected to and whose output 
will satisfy the evidentiary requirements, regardless of its form.2 It is worth examining 
this standard in some detail.
1 Duranti and others, ‘Electronic records and the law of evidence in Canada’, 109.
2 Government of Canada Standard Board (CGSB) 72.34, 2017, Electronic Records as Documentary 
Evidence. CAN/ CGSB- 72.34- 2017, 14– 24, https:// s3.amazonaws.com/ tld- documents.llnassets.com/ 
0014000/ 14461/ chasse2.pdf.
6.49 In its introduction, the CGSB 72:34- 2017 standard refers to s 6 of the UEEA as 
embedded in the Canada Evidence Act, as well as in most provincial and territorial 
Evidence Acts, encouraging the use of standards.1 It states:
0.3 Use of this standard in legal proceedings
In legal proceedings, this standard could inform the development of arguments 
about the definitions of the key phrases of the rules of admissibility for electronic 
records. These phrases are ‘IT system integrity’ and ‘record integrity’, as used in 
the electronic record provisions of the Evidence Acts, and records ‘made in the 
usual and ordinary course of business’ as used in the CEA.2
1 Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence. CAN/ CGSB- 72.34- 2017, s2:iv.
2 Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence. CAN/ CGSB- 72.34- 2017, s3:iv.
6.50 The standard defines an IT system as a ‘set of one or more computers, associated 
software, peripherals, terminals, human operations, physical processes, information 
transfer means, that form an autonomous whole, capable of performing information 
processing and/ or information transfer’, and IT system integrity as ‘proven capability 
of an IT system to perform its intended functions in an unimpaired manner, free from 
unauthorized manipulation, whether intentional or accidental, and the fact that it did 
so when the recorded information was generated and used’. It is important to know that 
this standard, like the legislation, focuses on the integrity of the system when discussing 
authentication, rather than on its reliability. The standard does consider reliability and 
defines it as the ‘quality of a system that has been tested, subjected to peer review or 
publication, accepted within the relevant scientific community and whose known or 
potential error rate is acceptable’, but only in relation to its recommendations on how 
organizations should manage their records.1
1 These definitions are in Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence. CAN/ CGSB- 72.34- 2017 at 
ss 3.36, 3.37 and 3.38, 5.
6.51 In s 5.2.2 the Standard states that ‘the law of evidence provides that the best 
evidence rule can be satisfied by proof of the integrity of the records system, as in 
subs. 31.2(1)(a) of the CEA’, and that ‘such integrity is proven, in the absence of proof 
to the contrary, by evidence that: (a) the electronic records system was at all material 
times operating properly or, if it was not, the fact of its not operating properly did not 
affect the integrity of the electronic record, and there are no other reasonable grounds 
to doubt the integrity of the system. (e.g. subs. 31.3(a) of the CEA)’.1
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6.52 In s 5.2.4 the Standard identifies the factors that can be used to prove the 
integrity of an organization’s electronic records system. They include:
(a) sources: the origin of the data in its electronic records is known;
(b) contemporaneous recording: the electronic records are made or received or 
stored within a reasonable time after the events to which they relate, or stored 
within a reasonable time after they are received;
(c) routine business data: the data within a record is of a type regularly supplied 
to the originating organisation, or created by it during its regular activities;
(d) data entry: the data entry procedures are part of the usual and ordinary 
course of business of the organisation, and are carried out in compliance with 
the RM manual and IT system management guide (see 6.4 and 6.5);
(e) standards: the organisation complies with applicable electronic records 
management standards (as per 6.3.2. b);
(f) decision making: the organisation, when making decisions, relies upon the 
electronic records in its electronic records system;
(g) software: the organisation’s software reliably operates the electronic records 
system and processes its data;
(h) system changes: a record of record system changes and alterations is kept;
(i) privacy: the use of the data in the organisation’s electronic records complies 
with the relevant Canadian, provincial and territorial privacy statutes governing 
the collection, use or disclosure of personal information, confidential commercial 
information, trade secrets, privileges or other confidential information; and
(j) security: security procedures, such as protection against unauthorized access 
and disaster recovery plans, are used to guarantee the integrity of the electronic 
records system. 1
1 Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence. CAN/ CGSB- 72.34- 2017, 10– 11.
6.53 Proof of these factors has to be provided by the organization’s records 
management manual (s 6.4 of the Standard, 16– 20) and the IT system management 
guide (s 6.5 of the Standard, 20– 24). From the number of inferences that need to be 
made to establish authenticity and the requirements for system management, it is 
clear that system security is vital to authentication of the digital entities stored in the 
system.1
1 See Denco Limited v Joinson [1991] 1 WLR 330, [1992] 1 All ER 413, [1990] 11 WLUK 224, [1991] 
ICR 172, [1991] IRLR 63, Times, 22 November 1990, [1991] CLY 1679 where Wood J observed that the 
members of the industrial tribunal were ‘extremely critical of the security arrangements made by the 
employers in connection with the use of the computer’ ([1991] ICR 172 at 178).
6.54 The Canadian legislation recognizes that the authenticity of the digital evidence 
as created and stored within a computer system is tied to the integrity of the system. 
If there is evidence of the integrity of the computer system, which can be provided 
by a witness who has knowledge of such system and can attest that it was operating 
properly at the time the digital evidence was created or stored in it, the evidence can 
be authenticated. However, the evidence of system integrity can still be rebutted. If 
the party challenging the evidence convinces the judge that they have good reason for 
doing so, it will then be for the party adducing the digital evidence to demonstrate that 
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6.55 While the rebuttable presumption works for a great number of cases, because 
it means that evidence can be admitted without challenge where required, reducing 
hearing time and, therefore, expense as a result, serious problems have followed when 
systems have been presumed – as opposed to proven, or declared by a knowledgeable 
witness – to be operating correctly (as has been the case in England1). Mason is of the 
view that the presumption of ‘reliability’ of computer evidence should be questioned, 
particularly in relation to software which is, and will continue to be, unreliable.2 Mason 
points out that software is inherently complex and subject to change, whether in regard 
to the code, to the operating system or other components and other vulnerabilities, 
including being subject to ‘hacking’. Likewise, Ladkin, Littlewood, Thimbleby and 
Thomas CBE3 argue that it is a practical impossibility to develop such a system ‘so 
that the correctness of every software operation is provable to the relevant standard 
in legal proceedings’.4 The authors point out that most software contains defects at the 
rate of between 1 and 100 defects per 1,000 lines of source code.5 As a result, software 
can be inherently unreliable; yet the presumption is quite the opposite. Although this 
presumption can be rebutted, this puts the onus, and, therefore, the expense, on the 
party who wishes to rebut the presumption. This fact has been highlighted in England 
by the case of Bates v Post Office Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues) Rev 16 (the Horizon Software 
case), where a number of sub- postmasters and sub- postmistresses were prosecuted 
on the basis of the ‘robustness’ of the Horizon computer system, with some being 
imprisoned and others losing their life savings.
1 For which see the Post Office Horizon scandal in England and Wales, discussed in Chapter 5.
2 See Chapter 5.
3 Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bev Littlewood, Harold Thimbleby and Martyn Thomas CBE, ‘The Law 
Commission presumption concerning the dependability of computer evidence’ (2020) 17 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 1.
4 Ladkin and others, ‘The Law Commission presumption’, 1.
5 Ladkin and others, ‘The Law Commission presumption’, 2.
6 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB), [2019] 12 WLUK 208.
6.56 In reviewing the presumption, Ladkin and others opined that inaccuracies in 
electronic evidence are as likely to result from errors in the computer software as from 
errors in the data.1 They conclude there are three propositions that a court should 
consider when evaluating digital evidence:
1. A presumption that any particular computer system failure is not caused by 
software is not justified, even for software that has previously been shown to be 
very reliable.
2. Evidence of previous computer failure undermines a presumption of current 
proper function.
3. The fact that a class of failures has not happened before is not a reason for 
assuming it cannot occur.2
1 Ladkin and others, ‘The Law Commission presumption’, 4.
2 Ladkin and others, ‘The Law Commission presumption’, 9.
6.57 In R v Cahill, R v Pugh1 two nurses in the UK National Health System (NHS) 
were charged with falsification of readings taken with blood glucometers which 
they operated to monitor patients’ blood glucose levels. As a result of the incorrect 
glucose readings, a number of patients died. The glucometers had automatically taken 
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the manual readings taken by the nurses and written on paper did not correspond to 
any readings on the glucometers or on the database. The prosecution argued there 
were no problems with the equipment the nurses had used, and advanced the case that 
the nurses’ manual records were fabricated. It turned out that the manual readings 
were taken by the nurses as workarounds to accommodate issues with the glucometer 
system. Nurses also used their staff ID because the glucometer software had difficulties 
reading the patients’ ID. Such workarounds were accepted by the software, and meant 
a correct glucose reading was still obtained. However, the backend system had been 
configured to reject the data collected using the workarounds and store it separately for 
later ‘fixing’: these were subsequently ignored rather than being processed. Professor 
Thimbleby2 was called as an expert witness to examine this evidence of the glucometer 
readings and database provided by the prosecution. He discovered ‘that over 20 per 
cent of the database entries had an “error flag” set’, which raised his suspicions and led 
him to conclude that the matter became ‘a more complex story than the prosecution 
painted’.3 The professor concluded that this indicated that ‘nobody was paying much 
attention to the management of the database’.4 He also criticized the way in which 
police had inexplicably converted the data from the database into Excel spreadsheets 
and copied them onto USB (Universal Serial Bus) drives rather than taking a forensic 
copy of the original database. Consequently, the court excluded the evidence relied 
on by the prosecution on the basis that it was unreliable and acquitted the nurses.5 
Professor Thimbleby summarized his experience by saying that ‘the big picture is that 
nobody seems to be fully aware of the complexity and risks of IT. This results in lax 
legislation, lax regulation and lax procurement.’6
1 14 October 2014, Crown Court at Cardiff, T20141094 and T20141061 before HHJ Crowther QC, 
(2017) 14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 67.
2 Harold Thimbleby, ‘Misunderstanding IT: hospital cybersecurity and IT problems reach the courts’ 
(2018) 15 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signatures Law Review 11.
3 Thimbleby, ‘Misunderstanding IT’,16.
4 Thimbleby, ‘Misunderstanding IT’,16– 17.
5 14 October 2014, Crown Court at Cardiff, T20141094 and T20141061 before HHJ Crowther QC, 
(2017) 14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 67.
6 Thimbleby, Misunderstanding IT’, 23.
6.58 Reliability goes to the heart of authentication. Caruso and others sum up the 
problem as follows:
Electronic evidence is typically authenticated by methods which are limited to 
analysis of computer coding to determine if the machine functions according 
to its code. Putting aside issues regarding the accessibility of that code,1 and 
assuming the code is verifiable, the examples we have given earlier indicate that 
the proper functioning of the technology can be an incomplete answer to the 
authenticity of the electronic evidence produced.2
1 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, ‘Computer source code: a source of the growing controversy over 
the reliability of automated forensic techniques’ (2017) 66 DePaul Law Review 97; Professor 
Imwinkelried’s suggestions are considered in Chapter 5.
2 David Caruso, Michael Legg and Jordan Phoustanis, ‘The automation paradox in litigation: the 
inadequacy of procedure and evidence law to manage electronic evidence generated by the “Internet 
of Things” in civil disputes’ (2019) 19 Macquarie Law Journal 157, 181.
6.59 This comment does make the point that the ‘proper functioning of the 
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not automatically prove that the evidence is authentic. Further, as demonstrated by the 
cases outlined above, it is not always easy to rebut the presumption of reliability.
Methods of authentication
6.60 Since the concept of an ‘original’ is no longer useful when dealing with digital 
evidence, a digital object has to be authenticated by verifying the claims associated 
with it, such as:
1. The organizational criteria demonstrating the provenance of the digital object, 
including the documentation pertaining to the continuity of custody (and the 
extent to which this documentation can be trusted), and the extent to which the 
custodians can be trusted.
2. When the object is examined forensically, its characteristics and content 
are consistent with the claims made about it and the record of its provenance 
(although the methods used may also be subject to challenge – for instance, how 
a computer is tested for reliability or consistency of output).
3. The forensic imaging techniques are appropriate when relying on the evidence 
from a personal computer.
4. Any signatures, seals and time stamps that may be attached to the object to 
help test the claims about consistency and provenance.
Self- authentication
6.61 Self- authentication allows a document to be authenticated without the need 
for external evidence and is proof of the particulars stated within. Self- authenticating 
evidence includes certified public or official records1 such as certified copies of birth, 
marriage and death certificates. Some jurisdictions would go further and provide that 
such evidence fall within the exception to the rule against hearsay. If public or official 
records were to be admitted only through a witness who could attest to the document’s 
creation and its authenticity, trials would take much longer and be more expensive. 
Many jurisdictions provide for rules of evidence to establish the authenticity of public 
documents.2
1 Irish Society v Bishop of Derry & Raphoe (1846) 12 Cl. & Fin. 641, 8 ER 1561.
2 For Australia, see s 155 of the Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995; for England and Wales, see s 9 
of the Civil Evidence Act 1995; for Canada, see ss 24– 26 the Canada Evidence Act 1995; for the USA, 
see the Federal Rules of Evidence, s 902(1), (2) – note that Rule 902(11) also provides that business 
records as ‘records of a regularly conducted activity’ may be self- certified as authentic. This rule has 
faced some criticism, for which see Paul W. Grimm, Daniel J. Capra and Gregory J. Joseph, ‘Authenticating 
digital evidence’ (2017) 69 Baylor L Rev 1, 40.
System authentication
6.62 Most public and private organizations keep their digital material in Electronic 
Documents and Records Management Systems (EDRMS). These systems are regulated 
by national and international standards, which are essential for assessing the 
reliability and integrity of the systems through which electronic evidence is created, 
stored and managed, as well as to determine whether such electronic evidence falls 
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1. The system software should be able to present old materials as they originally 
appeared (backward compatible), and allow the sharing of materials easily with 
other systems (interoperable).
2. The software should have undergone theoretical or empirical testing and 
peer review; its error rate should be known; and it should have gained general 
acceptance within the scientific community (Daubert standard).2
3. The formats used should be non- proprietary, platform independent and 
uncompressed,3 with freely available specifications (open format) and software 
whose source code is made (freely) available and can be modified (open source).
4. The results produced by using the system should be repeatable, objective and 
verifiable.
5. The specifications of the software must be maintained and available.
6. If the software is customized, the changes must be documented (including 
comments in the software code).
7. The construction of the whole system must be documented.
1 The established record- keeping standards are: in Europe, the Model requirements (Moreq) series 
of standards, https:// moreq.info/ ; in the US, the Department of Defense 5015.2- 2007 standard: https:// 
www.esd.whs.mil/ Portals/ 54/ Documents/ DD/ issuances/ dodm/ 501502std.pdf; in Canada, the CGSB 
72.34- 2017 standard: https:// www.scc.ca/ en/ standardsdb/ standards/ 28933; and internationally the 
International Council on Archives Requirements, ICA- Req standards: https:// www.ica.org/ en/ ica- req 
(requires a username and password).
2 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Daubert rules 
are a generally accepted standard for records systems in the US: https:// www.law.cornell.edu/ wex/ 
daubert_ standard.
3 Note that the Moreq standard and Department of Defense 5015.2- 2007 standard recognize the 
use of compression for archiving.
6.63 The integrity of any system, not only EDRMS, should be inferred from sufficient 
security measures1 to prevent unauthorized or untracked access to the computers, 
networks, devices or storage; and stable physical devices that will ensure the values 
they were provided with should be maintained until changed with authorization. 
These devices include user names and permissions, passwords, firewalls and logs. 
While the first three are self- explanatory, the logs deserve a more detailed discussion, 
because they are an important part of the authentication of the system and the digital 
material stored in it. Logs are sets of files automatically created to track the actions 
taken, services run, or files accessed or modified, and the time, identity of the person 
undertaking the action and their location. They can be separated into:
1. Web logs (Client IP Address, Request Date/ Time, Page Requested, HTTP Code, 
Bytes Sent, Browser Type, etc.).
2. Access logs (User account ID, User IP address, File Descriptor, Actions taken 
upon record, Unbind record, Closed connection).
3. Transaction logs (History of actions taken on a system to ensure Atomicity, 
Consistency, Isolation, Durability (ACID)2); Sequence number; Link to previous 
log; Transaction ID; Type; Updates, commits, aborts, completes).
4. Auditing Logs. They are increasing required by law to demonstrate the 
integrity of the system. If properly configured, and if their access is restricted, 
they can provide checks and balances, determine effective security policies, 
catch errors that occur, provide instantaneous notification of events, monitor 








Authenticating electronic evidence 257
of people, provide the necessary snapshot for post- event reconstruction (‘black- 
box’), and, if retained for a long enough time, have the capability to answer the 
Who- What- Where- When questions.
1 From a practical point of view, when organizations and individuals entrust their data, documents 
or records to cloud providers, it is not possible to verify the integrity of the data centres where the 
digital material is stored. Thus, it is only possible to examine the security measures agreed upon in 
the contract between provider and user, and make an inference of authenticity from these criteria. 
Contrary to common belief, security is usually higher in the cloud than in anyone’s in- house repository, 
if the user is willing to pay for it. In fact, cloud providers have the ability to offer more complex and 
expensive technologies and centralized controls than would be available at any single organization. 
This means it is arguable that, in the cloud environment, security can be considered the equivalent of 
authenticity.
2 ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability) is an acronym and mnemonic device for 
learning and remembering the four primary attributes ensured to any transaction by a transaction 
manager (which is also called a transaction monitor). Atomicity: in a transaction involving two or 
more discrete pieces of information, either all of the pieces are committed or none are. Consistency: a 
transaction either creates a new and valid state of data, or, if any failure occurs, returns all data to its 
state before the transaction was started. Isolation: a transaction in process and not yet committed must 
remain isolated from any other transaction. Durability: committed data is saved by the system in such 
a way that, even in the event of a failure and system restart, the data is available in its correct state.
6.64 While any system can be authenticated on the basis of a thorough examination 
by an expert of the security measures mentioned above, EDRMS must be shown to 
protect documents from accidental loss or corruption as well as hardware and 
software obsolescence. This has more to do with management of the system and its 
contents than with technology. Thus, a witness who is knowledgeable of procedures 
and processes in the organization should be able to attest that the system is backed up 
at least once a day, using the best backup technique for the circumstances and ensuring 
that the backup system includes an audit trail. It should be noted that the purpose of 
the backup is to recover the system in case of failure, and backups are destroyed on 
a regular basis. Ideally, duplicates of documents should be maintained on additional 
hard drives. If they are stored on tapes or discs, it is necessary to refresh and upgrade 
them periodically. Considering that the integrity of the electronic system guarantees 
the trustworthiness of the documents stored in them, at least in Canada (and de facto 
also in the United States), it is important for organizations to eliminate dependence on 
specific hardware by transferring all its functionalities to the software (this is where IT 
departments can help); to plan for regular technology upgrades (keeping in mind the 
need for backward compatibility); to consider external storage for infrequently used 
documents; and, if documents are removed from the live system, to associate with it 
the system documentation and all the necessary information about the material to be 
able to maintain accessibility and to understand the content of the material itself.1
1 For the characteristics of EDRMS that ensure the trustworthiness of the records created and/ or 
stored in them, see InterPARES 2 Project, Creator Guidelines, http:// www.interpares.org/ ip2/ display_ 
file.cfm?doc=ip2(pub)creator_ guidelines_ booklet.pdf.
Digital certification
6.65 Digital certification may be a way of proving the authenticity of evidence. 
However, such certification can only be as reliable as the method used to generate 
digital certificates, for example in a public key infrastructure where the certification 
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being verified.1 The most significant issue with the authenticity certificates issued by 
certifying authorities is that they are usually valid for no longer than five years.2
1 See Chapter 7, ‘Electronic signatures’ for a detailed explanation of digital signatures.
2 See Hrvoje Stančić, ‘Authentication’, in Luciana Duranti and Corinne Rogers, (eds) Trusting Records 
in the Cloud (Facet Publishers and the Society of American Archivists 2019), 131– 154. For a detailed 
technical explanation and how such systems fail, see Chapter 7, ‘Electronic signatures’.
6.66 Other forms of digital certification include the use of checksums or of ‘hash 
algorithms’, such as MD5 or SHA- 1, which, once generated, can be compared with 
those generated on later versions of the digital document to ascertain whether any 
changes have occurred to the document. These methods prove the bitwise integrity of 
the digital documents, and are one way to demonstrate the continuity of evidence and 
that the document has not been tampered with, if the metadata showing it is part of the 
checksum or the hash.
Digital forensics
6.67 If the evidence is collected in such a way that the continuity of evidence is not 
preserved from the time of collection until its presentation at trial, this may affect its 
admissibility or, if admitted, the weight that the court may attach to it. To obviate this 
challenge, a specialist ‘science’ known as computer forensics or digital forensics has 
evolved to assist the court. Digital forensics encompasses four elements: identification, 
preservation, analysis and presentation. Safeguards and methodologies used by digital 
evidence professionals must preserve evidence in a way that will withstand both 
judicial scrutiny and challenges raised by an opposing party, should the matter go to 
trial.1
1 This topic is discussed in detail in Chapter 9. See also Luciana Duranti, ‘From digital diplomatics 
to digital records forensics’ (2009) 68 Archivaria 39; Luciana Duranti and Barbara Endicott- Popovsky, 
‘Digital records forensics: a new science and academic program for forensic readiness’ (2010) 5.2 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law 45; and Luciana Duranti and Corinne Rogers, ‘Memory 
forensics: integrating digital forensics with archival science for trusting records and data’, eForensics 
Magazine (October 2013).
Extrinsic and circumstantial evidence
6.68 Circumstantial evidence is evidence of a fact from which the existence of the fact in 
issue may be inferred. Circumstantial evidence can be differentiated from direct evidence, 
which is evidence that directly supports an assertion. For example, circumstantial 
evidence would include testimony of a witness who saw a person leaving a murder 
scene carrying a blood- stained knife, but who did not actually see the person killing the 
deceased. With respect to digital evidence, circumstantial evidence can be necessary to 
prove, for example, that a person wrote a particular email, or placed a particular post 
on a social media site. Circumstantial evidence can be important, since some judges are 
reluctant to accept testimony from the recipient of messages as a sufficient basis for 
authentication.1
1 Elizabeth A. Flanagan, ‘#Guilty? Sublet v. State and the authentication of social media evidence in 
criminal proceedings’ (2016) 61 Vill L R 287, 298.
6.69 Circumstantial evidence is particularly important when attempting to authenticate 
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anyone can create a profile using a false name, and someone else might obtain access to 
another person’s profile if they gain access to their username and password.1
1 Flanagan, ‘#Guilty? ’, 301.
6.70 Grimm, Capra and Joseph note that the ‘standard for establishing authenticity 
of digital evidence is the same mild standard as for traditional forms of evidence’.1 
For example, if the sender of an email denies having written the email, then the 
party tendering the email will need to provide a wide array of evidence to prove the 
identity of the sender. This may be difficult, unless the party tendering the email has 
circumstantial evidence to show the sender was at a particular place at a particular 
time and the balance of probabilities (for civil matters) is that she did send the email.
1 Paul W. Grimm, Daniel J. Capra and Gregory J. Joseph, ‘Authenticating digital evidence’, 5.
Judicial notice
6.71 Judicial notice may be taken of evidence where the facts are so notorious or well 
known that they cannot reasonably be doubted. Such evidence does not need to be 
admitted through a witness and can be admitted at the request of one party. Wigmore 
sums up the rule as follows:
The object of this rule is to save time, labor, and expense in securing and 
introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and 
are actually not bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can safely be assumed 
from the tribunal’s general knowledge or from slight research on its part ... It thus 
becomes a useful expedient for speeding trials and curing informalities.1
1 John Henry Wigmore, A Pocket Code of the Rules of Evidence in Trials at Law (Little, Brown & Co 
1910), 2120.
6.72 The common law ‘notorious instrument’ presumption allows courts to presume 
that readings from scientific instruments are accurate. The courts, however, tend to 
be slow to recognize any newly developed scientific devices.1 Once judicial notice has 
been taken of a fact, arguably no evidence in rebuttal is admissible.2 However, some 
judges have been critical of judicial notice being taken of facts based on incorrect 
assumptions. Judge Harvey refers to the following passage made by Fogarty J in Senior 
v Police:
The Court takes judicial notice that persons who use Facebook are very aware 
that the contents of Facebook are often communicated to persons beyond the 
‘friends’ who use Facebook. When information is put on a Facebook page, to 
which hundreds of people have access, the persons putting the information on 
the page know that that information will likely extend way beyond the defined 
class of ‘friends’. Very strong personal abuse directed at a former partner, placed 
on Facebook, read by a large number of friends, some of whom will inevitably 
have contact in the natural social network with the person being abused, is at the 
very least highly reckless.3
1 Harvey, ‘Digital evidence admissibility: some issues’; this topic is dealt with more extensively in 
Chapter 5.
2 J. D. Heydon, Cross on Evidence (12th edn, LexisNexis 2020), 229.
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6.73 Judge Harvey criticized this passage on the basis it relied on an incorrect 
assumption: it wrongly assumes that ‘a person who posts to a network of friends is 
aware that publication is being made to the world’, or that a posting will come to the 
attention of a particular person.1 Judge Harvey says that, in his view, ‘that cannot be 
assumed and should be the subject of proof’ and that ‘the sweeping assumption by 
Fogarty J couched in the concept of judicial notice, cannot be sustained and should 
be treated with extreme caution’. Further, given the lack of discussion and analysis of 
the facts or evidence that led to the assumption, Judge Harvey stated that ‘in some 
respects, it creates a reversal of the burden of proof’. Importantly, Judge Harvey goes 
on to say:
Working on the assumption that posting material on a Facebook page is 
automatically intended to be communicated to the 2 billion per month Facebook 
subscribers, a defendant then has the burden of proving that in fact this was 
not the case and evidence would have to be led that the various settings on 
the particular Facebook account did not permit this to take place. In reality the 
burden should be on the prosecution to exclude such a possibility.2
1 Harvey, ‘Digital evidence admissibility: some issues’, 13.
2 Harvey, ‘Digital evidence admissibility: some issues’, 13.
6.74 The fact recognized by judicial notice in Senior v Police was adopted in the later 
case of S v S,1 where, in Judge Harvey’s view, the incorrect generalization was extended 
to all social media platforms. Judge Harvey sums up the position as follows:
The utilisation of digital technologies and the way that they are treated by lawyers 
and the Courts requires a rigorous approach and a journey into unfamiliar 
territory by both lawyers and judges.2
1 [2017] NZHC 1574.
2 Harvey, ‘Digital evidence admissibility: some issues’, 15.
6.75 In our view, Judge Harvey correctly sums up the position with respect to the 
assumptions made by courts and digital technology.
Digital evidence in archival systems
6.76 When the documentary material submitted as documentary evidence is in the 
custody of an archival institution, archival description (that is, inventories) acquires a 
primary authentication function. The authentication function of archival description 
is a collective attestation of the authenticity of the documents or records in an 
archival fonds (the Canadian expression ‘archival fonds’ is equivalent to ‘archive’ in 
British usage, and ‘archives’ in Australian and American usage) as well as of all their 
interrelationships; in other words, authenticity in their documentary context. Archival 
description provides a historical view of the records and of their transformations 
while maintaining the bond of their common provenance and destination. Archival 
description of permanent digital records relies on metadata as evidence about a 
record’s identity and integrity, which is discussed in more detail below.
6.77 The authenticity of the documentary material of an organization can be 
presumed if such organization or the archival institution to which it transfers its 
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mission is to provide reliable, long- term access to managed digital resources to its 
designated community, now and in the future.’1 Trusted Digital Repositories (TDR) 
are expensive and require professionals with specific and costly qualifications to 
operate them. There are few ‘trusted’ repositories that are ‘trustworthy’. Regardless 
of certification, TDRs appear to be trusted only when they are in a trusted ‘place of 
preservation’ such as archives or a library.2
1 RLG- OCLC report Trusted Digital Repositories: Attributes and Responsibilities, 5, https:// www.oclc.
org/ content/ dam/ research/ activities/ trustedrep/ repositories.pdf.
2 Devan Ray Donaldson and Paul Conway, ‘User conceptions of trustworthiness for digital archival 
documents’ (2015) 66(12) Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology 2427.
6.78 The two exemplary models of TDRs both come from research activities. The first 
was the Open Archival Information System (OAIS), created by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), which became an ISO standard in 2003, revised in 
2012 as ISO 14721:2012 and as Trusted Third Party Repository ISO 17068: 2012 and 
2017.1 The second was the Chain of Preservation Model generated by the InterPARES 
research project.2
1 Consultative Committee for Space Data System, Reference Model for an Open Archival Information 
System (OAIS), (June 2021), https:// public.ccsds.org/ pubs/ 650x0m2.pdf.
2 Chain of Preservation Model: http:// www.interpares.org/ display_ file.cfm?doc=ip2_ COP_ diagrams 
(complete).pdf.
6.79 The OAIS model was not developed by archival specialists, neither was it 
intended for archival institutions. Rather, it was conceived as a preservation system 
internal to an organization, such as NASA. It offers a conceptual framework for digital 
preservation that describes, in a technologically neutral manner, the activities and the 
information that are necessary for trustworthy preservation. Effectively, it has defined 
the universe of discourse for digital preservation in a variety of contexts around the 
world. It details the authorized custody services of a Trusted Third Party Repository 
(TTPR) in order to ensure provable authenticity of the clients’ digital records and serve 
as a source of reliable evidence. It describes the services and processes to be provided 
by a TTPR for the clients’ digital records during the retention period to ensure trust. It 
also details the criteria of ‘trustworthiness’ and the particular requirements of TTPR 
services, hardware and software systems, and management. Its limitation is that the 
authorized custody of the stored material is by way of an agreement between only the 
third party and the client.
6.80 The InterPARES project recognized that digital preservation requires a Chain 
of Preservation (COP) that ensures that digital records survive uncorrupted from 
creation through their migration from one system to another. The phrase ‘Chain 
of Preservation’ was chosen to indicate that all the activities to manage records 
throughout their existence are linked, as in a chain, and are interdependent. If a link 
in the chain fails, the chain cannot do its job. If certain actions are not undertaken on 
documentary evidence, its trustworthiness and preservation are imperilled. Any break 
in how digital information has been preserved could make it impossible to assert that 
what remains is what it should be.
6.81 The COP is realized by implementing controls that ensure that the requirements 
for preservation are satisfied throughout the life of the records. The COP is reflected, 
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These are identity and integrity metadata. Identity metadata include, but are not 
limited to:
(1) Names of the persons concurring in the creation of the digital entity (e.g. 
author, writer, addressee, originator, creator, etc.);
(2) Date(s) and time(s) of issuing, transmission and receipt;
(3) The matter or action in which the entity participates;
(4) The expression of its relationship to other entities (e.g. classification code);
(5) Documentary form (e.g. report);
(6) Digital presentation (e.g. pdf);
(7) The indication of any attachment(s);
(8) Possible presence of digital signature; and
(9) Name of the person responsible for the business matter.
6.82 Integrity metadata include, but are not limited to:
(1) Name(s) of handling persons/ offices over time;
(2) Name of person/ office responsible for keeping the entity;
(3) Indication of annotations;
(4) Indication of technical changes;
(5) Indication of presence or removal of digital signature;
(6) Checksum;
(7) Time of planned removal from the system (migration);
(8) Time of transfer to a custodian (archives program or institution);
(9) Time of planned deletion; and
(10) Existence and location of duplicates outside the system.
6.83 Given the nature of digital material, the integrity of the digital environment is of 
greater concern than that of the identity metadata. If the server is stable, it is possible 
to be confident that the creator’s records are what they purport to be, and therefore for 
all intents and purposes they can be presumed authentic.
6.84 By scrutinizing the digital records preservation practice in the context of 
the authenticity metadata listed above, it is possible to say that digital records 
authentication can be broken down into at least two tiers. The first, and most important, 
tier for the presumption of authenticity is to audit the integrity of the preservation 
system in which records are kept.1 To date there are a number of ways metadata 
are included in this tier: the use of checksums, the conduct of visual inspection and 
the comparison with duplicated material in a parallel system. The checksum can be 
easily verified, whereas the comparison often goes undocumented. The second tier 
for the presumption of authenticity moves from audit of integrity to the verification of 
identity. Identity metadata are provided during the process of making, transmitting, 
receiving and storing the digital entity. The identity metadata rely on how the creator’s 
system (for instance, an EDRMS) works to encapsulate the entirety of the state of the 
digital evidence as used by the creator in the ordinary course of business. Thus, to 
authenticate material that has been preserved in a system other than the one in which 
it was generated and/ or received, it is necessary to authenticate all digital systems 
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used over time to store such material and focus on the sum total of what can be said 
about the evidence from its creation to its preservation (and subsequent retrieval 
and use).
1 This is of course independent of the trustworthiness of the preserver. If the material submitted as 
evidence is preserved in a digital preservation system by a public archival institution, presumption of 
authenticity, until proof to the contrary, is a given.
Technological authentication
Digital signatures
6.85 The most common form of technological authentication for records is the secure 
digital signature. Such a signature acts to protect bitwise integrity, verifies a record’s 
origin (part of its identity) and makes a record indisputable and incontestable (non- 
repudiation1). The digital signature has been given legal value mainly by legislative 
acts,2 is enabled through complex and costly public- key infrastructures (PKI) and 
ensures authenticity of information across space (transmission from a person to 
another), though not through time. This is because it is subject to obsolescence, it 
compounds the problem of preservation, as it cannot be migrated with the record it is 
attached to, and the certificates linked to it have an expiry date. Archival science tells 
us that a digital signature has the function of a seal, in that it is attached to a document 
that is complete without it, rather than that of a signature, which is an essential 
part of a record, so it can be removed and substituted with metadata attesting to its 
presence at the time of transmission and receipt. This is largely the position taken by 
evidence law in common law countries. A detailed discussion of digital signatures and 
the challenges they present when the documents to which they are attached must be 
maintained for longer than 2– 5 years can be found in Chapter 7.
1 For the meaning of ‘non- repudiation’ and its limits, see Chapter 7, Electronic signatures.
2 For a list, see ‘World electronic signature legislation’ (2019) 16 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 135, https:// journals.sas.ac.uk/ deeslr/ article/ view/ 5092.
Blockchain
6.86 The blockchain is a type of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), a concept 
referring to the maintenance of a decentralized data repository geographically spread 
across multiple sites, multiple countries and multiple organizations. The blockchain is 
the underlying technology that enables the virtual currency Bitcoin. It is a ledger – an 
information store that keeps a final and definitive (immutable) trace of transactions 
(their hash codes1). To operate, it relies upon a distributed network, given that all 
nodes and servers are equal, and on decentralized consensus, with no centre(s) and 
no single point of control or attack. The confirmed and validated sets of transactions 
are held in blocks, which are linked (chained) in a chain that is tamper- resistant and 
append- only. A blockchain starts with the genesis block, and each block contains, in 
addition to the hash of a predetermined number of documents, a hash of the prior 
block in the chain (referred to as the Merkle tree).
1 A hash code is computed from the base number using an algorithm. It is nearly impossible to derive 
without original data. It typically uses 128bit or greater algorithms, so 2128. The hash code compresses bits 
of a message into a fixed- size value; thus, it is extremely difficult to come up with original records based 











264 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
6.87 A blockchain can be used to confirm the integrity of a record kept elsewhere, 
in that a record existed or was created at a certain point in time, although not after it 
has been time- stamped and registered in the blockchain, and the sequence of records 
leading to it. It is not a system that records business records. It holds the hash of 
records, not the records themselves. Smart contracts, which are agreements between 
parties directly written into lines of code on a blockchain, are not yet recognized as 
records. The records must still be stored and managed off chain. This is good, because 
if they were in the blockchain, they would be immutable.
6.88 Immutability is the attraction of a blockchain: it is what ensures integrity, as 
nothing can be changed in a blockchain block or removed from a block. At the same 
time, this is the central problem of blockchain. In fact, with current records, that is 
records used in the present and active course of current business, any updating or 
correction of the wrong data, any form of privacy protection, any exercise of the right to 
be forgotten, any disposition of records that are no longer needed, any system upgrade, 
and in short any change in the record, would invalidate the blockchain. Where records 
are kept or identified for continuing and possibly long- term preservation, any transfer, 
migration or addition to the records of a preservation system would invalidate the 
blockchain.
6.89 The blockchain therefore presents a problem for authentication that goes 
beyond bit- wise integrity, in that any form of indirect or circumstantial authentication 
is not possible, because the hash on the blockchain does not allow for links to the 
hash of related records or the hash of metadata. If the metadata were embedded 
in each record at creation, the hash of such record would not allow for additions 
or changes, which is always necessary when carrying out any usual and ordinary 
business.
6.90 Further, handling the decentralized (and thus trans- jurisdictional) nature of 
the blockchain is complicated. At any given time, determining the author of a record, 
the owner and what law applies is difficult, especially when dealing with code in a 
situation where different participants in different jurisdictions control the necessary 
components of the transaction. An additional issue is presented by smart contracts, 
which lack both the equivalent of a signature and the date of the completion of an 
agreement. Thus, decentralization, the attractive aspect of blockchain that takes away 
central control and democratizes it, is a problem for authentication of data in digital 
form. This is because information processing happens on a complex technological 
stack in which different technical components may be in the custody of, and operated 
by, very different participants. Some components may be under the control of a single 
organization, others under the control of business partners who are members of 
a blockchain consortium, and still others under the control of unknown third- party 
contributors. An organization’s records could be in the custody of thousands of 
independent legal entities or individuals over which the creators of the records exercise 
little or no control. The consensus mechanism, and other protocols or standards that 
determine how the blockchain operates, may not be within the decision- making 
purview of the creator (or the creator’s designated records professional). These may 
be decided by remote (and even unknown) third party developers. In many cases, 
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these protocols and standards are still unstable, and thus the reliability of the upload 
of organizational records to the blockchain could be very difficult to establish with any 
certainty.
Challenges to the authenticity of evidence in  
digital form
The cloud
6.91 Blanchette states that cloud computing has become a ‘certain kind of meta- 
infrastructure’ capable of unprecedented sustainable growth, where infrastructure 
is defined as ‘the elements of the computing ecosystem that provide services to 
applications, in contrast to the applications that provide services to users’.1 Countries 
are beginning to look at the cloud as a critical infrastructure, that is, an infrastructure 
that is vital to the functioning of their economy and society. It is therefore logical 
to expect that, in the future, IT systems, including record- keeping and preservation 
systems, will be more often than not in the cloud.
1 Jean- François Blanchette, ‘Introduction’ in Christopher S. Yoo and Jean- François Blanchette (eds) 
Regulating the Cloud. Policy for Computing Infrastructure (MIT Press 2015), 3, emphasis added.
6.92 When a user entrusts its data, documents or records to a cloud provider, and 
uses the provider’s platform and application to generate additional data, the provider 
will create metadata related to the user’s actions about data processing, management, 
and such like. While the user who creates content and stores that in the cloud owns 
that content, they do not own the metadata created by the provider. This means that 
as the user needs them to authenticate its material by demonstrating its integrity, 
the provisions of the contractual agreements between users and cloud providers will 
determine whether the user has the right to obtain access to and use the provider’s 
metadata. Usually such agreements do not discuss ownership of metadata generated 
by providers and, as a consequence, authentication of material stored in a cloud 
environment cannot be easily supported with evidence of its integrity or the integrity 
of the system.1
1 For a discussion of contractual agreements for cloud services see Jessica Bushey, Marie Demoulin 
and Robert McLelland, ‘Cloud service contracts: an issue of trust’ (2015 June) 39(2) The Canadian 
Journal of Information and Library Science 128.
6.93 Cloud providers claim certain standards for the availability of services, such 
as retrieval and access to data. This involves making available the stored material 
and also implies the availability of the infrastructure, which facilitates the retrieval 
and readability of the data. But technical difficulties might slow discovery, access and 
authentication processes; these difficulties might create an issue when, for example, 
there are deadlines imposed by a judge. Could providers also claim certain standards 
for the reliability of their services? Reliability is the characteristic of behaving 
consistently with expectations. Data stored in the cloud has the characteristic of being 
redundant, which means that multiple copies exist in multiple places; thus, the issue 







266 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
different copies see the same thing. However, compliance is difficult to verify. The 
continuing transfer of data by the cloud provider from one data centre to another for 
retention purposes might involve the loss of authenticity. Where and how the data are 
stored and maintained may affect the quality of the documents and their ability to 
serve as evidence, especially in jurisdictions where the authenticity of the document 
is an inference made from the integrity of the system where the data reside. In a cloud 
environment, the data are constantly moved, and the provider’s metadata, which reveals 
where the data were at any given time, may not be accessible, as mentioned above.
6.94 Contractual agreements with cloud providers do not generally specify how 
data, documents or records are maintained across changing technologies and data 
formats. They generally provide that users are responsible for backing up their data, 
including maintenance procedures such as proper storage, care, custody and data 
control as ‘backup procedures’. Thus, it cannot be known how the data centres protect 
data from unauthorized access, use, alteration or destruction. And these issues have to 
be resolved before issues as to the authentication of cloud data can be addressed.
6.95 In a world where the integrity of a system is an inference made from its security, 
and the integrity of the data, documents or records is an inference one makes from 
the integrity of the system, security is the new authenticity, and authentication itself 
becomes an inference based on an assessment of security levels. Organizations enforce 
security with something they know (e.g. passwords), they own (e.g. tokens), or things 
which belong to the user (e.g., biometric measurements of eyes or fingerprints; private 
keys in a PKI environment). Cloud providers enforce security by means of encryption of 
data, in storage and during transmission, and should be in a position to produce audit 
trails and access logs, and capture, maintain and make available metadata associated 
with access, retrieval, use and management of the data, in addition to those linked 
to the data themselves. Unless a contract explicitly states so, comprehensive security 
measures may not be in place; but even if they are, security still relates directly to the 
matter of data location and cross- border data flow.
6.96 The cloud is the platform of choice for mobile applications and the data 
generated using them, as well as those created for use on smart devices. Records can 
be stored in data centres anywhere in the world and the location of the records is a 
criterion in determining the law that applies in case of litigation. But providers may 
not always know where the records are at any given time and they can subcontract 
some of their services to other providers in different countries.
6.97 If the material to be submitted as evidence has been retained for a long time, 
these issues are compounded. The same hardware and software will not remain 
in service for as long as the records must be preserved, and it is doubtful that the 
technologies replacing them will be compatible with the earlier ones. Providers 
may claim to follow the standards for preservation formats, but it is not possible to 
control compliance. Furthermore, if the provider ceases to exist, becomes insolvent 
or terminates one or more of its services (for breach, inactivity or convenience), the 
records will be deleted or inaccessible. This is the case with free services, since these do 
not have an established duration and providers may close users accounts unilaterally, 
require users to delete software and applications, and prevent them from obtaining 
access to the remaining data. When the data are given back to the user, it is not certain 
that it will be in a usable and interoperable format.
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6.98 This all means that the authentication of data, documents or records created and 
stored in the cloud has to rely on circumstantial evidence, on testimony of witnesses, 
or on the existence of copies elsewhere. Otherwise, it has to rely on what is known 
about the security measures used by the provider and a presumption of authenticity, 
unless there is proof to the contrary.1
1 For an in- depth discussion of business records created and/ or stored in the cloud environment, 
see Duranti and Rogers, Trusting Records in the Cloud.
The Internet of Things
6.99 Caruso and others1 identify issues with authentication of Internet of 
Things (IoT) derived electronic evidence. Compared with traditional methods of 
authentication, they note that for IoT- derived evidence, there is ‘the absence of human 
input in the ordinary functioning of the device’.2 IoT is generating electronic evidence 
without human input and thus creating additional challenges for authentication. As 
the authors note:
The absence of human input removes the IoT- derived evidence from the purview 
of the hearsay rule because the automation of recording eliminates the potential 
human foibles and infractions against which hearsay guards. The paradox is that 
this pathway to admissible use relies on the very divorce of the IoT from human 
input, monitoring or awareness that derogates from the capacity of the human- 
centric trial to authenticate IoT- derived electronic evidence. This derogation is 
likely to become more significant as future waves of autonomous technology 
decreasingly rely on human input; whilst humans increasingly rely on these 
technologies.3
1 Caruso and others, ‘The automation paradox in litigation’; see also Anne Toomey McKenna, Amy 
C. Gaudion and Jenni L. Evans, ‘The role of satellites and smart devices: data surprises and security, 
privacy, and regulatory challenges’, (2019) 123 Penn St L Rev 591, and Marie- Helen Maras and Adam 
Scott Wandt, ‘State of Ohio v Ross Compton: internet- enabled medical device data introduced as 
evidence of arson and insurance fraud’, (2020) 24(3) E & P 321.
2 Caruso and others, ‘The automation paradox in litigation’, 176.
3 Caruso and others, ‘The automation paradox in litigation’, 177.
6.100 The Internet of Things comprises data collected by devices, which transmit such 
data to other devices including storage platforms. Such devices might include devices 
located in residences such as refrigerators, where the data generated are collected in 
a database for a variety of purposes, including garnering the ‘lifestyle conditions and 
habits of the occupants of the residence’.1 Such data collected without human input 
may be used in evidence, for example, to show the condition of the refrigerator where 
food poisoning is suspected or to monitor a patient’s medication needs.2 Likewise, 
wearable devices such as Fitbits collect all sorts of data that have been used in litigation 
as circumstantial evidence to prove the location of a person at a particular point in 
time.3
1 Caruso and others, ‘The automation paradox in litigation’, 159.
2 Caruso and others, ‘The automation paradox in litigation’, 164.
3 Nicole Chauriye, ‘Wearable devices as admissible evidence: technology is killing our opportunity 
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Digital preservation
6.101 The preservation of digital material is a continuous process that begins before 
data or documents or records1 are created and the purpose of which is to transmit 
trustworthy (that is reliable, accurate and authentic) digital entities through time and 
across space.2 Digital materials of a documentary nature (documents and records) 
consist of ‘formal elements’ that are shown on their face (address, date, salutation), 
metadata or attributes that demonstrate their identity and integrity, and digital 
components, that is, stored digital entities that require a specific preservation measure. 
Furthermore, they must have fixed form and stable content.
1 When discussing digital preservation, it is essential to keep in mind the difference among records 
(documents made or received in the course of activity as an instrument and by- product of it, and kept 
for the purposes of such activity), documents (information recorded on a medium, where information 
is a message meant for communication) and data (the smallest meaningful piece of information). When 
data is stored over the long term, we usually speak of curation, the cleaning of and adding value to 
data, rather than preservation. Digital preservation refers to documentary material, which includes 
documents and records (all records are documents, though not all documents are records, and not all 
records are ‘business records’). In addition to the CGSB 74.34- 2017, see Duranti and Thibodeau, ‘The 
concept of record in interactive, experiential and dynamic environments’.
2 Luciana Duranti (ed), The Long- term Preservation of Authentic Electronic Records: Findings of the 
InterPARES Project (Archilab 2005); Luciana Duranti and Randy Preston (eds), InterPARES 2: Interactive, 
Dynamic and Experiential Records (ANAI 2008); Duranti and Rogers, ‘Trust in digital records’.
6.102 Thus, when discussing preservation of digital documentary evidence, it is 
necessary to consider both the ‘stored record’ and the ‘manifested record’. The 
stored record is composed of the digital component(s) used in re- producing it. This 
comprises the data to be processed in order to manifest the record (content data and 
form data) and the rules for processing the data, including those enabling variations 
(composition data – that is, data enabling any kind of structural change in the record). 
The manifested record is the visualization or instantiation of the record in a form 
suitable for presentation to a person or a system. Sometimes it does not have a 
corresponding stored record, but it is recreated from fixed content data when a user’s 
action associates them with specific form data and composition data (for instance, a 
record produced from a relational database).
6.103 A documentary entity has a fixed form if its binary content is stored so that 
the message it conveys can be rendered with the same documentary presentation (or 
manifestation) it had on the screen when first saved (though it might have changed 
its stored presentation from, say, a MS Word document to pdf format). A documentary 
entity also has fixed form if the same content can be presented on the screen in several 
different manifestations but in a limited number of ways: in this case there would be 
a different documentary presentation of the same stored record with a fixed form (for 
instance, statistical data viewed as a pie chart, a bar chart or a table).
6.104 A documentary entity has stable content if the data and the message it conveys 
are unchanged and unchangeable, meaning that data cannot be overwritten, altered, 
deleted or added to. In the digital environment, the concept of ‘bounded variability’ 
is present when changes to the documentary presentation of a determined stable 
content are limited and controlled by fixed rules, so that the same query or interaction 
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of the same content, as required by the author or as a result of different operating 
systems or applications.
6.105 Digital documentary materials may be static, in that they do not provide 
possibilities for changing their content or form beyond opening, closing and navigating 
them (email, reports, sound recordings, motion video, snapshots of web pages), or 
interactive, in that they present variable content, form, or both, and the rules governing 
the content and form of presentation may be either fixed or variable.
6.106 Further, digital documentary evidence can be non- dynamic, in that the rules 
governing the presentation of content and form do not vary, and the content presented 
each time is selected from a fixed store of data (interactive web pages, online catalogues 
or inventories, records enabling performances – they are documents or records), or 
dynamic, in that the rules governing the presentation of content and form may vary 
(this is the case with, for instance, Geographic Information Systems or GIS, which 
contain only data1).
1 An example of a GIS is the VanMap of the City of Vancouver, which is used by all the city staff in 
order to make decisions. The data often does not exist anywhere else, especially in the correlated form 
shown on the GIS layers, and are consistently overwritten by new data flowing in from a variety of 
databases, without being saved, https:// maps.vancouver.ca/ portal/ apps/ sites/ #/ vanmap/ .
6.107 Traditional preservation is defined as the whole of the principles, policies and 
strategies that control the activities designed to ensure the physical and technological 
stabilization and protection of intellectual content in materials (data, documents 
or records). Considering all the characteristics of digital material mentioned above, 
‘digital preservation’ is defined as the process of maintaining digital materials during 
and across different generations of technology over time, irrespective of where they 
are stored.1 This is because it is not possible to preserve digital material. It is only 
possible to preserve the ability to reproduce it in a reliable, accurate and authentic way. 
This means that, when obtaining access to digital documentary evidence that has been 
maintained for a period longer than the life of the system in which it exists at the time 
of submission, it is not sufficient to look at the integrity of such system, but it is also 
essential to assess the entire preservation plan from the creation of the documentary 
material in the original system through its entire cycle of maintenance and preservation 
across systems, keeping in mind the continuity of evidence through time.
1 InterPARES Trust, Terminology Database, https:// interparestrust.org/ terminology/ term/ digital% 
20preservation.
6.108 Thus, any organization, public or private, that intends to maintain its digital 
material in such a way that one day it can be used as documentary evidence and be 
authenticated, needs to develop plans for transfer to a trusted custodian (which can 
be an archives program within the organization or an external body with archival 
functions), enforce standardized procedures for implementing it, keep the oldest 
available logical format of any document that is moved to another IT system, eliminate 
duplicates while ensuring redundancy (all materials should be duplicated in a separate 
digital repository in another location), document all processing, and ensure that all 
transferred materials are authentic copies of the previous ones by keeping audit and 
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Migration and format changes
6.109 When it comes to authentication of evidence preserved for the long term, 
judges and lawyers need to be aware of what activities are routinely carried out by the 
preserving organization to ensure the continuing integrity of the records, as well as the 
ability to verify them. Appropriately qualified witnesses should be able to attest that 
the organization has implemented the following:
1. A controlled process of migration of the records to the archives’ technological 
environment (always keeping the records in the format in which they were 
acquired);
2. The accurate documentation of any change that the records undergo during 
such process and every time that the archives’ technological environment is 
upgraded;
3. Privileges concerning the access, use and reproduction of the records within 
the archives; and
4. Procedures to prevent, discover and correct loss or corruption of records; to 
guarantee the continuing identity and integrity of the records against media 
deterioration and across technological changes though continuing conversion 
and migration; to assign responsibility for and means of authentication of 
individual records, when required; and to ensure redundancy, internally and 
remotely.
6.110 One of the major authentication challenges relates to formats and migration. 
Consideration should be given to verifying that the organization has selected 
preservation formats using accepted criteria, such as widespread adoption, non- 
proprietary origin, published specifications, interoperability (platform independence), 
and lack of compression or lossless compression. The most accepted standards for 
documentary evidence are PDF 1.4, which became PDF/ A ISO 19005- 1:2005; PDF 1.7, 
which became ISO 32000- 1: 2008; PDF/ A- 2, which became ISO 19005- 2:2011; and 
PDF/ A- 3, which became ISO 19005- 3:2012.1
1 PDF/ A disallows audio/ video content, JavaScript, compression and encryption. It requires that 
all fonts be embedded, and uses XMP metadata rules with the ability to supply new metadata schema 
if needed. PDF/ A- 2 includes better PDF tagging, which improves accessibility for smaller file sizes. It 
permits the use of JPEG2000 image compression, and allows the attachment of other PDF/ A files. PDF/ 
A- 3 has exactly the same functionalities as PDF/ A- 2 but with one major difference: instead of being 
able to only embed other PDF/ A files, it can embed any kind of data stream. The ‘hybrid archiving’ 
approach of PDF/ A- 3 could provide the best of both worlds from an evidence and archival perspective. 
The static visual elements of the main display document present the record content with fixity. Any 
concern about integrity can be addressed with the embedding of the original bitstream of the source 
record itself. This format provides a faithful representation of the record, is similar to that of a printout 
and offers the option of comparing the best format to the native one. Other standards that are valid for 
evidentiary purposes are: for audio, WAVE (LPCM); for email, MBOX; for Raster Images, TIFF; and for 
video, FFV1/ LPCM in MKV. See Archivematica Preservation Formats, https:// www.archivematica.org/ 
en/ docs/ archivematica- 1.11/ user- manual/ preservation/ preservation- planning/ .
6.111 In consideration of the fact that migration of documentary material from an 
obsolescent system to a current or emerging technology always entails some degree of 
risk, expert witnesses should show that the required functionalities of the old format 
were maintained through migration to a new format. Useful tools to verify a migration 
that has respected professional standards are the Conversions Software Registry 
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Registry – Query Conversions’) and the PRONOM’s DROID (from The National Archives 
of the United Kingdom). It is important, when authenticating material older than the 
system in which it is stored, to gather all information about its migration history.1
1 For instance, see http:// www.interpares.org/ display_ file.cfm?doc=ip2_ file_ formats(complete).pdf.
The business records exception to the rule against 
hearsay
The business records exception
6.112 Several exceptions to the rule against hearsay have been developed over time 
for documentary evidence, most notably for business records. The rule against hearsay 
ensures that out- of- court statements do not make their way into evidence as truth of 
the assertions made in such statements. In other words, for a statement to be relied 
upon, it must be tendered in evidence through the witness who made the statement. 
This rule was introduced in England in the 1500s;1 however, it was not fully developed 
until the early 1700s.
1 John H. Wigmore, ‘The history of the hearsay rule’ (1904) 7 Harvard Law Review 437.
6.113 The rationale behind this exception has its origins in the bankers’ books rule1 
where records entered into log books by bank employees could be relied upon as a 
record made at that point in time. This exception to the rule against hearsay is an 
important one when considering authentication of evidence, because the basis on 
which the law developed over centuries was that employees would literally enter 
records on paper within the binding of a book. The business records exception to the 
rule against hearsay essentially provides that, providing the record was generated in 
the ordinary course of business, someone with knowledge of the records, typically a 
senior member of the business, can give evidence which leads to the admission of the 
documents into evidence. This rule developed as a common- sense approach where 
employees leave businesses, only to have records tendered after their departure. In 
a matter involving documents over a lengthy period of time, it makes practical sense 
to have a person with knowledge of the business tender all documents, rather than 
several different people, many of whom may no longer work for the business.
1 This rule has its origins in the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 (UK), which provided in s 3: 
‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, a copy of an entry in a banker’s book shall in all legal proceedings 
be received as prima facie evidence of such entry, and of the matters, transactions, and accounts therein 
recorded.’
6.114 While not articulating the underlying rationale, Lord Phillips illustrated this 
assumption in R v Horncastle (Michael Christopher):
Business records are made admissible (by s.117 or, where a machine is involved, 
s.129) because, in the ordinary way, they are compiled by persons who are 
disinterested and, in the ordinary course of events, such statements are likely to 
be accurate; they are therefore admissible as evidence because prima facie they 
are reliable.1
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6.115 The exclusionary rules of the common law were relaxed by the Bankers’ Books 
Evidence Act 1879. This Act provided that copies of entries in bankers’ books – that is, 
ledgers, day books, cash books, account books and all other books kept in the ordinary 
business of the bank – are considered prima facie evidence of the matters recorded,1 
subject to a number of requirements before they can be admitted into evidence. As 
Professor Tapper remarked, the primary purpose was to prevent the business from 
being disrupted by the need to produce the original books in court.2 In 1938, the case 
of a prosecution at a Metropolitan Police Court was commented upon in the Journal 
of Criminal Law.3 A bank clerk gave evidence, and produced a photograph of the 
document. The representative of the accused did not object to the way the evidence was 
presented, but the commentator on the case raised a number of issues of relevance, the 
first of which was that the photograph was secondary evidence of the original, which 
is correct. The commentator then proceeded to consider the rules by which evidence 
is admitted under the provisions of the Act. First, the provisions of s 5 were noted. 
Section 5 provides as follows:
Verification of copy.
A copy of an entry in a banker’s book shall not be received in evidence under this 
Act unless it be further proved that the copy has been examined with the original 
entry and is correct.
Such proof shall be given by some person who has examined the copy with the 
original entry, and may be given either orally or by an affidavit sworn before any 
commissioner or person authorised to take affidavits.
1 In Job v Halifax PLC (2009, unreported), Inglis J accepted printouts of records cut and pasted from 
log files as evidence of the matters recorded; the trial was held on 30 April 2009 in Nottingham County 
Court and judgment was delivered on 4 June 2009. The full transcript of the judgment is available, with 
a commentary by Alistair Kelman, in (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 
235.
2 Colin Tapper, Computer Law (4th edn, Longman 1989), 407.
3 ‘Admissibility of a photograph of a banking account’ (1938) 2(7) The Journal of Criminal Law 357.
6.116 It was pointed out that no such evidence was tendered in this case, and it was 
suggested that the photograph was admitted on the basis that ‘the camera cannot lie’ – 
which does not follow. Second, citing the comments by Smith LJ in Hindson v Ashby,1 the 
bank clerk did not give evidence that he took the photograph that was produced, which 
meant that the image was no more than hearsay. The commentator distinguished the 
decision in R v Tolson2 because the purpose of the photograph in Tolson was to identify 
the husband, who was accused of bigamy. In the case of the photograph of the bank 
account, it was claimed that a witness could not say whether the photograph was 
correct in every detail of that particular account. A further problem with admitting the 
photograph arose in the light of the provisions of s 4, which reads:
Proof that book is a banker’s book.
A copy of an entry in a banker’s book shall not be received in evidence under 
this Act unless it be first proved that the book was at the time of the making of 
the entry one of the ordinary books of the bank, and that the entry was made in 
the usual and ordinary course of business, and that the book is in the custody or 
control of the bank.
Such proof may be given by a partner or officer of the bank, and may be given 
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1 [1896] 2 Ch 1 (CA) 21.
2 (1864) 4 F & F 103, 176 ER 488.
6.117 The commentator suggested that the photograph could not be admitted unless 
the photographer was an officer of the bank with the necessary knowledge about the 
books of the bank. Finally, the commentator offered the opinion that there would be no 
requirement for the photograph to be proved where the bank officer producing it had 
first checked it against the account to which it related, because the Act does not require 
the person who made the copy to be called as a witness.
6.118 The technology used by banks altered considerably during the twentieth 
century, but this did not prevent judges from providing a wide construction to 
the statute, as in the (criminal) case of Barker v Wilson.1 The Divisional Court was 
requested to provide an opinion by way of case stated from North Yorkshire Justices 
sitting at York. The question was whether the justices reached the correct decision that 
microfilm was included within the definition of ‘bankers’ books’ in accordance with 
s 9 of the Act. Bridge LJJ and Caulfield J were both of the opinion that this was correct. 
Caulfield J said:
The justices came to the conclusion – and they put their conclusions in these 
terms: that they adopted some robust common sense – that section 9 does 
include microfilm, which is a modern process of producing banker’s records. It is 
probable that no modern bank in this country now maintains the old- fashioned 
books which were maintained at the time of the passing of the 1879 Act and 
possibly maintained for many years after 1879.2
1 [1980] 1 WLR 884, [1980] 2 All ER 81, [1980] 2 WLUK 2, (1980) 70 Cr App R 283 (DC), [1980] 
Crim LR 373, (1980) 124 SJ 326, [1980] CLY 469.
2 (1980) 70 Cr App R 283 at 286.
6.119 Bridge LJ reinforced the point:
The Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 was enacted with the practice of bankers 
in 1879 in mind. It must be construed in 1980 in relation to the practice of 
bankers as we now understand it. So construing the definition of ‘bankers’ book’ 
it seems to me that clearly both phrases are apt to include any form of permanent 
record kept by the bank of transactions relating to the banks’ business, made 
by any of the methods which modern technology makes available, including, in 
particular, microfilm.1
1 (1980) 70 Cr App R 283 at 287.
6.120 Professor Tapper commended the flexibility of the judiciary to amend a statutory 
rule in such circumstances.1 Section 9 has been amended by various enactments, and 
the relevant section, s 9(2), now reads as follows:
(2) Expressions in this Act relating to ‘bankers’ books’ include ledgers, day books, 
cash books, account books and other records used in the ordinary business of 
the bank, whether those records are in written form or are kept on microfilm, 
magnetic tape or any other form of mechanical or electronic data retrieval 
mechanism.
1 Tapper, Computer Law, 408. See also the decision in Victor Chandler International v Customs and 
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(2000) 97(11) LSG 36 (2000), 150 NLJ 341, (2000) 144 SJLB 127, Times, 8 March 2000, Independent, 
10 March 2000, [2000] CLY 414, in which the Court of Appeal adopted an ‘always speaking’ construction 
to a statute, taking into account developments that had taken place since the provision was first 
enacted, even though it created a criminal offence.
6.121 Other statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule are covered in the standard 
practitioner texts on the subject.
6.122 Generally, business records should be accurate records, which are indeed 
more reliable than memory. However, business records in digital form are subject to 
manipulation from any number of sources and it is important to ascertain that the 
record- keeping system had a reasonable level of security around it before admitting 
them into evidence.
Authentication of digital business records
6.123 Documents in digital form can be forged as easily as, if not more easily than, 
documents in paper or other analogue form. The authenticity of digital data in legal 
proceedings has been considered on a case-by-case basis.1 Email is one example of 
electronic documents that can be forged; however, this does not mean that every 
email needs to undergo an extensive authentication process to prove it is not a 
forgery.2 In R v Mawji (Rizwan),3 evidence of a threat to kill included an email sent 
to the victim, which included the words ‘I’m going to kill you’. The Court of Appeal 
rejected submissions that it was necessary to authenticate the email by showing the 
audit trail of where the email originated, because there was sufficient evidence to 
show that the email was written and sent by the appellant. The court said that the 
content of the email demonstrated its authenticity on the face of the totality of the 
evidence. If the email had been fabricated, why would somebody go to the length of 
forging the content of an email that was so obviously linked to the other evidence 
produced at the trial, the court asked.
1 For example, in R v Cochrane [1992] 6 WLUK 63, [1993] Crim LR 48 (CA), [1993] CLY 366, McCowan 
LJ, Waterhouse and Brooke JJ said that it was necessary for appropriate authoritative evidence to be 
called to describe the function and operation of a mainframe computer.
2 They were forged in R. v Debnath (Anita) [2005] EWCA Crim 3472, [2005] 12 WLUK 64, [2006] 2 
Cr App R (S) 25, [2006] Crim LR 451, [2006] CLY 855; see also Masood v Zahoor [2008] EWHC 1034 
(Ch), [2008] 5 WLUK 282; on appeal Zahoor v Masood [2009] EWCA Civ 650, [2010] 1 WLR 746, [2010] 
1 All ER 888, [2009] 7 WLUK 101, [2009] CP Rep 44, [2010] Bus LR D12, [2010] CLY 424 where the trial 
judge reached the conclusion that both parties committed forgery and perjury.
3 [2003] EWCA Crim 3067, [2003] 10 WLUK 438.
6.124 At the hearing, it may be relevant to produce the analysis of the metadata of 
an email to show where it originated. The email header can prove that the email was 
sent and received and show it was not a forgery.1 Use of IP addresses within emails, 
however, has limited utility as they cannot identify the person who drafted the email, 
but can only identify the person ‘who has the contract with their ISP to have Internet 
access’.2 Authenticating pages from the Internet can also be difficult because they alter 
frequently.3
1 Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1462, [2005] QB 972, [2005] 3 WLR 281, 
[2005] 1 All ER 30, [2004] 11 WLUK 165, [2005] EMLR 10, (2004) 101(45) LSG 31, (2004) 148 SJLB 
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2 Media CAT Limited v Adams [2011] EWPCC 6, [2011] 2 WLUK 291, [2011] FSR 28, [2011] CLY 1945 
([2011] FSR 28 at [28] (Birss QCJ)).
3 R. v Skinner (Philip) [2005] EWCA Crim 1439, [2005] 5 WLUK 506, [2006] Crim LR 56.
6.125 Circumstantial evidence can be used to authenticate a document in digital 
format, and such circumstantial evidence includes a range of factors including, but not 
limited to, appearance and the contents of the document, the subject matter, witness 
testimony, and any distinctive features that indicate a nexus.
6.126 There have been a number of authorities in Australia that have considered 
the authentication of business records, and some confusion arose as to whether 
authenticity was a precondition to admissibility. Bryson J, in National Australia 
Bank Ltd v Rusu,1 stated that documents would be relevant if they were shown to be 
authentic. In this case, the judge decided that the evidence of authenticity was lacking 
in the case before him. Bryson J’s reasoning in National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu was 
criticized by Stephen Odgers SC.2 Odgers inferred that on Bryson J’s approach, the 
court may not draw reasonable inferences from a document as to its authenticity. In 
Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs,3 Madgwick J took 
up Odgers’ criticism. One of the arguments advanced by the applicant in that case 
was that the note was inadmissible as a business record, having regard to National 
Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu. Madgwick J described National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu at 
[25] as a ‘controversial NSW authority’:
In Rusu, his Honour may have meant no more than that there may be cases in 
which, as a matter of fact, no inference as to authenticity of a document may 
be properly drawn from the document itself. If he meant to say more than that, 
it is by no means clear to me that the way is open for a court to read some 
unexpressed limitation into a grant of power to courts: such grants are generally 
very liberally construed.
1 [1999] NSWSC 539, (1999) 47 NSWLR 309.
2 Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (6th edn, Thomson Reuters 2004) 183.
3 [2002] FCAFC 305.
6.127 In ASIC v Rich Austin J examined the decision in Rusu. Austin J stated that:
In the case of a business record, its authenticity may be proved, at the simplest, 
by the evidence of a person who satisfies two conditions: namely, first, that he 
or she participates in the conduct of the business; and secondly, that he or she 
compiled the document, or found it among the records of the business, or can 
recognise it as one of the records of the business.1
1 (2005) 216 ALR 320 at [99].
6.128 In referring to Bryson J’s decision in NAB v Rusu, Austin J said that the judge 
did not have in mind proof of the authenticity of the business record ‘by the evidence 
of a person unconnected with the business who has found the document among the 
records of the business or can recognise it as a business record’.
6.129 After reviewing the authorities,1 Austin J considered authentication cannot be 
achieved solely by drawing inferences from the face of the document where there is 
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for that would ‘put the court entirely in the hands of whatever a document which 
a party chose to tender purported to be, subject to whatever opportunity another 
party had of overcoming its apparent effect’. On the other hand, it is important 
not to set the bar too high for the authentication of documents, because if too 
much is demanded, the authentication requirement will fight against the policy 
underlying the business records provisions which, as Hope JA remarked in 
Albrighton (at 548), is ‘of great importance in the search for truth’. That policy 
recognises that any significant organisation depends for its efficiency upon the 
keeping of proper records, to be used and relied upon in the everyday carrying 
on of the activities of the business and therefore likely to be accurate, and ‘likely 
to be a far more reliable source of truth than memory’ (Albrighton, at 548– 549 
per Hope JA; see also Australian Law Reform Commission, Interim Report on 
Evidence (Report No 26, vol 1), at [709]). It is reflected in the terms of s 69, 
which makes hearsay representations in business records admissible without 
requiring evidence from their authors.2
1 See also O’Meara v Dominican Fathers [2003] ACTCA 24, Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital 
(1980) 2 NSWLR 542.
2 (2005) 216 ALR 320 at [116].
6.130 In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited 
(No 1),1 the court stated that if there is an issue regarding the authenticity of a 
document, it may still be admissible if it is relevant or arguably so. This is so, provided 
there is material from which its authenticity may reasonably be inferred. That material 
will include what may reasonably be inferred from the document itself. The process of 
determining whether or not documents are relevant is integral to the discovery process.
1 [2012] FCA 1355, (2012) 207 FCR 448, this decision was approved in Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v Cassaniti [2018] FCAFC 212 and Gregg v R [2020] NSWCCA 245.
Conclusion
6.131 Authentication is about proving that something is what it purports to be. 
When seeking to prove the authenticity of digital material submitted as evidence, the 
traditional methods of authenticating paper and other forms of analogue evidence do 
not apply, because digital technology is a new and evolving paradigm and its products 
have characteristics quite different from those of evidence affixed to an analogue 
medium. Although traditional means of authentication, such as proof of the continuity 
of evidence and trustworthiness of the preserver, still have a role in assessing that an 
entity is what it claims to be, these criteria on their own are insufficient to demonstrate 
the authenticity of digital evidence. Even the term ‘demonstrating’ is at issue in the 
digital environment because, at most, authenticity may be ‘inferred’ from several 
factors rather than shown, due to the fact that digital material is perpetually being 
reproduced in the process of maintenance and use, and the entity under consideration 
is always new. The significant differences between authentication of analogue material 
and that of electronic evidence lie in three fundamental concepts: best evidence, 
system integrity and security, and the significant properties of the evidence.
6.132 The best evidence rule rose out of a concern that, when multiple instantiations 
of the same document exist, the most trustworthy and authoritative among them be 







Authenticating electronic evidence 277
first complete document capable of reaching the purposes for which it was generated. 
Thus, the best evidence rule has been interpreted through time as a requirement to 
submit original documents when they existed, and to provide a rational explanation 
for their absence when only drafts or copies were available. In the digital environment, 
originals come into being when first received by an addressee or first saved to a system 
by an author, but in both cases, when the document is closed, it breaks into its digital 
components, and when it is opened a copy is generated. These copies that come into 
being every time digital documents are opened, navigated or, if interactive, reproduced 
from content data, form data and composition data, are never identical to the original 
or to each other, even when they may look so, because at the very minimum their 
metadata have changed. This does not mean that the best evidence rule is no longer 
applicable. It simply means that, rather than referring to the original document, it has 
to refer to the degree of integrity of the document, as proven either by technological 
authentication, the integrity of the system(s) where the document was created (made, 
received and managed) or stored over time, or the fixity and stability of the format in 
which it was created or preserved.
6.133 System integrity and security come into play in jurisdictions, such as Canada, 
where authentication is based on an inference made from the technological environment 
in which the potential evidence exists. Because of the vulnerability of digital material 
and the difficulty of establishing authenticity by examining the digital entity itself, 
its identity and integrity can be deduced from the system’s requirements on access, 
use, management and such like. This implies that strict policies and procedures are in 
place for controlling not only all the documents in the system, but also any interaction 
with them within the system and from outside. Records management manuals and 
information technology guides are fundamental to establishing the integrity of a 
system. However, they exist only in public institutions and private organizations that 
have their own information and preservation systems subject to mandated standards 
of practice. When organizations and individuals entrust their data, documents or 
records to cloud providers, it is not possible to verify the integrity of servers in the 
data centres where the digital material is stored. Thus, it is only possible to examine 
the security measures agreed upon in the contract between provider and user and 
make an inference of authenticity from them.
6.134 The most significant properties of any item of electronic evidence are the 
attributes necessary to establish its identity and integrity through time. Some of these 
data are produced when a digital entity is generated (they contribute to establishing 
its identity), some during its use and management (they help to establish its integrity) 
and others are added after the entity is selected for permanent preservation in an 
archive to ensure that its authenticity remains verifiable over time. Some of these 
properties are metadata while others are logs, and several of them are not visible on 
the face of the document. These are attributes having different functions, the most 
significant of which for evidentiary purposes are: specifying the date a document is 
made or received and filed; identifying the names of the persons interacting with the 
document (author(s), addressee(s), other recipients, handling office); naming the 
form of the document (report, memo) and the action involved (contract, sentence, 
patent, application); indicating the format and other technological characteristics 
of the entity; naming the title of the document, its subject matter, or the action it 
embodies; indicating the relationships of the document to other documents (registry 
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number, classification code, identification number); specifying whether the document 
was received with a digital seal or digital signature, or was encrypted; providing 
information about the technical context of the entity or the migration to a new system; 
describing rights and obligations such as copyright, usage and security restrictions; 
describing activities carried out on the entity over time and across technological 
changes, such as conversion or reproduction to ensure redundancy; documenting the 
structural relationships between or within digital entities, such as the linkage between 
pages in a website; and identifying the users of the entity (social tags, access logs, user 
search logs).
6.135 In conclusion, the fundamental difference between the authentication of 
analogue and electronic evidence is in the fact that, while analogue material can be 
authenticated on its face and only exceptionally is circumstantial or extrinsic evidence 
necessary, the authentication of digital material is always an inference based on 
extrinsic elements such as significant properties, and it relies on circumstantial 
evidence such as the integrity of the system hosting it, the policies and procedures 




The purpose of a signature
7.1 Legislation providing for electronic signatures has, essentially, been directed 
to provide for the authenticity of the person using the signature, although various 
statutes provide for additional uses, such as providing for the integrity of a message or 
document. Authentication can be the process by which a person or legal entity seeks 
to verify the validity or genuineness of a particular piece of information. Alternatively, 
it can mean the formal assertion of validity, such as the signing of a certificate: we 
authenticate what it certifies. In certain circumstances, there may also be a need to 
verify the identity of an individual or legal entity, although what is meant by ‘identity’ 
will also depend on the reason for ascertaining the identity. For example, with a cheque, 
the signature serves to link the name of the person printed on the cheque with the 
person who claims to have the authority to draw money from the account indicated on 
the cheque. In the past, the existence of the cheque guarantee card with a manuscript 
signature on the reverse served to reinforce the link between the card and the cheque, 
although the signature did not necessarily identify the person signing the cheque, even 
if the signature on the reverse of the cheque guarantee card matched the signature on 
the cheque. In cheque cases, the printed name on a cheque is not necessarily accepted 
as a form of signature, although it can contribute to authenticity. For instance, in 
Ringham v Hackett,1 Lawton LJ considered the issue of authenticity in relation to a 
cheque with a name printed on it, and suggested that ‘A printed name accompanied 
by a written signature was prima facie evidence that the cheque was being drawn on 
the account it purported to be drawn on’,2 although in the South African case of Akasia 
Finance v Da Souza,3 Leveson J indicated, at 338 G– H, why he did not consider the name 
printed on the cheque could be a signature:
At the foot of each cheque, where the signature of the drawer is normally to be 
found, appear the words, ‘Domestic Homes (Pty) Ltd, Registration No 73/ 0541’. 
The words are printed and are plainly printed by machine.
It is well known that for several years past banks have been issuing cheque books 
to their customers with the customer’s name machine- printed thereon in the 
same space as the cheques in the present case. The printing is usually computer- 
controlled. This is done as part of a design to facilitate the modern banking 
system. Of importance is the fact that the printing is not done by the customer. 
It is therefore not the company’s signature in the sense that, if put there by a 
person authorised by a corporate customer, it would constitute the company’s 
signature or seal under the provisions of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.
1 [1980] 1 WLUK 323, (1980) 124 SJ 201, Times, 9 February 1980, [1980] CLY 158.
2 (1980) 124 SJ 201 at 202(a). In Central Motors (Birmingham) v PA & SNP Wadsworth (trading as 
Pensagain) [1982] 5 WLUK 265, [1983] CLY 6u, [1982] CAT 231, 28 May 1982; (1983) 133 NLJ 555, a 
Stephen Mason, ‘Electronic signatures’, in Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng (eds.), Electronic Evidence 
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second account holder was held jointly liable for a cheque that he did not sign under the provisions of 
the Bills of Exchange Act 1882.
3 1993 (2) SA 337 (W).
7.2 The function of a signature is generally determined by the nature and content 
of the document to which it is affixed.
7.3 It is thought that the act of a person fixing their name to a document is well 
understood by lawyers and non- lawyers alike. However, a consideration of the case 
law demonstrates the range of issues that have arisen in relation to what seems, at first 
glance, a relatively simple concept. The means by which judges have tested the validity 
of a signature has altered over time. From concentrating on the form a signature 
takes, judges went on to question its validity by considering the function the signature 
performs.1 The analysis in the move from form to function applies equally to the 
analysis of electronic signatures. The perceptive comments from the sound dissenting 
judgment of Bell J in 1855 in the South African case of Van Vuuren v Van Vuuren,2 at 121, 
provides a useful summary with which to begin:
the expression ‘to sign’ a document has no strict legal or technical meaning 
different from the popular meaning, viz., to authenticate by that which stands 
for or is intended to represent the name of the person who is to authenticate. If 
you say to the most illiterate person ‘Sign this paper’, if he cannot write, he will 
put a cross to it, and if he do not know how to do this the most experienced man 
of business cannot tell him to do more. If the party have learned a little writing, 
or if rheumatism of hard labour have cramped the nerves of his hand, and you 
ask him to sign a document, he will put the initial capital letters of his Christian 
and surname, while he will not venture upon writing the other more minute and 
therefore more difficult to be executed letters of these names, and he will feel 
satisfied that he has ‘signed’. If the man of business doubt this, and, seeing he can 
write so far as to be able to make the capital letters, think it will not be sufficient 
without the smaller letters, and insist upon his making them, should the party 
say he cannot, the lawyer will be content. On the other hand, should the party 
make the attempt and produce a scrawl more or less legible, so again the man of 
business will be content – whether the scrawl be legible or illegible, he will be 
satisfied that the man has ‘signed’. Such is the popular and professional practice, 
and the decision of the Courts had been conformably to it.
1 Chris Reed, ‘What is a signature?’ (2000) 3 Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT), 
http:// www2.warwick.ac.uk/ fac/ soc/ law/ elj/ jilt/ 2000_ 3/ reed/ .
2 2 Searle 116.
Dictionary definitions
7.4 The Oxford English Dictionary offers a number of definitions of the word 
‘signature’ as a noun and a verb.1 The earliest references relate to signatures of a public 
nature that are intended to have legal effect. The first definition of a signature as a noun 
is that of ‘A writing prepared and presented to the Baron of Exchequer by a writer to the 
signet, as the ground of a royal grant to the person in whose name it is presented’. An 
illustration for 1534 refers to ‘To pass with writings and signaturis to be subscrivit be 
the Kingis grace’. The remaining references for this entry also relate to royal signatures 
in the public domain. The second and third definitions continue with the same meaning. 









own hand as an authentication of some document or writing’, and is illustrated from 
Hollyband of 1580, referring to ‘the signature or marke of a Notaries’, with the next 
illustration from Coke dated 1633 referring to ‘A bill superscribed with the signature 
or signe manuall, or royall hand of the King’. The third reference, item 2(b), ‘The action 
of signing one’s name, or of authenticating a document by doing so’, is also illustrated 
by an early reference to Lord Keeper Williams from 1621: ‘Some things wee must offer 
to the kings signature when the clarkes are not to bee found.’ The law dictionaries vary 
in their treatment of the definition of ‘signature’.2
1 Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edn on CD- ROM, version 4.0, 2009).
2 Bryan A. Gardner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (11th edn, West Group 2019); Daniel Greenberg 
(ed), Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2019); David Hay, 
Words and Phrases Legally Defined (5th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2018).
The manuscript signature
7.5 The epitome of a signature is the act of an individual writing their name in their 
own hand on a document, usually in the form of a manuscript signature.1 More widely, 
it is the action of a person affixing a permanent imprint upon a document. In the world 
before the invention of electricity and computers, an imprint was required to have the 
characteristic of permanency because it was necessary to retain tangible evidence of 
intention. In addition, the parties to the document may consider it necessary to retain 
the evidence for a sufficient length of time in order to enforce any rights or obligations 
evidenced in the record.
1 Although the tuğra (a cipher or imperial monogram) of the Ottoman sultans that served as the 
signature of the sultan was drawn up by a court official and affixed to official documents. Over time, it 
was also carved on seals and stamped on coins, and artists illuminated later tuğra.
7.6 Before the development of the telegraph, a document would normally be 
considered something written onto a material, mainly paper. Although a number 
of people may be involved with the framing of a document and its subsequent 
manifestation in its final physical form, the document will have been created physically. 
Thus, if an instruction was passed from one party to another by means of the operators 
of semaphore, the sending operator could give evidence of the instructions received 
from the instructing party and the signals they used to transmit the message, and the 
receiving operator could give evidence of the signals they observed and noted down on 
paper. With the development of communications over the electric telegraph, the same 
principles would apply as with semaphore, but the electronic pulses of the telegraph 
would be interpreted in the light of the code used by the sending and receiving operators. 
The use of the telegraph meant that the message was encoded into electronic pulses, 
but the pulses were not stored. The receiving operator transferred the evidence of the 
message to a carrier. In contrast, software code transmits and stores the data in digital 
form, but the data are not visible to the human eye. A combination of the interpretation 
and use of hardware and software to make the data visible to the human are required.
7.7 In a world that relied on physical and permanent evidence of proof of intent, the 
requirement for an enduring record is understandable. While the legal consequences 
of a signature will differ when fixed to artefacts, such as items of pottery, paintings, 
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nevertheless a signature is capable of establishing the identity of the creator of the 
article and is also capable of authenticating the provenance of the object.1
1 The copy of a painting with a false signature painted on it with the intention of passing off the 
painting as by the genuine painter was determined to be a cheat at common law by Cockburn LCJ and 
his fellow judges in Regina v Thomas Closs (1858) LRCCR 460, Dears & B 460.
7.8 A document usually exists on a carrier, typically paper. The carrier is marked 
permanently with content, usually with ink, either in the form of handwriting or by means 
of a printing press. This process alters the carrier physically. The content imprinted on 
the carrier may include a range of information, depending on the nature of the document, 
including information about the person who created, issued or initiated the content. Over 
time, the carrier will include additional information as it is handled, including coffee or 
tea stains, scratches, additional content, fingerprints and DNA. Finally, a person or legal 
entity might sign the carrier with a signature. The reason for signing the document will 
depend on the nature of the document and the purpose for which the person is signing. 
When brought together, these components comprise the document in its entirety.1
1 For the meaning of a ‘document’, see Stephen Mason, ‘Documents signed or executed with 
electronic signatures in English law’ [2018] 34(4) Computer Law and Security Report 933.
Statutory definition of signature
7.9 There does not appear to be a statutory definition of the term ‘signature’, and 
Ashman J commented in 1892 in a case regarding probate that there was no judicial 
formula either:1
Exactly what constitutes a signature has never been reduced to a judicial formula 
… The principle upon which these cases proceeded was that whatever the testator 
of grantor was shown to have intended as his signature was a valid signing, no 
matter how imperfect or unfinished or fantastical or illegible, or even false, the 
separate characters or symbols he used might be, when critically judged.
1 Mitchell J quoted these comments of Ashman J (whose decision was reversed) in In re Plate’s 
Estate, 148 Pa. 55, 23 A. 1038.
7.10 The Interpretation Act 1978 does not provide a definition, although Professor 
Reed noted there were 15 statutory definitions of ‘signature’ or ‘signing’ in force 
in 1996, 11 of which adopted an identical or similar variation to the following: 
‘ “signature” includes a facsimile of a signature by whatever process reproduced’.1 This 
particular definition is sufficiently general to include a representation of a signature 
in electronic form. The most obvious example is that of a manuscript signature that 
is scanned and converted into digital form. Such a representation can be attached 
to a document produced on a computer, or it could be the image of the signature as 
sent and received by a facsimile machine. It is estimated that there are in the region of 
40,000 references to the requirement for a manuscript signature.2 However, whether 
a personal signature is required depends upon the wording of the statute or from the 
context of the requirement.3 With respect to legislation, Professor Reed notes that 













Where documents that have been signed are admissible in evidence, or create 
evidential presumptions. The evidential presumptions are either that the 
document is conclusive proof of its contents, or it is clear evidence of the facts 
set out in the document.
Where documents have to be signed for the purpose of authentication, either 
expressly or from the context of the requirement.
Where a signature is required to exercise a statutory power.4
1 Water Resources Act 1991 (c 57) Schedule 4, Part II, Proceedings of Flood Defence Committees, 
quoted in Chris Reed, Digital Information Law: Electronic Documents and Requirement of Form (Centre 
for Commercial Law Studies 1996) 225; table 5.1, 262– 263 for the full list.
2 HC Official Report (6th series) col 41, 29 November 1999; note also Reed, Digital Information Law, 
239 and n 41; Reed, ‘What is a signature?’, 3.1.2 and n 68.
3 Reed, Digital Information Law, 233– 234 and nn 23 and 24.
4 Reed, Digital Information Law, 240– 241. Professor Reed provides examples at 42– 52.
The functions of a signature
7.11 A signature can serve a number of functions, each of which can have varying 
degrees of importance,1 including complying with a legal requirement that something 
be signed.
1 Lon L. Fuller, ‘Consideration and form’ (1941) 42 Columbia Law Review 799 refers to the evidentiary, 
cautionary function and channelling functions; Ashbel G. Gulliver, ‘Classification of gratuitous transfers 
(with Catherine J. Tilson)’ (1941) 51 Yale Law Journal 1; John H. Langbein, ‘Substantial compliance 
with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88(3) Harvard Law Review 489; Mark Sneddon, ‘Legislating to facilitate 
electronic signatures and records: exceptions, standards and the impact on the statute book’ (1998) 
21(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 334 part 2 IIA (i)– (iv), http:// www.austlii.edu.au/ 
au/ journals/ UNSWLJ/ 1998/ 59.html; Adrian McCullagh, Peter Little and William Caelli, ‘Electronic 
signatures: understand the past to develop the future’ (1998) 21 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 56; UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996 with 
additional article 5 bis as adopted in 1998 (United Nations 1999) paras 48 and 53; UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment 2001 (United Nations 2002) para 29; Promoting 
Confidence in Electronic Commerce: Legal Issues on International Use of Electronic Authentication and 
Signature Methods (United Nations 2009) 1– 8; for a similar overview of the same topic and discussion 
of the development of signatures, see Lorna Brazell, Electronic Signatures and Identities Law and 
Regulation (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 2- 001.
The primary evidential function
7.12 It is suggested that the primary purpose of a signature serves to provide 
admissible and reliable evidence that comprises the following elements:
(1) To provide tangible evidence that the signatory approves and adopts the 
contents of the document.
(2) In so doing, the signatory agrees that the content of the document is binding 
upon them and will have legal effect.
(3) Further, the signatory is reminded of the significance of the act and the need 
to act within the provisions of the document.
7.13 The nature of the act of signing differs between the application of a manuscript 
signature and the use of an electronic signature. This is because a manuscript 
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authentication systems bind signatures to individuals by way of software code and 
procedural mechanisms.
7.14 With electronic signatures, the person does not physically sign anything, but 
causes software to sign electronically using an untrustworthy machine for knowing 
what document has been signed1 – even when using a biodynamic version of a 
manuscript signature. This is significant, because the act of signing using an electronic 
signature has a different symbolic meaning to that of a manuscript signature, and 
suggests a weaker sense of the involvement of the person in the process of signing, as 
noted by Professor Chou.2
1 Stephen Mason and Timothy S. Reiniger, ‘ “Trust” between machines? Establishing identity 
between humans and software code, or whether you know it is a dog, and if so, which dog?’ (2015) 21 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 135.
2 Eileen Y. Chou, ‘Paperless and soulless: e- signatures diminish the signer’s presence and decrease 
acceptance’ (2015) 6 Social Psychological and Personality Science 343. Professor Chou provides 
further citations.
Secondary evidential functions
7.15 A signature can also provide evidence of identification and proof of the 
following:
(1) The signature can authenticate the identity of the person signing the 
document. One example would be to reinforce the causal link between the 
signature and a name printed on a document, such as a name printed on a 
chequebook or credit card.
(2) The identity of a particular characteristic, or attribute, or status of the person 
such as a government minister or company director.
(3) Where a person signing acknowledges, verifies or witnesses the record, but 
does not necessarily agree to be bound by the content of the document.
(4) The existence of the document provides a record of the intent of the 
signatory, and, in turn, physical evidence of the originality and completeness of 
the document itself, including the time, date and place of the act of the affixing of 
the signature to the document.
(5) Where a person is a witness to the signing of a document, the signature of 
the witness can provide for the authenticity and the voluntary nature of the 
signature of a third party.
(6) It can demonstrate that the content of the document has not been altered 
subsequent to the affixing of the signature.
(7) A signature can provide evidence that the record is a true copy of another 
record.
(8) A signature can be used to confirm the receipt of something, or to obtain 
access to something.
Cautionary function
7.16 This function acts to reinforce the legal nature of the document, thereby 
encouraging the person affixing their signature that they should take care before 









7.17 As a corollary to the cautionary function, the party receiving the document 
containing a manuscript signature recognizes that the other party affirms the content 
of the document and they have given their full attention to the content of the document. 
They can also be assured of the identity of the signatory, and are consequently in 
receipt of the proof of the source and contents of the document. This function is linked 
to the evidentiary function.1
1 Sneddon, ‘Legislating to facilitate electronic signatures and records’, Part 2 IIA (ii).
Channelling function
7.18 The formality of a manuscript signature helps to clarify the point at which a 
person recognizes the act has become legally significant. Also, the content of the 
document, by being recorded on a durable form, serves to concentrate the mind on the 
legally binding nature of the document, thus reducing the risks associated with oral 
recollections. This function is also linked to the evidentiary function.
Record- keeping function
7.19 Closely related to the evidentiary function, a document contained on a carrier 
manifest in physical form serves as a durable record of the terms of the agreement. It 
also enables governments to impose taxes on documents and permit audits based on 
the existence of documents having a physical existence.
Disputing a manuscript signature
Defences
7.20 A manuscript signature cannot be disputed unless the following defences can 
be established: the signature is a forgery;1 the signature was conditional; the signature 
was obtained as a result of misrepresentation; the signature was obtained in such a 
circumstance that it was not the act of the person signing (non est factum); mental 
incapacity; mistake; where one party unilaterally added material terms to the writing 
after the other had signed the document; where the person signing the document did 
not realize the document they signed was a contractual document; by statute as being 
unreasonable or unfair. These defences are not dealt with in this chapter, other than 
a brief consideration of the disputes where a manuscript signature has been at issue. 
The reader is referred to the standard textbooks on the subject. It is well known that 
manuscript signatures can be and are forged. To prevent this problem, and to test both 
the validity and the effectiveness of a manuscript signature, some documents require 
the signature to be affixed in the presence of a witness or an authorized official, such 
as a notary.
1 In the case of Brown v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187, [1964] 6 WLUK 133, 
[1964] CLY 191, the bank paid sums of money on 329 cheques that were alleged to contain forged copies 
of Mrs Brown’s signature. The bank admitted to paying out on 100 cheques that were forged, but put 
Mrs Brown to prove that the remaining cheques were forged. This was because the bank took measures, 
through the branch managers, to question Mrs Brown on a number of cheques that passed through her 
account. Mrs Brown failed to prove that she did not sign the remaining cheques. For similar facts in 
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Evidence of the manuscript signature
7.21 Where a manuscript signature on a document is challenged, evidence will need 
to demonstrate the issues discussed below. It should be noted that the evidentiary 
burden is a factor in considering the precise nature of the signature. In the Canadian 
case of Regina v Blumes,1 the signature on a vehicle registration document, issued by 
the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, was challenged. It was alleged that the 
document was not admissible because it was not clear whether the signature was a 
manuscript signature, a rubber stamp or a facsimile signature. This document was 
afforded the presumption of regularity, which meant that a mere challenge was not 
sufficient to avoid the operation of regularity.
1 2002 BCPC 0045.
The identity of the person affixing the manuscript signature
7.22 Evidence will have to be adduced to show the signature affixed to the document 
is that of the signatory. In such cases, the signature in question will have to be compared 
to samples of the same signature. A signature may be forged or the signature could 
be that of the signatory, but they may have attempted to disguise their handwriting. 
Thus a handwriting analyst1 will need to have two kinds of sample: ‘request samples’ 
which are produced for the examination and duplicate the material in question; and 
naturally occurring samples, made by the signatory without realizing the example will 
be examined. Two main factors can then be examined, the first being that of pictorial 
impression, which includes matters such as slope, size, margins, spacing and the 
position of the writing in relation to lines. Second, the construction of the letters can 
be examined, such as the direction in which the letter ‘o’ is formed, the way the letter 
‘t’ is crossed and the way in which the person has written letters that require more 
than one movement. Forgers tend to concentrate on the pictorial impression and fail 
to copy details of the way letters are constructed. Likewise, people trying to disguise 
their handwriting also concentrate on the pictorial impression, rather than changing 
the formation of their letters.
1 Recent research has demonstrated that the findings of experts across all forensic disciplines can 
be subject to bias as the result of cognitive factors, such that the same expert has reached the opposite 
conclusion with the same evidence, for which see Itiel D. Dror, Christophe Champod, Glenn Langenburg, 
David Charlton, Heloise Hunt and Robert Rosenthal, ‘Cognitive issues of fingerprint analysis: inter- 
and intra- expert consistency and the effect of a “target” comparison’ (2011) 208 Forensic Science 
International 10 and the references cited therein. Apparently the US Secret Service uses a software 
program called Forensic Information System for Handwriting (FISH) that enables document examiners 
to scan and digitize text writings such as threatening correspondence; for a claim of a forged signature 
on a facsimile transmission, see Diya v Halifax Plc [2009] EWCA Civ 183, [2009] 1 WLUK 245; for an 
electronic signature that was used without authority and a manuscript signature that was forged, see 
Jones v Hamilton [2017] EWHC 1065 (Ch), [2017] 5 WLUK 385.
7.23 Further analysis can be undertaken by considering the relative proportions 
of letters, the spaces between letters and pressure variations. The attributes of the 
instrument used to affix the signature to the document can also be considered, such 
as how smoothly the signature has been written, whether it is jagged or confident, 
whether there is a pause and where the instrument lifts off the surface. Further, the 
carrier itself can be examined, from the type of material used (physical properties, 








(the use and identification of a photocopier, computer or printer) and other evidence 
such as perforations and microscopic analysis that might reveal imperfections that 
may link the carrier to the person. Further examination can include the comparison of 
typescript; impressions by means of Electrostatic Detection Apparatus; whether more 
than one type of material was used to affix information on the carrier; whether any 
alterations were made or entries obliterated, and the sequence in which intersecting 
lines have been written.
7.24 Where the party relying on the authenticity of the manuscript signature 
successfully demonstrates the similarity of the manuscript signature to the sample 
signatures, the evidential burden will then fall upon the alleged signatory to prove 
the signature was forged. Although this point was made in Saunders v Anglia 
Building Society1 in relation to the defence where the signature was obtained in such 
circumstances that it was not the act of the person signing, the principle applies to a 
forged signature.
1 [1971] AC 1004, [1970] 3 WLR 1078, [1970] 3 All ER 961, [1970] 11 WLUK 45, (1971) 22 P & CR 
300, (1970) 114 SJ 885, Times, 10 November 1970, [1971] CLY 1805; Dr Charles Y. C. Chew, ‘Mistake in 
its variety of forms: the injustice of giving securities supporting financial institution debts on an error 
of judgement or without informed consent’ (2017) 32(6) JIBLR 221.
Intention to authenticate and adopt the document
7.25 Where a person affixes their manuscript signature to a document, it must be 
shown that they intended to sign the document. The case of L’Estrange v F Graucob 
Limited,1 which predates the modern legislation, serves to illustrate the point. In this 
case, Miss L’Estrange carried on the business of a café. The defendants manufactured 
and sold automatic slot machines. In early 1933, Miss L’Estrange agreed to buy an 
automatic slot machine for cigarettes for a total of £81 5s 6d, payable over 18 months. 
She signed a form, printed on brown paper, headed ‘Sales Agreement’. This document 
included a number of contract terms written in very small print, one of which included 
‘This agreement contains all the terms and conditions under which I agree to purchase 
the machine specified above, and any express or implied condition, statement, or 
warranty, statutory or otherwise not stated herein is hereby excluded’. The machine 
was installed on 29 March 1933. However, it failed to work, and she eventually initiated 
an action in the county court to recover the payments she had made. Judgment 
was made in her favour. The decision was reversed in the Divisional Court because 
Miss L’Estrange had signed the written contract, and in doing so acknowledged that 
she was bound by the terms. There was no misrepresentation that induced her to sign. 
It was irrelevant that she did not read the contract or know its contents.2
1 [1934] 2 KB 394, [1934] 2 WLUK 22; J. R. Spencer, ‘Signature, consent, and the rule in L’Estrange 
v Graucob’ 32(1) CLJ 104, notes at 104 that this was not the first case in which the rule was laid down, 
although it was the case that made the rule famous; see Parker v The South Eastern Railway Company 
(1877) 2 CPD 416; The Luna [1920] P 22 and Blay v Pollard and Morris [1930] 1 KB 628.
2 This decision, and the discussion of a fourth defence, that the signatory did not agree to the term, 
is discussed in Spencer, ‘Signature, consent, and the rule in L’Estrange v Graucob’.
7.26 This was not the case in Pryor v Pryor.1 Anthony Pryor made a will on 5 November 
1859. One of the attesting witnesses was his daughter. The testator wanted his daughter’s 
husband to sign the will as a witness, but because it was not known when he would 
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so. Sir C Creswell refused to admit the will to probate because the subscription was not 
intended to represent her signature.
1 (1860) LJR 29 NS P, M & A 114.
7.27 Although a manuscript signature on a document may not be in dispute, the 
person signing the document may wish the other party to infer they had the authority 
to sign the document, as in the case of Ringham v Hackett.1 The presumption may be 
rebutted by evidence. In this case, the name printed on the cheque in Ringham was that 
of a partnership, and the signature by one of the partners on the cheque was deemed 
to be sufficient evidence to intend the recipient to infer the cheque was drawn on the 
partnership. In the case of Central Motors (Birmingham) v PA & SNP Wadsworth (trading 
as Pensagain),2 Central Motors required a cheque for the payment for a motor car in 
the name of the firm. In accordance with this request, Mr Wadsworth gave Central 
Motors a cheque with his signature beneath the name of the firm, which was printed 
on the cheque, below that of the names of the defendants. It was held that by handing 
over a cheque signed in this way, Mr Wadsworth provided sufficient evidence from the 
circumstances to personally authenticate the document as being a cheque of the firm. 
By signing the cheque, Mr Wadsworth had the requisite intent to adopt the cheque as 
that of the firm.
1 [1980] 1 WLUK 323 (1980), 124 SJ 201, Times, 9 February 1980, [1980] CLY 158.
2 [1982] 5 WLUK 265, [1983] CLY 6u, [1982] CAT 231, 28 May 1982, (1983) 133 NLJ 555.
The electronic signature
7.28 An electronic signature can perform the same functions as a manuscript 
signature.1 The difference is that the document to be signed does not exist as a physical 
object in the same way as the content of a document rendered on to a paper carrier, 
which means the quality and extent of the evidence to provide intent becomes vitally 
important in the event it is disputed that an electronic signature was affixed to a 
document or communication, was not by passed by a third party,2 or was affixed to the 
relevant document in a batch of documents.3
1 If there is a specific requirement for a handwritten signature, a laser signature is not acceptable, 
for which in the context of the law in Saudi Arabia, see Golden Belt 1 Sukuk Company BSC(c) v BNP 
Paribas [2017] WLR(D) 822, [2017] EWHC 3182 (Comm), [2018] 3 All ER 113, [2018] 1 All ER (Comm) 
1126, [2018] Bus LR 816, [2017] 12 WLUK 159, [2018] 1 BCLC 385, [2018] CLY 1736.
2 Sell Your Car With Us Ltd v Sareen [2019] EWHC 2332 (Ch), [2019] 9 WLUK 397 [2019] BCC 1211, 
[2020] 1 CL 112.
3 FHG Publications Ltd v Tee- Hillman [2001] 11 WLUK 642, [2001] CLY 662, where a single Statement 
of Truth was sent accompanying a batch of proceedings to be issued.
7.29 When a manuscript signature is affixed to a physical carrier, two changes occur. 
First, the signature alters the carrier physically with the addition of a substance, such 
as ink, to the surface. Second, the signature increases the amount of information about 
the carrier, and thereby the document. An electronic signature, on the other hand, only 
tends to alter the information relating to the digital data, including the metadata that 
can include and be taken automatically from the originating application software or 
supplied by the person who originally created the record. As a result, a digital record 














its internal structure, and the metadata, which describes the record and each of the 
constituent parts.
Forms of electronic signature
7.30 Electronic signatures are manifest in a variety of forms, all of which can 
demonstrate the intent of the signing party to authenticate the data. Unfortunately, the 
terms ‘electronic signature’ and ‘digital signature’ tend to be used interchangeably.1 This 
creates confusion.2 In essence, a digital signature is data appended to, or a cryptographic 
transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data to prove the source and 
integrity of the data unit. The digital signature mechanism defines two processes, that 
of the purported signing of a data unit by the person initiating the signature, which is 
a private action, and the verification of a signed data unit by using the procedures and 
information publicly available. A digital signature is a signature that is specifically based 
on asymmetric cryptography, coupled with a one- way hash function. It is a particular 
type of signature that is usually brought about by the use of a public key infrastructure3 
and is not a plain sequence of numbers.4 It is often asserted that the digital signature 
provides a higher degree of certainty for the recipient. However, little attention is 
paid to illustrating the significant technical and legal obstacles to this assertion; that 
the verification process is opaque, or that a digital signature, as with other forms of 
signature, can be removed from a document in electronic form without trace,5 and that 
a public key infrastructure provides for encryption, not the process of signing.
1 This is also pointed out in paragraph 2.2 of the Final Report of the European Electronic Signature 
Standardization Initiative Expert Team dated 20 July 1999 , and on page 16 of OECD, ‘A Global Action 
Plan for Electronic Commerce Prepared by Business with Recommendations from Governments’, 
7– 9 October 1998, Ottawa, Canada (Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry Steering 
Committee for the Preparation of the Ottawa Ministerial Conference, SG/ EC(98)11/ REV2); see also 
GUIDEC II, ‘General Usage for International Digitally Ensured Commerce’ for further discussion of the 
terms. GUIDEC II does not use the term ‘electronic signature’ but ‘digital signature’, thus adding to 
the confusion. In addition, the Draft Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures, dated 12– 23 March 2001 (A/ CN.9/ WG.IV/ WP.88) also appears to refer to digital signatures 
and electronic signatures interchangeably: see paragraphs 31 to 62. Yet further confusion is rendered 
with the title of at least one legal textbook: D. Campbell (ed), E- Commerce and the Law of Digital 
Signatures (Oceana Publications 2005).
2 Also noted by Carlisle Adams and Steve Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, Standards, and 
Deployment Considerations (2nd edn, Addison- Wesley 2002), 184– 185.
3 See also paragraph 33 to UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, Guide to Enactment.
4 In Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal Decision No. 2877/ 07R 2008 ONWSIAT 
3111 (CanLII), an NSR (a seven- digit number), where ‘NSR’ stands for ‘no signature required’, is 
incorrectly described as a digital signature. In 1475182 Ontario Inc. o/a Edges Contracting v Ghotbi 2021 
ONSC 3477 (CanLII), Boswell J incorrectly determined, at [50], that when text messages are exchanged 
without a name appearing at the end of the text message, that the unique telephone number linked to a 
cellular telephone, taken together with the International Mobile Equipment Identifier number ‘provide, 
in effect, a digital signature on every message sent by the user of that particular device.’
5 Adrian McCullagh, William Caelli and Peter Little, ‘Signature stripping: a digital dilemma’ (2001) 1 
Journal of Information, Law and Technology, http:// www2.warwick.ac.uk/ fac/ soc/ law/ elj/ jilt/ 2001_ 
1/ mccullagh.
7.31 By comparison, the term ‘electronic signature’ is anything in electronic form 
that can be used to demonstrate a signing entity intended their signature to have legal 
effect. An electronic signature, especially when defined in legislation, tends to represent 
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a context. A signature can be manifest in different forms,1 and the term ‘electronic 
signature’ is used to reflect methods other than the use of a public key infrastructure to 
sign a message or document, such as the typing of a name on an electronic document, 
or the capture of the dynamics of a manuscript signature.
1 The use of ‘s/ ’ instead of ‘/ s/ ’ when indicating the electronic signature of an attorney is irrelevant: 
Federal, 3rd Circuit, Xu v Naqvi, 537 Fed.Appx. 76 (2013), 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013– 6538, 2013– 2 USTC P 
50, 556.
7.32 For the sake of clarity, the term ‘electronic signature’ is used to denote the generic 
concept of a signature that is brought about by the use of a computer or computer- 
like device, and includes a digital signature as one form of electronic signature.1 We 
should also be alert to new forms of electronic signature as they are developed and 
used.2 However, this does not prevent the terms used to describe electronic signatures 
from adding to or increasing the confusion for failing to describe the form of electronic 
signature at issue. This is illustrated in the Zimbabwean case of Tedco Mgmt Svcs (PVT) 
Ltd v Grain Marketing Board,3 in which an employee stole a total of $204,818.61 by 
adding the electronic signature of an authorized signatory to a series of cheques. The 
signatures were described as ‘machine’ signatures printed from the computer, which 
implies that the company caused authorized images of manuscript signatures to be 
scanned and stored on a computer.
1 In the British Columbia case of Ghaed v Telus Communications Co. 2013 Carswell BC 2727, 2013 
BCSC 1675, [2013] BCWLD 8841, 234 ACWS (3d) 897, a digital signature is referred to, but it is 
debatable whether this particular form of signature was being used by Dr Ghaed, given his lack of 
technical knowledge.
2 Jillian Friedman, ‘Signing your next deal with your Twitter @username: the legal uses of identity 
based cryptography’ (2015) 13 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 33.
3 1996 (1) ZLR 109 (SC).
Authority, delegation and ratification
7.33 A person can be delegated to sign a document, as in the Australian case of 
Whittaker v Child Support Registrar1 where a person affixed the scanned electronic 
signature of another to a letter with authority.2 In contrast, the New Zealand case of 
Gong v Zhang3 provides an example of an electronic signature used without authority. 
When forms of electronic signature are placed on a hard drive in such a way that there 
is no mechanism to prevent others from using the electronic signature of another 
person, they are exposed to being used without authority, as in the Canadian case of 
Adamo v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario,4 where the electronic signature 
of another doctor was affixed to a falsified record without permission.5
1 [2010] FCA 43 (5 February 2010).
2 In Athena Brands Ltd v Superdrug Stores Plc [2019] EWHC 3503 (Comm), [2019] 12 WLUK 279, 
His Honour Judge David Cooke concluded that employees had the authority to bind their respective 
organizations in email exchanges.
3 [2014] NZHC 2838.
4 2007 CanLII 9873 (ON SCDC).
5 For allegations that a scanned image of a manuscript signature was ‘photoshopped’ on to 
documents, see R&D Arts Inc. v Feld 2013 Carswell BC 3153, 2013 BCSC 1896, [2013] BCWLD 9633, 
[2013] BCWLD 9767, 235 ACWS (3d) 501.
7.34 Depending on the facts, a person can ratify the signature. For instance, in a 2013 
case the Supreme Court, New York County, New York concluded that where a personal 





















electronic signature software without explicit authority, the signature is capable of being 
ratified by the principal.1
1 In the Matter of an Article 75 Proceeding ADHY Investments Properties, LLC, Petitioner v Garrison 
Lifestyle Pierce Hill LLC, 41 Misc.3d 1211(A), 980 N.Y.S.2d 274, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 51634(U).
Forged signatures
7.35 The use of electronic signatures can facilitate the smooth running of an 
organization, but undue pressure can be placed on employees who fail to act as they 
ought. This was illustrated in the Canadian case of Re: Jade Truman Kaiser Mason,1 
where Mr Mason affixed the electronic signature of a customer to electronic documents 
without their knowledge, although it is not clear what form the electronic signature 
took in this case.
1 2012 CanLII 42180 (CA MFDAC); 2012 CanLII 42181 (CA MFDAC).
7.36 An early case where the PIN to a corporate bank account was used without 
authority occurred in the Australian employment case of H. Sayner and Joblink Plus 
Limited – re Termination of employment,1 where Joblink had an electronic transfer 
policy which stated that a member of the Board must enter a code into the system when 
transferring funds electronically. The codes were written on a piece of paper, placed in 
a sealed envelope and left with the Finance Manager to store in a safe location and to 
be opened in an emergency. The envelope had a direction written on the outside to the 
effect that the envelope was not to be opened except in an emergency. Ms Sayner used the 
corporate PIN to pay for a holiday for the then Finance Manager Mr Helanath Disanayake 
and his family to the Novotel Opal Cove Resort at Coffs Harbour using Joblink funds in the 
amount of A$2,241.50. This expenditure was improper and not approved by the Board.
1 PR950280 [2004] AIRC 748 (30 July 2004).
7.37 Other examples of forgery include the Australian case of Salfinger v Niugini 
Mining (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 3),1 which concerned the falsification of purported 
assignments, and Re Macartney and Tax Agents’ Board of Victoria,2 where the applicant 
obtained a copy of the letterhead of the firm he was working for, together with an 
electronic signature of one of the partners of the firm. He then forged a statement of 
employment using the letterhead and electronic signature of the partner.3 A further 
example of a falsified electronic signature in the context of employment is provided 
in the British Columbia case of Caravel Management Corp. v Roberts,4 where a senior 
employee used the electronic signature of an authorized signatory to steal.
1 [2007] FCA 1532 (8 October 2007).
2 [2008] AATA 210.
3 See also Djordje Mitic v Eco Pro Australia Pty Ltd [2009] AIRC 503 (26 May 2009) and Williams 
Group Australia Pty Ltd v Crocker [2015] NSWSC 1907, upheld on appeal Williams Group Australia Pty 
Ltd v Crocker [2016] NSWCA 265.
4 2014 CarswellBC 2249, 2014 BCSC 1419, [2014] BCWLD 6492, [2014] BCWLD 6586, [2014] 
BCWLD 6591, [2014] BCWLD 6594, 243 ACWS (3d) 766.
Evidence of intent to sign
7.38 An issue that can exercise the minds of the adjudicator is how to determine the 
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when the act occurred, and whether a person affixed their electronic signature in 
circumstances where they deny the signature was theirs.1 In the case of a manuscript 
signature, the person furnishes evidence of their intent by physically writing on a 
carrier, and providing there is sufficient text to link the person to the document, 
the proof of intent is demonstrated.2 The question of intent is illustrated in the New 
Zealand case of MFT Properties Limited v Country Club Apartments Limited,3 which 
concerned negotiations by email. One email was signed ‘Gary’. It was not in dispute 
that this referred to Mr Gary McNabb, the sole director of MFT. The issue was whether 
he was expressing a personal view during the course of negotiations or whether he 
was expressing an intention to bind MFT to the reduced rent it had been receiving. 
Woolford J concluded, at [39], that:
The name ‘Gary’ sufficiently identifies Mr McNabb but I am of the view that it 
does not evidence his intention to bind MFT to the contents of the document.
1 Where a person denied the electronic signature was applied with their authority to a witness 
statement, see Zurich Insurance Plc v Romaine [2019] EWCA Civ 851, [2019] 1 WLR 5224, [2019] 5 
WLUK 279, [2019] CLY 314.
2 For an example of the failure to prove an electronic signature, see the Californian case of Rosas v 
Macy’s, Inc., 2012 WL 3656274.
3 HC Auckland CIV- 2010- 404- 005913 [2011] NZHC 422 (13 April 2011).
7.39 In the digital context, the moment of authentication may be when the person 
actually types in their name or adopts the signature text at the end of the email, or at 
the moment the signature is put in automatically when a new email is begun where the 
program is set up to include a signature at the end of the email.
The automatic inclusion of the signature
7.40 The problems with the automatic inclusion of the signature block in facsimile 
transmissions, email and SWIFT communications has caused some differences in 
opinion between judges.
Facsimile transmission
7.41 It is useful to consider the historical cases of facsimile transmission first. The 
practice of programming the machine to include automatically the name of the sender 
on the top or bottom of each page was challenged in the New York case of Parma Tile 
Mosaic & Marble Co., Inc. v Estate of Fred Short, d/ b/ a Sime Construction Co.1 In this 
instance, it was held that the automatic imprinting by the facsimile machine of the 
name of the sender at the top of each page transmitted did not satisfy the requirement 
that writing shall be subscribed. The decision in this case remains arguable on the facts. 
Miller J reached the same conclusion in the New Zealand case of Welsch v Gatchell.2 
Having analysed a number of electronic signature cases, he said, at [63]:
It follows from what I have said that a name written on a fax may amount to a 
signature. But a fax header printed using the machine’s capacity to add writing to 
the document as it is copied and sent cannot serve as a signature unless, perhaps, 
there is evidence that is was specifically inserted for the transaction concerned. 
A fax header identifies the owner of the sending machine, the sending number 
and the time of despatch. There is no reason to suppose that it serves the added 
purpose of a signature, because every fax does not require a signature. And 












it was not affixed to the particular writing with the intention that by adding his 
or her name the sender would adopt its contents.
1 155 Misc.2d 950, 590 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (Supp. 1992), motion for summary judgment affirmed, 209 
A.D.2d 495, 619 N.Y.S.2d 628, reversed 663 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1996), 640 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Ct.App. 1996), 
87 N.Y.2D 524; this case was treated negatively in Rosenfeld v Zerneck, 776 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sup. 2004), 4 
Misc.3d 194.
2 [2007] NZHC 1898, [2009] 1 NZLR 241, (2007) 8 NZCPR 708, (2007) 5 NZ ConvC 194,549 (21 June 
2007).
7.42 In this case, a contract for the sale of land was formed orally and by facsimile. The 
sale of land requires the adoption of the contract by way of a signature. The document 
was not signed, which means there was no evidence to demonstrate an intent to be 
bound by the transaction, because the name and number printed automatically only 
acted to identify the person sending and receiving the document.
Email
7.43 An identical legal question arises in the case of email. A human directs the 
software to include the signature block in an email when it is sent. There is little 
difference between manually typing a signature block into a series of emails and 
typing the block once and instructing a computer program to append it to future 
messages. The difference between an email program and a facsimile transmission is 
that to remove the information in a facsimile transmission would mean resetting the 
machine. In the case of an email (and depending on how the email client works), it is 
usually possible for a person to delete or amend the signature block when writing a 
new email or when replying to an email.
7.44 This issue arose in Neocleous v Rees,1 where the claimant sought specific 
performance of an alleged contract of compromise that involved a disposition of an 
interest in land. The defendant contended that the contract failed to comply with the 
formalities required by s 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, 
and was therefore not enforceable. The issue was whether the signature included in 
the automatic footer of an email was sufficient to bind a party. The judge said that 
to suggest the text included in an email automatically should be ignored is incorrect. 
This is because the content of the footer was created and added to the software in a 
conscious action at some stage by a person. In addition, the sender knew their name 
was added to every email. It was also observed that the recipient of the email is not 
able to ascertain whether the footer was added because of an automatic rule or by 
the sender manually entering the content. When considered objectively, the judge 
concluded that the presence of the name in the footer indicated a clear intention to 
associate the sender with the email – and to authenticate or sign it. His Honour Judge 
Pearce concluded that the email was signed, as set out at [57]:
In my judgment, no such difficulty arises if the email footer here is treated as 
being a sufficient act of signing:
i) It is common ground that such a footer can only be present because of a 
conscious decision to insert the contents, albeit that that decision may have been 
made the subject of a general rule that automatically applied the contents in all 
cases. The recipient of such an email would therefore naturally conclude that the 
sender’s details had been included as a means of identifying the sender with the 
contents of the email, since such a footer must have been added either as a result 
of a conscious decision in the particular case or a more general decision to add 
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ii) The sender of the email is aware that their name is being applied as a footer. 
The recipient has no reason to think that the presence of the name as a signature 
is unknown to the sender.
iii) The use of the words “Many Thanks” before the footer shows an intention to 
connect the name with the contents of the email.
iv) The presence of the name and contact details is in the conventional style 
of a signature, at the end of the document. That contrasts with the name and 
contact address of Mr Hale, the person alleged to have signed the letter in 
Firstpost, whose name and address appeared above the text of the letter, in the 
conventional manner of inserting the addressee’s details.
1 [2019] EWHC 2462 (Ch), [2019] 9 WLUK 295, [2020] 2 P & CR 4, [2020] 1 P & CR DG8.
7.45 Approaching the question from the point of view of how the technology is set 
up is one way of helping to determine this particular issue. Arguably, if an organization 
authorizes an employee to insert the name, address and contact details of the legal 
entity into an email program, then it must be appropriate for the organization to put 
recipients on notice that they can or cannot use this information as a form of signature, 
or to prove intent, or that the recipient cannot rely on such information to bind the 
company for any legal purpose. When reaching judgments on such issues, it cannot be 
correct to ignore the way the technology is set up and used.
SWIFT communications
7.46 In Singapore in 2003, Tay Yong Kwang JC held in the case of Industrial & 
Commercial Bank Ltd v Banco Ambrosiano Veneto SpA1 that a message using an 
authentication code sent through the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication) system has the legal effect of binding the sender bank 
according to its contents, and where a recipient bank undertakes further checks 
on credit standing or other aspects, this does not detract from the proposition. In 
England, Blair J reached the same conclusion in WS Tankship II BV v The Kwangju Bank 
Ltd.2 A guarantee was issued by Kwangju Bank, but the guarantee was not signed. Even 
the words ‘Kwangju Bank’ did not appear on it; the bank was referred to as ‘we’ in 
the guarantee. The case for the bank was that the guarantee was therefore not signed 
and the bank was not bound. Blair J rejected this argument at [154], because the bank 
accepted that the guarantee was properly issued, fully authorized and intended the 
beneficiary to rely on it. In addition, it was sent by conventional means by way of the 
secure messaging system used between banks – that is, using a digital signature – and 
the words ‘Kwangju Bank Ltd’ were contained in the header to the SWIFT message. 
Blair J continued, at [155]:
It is argued on behalf of Kwangju Bank that this is not text which it typed in, but an 
output message header, that is, text generated by the SWIFT messaging system. 
That may be correct, but the name appears, and in my opinion it is a sufficient 
signature for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds. The words ‘Kwangju Bank 
Ltd’ appear in the header, because the bank caused them to be there by sending 
the message. They were ‘voluntarily affixed’ in the words of the old cases (c.f. J 
Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta [2006] 1WLR 1543 dealing with email addresses). 
Whether or not automatically generated by the system, and whether or not stated 
in whole, or abbreviated (in fact the name of the bank appeared here in complete 
form), this is in my judgment a sufficient signature for the purposes of the Statute 






in Golden Ocean Group Ltd v Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd [2011] EWHC 
56 (Comm) who at [103] observed that ‘an email, the text of which begins “Paul/ 
Peter”, may be regarded as signed by Peter because by that form of wording Peter 
signifies that he is addressing Paul and authenticates the content of the whole 
of what follows’. Therefore, I reject Kwangju Bank’s submissions in this regard.
1 [2003] 1 SLR 221.
2 [2011] EWHC 3103 (Comm), [2011] 11 WLUK 729, [2012] CILL 3155.
7.47 One commentator who agrees with the decision in this case suggests it is 
arguable that the reasoning is wrong. Richard Bethell- Jones suggests that ‘The 
automatic insertion of a name in a header is hardly something that any person 
(including a company) would regard as having the solemn authenticating properties of 
a “signature” ’.1 It is suggested that accepting this argument is to ignore the underlying 
rationale of the SWIFT system between banks.
1 Richard Bethell- Jones, ‘Digital signatures and the statutory signature requirement’, [2012] LMCLQ 
184, 186.
Partial document with separate signature page
7.48 As technology is developed and used, so individuals will adjust their behaviour 
and adapt accordingly. It is undoubtedly the experience of many lawyers across the 
world that some clients will expect them to work at an impossibly fast pace when 
negotiating and entering into contractual relationships. The need for speed has 
increased significantly since the world became networked digitally. For this reason, 
contracts will be formed and real estate purchased solely relying on documents in 
digital form. In most cases, a document in digital form is a perfectly acceptable way of 
entering into legal relations. However, the digital environment often means that our 
concept of a ‘document’ has had to change.
7.49 Technically, there is only digital data, but for the purposes of this discussion, 
let us consider only documents on paper – thus we associate a contract as recorded 
on paper and signed with manuscript signatures on the relevant page. In developing 
the terms of a contract, the signature page is often left until the document is finished 
to the satisfaction of the parties. What then occurs will depend on the parties and 
the advice they receive from their lawyers. There are a number of options: the 
signature page is signed with the manuscript signature of each party who happen 
to be physically together; the signature page, containing a number of signatures for 
people across continents, is signed by each on a separate piece of paper and then 
scanned; perhaps each signatory appends a digital signature at different times to the 
document. Whatever method is used, it is highly likely that the document and the 
signature pages might well be separate documents.1 In such circumstances, it then 
becomes necessary to undertake appropriate measures to prevent additional pages 
from being added to the agreement that have not been agreed, and for the signature 
pages, or signatures generally, to be properly associated with the agreement,2 and 
for draft signature pages to be dealt with appropriately.3 In Scotland, this particular 
issue is now dealt with by the Legal Writings (Counterparts and Delivery) (Scotland) 
Act 2015.4
1 Much as painters once signed the frame, not the painting, which makes attribution difficult, for 
which see Louise C. Matthew, ‘The painter’s presence: signatures in Venetian Renaissance pictures’ 
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2 In the context of a lease, see Garguilo v Gershinon and Brooks [2012] EWLandRA 2011_ 0377 and 
Gopaul v Naidoo [2014] EWHC 2684 (QB), [2014] 7 WLUK 1132 regarding the redevelopment of two 
properties by conversion into six flats.
3 For draft signatures, see Mercury Tax Group Ltd, R (on the application of) v HM Commissioners of 
Revenue & Customs [2008] EWHC 2721 (Admin), [2009] STC 743, [2008] 11 WLUK 303, [2009] Lloyd’s 
Rep FC 135, [2009] BTC 3, [2008] STI 2670, [2009] CLY 3928; Mason, ‘Documents signed or executed 
with electronic signatures in English law’; Law Commission, Electronic Execution of Documents (Law 
Com No 386, HC 2624, 2019).
4 Hector MacQueen and Charles Garland, ‘Signatures in Scots law: form, effect, and burden of proof’ 
(2015) Juridical Review 107.
7.50 Signing a blank document cannot be correct in criminal matters. Morse J 
rejected an ‘e- ticket’ in the New York case of People of the State of New York v Rose,1 
where computer- generated simplified traffic information and supporting depositions 
were generated by a device. At the time, the e- ticket was ‘signed’ before any information 
was placed on the ticket. This meant the arresting officer was essentially signing a 
blank document.
1 11 Misc.3d 200 (2005), 805 N.Y.S.2d 506, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 25526.
The Electronic Communications Act 2000
7.51 In England and Wales,1 the first draft of a bill, the Electronic Communications 
Bill, was published in July 1999. This Bill was withdrawn when it attracted a great 
deal of wrath regarding key escrow (which is now expressly excluded in the Act by 
s 14) and provisions that were later incorporated into the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000. The Electronic Communications Act received the royal assent on 
25 May 2000, and extends to Northern Ireland.2 Sections 7, 11 and 12 came into force 
on 25 July 2000 in accordance with the provisions of the Electronic Communications 
Act 2000 (Commencement No 1) Order 2000 (SI 2000/ 1798); s 4(2) was amended by 
s 82, Schedule 4(10) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 15(1) was 
amended by s 406(1), Schedule 17(158) of the Communications Act 2003, and ss 11 
and 12 were repealed by s 406(7), Schedule 19(1) of the Communications Act 2003. 
The Act was amended in 2016 by The Electronic Identification and Trust Services 
for Electronic Transactions Regulations 2016 (SI 2016/ 696),3 and The Electronic 
Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions (Amendment etc.) (EU 
Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/ 89).4 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Statutory 
Instrument5 makes an unsubstantiated assertion at paragraph 7.3, third bullet point, 
dealing with a qualified electronic signature:
It is considered to be sufficiently secure to withstand repudiation in a court of 
law.
1 For a discussion of the topic in an international context, see Stephen Mason, ‘International 
initiatives and electronic signatures’ (2012) 27(2) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 37.
2 Section 16(5).
3 Made on 30 June 2016; laid before Parliament 1 July 2016; into force on 22 July 2016.
4 Made on 22 January 2019, laid before Parliament 23 January 2019, coming into force in accordance 
with regulation 1 (that is, on exit day).
5 http:// www.legislation.gov.uk/ uksi/ 2019/ 89/ pdfs/ uksiem_ 20190089_ en.pdf.
7.52 For the purposes of justice, the legal profession is supposed to base decisions 


















basis of the assertion ‘it is considered’ is not provided. Furthermore, the discussion 
about computers and reliability in Chapter 5 is ignored. It is to be inferred that the 
government considers that this unproven declaration will be complied with in 
the same way as the presumption that a computer is reliable is also acted upon, in the 
absence of evidence and with lethargic indifference to the truth.
7.53 Unless there is a specific statutory requirement for a document to be signed, 
English law does not require any document to be signed to be both valid and effective. 
Thus, in many instances it was possible to sign a document with an electronic signature 
before the passing of the Act. The signature at the end of an email, as in the case of Hall 
v Cognos Limited,1 was sufficient, providing the person signing the document intended 
to sign it and intended their signature to affect the authenticity of the document. If 
the identity of the person signing the document is in doubt, further evidence can be 
adduced to identify the person who affixed their signature to the document.
1 Hull Industrial Tribunal, 1997, Case No 1803325/ 97.
The definition of an electronic signature
7.54 The amended definition of an electronic signature1 reads in s 7(2) as follows:
(2) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature is so much of anything 
in electronic form as– 
(a) is incorporated into or otherwise logically associated with any 
electronic communication or electronic data; and
(b) purports to be used by the individual creating it to sign.
1 Amended by The Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions 
Regulations 2016 (SI 2016 No 696) (made on 30 June 2016; laid before Parliament 1 July 2016; in 
force on 22 July 2016).
7.55 An electronic communication is defined in s 15(1):1
‘electronic communication’ means a communication transmitted (whether from 
one person to another, from one device to another or from a person to a device 
or vice versa) – 
(a) by means of an electronic communications network; or
(b) by other means but while in an electronic form;
1 As amended by s 406(1), Schedule 17(158) of the Communications Act 2003.
7.56 An electronic signature does not have the same characteristics as a manuscript 
signature, but it is the equivalent of a manuscript signature when it performs a similar 
function. The better view is to consider an electronic signature as a link between 
protocols of electronic devices that communicate via software, each with the other. The 
attention should be focused on the treatment of messages before they are transmitted 
and after they are received – the owner or user may not be aware that the computer 
cannot be trusted.
7.57 An electronic signature can be the equivalent of a manuscript signature where 
it performs a similar function, even though the two types of signature are conceptually 
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physical application of matter to alter the surface of a carrier. An electronic signature 
can only be defined within the operational boundaries of the binary numbers used by 
computers.
The elements of an electronic signature
So much of anything in electronic form
7.58 This is a wide- ranging provision that should ensure new concepts yet to be 
invented are covered by the term ‘electronic form’.
Incorporation or logical association
7.59 The first element, ‘so much of anything in electronic form’ must either be 
incorporated or logically associated with any electronic communication or electronic 
data. This part of the requirement differs slightly from article 3(10) of EU Regulation 
910/ 2014,1 which refers to ‘attached to or logically associated with’. However, the 
meaning of the word ‘attached’ is defined as ‘joined functionally’, which implies 
a similarity to the meaning of ‘incorporated’, which in turn is defined as to ‘be 
included as part of a whole’ or ‘embodied’.2 This seems to be a semantic difference 
that does not affect meaning. The signature could be incorporated by reference to 
the way it is created. For instance, with a digital signature incorporation is possible 
when the software takes part of the plaintext and encrypts it (creating the message 
authentication code), so the recipient can check if the message has been altered. In 
effect, the message authentication code is a separate part of the message, but is also 
incorporated into the message by taking the message and encoding it. Alternatively, 
a biometric measurement can be attached to a message. This is where the biometric 
measurement, if used, must be logically associated with the message, otherwise it 
will not serve any function. Although the discussion above is predicated on particular 
methods of producing electronic signatures, the underlying principles are the same for 
all methods, including a name typed into an email or an email address, although the 
functions of an electronic signature may differ between products and methods.
1 Regulation (EU) No 910/ 2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 
on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and 
repealing Directive 1999/ 93/ EC, OJ L257, 28.8.2014, 73; S. Mason, ‘Electronic signatures and the EU 
legislation’ (2020) 26(3) CTLR 73.
2 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition on CD- ROM (v. 4.0).
Purports to be used by the individual creating it to sign
7.60 This revised sub- clause recognizes that it does not follow that where an 
electronic signature was affixed to data, the person whose signature it purports to be 
was the person who caused the signature to be affixed. In the context of the Act, the 
meaning of authenticity relates to the single issue of verifying the person or entity, as 
provided for in s 15(2):
(2) In this Act– 
(a) references to the authenticity of any communication or data are references to 










(i) whether the communication or data comes from a particular person 
or other source;
(ii) whether it is accurately timed and dated;
(iii) whether it is intended to have legal effect;
(b) references to the integrity of any communication or data are references 
to whether there has been any tampering with or other modification of the 
communication or data.
7.61 This definition relates to the evidential issues regarding the authentication 
of the communication or data. Where an electronic signature is in issue, whichever 
party has the burden of proof will be required to submit evidence in response to the 
guidance set out in s 15(2), together with any other extrinsic evidence that may be 
necessary to support the evidential burden.1
1 Nicholas Bohm and Stephen Mason, ‘Electronic signatures and reliance’ (2018, Summer) 110 
Amicus Curiae The Journal of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies 1.
7.62 An electronic signature will have to be admissible before it can become legally 
effective.1 In addition, it does not follow that the communication will have a legal effect 
unless it is intended to have such an effect,2 and the provisions of s 7 do not address 
whether the signature is genuine. Section 7(1) of the Act provides for the admissibility 
of the electronic signature in two ways:
7(1) In any legal proceedings– 
(a) an electronic signature incorporated into or logically associated with a 
particular electronic communication or particular electronic data, and
(b) the certification by any person of such a signature,
shall each be admissible in evidence in relation to any question as to the 
authenticity of the communication or data or as to the integrity of the 
communication or data.
1 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions Advice 
from the Law Commission (2001), 3.27.
2 Section 15(2)(a)(iii).
7.63 First, an electronic signature is admissible under the provisions of s 7(1)
(a) where it is incorporated into or logically associated with a particular electronic 
communication or data. Alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of s 7(1)(b), 
the authenticity or the integrity of the communication or data can be admissible where 
any person certifies the signature. The certificate would normally be provided by an 
entity such as a trusted third party, although it does not follow that such a certificate 
has to be provided by a trusted third party. For instance, it is perfectly possible for Bob 
to certify that Alice signed an email she sent when she typed her name at the bottom 
of the text. It seems, therefore, that if a recipient receives an electronic communication 
which is signed with an electronic signature, and the certifying certificate relating to 
the electronic signature can be verified, the communication in question is admissible 
in evidence, subject to the provisions of s 15(2) of the Act.1
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7.64 The certification by any person mentioned in s 7(1)(b) is satisfactory if the 
statement made includes the criteria set out in s 7(3), as follows:
(3) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature incorporated into or 
associated with a particular electronic communication or particular electronic 
data is certified by any person if that person (whether before or after the making 
of the communication) has made a statement confirming that– 
(a) the signature,
(b) a means of producing, communicating or verifying the signature, or
(c) a procedure applied to the signature,
is (either alone or in combination with other factors) a valid means of 
establishing the authenticity of the communication or data, the integrity of the 
communication or data, or both.
7.65 The person or organization certifying the electronic signature may need to 
certify before or after, or both before and after, sending the communication that the 
signature is authentic and the integrity of the data or communication is therefore not 
to be questioned. From a practical point of view, the certification process will probably 
occur before the sending of the communication, although there may be circumstances 
where the certification process can occur after the communication is sent. The 
actual certification will probably be an assertion, which ought to be substantiated by 
suitable evidence, by the person or organization certifying the signature that there 
is an association that links the verification key (if a digital signature) with an entity, 
and certifies that the use of the verification key is a valid way of verifying whether a 
private key issued to the person named was used in creating the signature. The link 
between the components of the key pair, if this were to be challenged, would have 
to be the subject of expert evidence. It is possible for a certificate in isolation to be 
sufficient in some instances. In all probability, where a party seeks to adduce evidence 
of a certificate as establishing the authenticity or integrity of the communication or 
message or both, additional evidence may be required. Hence the addition of the 
phrase ‘alone or in combination with other factors’ in s 7(3). It is the provision of this 
extrinsic evidence that is necessary to provide evidence of the user’s identity.
7.66 From a practical point of view, it may be difficult to obtain such evidence if the 
communication in question is the subject of legal action years after it was sent. Even if 
such a certificate is accepted as evidence of the facts contained in the certificate, it will 
not link the act of signing with the individual or entity whose signature it is. Whether 
the certification is provided electronically or physically, it may have to be the subject 
of proof that part of the content of the certificate is acceptable as to the truth of the 
content, because the information relating to the subscribing party will be a hearsay 
statement in relation to any facts not within the knowledge of the certification service 
provider. It should be noted that the provisions of s 7 do not consider whether the 
signature is genuine, or if it demonstrates the necessary intent by the signing party. In 
dealing with admissibility, the section leaves the question of evidential weight to the 
adjudicator.
Liability of a certification service provider
7.67 The British government has set out the extent of the liability that a certification 
service provider faces when they issue a key pair that conforms to the criteria of an 
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advanced electronic signature under the provisions of the Electronic Signatures 
Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/ 318), which came into force on 8 March 2002. The liability 
of a certification service provider is not dealt with in this text, but it is interesting 
to note that a certification service provider who issues a qualified certificate will be 
liable to the relying party unless it can be demonstrated that the provider was not 
negligent.1 The burden of proof is reversed from the normal standard for negligence, 
where the person suffering loss is usually required to prove negligence. This leads to 
the possibility that organizations that decide to issue qualified certificates may seek an 
indemnity from the subscribing party against claims by a receiving party.
1 Regulations 4(1)(d) and 4(3)(d).
The power to modify legislation
7.68 There are many thousands of references in statutes and statutory instruments 
which require the use of paper or can be interpreted to require the use of paper, as 
well as the use of manuscript signatures. Amending such provisions with an overall 
catch- all clause was not possible, nor desirable. However, it is pertinent to observe a 
comment by the Law Commission in relation to this issue:
While section 7 deals with admissibility, it does not provide that electronic 
signatures will satisfy a statutory signature requirement. It does not, therefore, 
assist in determining to what extent existing statutory signature requirements 
are capable of being satisfied electronically.1
1 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions Advice 
from the Law Commission (2001), 3.27.
7.69 Power has been delegated to Ministers to modify, by order made by statutory 
instrument, the provisions of any enactment or subordinate legislation, or instruments 
made under such legislation, for which they are responsible. The authority granted 
to Ministers is provided by s 8(1). Ministers have the power to modify by statutory 
instrument the provisions of:1
(a) any enactment or subordinate legislation, or
(b) any scheme, licence, authorisation or approval issued, granted or given by 
or under any enactment or subordinate legislation, in such manner as he may 
think fit for the purpose of authorising or facilitating the use of electronic 
communications or electronic storage (instead of other forms of communication 
or storage) for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2).
1 By s 8(7), matters under the care and control of the Commissioners of the Inland Revenue or 
Customs and Excise are not included, because there are corresponding powers in s 132 of the Finance 
Act 1999 which have already been exercised by way of statutory instruments relating to electronic tax 
and VAT returns.
Limitation of powers
7.70 The power granted to the Minister is limited by the terms of s 8(3), where 
consideration must be given to the arrangements for record- keeping. Changes must 
not be made that make the new arrangements for record- keeping less satisfactory 
than before the changes were made. A further limitation is set out in s 8(6), which 
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electronic storage for any purpose’. This subsection is qualified by s 8(6)(b), which 
permits a period of notice to expire before effect is given to a variation or withdrawal 
of an election or other decision.
Purposes for which modification can be made
7.71 Modification of an enactment can be made for the following purposes, by 
permitting the use of electronic means as follows:
(a) The doing of things that may need to be evidenced in writing or where a 
document, notice or instrument is required.1
(b) Alternative means of delivery where the post or other specified means of 
delivery is required.2
(c) Where there is a requirement for a matter to be authorized by a person’s 
signature or seal, or where it is required to be delivered as a deed or witnessed.3
(d) Where a statement may be required to be made under oath or to be contained 
in a statutory declaration.4
(e) Where records have to be kept, maintained or preserved in relation to any 
account, record, notice instrument or other document.5
(f) The provision, production or publication relating to any information or other 
matter.6








The provisions a Minister may make
7.72 The Act provides the Minister with a power to provide for a range of issues 
when drafting a statutory instrument. The list is set out in s 8(4). The provisions of 
s 8(4)(g) cross refer to s 8(5). These two sections provide Ministers with the powers to 
determine such issues as matters relating to the legal presumption and the burden of 
proof. Section 8(4)(g) reads as follows:
(g) provision, in relation to cases in which the use of electronic communications 
or electronic storage is so authorised, for the determination of any of the matters 
mentioned in subsection (5), or as to the manner in which they may be proved 
in legal proceedings.
7.73 Section 8(5) provides:
(5) The matters referred to in subsection (4)(g) are– 
(a) whether a thing has been done using an electronic communication or 
electronic storage;
(b) the time at which, or date on which, a thing done using any such communication 
or storage was done;


















(d) the person by whom such a thing was done; and
(e) the contents, authenticity or integrity of any electronic data.
7.74 These two sections, taken together, indicate that a Minister has a great deal of 
control over how electronic communications are to be handled, and what presumptions 
will apply when using electronic communications. The combined effect of s 8(4) and 
s 8(5) permits a Minister to impose rebuttable or irrebuttable presumptions, with 
the potential for shifting the risks from the receiving party to the purported signing 
party. This has the potential for doing great injustice. Arguably, the power is wider 
than just replacing paper documents with an electronic equivalent. An example 
would be replacing the circulation of statutory accounts to shareholders by post or as 
attachments to an email, with an electronic notice of their availability at a nominated 
uniform resource locator.
7.75 The Electronic Communications Act 2000 has not altered the underlying 
flexibility of the meaning of a signature. An electronic signature does not have to be 
in the specific form of digital signature for it to be accepted as a signature. By typing 
a name on an electronic document, all the person needs to do is intend the name they 
type to act as a means of authentication, and intend the recipient to act upon the content 
of the document. The act of typing a name in this fashion comes within the provisions 
of s 7(2) of the Electronic Communications Act 2000, because the typed signature is 
incorporated with the content of the document for the purpose of establishing the 
authenticity of the communication.1 No further requirements are necessary to make a 
typed signature admissible.
1 In Golden Ocean Group Limited v Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd [2011] EWHC 56 (Comm), 
[2011] 1 WLR 2575, [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 95, [2011] 1 WLUK 356, [2011] 1 CLC 125, [2011] CILL 
3022, [2011] CLY 3112, Mr Justice Christopher Clarke indicated at 103 that ‘an email, the text of which 
begins “Paul/ Peter”, may be regarded as signed by Peter because by that form of wording Peter signifies 
that he is addressing Paul and authenticates the content of the whole of what follows’.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
7.76 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), which extends to 
Northern Ireland, received royal assent on 28 July 2000. For the purposes of this 
chapter, the powers relating to the disclosure of a key are relevant. The power to 
require disclosure is provided in s 49, but of importance is the meaning of a key. What 
constitutes a key is widely defined, and includes codes and passwords. The definition 
in s 56(1) is as follows:
in relation to any electronic data, means any key, code, password, algorithm or 
other data the use of which (with or without other keys) – 
(a) allows access to the electronic data, or
(b) facilitates the putting of data into an intelligible form
7.77 In the context of digital signatures, any person or organization that obtains 
and uses private keys should ensure the key is only suitable for the purposes of a 
digital signature, and it cannot be used for any other purpose.1 If a key can be used for 
purposes other than a digital signature, it may be the subject of a s 49 notice. Also, it 
will be important to ensure keys used for digital signatures are stored separately from 
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1 It is possible for encrypted data to be encoded in such a way that it can be decoded in two 
separate ways, one to reveal the secret message and the other to reveal an innocuous message, for 
which see Derrick Grover, ‘Dual encryption and plausible deniability’ (2004) 20 Computer Law & 
Security Report 37.
Possession of a key
7.78 A person has possession of a key in accordance with the provisions of s 56(2). 
A person may be deemed to have a key, even they do not have the key. The definition is 
as follows:
References in this Part to a person’s having information (including a key to 
protected information) in his possession include references– 
(a) to its being in the possession of a person who is under his control so far as 
that information is concerned;
(b) to his having an immediate right of access to it, or an immediate right to have 
it transmitted or otherwise supplied to him; and
(c) to its being, or being contained in, anything which he or a person under his 
control is entitled, in exercise of any statutory power and without otherwise 
taking possession of it, to detain, inspect or search.
7.79 This is a fairly important provision, because the officers of an organization, 
whatever the legal form the organization takes, are the ones responsible for the proper 
management of the private key.1 This is because any s 49 notice will be served on an 
officer or senior manager. Control must, therefore, be exercised over the acquisition 
and use of private keys. For instance, a person at the highest level in an organization 
should be made responsible for this issue. Considerations on whether to use private 
keys will cover, but not be limited to:
(1) Deciding if information sent electronically needs to be encrypted. If it does, 
whether there are more appropriate means of delivering the information to the 
intended recipient.
(2) Deciding if documents or messages need to be digitally signed. If so, then 
the next question is whether a risk analysis has been conducted to determine 
the likely costs of resolving a dispute if a signature has been misused, bearing in 
mind the discussion elsewhere in this chapter relating to liability.
(3) If private keys are to be used, whatever the purpose, sufficient consideration 
must be given to storage, access for appropriately authorized officers and 
employees, and the provision of checks and balances to provide for security.
1 Ross J. Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems (2nd 
edn, Wiley 2008), ch 25 for a discussion on the principles involved in this process. (Professor Anderson 
was updating his book as this text was being updated. Some of his book will be available as open source 
at https:// www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ ~rja14/ book.html for a short period before the text is published. The 
entire book will be made available again as open source in 2023.)
Exclusion of electronic signatures
7.80 Where a key is used only for the purpose of generating a digital signature, it 
does not have to be disclosed in response to a notice, providing it has not been used for 
any other purpose.1 It might be useful to recall that a key pair has more than the single 








a message, depending on the algorithm used. An electronic signature is defined in 
s 56(2) as follows:
anything in electronic form which– 
(a) is incorporated into or logically associated with, any electronic communication 
or other data;
(b) is generated by the signatory or other source of the communication or 
data; and
(c) is used for the purpose of facilitating, by means of a link between the 
signatory or other source and the communication or data, the establishment of 
the authenticity of the communication or data, the establishment of its integrity, 
or both;
1 Section 49(9).
7.81 This exemption may be less effective than it seems. In a commercial context, 
where more than one person may properly have access to a key, the person served with 
the notice may not be able to be sure that a key, despite being intended for signature 
purposes, has never been used to decrypt a message encrypted with the corresponding 
public key. Although it is arguably for the prosecution to prove that a key has been used 
for such a purpose, and is therefore subject to seizure, the mere assertion of this fact 
by the person demanding access to the key would place the recipient of the notice in a 
position of impossible difficulty in resisting the demand.
Electronic sound
7.82 It is possible to record sounds digitally when a person speaks to software code. 
In the USA, electronic signatures are defined by s 106(5) of the Electronic Signatures 
in Global and National Commerce Act, 106- 229, which provides:
Electronic signature. – The term ‘electronic signature’ means an electronic sound, 
symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other 
record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.
7.83 In the 2007 9th circuit case of Shroyer v New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc.,1 a 
person indicated their assent, and thereby executed an electronic signature over the 
telephone, by selecting the answer ‘Yes’ in response to the statement ‘You agree to 
the terms as stated in the Wireless Service Agreement and terms of service’. Although 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals did not explicitly indicate that this form of 
electronic signature is valid under the Act, nevertheless this decision is in keeping with 
the definition of electronic signature, and is a perfectly acceptable form of electronic 
signature.
1 498 F.3d 976.
7.84 In December 2007, the Court of Appeals in Kansas also reached a similar 
conclusion. In the case of In the Matter of the Marriage of Takusagawa,1 the appellant 
argued that the provisions of the Kansas Statute of Frauds required a written signature 
where an agreement to the transfer of land was part of the divorce settlement. The 
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hearing, and the details of the agreement were put on the record. Both parties stated 
under oath that what was recorded by the court was their understanding of the terms 
of the agreement. The transcript indicated that the judge asked the appellant ‘Ma’am, 
is that your understanding of the agreement?’ The appellant replied ‘Yes’.2 It is certain 
that the appellant did not affix her manuscript signature to any document. The issue 
was whether the oral response to a judge was a form of signature. Leben J, who wrote 
the judgment of the court, cited the 1921 decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in 
Whitlow v Board of Education,3 in which the members of the school board voted at a 
meeting to sell some land. When the appellant handed over her cheque in payment 
and to complete the transaction, the members of the board refused to complete the 
sale. The minutes of the meeting indicated that a motion to sell the land to Josephine 
Whitlow was made and passed, and that the members of the board authorized the 
president of the board to sign a deed in exchange for payment. The Supreme Court of 
Kansas rejected the argument of the school board that the Statute of Frauds prevented 
the agreement being enforced because the minutes of the board had not been signed. It 
was determined that the minutes as recorded by the clerk were an authentic record that 
the law required the board to keep. In this respect, the minutes constituted a sufficient 
memorandum of the contract to bind the board under the Statute of Frauds. In this 
instance, a signature was not necessary where a public record was maintained by law, 
which in turn provided authentication of the formation and terms of the contract. The 
members of the court considered that a properly certified transcript of a court hearing 
was superior to the minutes recorded by the clerk to the school board, and found that 
a signature was not necessary where ‘a court transcript providing the terms of the 
agreement and the oral assent of the party to be charged with the agreement that has 
been fairly stated on the record of the proceeding’.4
1 38 Kan.App.2d 401, 166 P.3d 440.
2 38 Kan.App.2d 401 at 410.
3 108 Kan. 604, 196 P. 772.
4 38 Kan.App.2d 401 at 409.
7.85 However, the discussion did not end at this point. Leben J then went on to 
consider the provisions of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act K. S. A. 2006 Supp 
16- 1601, on the assumption that the transcript of the agreement was recorded on 
equipment that required electricity to enable it to work. Based on this assumption, the 
judge then considered s 16- 1602(f), (h) and (i), which reads as follows:
(f) ‘Electronic’ means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, 
wireless, optical, electromagnetic or similar capabilities.
…
(h) ‘Electronic record’ means a record created, generated, sent, communicated, 
received or stored by electronic means.
(i) ‘Electronic signature’ means an electronic sound, symbol or process attached 
to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with 
the intent to sign the record.
7.86 He concluded that where a party makes an oral statement in legal proceedings 









modern practice, it would appear that the electronic capture of Mieko’s oral assent that 
this was the agreement would satisfy the Statute of Frauds. No more is needed to show 
that Mieko made or adopted the agreement’.1 This line of reasoning is far from convincing,2 
and arguably stretches the meaning of electronic signature beyond the terms of the 
statute.3
1 38 Kan.App.2d 401 at 410.
2 This decision was distinguished by the Court of Appeals of Kansas in Ronald L. Jones Charitable 
Trust v Sanders, 284 P.3d 375 (2012), 2012 WL 3966557 and In re Estate of McLeish, 49 Kan.App.2d 
246, 307 P.3d 221 (Kan.App. 2013).
3 The same could be argued if a will is recorded on tape, and not written down, as in the case of In the 
Matter of the Estate of Reed v Buckley, 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983); in Franklin County Cooperative v MFC 
Services (A.A.L.), 441 So.2d 1376 (Miss. 1983) it was determined by the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
that the statement ‘OK, we will take care of it’ made over the telephone had the capacity of proving 
intent to enter a contract when the words are subsequently written down in a memorandum.
7.87 The final claim to support the thesis that both parties entered into a binding 
agreement in court is more convincing: that an oral settlement placed on the record 
and acknowledged by the parties in open court should be sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of the Statute of Frauds, especially because the law in Kansas allowed 
for oral separation agreements in divorce proceedings, and such agreements can be 
incorporated into the decree of divorce if approved by the judge.
7.88 Where one party to a conversation records what is said without the knowledge 
of the other party or parties, it does not follow that promises made, including a 
statement that might be construed as an electronic signature, will be valid. In the case 
of Sawyer v Mills,1 heard at appeal before the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Barbara 
Sawyer and her husband recorded a conversation with Mr Mills in which he made 
promises to make certain payments. Among other things, it was determined that any 
contract formed during this conversation was not enforceable under the provision of 
the Statute of Frauds. Further, the court considered that the agreement by Mr Mills 
did not constitute an electronic signature just because it was identifiable and was 
identified at trial as being his. In explaining this in giving the opinion of the court, 
Nobel J said, at 8:
There must be intent to attach or logically associate the electronic signature to 
the agreement, that is, an intent to execute the contract. That was impossible 
here, because the medium on which the alleged agreement and electronic 
signature were recorded (the audio tape) was used surreptitiously. Mills did 
not know he was being recorded when he went to the Sawyers’ art studio. Thus, 
Mills’s identifiable voice on the tape, even if construed as an electronic signature, 
was procured without Mills’s knowledge or intent, and would be tantamount to a 
forgery which cannot be used to demonstrate a valid contract.
1 Ky., 295 S.W.3d 79.
7.89 Although the comments made by Mr Mills were capable of being construed as an 
electronic signature, the text of the statute envisages more than a mere spoken assent 
that is recorded in secret. The statute requires the electronic equivalent of a signature, 
that is, an electronic sound, symbol or process that demonstrates an intention to enter 
the agreement. Furthermore, the parties put the agreement into writing. Mr Mills 
refused to sign the written contract. This refusal to sign by Mr Mills demonstrated that 
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The ‘I accept’ and ‘wrap’ methods of indicating intent
Click wrap
7.90 Clicking the ‘I accept’ or ‘I agree’ icon (also known as ‘click wrap’) to confirm 
the intention to enter a contract when buying goods or services electronically is now 
a very popular method of demonstrating intent. In the USA, the phrase ‘wrap’ has 
become common. The action of clicking an icon is capable of providing evidence of the 
process that is executed or adopted by the person clicking on the icon – that is, the user 
is required to undertake a positive activity.1 This is certainly implied in the Canadian 
case of Rudder v Microsoft Corp,2 and has been widely accepted in the USA.3
1 Although technically literate people are capable of installing software and by passing the need to 
click on the ‘I agree’ icon, for which see Aral v Earthlink, Inc., 134 Cal.App.4th 544 (2005), 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 
229 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (determined by members of the Court of Appeal, Second District, Division, 
California, to be a contract of adhesion); where there is a succession of changes to the terms uploaded 
on to a website, it is incumbent on the issuer of such terms to ensure they retain evidence to prove 
when a person clicked to acknowledge that the new terms were received, as in the Maryland case of 
Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc., v FNC, INC., 575 F.Supp.2d 696; in Rogers v Dell Computer Corporation, 
127 P.3d 560 (Okla. 2005), Dell failed to provide evidence to demonstrate where the contract was 
formed.
2 (1999) 2 CPR (4th) 474, 47 CCLT (2d) 168 (Ont Sup Ct), FSR (1996) 367. See also Kanitz v Rogers 
Cable Inc. (2002), 58 OR (3d) 299 (Sup Ct) and Barry Sookman, ‘Browsewraps, fair dealing and 
Blacklock’s Reporter v Canada: a critical commentary’ (2017) 23(3) CTLR 55.
3 The following selected books and articles consider the US position: Nancy C. Kim, Wrap Contracts: 
Foundations and Ramifications (New York: Oxford University Press 2013); Simon Blount, Electronic 
Contracts (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths Australia 2015); Rachel C. Anderson, ‘Enforcement of 
contractual terms in clickwrap agreements: courts refusing to enforce forum selection and binding 
arbitration clauses’(2007) 3 Shidler J L Com & Tech 11; Robert Lee Dickens, ‘Finding common ground 
in the world of electronic contracts: the consistency of legal reasoning in clickwrap cases’ (2007) 11 
Marq Intell Prop L Rev 379; Juliet M. Moringiello and William L. Reynolds, ‘From Lord Coke to internet 
privacy: the past, present, and future of the law of electronic contracting’ (2013) 72 Md L Rev 452; Erin 
Canino, ‘The electronic “sign- in- wrap” contract: issues of notice and assent, the average internet user 
standard, and unconscionability’ (2016) 50 UC Davis L Rev 535; Mark E. Budnitz, ‘Touching, tapping, 
and talking: the formation of contracts in cyberspace’ (2019) 43 Nova L Rev 235; Caterina Gardiner, 
‘Principles of internet contracting: illuminating the shadows’ (2019) 48(4) CLWR 208 for a review of 
US and Irish cases.
7.91 For a ‘click wrap’ contract to be enforceable, it is necessary that the party to 
whom the contract is directed is notified that a contract exists, and that it is intended 
to apply to them. In the 9th circuit case of Knutson v Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,1 Mr Knutson, 
in purchasing a motor vehicle from Toyota, was not aware that a trial subscription 
to Sirius XM satellite radio that accompanied the purchase of the vehicle also meant 
that Sirius intended him to be bound by the terms of a contract that he was not aware 
existed.
1 771 F.3d 559, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 12,769, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,058.
7.92 In England and Wales, the Law Commission has suggested that this form of 
signature is the technological equivalent of a manuscript signature using a cross.1 It is 
suggested that this analysis is sound. This analysis is also in keeping with the decisions 
made by judges over the past 200 years regarding the form that a manuscript signature 
may take.2 In English law, the validity of the signature depends on the function it 













icon to order goods or services is deemed to be less secure than that provided by a 
manuscript signature, it does not follow that the reliability of the signature will affect 
its validity. Should a dispute occur between a buyer and a seller where one of the 
issues relates to the pressing of the icon, and the parties fail to resolve the matter, 
they will have to contemplate taking legal action. Before the matter reaches court, both 
parties will have to pay particular attention to the quantity and quality of the evidence 
available to them. In all probability, the reliability of the signature will depend on the 
ability of one or both of the parties to adduce sufficient forensic evidence of a high 
enough quality to demonstrate that either the icon was clicked or it was not. Even if the 
relying party can prove that the icon was clicked, it will not follow that the purported 
buyer clicked it. The nexus between the action of clicking the icon and the identity of 
the person who purported to order the items may be difficult to resolve, bearing in 
mind the security risks associated with using the Internet.
1 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions Advice 
from the Law Commission (2001), 3.37; see also 3.36 and 3.38.
2 For a historical consideration of the case law from every common law country relating to 
manuscript signatures, facsimile transmission and telegram up to 1990 (including an exhaustive 
treatment of the US) – invaluable in understanding electronic signatures and the various forms 
electronic signatures can take, and helpful in understanding how judges in common law jurisdictions 
adapted the meaning of a signature as technologies developed and people used them in ways that were 
not anticipated – see Stephen Mason, The Signature: The Judicial Development of the Concept from the 
Thirteenth Century to the Age of the Facsimile Transmission (Institute of Advanced Legal Studies for 
the SAS Humanities Digital Library, School of Advanced Study, University of London) (to be published 
in 2022).
7.93 Proof is central to the question. In the US case of Kerr v Dillard Stores Services, 
Inc.,1 the issue was whether an employee had clicked the ‘I accept’ icon in respect of an 
arbitration agreement. In this instance, the employer required employees to consent 
to arbitration by executing the arbitration agreement by way of an intranet computer 
system. For months, the employee had made it clear that she did not wish to sign the 
arbitration agreement, and refused to do so. Evidence was given to demonstrate how 
easy it was for a supervisor to reset an employee’s password: indeed, this is just what 
a supervisor did in front of the plaintiff when the plaintiff had failed to log on to find 
out when she was next on duty. On the same day that the supervisor logged on to 
change the plaintiff ’s password, the computer system sent an internal email to the 
plaintiff, indicating that the agreement had been ‘signed’. The employee was adamant 
that she had not executed the agreement, and Vratil J concluded that it was unlikely 
that the plaintiff would not have spontaneously reversed her decision in front of the 
supervisor, and that the supervisor could have clicked on the ‘I accept’ icon as the 
plaintiff watched. The judge set out the problem:
The problem with Dillard’s position is that it did not have adequate procedures 
to maintain the security of intranet passwords, to restrict authorized access to 
the screen which permitted electronic execution of the arbitration agreement, 
to determine whether electronic signatures were genuine or to determine 
who opened individual emails. While the record establishes that Champlin 
and plaintiff were at the kiosk on April 28, it does not show that they were 
there at precisely 3:26:20 p.m. Therefore, it is not inconceivable Champlin or 
a supervisor logged on to plaintiff ’s account and executed the agreement. The 
Court recognizes that defendants’ burden of proof is not absolute certainty, but 
merely a preponderance of the evidence. At the same time, Dillard’s has not 
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signatures. Therefore, its version of events is no more likely true than plaintiff ’s. 
For these reasons, this case basically turns on the burden of proof. Dillard’s 
has the burden of proof and its evidence that plaintiff executed the arbitration 
agreement is not persuasive. On this record, the Court cannot find that it is more 
likely than not true that plaintiff executed the electronic agreement to arbitrate.2
1 2009 WL 385863, 105 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1298, 92 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,483.
2 2009 WL 385863 at 5.
7.94 This case illustrates how important proof is in the context of digital evidence.
7.95 In passing, Professor Preston notes that ‘wrap’ contracts are now considered 
to be enforceable without further inquiry, and the trend among judges in the US 
demonstrates a ‘circularity of judicial review: one court finds a new kind of contract 
enforceable, and other courts then assume enforceability because “everyone is doing 
it” without performing a thorough analysis of the earlier opinions and distinguishing 
the facts’,1 and cites Matheson CJ in the case of Hancock v American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company, Inc.,2 where the judge states, at 1255, that ‘Clickwrap agreements 
are increasingly common and “have routinely been upheld” ’. New terms to describe 
the methods devised to enforce contract terms on websites include ‘sign- in- wraps’ and 
‘scrollwrap’.3
1 Cheryl B. Preston, ‘ “Please note: you have waived everything”: can notice redeem online 
contracts?’ (2015) 64 American University Law Review 535,543, including the further citations noted 
in the article; see also Jeffrey H. Dasteela, ‘Consumer click arbitration: a review of online consumer 
arbitration agreements’ (2017) 9 YB On Arb & Mediation 1 .
2 701 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2012).
3 New York: Berkson v Gogo, LLC, 97 F.Supp.3d 359 (2015).
7.96 In the Queensland case of Harding v Brisbane City Council,1 the applicant used 
an online facility to appeal against a planning application. The person submitting 
the request was required to include details of a form of ‘identification’ as part of the 
submission process. Mr Harding typed in the number of his driving licence, but he 
made an error, and one of the numbers he typed in was incorrect. His application was 
rejected. At the appeal, the judge was required to determine, among other things, 
whether the input of an incorrect number merited the rejection of the submission. It 
did not. Robin QC DCJ held at [18] that:
I think a common sense approach should be taken by which erroneous 
reproduction of more than a couple of digits (in the absence of special 
circumstances, such as the same number (exclusively) repeated – which may 
indicate some hardware or software malfunction) might be seen as creating 
some concern as to the signature, having regard to s 14(a) & (b) of the [Electronic 
Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001]; on a commonsense approach in the 
present context, one wrong digit does not create any real concern.
1 [2008] QPEC 75 (16 October 2008).
7.97 This discrepancy did not vitiate the submission as a properly made one. 
Interesting as the observation made by Robin QC DCJ is, that is the numbers identifying 
the driving licence constituted a ‘signature’, the judge was not correct. The signature 
comprised the act of clicking the ‘accept’ icon, and not the submission of the numbers 














an additional item of evidence to demonstrate to the Council that the person making 
the submission was who they claimed to be, which is a different issue entirely.
1 The ‘I accept’ icon was accepted in eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd 
(ACN 098 183 281) [2006] FCA 1768.
Browse wrap
7.98 There is a category of electronic signatures commonly called ‘browse wrap’ 
agreements, although there is some controversy around how judges apply the distinction 
between ‘click wrap’ and ‘browse wrap’ in case law.1 Judges have also had to deal with 
cases that look like ‘browse wrap’, but are ‘click wrap’,2 and what can be described as 
hybrid cases,3 as described in the case of Fjeja v Facebook, Inc.4 by Holwell, J at 838:
Facebook’s Terms of Use are somewhat like a browsewrap agreement in that 
the terms are only visible via a hyperlink, but also somewhat like a clickwrap 
agreement in that the user must do something else – click ‘Sign Up’ – to assent to 
the hyperlinked terms. Yet, unlike some clickwrap agreements, the user can click 
to assent whether or not the user has been presented with the terms.
1 For the US, see: Monique C. M. Leahy, ‘Litigation of internet “wrap” agreements’ (2017) 150 Am 
Jur Trials 383; Cheryl B. Preston, ‘How did we end up in a world where browsewraps are enforced 
even when they waive all consumer rights?’ (2018) 45 Fla St U L Rev 1012; James Gibson, ‘Boilerplate’s 
false dichotomy’ (2018) 106 Geo LJ 249; Kevin Conroy and John A. Shope, ‘Look before you click: the 
enforceability of website and smartphone app terms and conditions’ (2019) 63 B BJ 23. For the position 
in Canada, see Sookman, ‘Browsewraps, fair dealing and Blacklock’s Reporter v. Canada’; Theodore 
Milosevic, ‘What makes a consumer? Mandatory arbitration clauses and free digital services in Canada’ 
(2017) 75 UT Fac L Rev 9; see also Eliza Mik, ‘Contracts governing the use of websites’ 2016 Sing J Legal 
Stud 70. For the European Union, where clickwrap is acceptable in respect of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 44/ 2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, 1– 23, see El Majdoub v CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland 
GmbH (C- 322/ 14) EU:C:2015:3343, [2015] 1 WLR 3986, [2016] 1 All ER (Comm) 197, [2015] 5 WLUK 
617, [2015] All ER (EC) 1073, [2015] CEC 1225, [2015] ILPr 32 and Andrew Dickinson and Johannes 
Ungerer, ‘ “Click wrapping” choice of court agreements in the Brussels I regime’, L.M.C.L.Q. 2016, 1(Feb), 
15– 19.
2 California: Savetsky v Pre- Paid Legal Services, Inc. d/ b/ a LegalShield, 2015 WL 4593744 (previous 
hearing reported at 2015 WL 604767).
3 The Court of Appeals of Texas concluded the facts in Hotels.com, L.P. v Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 195 
S.W.3d 147 (2006), which illustrated a similar hybrid approach. In this case, the terms did not apply 
to the main plaintiff because it entered a contract over the telephone, but the terms applied to those 
plaintiffs that had used the website.
4 841 F.Supp.2d 829 (2012).
7.99 In this case, the judge held that the user was bound by the terms and conditions, 
and said, at 839– 840:
The mechanics of the internet surely remain unfamiliar, even obtuse to many 
people. But it is not too much to expect that an internet user whose social 
networking was so prolific that losing Facebook access allegedly caused him 
mental anguish would understand that the hyperlinked phrase ‘Terms of Use’ 
is really a sign that says ‘Click Here for Terms of Use’. So understood, at least 
for those to whom the internet is in an indispensable part of daily life, clicking 
the hyperlinked phrase is the 21st- century equivalent of turning over the cruise 
ticket. In both cases, the consumer is prompted to examine terms of sale that 
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…
Here, Fteja was informed of the consequences of his assenting click and he was 
shown, immediately below, where to click to understand those consequences. 
That was enough.
7.100 ‘Browse wrap’ agreements are where one party aims to impose terms of use or 
sale on another party where a visitor demonstrates assent by using the website.1 The 
potential customer is not required to indicate acceptance of any terms by any positive 
action, but the user must have had actual or constructive knowledge of the terms and 
conditions for them to be effective.2 This form of electronic signature comprises the 
process of using the website, thereby indicating knowledge of the relevant terms, 
although for such terms to be effective, or for constructive notice to apply, they must be 
conspicuous, intend to apply and the party with the burden of proof must demonstrate 
how a visitor is made aware of the terms. A party might fail because they cannot 
demonstrate a number of issues of relevance, such as that the agreement actually 
existed on its website at the material time, that any agreement applied to the actual 
product in dispute, or that the defendants agreed to its terms.3
1 Further reading: Uri Benoliela and Shmuel I. Becher, ‘The duty to read the unreadable’ (2019) 60 
BC L Rev 2255; William Hurley, ‘Failure of notice to terms in online contract formation: a solution that 
informs consumers of their obligations and rights’ (2019) 14 Liberty U L Rev 249; Tal Kastner and 
Ethan J. Leib, ‘Contract creep’ (2019) 107 Geo LJ 1277; Budnitz, ‘Touching, tapping, and talking’.
2 Or the product, if in Illinois: Schafer v AT & T Wireless Services, Inc., 2005 WL 850459 (S.D.Ill.).
3 Florida: IT Strategies Group, Inc. v The Allday Consulting Group, L.L.C., 975 F.Supp.2d 1267 (2013) 
where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of 
its online user agreement and that they had assented to the terms of that agreement.
‘I accept’
7.101 The first instance decision in the case of Bassano v Toft1 is an example where the 
use of the ‘I accept’ icon was upheld in England under the provisions of the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974. It was argued by counsel for Mrs Bassano that the loan agreement was 
not executed by her in a manner that complied with the Act. Popplewell J disagreed, 
indicating, at [43], that:
s61 of the Act requires the agreement to be signed in the prescribed form, 
and the form prescribed at the time was that required by The Consumer 
Credit (Agreements) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010 No 1014). The only relevant 
prescription was in regulation 4(3)(a), which provides that the signature must 
be in a space indicated in the document for that purpose and dated. Regulation 
4(5) recognises that a regulated agreement may be concluded electronically 
by regulation 4(5), and that the document may contain ‘information about the 
process or means of providing, communicating or verifying the signature to be 
made by the debtor’. There was therefore nothing in the Consumer Credit Act 
1974 to suggest that regulated agreements were capable of being signed by an 
electronic signature; and I can see no reasons of policy why a signature should 
not be capable of being affixed and communicated electronically to an agreement 
regulated by the Act, just as it can for other documents which are required to be 
signed.
1 [2014] EWHC 377 (QB), [2014] 2 WLUK 800, [2014] ECC 144, [2014] CTLC 1177, [2014] Bus LR 











7.102 This type of conflicting evidence, coupled with a denial that the email 
communications were sent by the sender, occurred in Germany in the three cases of 
OLG Köln, 19 U 16/ 02, LG Konstanz, 2 O 141/ 01 A, and AG Erfurt, 28 C 2354/ 01.1 The 
three individual defendants were asked to pay for items bought in Internet auctions. 
The winning bids were sent from email accounts where the user can write the email 
on the website of the provider of the address. Each of the defendants had access to 
the address by means of a password, but denied taking part in the bidding process. All 
three cases were dismissed, because the relying party failed to prove to the satisfaction 
of the courts that the defendants sent the declarations, which meant the plaintiff failed 
to prove that a contract had been concluded. By the same token, exactly the same 
problem may occur with the use of digital signatures. Whether a user denies clicking 
on an icon or using their private key to sign a document or message, the problem will 
be the same: proving that the sending party carried out the action. In this respect, the 
difference between a digital signature and clicking an icon is a narrow one.
1 Michael Knopp, Case Note, OLG Köln, Ur19 U 16/ 02; LG Konstanz, 2 O 141/ 01 A; AG Erfurt, 28 C 
2354/ 01, (2005) 2 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 105; for a translation of Ur19 
U 16/ 02, see Henriette Picot and Marlene Kast (2008) 5 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 108.
Personal Identification Number (PIN) and password
7.103 The PIN is possibly the oldest form of electronic signature,1 and has become a 
very widely used form of authentication, especially to obtain access to a bank account 
through the use of an ATM (automated teller machine or automatic teller machine or 
automated banking machine or cash machine), or to confirm a transaction with a credit 
card or debit card.2 Arguably, in the banking context, the PIN combines two functions. 
Before we consider these two functions, let us look at the requirements of the bank. 
The bank needs to satisfy itself that:
1. The card is legitimate (this is difficult to achieve, as the reports about fraud 
demonstrate), and
2. The card is in the possession of the customer to whom it was issued, or a 
person authorized by the customer to use the card.
1 In United States of America v Miller, 70 F.3d 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1995), Karen LeCraft Henderson J 
referred to the PIN at 1355 as acting ‘as a sort of electronic signature authorizing an ATM to release 
available funds’.
2 The use of a PIN was explicitly recognized as a type of electronic signature by the Civil Chamber 
of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in its ruling in the case of Ž.Š. v AB Lietuva taupomasis bankas, civil 
case no. 3K- 3- 390/ 2002; for a case note, see S. Trofimovs (2008) 5 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 143, and for a translation, see Sergejs Trofimovs (2009) 6 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 255; for Austria, see case note, OGH Urteil vom 29.6.2000, 2 
Ob 133/ 99v, Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court) (2008) 5 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 141 and translation into English: OGH judgment of 29.06.2000, 2 Ob 133/ 99v 
– Liability for misuse of ATM cards, Oberste Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) (2009) 6 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 223.
7.104 If the bank satisfies itself that its computer systems are interacting with the 
card issued to the customer (which is not always the case), then the computer system 
requests the purported customer to undertake one further act to confirm they (or a 
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point of sale terminal, by keying in the correct PIN. Generally, if the computer systems 
receive positive results from both interactions, then the bank will permit the person at 
the ATM or the point of sale terminal to undertake whatever activity they are permitted 
to do within the terms of the mandate.
1. The first function of a PIN
The first function of the PIN acts as a means of authentication. The PIN purports 
to demonstrate that the person who keyed in the PIN knew the correct PIN (there 
are some forms of attack that do not need the correct PIN – any combination 
of numbers will act to deceive the card issuer that the correct PIN has been 
keyed in).
2. The second function of a PIN
Once the computer systems of the bank are satisfied that the card is legitimate 
and the PIN is the correct PIN of the customer, then the person at the ATM or the 
point of sale terminal can undertake any activity on the account that is permitted 
within the mandate and within the limitations of the technology.
7.105 The PIN, even though it is offered to the machine before a transaction is effected, 
acts as a signature to verify a payment or other form of transaction. This means that 
the presentation of a card to an ATM, and the input of a PIN, is similar to a cheque 
that is written out by the account holder, signed and then presented to the cashier 
at the bank. The customer completes the action necessary to request a payment in 
advance of the payment being made by the cashier, and then signs the cheque in the 
presence of the cashier – all before receiving acknowledgment that a transaction has 
been authorized. This means the PIN is a form of electronic signature.
7.106 It might be considered that the action of clicking the ‘I accept’ icon or box, or 
typing in a PIN, is merely a means by which the person agrees to conclude the contract, 
but the act is not that of appending their electronic signature. This analysis might 
be right, but we must recall that the digital world is different to the physical world. 
Conceptually, some of the forms of electronic signature may not strictly be considered 
‘signatures’ in the physical world. Nevertheless, it is a convenient shorthand to refer to 
some forms of agreeing to enter a contract as an ‘electronic signature’ – at least we can 
all understand the meaning behind these words, even if the form is not quite what we 
expect.
7.107 Invariably, a claim by the user that they did not authorize one or more 
transactions conducted on the account will require the relying party – that is, the bank, 
with the burden of proof – to prove the account holder authorized the transaction. The 
fact that a withdrawal or other form of transaction took place may not be in issue, and in 
any event the bank can adduce the evidence under the relevant business records or the 
Bankers’ Books exemptions. The burden remains the same,1 whatever the technology 
used.2
1 In Cormac Herley, P. C. van Oorschot and Andrew S. Patrick, ‘Passwords: if we’re so smart, 
why are we still using them?’, in Roger Dingledine and Phillipe Golle (eds), Financial Cryptography 
and Data Security, 13th International Conference, FC 2009, Accra Beach, Barbados, February 23– 26, 
2009 (Springer 2009), https:// www.microsoft.com/ en- us/ research/ publication/ passwords- if-  
were- so- smart- why- are- we- still- using- them/ ?from=http%3A%2F%2Fresearch.microsoft.
com%2Fpubs%2F80199%2Ffc09.pdf, the statement that ‘users become responsible for all approved 





that is used, the relying party has the burden of proof. The bank must prove that it had the mandate 
of the customer to undertake an action on the account, regardless of the nature of the technology. 
Although it was held in the South African case of Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Singh 2004 (3) SA 630 (D) 
that a contract term by which the customer was liable, irrespective of who used the PIN, was not 
against public policy; compare this to the Japanese decision by the Supreme Court in Taro Kono (an 
alias) v The Shinwa Bank, Ltd 8 April 2003, MINSHU Vol. 57 No 4 at 337, Hanrei- Times No 1121 at 
96, discussed with other Japanese authorities and the effect of the Depositor Protection Act 2005 by 
Hironao Kaneko, ‘How bank depositors are protected in Japan’ (2011) 8 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signatures Review 92. For a comparative analysis of the contractual tension between the liability of 
a bank and the liability of the customer generally, see Sandra Booysen, ‘Consumer protection and the 
court’s role in shaping the bank- customer contract’ (2019) 135 (Jul) LQR 437.
2 Maryke Silalahi Nuth, ‘Unauthorized use of bank cards with or without the PIN: a lost case for 
the customer?’ (2012) 9 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 95; case translation: 
Norway, Journal number 04- 016794TVI- TRON, Bernt Petter Jørgensen v DnB NOR Bank ASA by the 
Chairman of the Board (Trondheim District Court, 24 September 2004) (2012) 9 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 117; case translation: Republic of Turkey, case number: 2009/ 11485, 
judgment number: 2011/ 4033, by Av. Burcu Orhan Holmgren (2012) 9 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 124.
7.108 The central concern is usually whether it was the customer or somebody else who 
was responsible for withdrawals made from the customer’s account using the correct PIN 
or password. Judges across the globe have had to address numerous problems that have 
arisen in connection with the use of the PIN in personal banking. Issues include:
(1) Whether it was the customer or a third party without authority who used 
the PIN (the debate might be that the technology does not need the correct 
PIN)1 – by way of example, cases that illustrate this issue are recorded in the 
USA,2 Germany,3 Nigeria,4 Papua New Guinea,5 and England and Wales.6
(2) Responsibility for the PIN sent by the bank through the postal service falling 
into the wrong hands and leading to the unauthorized use of the PIN in banking 
transactions, causing loss to the customer.7
(3) Transactions that occur with the authority of the user, but the user may 
dispute the amount they authorized, as in the Danish case of U.2000.1853V, 
where, at a restaurant with late- night opening hours, A authorized two Dankort 
card payments as he swiped his debit card through one of N’s card terminals, 
entered his PIN and agreed the amount that appeared on the display. The 
court was satisfied that one of the payments was erroneously accepted in the 
sum of DKK 10,500 instead of DKK 105. N was therefore ordered to pay back 
the difference. The court accepted, as a starting point, that when the appellant 
entered his PIN and approved an amount in the sum of DKK 10,500, the appellant 
made a binding payment to the respondent. However, that action did not rule out 
that it could be proved that payment of a higher amount was made by mistake.8
1 Steven J. Murdoch, ‘Reliability of chip & pin evidence in banking disputes’ (2009) 6 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 98; Roger Porkess and Stephen Mason, ‘Looking at debit and 
credit card fraud’ (2012 Autumn) 34(3) Teaching Statistics 87 (also translated into German: Betrug mit 
Kundenkarten und Kreditkarten, Stochastik in der Schule (2014) 34(2), S. 15).
2 For a number of early cases in the US, see Judd v Citibank, N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 435 N.Y.S.2d 210; Feldman 
v Citibank, N.A.; Pickman v Citibank, N.A., N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 443 N.Y.S.2d 43; Ognibene v Citibank, N.A., 
N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 446 N.Y.S.2d 845; see also State of New York, by Abrams v Citibank, N.A., 537 F.Supp. 1192 
(1982); in Porter v Citibank, N.A., 123 Misc.2d 28, 472 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct. 1984), where the 
customer used their card but no money was dispensed, employees of the bank testified that on average 
cash machines were out of balance once or twice a week.
3 5 October 2004, XI ZR 210/ 03, published BGHZ 160, 308– 321 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of 
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Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 248; it has been demonstrated that any PIN can be used 
to obtain money from an ATM, with no need for the thief to have the correct PIN, for which see Steven J. 
Murdoch, Saar Drimer, Ross Anderson and Mike Bond, ‘Chip and PIN is broken’, 2010 IEEE Symposium 
on Security and Privacy, http:// www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ ~sjm217/ papers/ oakland10chipbroken.pdf (this 
was awarded the Best Practical Paper).
4 Geoffrey Amano v United Bank for Africa (UBA) PLC, Suit No: PHC/ 257/ 2011, reported in (2013) 
3 SLP (Section on Legal Practice) Law Journal 114; Benjamin Agi v Access Bank PLC (2014) BNLR 23 
discussed by Timothy Tion, ‘Electronic evidence in Nigeria’ (2014) 11 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 76; for an example of members of staff stealing from ATMs, see Timothy Tion, 
‘Another method of stealing cash from ATMs’ (2017) 14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 13.
5 Roni v Kagure [2004] PGDC 1, DC84 (1 January 2004).
6 Job v Halifax PLC (not reported) Case number 7BQ00307 (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 235; Shojibur Rahman v Barclays Bank PLC, commentary by Stephen Mason 
and Nicholas Bohm (2013) 10 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 169; Shojibur 
Rahman v Barclays Bank PLC (on appeal from the judgment of Her Honour District Judge Millard dated 
24 October 2012), commentary by Stephen Mason and Nicholas Bohm (2013) 10 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 175.
7 Court of First Instance of Athens constituted by a single judge 5526/ 1999; for a translation into 
English, see Anastasia Fylla, Case note – Greece (2007) 4 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 89.
8 For a full report of this case, see (2007) 4 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 
98.
7.109 Of interest is a decision that accepts the proposition that the unique number 
issued by a bank can be a signature. In the New Jersey case of Spevack, Cameron & Boyd 
v National Community Bank of New Jersey,1 the unique account number assigned by a 
bank to a depositor was determined to be as complete a signature as the depositor’s 
written or printed name. Bilder J (retired and temporarily assigned on recall) observed, 
at 1169, that a signature may take many forms, and there was no reason why a bank 
account number could not be one of them:
In this computer age the use of numbers as a means of identification has 
become pervasive. Indeed, numbers are more readily recognized and handled 
than signatures. The ‘signature’ used by Homequity was its account number at 
Midlantic, the bank in which it deposited the check. That ‘signature’ accurately 
identified the payee and the funds were properly credited to the payee’s account. 
In fact, had Homequity written a name without the account number, the bank 
would have had to look up the number that corresponded with the same. 
In keeping with the electronic age, it is the numbers which have the primary 
significance.
1 677 A.2d 1168 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1996), 291 N.J.Super. 577. Note the 1844 New York case of Brown v 
The Butchers & Drovers’ Bank, 6 Hill 443, 41 Am.Dec. 755 where a person writing ‘1. 2. 8.’ on the back of 
a bill of exchange as a substitute for his name served to endorse the bill.
7.110 The problems with the PIN and banking applications represent an ever- 
changing struggle between clever thieves who implement new strategies to steal and 
the banks in overcoming the threats as they are discovered.1
1 Mason and Reiniger, ‘ “Trust” between machines?’; Stephen Mason, ‘Electronic banking and how 
courts approach the evidence’ (2013) 29 Computer Law and Security Review 144; Stephen Mason, 
‘Debit cards, ATMs and negligence of the bank and customer’ (2012) 27 Butterworths Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law 163; Stephen Mason, ‘UK credit card fraud: the scale of the 











7.111 As to the use of passwords as a form of electronic signature, in England and 
Wales Companies House relies on a six- character alphanumeric ‘Authentication Code’ 
which it describes as the ‘equivalent of a company officer’s signature’.1 The password, 
which can be changed by the user, will only be sent out by Companies House by post 
to the company’s registered office. Likewise, electronic tax returns to HM Revenue 
& Customs go through a government gateway, which involves identity and security 
checks including a unique taxpayer reference number, a password and an activation 
code, thereby removing the need for a signature.2
1 https:// www.gov.uk/ guidance/ company- authentication- codes- for- online- filing.
2 Confirmed in Creative Eye Photography LLP Helipix LLP v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s 
Revenue & Customs [2017] UKFTT 399 (TC), [2017] 5 WLUK 213 at [27], a decision of the First- tier 
Tribunal Tax Chamber.
7.112 In Niche Generics Ltd v European Commission (T- 701/ 14),1 an application was 
made for an annulment of a decision by the Commission that a settlement agreement 
entered into by the applicant constituted a restriction on competition. An issue arose 
as to whether a defence had been filed by the Commission, it being a requirement in 
article 3(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991, that ‘[t] he 
original of every pleading must be signed by the party’s agent or lawyer’. However, the 
Rules also provided a mechanism by which certain criteria could be put in place to 
satisfy that requirement. A decision by the General Court on the lodging and service of 
procedural documents by means of e- Curia was made on 14 September 20112 in these 
terms in article 3:
A procedural document lodged by means of e- Curia shall be deemed to be the 
original of that document for the purposes of the first subparagraph of Article 
43(1) of the Rules of Procedure where the representative’s user identification 
and password have been used to effect that lodgement. Such identification shall 
constitute the signature of the document concerned.
1 Also known as Perindopril, Re, Servier, Re EU:T:2018:921, [2018] 12 WLUK 705, [2019] 4 CMLR 15.
2 Decision of the General Court of 14 September 2011 on the lodging and service of procedural 
documents by means of e- Curia, OJ C 289, 1.10.2011, 9.
7.113 The argument as to any failure to file a defence was rejected. The procedural 
decision and overall decision of the General Court in Niche Generics demonstrates the 
fact that a user identification and password are capable of amounting to an electronic 
signature in that context. It is easy to see how that concept could be expanded in 
relation to passwords actually being a component of an electronic signature.
Typing a name into an electronic document
7.114 The use of electronic signatures predates any form of legislation, and in the 
latter decade of the twentieth century adjudicators found themselves applying well- 
established legal principles to new technologies when presented in the form of 
electronic signatures, just as judges in the nineteenth century were confronted with 
the increasing use of printing, typewriting and telegrams: all, it must be said, without 
the need for special legislation to be enacted. The early case law in which electronic 
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form of electronic signature is not uniformly accepted in all jurisdictions,2 and some 
judges in common law jurisdictions have failed to demonstrate flexibility.3
1 The first example appears to be Wilkens v Iowa Insurance Commissioner 457 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa App. 
1990), where an agent countersigned insurance policies by typing his name into the document on 
the computer; see also Doherty v Registry of Motor Vehicles, No 97/ CV0050 (Suffolk, SS Massachusetts 
District Court, May 28, 1997), http:// www.loundy.com/ CASES/ Doherty_ v_ RMV.html, where an email 
was signed by the typewritten name of the officer; electronic signatures are used routinely in traffic 
offences, for which see the Canadian cases of R v Eged, 2009 BCPC 180 (CanLII) and City of London v 
Caza, 2010 ONSC 1548 (CanLII) by way of example.
2 For instance, see the following case translations from Denmark: U.2001.252Ø (request for 
dissolution; Bankruptcy Court; signature; sufficiency of electronic signature with name typed on 
document) and U.2001.1980/ 1H (request for dissolution; Bankruptcy Court; requirement for 
manuscript signature; sufficiency of electronic signature with name typed on document) (2009) 6 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 232.
3 In the Australian case of Philip Laming v TicketXpress Pty Ltd PR941462 [2003] AIRC 1503 (3 
December 2003), Hamilton, Deputy President of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
indicated, incorrectly, at [2] that ‘Emails do not contain signatures, even electronic signatures, and the 
only readily identifiable marking may be the email address’.
7.115 Typing a name into a document such as an email is a valid method of signing 
a document,1 as established in Orton v Collins,2 where the word ‘Putsmans’ was 
deliberately typed in an email after the customary salutation ‘Yours faithfully’. Mr Peter 
Prescott QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge, said, at [21]:
I have no doubt that its purpose would be recognized throughout the profession. 
Anyone would think: ‘Putsmans are signing off on this document’. It was intended 
to signify that document was being sent out with the authority of the defendants’ 
legal representative.
1 For additional examples, see China: Beijing Han- Hua- Kai- Jie Technology development Ltd. v Chen 
Hong (2018) Zhe 0192 (2007) 4 Digital Evidence and Electronic Law Review 96 (employment); 
France: Case number 235784 from the Conseil d’Etat, Elections municipales de la Commune 
d’Entre- Deux- Monts dated 28 December 2001 (2004) 1 Digital Evidence and Electronic Law Review 
81; Case number 00- 46467 from the Cour de Cassation, chambre civile 2, Sté Chalets Boisson c/ 
M. X. dated 30 April 2003 (2004) 1 Digital Evidence and Electronic Law Review 82; Germany: OLG 
Köln, 19 U 16/ 02; LG Konstanz, 2 O 141/ 01 A; AG Erfurt, 28C 2354/ 01 (2005) 2 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Law Review 105; Ur19 U 16/ 02, OLG Köln, 6 September 2002 (2008) 5 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Law Review 108; 12 U 34/ 07, Court of Appeal Berlin (Kammergericht 
Berlin), 30 August 2007 (2008) 5 Digital Evidence and Electronic Law Review 110 (all contracts); 
Italy: Tribunale sez. V, Milano, 18/ 10/ 2016, n. 11402 (2019) 16 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Law Review 90 (contract); Slovenia: I Up 505/ 2003, The Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia 
(2007) 4 Digital Evidence and Electronic Law Review 97 (procedure). For a name in a text message, 
see China: Yang Chunning v Han Ying (2005) hai min chu zi NO.4670, Beijing Hai Dian District People’s 
Court (2008) 5 Digital Evidence and Electronic Law Review 103 and Denmark: U.2001.252Ø (2009) 
6 Digital Evidence and Electronic Law Review 232; U.2001.1980/ 1H (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Law Review 234.
2 [2007] EWHC 803 (Ch), [2007] 1 WLR 2953, [2007] 3 All ER 863, [2007] 4 WLUK 353, [2007] 
2 EGLR 147, (2007) 151 SJLB 608, [2007] NPC 49, [2007] CLY 488; Green (Liquidator of Stealth 
Construction Ltd) v Ireland [2011] EWHC 1305 (Ch), [2011] 5 WLUK 588, [2012] 1 BCLC 297, [2011] 
BPIR 1173, [2011] CLY 1875 where it was accepted that typing a name into an email is sufficient for the 
purposes of s 2 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989; Lindsay v O’Loughnane [2010] 
EWHC 529 (QB), [2010] 3 WLUK 515, [2012] BCC 153.
7.116 The main area of contention is to argue whether an email or series of emails 














Acts by a lawyer as agent
7.117 An agent, with the appropriate authority, remains capable of binding their 
principal digitally, just as in the physical world. That this applies to attorneys is 
illustrated in the Tennessee case of Waddle v Elrod,1 where the Supreme Court 
determined that the emails exchanged between counsel with their name typed at the 
bottom of the email satisfied the signature requirement of the Statute of Frauds. The 
same principle applies in New Zealand.2
1 367 S.W.3d 217 (2012).
2 Cox v Coughlan [2014] NZHC 164 (14 February 2014).
Interest in real property
7.118 In Faulks v Cameron,1 the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in Australia 
applied the provisions of s 9 of the Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act 2000 
(NT) to the name typed at the bottom of the email. Acting Master Young concluded, at 64:
I am satisfied that the printed signature on the defendant’s emails identifies him 
and indicates his approval of the information communicated, that the method 
was as reliable as was appropriate and that the plaintiff consented to the method. 
I am satisfied that the agreement is ‘signed’ for the purposes of s45(2).
1 [2004] 32 Fam LR 417, [2004] NTSC 61; see also Kavia Holdings Pty Limited v Suntrack Holdings 
Pty Limited [2011] NSWSC 716.
Loan of money
7.119 In the New South Wales case of Stuart v Hishon,1 Ms Hishon loaned money 
to Mr Stuart and subsequently initiated proceedings to recover A$28,216.17 plus 
interest, being the outstanding and unpaid balance of monies owing to her pursuant to 
the loan of A$83,760.87 made by Ms Hishon to him in July 1996. Prior to the litigation, 
a series of email correspondence occurred between the parties regarding the payment 
of the loan, and Mr Stuart ended each email with ‘Tom’. Counsel for Mr Stuart argued 
that it was necessary to provide evidence to establish that Mr Stuart placed the printed 
name on his email intending it to be an acknowledgment of the debt, and that no 
such evidence existed. Harrison J did not accept this argument, stating, at [34], that 
‘Mr Stuart typed his name on the foot of the email. He signed it by doing so. It would be 
an almost lethal assault on common sense to take any other view.’
1 [2013] NSWSC 766.
7.120 In China, in the court of first instance case of Yang Chunning v Han Ying,1 Mr Yang 
claimed that the defendant Miss Han asked to borrow RMB 11,000 from him. Yang 
agreed to lend the money to Miss Han, but she failed to return the money. As evidence, 
Mr Yang exhibited several text messages sent from Miss Han’s mobile telephone about 
the loan. It was confirmed that the messages were transmitted from Miss Han’s mobile 
telephone number. In this case, the judge supported the plaintiff ’s claim based on the 
evidence of the mobile telephone message between the parties. The court judged that 
these messages, as a form of electronic text according to the Electronic Signature Law,2 
could serve as evidence to support Mr Yang’s claim.
1 (2005) hai min chu zi NO.4670, Beijing Hai Dian District People’s Court; for a translation into 
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2 Electronic Signatures Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2004 (amended by Electronic 
Signatures Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2015 (Order No. 24 of the President of the People’s 
Republic of China, promulgated on and effective since 4 April 2015).
7.121 In the Texas case of Parks v Seybold1 before the Court of Appeals, the Gaming 
Management Corporation executed a note payable to Scott Seybold in the amount 
of US$10,000, plus 15 per cent interest. Clyde Parks wrote the note by hand, and he 
signed it in his capacity as vice- president of the corporation. The corporation ceased 
to exist, and Mr Seybold sought full payment on the note. The parties subsequently 
exchanged a number of emails, and the court agreed with the trial judge that the 
emails constituted writing, and the inclusion of the words ‘Thank you, Clyde’ above an 
automatic signature block served to demonstrate that Parks had signed the emails.
1 2015 WL 4481768; John G. Browning, ‘No ink, no problems? A look at the validity of email 
signatures as contracts’ (2017) 80 Tex BJ 772 ; George L. Blum, ‘Use of e- mails to establish enforceable 
contracts’ (2017) 32 ALR 7th Art 6.
Employment
7.122 In England and Wales, the first case of this nature occurred in the Industrial 
Tribunal case of Hall v Cognos Limited.1 Cognos employed Mr Hall as a sales executive 
under the terms of the Standard Employment Agreement used by Cognos. He was 
provided with a motor car for business and personal use. Mr Hall was reimbursed 
for all reasonable expenses incurred for travel, accommodation and other costs in 
accordance with the relevant policy, which the chairman determined was incorporated 
into the contract. The policy stated that all expenses over six months old would not 
be paid. Mr Hall failed to submit any travel expenses between 1 December 1995 
and 3 June 1996. By January 1997 Mr Hall wanted his expenses to be paid. A series 
of emails was exchanged on 15 January between Mr Hall, Sarah McGoun (of HR) 
and Keith Schroeder, Mr Hall’s line manager. Mr Hall asked if he could submit a late 
expenses claim to Ms McGoun. Ms McGoun in turn referred Mr Hall to Keith Schroeder, 
and Mr Schroeder, in response to the question as to ‘whether [the late submission] 
is OK with you?’ replied, ‘Yes, it is OK.’ Mr Hall subsequently submitted his expenses, 
although he did not provide all the necessary forms immediately. He also inflated his 
claims. His employers refused to make any payment and dismissed him.
1 Industrial Tribunal Case No 1803325/ 97.
7.123 Counsel for Cognos argued that because an email was not in writing and 
signed, the exchange of emails did not have any effect on the terms of the employment 
agreement. Mr C. T. Grazin, the chairman sitting on his own, declined to accept this 
proposition, attractive as it appeared to him. He held that the emails were in writing 
and signed once they were printed out. Despite there being no reference or discussion 
to any relevant case law or the statutory definitions of ‘writing’ and ‘document,’ the 
chairman concluded at 5:
I am satisfied than an email is ‘in writing and signed by the parties’ once it is 
printed out. The position might (it is not necessary to make any finding on this 
point) be different if the email was only retained temporarily on the computer’s 
hard disk storage system. The documents that were, however, produced from the 
computer are clearly in writing and bear the signatures of both ‘Sarah’ and ‘Keith’. 
The fact that those signatures are printed, rather than hand- written, is not in my 








email messages are incapable, as a matter of law, of having any modifying effect 
on the specific contract between the parties.
7.124 A further argument put forward on behalf of Cognos was that Mr Schroeder did 
not have the authority to respond to Mr Hall’s request, nor was he authorized to agree 
to it. This was rejected on the basis that, as Mr Hall’s line manager, Mr Schroeder was 
vested with the appropriate authority to deal with such a request, and as a result, Mr 
Hall could rely on Mr Schroeder’s response. This meant Mr Schroeder’s response acted 
to bind Cognos. As a result, the exchange of emails between Mr Hall and his line manager 
acted to vary the policy, and Cognos was obliged to pay Mr Hall his reasonable expenses.
Contract
7.125 The members of the Court of Appeal Civil Division in Nicholas Prestige Homes v 
Neal1 did not concern themselves with the question of the signature in emails in this 
particular case. It was concluded that a contract was formed with the exchange of 
emails regarding the commission on a sale of property. By implication, the names typed 
at the end of the email, ‘Marc Taylor’ and ‘Sally’, were construed as valid signatures.2
1 [2010] EWCA Civ 1552, [2010] WLUK 9, (2010) 107(48) LSG 14.
2 An exchange of emails constituted an agreement in Bieber v Teathers Ltd (In Liquidation) [2014] 
EWHC 4205 (Ch), [2014] 12 WLUK 408, [2015] CILL 3609, and as with Nicholas Prestige Homes v Neal, 
the nature of the signatures was not considered. In Temple, Re 2012 CarswellOnt 2817, 2012 ONSC 376, 
[2012] O.J. No. 856, 109 O.R. (3d) 374, 214 A.C.W.S. (3d) 609, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 312, Newbould J determined 
that a name on an email was a sufficient signature within the requirements of the Limitations Act, 2002, 
S.O. 2002, c. 24 (Ontario), but the judge did not indicate where the name was placed, whether it as at the 
end of the email or the name as part of the email address, in Toronto Common Elements Condo. Corp. No. 
2041 v Toronto Standard Condo. Corp. No. 2051, 2015 ONSC 4245 (CanLII), Corbett J refused to accept 
an email was signed, but failed to indicate whether a name appeared in the body of the email, and if a 
name was included in the body of the email, where the name was placed, whether it as at the end of the 
email or if a name formed part of the email address. In Lev v Serebrennikov 2016 ONSC 2093 (CanLII), 
Pattillo J accepted an email was signed, but did not clarify where the name was placed, whether it as 
at the end of the email or the name as part of the email address, although by inference, the judge was 
probably referring to the name that formed part of the email address.
7.126 Whether a signature contained in an email constitutes a valid contract in Israel 
was considered by Noa Grossman J in Computer Sky Edv v Prime Medical Company Ltd.1 
It was held that a contract that was signed through email correspondence is valid. In 
essence, the reasoning of the decision was as follows: negotiations are carried out today 
through electronic communications; an offer, a request for an offer and the reception of 
an offer can all be performed via email correspondence; the correspondence as a whole 
is what creates the actual agreement; unlike a printed contract that incorporates the 
parties’ will into one document, a contract reached by way of reciprocating electronic 
communications is a mosaic of all the parties’ communications.
1 Tel Aviv Peace Court Civil Case 29488/ 04 (4 August 2005, unpublished decision).
7.127 Two rulings of the Lithuanian courts, in the Court of Appeal1 and in the Supreme 
Court of Lithuania,2 accepted email communications (typed by the person who appends 
their name at the end) as evidence in civil proceedings, although it is not certain 
whether names written in the emails will be accepted as a form of electronic signature.
1 10 April 2006, case no. 2A– 95/ 2006.
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7.128 In Scotland, the nature of the electronic signature was not specifically at issue 
in Baillie Estates Ltd v Du Pont (UK) Ltd,1 where Hodge L concluded that an exchange 
of emails constituted a valid contract, notwithstanding the apparent informality of the 
content of the emails exchanged, because the exchange demonstrated an agreement to 
enter into a contract. By inference, it is possible to observe that the name typed at the 
bottom of each email constituted an electronic signature.
1 2009 GWD 25– 399, [2009] ScotCS CSOH_ 95, [2009] CSOH 95.
7.129 A contract in South Africa can be varied by an exchange of emails that includes 
the name of the person sending the email where their name appears in the email, as 
in the case of Spring Forest Trading v Wilberry,1 where the parties agreed to cancel a 
contract by exchange of emails. Cachalia JA said, at [28]:
The typewritten names of the parties at the foot of the emails, which were used 
to identify the users, constitute ‘data’ that is logically associated with the data in 
the body of the emails, as envisaged in the definition of an ‘electronic signature’. 
They therefore satisfy the requirement of a signature and had the effect of 
authenticating the information contained in the emails.
1 (725/ 13) [2014] ZASCA 178, 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA) (21 November 2014).
7.130 This finding is also consistent with the approach taken by the courts in South 
Africa, as noted by the judge at [26]:
The approach of the courts to signatures has therefore been pragmatic, not 
formalistic. They look to whether the method of the signature used fulfils the 
function of a signature – to authenticate the identity of the signatory – rather 
than insist on the form of the signature used.
Guarantees and debt
7.131 That email correspondence is used extensively for business has become a fact 
that judges now take for granted. An exchange of emails occurred in respect of a debt 
claimed in two amounts, one of A$33,884.02 and the other of A$2,859.14, in respect 
of two different companies in a case before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in 
Austral- Asia Freight Pty Ltd v Turner.1 Hartnett J concluded, at [30], that there was an 
objectively manifested intention to be legally bound, that it was conveyed in sufficient 
writing, and that the name typed at the end of the emails constituted a signature for 
the purposes of s 126 of the Instruments Act 1958 (Vic). In New Zealand, in the case of 
Sanson v Parval Marketing Limited,2 upheld on appeal under Gachot v Sanson,3 it was 
accepted that the first name of a person typed into an email is capable of forming part 
of the evidence to demonstrate the assignment of a guarantee.
1 [2013] FCCA 298 (2013), 2013 WL 2253153; Dane Weber, ‘Tech neutrality in Australian signature 
law’ (2015) 24 JL Inf & Sci 101.
2 [2008] NZHC 87 (11 February 2008).
3 [2009] NZCA (CA95/ 2008) 86; Barry Allen, ‘The validity of informal guarantees’ (2013) 13 Otago 
L Rev 57.
Public administration, the judiciary and the police
7.132 In Badre v Court of Florence, Italy,1 an extradition order was made in enforcement 














Serious Organised Crime Agency was challenged because, it was argued, it was not 
subscribed with a physical signature in ink, but with an electronic signature in the form 
of letters and a number: ‘GW (200820)’. There was no other dispute about the content 
of the certificate. It was accepted that in all other respects the document produced was a 
proper certificate. The certificate was issued under the provisions of s 2(7) and (8) of the 
Extradition Act 2003. The purpose of the certificate is to assert the authority to issue an 
arrest warrant under the Act. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the provision of a 
proper certificate under s 2 of the Act is a precursor to the validity of the warrant and the 
subsequent jurisdiction of the court. When a certificate is issued, the requested person 
may be lawfully arrested. The powers of the court follow on from such an arrest. If the 
arrest cannot be shown to be lawful, the court has no jurisdiction. Mr Summers argued 
that a machine purported to issue the certificate in this case. McCombe LJ rejected this 
argument, indicating that it seemed clear that the designated authority provided the 
certificate. The official causing the certificate to be issued used their initials GW and an 
identifying code as a means of authentication. The electronic form of the signature on 
the certificate did not act to detract from the validity of it. The judge then went on to 
observe, at [16], that a manuscript signature would be preferable:
It is perhaps unfortunate that the electronic age has produced more haste and 
less speed, because it has thrown up this technical argument where none existed 
before. It must surely be the easiest task in the world to produce a signature 
in ink, or at least the full name and designation of the individual certifying and 
perhaps an official stamp or rubric confirming that that individual does indeed 
certify the contents of the document to lend some additional force of authority 
to the certificate that is being produced. I would hope that SOCA would consider 
either reverting to the old practice of producing these certificates, properly 
signed by a real person, in the form that was actually used in an earlier warrant in 
this case (subsequently withdrawn); or at least better identifying the individual 
making the certification on the face of the document.
1 [2014] EWHC 614 (Admin), [2014] 3 WLUK 250, [2014] ACD 933.
7.133 An identical point was taken in The Queen on the Application of Neculai Jugan v 
Deta Court of First Instance, Romania,1 where a certificate was issued pursuant to s 2(7) 
of the Extradition Act 2003. It was dated 28 May 2013, and below the date were the 
words ‘Signed LT’ in type, and underneath that ‘#101782’. The appellant contended that 
this was not a valid signature, which meant that an essential procedural requirement 
had not been made out. This argument was rejected on the basis that a witness gave 
written evidence confirming the signature and the authenticity of the certificate.
1 [2014] EWHC 460 (Admin), [2014] 2 WLUK 261.
7.134 Many police forces in the United Kingdom now use digital systems to implement 
and record decisions, as in the case from Scotland of HM Advocate v Purves,1 as 
explained by Maciver S at [7] :
I found from that evidence that the procedure within Lothian and Borders Police is 
that the applications from various officers for directed surveillance are dealt with by 
a secure online system which meets that Force’s requirements in respect of security 
and accessibility. A password system is used which means that only selected and 
appropriate individuals can access the system and once authorization has been given 
by a detective superintendent the authorization cannot be altered. The applying 
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application and that is read on screen by a detective superintendent or superior 
rank who, having considered the application, either grants or refuses authorization. 
If authorization is granted as in this case, the reasons for authorization are typed 
personally by the superintendent and thus entered into the secure system.
1 2009 GWD 30- 479, [2009] HCJ 2, 2009 SLT 969, [2009] ScotHC HCJ_ 2, 2010 SCL 88.
7.135 In this instance, the solicitor advocate for the first accused argued that the 
authorization for directed surveillance granted by the police superintendent in terms 
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 was not in writing 
until it was printed off, and it could not therefore be a valid authorization until that 
time, and that when it was printed off, it did not have the signature of the authorizing 
superintendent and was also defective on that account. The Sheriff rejected both 
arguments. As a matter of general principle, he dismissed the first argument at [11]:
I found on a simple basis of commonsense and reality, that it must be accepted and 
understood that in every phase of life, society has moved forward, and specifically 
in this connection has moved on from only producing documents in pen and ink, 
and that the development is normal and acceptable. I did not find it an acceptable 
or reasonable argument that an online document which had not yet been printed 
off but which had been typed and was viewable on a screen was not to be 
regarded as being ‘in writing’. I came to the view that such a document, having 
been prepared in this case by Detective Superintendent Doneghan personally by 
depressing the keys on his personal computer and by the use of a secure system, 
was in fact a written document and was preserved for future use within Lothian 
and Borders Police online system. I consider it to be a flawed argument to suggest 
that that document could not be regarded as a written document until it was 
actually printed off and could be held in the hand for reading purposes.
7.136 Regarding the issue of whether the authorization was signed, there is no 
requirement for the document to be signed under the provisions of the statute, so it 
follows that the authorization was valid.1
1 For an electronic facsimile in Scotland, see Scrimgeour- Wedderburn v Procurator Fiscal, Kirkcaldy 
[2019] HCJAC 57.
Statute of Frauds
7.137 Email is a particularly useful means of communicating and negotiating the 
terms of contracts. Aside from the question as to whether the content of an exchange 
of emails is sufficient to demonstrate the formation of a contract, one of the issues is 
whether the exchange of electronic communications was signed, and if so, whether the 
emails were sufficiently signed under the relevant Statute of Frauds, or whether the 
signatures in an exchange of emails between the parties clearly identified the parties. 
In Canada, an electronic signature in an email was held to constitute a signature under 
the Statute of Frauds 1677.1 In England and Wales, Clarke J considered that a series of 
emails was capable of constituting writing under the Statute of Frauds in Golden Ocean 
Group Limited v Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd,2 and said, at [103], that ‘an email, 
the text of which begins “Paul/ Peter”, may be regarded as signed by Peter because by 
that form of wording Peter signifies that he is addressing Paul and authenticates the 
content of the whole of what follows’. On appeal before the Civil Division of the Court of 
Appeal,3 Tomlinson LJ saw no reason why a series of emails ought to be excluded from 









I can see no reason why the contract of guarantee so identified should not be 
regarded as an agreement in writing for the purposes of the Statute … I can see 
no objection in principle to reference to a sequence of negotiating emails or other 
documents of the sort which is commonplace in ship chartering and ship sale and 
purchase. Whether the pattern of contract negotiation and formation habitually 
adopted in other areas of commercial life presents difficulty in adoption of the 
same approach must await examination when the problem arises. Nothing I have 
said is intended to discourage the obviously sensible practice of incorporating a 
guarantee either in a readily identifiable self- standing document or otherwise 
providing for it as part of the terms of a formally executed document. The Statute 
must however, if possible, be construed in a manner which accommodates 
accepted contemporary business practice. The present case is not concerned 
with prescribing best or prudent practice. It is concerned with ensuring, so far as 
is possible, that the adoption of usual and accepted practice cannot be used as a 
vehicle for injustice by permitting parties to break promises which are supported 
by consideration and upon which reliance has been placed.
1 Leoppky v Meston 2008 ABQB 45 (CanLII).
2 [2011] EWHC 56 (Comm), [2011] 1 WLR 2575, [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 95, [2011] 1 WLUK 356, 
[2011] 1 CLC 125, [2011] CILL 3022, [2011] CLY 3112.
3 Golden Ocean Group Ltd v Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 265, [2012] 1 
WLR 3674, [2012] 3 All ER 842, [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 978, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 542, [2012] 3 WLUK 
313, [2012] 1 CLC 479, [2012] CILL 3161, (2012) 162 NLJ 425, [2012] CLY 3047.
7.138 The court dismissed the arguments that the name ‘Guy’ at the end of the email 
was not a signature, and no more than a salutation, and one typed in a ‘matey’ or 
familiar fashion, or in the alternative, if it was a signature, it was only the signature 
of a communication and not appropriate or effective to authenticate a contract of 
guarantee. The court considered that the name was typed in a manner that indicated 
that it was intended to authenticate the document, and agreed that an electronic 
signature is sufficient and that a first name, initials or a nickname will suffice.
Wills
7.139 There are circumstances when a will has been considered for probate as a result 
of being written on a computer, and it is conceivable that a court may be required to 
consider the content of an email that is clearly testamentary in character – perhaps an 
email sent by a serviceman or woman while on active duty.1
1 Jeremy Malcolm, a lawyer in Australia, signed his will using digital signatures; see Angus Kidman, 
‘Australian makes digital will’, ZDNet Australia, 20 January 2004, http:// www.zdnet.com/ article/ 
australian- makes- digital- will/ , (2004) 1 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 90; 
Michael Cameron Wood- Bodley, ‘Wills, data messages, and the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act’ (2004) 21 The South African Law Journal 526; Law Commission, Making a Will 
(Consultation Paper 231, 2017), ch 6 on electronic wills – the Law Commission has yet to finalize its 
recommendations at the time of writing.
7.140 An early example of a will prepared in digital form is the Quebec case of Rioux 
v Coulombe,1 where the police found a note after the testator committed suicide on 
4 May 1996 that led to the discovery of a diskette, with the following text written by 
hand on the label: ‘Ceci est mon testament/ Jacqueline Rioux/ 1er février 1996’ (‘This 
is my will/ Jacqueline Rioux/ 1 February 1996’). A single electronic file was stored on 
the disk, comprising directions of a testamentary nature. There was no signature in 
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day, the testator wrote in her diary that she had made a will on her computer, bearing 
the date 1 February 1996. Michaud, greffier (master) of the Quebec Superior Court, 
decided that the text did not meet the requirements of article 726 of the Code civil du 
Québec requiring a holograph testament.2 However, he found the electronic will to be 
valid under the dispensing power of Quebec. In so doing, he failed to address any of 
the evidential issues that arose out of the circumstances.3 Such matters were covered 
in the South African case of Macdonald v The Master,4 where the deceased committed 
suicide on or about 14 December 2000 and left in his own handwriting four notes 
dated 13 December 2000 on a bedside table next to the bed on which he was lying. One 
of the notes read as follows:
I, Malcom Scott MacDonald, ID 5609065240106, do hereby declare that my last 
will and testament can be found on my PC at IBM under directory C:/ WINDOWS/ 
MYSTUFF/ MYWILL/ PERSONAL.
1 1996 CarswellQue 1226, 19 ETR (2d) 201, JE 97- 263, EYB 1996– 87749.
2 Brown J considered the meaning of the word ‘holograph’ in detail in the case of In the Matter of the 
Estate of Reed v Buckley, 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983) at 831– 832, and reached the logical conclusion that 
a tape recording could not be considered to be a piece of writing. It follows that a will drafted using 
digital data cannot be a holographic will.
3 Nicholas Kasirer, ‘From written record to memory in the law of wills’ (1997– 8) 29 Ottawa Law 
Review 39, suggested, at 44, that the Master was somewhat perfunctory in deciding that the diskette 
and the text recorded on it did not constitute a holographic will, missing the opportunity of testing the 
elasticity of the ordinary rules of form, and he went on to discuss the evidential problems that were not 
addressed (44– 48).
4 2002 (5) SA 64; Michael Cameron Wood- Bodley, ‘Macdonald v The Master: computer files and the 
“rescue provision” of the Wills Act: notes’ (2004 January) 21(1) South African Law Journal34; Sizwe 
Snail and Nicholas Hall, ‘Electronic wills in South Africa’ (2010) 7 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 67; see also Juliet Brook, ‘Succession: to dispense or not to dispense? A 
comparison of dispensing powers and their judicial application’ (2019) 1 PCB 9.
7.141 The deceased was employed as a senior IT specialist with IBM Global Services. 
The evidence before the court was that the personal computer allocated to the 
deceased was controlled by a password that only the deceased knew. Each employee 
with a personal computer at IBM was required to change their password every month, 
to record the password on a piece of paper, seal it in an envelope and hand it over to 
an employee whose job was to safeguard the passwords by keeping them in a locked 
facility. Only three senior members of staff had the right to request the password. Mr 
Dimmick, the Professional Development Manager, had a right to obtain the password. 
On 14 December 2000 he obtained access to the computer and printed the contents on 
to paper. The document purported to be the deceased’s last will and testament. It was 
handed to his widow and the file was then deleted. The document had the following 
heading: LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT FROM MALCOLM SCOTT MACDONALD. The 
first paragraph read:
I, the undersigned, Malcolm Scott Macdonald (ID 5609065240106), divorced, do 
hereby revoke all wills, codicils and other testamentary acts heretofore made by 
me and declare the following to be my last will and testament.
7.142 The document then appointed an executor and set out the disposition of the 
deceased’s property, but it was neither dated nor signed by any witnesses or the 
deceased. The Master refused to accept the will, because it failed to comply with 










to be in writing, signed and attested by two competent witnesses, and the testator 
must initial every page. Hattingh J set out the requirements necessary for the will to 
be accepted at 70 F– G:
In order to be successful with their application under this section, the applicants 
must, on a balance of probabilities, establish:
(a) the documents, annexures A and F were drafted by the deceased;
(b) that the deceased had died since the drafting of the documents; and
(c) the documents were intended by the deceased to be his will.
7.143 It was necessary to decide whether the requirements of s 2(3) had been 
satisfied. It reads:
If a court is satisfied that a document or the amendment of a document drafted 
or executed by a person who has died since the drafting or execution thereof, 
was intended to be his will or an amendment of his will, the court shall order the 
Master to accept that document, or that document as amended, for the purpose 
of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965), as a will, although 
it does not comply with all the formalities for the execution or amendment of 
wills referred to in subsection (1).
7.144 Hattingh J commented that the legislature introduced s 2(3) with the intention 
of eliminating injustice and inequity where a person failed to comply with the 
formalities set out in s 2(1). It was necessary to determine whether the deceased 
drafted the documents. Of the two approaches that could be adopted (the document 
must be drafted in the deceased’s handwriting, or the document may be typed by the 
deceased or even dictated by the deceased), the judge adopted the liberal approach, 
commenting at 71A– B that:
The retention of the formal requirements of s2(1) and the peremptory nature of 
s2(3) do not justify a strict interpretation of s2(3). Not only is this inconsistent 
with the very purpose of s2(3), namely to prevent the last wishes of a testator 
from being nullified by a non- compliance with technical formalities, but it also 
does not take cognizance of the realities of the technological world we live in.1
1 Hattingh J gave detailed reasons for trusting the digital data and the surrounding circumstances at 
71G– J.
7.145 The second point, that the deceased had died since the drafting of the 
documents, was accepted, as was the third point, that the testator intended the draft 
will to be his last will and testament. Hattingh J usefully set out the factors at 72C– G 
that were of importance in reaching his decision:
(a) the documents are a clear indication of the deceased’s intention that they 
should be regarded as his will and testament;
(b) the documents are not preliminary sketches or notes for discussion with an 
attorney or anybody else to draft a will, but his final wishes;
(c) there is no element of suspicion of fraud attached to the documents and their 
reproduction;
(d) there is no suspicion that there could have been any tampering with the 
computer or the documents;
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(e) not only did the documents exist on the computer, but there was indeed clear 
reference by the testator to these specific documents in his notes;
(f) there was a clear indication by the deceased where this document could be 
found on his computer;
(g) only the deceased had access, by way of secret password, to put the documents 
on the computer;
(h) only the deceased could have typed the said documents;
(i) they could only be extracted upon the instructions of the deceased in his own 
handwriting and only with the deceased’s own secret code.
7.146 In this case, Hattingh J concluded, at 72I– J, that s 2(3) called ‘for an approach 
which promotes an extensive or flexible interpretation. This is also in accordance with 
the spirit of the technological age. ’ Although the testator did not sign his name in the 
document, it could be argued that the password served a similar function.
7.147 In the Saskatchewan case of Buckmeyer Estate (Re),1 the executor proffered 
three documents for admission to probate: a will dated 5 May 2007, an email dated 
23 August 2007 and an amendment to the will dated 27 August 2007. The will 
was properly proven. The issue to be determined was whether the email and the 
amendment were testamentary documents and whether s 37 of The Wills Act, 1996, 
S.S. 1996 c. W- 14.1 applied. The email was from the deceased, John Buckmeyer, to the 
executor (johnbuckmeyer@hotmail.com to dave.gibson@sasktel.net). The subject was 
‘John’s arrangements’. The email consisted of two pages. It was accepted that he wrote 
the email and that it contained his electronic signature. The content indicated that 
he was very sick and in his last days, and stated that he wanted to give the executor 
more information and express his wishes clearly before he died. The deceased listed 
his credit accounts, gave a direction with respect to his cremation, where his ashes 
were to be sent and directions with respect to funeral services. Ottenbreit J considered 
the provisions of the Electronic Information and Documents Act 2000, S.S. 2000 c. E- 
7.22 in respect of the electronic signature in the email. The judge, it is respectfully 
suggested, correctly indicated that the issue was whether the content of the email 
complied with the provisions of the Wills Act. The issue was whether the content of the 
email constituted a disposition intended to take effect on death, reflecting testamentary 
intention, as an essential element for a clause to be considered testamentary is the 
disposal of property. In this instance, Ottenbreit J decided that the purpose of the email 
was to provide additional information to the executor in carrying out his duties. It was 
not a testamentary document and therefore not admitted to probate.
1 2008 SKQB 260 (CanLII).
7.148 There have been a number of cases in Australia where wills have been made 
only in electronic form. Aside from deciding whether the electronic will is valid, the 
judges have also had to decide whether a will is signed where the deceased typed their 
name into the document. In the case of In the will of Mark Edwin Trethewey,1 Beach J 
concluded that typing the name at the foot of the document was the equivalent of a 
signature in the circumstances of the case.2
1 [2002] VSC 83 (14 March 2002).
2 Other cases from Australia include: Queensland: Mellino v Wnuk [2013] QSC 336, where the 








shortly before the deceased took his own life he created a series of documents on his iPhone, typing 
his name at the end of the document in a place where on a paper document a signature would appear, 
followed by the date, and a repetition of his address; Re Nichol; Nichol v Nichol [2017] QSC 220, where 
the deceased created a text message stating a testamentary intention on his mobile telephone without 
sending it shortly before he took his own life, signing it ‘MRN190162Q’, which matched the deceased’s 
initials and date of birth, 19 January 1962; but see Mahlo v Hehir [2011] QSC 243, where McMurdo 
J concluded that he was not satisfied that Dr Mahlo intended that an electronic document should 
form her will, because she knew that in writing a new will, she had to do more than type or modify 
a document upon her computer. She understood that she also had to sign it; New South Wales: Alan 
Yazbek v Ghosn Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594, where a Microsoft Word document, Will.doc, was completed 
by the deceased on 14 July 2009 and was found in his laptop computer after his death; Re Estate of 
Wai Fun Chan, Deceased [2015] NSWSC 1107, where the deceased made a will by video; The Estate of 
Roger Christopher Currie, late of Balmain [2015] NSWSC 1098, where a will written by the deceased 
in a computer file, ending ‘Signed by the writer Roger Christopher Currie on this day Wednesday, 1 
April 2009’, was granted probate; South Australia, In the Estate of Wilden (Deceased) [2015] SASC 9, 
where the deceased left two items of a testamentary nature, a DVD containing a video recording of the 
deceased and a typed document signed by the deceased but not witnessed. For a useful discussion of 
the case law in the USA, see David Horton, ‘Tomorrow’s inheritance: the frontiers of estate planning 
formalism’ (2017) 58 BC. Rev 539 and David Horton, ‘Wills without signatures’ (2019) 99 BUL Rev 
1623. In 2007, the Borgarting lagmannsrett (Court of Appeal for the region near Oslo) in Norway was 
required to determine whether an electronic copy of a testament that was lost could be admitted into 
probate in the case of LB- 2006- 27667, for which see Jon Bing, translation and commentary (2008) 5 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 134.
Constitution of a legal entity
7.149 In Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic 
Councils Inc,1 Brereton J observed at [22] that the constitution of the organization did 
not explicitly require that a request be signed, but went on to observe that ‘if it were 
necessary that it be formally signed, the word “Ramzi” was subscribed to the email 
with the intent of authenticating the communications, and constitutes a signature 
notwithstanding that it appears in typewritten and not handwritten form’.
1 [2009] NSWSC 211.
Amending boilerplate contractual terms
7.150 The findings in the above cases, especially those cases that revolve around the 
exchange of emails, are significant. Even if the Industrial Tribunal decision of Hall 
v Cognos Limited from England and Wales is not binding on any court, it remains a 
good decision. This is partly because the form of the document is irrelevant. First, the 
effect the case law should have on the advice that a lawyer gives their clients is highly 
pertinent, whether dealing with commercial contracts, employment contracts or any 
other form of relationship that it is possible to create or vary in writing. Consider, by 
way of example, a standard clause added to most contracts in the following terms:
The contract shall not be altered unless done so in writing and signed by both 
parties.
7.151 If the words ‘in writing and signed’ remain as a standard element in such a 
clause, it will leave open the probability that contracts, no matter how long they have 
taken to negotiate, or their apparent length, are susceptible to being varied by an 
exchange of emails, perhaps between two fairly junior employees, or a person posing 
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organizations have now lost control of their means of communication, because all, 
or virtually all, employees in some sectors have the ability to communicate with the 
outside world by means of email and other forms of technology, contrary to the position 
before the introduction of such facilities. This problem will be mitigated to a certain 
extent in contracts that provide a list of nominated personnel within each organization 
who have the authority to agree alterations and variations. In such circumstances, if a 
junior employee agrees an alteration without reference to those who are authorized to 
agree such changes, any dispute will centre on what, if any, authority was vested in the 
junior employee, and whether their actions acted to bind the organization. From the 
point of view of the organization, it is imperative to ensure that its employees are made 
aware of the effect that a promise can have if made by exchange of email. To mitigate 
this problem, it may be wise to establish whether the parties are content for a contract 
to be altered by exchange of emails, and if not, to include an amended version of the 
standard clause, such as:
The contract shall not be altered unless done so in writing on paper and signed 
with the manuscript signature of both parties.
1 As occurred in CSX Transportation, Inc. v Recovery Express, Inc., 415 F.Supp.2d 6 (D.Mass. 2006).
7.152 The Hall v Cognos Limited case illustrates the ease by which a contract can be 
varied, as does C&S Associates UK Ltd v Enterprise Insurance Company Plc,1 the Ohio 
case of In re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., Amedisys, Inc., v JP Morgan 
Chase Manhattan Bank, as Trustees2 and the New York case of Stevens v Publicis, S.A.3 
A further point centres on whether the use of email is appropriate and reasonable in 
the circumstances. Whether the use of email is a reasonable means of communication 
between two parties, or any number of parties, will depend on a range of factors, as 
indicated by Marrero DJ in Bazak International Corp. v Tarrant Apparel Group,4 where 
he commented, at 387– 388:
Nonetheless, whether email is an appropriate and reasonably expected form 
of communication between the two particular parties before the court is a 
question of fact. Here, the issue’s resolution requires a factual inquiry into trade 
usage and course of dealing … Neither party directly addresses whether email 
is an appropriate method of communication in the re- sale trade generally or 
in Tarrant and Bazak’s particular relationship. Yet later email correspondence 
from Tarrant to Bazak (the ‘GMAC email’) provides evidence in light of which a 
reasonable jury could find that the parties did accept email as an appropriate 
form of communication.
1 [2015] EWHC 3757 (Comm), [2015] 12 WLUK 703.
2 310 B.R. 580 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 2004).
3 50 A.D.3d 253, 854 N.T.S.2d 690, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 02880.
4 378 F.Supp.2d 37758 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
7.153 This view corresponds with that expounded in Campbell v General Dynamics 
Government Systems Corporation,1 although this issue was never debated with other 
forms of communication, such as the use of telegrams or telex.2
1 321 F.Supp.2d 142 (D.Mass. 2004), affirmed 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005).
2 The position is reinforced in the case of Basis Technology Corporation v Amazon.com, Inc., 71 Mass.















The name in an email address
7.154 The name in an email address is capable of identifying a person. This is 
particularly so where an email address in an organization, whether public or private, 
is allocated by setting out the name of the person followed by the domain name of 
the organization. There are other variations that can be used, such as when an email 
address describes the office or function of the person, rather than their name. However, 
even this, if allocated to a single person, can also function to identify an individual. The 
link between the prefix of the email address and the person responsible for sending the 
email can be problematic: for instance, the sender may be able to choose the first part, 
and may decide to adopt letters or numbers or a combination of letters and numbers 
with a view to obfuscating their identity. Further, the sender might hide the true email 
address. If it was not obvious who the sender was, and if correspondence ensues 
and a dispute occurs, it will be a matter of establishing what, if any, evidence there is 
pertaining to the source of the relevant emails as a preliminary point. It has been held 
in a number of jurisdictions that the name in an email address, or the combination 
of the name and the domain name in an email address can be a form of electronic 
signature.
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW)
7.155 The case of McGuren v Simpson1 raised the issue as to whether correspondence 
by email was capable of constituting an acknowledgement that was in writing 
and signed for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). Mr Simpson and 
Ms McGuren were in a relationship between 1992 and 2000. Mr Simpson received a 
cheque for A$23,000 when he was in prison in November 1993 in respect of a claim 
for damages for personal injuries he suffered in a motor vehicle accident. He endorsed 
the cheque in favour of Ms McGuren’s sister to enable her to bank the cheque in her 
account on behalf of Ms McGuren (Ms McGuren did not want to pay the cheque into 
her own account as it would have affected the state benefits she was receiving at the 
time). Mr Simpson claimed that the defendant used the money almost entirely for her 
own purposes and he sought recovery of the money from Ms McGuren. Ms McGuren 
asserted that she used the money in accordance with his instructions and with his 
approval. Mr Simpson’s main item of evidence was in the form of an email sent to him 
by Ms McGuren. It read in part:
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 1999 14 16.20+1000
To: “Rob – yahoo”<Robert- john- simpson@yahoo.com.au>
From: “McGuren, Kim” Kim.Mcguran@air.gov.au
I am going to try and book a cab for 6pm at childcare does that suit you?
It probably won’t turn up but I may as well book it. So, what do you want to 
do: split up, – go to counselling or – just blame each other for every thing since 
everything is obviously the other persons fault, for the rest of our lives? Yes, 
I spent the money and I shouldn’t have and yes, you have been violent and you 
shouldn’t have so what now??
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7.156 Master Harrison dealt with an appeal from a Local Court Magistrate, and the 
main issue to determine was whether Mr Simpson’s cause of action was statute barred 
under s 14 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). The time limit is extended under the 
provisions of s 54 where the person against whom the cause of action lies confirms 
the cause of action by acknowledging it to the person who holds the action, providing 
the acknowledgment is in writing and signed by the maker. Mr Simpson’s case was 
that Ms McGuren acknowledged the cause of action in the email she sent when she 
wrote the words ‘Yes, I spent the money and I shouldn’t have’. The Magistrate had 
previously determined that the email was an electronic communication within the 
meaning of s 9(1) of the Electronic Transaction Act 2000 (NSW). However, the Act 
was not in force at the time the email was sent, which meant the provisions of the 
Act did not apply to the email, hence the Magistrate’s decision was incorrect. Master 
Harrison dealt with the problem in the context of the common law. First, he concluded 
that the email constituted a written document. In so doing, he noted the expansive 
approach taken in other jurisdictions [at 20], and decided to construe the Act to take 
into account the changes in technology [at 21], a view taken by judges in England and 
Wales and the USA in the nineteenth century: ‘It is my view that … section 54 of the 
Act ought to be read to accommodate technological change and that, accordingly, the 
email sent by the plaintiff constitutes a written document’. Second, he agreed with 
the decision of the Magistrate, that the email address was a signature for the purpose 
of s 54(4) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), at [22]:
As Ms McGuren’s name appears in the email and she expressly acknowledges 
in the email as an authenticated expression of a prior agreement, the email is 
recognisable as a note of a concluded agreement. Accordingly, the Magistrate 
was correct at law to conclude that Ms McGuren signed the email and that the 
requirements of s 54(4) of the Act were met. It was open to the Magistrate to find 
that Ms McGuren acknowledged the claim and she has admitted her legal liability 
to pay Mr Simpson that which he seeks to recover.
Statute of Frauds
7.157 The question arose in the English case of J Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta1 whether 
the name forming part of an email address could be construed as a signature. J Pereira 
Fernandes SA is a Portuguese company that supplied bedding products in July 2002 to 
Bedcare (UK) Limited,2 a company of which Mr Mehta was a director. Bedcare failed 
to pay for the products it had received, and was wound up on a Petition by J Pereira 
Fernandes SA by an Order made on 7 March 2005. The cause of the appeal before His 
Honour Judge Pelling QC, sitting as a judge of the Chancery Division, related to the 
presentation of a winding up petition by J Pereira Fernandes SA on 12 January 2005. 
On 20 February 2005 an email was sent from the email address ‘Nelmehta@aol.com’ to 
Ian Simpson & Co, solicitors acting for J Pereira Fernandes SA.3 Mr Mehta’s name was 
not typed at the end of the email. On 9 November 2005, District Judge Harrison gave 
summary judgment to J Pereira Fernandes SA in the sum of £24,985.53 and ordered 
Mr Mehta to pay the costs of the claim, which were summarily assessed in the sum of 
£1,080.00. Mr Mehta was subsequently given permission to appeal by Holman J on 
20 February 2006. The email contained the following text:
I would be grateful if you could kindly consider the following.









a. A Personal Guarantee to be given in the amount of £25,000 in favour of your 
client – together with a list of my personal assets provided to you by my solicitor
b. A repayment schedule to be redrawn over a period of six months with a 
payment of £5,000.00 drawn from my personal funds to be made before the 
adjourned hearing
I am also prepared to give a company undertaking not to sell market or dispose of 
any company assets without prior consent from your client pending the signing 
of the Personal Guarantee.
1 [2006] EWHC 813 (Ch), [2006] 1 WLR 1543, [2006] 2 All ER 891, [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 885, 
[2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 244, [2006] 4 WLUK 182, [2006] Info. TLR 203, Times, 16 May 2006, [2006] CLY 
774, also known as Metha v J Pereira Fernandes SA.
2 A search on the website of Companies House for Bedcare (UK) Limited does not reveal any results, 
and there are no results for a person by the name of Nilesh Mehta associated with a legal entity known 
as Bedcare (UK) Limited.
3 In the reports, it is said that Mr Mehta caused one of his members of staff to send the email. The 
email was sent on Tuesday 20 February 2005 at 20:30. It was subsequently confirmed in May 2006 to 
Ian Simpson & Co by the Insolvency Service in Manchester that no employee or salary records were 
recorded as being delivered up for Bedcare (UK) Limited (information provided by Ian Simpson & Co 
to the author).
7.158 The email address that appeared on this particular email also appeared on 
other emails sent to Ian Simpson & Co by Mr Mehta, which included his name typed 
at the end of the email. There were two matters of relevance to consider: whether the 
email could be considered a sufficient note or memorandum, and if so, whether it was 
signed by the party charged, that is, or on behalf of Mr Mehta. The email was a rare 
example of a document that is brought into the purview of s 4 of the Statute of Frauds 
1677.1 This is because s 4 now only applies to contracts of guarantee, and the content 
of this email provided a guarantee, in that Mr Mehta offered to personally cover debts 
owed by the company. Section 4 reads:
Noe action shall be brought … whereby to charge the defendant upon any speciall 
promise to answere for the debt default or miscarriages of another person … 
unlesse the agreement upon which such action shall be brought or some 
memorandum or note thereof shall be in writeing and signed by the partie to be 
charged therewith or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised.2
1 For a history of the Statute, see W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law Volume VI (Methuen & 
Co 1924), 379– 97, who considered that the Statute was out of date when he wrote this text, at 396: ‘the 
prevailing feeling both in the legal and the commercial world is, and has for a long time been, that these 
clauses have outlived their usefulness, and are quite out of place amid the changed legal and commercial 
conditions of to- day.’; E. Rabel, ‘The Statute of Frauds and comparative legal history’ (1947) 63 Law 
Quarterly Review 174, in which he concluded, at 187, ‘The case against the Statute of Frauds has been 
proved time and again by outstanding authorities, even before the Sixth Interim Report of the English 
Law Revision Committee of 1937 solemnly pronounced sentence for repeal. An examination of the 
historical background on which the Statute arose can but support the views expressed by the Revision 
Committee and the conclusion that the Statute essentially belongs to distant times, far removed from 
the conditions of modern life’; Lord Wright, Legal Essays and Addresses (Cambridge University Press 
1939), 226; for a discussion of the purpose and additional sources of criticism, see Graham S. McBain, 
‘Legislative comment abolishing the Statute of Frauds 1677 section 4’ (2010) 5 Journal of Business 
Law 420, who concluded, at 433: ‘When dealing with ancient legislation it is easy to develop a visceral 
fear akin to that of Vitalstatistix in the Asterix cartoons. He has only one fear: he is afraid that the sky 
may fall on his head tomorrow. However, as he always says, tomorrow never comes. If s.4 is repealed, 
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nor the amount of litigation concerning them. And there is no reason to believe that, in the case of oral 
guarantees giving rise to litigation, the English judiciary will fail to be vigilant in detecting perjury.’
2 Halsbury’s Statutes of England and Wales Volume 11(1) (4th edn, 2010 reissue), 7; Chronological 
Table of the Statutes Part 1 (HMSO).
7.159 Harrison DJ, in giving summary judgment, considered that the email did amount 
to a note or memorandum of guarantee, although he did not explicitly comment on 
whether the names in the email address could amount to a signature. Judge Pelling 
QC agreed with Harrison DJ on this point, and also held the email to be a note or 
memorandum that brought it within s 4 of the statute. He commented on the purpose 
of the statute as follows at [16]:
The purpose of the statute of frauds is to protect people from being held liable 
on informal communications because they may be made without sufficient 
consideration or expressed ambiguously or because such a communication 
might be fraudulently alleged against the party to be charged. That being so, the 
logic underlying the authorities I have referred to would appear to be that where 
(as in this case) there is an offer in writing made by the party to be bound which 
contains the essential terms of what is offered and the party to be bound accepts 
that his offer has been accepted unconditionally, albeit orally, there is a sufficient 
note or memorandum to satisfy s 4.
7.160 The second question to consider was whether the email had been signed. 
Solicitors for J Pereira Fernandes SA already had a number of emails from Mr Mehta 
in which he included his name typed at the bottom of the text. In this respect, the 
evidence of a number of communications from the same address demonstrated that 
they were authentic. Mr Mehta did not dispute that the email was sent.
7.161 The evidence upon which a decision could be made in Fernandes was more 
substantial than the evidence that Prakash J (as she then was) dealt with in SM Integrated 
Transware Ltd v Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd.1 In this instance, Judge Pelling QC took 
the view that the email address was similar to an automatically generated name and 
facsimile number of the sender of a facsimile transmission, although his comments, at 
[19], noted that a human being had to type the data into the software:
As is well known to anyone who uses email on a regular basis, what is relied 
upon is not inserted by the sender of the email in any active sense. It is inserted 
automatically. My knowledge of the technicalities of email is not sufficiently 
detailed to enable me to know whether it is inserted by the ISP with whom the 
sender or the recipient has his email account. However, I accept Mr Aslett’s 
submission that as a matter of obvious inference, if it is inserted by the latter 
it can only be from information supplied by the former. Mr Mehta suggested 
that the address was inserted by his employee. I do not see how this could be so 
and certainly Mr Mehta was not able to give me a coherent explanation of how 
that might be so. It is possible that Mr Mehta’s employee was authorised to use  
Mr Mehta’s e mail account remotely but, even if that is so, I do not see how that 
can impact on any of the issues I have to resolve since it is not in dispute that the  
email was sent on the instructions of Mr Mehta and the method by which the 
sender address came to be inserted would not be affected even if that was  
the position.





7.162 That such information is considered in judgments to be ‘automatic’ illustrates 
a misunderstanding. A human being has to put the information into the machine. The 
facsimile number of the sender is put into the machine by a person, as is the name in 
an email address or the ‘signature block’ of an email.
7.163 Counsel for J Pereira Fernandes SA submitted that the intent to sign was not 
relevant, and mentioned Elpis Maritime Co. Ltd. v Marti Chartering Co. Inc.,1 which had 
different facts to the case in point, and also emphasized the decision in Evans v Hoare,2 
where the name and address were relied upon to serve as a signature. However, the 
judge pointed out that in Evans v Hoare, Cave J considered, at 597, that the place of the 
signature was not relevant: ‘Whether the name occurs in the body of the memorandum, 
or at the beginning, or at the end, if it is intended for a signature there is a memorandum 
of the agreement within the meaning of the statute.’ Judge Pelling QC then went on to 
indicate that the name of the party to be bound must be intended as a signature. In 
reaching this conclusion, the judge did not refer to the comments made by Cave J (at 
597– 598, (reference omitted)) after the text he quoted, which are highly significant:
In the present case it is true that the name of the defendants occurs in the 
agreement; but it is suggested on behalf of the defendants that it was only put in 
to shew who the persons were to whom the letter was addressed. The answer is 
that there is the name, and it was inserted by the defendants’ agent in a contract 
which was undoubtedly intended by the defendants to be binding on the plaintiff; 
and, therefore, the fact that it is only in the form of an address is immaterial. A 
case was referred to in the argument, Schneider v Norris, in which a printed bill- 
head was held to amount to a signature within the meaning of the statute. That is 
a stronger case than the present. The printed heading there was not put into the 
document for the purpose of constituting a memorandum of the contract; but it 
was so used with the assent of the party sought to be charged, and it therefore 
was held to have the effect of a signature. This shews that it is unimportant how 
the name came to be inserted in the document.
1 [1992] 1 AC 21, [1991] 3 WLR 330, [1991] 3 All ER 758, [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 311, [1991] 7 WLUK 
297, (1991) 141 NLJ 1109, (1991) 135 SJLB 100, [1992] CLY 3931.
2 [1892] 1 QB 593, (1892) 66 LTRep NS 345.
7.164 The judge considered that the approach he took was supported by the decision 
in Caton v Caton.1 The facts in this case might be compared to the decision in the case 
decided by the Master of the Rolls, De Biel v Thomson,2 and subsequently affirmed by 
the Lord Chancellor and reaffirmed upon further appeal, Hammersley v De Biel, an 
infant, by Blake,3 where an extremely vague promise, the evidence of which was very 
tenuous, was upheld under the Statute of Frauds.
1 (1867) LR 2 HL 127.
2 3 Beav. 469.
3 [1845] 12 Clark & Finnelly 45, 8 ER 1312.
7.165 Earlier cases on the physical position of the signature also emphasizes the need 
to consider the intent behind the signature, as commented on by the Lord Chief Baron 
in Stokes v Moore.1 In Ogilvie v Foljambe,2 a letter written by the plaintiff relating to 
the sale of a lease situated in Grosvenor Place began ‘Mr Ogilvie has the pleasure to 
acquaint Mr Foljambe …’ In this instance, Sir William Grant MR held the name governed 
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hand of the defendant with his name written on top, but not signed at the end, was 
held to be a sufficient signature for the document. In his judgment at 796, Crowder J 
intimated why this issue was of some importance:
In the case of a note written in the third person, the name at the commencement 
serves to authenticate the document just as well as a formal signature at the foot 
of it. If, then, the signature is sufficient, what does the defendant say here? In 
effect he says, – ‘I have given two promissory notes for 510l., and I am now liable 
upon them’. That is a plain and deliberate and unconditional acknowledgment 
of a debt, and it is clear from the case of Tanner v Smart, 6 B. & C. 603, 9 D. R. 
549, and the authorities which have followed it, that, where there is an absolute 
and unconditional acknowledgment of an existing debt, a promise to pay is to 
be inferred. It seems to me that the acknowledgment here is one from which a 
promise to pay must necessarily be inferred.
1 (1786) 1 Cox 219, 29 ER 1137.
2 (1817) 3 Mer 53, 36 ER 21.
3 (1858) 3 CB (NS) 789, 140 ER 953.
7.166 It appears that judges, when dealing with cases where a promise was made that 
affected an innocent party, and the person making the promise subsequently sought 
to avoid being held to their promise by arguing a technical point that the promise 
was not signed, thus making it unenforceable, were generally not willing to allow the 
person making the promise to succeed on such a technicality. Two of the most notable 
English cases, Lobb and Knight v Stanley1 and Tourret v Cripps,2 neither of which was 
cited or discussed in Fernandes, illustrates that similar situations had arisen in the 
past, and lawyers and judges have previously been required to deal with similar factual 
situations as in Fernandes. In Lobb, Stanley, a certified bankrupt, gave a written promise 
signed by him after his bankruptcy. Three undated letters were produced, one of which 
read ‘Mr Stanley begs to inform Mr Lobb …’ It was considered sufficient that he began 
the text with his name, and his name governed the promise that followed.3 In Tourret 
v Cripps,4 Mr R. L. Cripps wrote in his own hand on a sheet of memorandum paper an 
offer to lease parts of 14 and 15 Mortimer Street, Cavendish Square. The memorandum 
was not signed by him, but contained, at its head, the words ‘From Richd. L Cripps’ and 
his address. Tourret, who initiated an action against Cripps for specific performance, 
accepted the offer. His printed name served as a signature to hold him to the promise 
he made.
1 (1844) 5 QB 574, 114 ER 1366.
2 (1879) 48 L J Ch 567, 27 WR 706.
3 This case was specifically mentioned by Phipson, where a ‘signature under the Statute of Frauds 
may be by surname only’ (S. L. Phipson, The Law of Evidence (6th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1921), 516).
4 (1879) 48 L J Ch 567, 27 WR 706. These cases were reviewed by Buckley J in Hucklesby v Hook 82 
LT 117.
7.167 Judge Pelling QC considered the automatic insertion of an email address at [28] 
and [29] (original emphasis):
However, that is not the issue in this case. Here the issue is whether the automatic 
insertion of a person’s email address after the document has been transmitted by 













29. In my judgment the inclusion of an email address in such circumstances is a 
clear example of the inclusion of a name which is incidental in the sense identified 
by Lord Westbury in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention. Its appearance 
divorced from the main body of the text of the message emphasizes this to be so. 
Absent evidence to the contrary, in my view it is not possible to hold that the 
automatic insertion of an e mail address is, to use Cave J’s language, ‘intended 
for a signature’. To conclude that the automatic insertion of an email address in 
the circumstances I have described constituted a signature for the purposes of 
s 4 would I think undermine or potentially undermine what I understand to be 
the Act’s purpose, would be contrary to the underlying principle to be derived 
from the cases to which I have referred and would have widespread and wholly 
unintended legal and commercial effects. In those circumstances, I conclude that 
the e mail referred to at [3] above did not bear a signature sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of s 4.
7.168 In this particular instance, the judge made observations about the technicalities 
of email in the absence of expert evidence, as did Lyberopoulos J, the president of the 
court in the Greek case 1327/ 2001 – Payment Order.1 It seems that the judge assumed 
that the ISP adds the email address to the document.2 He then concluded, in the 
absence of any relevant technical evidence, that the email address could not, therefore, 
be intended as a signature. It is suggested that this approach is arguable. It is possible 
to distinguish the decision by Hall VC in Tourret v Cripps3 on the basis that Cripps 
wrote the content by hand. That decision must be correct, taking into account the 
handwritten text, the printed words ‘From Richd. L Cripps’, and the address printed on 
the paper. Hall VC might have speculated as to the purpose of having stationery printed, 
and whether each time a letter or note is sent, the use of the information printed on 
the letter was sufficient evidence to demonstrate an intent to sign. In this instance, 
as in other cases, the judge looked to the entire document for evidence to indicate 
intent, and taking into account the message written on the letter, together with the 
name printed on the top of the stationery, Hall VC considered that this was sufficient 
to hold the man to his promise. However, to distinguish Tourret from Fernandes in this 
way is far from satisfactory. This is because the facts in Tourret comprised a mix of text 
written by hand with pre- printed text. With networked communications, such a mix is 
impossible. The very nature of networked communications means that content must 
be typed – or cut and pasted – so to argue that the decision in Tourret is significantly 
different because of the addition of text written by hand cannot be right.
1 English translation by Michael G. Rachavelias, Case Translation – Greece (2006) 3 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 104; Georgia Skouma, Case Note (2004) 1 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 83.
2 In Golden Ocean Group Limited v Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd [2011] EWHC 56 (Comm), Mr 
Justice Christopher Clarke indicated, at [103], that ‘There is authority that the insertion of a person’s 
email address by an internet service provider after the document has been transmitted is, absent 
evidence to the contrary, incidental’.
3 (1879) 48 L J Ch 567, 27 WR 706. These cases were reviewed by Buckley J in Hucklesby v Hook 82 
LT 117.
7.169 Also, Judge Pelling QC did not consider the email as a complete document. The 
problem with his analysis is that the information contained in the ‘From’, ‘To’, ‘Sent’ and 
‘Subject’ part of the email cannot be disconnected from the body. The information is 
neither separate when presented visually on a screen, nor when printed out on paper. 
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this set of metadata is of considerable evidential value, as argued by the applicant in 
the pleadings in the case of Tribunale Mondovì, 7 giugno 2004, n. 375 (decr.), Giur. It. 
2005, 1026.1 Further, should the method used to cause an email address to be attached 
to a particular email be of relevance, then other factors ought to be considered, 
including the mechanism by which the application software brings the disparate 
objects together to permit the user to view the email on screen, because each object 
will be in a different storage location on the computer.
1 For a translation of the pleadings, see Gian Paulo Coppola, Case Note (2007) 4 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 86.
7.170 A similar issue relating to email correspondence confronted Phelan J in the 
Canadian case of Dursol- Fabrik Otto Durst GmbH & Co. c. Dursol North America Inc.,1 
decided after the decision by Judge Pelling QC, in proceedings for contempt of court 
where the defendant and his company were the subject of a number of orders prohibiting 
the marketing and selling of goods. One of the issues to determine was whether the 
defendant, Robert Scott, used email correspondence to market and sell products. In 
his evidence, he claimed he was ignorant of two email addresses in issue and how 
the signature that appeared at the end of emails worked. The evidence indicated he 
sent out emails that identified him in his corporate capacity. In this case, the court 
heard appropriate technical evidence as well as the evidence from the defendant. The 
judge did not believe the defendant because his evidence was both contradictory and 
inconsistent. In reaching his decision, the judge made some interesting and highly 
pertinent remarks at 56 about the use of email and the practical aspects of using email 
that bear repeating:
Even if one accepted Scott’s explanation, which I do not, he was a business 
man who used computers constantly to transact business. He took no steps to 
deal with his address and signature. In today’s world such ignorance, or, more 
importantly, the refusal to secure the technical assistance to deal with these 
types of matters, is not acceptable. Scott exhibited recklessness and a complete 
disregard for the obligations he had under this Court’s Orders.
1 2006 FC 1115.
7.171 The technical evidence demonstrated that, contrary to the defendant’s 
assertions, he could see the default signature he set up, thus contradicting his claim 
that he was not aware his signature appeared at the end of the email. Further, it was 
also established that the defendant had a number of different email addresses, and 
had the option of using whichever address he chose when sending and responding to 
correspondence. The judge rejected the contention that the defendant’s claimed lack 
of knowledge of email addresses and signatures was a mitigating factor in disobeying 
a court order.
7.172 One further point might be usefully considered, and that is the purpose of the 
email address, which is of the utmost significance. The address acts to ensure the 
communication reaches the person it is addressed to; otherwise, an email address, even 
if different by one letter, number or dot, is unforgiving. It will not reach its destination, 
unlike a letter sent by way of post, where a human being can extract information from 
the envelope and use their knowledge to effect delivery of an envelope incorrectly 







identify the sender (it being the function of the ‘reply- to’ address to indicate where, by 
default, a reply will be sent). If it follows that the ‘From’ line of an email acts to designate 
the sender, then the act of signature is the irrevocable dispatch of the email. Additional 
technical evidence may be adduced to demonstrate a connection to the person who 
sent, or caused to be sent, a document in electronic form, taking into account all of 
the data associated with the document, including the metadata, client software and 
any other technical information that may not be obvious on the face of the document 
as presented on the screen to a recipient without further exploration of the technical 
attributes of the software. In this respect, it is difficult to see how the email address can 
be considered to have merely appeared or is incidental: it is a crucial element of the 
document.1
1 On the face of it, the email address, if correct, appears to contain all the information required 
to deliver it to the intended recipient. However, that is not always the case, as illustrated by Tim 
McCormack in ‘Electronic delivery’ (2018) 15 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 
70, where he considers this precise problem in Edgbaston Golf Club Ltd v Revenue and Customs (VAT 
– REPAYMENTS: Vat – repayments) [2018] UKFTT 189 (TC), [2018] 4 WLUK 30, [2018] STI 834.
7.173 It is the action of clicking the ‘send’ icon, or causing an agent to click the 
‘send’ icon, that is the act of authentication. This view accords with the comments 
offered in the Law Commission Report,1 where it is suggested that the clicking of an 
icon probably constitutes the technological equivalent of signing with mark, and is 
therefore a signature. Further, the action of clicking the ‘send’ icon tends to be the 
irrevocable dispatch of the communication (although if the person is quick enough, 
they may, depending on the software, stop the software from sending the email), and 
can be similar to, or the equivalent of, the act of writing a manuscript signature or 
affixing a stamp to a document. In this respect, the information contained in the email 
address serves the same function as the use of headed notepaper in Tourret v Cripps. 
Cripps took a sheet of headed notepaper and wrote a promise on the paper. In J Pereira 
Fernandes SA v Mehta, Mehta either himself or through an agent, caused an email to be 
written (or the contents cut and pasted) that contained a promise. Instead of taking 
out a physical piece of notepaper and writing on it, he or his agent used a machine, 
namely a computer. The information contained in the email address served the same 
purpose as the name and address on the notepaper used by Cripps. Conceptually, 
there is no difference between the two: the cases are merely separated by time and the 
technology – that is, Mehta did not add any content by writing by hand. Prakash J gave 
her reasons for accepting the name in an email address based upon the same principle 
in SM Integrated Transware Ltd v Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd2 at 92:
There is no doubt that at the time he sent them out, he intended the recipients of 
the various messages to know that they had come from him. Despite that, he did 
not find it necessary to identify himself as the sender by appending his name at 
the end of any of the emails whether the messages were sent to his colleagues or 
to third parties like Mr Heng. I can only infer that his omission to type in his name 
was due to his knowledge that his name appeared at the head of every message 
next to his email address so clearly that there could be no doubt that he was 
intended to be identified as the sender of such message.
1 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions Advice 
from the Law Commission (2001), 3.37– 3.38.
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7.174 In analysing this case, Professor Ter Kah Lang indicated that the judge only 
addressed the identification function of the email address, not the intent to authenticate. 
Had the judge considered authentication, Professor Ter Kah Lang suggests that the 
conclusion might have been different.1 Simon Blount also agrees with this analysis. 
However, he suggests that if Tan was saying that he did not need to sign his emails 
because he knew his name was already part of the email address, the decision may be 
correct, although in such case the author then intends to be bound by every word sent 
in the email.2
1 Ter Kah Leng, ‘Have you signed your electronic contract?’ (2011) 27 Computer Law & Security 
Review 75, 77.
2 Simon Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2015), 35.
7.175 In J Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta, Judge Pelling QC mentioned the Electronic 
Communications Act 2000, but no consideration was given to the provisions of s 7,1 
or whether s 7 applied to the facts of this case. Arguably, an email address is brought 
within the ambit of the Act as a form of electronic signature. First, the question is 
whether the email address can be considered a signature for the purposes of the Act, 
and the provisions of s 7(2)(a) have to be considered. As discussed above, an email will 
not arrive at its destination without a correct address, and if a person sending an email 
wishes the person receiving the email to reply, they must also use an accurate ‘reply- to’ 
email address, otherwise the recipient will not be able to respond. It is suggested above 
that there is a purpose for including a name or other form of description (such as the 
use of a title in lieu of a name) in the address of an email: to identify the sender. Also, 
technically, an email includes the various addresses in the email. Without an address, 
there would be no purpose in sending or receiving email correspondence. If the email 
address is not logically incorporated into the body of the text to be sent, the content 
will not be sent or received. To relate the email address to the provisions of s 7(2), it is 
necessary to consider the elements of an electronic signature:
‘So much of anything in electronic form’: This is such a wide- ranging provision 
that the address associated with an email must come with the term, just as the 
hidden metadata must also come within the term. Without the email address, the 
email could not be sent and received.
‘Incorporation or logical association for the purpose of establishing authenticity 
or integrity’: The thing in electronic form must be incorporated or logically 
associated with the communication or data for the purpose of being used to 
establish the authenticity or the integrity of the communication or data, or both. 
For the thing to be an electronic signature, it must be affixed to the data for a 
purpose: that is, to authenticate the communication or data or provide for the 
identity of the communication or data.
1 The judge stated, at [30], that it was his understanding that the Electronic Communications Act 
2000 was enacted to give effect to Directive 2000/ 31/ EC on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) 
(OJ L 187/ 1, 17.7.2000). The aim of the Act was to implement the provisions of the now repealed 
Directive 1999/ 93/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a 
Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19.01.2000, 12, as set out in Note 19 of the 
Explanatory Notes to the Act.
7.176 An email address clearly comes within the requirements of this provision: it 
is in electronic form, and the name in the email address is included for the purpose 








pseudonym, rather than a proper name or part of a proper name, the same conclusion 
would apply, based on the previous decisions at common law. If it is accepted that the 
email address, or the name of the person in an email address, can be considered an 
electronic signature, it can be admitted into evidence under the provisions of s 7(1).1
1 Judge Pelling QC expressed the view, at [30], that typing a name into the main body of an email can 
constitute an electronic signature, which is correct.
7.177 Finally, the Law Commission considered the nature of the evidence required to 
demonstrate the intent to authenticate. An objective test was proposed:
3.29 Because signatures affect many areas of personal and commercial life, it 
is essential that the courts develop a straight- forward approach. We believe 
this should be by way of a purely objective test: namely, would the conduct of 
the signatory indicate an authenticating intention to a reasonable person? 
This approach is consistent with the authorities, flexible and would, over time, 
produce the greatest certainty.1
1 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions Advice 
from the Law Commission.
7.178 It is suggested that this test cannot be right, because an objective test would 
need to be based on an analysis of the surrounding circumstances, including the 
technology, and the average person using the technology probably varies widely in 
terms of their technical understanding and ability, partly because the technology 
changes so rapidly. It was suggested that a subjective test is more appropriate.1 This 
is the view taken by Flemming DJP in the South African case of Chisnall and Chisnall 
v Sturgeon and Sturgeon,2 where he held that the signing of a contract for the sale 
of an erf (a legal term for a plot of land in Namibia, South Africa) was achieved by a 
mark or marks with the function of making the document an act of the signer, and of 
signifying assent to the content of the document. He indicated, at 645F, that ‘An enquiry 
concerning assent must, of course, not be into what the signatory subjectively planned 
but what his acts signify to the other party’. This is what the English authorities have 
also held up to this point. A subjective test will allow a judge to consider both the 
surrounding circumstances and what was in the mind of the sender at the moment they 
are deemed to sign. If the facts of J Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta are considered in this 
light, the conclusion must be that the email in question was signed. The surrounding 
circumstances in this case, as in SM Integrated Transware Ltd v Schenker Singapore 
(Pte) Ltd, were as follows:
(1) The email was from Mr Mehta.
(2) Mr Mehta knew that his email address would appear in the email, which 
went to show that it came from him; it also enabled the recipient to respond; as a 
result, the email address was his unique mark.
(3) There was a course of correspondence between the parties by email.
(4) The email contained a promise made by Mr Mehta or under his authority.
(5) Mr Mehta admitted the email was sent, which indicated that he adopted the 
content of the email.
1 The subjective test is proposed by Mr Pépin Aslett, counsel for J Pereira Fernandes SA, Nicholas 
Bohm and the author.
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7.179 In this case, Prakash J had a great deal of evidence to demonstrate that the name 
in the email address could be construed as an electronic signature.
7.180 In summary, it is suggested that the requirement for a signature is not dependent 
and should not be limited by technology, and this is borne out by the case law from the 
past.1 Lawyers and judges have been required to consider how new technologies affect 
the underlying legal principles. The decisions reached in the past remain relevant: the 
conclusion was, and remains, that any form of mark, whatever the technology used, has 
the capacity to demonstrate intent, and this should be no different when considering 
electronic signatures. Taking this into account, the decision by Judge Pelling QC is open 
to question. In addition, the judge suggested, in reaching his decision, that to conclude 
otherwise would lead to ‘widespread and wholly unintended legal and commercial 
effects’. Arguably, this decision has led to the opposite: there is now uncertainty, 
especially among lay people who cannot be expected to understand that this decision 
refers only to s 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and only to guarantees. This decision is 
incompatible with the previous decisions on identical facts, albeit in applying the legal 
principles to different technologies, and sends a signal out that implies that a person 
may no longer be held to their promise for the lack of typing their name into the body 
of an email.2 Notwithstanding this observation, this decision is generally accepted as 
being correct, sometimes with no discussion,3 and sometimes with some discussion 
but without covering much of the case law discussed above.4 Professor Ter Kah Lang set 
out the issue: that there is a fundamental distinction between identifying the sender by 
means of the pre- printed letterhead, and the intent of the signatory to adopt the name 
as authenticating the document.5 Miller J commented on this point in Welsch v Gatchell6 
at [75], although arguments could abound if one party specifies that a particular type 
of electronic signature is required:
An electronic signature will not prove adequate unless the Court is satisfied 
that its insertion was intended to signify adoption of the electronic note or 
memorandum of which it forms part or with which it is otherwise associated. 
That suggests that it would be prudent for those who wish to rely on an electronic 
writing and signature to warn the party to be charged that the writing is a 
contract that will bind that party when he or she attaches an electronic signature 
to it, and to specify what form of electronic signature is required.
1 In Mercury Tax Group Ltd, R (on the application of) v HM Commissioners of Revenue & Customs 
[2008] EWHC 2721 (Admin), [2009] STC 743, [2008] 11 WLUK 303, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep FC 135, [2009] 
BTC 3, [2008] STI 2670, [2009] CLY 3928 the signature pages of a trust deed, an option agreement and 
a sale/ purchase agreement were signed some time before the final versions were complete, and were 
then attached, without the consent of those who signed the pages, to final versions that were different 
to the draft versions; see also Emma Walton, ‘Guidance on the execution of documents at “virtual” 
signings following the Mercury case’ (2009) 24 Butterworths Journal of International Banking and 
Financial Law 327.
2 Judges in both the High Court and Court of Appeal (Civil Division) took a different view where 
it appears there was no signature in the case of Decouvreur v Jordan [1987] 1 WLUK 115, Times, 25 
May 1987, [1987] CLY 1842; an appeal was dismissed before a court comprising Fox and Nourse LJJ 
and Sir Denys Buckley, where judgment for the plaintiff had been given by Mr Justice Farquharson 
in the sum of £15,000 on a claim against the second defendant under a contract of guarantee. The 
report states that ‘Any writing by which the guarantor of a debt could be identified in a memorandum 
of the guarantee and which showed an intention to adopt the guarantee sufficed as a signature for 
the purposes of the Statute of Frauds 1677’. See Clive Freedman and Jake Hardy, ‘J Pereira Fernandes 











3 Brazell, Electronic Signatures and Identities Law and Regulation, 2- 017; The Hon Mrs Justice 
Geraldine Andrews and Richard Millett, Law of Guarantees (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015), 82; 
MacQueen and Garland, ‘Signatures in Scots law’.
4 Leng, ‘Have you signed your electronic contract?’; Blount, Electronic Contracts.
5 Leng, ‘Have you signed your electronic contract?’, 79.
6 [2007] NZHC 1898, [2009] 1 NZLR 241, (2007) 8 NZCPR 708, (2007) 5 NZ ConvC 194,549 (21 June 
2007).
7.181 Whether the name typed into an email can satisfy the provisions of s 4 of the 
Statute of Frauds is open to debate. What is disappointing is the lack of consideration 
of the decisions by senior judges from the nineteenth century when faced with 
identical facts in slightly different formats. The common law is supposed to be based 
on precedent, yet pertinent decisions by senior judges have either been missed or 
ignored in this debate.
Legal fees arrangement
7.182 In Israel, Hagai Brenner J determined, in a claim for legal fees in the case of 
Atias v Salfan Ltd,1 that there was no basis for the defendant’s claim that a legal fees 
agreement between her and the plaintiff was not signed. The plaintiff sent an email to 
the defendant in which he summarized their joint understanding of the legal fees. The 
defendant confirmed that understanding in a reply message, and used an expression 
that literally translates as ‘No problem’. A legal fees agreement is not required to be in 
writing (although this is recommended) and the email correspondence between the 
two parties was determined to be sufficient proof of the existence of the agreement. In 
the absence of any other information, such as whether the defendant also signed her 
name in the reply email, it may be inferred that Hagai Brenner J reached the decision 
based on the email address of the defendant.
1 Tel Aviv Peace Court Civil Case 24210/ 06 (5 July 2006, unpublished decision).
Civil Law Act
7.183 In Singapore, whether the name in an email address could be an electronic 
signature was raised in the case SM Integrated Transware of Ltd v Schenker Singapore 
(Pte) Ltd.1 In this instance, Prakash J determined that it was possible for an email 
address to be a form of electronic signature for the purposes of s 6(d) of the Civil Law 
Act (Cap 43, 1994 Rev Ed). In this case, SM Integrated entered into negotiations to 
provide warehousing space and logistics services to Schenker. Schenker intended to 
enter a contract with a third party to handle dangerous goods, which in turn meant 
Schenker needed more storage facilities than it actually had. SM Integrated and 
Schenker prepared a draft agreement by way of meetings and the exchange of email 
correspondence, the content of which included reference to the transaction and the 
terms of the draft agreement. The agreement was never signed. Schenker subsequently 
failed to enter a contract with the third party, and because it no longer required the 
additional storage space, it declined to sign the draft agreement. SM Integrated initiated 
an action for damages suffered as a result of the alleged repudiation of the proposed 
lease, claiming that a combination of the draft agreement and the correspondence by 
email relating to the terms of the agreement demonstrated that an agreement had been 
formed. Schenker took the view that there was no contract because the negotiations 
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the requirements of the Electronic Transactions Act 1998 (Cap 88 of 1999), in that it 
was neither in writing nor signed.
1 [2005] 2 SLR 651, [2005] SGHC 58; Ter Kah Leng, ‘Concluding leases by email’ (2005) 21 Computer 
Law & Security Report 423; Bryan Tan, ‘SM Integrated Transware Pte Ltd v Schenker Singapore (Pte) 
Ltd [(2005)] SGHC 58’ (2005) 2 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 112; Daniel Seng, 
‘The Singapore Electronic Transactions Act and the Hong Kong Electronic Transactions Ordinance’ 
(2008) 5 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 7.
7.184 The arguments put forward by Schenker were not accepted. In her reasons 
for judgment, Prakash J gave careful consideration to the issue of whether or not the 
correspondence by email that passed between the parties was capable of satisfying the 
Statute of Frauds requirements of s 6(d) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1994 Rev Ed).
7.185 Counsel for Schenker argued that the signature and writing requirements 
regarding this particular type of contract were not capable of being satisfied 
electronically because of the provisions of s 4(1)(d) of the Electronic Transactions Act 
1998 (as it was then), which stated that the Act does not apply to ‘any contract for the 
sale or other disposition of immovable property, or any interest in such property’. This 
argument was also rejected.
7.186 In reaching a decision on this matter, it was reasonable to consider the position 
at common law and by construing the provisions of s 6(d) Civil Law Act 1994, not 
by ‘blindly relying on s4(1)(d) of the ETA’.1 It was also held that the communications 
exchanged by email were in writing.2 Apart from the legal basis of the decision that 
the emails were in writing, Prakash J, at [81], took a realistic and sound approach by 
making it clear that, despite the claim that the emails did not constitute writing, the 
facts did not correspond to such a contention.
1 [2005] 2 SLR 651, paragraph 76.
2 [2005] 2 SLR 651, paragraphs 77– 85.
7.187 Arguments that email and other documents created in digital form do not 
constitute ‘writing’ are disingenuous. The law is often derided for not responding to the 
development of new technologies, yet the comments made by judges in the nineteenth 
century indicated they were perfectly willing and able to apply legal principles to new 
forms of technology. It is widely recognized that digital data is the mainstay of many 
businesses and governments across the world, and to suggest that evidence from such 
sources is not admissible because it is not a ‘writing’ is bordering on the preposterous.
7.188 Mr Tan did not append his name at the bottom of the email, so the only evidence 
of a signature comprised the content of the heading: ‘From “Tan Tian Tye”<tian- tye.
tan@schenker.com>.’ The name in the email address was considered a signature, and 
in reaching this conclusion, Prakash J referred to the Massachusetts case of Shattuck 
v Klotzbach,1 and the seventh circuit case of Cloud Corporation v Hasbro, Inc.2 In her 
judgment, Prakash J provided a clear exposition of the underlying principles that were 
established in the English and American courts in the nineteenth century:
91. I am satisfied that the common law does not require handwritten signatures 
for the purpose of satisfying the signature requirements of s 6(d) of the CLA. 
A typewritten or printed form is sufficient. In my view, no real distinction can be 
drawn between a typewritten form and a signature that has been typed onto an 








92. One minor difficulty in this case is that Mr Tan did not append his name 
at the bottom of any of his email messages. All his email messages, however, 
including the message dated 4 February 2003 and sent to Ms Yong, had, near 
the start thereof, a line reading ‘From: “Tan Tian Tye” <tian- tye.tan @schenker.
com>’. Mr Tan confirmed in court that he had sent out those messages. There 
is no doubt that at the time he sent them out, he intended the recipients of the 
various messages to know that they had come from him. Despite that, he did not 
find it necessary to identify himself as the sender by appending his name at the 
end of any of the emails whether the messages were sent to his colleagues or to 
third parties like Mr Heng. I can only infer that his omission to type in his name 
was due to his knowledge that his name appeared at the head of every message 
next to his email address so clearly that there could be no doubt that he was 
intended to be identified as the sender of such message. Therefore, I hold that the 
signature requirement of s6(d) is satisfied by the inscription of Mr Tan’s name 
next to his email address at the top of the email of 4 February 2003.
93. I recognize that one person’s email facility can, in some cases, be accessed 
by a third party who can then send out messages which purport to be authentic 
messages from the owner of that email address. If that happened, the owner 
of the address would be entitled to dispute the authenticity of the messages 
purportedly sent by him. That is not the case here. Further, such dispute would 
be as to the person who initiated the message and would not be decided on the 
basis of whether the message bore a signature.
1 14 Mass. L. Rptr 360, 2001 WL 1839720 (Mass. Super.).
2 314 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002).
7.189 In the same year, Lai Kew Chai J referred to the decision of Judith Prakash J in the 
bankruptcy proceedings of Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Lim Chor Pee.1 Although the judge 
did not have to consider the email correspondence in this case, having determined 
that the exchange did not form a valid agreement because there was no meeting of the 
minds, nevertheless he commented, at [39], that he considered the exchange of email 
correspondence was likely to satisfy the written record and signature requirements of 
s 111 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2001 Rev Ed).2
1 [2005] 4 SLR 367, [2005] SGHC 159.
2 Note also Singh Chiranjeev v Joseph Mathew [2008] SGHC 222, [2009] 2 SLR 73.
7.190 It can be safely concluded that whether an email address is capable of 
constituting a form of electronic signature will depend on the facts of each case.1
1 For other examples regarding a name in an email address: Greece – 32/ 2011, translation and 
commentary by Michael G. Rachavelias (2014) 11 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 
174  (assignment; validity; status of electronic document; email address; evidential weight); Payment 
Order 5845/ 2013, translation by Michael G. Rachavelias (2014) 11 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 177 (debt; electronic document; email; email address; burden of proof; forgery); 
Court Decision No. 1963/ 2004 (2005) 2 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 107 
(notification procedure); Italy, Tribunale Mondovì, 7 giugno 2004, n. 375 (decr.), Giur. It. 2005, 1026 
(2007) 4 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 86 (email acknowledging debt).
A manuscript signature that has been scanned
7.191 A variation of the biodynamic version of a manuscript signature is where a 
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form, which makes it very easy to use by the recipient for the purposes of forgery. The 
files containing the representation of the signature can then be attached to a document. 
This version of a signature is used widely in commerce, especially when marketing 
materials are sent through the postal system and addressed to hundreds of thousands, 
if not millions, of addresses. It could be argued that when sending a document by 
facsimile transmission the recipient of the document has in their possession this 
version of the manuscript signature: the entire document is scanned and transmitted, 
together with the content. Arguably, this is the form of signature that was discussed 
in the case of Re a debtor (No 2021 of 1995), Ex p, Inland Revenue Commissioners v The 
debtor; Re a debtor (No 2022 of 1995), Ex, Inland Revenue Commissioners v The debtor2 
where a completed form of proxy was sent by facsimile transmission. Although the 
report does not clearly state the proxy form, as transmitted, contained the manuscript 
signature of the relevant official from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, it can be 
inferred that a manuscript signature had been appended to the original form of proxy 
that was sent by facsimile transmission. Laddie J offered an opinion in relation to this 
point at 351f– g:
For example, it is possible to instruct a printing machine to print a signature by 
electronic signal sent over a network or via a modem. Similarly, it is now possible 
with standard personal computer equipment and readily available popular word 
processing software to compose, say, a letter on a computer screen, incorporate 
within it the author’s signature which has been scanned into the computer and 
is stored in electronic form, and to send the whole document including the 
signature by fax modem to a remote fax. The fax received at the remote station 
may well be the only hard copy of the document. It seems to me that such a 
document has been ‘signed’ by the author.
1 By way of example, scanned signatures were relied upon in the following cases in England and 
Wales (this list is not exhaustive): National Bank Trust v Yurov [2020] EWHC 100 (Comm), [2020] 1 
WLUK 148; TFS Stores Ltd v The Designer Retail Outlet Centres (Mansfield) General Partner Ltd [2019] 
EWHC 1363 (Ch), [2019] Bus LR 1970, [2019] 6 WLUK 10, [2020] 1 P & CR 6, [2019] L & TR 26, 
[2019] CLY 1697; Rotam Agrochemical Company Ltd v GAT Microencapsulation GMBH [2018] EWHC 
2765 (Comm), [2018] 10 WLUK 406; FSHC Group Holdings Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [2018] EWHC 1558 
(Ch), [2018] 6 WLUK 448; Chartwell Estate Agents Ltd v Fergies Properties SA [2014] EWHC 1567 (QB), 
[2014] 5 WLUK 471.
2 [1996] 2 All ER 345, [1995] 11 WLUK 290, [1996] BCC 189, [1996] 1 BCLC 538, [1996] BPIR 398, 
[1996] CLY 3469.
7.192 This observation must be correct. Providing the sending party intended the 
recipient to accept such a signature as a method of authentication and to act upon 
the content of the document transmitted, the method used to transmit the signature 
remains merely a method by which the document or message is communicated. The 
means of communication used should not affect the legal consequences that follow the 
delivery and subsequent receipt of the document.1
1 For a discussion of cases involving scanned images of manuscript signatures in Belgium, see Johan 
Vandendriessche, ‘An overview of some recent case law in Belgium in relation to electronic signature’ 
(2010) 7 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 90.
Mortgage redemption
7.193 In 2006 a registration judge in Denmark refused to cancel a mortgage because 








Western High Court upheld this decision in case U.2006.1341V. The facts were that a 
mortgage bank N delivered a mortgage for the purpose of cancellation. The scanned 
signatures of A and B were affixed to the cancellation endorsement. By a notice 
circulated to all judicial districts, N had authorized A and B to jointly endorse the 
mortgage by means of scanned manuscript signatures. The endorsements were added 
or attached to the original mortgage. The registration judge refused to cancel the 
mortgage because the signatures were not added by means of a manuscript signature in 
accordance with s 9(1) of the Danish Registration of Property Act. The Danish Western 
High Court upheld this decision, and took the view that under s 261(2) of the Danish 
Administration of Justice Act, the endorsement must be signed, and in accordance 
with established case law, pleadings must be available in their original form, and 
photocopies or facsimiles are therefore not sufficient. In addition, the registry took 
the view that, on grounds of due process, manuscript signatures are still required on 
documents to be registered (or cancelled), and that any change of this state of the law 
should, if necessary, be clarified by the legislature in the same way as the provisions on 
digital signatures.1
1 For a case report, see (2007) 4 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 99.
Writing
7.194 In a case before the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), file 
number XI ZB 40/ 06, NJW 2006, 3784 regarding §130 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO)
(the German code of civil procedure), it was held that a scanned manuscript signature 
is not sufficient to be qualified as ‘in writing’ under §130(6) ZPO if the signature is 
printed on a document and then sent by facsimile transmission. This ruling appears 
to prevent the admission into evidence of a document twice removed from the source. 
First, the signature is scanned and then printed on the document, then the document 
is sent on by means of facsimile transmission. As an item of evidence, such a document 
might be highly suspect in the absence of a clear acknowledgment by the person 
whose signature it is that they were entirely responsible for the entire process or they 
authorized another person to produce the document and transmit it, and they adopted 
the content of the document as their own.
Employment
7.195 In France, the case of Cour de Cassation, soc., 17 mai 2006, 04- 467061 also 
considered the legal effect of a scanned signature. In this instance, an employee of the 
Association of La Réunion Marine Park was dismissed on 27 January 2002. A claim for 
unfair dismissal was issued. The only relevant issue for present purposes was that the 
dismissal letter had not been signed, but took the form of a letter bearing a signature 
that had been scanned. On 25 May 2004 the Court of Appeal of Saint- Denis de la Réunion 
held that a scanned manuscript signature did not constitute an electronic signature, as 
defined by article 1316– 4 of the French Civil Code, but nevertheless considered that 
the dismissal letter had been validly signed. Upon appeal to the Cour de Cassation, the 
supreme French civil court, the employee argued that the Court of Appeal should have 
decided that the dismissal letter was not admissible, as the Court of Appeal had found 
the signature had been rendered into digital form earlier. On this point, the Cour de 
Cassation held that the fact that the signature had been put into digital form on the 
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in itself deprive the dismissal of substantive justifiable grounds. The Cour de Cassation 
appeared to leave open the question of whether or not the electronic signature did 
affect the dismissal procedure. In this instance, the Cour de Cassation held that there 
were justifiable substantive grounds for the dismissal.
1 The decision in French is available at http:// www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ .
Biodynamic version of a manuscript signature
7.196 There are products available that permit a person to produce a biodynamic 
version of their manuscript signature.1 For instance, some delivery companies use 
hand- held devices that require the recipient of an item of post or parcel to sign on 
a screen acknowledging receipt of the mail, and some banks use similar methods to 
provide a signature when using a debit or credit card.
1 Such a system was relied upon in Sell Your Car With Us Ltd v Sareen [2019] EWHC 2332 (Ch), 
[2019] 9 WLUK 397, [2019] BCC 1211, [2020] 1 CL 112; see also Fitzpatrick v AIG Europe (unreported) 
1 July 2015, Jenkinson DJ, where the judge considered an electronic signature made with a proprietary 
product on a witness statement to be valid, for which see Gordon Exall, ‘Electronic signature of witness 
statements: is it valid? A first instance decision’, https:// www.civillitigationbrief.com/ 2015/ 07/ 02/ 
electronic- signature- of- witness- statements- is- it- valid- a- first- instance- decision/ .
7.197 Another method of obtaining a digital version of a manuscript signature is 
where a person can write their manuscript signature by using a special pen and pad. 
The signature is reproduced on the computer screen, and a series of measurements 
record the behaviour of the person as they perform the action. The measurements 
include the speed, rhythm, pattern, habit, stroke sequence and dynamics that are 
unique to the individual at the time they write their signature.1 The subsequent 
electronic file can then be attached to any document in electronic form to provide 
a measurement of a signature represented in graphic form on the screen. While it 
appears that this concept might be usefully applied in the electronic environment, the 
drawbacks are as significant as for any other form of generating electronic signatures, 
including linking the evidence in a coherent fashion to prove a person signed a 
particular document,2 and problems relating to the protection of personal data.3
1 Such a device seems to be used by the Queensland Police Services, for which see Bismark v 
Queensland Police Service District Court of Queensland [2014] QDC 152 2014, WL 8104519 in which 
such a device is used by the appellant.
2 The nature of the evidence was discussed by Chin DJ in Labajo v Best Buy Stores, L.P., 478 F.Supp.2d 
523 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) at 530, although this report was in respect of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and before discovery, so the defendants would have had the opportunity of obtaining more 
coherent evidence for the trial; Fangjun Luan, Shiliang Ma, Kaidong Cheng and Xianfeng Dong, ‘On- line 
handwritten signature verification algorithm based on time sequence’ (2005) 1 International Journal 
of Information and Systems Sciences 229; Ricardo P. Gonçalves, Alexandre B. Augusto and Manuel E. 
Correia, ‘Time/ space based biometric handwritten signature verification’, 10th Iberian Conference on 
Information Systems and Technologies (CISTI), 2015 (IEEE 2015), 743– 748.
3 Anderson, Security Engineering, 15.9 for an indication about what can go wrong with biometric 
systems, and Jan Grijpink, ‘Biometrics and privacy’ (2001) 17 Computer Law and Security Report 154.
Electoral register
7.198 In Australia, the Electoral Commissioner rejected the biodynamic version of 













Commissioner1 prior to the Australian election in August 2010. Ms Trevitt used her 
biodynamic signature to enrol as a voter over the Internet before the election took 
place. Lawyers for the Commissioner wrote to Ms Trevitt, indicating ‘that the 
electronic signature on the claim form was not sufficient’.2 Her attempt to register her 
vote was rejected. The main point at issue was whether the form of signature used 
was appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of s 10(1)(b) of the Electronic 
Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). Perram J considered s 10(1)(a) and (b), and whether this 
Act applied to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).
1 [2010] FCA 869 (13 August 2010).
2 [2010] FCA 869 (13 August 2010) at [8] .
7.199 Ms Trevitt affixed her electronic signature to the form with a biodynamic signature. 
It was argued by counsel for the Commissioner that it was for the Commissioner to 
form an opinion about the reliability of the method in accordance with the purpose. The 
judge did not agree with this argument. He set out his reasoning at 14– 15:
The provision does not mention anyone forming an opinion. In particular, 
because s 10(1)(b) is pitched at a very high level of generality it understandably 
eschews identifying any of the parties to the communication at all. Even 
assuming the provision should be read as requiring someone to hold an opinion 
it is silent as to whether it is to be held by the sender or the recipient or both. 
Further, as Mr Kirk, who appeared with Ms Rao for the applicants, pointed out, 
the breadth of the requirement that the issue be considered in light of all of the 
relevant circumstances bespoke the possibility that not all of the circumstances 
might be known to the participants to the communication. Such a view of the 
provision counted against it being read as requiring the formation of an opinion 
by one or other of the persons involved in its application.
15. I do not see a way around those concerns. To accede to the notion that 
s 10(1)(b) required the Commissioner to form an opinion would involve, so it 
seems to me, an intolerably strained construction of its plain words. Further, it 
would be a construction which necessarily identified the recipient as the person 
whose opinion mattered. That reading of s 10(1)(b) might have very serious 
consequences in a range of cases yet to come and about which nothing can be 
known. In those circumstances, I do not read s 10(1)(b) in a manner for which 
the Commissioner contends. This has the consequence that the provision sets a 
standard which, in this instance, is to be ascertained and applied by the Court.
7.200 Perram J then considered the nature of the evidence, the possibility of forgery and 
the fact that the Commissioner accepted other forms of signature (whether they were 
sent by facsimile transmission and scanned versions of manuscript signatures), and 
concluded, at 17 that:
In that circumstance, I cannot accept the slightly pixelated nature of Ms Trevitt’s 
signature rendered it unreliable for the Commissioner’s purposes, not at least while 
he continues to accept faxed or emailed claim forms.
7.201 This particular point, the abstract reliability test, refers to article 9(3) of the 
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts. If not understood, the abstract reliability test could increase the risks of 
invalidity after the event, where the form of signature had never posed problems of 
authentication previously.1
1 The provision of the abstract reliability test merits further observations, for which see John D. Gregory, 
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Contract formation
7.202 At issue in the US case of American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v 
Biles1 was whether the signature of the late David Biles was a forgery. The method used 
by Mr Biles to apply his signature to a life insurance policy was by way of a proprietary 
biodynamic version of his manuscript signature, using a pad and computer. Of interest 
was the approach taken by the two document examiners in the case. Robert G. Foley 
gave evidence for the plaintiff,2 and William J. Flynn gave evidence for the defendant.3 
Mr Foley compared the photocopies presented to him by the plaintiff of the images of 
two signatures affixed to the document. Mr Flynn, in contrast, examined the data files 
used to create the images representing the electronic signature. One of the reasons 
for the hearings was an application to strike out the affidavit of Robert G. Foley on the 
basis that his examination was not appropriate, given that he ought to have examined 
the data files. Lee DJ ordered a Daubert4 hearing to determine whether to agree to 
exclude Mr Foley’s evidence.5 At the subsequent hearing, the defendants sought to 
exclude the evidence of Mr Flynn. After hearing the evidence, the judge concluded 
that the challenge to Mr Foley’s reliability was well taken, because his opinion was 
not based on the examination of the best evidence available.6 The implication is that 
when electronic signatures of this nature are challenged, it is important to ensure the 
adjudicator is aware of the need for the examination of the digital data, and that a 
comparison of the images produced by the digital data alone is not appropriate.7
1 2011 WL 4014463 (S.D.Miss.) and 2011 WL 5325622 (S.D.Miss.).
2 American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v Biles, 2011 WL 5835356 (S.D.Miss.) 
(affidavit of Robert G. Foley); American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v Biles, 2011 WL 
7909386 (S.D.Miss.) (supplemental affidavit of Robert G. Foley).
3 American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v Biles, 2011 WL 5835357 (S.D.Miss.) 
(affidavit of William J. Flynn).
4 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5 American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v Biles, 2011 WL 4014463 2011 (S.D.Miss.).
6 American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v Biles, 2011 WL 5325622 (S.D.Miss.); 
American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v Glenda C. Biles, Individually, Natural Mother of 
David Biles, Deceased, and Administratrix of Estate of David Biles, Deceased, 714 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(appeal on the enforcement of the arbitration agreement).
7 Heidi H. Harralson, ‘Forensic document examination of electronically captured signatures’ (2012) 
9 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 67; for the failure to adduce relevant evidence 
of a signature, see a case from the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, Meadlock v American Family Life 
Assurance Company of Columbus, 221 N.C.App. 669, 729 S.E.2d 127 (Table), 2012 WL 2891079.
Digital signatures
Technical overview of digital signatures
7.203 Cryptography is the method of hiding the contents of a message, as used from 
ancient times to the present. Encryption (or enciphering) is the process by which a 
plaintext (or cleartext) message is disguised sufficiently to hide the substance of the 
content. As well as ordinary text, a plaintext message can be a stream of binary digits, 
a text file, a bitmap, a recording of sound in digital format, audio images of a video 
or film and any other information formed into digital bits. When a message has been 
encrypted, it is known as ciphertext or a cryptogram. The opposite procedure, that of 
turning the ciphertext back into plaintext, is called decryption (or deciphering).1 In 



















meaning (binary data) into a second set of symbols that have no meaning, by means 
of a mathematical process. Cryptography is usually required to undertake a number 
of functions, the most important of which is authenticity rather than secrecy. These 
functions are discussed below.
(1) Authenticity: When sending or receiving information or placing an order, 
both parties need to have assurance of the origin of the message. The aim is to 
corroborate the identity of the software that sent the data. The identity of a person 
cannot be corroborated, because a person is not part of the communications 
process – the process only involves communications between software.
(2) Integrity: It is helpful to demonstrate the integrity of the message, because 
it is important to know if the content of the message has been tampered with.
(3) Honesty: To provide an assurance, to the extent that is technically possible, 
that demonstrates that the software emanates from a known source, such that 
the purported sender has been honest about the actions that have been caused 
to be undertaken. The purpose is an attempt to bind human users to specific 
actions in such a way that if they deny taking the action, they either demonstrate 
an intention to deceive, or they have been negligent in failing to secure the use 
of their private key adequately. This is called ‘non- repudiation’ in the security 
industry. There are different types of non- repudiation: non- repudiation of origin, 
which prevents the entity that sent the message or document from denying that 
they sent it, and non- repudiation of receipt, where an entity cannot deny they 
have received a message or document. Other types of non- repudiation include 
non- repudiation of creation, non- repudiation of delivery and non- repudiation of 
approval.2
(4) Confidentiality: Another purpose is to provide for the confidentiality of a 
document. In the digital environment, cryptography is used as a substitute for a 
manuscript signature, and is often described as a digital signature. To understand 
how a document can be signed with a digital signature, it is necessary to be aware 
of how cryptography works, for which see the discussion below.
1 Encipher and decipher are terms used in the ISO 7498- 2 standard.
2 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, 51.
Algorithms and keys
7.204 The plaintext of a message is encrypted and decrypted by the use of a 
cryptographic algorithm (also called a cipher). There tend to be two related functions, 
one for encryption and another for decryption. In most instances, the secrecy of 
the algorithm will not matter, because modern cryptography uses a key. However, it 
is possible to have what is called a restricted algorithm, because the security of the 
algorithm is based on ensuring the way it works is kept a secret. There are drawbacks 
to the use of restricted algorithms. If a user leaves the group that shares the algorithm, 
or should the secret be revealed for any reason, then the algorithm must be changed. 
Further, there is no quality control or standardization, which means these algorithms 
can be easy to break. By using a key, a strong algorithm does not need to be secret and 
can be used by millions of users. As a result, there is no need to constantly develop 
new algorithms. A key can comprise a number of values. This range of values is called 
a keyspace. A key can be used to encrypt and decrypt a message, or there can be two 
separate keys, one to encrypt a message and another for decrypting the message. To 
complete the picture, a cryptosystem comprises an algorithm, all possible messages, 
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Control of the key
7.205 To decrypt the ciphertext, the recipient needs to know both the decryption 
algorithm and the decryption key. The way a key is controlled, managed and distributed 
is crucial. This is why the principle laid down by Auguste Kerckhoffs von Niuewenhof 
remains a fundamental rule of cryptanalysis: the security of a cryptosystem must 
depend on keeping the key secret.1 This issue is discussed more fully when considering 
the weaknesses relating to cryptosystems.
1 Auguste Kerckhoffs, ‘La Cryptographie militaire’ (1983) 9 Journal des Sciences Militaires 5, 
although this principle applied to a time when all systems were symmetric.
Disguising the message
7.206 There are two types of mathematical families that permit a message to be 
disguised: symmetric cryptographic systems and asymmetric cryptographic systems.
Conventional or symmetric cryptographic systems
7.207 As the name infers, the encryption key can be computed from the decryption 
key, and the decryption key can be computed from the encryption key. In practice, 
these two keys are often identical when used in symmetric systems. The symmetric 
system is also referred to as secret- key algorithms, single- key algorithms, one- key 
algorithms or shared key ciphers. Two people can use the same system to send and 
receive encrypted messages to each other and both the sender and the receiver must 
agree on the key before they can communicate. This system can have very long keys, 
which means a message can be very secure. The effectiveness of this system depends 
on the key, and is suitable for closed user groups where there is a strong element of 
mutual trust between the users, such as banks, the military and intelligence agencies. 
However, a disadvantage is that the key must be kept secure and secret. Two people 
must have the key to communicate. If encrypted messages are to pass between large 
numbers of people, a large number of keys will have to be distributed. The security of 
the system depends on those people with access to the keys ensuring they are kept 
secure and secret. Also, from the point of view of managing the keys, it is important 
for pairs of users to have different keys to reduce the risks of compromise when large 
numbers of people share a key.
7.208 Some symmetric algorithms work on the plaintext, one digit at a time. These are 
called stream ciphers. Others work in groups of digits on the plaintext. The groups of 
digits are called blocks, and the algorithms are called block algorithms or block ciphers. 
How an algorithm and the cipher work is important, because of their strengths and 
weaknesses. If an algorithm or cipher is easy to attack, then an application should not 
use it, and if losses occur because of the failure of either, then a successful legal action 
may be possible because it could be argued that the system was designed and possibly 
implemented negligently.
7.209 Sending a message that has been encrypted provides for the security of the 
content only. It does not attribute the message to the source from which the message 
was sent. It is possible for an interceptor to intercept the message and send a 







recipient will not be aware that the sender of the message has used the key improperly. 
Authentication seeks to corroborate the integrity of the message and authenticity of 
the sender. There are two types of authentication.
(1) One- way authentication is where one party is authenticated to another 
party, such as a person using an ATM when they wish to withdraw cash or make 
a deposit. The user identifies themselves by using their PIN, and the card is 
authenticated cryptographically.
(2) Two- way authentication, where both parties to a message seek to verify the 
attribution of data that purports to identify each other or the message or both, 
such as virtual private networks.
7.210 The process of authentication also uses a secret key. This is called the message 
authentication code or data authentication code. This mechanism can provide 
authentication without the need for secrecy. In symmetric cryptographic systems, the 
aim is for the originator and the legitimate recipient to be the only two entities that 
can create or check the message authentication code. Here is an example of how the 
message authentication code can work:1
Alice sends a message in plaintext to Bob. The software on the computer that 
Alice uses encrypts the message by using a block algorithm or cipher. All of the 
ciphertext blocks are then discarded with the exception of the last block. The 
last block is the message authentication code. (Note: if Alice wants to provide 
for both the integrity and the privacy of the message, the message can also be 
encrypted again.)
Bob receives the message. The software on his computer computes what the 
message authentication code should have been. If Eve intercepted and altered 
the message, Bob will realise this, because the incorrect plaintext is re- encrypted, 
producing an incorrect message authentication code. If the plaintext has been 
altered, the ciphertext blocks will be different, especially the last ciphertext 
block. If the plaintext has not been altered, the re- encrypted plaintext will not 
have changed, and Bob can be sure that Alice has sent the plaintext message.
1 Alice, Bob, Carol, Dave and interloper Eve are used widely in cryptology. See ‘The Alice and Bob 
after dinner speech’ given at the Zürich Seminar, April 1984 by John Gordon by invitation of Professor 
John Massey, http:// web.mit.edu/ jemorris/ humor/ alice- and- bob.
7.211 However, this does not prevent Eve from listening in to Alice when she sends 
the message to Bob. Eve can then record every message, together with the message 
authentication code. Alternatively, she can delete the message sent by Alice, repeat 
old messages or change the order in which the messages are sent. Thus the message 
authentication code needs to include a scheme by which each message is numbered 
sequentially.
Asymmetric cryptographic systems (Public key)
7.212 Using a symmetric cryptographic system with large numbers of users is 
difficult. Keys cannot be distributed over the open communications network, so they 
have to be distributed in other ways. When a member leaves the group, all the other 
members have to redistribute new keys. Thus, assuming a separate key is used for each 
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will be required. The development of the asymmetric cryptographic system, or public 
key,1 helps to resolve this problem. With this system, keys only have one purpose: one 
key to encrypt and one key to decrypt. Given a large enough key, the decryption key 
cannot be calculated from the encryption key within a useful length of time (perhaps 
several centuries). The algorithms used in the system are commonly called ‘public key’ 
because the encryption key is usually made public. Anybody can use the encryption 
key to encrypt a plaintext message, but only the person with the decryption key that 
corresponds to the encryption key can decrypt the message. The encryption key is 
called the public key or public encryption key, and the decryption key is called the 
private key, secret key or private decryption key. The system can work in two ways, as 
indicated below.
1 The concept of public key cryptography was invented twice during the twentieth century. First, 
by James H. Ellis, Clifford Cocks and Malcolm J. Williamson at British Intelligence GCHQ, whose work 
remained classified until December 1997. Second, two researchers at Stanford University, Whitfield 
Diffie and Martin Hellman, proposed the concept in 1976. Development of the principles can also be 
attributed to Ralph C. Merkle, Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard A. Adleman.
7.213 An individual creates and controls their own public key The user can 
generate a pair of keys using what is called a trapdoor one- way function, containing 
the mathematical equivalent of a secret trapdoor. For the purposes of understanding 
the concept, this algorithm is easy to compute in one direction and difficult to compute 
in the opposite direction, unless you know the secret.1 Sending a message using public 
key cryptography can be described as follows:
Alice and Bob decide to exchange messages that are encrypted.
Alice generates her own public and private keys using the software on her 
computer. Although she keeps the private key secret, she gives Bob her public key.
Bob writes his message and encrypts it using Alice’s public key. He sends it 
to Alice.
Alice decrypts Bob’s message using her private key.
1 It has yet to be proven that a mathematical function can have a one- way function, for which see 
Fred Piper, Simon Blake- Wilson and John Mitchell, Digital Signatures: Security & Controls (Information 
Systems Audit and Control Foundation 1999), 16.
7.214 This method of encrypting and decrypting messages means that private keys do 
not have to be distributed. The private key should always be under the direct control 
of the owner. If the private key was distributed, there is no way of asserting a signature 
is yours, because you could always claim the other person who received your key 
executed the signature.
7.215 In addition, it is possible for Alice to place her public key in a public database. 
The protocol then looks like this:
Bob goes to the database and obtains Alice’s public key.
Bob writes Alice a message and uses her public key to encrypt the message. Bob 
then sends the message to her.









7.216 There can be problems in relation to the methods by which an individual creates 
and controls their own keys, as in Maughan v Wilmot,1 where the husband created his 
own digital signature to attach to emails.
1 [2016] EWHC 29 (Fam), [2016] 1 WLR 2200, [2016] 1 WLUK 90, [2016] 2 FLR 1349, [2016] Fam 
Law 307, [2016] CLY 316.
7.217 Authenticating a signature using public key cryptography The underlying 
rationale of public key cryptography is that a message can be attributed to a particular 
entity. First, Alice can use a key generation algorithm to generate a key pair: a private 
signing key and the public signature verification key, or she can use her existing key pair. 
She then publishes her public key on a database. Thereafter, the example continues:
Alice writes a message and wants to send it to Bob with her digital signature. The 
software on her computer computes a digital signature from her private key and 
the content of the message.
Alice sends her message and the digital signature to Bob. The signature may be, 
but does not need to be, separate from the message.1 The signature operates in 
the same way as a message authentication code.
Upon receipt of the message, Bob uses Alice’s public key to verify that the 
corresponding private key signed the message.
1 This can be important, for which see Nicholas Bohm, ‘Watch what you sign!’ (2006) 3 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 45.
7.218 However, given this scenario, it is generally noted in the technical literature that 
Bob cannot be sure that the public key in the database is that of Alice. This means this 
mechanism does not resolve the issue of identifying the sender of the message. A person 
could generate their own public and private keys, post the public key on a database and 
claim it belongs to Alice. Bob might think he is sending messages to Alice, but in fact his 
message might be posted to an interceptor. In addition, the interceptor could use their 
own private key to send messages to Bob, which he would assume came from Alice. 
There is a further problem with this method of adding a signature to a message, which 
in turn is inherent in any system that uses cryptography in the electronic environment 
to create a signature. The signature is not computed by Alice, but by the software on her 
computer. Thus there is no direct evidence to show Alice appended the signature to the 
message. This is, naturally, an identical problem with all forms of electronic signature 
and communication over networked communications – for instance, the same point 
can be made about the origin of an email. The recipient cannot be certain that an email 
comes from the purported source, yet the vast majority of emails that are sent and 
received are trusted. This is because the correspondents either know each other in the 
physical world, or even if they have not met, then they become familiar with each other 
in the virtual world by way of an exchange of correspondence and other signs, such as 
looking at websites and asking others who are trusted to indicate whether the person 
they have yet to meet is indeed the person they claim to be.
Public key infrastructure
7.219 The concept of the public key infrastructure (PKI) tries to resolve this problem 
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key infrastructure is to have organizations called trusted intermediaries, trusted 
third parties, trust service providers or certification authorities that act to certify 
the connection between a person and their public key. In theory, the trusted third 
party guarantees the authenticity of the public key by issuing an individual identity 
certificate (usually abbreviated to ‘certificate’), which binds a name string to a public 
key. This in turn seeks to create a link between the provision of a key and the identity 
of the natural person or legal entity to which the key has been issued. It should be 
emphasized that, when using a public key infrastructure, users should aim to continue 
to generate their own key pairs. Where a third party generates the key pair on behalf 
of a user, the degree of security exercised over the key pair is reduced.
1 For the flaws in PKI, see Carl Ellison, ‘Improvements on conventional PKI wisdom’, Proceedings of 
the 1st Annual PKI Research Workshop (NIST 2002), https:// users.ece.cmu.edu/ ~adrian/ 731- sp04/ 
readings/ ellison- PKI- wisdom.pdf.
7.220 The certification authority issues an individual identity certificate, which 
includes the following characteristics: data identifying the certification authority, data 
identifying the subscriber that includes the subscriber’s public key, and that it is signed 
with the Certification Authority’s private key. The individual identity certificate may 
also contain other information, such as the level of inquiry carried out before issuing 
the certificate.
7.221 To acquire such a certificate, Alice will provide the certification authority with a 
copy of her public key and proof of her identity. The degree of proof of identity will differ, 
depending on the level of liability Alice wants to cover. When Alice sends a message to 
Bob, she also sends him a copy of her certificate. Alternatively, when she publishes 
her verification key, she publishes the certificate. The software on Bob’s computer 
will decrypt the message according to the key he has been given. It will then be for 
Bob in most circumstances to undertake his own due diligence, perhaps by checking 
the certificate revocation list to ensure the public key has not been revoked or has 
expired, or sending an email to Alice (or contacting her by telephone) to confirm that 
she sent the communication. If Bob does not act to verify the information contained 
in the certificate, but contacts Alice directly, his due diligence will not involve the 
organization that issues the certificate.
Difficulties with public key infrastructure
7.222 The rationale behind the public key infrastructure is this: when a certification 
authority issues a certificate, it bases the issuance of the certificate on its Certificate 
Practice Statement and terms of trade. A contractual relationship is formed between the 
certification authority and the customer who buys the certificate. While the certificate 
purports to verify the identity of an individual person or legal entity, it is the merchant 
or person receiving the certificate who relies on the content of the certificate. The logic 
is as follows:1
(1) The individual or entity provides the certification authority with sufficient 
evidence acceptable to the certification authority or registration authority to 
demonstrate that they are who they say they are. Depending on the level of the 
certificate obtained, this information could be the name, address and the number 





person or entity seeking a certificate may be required to provide more robust 
evidence, including physically appearing before a notary public.
(2) The certification authority provides the user with a certificate.
(3) The individual or entity is then given a keyholder’s name.
(4) The keyholder is the person or entity that obtained the certificate.
(5) This is all the recipient needs to know.
1 Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier, ‘Ten risks of PKI: what you’re not being told about public key 
infrastructure’ (2000) 16 Computer Security Journal 1; for two responses to this article, see Ben Laurie, 
‘Seven and a half non- risks of PKI: what you shouldn’t be told about public key infrastructure’, https:// 
groups.google.com/ forum/ #!topic/ jyu.ohjelmointi.coderpunks/ PtWHnFue9Zk and Aram Pérez, 
‘Response to “Ten risks of PKI” ’, https:// sites.google.com/ site/ aramperez/ home/ 10- risks- of- pki; ‘PKI 
Assessment Guidelines’, C.4.2 ‘Attribution presumptions in digital signature statutes’.
7.223 There are a number of flaws with this logic. For instance, John Smith of York may 
wish to enter a contract with a company who is not aware of his identity. The company 
cannot distinguish, when it looks at the certificate, how many John Smiths live in York 
and whether this particular John Smith is the person identified with the certificate. 
Unless the certificate provides the company with a unique identifier for this particular 
John Smith (which they may or may not provide), and the company wishes to confirm 
John Smith’s identity, it must consider other ways of doing so. The certification authority 
generally does not share a secret with the person to whom it issues a certificate, although 
there must be a method by which the certification authority can verify the identity of the 
person to whom it issues a certificate. Some certification authorities use the information 
collected by a credit bureau to verify the identity of the applicant. This means the 
identification verification process can be based on the accuracy of the data collected by 
the credit bureau – bearing in mind the focus of a credit bureau is on creditworthiness – 
and their effectiveness in keeping the information up to date and secret. Another issue 
is whether the recipient of the electronic signature trusts the originator’s certification 
authority. If a certification authority were to undertake to positively identify a subscribing 
party, the information that might be needed to satisfy the recipient may be so extensive 
that few individuals or legal entities would consider subscribing for such a certificate.1 
In conclusion, a certification authority provides a very narrow promise when issuing a 
certifying certificate. It does not appear that certification authorities seek first to establish 
the identity of a person and then go on to verify that identity. It is important to understand 
that verification is not the same as identification.2
1 For a useful discussion, see Carl Ellison, ‘Improvements on conventional PKI wisdom’, Proceedings 
of the 1st Annual PKI Research Workshop (NIST 2002), 165– 75, https:// users.ece.cmu.edu/ ~adrian/ 
731- sp04/ readings/ ellison- PKI- wisdom.pdf; Nicholas Bohm and Stephen Mason, ‘Identity and its 
verification’ (2010) 26 Computer Law & Security Review 43.
2 Jan Grijpink and Corien Prins, ‘Digital anonymity on the internet’ (2001) 17 Computer Law and 
Security Report 379, 381(a).
7.224 The purported advantage to the relying party of using the ‘standard model’ 
public key infrastructure digital signature is not that the signature provides greater 
security, but arises from persuading the subscribing party that because it is apparently 
more secure, the user takes responsibility for every use of the private key, whoever 
does so. It must be emphasized, however, that the greater security of the mechanism 
does not, in fact, offer the subscribing party any protection against attacks, such as 
the theft of the key or the failure of software such that the software signs something 
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a ‘non- repudiation’ property, and it is this property that justifies the imposition of a 
non- repudiation term on the subscribing party. This cannot be right, because if the 
system genuinely possessed a non- repudiation property, it would not be necessary to 
impose such a term. Given that digital signatures in a public key infrastructure do not 
possess such a property, and the inability to create false digital signatures is based on 
complex theoretic assumptions,1 the acceptance of such a term invariably involves an 
acceptance of risk by the user. However, the nature and extent of the risk is not made 
clear, and it is highly improbable that ordinary users will have the knowledge, skills 
and resources to manage such a risk.2
1 Birgit Pfitzmann, ‘Fail- stop signatures: principles and applications’, in Proceedings of the Eighth 
World Conference on Computer Security, Audit and Control (Elsevier 1991), 125– 134; Birgit Pfitzmann, 
Digital Signature Schemes: General Framework and Fail- Stop Signatures (Springer 1996).
2 Audun Jøsang and Bander AlFayyadh, ‘Robust WYSIWYS: a method for ensuring that what you 
see is what you sign’, in Ljiljana Brankovic and Mirka Miller (eds), Proceedings of the Sixth Australasian 
Conference on Information security – Volume 81 (Australian Computer Society 2008), 53– 58; Bohm, 
‘Watch what you sign!’; Don Davis, ‘Compliance defects in public- key cryptography’, Proceedings of the 
Sixth USENIX UNIX Security Symposium (San Jose, CA, 1996).
Authenticating the sender
7.225 There are various methods of obtaining sufficient evidence to demonstrate, 
with a degree of probability, that an electronic signature came from the person it 
purports to have been sent by. The aim is to gather sufficient evidence to be assured 
that the person sending the signature is the person they claim. Attempts are made, 
using various mechanisms, to obtain information from a combination of the following:1
Proof by knowledge: what the person knows.
Proof by possession: what the person owns.
Proof by characteristics: what the person is.
1 For an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each, see Richard E. Smith, Authentication from 
Passwords to Public Keys (Addison- Wesley 2002), 1.6.
7.226 When combined, the techniques relating to authentication can provide a higher 
level of authentication than a single method. In many instances, the method by which 
a person seeks to authenticate themselves is through a combination of hardware and 
software. A software component can retrieve and verify passwords. A token, such as 
a smart card, can be placed in a slot in a computer or in a separate ‘reader’. However, 
both methods are vulnerable to attacks.1 Identification can also be achieved by using a 
biometric measurement.
1 Saar Drimer, Steven J. Murdoch and Ross Anderson, ‘Optimised to fail: card readers for online 
banking’, in Roger Dingledine and Phillipe Golle (eds), Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 13th 
International Conference, FC 2009, Accra Beach, Barbados, February 23– 26, 2009 (Springer 2009), 184– 
200; Bohm and Mason, ‘Identity and its verification’.
The ideal attributes of a signature in electronic form
7.227 Whether a signature is in manuscript or electronic form, the purpose for affixing 
the signature will not alter. However, when a signature is in electronic form, more 
considerations will apply. While it is abundantly clear that a manuscript signature can 













can be altered after they have been signed, digital signatures can help to resist attacks 
of these kinds. The requirements of a digital signature are set out below:
(1) The signature must be authentic. In this respect the method ought, ideally, 
to provide for the authentication of the origin of the data and the integrity of the 
message.
(2) Ideally, there ought to be a technical method in place that prevents the person 
appending the signature to the document from claiming later that they did not 
sign it. This is virtually impossible to achieve in the electronic environment. Care 
must be taken to distinguish between the degree of probability that a system can 
be designed to prevent a person from making such a claim, and any suggestion 
of a presumption that purports to bind the user to a signature that is verified.2
(3) The signature should not be capable of being forged, in that the private key 
is secure.
(4) Where a signature is added to a message that comprises a legal act, the 
signature and its link to the relevant document should remain verifiable for as 
long as it is of legal importance.
(5) The signature cannot be reused.
(6) The document that has been signed cannot be altered without rendering the 
signature unverifiable.3
1 For examples where the cutting and pasting of manuscript signatures have been upheld in the 
USA, see Iowa: Ferguson v Stilwill, 224 N.W.2d 11, where the signature of the Illinois Secretary of State, 
cut from an instrument and attached to a certificate of conviction, was sufficient in the absence of 
evidence to show the act of pasting was not authorized (1974); Maine: Richardson v Bachelder, 19 Me. 
82, 1841 WL 932 (Me.), 1 App. 82, where an attorney affixed the signature of the magistrate, which was 
physically on a slip of paper, to the writ, and the writ was held to be properly issued, the magistrate 
having recognized and adopted it.
2 For an analysis of the means by which a computer can be affected by malicious software, see 
Daniel Bilar, ‘Known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns: anti- virus issues, malicious 
software and internet attacks for non- technical audiences’ (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 123.
3 Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography (2nd edn, Wiley 1996), 2.6.
7.228 In the digital environment, it is considered technically possible to achieve all of 
these attributes – in theory1 – but it must be emphasized that the connection between 
the human and the machine cannot be bridged, and the technology is fallible.2 Practical 
problems, which are discussed below, continue to exist with the implementation of a 
digital signature. However, the essential functions set out above can, largely, be met by the 
application of cryptography to the formation of a digital signature. As with manuscript 
signatures, there are always risks attached to the use of any form of electronic signature, 
and the user, whether a sending party or a receiving party, should make themselves aware 
of the risks before using any form of electronic signature for high value transactions.
1 Javier Lopez, Rolf Oppliger and Günther Pernu, ‘Why have public key infrastructures failed so far?’ 
(2005) 15 Internet Research 544.
2 Adam L. Young and Moti Yung, Malicious Cryptography: Exposing Cryptovirology (Wiley 2004).
7.229 There is one further meaning that an electronic signature cannot, without education 
and training, provide. This is the addition of what is termed ‘social meaning’, or what can 
also be described as the ‘significance of the act’. A ceremony is attached to the signing 
of a document, and when a person affixes their manuscript signature to a document, 
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intuitively understand that they are legally responsible for the documents to which they 
attach their autographs’.1 The function of attaching an electronic signature to a document 
or message is not understood in the same way as the use of manuscript signatures, 
partly because the signature can be applied to the document without any action by the 
individual to whom the signature is attributed, or even without their knowledge.2
1 Jos Dumortier, Patrick Van Eecke and Ilse Anné, The Legal Aspects of Digital Signatures 
(Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & Information Technology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1998), 77.
2 Eileen Y. Chou, ‘Paperless and soulless: e- signatures diminish the signer’s presence and decrease 
acceptance’ (2015) 6 Social Psychological and Personality Science 343.
Methods of authentication
Authentication using secret codes
7.230 Secret codes or passwords have been used for some time, especially in banking. 
The code usually consists of a combination of digits or characters or both. The principle 
is based on ensuring the code is unique and only known to the user and the issuer. There 
is a shared secret between the two parties. The user identifies themselves by using the 
code, and if the code is correct, the issuer assumes the person entering a transaction 
is the person to whom the code is assigned.1 Secret codes tend to be most appropriate 
when used in a closed community, as opposed to the open structure of the Internet, 
because a secret code cannot guarantee the identity of the person using the code. 
However, it should be noted that the evidence of a shared secret will not necessarily be 
sufficient to satisfy the relying party that an authorized user used the code. Evidence of 
the procedures and systems used by the relying party will not be sufficient to prove to 
a third party, such as a court, that it was the user that added the code. It is posited that 
a secret code cannot be considered strictly as a signature, because the code tends only 
to be used for the single characteristic of authenticating the user,2 but two courts have 
decided otherwise, with respect correctly, given the facts.3
1 See United States District Court, Southern District of New York: Banco del Austro, S.A., v Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 215 F.Supp.3d 302, 90 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1292; Salvatore Scanio, ‘Interbank liability 
for fraudulent transfers via SWIFT: Banco del Austro, S.A. v. Wells Fargo. Bank, N.A.’, (2017) 36(12) 
Banking & Fin Services Pol’y Rep 8; on the 2016 hack of the computers at Bangladesh Bank, the central 
bank of the country of Bangladesh, see Julie Anderson Hill, ‘SWIFT bank heists and Article 4A’ (2018) 
22 J Consumer & Com L 25, and Geoff White and Jean H. Lee, ‘The Lazarus heist: How North Korea 
almost pulled off a billion-dollar hack’ (this is the story of the hack taken from ‘The Lazarus Heist’, 
a series of 11 programmes on BBC News World Service, broadcast in April 2021), https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/stories-57520169.
2 Anderson, Security Engineering, 10.4 for a study of the problems relating to ATMs; Dumortier and 
others, The Legal Aspects of Digital Signatures, 60– 63.
3 Standard Bank London Ltd v Bank of Tokyo Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 169, [1995] 3 WLUK 182, 
[1995] CLC 496, [1998] Mason’s CLR Rep 126, Times, 15 April 1995, [1995] CLY 397 and Industrial 
& Commercial Bank Ltd v Banco Ambrosiano Veneto SpA [2003] 1 SLR 221, where a message using 
an authentication code sent through the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication) system had the legal effect of binding the sender bank according to its contents, 
and where a recipient bank undertook further checks on credit standing or other aspects, this did not 
detract from this proposition.
Authentication using biometric measurements
7.231 Using a biometric measurement is the method by which it is possible to 















A biometric measurement has the ability to identify a person because the image is 
reduced to digital form. Such a measurement represents a unique characteristic of 
that individual, but it cannot be a secret. Human characteristics comprise a number of 
attributes, some of which lend themselves to being measured:
(1) Appearance, such as height, weight, colour of skin, hair and eyes, visible physical 
markings, gender, facial hair, wearing of spectacles.
(2) Social behavioural traits, including voice recognition, style of speech, visible 
handicaps.
(3) Natural physiography, such as iris patterns, retinal scan, fingerprint or 
thumbprint verification, capillary patterns in earlobes, two or three dimensional 
facial recognition, vein check and hand geometry, DNA patterns.
(4) Bio- dynamics, such as signature verification and the dynamics when using the 
keys on a keyboard.1
1 Anderson, Security Engineering, ch. 15.
7.232 There are significant difficulties with the use of biometric measurements, 
including the range of tolerances to reduce false negatives and increase false positives, 
or vice versa. The manufacturer of the device usually sets the tolerances, and a great 
many devices do not work as claimed.1
1 Anderson, Security Engineering, ch. 15.
Fingerprints
7.233 Most fingerprint systems use optical or capacitive sensors for capturing the details 
of a fingerprint, such as branching and end points of the ridges. An optical sensor detects 
differences in reflection, while capacitive sensors detect differences in capacitance. Other 
systems use thermal sensors and ultrasound sensors. The process can be described 
thus: the image of the fingerprint is captured, features are then extracted from the image, 
and they are stored as templates on a database. Some systems encrypt templates and only 
manage the compressed images. Although widely used, there are problems associated 
with fingerprint scanners. Such systems can be undermined in a number of ways:
(1) A person can be forced to press their finger against a scanner by a criminal.1
(2) An impostor can use their own fingerprint and challenge the false rejection rate 
and false acceptance rate. Fingerprints tend to be categorized as ‘loops’, ‘whorls’ 
and ‘arches’, among other descriptions. If the impostor knows the category of the 
registered fingerprint and has a pattern similar to that of the registered one, there is 
a possibility that the scanner may not reject the false fingerprint.
(3) A person may have their finger cut off, so a criminal can use the severed finger 
to defeat the scanning device.2 This can be avoided where a device also gauges 
the temperature of the finger.
(4) The use of an artificial clone of the original fingerprint, where a fingerprint is 
copied by making a mould of the registered fingerprint. Such copies are cheap to 
replicate and seem to be effective against many fingerprint devices.3
(5) Other attacks will work, depending on the nature of the fingerprint 
system, such as making a noise or flashing a light against the scanner. Other 
techniques that can cause the scanner to stop working within the tolerances to 
the environment include heating up, cooling down, changing the humidity, and 
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1 The police in Norway now have the power to force a finger or thumb on to a screen to unlock it, for 
which see Ingvild Bruce, ‘Forced biometric authentication – on a recent amendment in the Norwegian 
Code of Criminal Procedure’ (2017) 14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 26.
2 See the example of Mr Kumaran, who had the tip of his index finger chopped off by thieves because 
the security system installed in his S- Class Mercedes Benz utilized the measurements of both the index 
fingers and thumbs of the owner. The immobilizer system caused the engine in the vehicle to cut out 
after a few minutes unless the owner pressed their finger or thumb on to the sensor: Jonathan Kent, 
‘Malaysia car thieves steal finger’, BBC News Kuala Lumpur, 31 March 2005, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/ 
hi/ world/ asia- pacific/ 4396831.stm).
3 Tsutomu Matsumoto, Hiroyuki Matsumoto, Koji Yamada and Satoshi Hoshino, ‘Impact of artificial 
“gummy” fingers on fingerprint systems’, Paper prepared for Proceedings of SPIE Vol 4677 Optical 
Security and Counterfeit Deterrence Techniques IV, 24– 25 January 2002, http:// cryptome.org/ gummy.
htm; note the comments on tests run by others as a result of this research in Anderson, Security 
Engineering, 15.5; see also David Chek Ling Ngo, Andrew Beng Jin Teoh and Jiankun Hu (eds), Biometric 
Security (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2015). It is becoming possible to use machine learning to 
create false fingerprints: Philip Bontrager, Aditi Roy, Julian Togelius, Nasir Memon and Arun Ross, 
‘DeepMasterPrints: Generating MasterPrints for Dictionary Attacks via Latent Variable Evolution’ in 
Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Biometrics: Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS) 
(Los Angeles, USA,October 2018), https:// arxiv.org/ pdf/ 1705.07386.pdf.
7.234 Regardless of how easy it may be to defeat fingerprint reading systems, they 
seem to be most effective when used as a deterrence factor, especially in reducing false 
claims by people on state benefits.1
1 Anderson, Security Engineering, 15.9.
7.235 In summary, it is possible to use a measurement of a biometric characteristic 
to authenticate an individual, but the use of such a measurement can only be effective 
in a closed system. There are many problems associated with the use of biometric 
measurements in an open system that have yet to be resolved.
Types of infrastructure for asymmetric cryptographic systems
7.236 There are a number of methods that provide for the signing of electronic 
documents by means of a digital signature. The discussion in this chapter will focus on 
the issues relating to the provision of key pairs that are provided and maintained by 
commercial organizations. However, it is to be noted that key pairs generated and used 
by individuals using any form of digital signature will also be subject to many of the 
issues discussed below.
7.237 The type of structure will affect the nature and extent of the legal liability that 
participants are exposed to. This in turn will determine how participants manage their 
legal liability. The two categories are:
(1) A closed environment, where there is only one domain for all communications. 
This domain can be located in a single place for a single enterprise, or comprise a 
collection of enterprises, each of which operates under the same set of technical 
and operational procedures. One example may be a multinational company that 
operates in several jurisdictions and maintains an intra- company domain across 
the world. Another example may be a group of end users (both sending and 
receiving parties) that enter a network with one or more certification authorities 
by which liability is allocated according to agreed contractual terms between the 









(2) An open environment, where a sender enters into an agreement with a 
certification authority to provide a certificate for a verification key, and where 
the receiving parties are not known by either the sending party or certification 
authority in advance. The role of trusted third parties, also called certification 
authorities, is to provide certificates that link the identity of the owner to the 
public key.2 These bodies can be public or private, licensed or unlicensed. 
Whether a certification authority is in the hands of a public or private body, and 
whether is it licensed or unlicensed, it must be trustworthy.
1 IdenTrust: http:// www.identrust.com; Bolero: http:// www.bolero.net.
2 Certification authorities issue certificates linked to a monetary value to limit liability on the 
certificate. When submitting documents to a court, it would hardly seem necessary to link the digital 
signature to the monetary value placed on the certificate, because the content of the document is the 
item of value, and the court does not rely on the monetary value of the certificate to accept documents 
electronically. This issue arose in the German case of FG Münster 11 K 990/ 05 F (Electronically signed 
statement of claim – On the interpretation of the term ‘monetary limitation’) before the Finance Court 
of Münster in Westphalia on 23 March 2006, which dismissed the claim because the corresponding 
signature certificate contained a monetary limitation of €100. This decision caused some consternation 
in Germany, for which see Martin Eßer, ‘Case note – Germany’ (2006) 3 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 111. The Federal Finance Court (Bundesfinanzhof) subsequently heard the 
appeal to this decision, and it was held that if such a signature contained a monetary restriction that 
restricts the kind of transactions it can be used for, the restriction does not impair the validity of the 
signature for the purposes of legal appeals: File number XI R 22/ 06; BB 2007, 92 (leading record only, 
otherwise not published); Martin Eßer, ‘Case note Germany, 19 February 2009, IV R 97/ 06’ (2009) 6 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 278.
Management of the key and certificate
7.238 The foundation of the public key infrastructure rests on asymmetric 
cryptography, with a public and private key pair. The public key is usually distributed 
in the form of a certificate, while the private key is a separate item with its own 
distinct structure that should be protected from being disclosed to unauthorized third 
parties when it is transported, used and stored. Once a person subscribes to a digital 
signature, a range of issues that are referred to as life- cycle management, among other 
terms, must be addressed. Regardless of the name given to the process, procedures 
and processes must be in place to create the certificate and key pair, verify the identity 
of the applicant, distribute the certificate and cancel the certificate at the end of its 
period of validity or before, should it be compromised. The quality of software, design 
of the network and management of the security system all affect the way the keys and 
certificate are managed and stored. This is important, because a digital signature is 
not computed by the user, but by software. The software on a computer will carry out 
the task on the instructions of a user, but the software is not in a position to identify 
whether the instructions come from a legitimate user or the signals from unauthorized 
malicious software that has successfully embedded itself in the user’s computer.
Identifying an applicant
7.239 It should be recalled that an individual could generate their own public and 
private key pair, using software on their computer. The individual then provides the 
certification authority with evidence of their identity. The type of evidence and degree 
of proof will depend on the nature of the type of certifying certificate required. In 











364 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
confirming the identity of a person or legal entity, a certification authority will tend to 
be expected to comply with the requirements from a recognized body.1
1 For an overview, see Piper and others, Digital Signatures, ch 5 and Adams and Lloyd, Understanding 
PKI Concepts, Part II.
7.240 The European Patent Office sets out the rules regarding electronic signatures 
and authentication in Decision of the President of the EPO dated 26 February 2009 
concerning the electronic filing of documents.1 In ERICSSON/ Electronic filing of appeals 
T1427/ 09,2 an electronic signature was affixed to the electronic filing of an appeal, but 
not in the correct name. This was an application for an appeal against the decision of 
the examining division, sent on 9 March 2009, refusing European patent application 
01962282.8. The notice of appeal and the statement setting out the grounds of appeal 
in this case were filed electronically on 11 May 2009 and 17 June 2009 respectively. 
The notice of appeal dated 11 May 2009 included the name of Mr Friedrich Kühn, a 
European Patent Attorney. There was no manuscript signature. The electronic filing 
of this document was certified by a signature authentication showing that both the 
sender certificate and the signer certificate underlying the filing were issued to 
I. Elfving. Mr Kühn provided a manuscript signature to the statement setting out the 
grounds of appeal dated 17 June 2009. The electronic filing of this statement was 
certified by a signature authentication showing that both the sender certificate and 
the signer certificate underlying the filing were issued to R. Ahlund. The reference to a 
‘sender certificate’ and a ‘signer certificate’ appears to indicate that a digital signature 
was affixed to the notice. In Decision of the President of the EPO dated 26 February 
2009 concerning the electronic filing of documents,3 article 8(2) provides that the 
authenticity of documents filed in appeal proceedings are to be confirmed by the use 
of an enhanced electronic signature of a person authorized to act in the proceedings 
in question. Neither I. Elfving nor R. Ahlund were authorized to act in the proceedings. 
As a result, the notice of appeal and the statement setting out the grounds of appeal 
were deemed not to be signed. The appellant was therefore invited to file signed copies 
of the documents within two months in accordance with Rule 50(3) of the European 
Patent Convention.
1 [2009] OJ EPO 182.
2 [2009] 11 WLUK 365, [2010] EPOR 22.
3 [2009] OJ EPO 182.
The certificate
7.241 When the certification authority has verified the identity of the individual or 
entity to their satisfaction, they will issue a certificate. This is a software record that 
affirms the connection of a public key to an identified person or corporate entity. It does 
not follow that a certification authority will undertake this task. There are a number of 
reasons for this. First, the cost of developing a suitable administrative infrastructure 
with the relevant expertise will be expensive. It may not, therefore, be possible to 
justify the cost in commercial terms. Second, there are a number of organizations that 
already have the relevant expertise, such as banks and credit reference agencies. While 
the database these organizations use may be imperfect, nevertheless it makes sound 
economic sense not to replicate a service that already exists. This usually means there 
is an added layer of contact where a certification authority issues a certificate. First, 













entity seeking a certificate. Upon confirmation of identity by the registration authority, 
the certification authority will then issue a certificate. Thus an additional layer of 
complexity is added to the mix surrounding the link between the person or legal entity 
seeking a certificate and the subsequent granting of the certificate.
7.242 The next point to ponder is the entity that generates the registration authority’s 
key. Whoever generates the registration authority’s key will also be involved in the 
contractual matrix. In all probability, a contractual relationship will exist between the 
certification authority and the registration authority, and the contract will provide for 
the liability and warranties between each entity. Where liability will fall in the event of 
a dispute will depend on the particular circumstances of the case.
The generation of the key pair belonging to the subscribing party
7.243 It is good practice for the subscribing party to generate their own key pair. 
Where the subscribing party generates a key pair, there is, theoretically, less of a risk of 
the private key being compromised. However, many subscribing parties will not have 
the software to generate their own key pair. This means a third party will be requested 
to generate a key pair on their behalf. There are two aspects to this that demonstrate 
a level of vulnerability that may be undesirable. The party generating the key pair will 
have to be trusted not to compromise the key, and the key pair will be vulnerable to 
attack or compromise when transported to the user.1
1 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, 92– 94; Piper and Murphy, Cryptography, 109– 110.
Validating the public key
7.244 Either the certification authority or the registration authority should carry 
out checks that the public key is actually that of the applicant, and that the applicant 
has the corresponding private key. The check is simple: it needs to be determined 
whether the subscriber can make a signature that can be verified by the public key. 
If carried out, such a check can protect both the subscribing party and the authority 
that undertakes the task, because it can ensure the subscribing party has submitted 
the correct key and the authority can demonstrate it undertook care to investigate and 
verify for itself that the public key was that of the applicant, thus making sure it did not 
certify an incorrect or invalid key.
Distributing certification authority keys
7.245 Individuals or entities wishing to use the public keys of different organizations 
or individuals may well have to visit each certificate authority to obtain the relevant 
public key. One mechanism is to have a hierarchy of certification authorities, where 
higher- level authorities certify low- level authorities. In this case, the prospective user 
needs to verify the highest level certificate first, usually called a root certification 
authority, then to check the trail and validity of every authority certificate that leads to 
the certificate the user wants to trust or use.1 When a person buys a computer, there 
are a number of certificates already installed in their browsers. As a result, the user, 
without realizing it, ‘trusts’ whoever uploaded the software to the computer to include 
the appropriate authorities’ certificates.2 The certificates can be deleted and new ones 
added, if the user knows how to do this. If the user does not update their browser, 
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messages when signatures are verified. In addition, unless the user is aware of the 
complexities of the hierarchy of certification authorities, it is possible for a malicious 
party to insert a fraudulent certificate into a chain of certificates, and appear to be 
trusted.3
1 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, 132– 145 for a detailed discussion; Piper and 
others, Digital Signatures, 37– 38.
2 Mason and Reiniger, ‘ “Trust” between machines?’
3 Niels Ferguson, Bruce Schneier and Tadayoshi Kohno, Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles 
and Practical Applications (Wiley 2010), 18.3.1 for an example of where a software fault had the capacity 
to undermine the security of an entire system; for further examples, especially of Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) certificates, see http:// wiki.cacert.org/ Risk/ History; Carbanak APT: The Great Bank Robbery 
(v 2.1, Kaspersky 2015), https:// media.kasperskycontenthub.com/ wp- content/ uploads/ sites/ 43/ 
2018/ 03/ 08064518/ Carbanak_ APT_ eng.pdf.
Revocation of a certificate
7.246 The certificate is used to bind the name of a person or entity to their public 
key. However, just as with physical seals, there may be many reasons for revoking a 
certificate (or seal) before the expiry date. In the past, the owner of the seal would put 
notices up in such public places as churches and markets, warning people not to rely 
on the seal.1 In the digital age, such notices are placed over the Internet. The reasons 
for revoking a certificate include, but are not limited to:
(1) The user is aware that the private key corresponding to the certificate has 
been lost or compromised.
(2) The certificate holder asks for the certificate to be revoked.
(3) The certification authority revokes a certificate where the holder breaches a 
term of the agreement.
(4) The certificate was issued in error.
1 As described by Wills J in The Staple of England v The Governor and Company of the Bank of England 
(1888) 21 QBD 160 at 167.
7.247 There are a range of technical solutions to providing public knowledge 
of certificates that have been revoked, but the most well known is the certificate 
revocation list.1 A certification revocation list is a signed data structure that contains a 
list of those certificates that have been revoked. Where a list exists, there are a number 
of important issues that must be addressed:
(1) The difference in time between the command to revoke the certificate and the 
last time the certificate was used.
(2) The reliability of the revocation procedure; in other words, whether it can 
be relied upon to provide a definitive answer that can be trusted (in addition, 
the accuracy of the clocks that determine the time the revocation was actually 
uploaded to the certification revocation list – whether it was the certification 
authority time or the relying party time, and at whose risk – for instance the 
relying party deliberately sets their clock at a different time to confuse the 
evidence).
(3) The number of revocation commands that the revocation system can handle 
at any one time.2
1 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, 107– 126.













7.248 If a certification authority does not have a revocation list, the person seeking 
to determine whether to rely on a certificate needs to know how they can establish 
whether a key has been revoked or compromised.
Expiry of keys
7.249 Certificates have a fixed period of validity, in the same way that a royal seal 
matrix had, and they expire in due course. One technical question relates to how the life 
of the key is computed. Ellison and Schneier contend that the key has a ‘theft lifetime’ 
as a function of the vulnerability of the subsystem that stores the key. Other factors that 
should also be taken into account include the threat of physical and network exposure 
to attacks and how attractive the key is to an attacker.1 In any event, there are three 
options available when a certificate expires: (1) no action is taken; (2) the certificate is 
renewed and the same public key is placed into a new certificate with a new period of 
validity, (3) a new pair of public and private keys are generated and a new certificate is 
generated to provide for a certificate update.2
1 Ellison and Schneier, ‘Ten risks of PKI’.
2 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, 101– 102.
The duties of a user
7.250 There are a number of points that people or organizations that use private keys 
should be aware of, as set out below.
(1) Management of private keys
The user must manage their private keys effectively and take measures that are 
appropriate to prevent the unauthorized use of the keys, and to protect them 
securely against any other form of attack, such as theft or misuse by a third party 
that gains access to the system by way of malicious software or other method. 
This duty is included in some electronic signature legislation.
(2) Storage of private keys after expiry
When deciding whether to use private keys, their use should be carefully 
monitored, because different types of algorithm are used for different purposes. 
Thus in the United Kingdom, consideration must be given to the possibility 
that a private key may be the subject of a s 49 notice under the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and to the safe storage of keys that have expired.
(3) Disposal of equipment with private keys
Particular care should be taken when disposing of the hardware that contains 
the private keys.
Internal management of a certification authority
7.251 The internal management of a certification authority, which the individual user 
may not be familiar with, can affect the trust to be placed in the certificates issued. 
Such issues include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) The level and extent of the checks made on employees.
(2) How to verify the identity of the employees who control the keys.
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(4) The mechanisms in place to verify that the relevant policies are followed.
(5) Whether the internal management of the certificate system is properly 
carried out.
(6) The level and extent of any insurance cover may also have a bearing on the 
suitability of different types of certificate issued.
Barriers to the use of the public key infrastructure
7.252 There are a variety of problems that affect those vendors that offer digital 
signature services. For instance:
(1) There is no standard in the industry relating to the provision of a directory 
service. A number of models exist and competing standards are under 
consideration, as well as the development of proprietary solutions.
(2) Vendors do not implement some functions, and when they are implemented, 
they may be implemented in a different manner to another vendor. This leads to 
problems with interoperability between the systems of different vendors.1
(3) The performance of the repository service where the certificate revocation 
lists are held may be a problem. At present there are a limited number of vendors 
that operate a public key infrastructure, and the numbers of people using those 
that are available are in the minority. Whether the systems in place are capable 
of expanding with greater use in the future is open to debate.
(4) The number of people that have any knowledge of public key cryptography 
is small. The numbers of personnel required are not limited to administrative 
personnel, but include people in senior positions who can develop the relevant 
policy documents, such as certification practice statements and interdomain 
interoperability agreements. The public key infrastructure strategy must also be 
considered and documented.2
1 Paweł Krawczyk, ‘When the EU qualified electronic signature becomes an information services 
preventer’ (2010) 7 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 7 .
2 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, ch 25.
7.253 In addition, there are weaknesses that can affect the use of the signature, 
including the fact the data to be signed can be modified; a personal identity number 
can be obtained; the person affixing a signature might sign different data than 
intended; and an attacker can interfere with the software code as it is communicated 
between component parts. In essence, the signatory has to have trust in the writer of 
the software that it will work as intended.1
1 Adrian Spalka, Armin B. Cremers and Hanno Langweg, ‘Trojan horse attacks on software for 
electronic signatures’ (2002) 26 Informatica 191; Hanno Langweg, Malware Attacks on Electronic 
Signatures Revisited (2006), ftp:// ftp.cryptopro.ru/ pub/ TrustedPass/ 110519/ Theory/ _ hanno_ 
research_ gi06p.pdf; ‘Attacks on PDF Signatures’, https:// www.pdf- insecurity.org/ signature/ signature.
html; Fabian Ising and Vladislav Mladenov, How to Break PDFs: Breaking PDF Encryption and PDF 
Signatures, https:// media.ccc.de/ v/ 36c3- 10832- how_ to_ break_ pdfs; Christian Mainka, Vladislav 
Mladenov and Simon Rohlmann, ‘Shadow attacks: hiding and replacing content in signed PDFs’, 
Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium 21– 25 February 2021, (Virtual), 









Risks associated with the use of digital signatures
Issuing a certificate to an impostor
7.254 A number of certification authorities have issued false SSL (Secure Socket Layer) 
certificates that support the security of websites.1 The issuing of false certificates 
illustrates the weakness of how certificates are created and issued, and also how 
important the certificates are in relation to the operation of the Internet. It is not known 
whether false certificates have been issued that are associated with digital signatures 
that are used by people or legal entities. The 2001 example of VeriSign issuing two 
Class 3 Software Publisher certificates incorrectly has been cited in previous editions 
of Electronic Signatures in Law (now incorporated into this text) by way of example.2 
A more significant incident occurred in 2011, when DigiNotar B.V., a Dutch certificate 
authority owned by VASCO Data Security International, Inc, was placed into voluntary 
bankruptcy as a result of the discovery that the company had issued several hundred 
fraudulent certificates.3 The company also issued certificates for the PKIoverheid 
program on behalf of the government in the Netherlands. A hacker obtained access to 
the DigiNotar computer systems and issued an unknown number of false certificates. 
On 2 September 2011, after being informed of the results of the investigation of the 
DigiNotar systems by Fox- IT, the Dutch government stopped trusting certificates 
issued by DigiNotar4 and regained control over the company’s intermediate certificate 
to manage an orderly transition, replacing untrusted certificates with new ones from 
another provider.5 The fact that false certificates have been issued illustrates the 
weaknesses inherent in the trust placed in software code6 – because it is software code 
that controls the entire edifice of everything digital – and it is imperative for lawyers 
to more fully understand the technical issues by adopting a realistically sceptical 
approach to understanding the nature of software.7
1 For the risks generally, see Piper and others, Digital Signatures, ch 4; Ferguson and others, 
Cryptography Engineering, ch 19; Doowon Kim, Bum Jun Kwon and Tudor Dumitras, ‘Certified malware: 
measuring breaches of trust in the windows code- signing PKI’, in CCS ’17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM 
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Association for Computing Machinery 
2017), 1435– 1448, https:// dl.acm.org/ doi/ 10.1145/ 3133956.3133958. See the CAcert Wiki for a list 
of fraudulent certificates that have been issued (the aim of this website is to maintain a list of attacks 
with reasonably authoritative references): http:// wiki.cacert.org/ Risk/ History.
2 The ‘VeriSign security alert fraud detected in Authenticode signing certificates’, 22 March 2000, is 
no longer available, nor is Gregory L. Guerin, ‘Microsoft, VeriSign, and certification revocation’; the CERT 
Advisory is also no longer available; for the Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01- 017, see https:// docs.
microsoft.com/ en- us/ security- updates/ securitybulletins/ 2001/ ms01- 017; US Department of Energy 
Computer Incident Advisory Capability, L- 062: Erroneous Verisign- Issued Digital Certificates for Microsoft; 
Ferdinand Gomes, ‘Security Alert: Fraudulent Digital Certificates’ (SANS Institute 2003), https:// www.
sans.org/ reading- room/ whitepapers/ certificates/ security- alert- fraudulent- digital- certificates- 679.
3 The bankruptcy of DigiNotar B.V. is set out in Form 10- K submitted by VASCO Data Security 
International, Inc. to the US Securities and Exchange Commission on 10 March 2017, https:// s24.
q4cdn.com/ 314592314/ files/ doc_ financials/ 2016/ q4/ VASCODataSecurityInternational_ 10K_ 
20170310.pdf.
4 Factsheet: Fraudulently Issued Security Certificate Discovered, 5 September 2011, version 2.2 (no 
longer available); Black Tulip Report of the Investigation into the DigiNotar Certificate Authority Breach 
(Fox- IT BV, PR- 110202, 13 August 2012, version 1.0), https:// www.researchgate.net/ publication/ 
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5 Overheid zegt vertrouwen in de certificaten van Diginotar op, Nieuwsbericht (3 September 2011) 
(no longer available).
6 Mason and Reiniger, ‘ “Trust” between machines?’
7 Note the comments by Nico van Eijk in ‘The DigiNotar case: internet security is no abstract matter’ 
(2013) 23 Computers & Law 21.
Certificate revocation list
7.255 There are two technical issues that affect the ability to download a suitably 
recent certificate revocation list: how the certification authority tells you where to 
obtain the relevant certificate revocation list, and whether your computer carries 
out the functions you require. There are many different ways to obtain a certificate 
revocation list, and because there is no standard within the industry, no one method is 
mandatory.1 Regardless of the method used, the significant issues for every recipient, 
which they may not be aware of, are as follows:
(1) The certificate revocation list should be digitally signed by the certificate 
authority using its root certificate to prevent a certificate revocation list from 
being forged.
(2) The certificate revocation list is dated by the certification authority, which 
means that every certificate revocation list expires.
(3) Every certificate revocation list has a higher sequence than the one issued 
previously, to prevent forgery.
(4) The person wishing to check a particular certificate must know where to find 
a suitably recent certificate revocation list.
(5) The certificate revocation list must be able to be obtained by a relying party.
(6) The contents of the certificate revocation list must be authenticated.
1 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, 107– 126.
7.256 Any duty that is to be imposed on a certification authority should take into 
account the complexity of these issues. If Microsoft designed the software to take a 
user to the address where the certificate revocation list existed only if the address 
was provided by the certification authority with the certificate, then establishing 
the responsibility for passing on this knowledge to a recipient will be a necessary 
prerequisite to any possible defence by a certification authority. In the VeriSign case, it 
did not issue Class 3 Software Publisher certificates with an address for the certificate 
revocation list. This appears to mean that, at the time of the incident, the user of the 
relevant Microsoft software was not able to retrieve the certificate revocation list of a 
given certifying certificate issued by VeriSign and Guerin concluded that Microsoft did 
not have software that had a working revocation infrastructure. Microsoft did not agree 
with this analysis, and published a rebuttal that is no longer available,1 to which Guerin 
rebutted the points raised by Microsoft in his article, which is also no longer available. 
The report located on the US Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory 
Capability website, referring to ‘L- 062: Erroneous Verisign- Issued Digital Certificates 
for Microsoft’ no longer appears to be available. However, if a vendor of software such 
as Microsoft did not have a working revocation infrastructure in place in the past, then 
it could be argued that past certificates can hardly be said to be reliable. This means 
the evidential weight to be given to a certificate must be considered against these 









a certificate irrelevant. Arguably, a court should take such practical issues into account 
when deciding whether a duty of care should be imposed on a certification authority.
1 Microsoft published ‘Response to inaccurate Crypto- Gram article on VeriSign certificates’ at 
https:// docs.microsoft.com/ en- us/ previous- versions/ tn- archive/ cc751324(v=technet.10)?redirecte
dfrom=MSDN.
7.257 Depending on how it is used, a public key infrastructure has its uses.1 However, 
it is very important to be clear about what a digital signature can and cannot do.
1 Ferguson and others, Cryptography Engineering, at 19.9, ‘So what is a PKI good for?’. The authors 
conclude that ‘there are few advantages to PKIs’.
What a digital signature is capable of doing
7.258 The uses to which cryptography can be put within a public key infrastructure 
include demonstrating the integrity of the message and providing for the confidentiality 
of a document, although using digital signatures within a public key infrastructure 
will not act to correct human behaviour.1 A public key infrastructure is only capable 
of making a link between a public key and a claimed identity. A digital signature 
only authenticates that a certain private key was used to create the relevant digital 
signature.
1 Davis, ‘Compliance defects in public- key cryptography’, paragraph 1; Adams and Lloyd, 
Understanding PKI Concepts, ch 14 for a useful and more detailed discussion; Bernard Reynis and 
Ugo Bechini, ‘European civil law notaries ready to launch international digital deeds’ (2007) 4 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 14; Joan Decker, ‘The e- notarization initiative, 
Pennsylvania, USA’ (2008) 5 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 73; Timothy S. 
Reiniger, ‘The proposed international e- identity assurance standard for electronic notarization’ (2008) 
5 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 78; this article is followed by the text of 
‘The draft International Electronic Notarization Assurance Standard’ (2008) 5 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 81.
What no form of electronic signature is capable of doing
7.259 A digital signature can provide for the authenticity of information. It binds 
key pairs with names. The recipient of a message or document with which a digital 
signature is associated can confirm the binding of the verification key with the name 
of the person whose private key has been used. But the recipient cannot determine 
whether the sending party authorized the use of the digital signature: this is also 
true of any other form of electronic signature. The private key of a digital signature 
is protected by a password or passphrase. The most important point to be aware of is 
this: the private key of a digital signature is only as good as the password that protects 
it. This means that when the password is inserted into a computer to provide access to 
the private key of a digital signature, it proves any of the following:
(1) The person to whom the private key was issued might have been the person 
that inserted this information into the software, and therefore the recipient can 
infer that the private key of the digital signature is capable of proving that the 
person to whom the private key was issued was physically at the keyboard at the 
time of the session; or
(2) a person (perhaps the owner of the private key or her secretary) instructed 
the software to retain the password information in the computer memory, so that 
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obtained control of the computer remotely) who obtains access to the private key 
can use the password, which in turn does not prove that the person to whom the 
private key was issued is physically at the keyboard at the time of the session (the 
recipient of the correspondence is not to know whether it was the person whose 
key it was, or her secretary, or an impostor), although it can be concluded that the 
use of the password proved the computer stored this information; or
(3) that a person (whether the owner of the key, their secretary or an imposter) 
who used the password actually knew the password.
7.260 The recipient relies on one small item to persuade them that the sender is 
the person whom they claim to be: the password that enables the sender to cause 
a computer to affix the private key of a digital signature to the document. In reality, 
reliance rests on the quality of the digital evidence1 that ties a presumed identity 
to a presumed act, and in turn the integrity of the password, the software code and 
the security in place to protect the password and private key. The problems with 
passwords are so well known that Dan Geer merely stated the obvious in a talk at the 
UNC Charlotte Cyber Security Symposium in 2013: ‘Everyone in this room knows how 
and why passwords are a problem.’2
1 Bearing in mind that computers and networks are not secure, for which see in the legal context, R. 
R. Jueneman and R. J. Robertson, Jr, ‘Biometrics and digital signatures in electronic commerce’ (2008) 
38 Jurimetrics Journal 427; note also the further technical problems in P. Švéda and V. Matyáš Jr, ‘Digital 
signatures and electronic documents: a cautionary tale revisited’ (2004) 5 Upgrade 35.
2 Dan Geer, ‘Tradeoffs in cyber security’, a talk at the UNC Charlotte Cyber Security Symposium (2013), 
9 October 2013, http:// geer.tinho.net/ geer.uncc.9x13.txt; see also Joseph Bonneau and Ekaterina 
Shutova, ‘Linguistic properties of multi- word passphrases’, in Jim Blythe (ed) Financial Cryptography 
and Data Security Volume 7398 (Springer 2012), 1– 12; Joseph Bonneau, Cormac Herley, Paul C. van 
Oorschot and Frank Stajano, The Quest to Replace Passwords: a Framework for Comparative Evaluation 
of Web Authentication Schemes (University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory Technical Report 817, 
2012), https:// www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ techreports/ UCAM- CL- TR- 817.pdf; Dan Goodwin, ‘Anatomy of a 
hack: how crackers ransack passwords like “qeadzcwrsfxv1331” ’, arstechnica, 21 May 2013, http:// 
arstechnica.com/ security/ 2013/ 05/ how- crackers- make- minced- meat- out- of- your- passwords/ ; 
Andrey Belenko and Dmitry Sklyarov, ‘ “Secure password managers” and “military- grade encryption” 
on smartphones: oh, really?’, (n.d.), http:// www.elcomsoft.co.uk/ WP/ BH- EU- 2012- WP.pdf.
7.261 It is generally recognized that the password is an exceedingly weak mechanism, 
as indicated by P. C. van Oorschot and Julie Thorpe:
The ubiquitous use of textual passwords for user authentication has a well- known 
weakness: users tend to choose passwords with predictable characteristics, 
related to how easy they are to remember. This often means passwords which 
have ‘meaning’ to the user. Unfortunately, many of these ‘higher probability’ 
passwords fall into a tiny subset of the full password space. Although its 
boundaries vary depending on its exact definition and the probabilities involved, 
we refer to this smaller subset as the probable password space.
Ideally, users would choose passwords equi- probably from a large subset of the 
overall password space, to increase the cost of a dictionary attack, i.e., a brute- 
force guessing attack involving candidate guesses from a prioritized list of ‘likely 
passwords’. If a password scheme’s probability distribution is non- uniform, its 
entropy is reduced. 1
1 P. C. van Oorschot and Julie Thorpe, ‘On the security of graphical password schemes’, Technical 
Report TR- 05- 11, http:// service.scs.carleton.ca/ sites/ default/ files/ tr/ TR- 05- 11.pdf. There is a 









human need to write down complex passwords (which could have a bearing on whether a human can 
be made liable for writing down passwords that the vendor or bank insists must be long and difficult to 
remember), for which see the following short list of more recent references, all of which in turn refer to 
other sources: Kirsi Helkala and Nils Kalstad Svendsen, ‘The security and memorability of passwords 
generated by using an association element and a personal factor’, in Peeter Laund (ed) Information 
Security Technology for Applications, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 7161 (Springer 2012), 
114– 130; Joseph Bonneau, ‘Guessing human- chosen secrets’ (University of Cambridge Computer 
Laboratory Technical Report 819, 2012); Joseph Bonneau and Sören Preibusch, ‘The password thicket: 
technical and market failures in human authentication on the web’, Ninth Workshop on the Economics 
of Information Security (WEIS 2010), http:// www.jbonneau.com/ publications.html and http:// 
preibusch.de/ publications/ password_ market/ ; Wendy Moncur and Grégory Leplâtre, ‘PINs, passwords 
and human memory’ (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 116; Martin A. 
Conway and Emily A. Holmes, Guidelines on Memory and the Law: Recommendations from the Scientific 
Study of Human Memory (The British Psychological Society Research Board 2008, revised 2010), 
https:// www.academia.edu/ 2326108/ Guidelines_ On_ Memory_ And_ The_ Law_ Recommendations_ 
From_ The_ Scientific_ Study_ Of_ Human_ Memory; Mark L. Howe and Lauren M. Knott, ‘The fallibility 
of memory in judicial processes: lessons from the past and their modern consequences’ (2015) 
23(5) Memory 633, https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/ articles/ PMC4409058/ ; Herley and others, 
‘Passwords’ (the authors report that transactions by way of a PIN reverse the burden of proof, but this 
is not correct).
7.262 The weaknesses are also explored by Petr Švéda and Václav Matyáš Jr.1 The 
authors illustrate, at paragraph 3, that when a person has the private key of a digital 
signature on their computer, the user or owner ‘cannot be sure that no further signature 
processes will be executed in the background when using his private key’, and they 
make the point in paragraph 4 that ‘It is very hard to build a system or an application 
that does not compromise its security. There are a lot of potential problems – e.g., it 
can be misused, one of the components can fail, as well as the signing application, keys 
stored on hard disk or in memory are vulnerable’. They go on to indicate, at 4.1:
At the time of writing, we know of no technology that can make a hardware 
device fully resistant to penetration by a skilled and determined attacker from 
a powerful organization. A lot of experts believe that absolute protection will 
remain unattainable. So the total cost of breaking a hardware device has to be 
much more than the value of stored and protected information.
1 Švéda and Matyáš, ‘Digital signatures and electronic documents’; Peter A. Loscocco, Stephen D. 
Smalley, Patrick A. Muckelbauer, Ruth C. Taylor, S. Jeff Turner and John F. Farrell, ‘The inevitability 
of failure: the flawed assumption of security in modern computing environments’, in 21st National 
Information Systems Security Conference: Building the Information Security Bridge to the 21st Century 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology 1998), 303– 314, https:// babel.hathitrust.org/ cgi/ 
pt?id=coo.31924083977813&view=1up&seq=5 – the individual paper is available at https:// www.
cs.utah.edu/ flux/ fluke/ html/ inevit- abs.html; Dan Goodin, ‘Once seen as bulletproof, 11 million+ 
Ashley Madison passwords already cracked’, arstechnica, 10 September 2015, https:// arstechnica.
com/ information- technology/ 2015/ 09/ once- seen- as- bulletproof- 11- million- ashley- madison- 
passwords- already- cracked/ .
7.263 Smart cards are also vulnerable, as the authors point out at 4.2 (reference 
omitted):1
A smart card is a simple and inexpensive security module. It consists of multiple 
components combined with a single chip that uses external power supply and 
clock. When a card is used as a personalized trusted device it generates a key 
pair locally, stores the private key locally, and only publishes the corresponding 
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communication channel to the user. None of current available smart cards 
has a really trustworthy user interface. The user is completely dependent on 
potentially untrusted devices to get some information about his transactions. For 
example if the personal computer to which the smart card has been connected is 
compromised, it might ask the smart card to sign a completely different message 
to that which the user sees.
Many successful attacks have occurred because smart cards were exposed 
to more sophisticated attackers than designers anticipated ... The smart card 
without trustworthy user interface is a typical example of an architectural error. 
Many attacks are also possible due to protocol and application programming 
interface failures.
1 Klaus Schmeh, Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure on the Internet (Wiley 2001), has a 
different view, although acknowledges attacks are possible (15.2.3).
7.264 In summary, it is necessary to ensure the person receiving data signed with 
the private key of a digital signature understands the difference between trusting the 
signature and trusting the owner of the signature.
The weakest link
7.265 Although this chapter has emphasized the reliance placed upon the activities 
of certification authorities and other participants in the public key infrastructure 
(registration authorities, directory services listing public keys, certification revocation 
list services, time stamping, to name but a few), comparatively little discussion has 
been given to the weakest link in the chain of a digital signature. If Bob wants Alice to 
use a digital signature to authenticate her messages, he has to persuade Alice that it is 
essential that when he receives a message or document from her, he can be completely 
assured, whether he decides to become a verifying party or not, that it was Alice, and 
only Alice, who caused the digital signature to be affixed to the document or message. 
He therefore has to persuade Alice that she must take good care of her private key, such 
that she accepts the risk of being held responsible for unauthorized use of it by others. 
If Alice asks, not without reason, ‘What’s in it for me?’, there seems to be no answer. 
Whether Bob decides to undertake the sometimes gargantuan task of carrying out the 
verification procedure or not, if he cannot satisfy himself that Alice kept her private 
key absolutely safe, he cannot be sure that Alice affixed the digital signature to the 
message. So he will try to insist that Alice carries the blame anyway.
7.266 In any event, the recipient of a digital signature can be certain that:
The person (whomsoever they might be) who keyed in the password that 
protects the private key of the digital signature, knew the password.
7.267 Or in the alternative, the recipient of a digital signature can be certain that:
The person who caused the private key to be attached to an email or document 
called up the private key and clicked on the ‘password’ icon (they did not need 
to know the password) because the software was instructed to remember the 
password.
7.268 There seems to be an unquestioning reliance on the use of digital signatures that 






also manifest in the assumption made that a digital signature proves the person whose 
signature it is, and was the person that caused the computer to affix the signature 
to the document, as in the Portuguese case of (Evora) Ac. RE 13- 12- 2005 (R.982/ 
2005), in which an email was sent with a digital signature attached. In this instance, 
it was determined that the digital signature served to authenticate the document, 
and guaranteed the identity of the sender and the integrity of the message. While 
a digital signature is capable of identifying the sender, it cannot guarantee that the 
sender caused the digital signature to be affixed to the message. The most important 
point to be aware of is this: the private key of a digital signature is only as good as the 
password that protects it and any additional mechanism used to protect the private 
key, as Richard E. Smith has pointed out:
Public key cryptography succeeds only as long as a private key’s owner can keep 
it under control – always available when needed but never disclosed to anyone 
else. 1
1 Richard E. Smith, Authentication: From Passwords to Public Keys (Addison- Wesley 2002), 431.
7.269 It will be argued by some that the private key to a digital signature can be secured 
by a combination of a password and the biometric measurement of a fingerprint, for 
instance. This ‘solution’ relies on the technology (secret) of the biometric scanner that 
is chosen to fulfil this role, and does not take into account the various methods by 
which the mechanism can be compromised.
7.270 A digital signature is not linked to the person creating it: the unique link is 
made with the private key, not the user. Nobody is capable of committing a private 
key to memory1 because it is far too complicated, which is why passwords are used to 














1 ‘Guidelines on memory and the law recommendations from the scientific study of human memory’; 
Howe and Knott, ‘The fallibility of memory in judicial processes’.
2 This example is from Symeon (Simos) Xenitellis, ‘The open- source PKI book: a guide to PKIs and 
open- source implementations’ and quoted under GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.3, 3 
November 2008, published by the Free Software Foundation: http:// ospkibook.sourceforge.net/ 
docs/ OSPKI- 2.4.7/ OSPKI- html/ sample- key- components.htm. For an example of a private key in PEM 
format, see http:// ospkibook.sourceforge.net/ docs/ OSPKI- 2.4.7/ OSPKI- html/ sample- priv- key.htm. I 
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7.271 This means that private keys are retained on a computer, disk or smart card. 
It is not possible to create an electronic signature that can be uniquely linked to the 
signatory, and it remains the case that passwords have to be relied upon to secure the 
private key of a digital signature.
The burden of managing the private key
7.272 The user of a digital signature is expected to keep their private key secure. 
Failure to do so will mean a mischievous member of staff or a malicious third party 
can append a digital signature to a document or message for nefarious purposes. The 
management of the private key acts to underpin the efficacy of a digital signature. Some 
of the issues to which a recipient must give consideration include those set out below.
Bypassing passwords
7.273 Depending on the nature of the application software on any given computer 
or system, where a user has set their security setting to ‘High’ they will have to enter 
their password every time they wish to enter their private key to affix the private 
key of a digital signature to a document or message. Where the security setting is set 
to the default, ‘Low’, the messages will be automatically signed without any further 
intervention by the user. Given this scenario, any person with access to a computer 
or device containing a digital signature in a powered- up state will be able to send 
messages or documents with a digital signature affixed.
7.274 A busy person might find it inconvenient to enter their password every time 
they wish to use their private key to affix a digital signature to a document or message. 
An alternative is for the user to retain their private key in memory during the login 
session. If a user keeps the private key in memory, this exposes the key to being stolen. 
Examples include leaving the computer unattended, thus permitting a third party to 
take sufficient action to steal the key. Alternatively, if the private key is on a laptop 
computer and the laptop computer is stolen, it may be possible for the thief to obtain 
access to the private key. Further, malicious software has been developed to steal 
passwords and private keys.1 Finally, even if the private key is stored on an encrypted 
smart card, it must be used with a computer to sign a message or document, and the 
computer may have been maliciously programmed to sign a document or message 
other than the one the user intends to sign.2
1 Swati Khandelwal, ‘Symantec API flaws reportedly let attackers steal private SSL keys and 
certificates’, The Hacker News, 28 March 2017, https:// thehackernews.com/ 2017/ 03/ symantec- 
ssl- certificates.html; ‘How cybercrime exploits digital certificates’, 28 July 2014, https:// resources.
infosecinstitute.com/ cybercrime- exploits- digital- certificates/ .
2 See Young and Yung, Malicious Cryptography for further examples of how the technology can be 
used for malicious purposes; note the discussion on this issue by Markus Rückert and Dominique 
Schröder, ‘Security of verifiably encrypted signatures’, in Pairing- Based Cryptography – Pairing 2009, 
Lecture Notes In Computer Science Volume 5671 (Springer 2009), 17– 34.
Quality of passwords
7.275 There are a number of issues surrounding the question of passwords, as noted 
above, and they are well documented. The entire edifice of the public key infrastructure 
and the security of the private key rests to a very large extent on the quality of the password 












passwords that are easy to remember, which in turn makes a password easy to guess 
and vulnerable to attack. If the user does not have effective control over the quality of the 
passwords used,2 the system will be vulnerable to an offline guessing attack.3
1 Bonneau and others, The Quest to Replace Passwords.
2 Kresimir Solic, Hrvoje Ocevcic and Damir Blazevic, ‘Survey on password quality and confidentiality’ 
(2015) 56 Automatika 69.
3 Davis, ‘Compliance defects in public- key cryptography’; Heiko Roßnagel and Jan Zibuschka, 
‘Integrating qualified electronic signatures with password legacy systems’ (2007) 4 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 7.
7.276 If a recipient of a digital signature intends to rely on the purported authority of the 
signature, they have a range of options:
(1) To rely on the signature without taking any affirmative action. In some 
jurisdictions, the electronic signature legislation lays down a duty on the recipient 
to verify the signature, although the duty is invariably set at a high level of generality. 
It is conceivable that judges will take into account the arrangements between 
the sender and recipient before reaching a conclusive judgment. For instance, if 
a recipient relied on a digital signature attached to a high- value contract, a court 
may well consider it is appropriate in the circumstances that a recipient takes 
reasonable steps to authenticate and verify the digital signature, and to ensure the 
sending party duly authorized it.
(2) To rely on the signature after undertaking steps to verify and authenticate 
the various certificates in the chain (that is, assuming the recipient has a trusted 
copy of the public key of the Root Certification Authority), and checking the 
authenticity and reliability of any time stamps (the time the time stamp is 
generated should not be independent of the time the digital signature data is 
generated),1 thus becoming a verifying party. Should a dispute occur, one of the 
questions that will need to be addressed is to what extent the actions taken by 
the verifying party were adequate in the circumstances of the case, including 
their state of knowledge at the time.
(3) Ignore the infrastructure surrounding the use of the digital signature, and 
require the sending party to confirm their intentions by an alternative method, 
or to confirm, using another medium (such as letter, facsimile transmission or 
telephone) that the communication was sent by them.
1 Jeff Stapleton, Paul Doyle and Steven Teppler, ‘The digital signature paradox’ (an updated version 
of a paper of the same name that was originally published in the Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Workshop 
on Information Assurance and Security), http:// docplayer.net/ 10585603- The- digital- signature- 
paradox.html.
7.277 As a result of the foregoing discussion, it becomes clear that public key 
cryptography is more suitable for server- to- server security, rather than for use on a 
desktop.
Evidence and digital signatures
7.278 Should an electronic signature become the subject of a dispute, the normal 
considerations will apply regarding the submission of evidence into legal proceedings, 
including any rules relating to the authentication of the evidence, the weight to be 
given to the evidence and whether it is necessary to help the adjudicator in reaching 








378 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
the reader to some of the issues that might arise in relation to digital signatures in 
particular.
The evidence forming a digital signature
7.279 A certificate is issued with a digital signature,1 which is a signed data structure 
that binds a public key to an identity. This certificate will purport to bind the public key 
to the information contained in the certificate. The subscribing party provides some of 
the information contained in the certificate, which may or may not be verified by the 
certification authority, and the certification authority is responsible for the remaining 
information. The subscriber will have a pair of keys, private and public. The key pairs 
may be generated by the keying material available to the subscribing party in their 
computer, by a registration authority, by the certification authority or by a trusted 
third party key generation facility.
1 The use of the word ‘certificate’ is shorthand for an individual identity certificate.
7.280 Individuals can create their own private and public key pairs, or key- generating 
organizations can undertake this task. The creation and certification processes are 
distinct. The same issues discussed here will apply to keys not certified by a third 
party, with the added complication that the level of authenticity may be lower because 
proving who the public key belonged to might be more difficult for any person wishing 
to rely on an uncertified key. How the key pair is generated may also be problematic if 
there is evidence that the software used to generate key pairs has flaws, such as being 
liable to generate weak keys.
7.281 A recipient can go through a list of checks to assure themselves that the 
certificate links the sending party to the document or message that was signed. To 
trust the certificate sent by Alice, Bob must check all of the certificates back to the root 
or foundation certificate. Only by checking back to the foundation certificate can Bob 
determine whether he can trust the public key in Alice’s certificate in relation to the 
purpose for which he will use it. The certificate attached to the message or document 
and the corresponding public key can only be trusted if every certificate and their 
corresponding keys in the path from the foundation key to Alice’s key can be trusted. 
There are two phases to this exercise:
(1) Constructing the path, which requires Bob to bring together all the relevant 
certificates to form a complete path. This process may be complicated and 
time- consuming, because there may be a number of certification authorities 
in the chain, all of which have cross- certified their respective certificates. The 
assumption is that Bob can retrieve all of the certificates he needs to scrutinize 
them and put the chain of certificates together in a logical sequence. Bob must 
also check the issuing certificate of each of the certification authorities in the 
chain against a certificate revocation list.
(2) Validating the path, where Bob must decide whether the path between each 
certificate is valid. This involves undertaking the mathematical computation to 
verify each digital signature; checking the validity period of each certificate for 
date of expiry; making sure each certificate has not been revoked, by checking 
the relevant certification revocation list; and then considering other issues such 
as the policies that apply to the certificate, any restrictions on the use of the key 






1 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, Standards, and Deployment Considerations, 
147– 149.
7.282 Once Bob has checked and validated the certificates and certificate path, he 
must then carry out the following checks:
(1) Establishing the integrity of the certificate by ensuring the digital signature 
on the certificate is properly verified.
(2) Checking the certificate validity period to ensure it is valid on the date and 
the time Bob intends to rely on it.
(3) Checking the certificate has not been revoked. There are various methods to 
implement a certificate revocation list with a number of variations, including, 
but not limited to, certificate revocation lists (which is a signed data structure 
that contains a list of revoked certificates) and certification authority revocation 
lists, used to revoke the public key certificates of certification authorities and 
online certificate status protocol, which is a protocol that permits Bob to receive 
a response to his request for information.
(4) Checking Alice has used the certificate in accordance with the constraints set 
out in the certificate, including the relevant agreements and certification policies.
7.283 As a result, when determining the nature of the evidence, it is necessary to 
ascertain the source of the information and the uses to which the relevant document 
is put. It is worth recalling the nature of the promise made to a receiving party when a 
sending party affixes a digital signature to a document or message:
Bob receives a message digitally signed by Alice with Alice’s digital signature 
certificate attached. Alice’s public key is incorporated into the certificate.  
The certificate purports to bind Alice’s name with her public key, and in turn 
the certificate purports to assure Bob that the message was signed using a key 
verifiable by a key certified in a certificate issued to Alice.
7.284 The nature of this promise is well illustrated by the following comment from the 
Select Committee on Trade and Industry, Seventh Report, House of Commons Session 
1998– 99, paragraph 12:
Written signatures are tightly associated with people and weakly associated with 
documents, whilst digital signatures are tightly bound to documents and weakly 
bound to individuals (or identities).
7.285 The crucial point to remember is that a digital signature does not, of itself, 
provide evidence that the sending party actually caused the private key of the digital 
signature to be affixed to the message or document. This proposition is relevant in 
respect of any form of electronic signature. Where a certification authority is involved 
within the framework of a public key infrastructure, all the certification authority can 
do is give evidence about how the certificate was formed, where the information was 
obtained, and if they verified the information, what methods were used to verify the 
information. Thus a certification authority can give evidence as to the formation of the 
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‘Non- repudiation’
7.286 By way of an introduction, the term ‘non- repudiation’ has become part of the 
vocabulary of digital signatures. This is a dangerous expression, and one that lawyers 
should take particular care in understanding. It does not mean the system for non- 
repudiation is perfect, although some technical authors (and lawyers and academics1) 
continue to assert that digital signatures are better than they actually are. By way of 
example, Klaus Schmeh incorrectly states that:
The purpose of a digital signature is to ensure non- repudiation. This means that 
Alice cannot contest her completed signature in retrospect. When all is said and 
done, a digital signature is an excellent way of meeting this requirement.2
1 ‘Data encryption’ (The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, no. 270, October 2006), 
incorrectly states at 2 that digital signatures ‘can also be used for non- repudiation: if a party digitally 
signs an electronic document, they cannot later deny this’; Rouhshi Low and Ernest Foo, ‘The 
susceptibility of digital signatures to fraud in the National Electronic Conveyancing System: an analysis’ 
(2009) 17 Australian Property Law Journal 303 incorrectly comments, at 307, that ‘When the recipient 
receives the coded summary and the certificate, the recipient can use the CA’s public key to verify the 
CA’s signature on the certificate. If that is successful, the recipient can have confidence that the sender’s 
public key is what it purports to be, that is, the sender’s public key actually did come from the sender’; 
Raymond Wacks, Privacy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2010) incorrectly states 
at 25– 26 that ‘The advantage of a public key system is that if you are able to decrypt the message, you 
know that it could only have been created by the sender’; Michael Bromby, ‘Identification, trust and 
privacy: how biometrics can aid certification of digital signatures’ (2010) 24 International Review of 
Law, Computers & Technology 133 incorrectly states at 135: ‘Parties involved in such an electronic 
communication cannot deny their involvement subsequently’; Arne Tauber, Peter Kustor and Bernhard 
Karning, ‘Cross- border certified electronic mailing: a European perspective’ (2013) 29 Computer Law 
& Security Review 28, in which the authors fail to indicate the issues relating to ‘non- repudiation’.
2 Schmeh, Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure, 16.1.1.
7.287 Francisco Jordan- Fernádez and Jordi Buch i Tarrats assert:
The most important benefit electronic signatures brings to e- commerce and all 
electronic transactional systems is that they cannot be repudiated. This service 
provides evidentiary value that proves that the data has been created by a 
specific entity and has not been altered since the date of its creation, thereby 
guaranteeing its irrefutability.1
1 ‘Electronic signature today: a manufacturer’s viewpoint’ (2004) 5 Upgrade 23, 24. See also an 
early paper by Roger Clarke, ‘Conventional public key infrastructure: an artefact ill- fitted to the needs 
of the information society’, prepared for submission to the ‘IS in the Information Society’ track of the 
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 2001), Bled, Slovenia, 27– 29 June 2001, http:// 
www.rogerclarke.com/ II/ PKIMisFit.html.
7.288 Professor Sorge states:
The private key, which is to be kept secret, is used by the signatory to sign 
messages; signatures can be verified with the corresponding public key. 
Successful verification of a digital signature guarantees integrity and authenticity 
of the corresponding message. Non- repudiation is also achieved, i.e. it can be 
proven that the message was signed by the signatory.1
1 Christoph Sorge, ‘The legal classification of identity- based signatures’ (2014) 30 Computer Law & 












7.289 None of these statements is correct.
7.290 When engineers use the term non- repudiation in an engineering sense, they 
mean that there is a degree of probability or certainty that the protocol can demonstrate 
that one item of software communicated with another item of software, or to put it 
another way, ‘Nonrepudiation provides proof of the integrity and origin of data that 
can be verified by a third party’.1 Many technicians assert that non- repudiation is 
a fact: that is, once the software proves that a message or document was sent and 
received, it follows that a human being caused the message to be sent. Such an assertion 
is not logical and is misleading. This reasoning is often extended from the engineering 
domain into the legal domain, by asserting that if the system can demonstrate that one 
item of software communicated with another item of software, that is, that digital data 
comprising a message or document was sent or received, it is for the purported sender 
to demonstrate that they caused it to be sent – or to prove they did not cause it to be 
sent. The purpose of the concept is to bind users to specific actions in such a way that 
if they deny taking the action, they either demonstrate an intention to deceive, or they 
have been negligent in failing to secure the use of their private key adequately. The use 
of the term is inherently misleading. The logic is as follows:
It is proven that certain items of software communicated, each with the other. (A 
message was sent from Alice’s computer to Bob’s computer, and Alice’s private 
key was affixed to the communication.)
It follows that the purported sender caused the software to communicate. (Ergo, 
Alice affixed the private key to the message.)
1 United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Government 
Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government 
Reform, House of Representatives, ‘Information security: advances and remaining challenges to 
adoption of public key infrastructure technology’, GAO- 01- 277, 2001, 18.
7.291 The purpose of the term non- repudiation is to provide for causation, which 
it cannot. It is generally assumed that non- repudiation has a legal effect: that is, a 
person cannot deny causing the software to send a message or document. However, a 
signature can be challenged for a number of reasons. The most pertinent is where the 
purported sender claims that they did not cause the electronic signature to be affixed 
to the message or document, as in the case of Dara O’Reilly, whose digital signature 
was used on two occasions in India in a complex property transaction. He denied using 
the digital signature.1 In effect, there is a claim that the signature is a forgery. In such 
circumstances, the fact that a message or document was sent might not be at issue. The 
dispute often turns on whether the sender caused the signature to be affixed to the 
message or document.2 In such instances, it is for the party relying on the signature to 
prove the message or document was sent, and that the purported sender caused their 
electronic signature to be affixed.
1 Dearbhail McDonald, ‘Sean Quinn aide at centre of mystery over $90m asset’, Irish Independent, 
23 August 2012, http:// www.independent.ie/ business/ irish/ sean- quinn- aide- at- centre- of- mystery- 
over- 90m- asset- 26889961.html.
2 For the cases where private keys were used without the authority or authorization of the 
person to whom the private key was linked, see the banking cases from the Russian Federation: Olga 
I. Kudryavtseva, ‘Russia’, in Stephen Mason (ed), International Electronic Evidence (British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law 2008); Olga I. Kudryavtseva, ‘The use of electronic digital 
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Signature Law Review 51; Resolution of the Federal Arbitration Court of Moscow Region of 5 November 
2003 N КГ- А 40/ 8531- 03- П(2008) 5 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 149; Alex 
Dolzhich, ‘Digital evidence and e- signature in the Russian Federation: a change in trend’ (2009) 6 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 181.
7.292 Other examples where the signature may be in dispute are where the sender 
accepts the message or document was sent with an electronic signature, but the 
signature was obtained as a result of unconscionable conduct by a party to a transaction, 
fraud instigated by a third party or undue influence exerted by a third party, among 
other reasons recognized in law. It will be for the adjudicator to determine whether a 
particular argument is credible. That the sender caused the signature to be affixed to a 
message or document may not be in issue.
7.293 It is important to ensure that the technical meaning of non- repudiation does not 
override the need to restrain the meaning within a legal context. Where engineers use 
the term, it should not be understood that they are using it in a legal context, despite 
a general misunderstanding in the view of some engineers that the term should have 
a legal meaning. Even where the evidence demonstrates that a message or document 
was sent or received with an electronic signature affixed, it does not follow that the 
message was sent by the person whose username or password (or both username and 
password) was used at the material time, nor that it was signed by them. Carl Ellison 
of Intel Laboratories in his paper ‘Improvements on conventional PKI wisdom’ has 
dismissed these arguments by technicians about non- repudiation.1 The comments in 
paragraph 3.4.3 entitled ‘Not Achievable’ demonstrate the vacuity of the link between 
evidence that software has communicated with software, and the assertion that such 
evidence is therefore proof that a particular person caused a machine to undertake a 
particular action:
The main problem with the theory of non- repudiation is that it is not technically 
achievable. That is, the intention is to bind a human being to a digitally signed 
document. With a holographic signature on a paper document, the human’s hand 
came in contact with the paper of the document. With a digital signature there 
is machinery between the human and the signed document: at least a keyboard, 
software (to display the document and to drive the signature process) and a key 
storage and use facility (e.g., a smart card).
No one has demonstrated, in the normal computer for home or office use, the 
prevention of introduction of hostile software. To the contrary, we have seen a 
steady increase in such incursions over the years.
There are secure facilities for key storage and use, but no mechanism that an 
average home or small business user would choose to buy has been proved 
secure.
Meanwhile, computers are not restricted to isolated rooms with card access 
entry, raised floors, guards outside the glass walls, etc., that they might have 
been in the 1970s when much of this thinking about public key cryptography 
had its nascence. Computers are not only everywhere; they are unprotected to 
a continually increasing degree. Therefore, even if the computer has no hostile 
software and its private key is kept in a truly secure facility, access to the 
keyboard of that computer is not limited to the person certified to be associated 
with that private key.
What might make this process of non- repudiation work would be hardware that 




the actions of a human being (e.g., through videotape), of what that human was 
reading and of the human’s positive action to assent to the displayed document. 
Such a log of human behavior could then be presented in court to prove the claim 
of non- repudiation.
Of course, if such hardware were available, then we would not need digital 
signatures, much less the assumption of non- repudiation on digital signatures.
1 First Annual PKI Research Workshop – April 2002, https:// users.ece.cmu.edu/ ~adrian/ 731- 
sp04/ readings/ ellison- PKI- wisdom.pdf.
7.294 This point is also considered in a slightly different way by Niels Ferguson, Bruce 
Schneier and Tadayoshi Kohno:
In theory, a PKI should provide you with nonrepudiation. Once Alice has signed 
a message with her key, she should not be able to later deny that she signed the 
message. A key server system can never provide this; the central server has access 
to the same key that Alice uses and can therefore forge an arbitrary message to 
make it look as if Alice sent it. In real life, nonrepudiation doesn’t work because 
people cannot store their secret keys sufficiently well. If Alice wants to deny 
that she signed a message, she is simply going to claim that a virus infected her 
machine and stole her private key. 1
1 Ferguson and others, Cryptography Engineering, 19.9, bullet point 3.
7.295 In 2000, Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier wrote on the same topic:
Alice’s digital signature does not prove that Alice signed the message, only that 
her private key did. When writing about non- repudiation, cryptographic theorists 
often ignore a messy detail that lies between Alice and her key: her computer. If 
her computer were appropriately infected, the malicious code could use her key 
to sign documents without her knowledge or permission. Even if she needed to 
give explicit approval for each signature (for example, via a fingerprint scanner), 
the malicious code could wait until she approved a signature and sign its own 
message instead of hers. If the private key is not in tamper- resistant hardware, 
the malicious code can steal the key as soon as it’s used.
While it’s legitimate to ignore such details in cryptographic research literature, 
it is just plain wrong to assume that real computer systems implement the 
theoretical ideal. Our computers may contain viruses. They may be accessible to 
passers- by who could plant malicious code or manually sign messages with our 
keys. Should we then need to deny some signature, we would have the burden of 
proving the negative – that we didn’t make the signature in question against the 
presumption that we did. 1
1 Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier, ‘Risks of PKI: e- commerce’ (2000) 43 Communications of the 
ACM 152.
7.296 Where the party whose private key is used denies they caused the private key 
to be affixed to the data, it is for the party relying on the signature to prove the signing 
party caused the private key to sign the data. The burden of proof will depend on the 
pleadings and what presumptions, if any, apply.
7.297 The term ‘cryptographic non- repudiation’ means being able to prove that 
where a digital signature verifies a public key, then the associated private key made 






384 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
private key to make the signature.1 However, non- repudiation is of no benefit without 
a secure time- stamping service to demonstrate that a particular event occurred at a 
given time and date, or that a specific item of data existed before a specific date. This 
technical meaning of the term has begun to be used in a legal sense by vendors of the 
public key infrastructure, which in turn has tended to confuse legislators.2
1 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, 32– 33, 51– 53; Dr Catharina Candolin, a Policy 
advisor at NATO HQ (Emerging Security Challenges Division/ Cyber Defence), demonstrated confusion 
in her PhD dissertation, ‘Securing military decision making in a network- centric environment’ (TKK 
Dissertations 20 Helsinki University of Technology, 20 December 2005), where, at 59 and 104, it is 
stated that the sender cannot deny having sent the packet, and at 77, the technical meaning of non- 
repudiation is correctly indicated: ‘that is, a malicious node cannot deny having created the IP packets.’
2 Bruce Schneier, Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World (Wiley 2000), 235, and Adrian 
McCullagh and William Caelli, ‘Non- repudiation in the digital environment’, https:// firstmonday.org/ 
ojs/ index.php/ fm/ article/ view/ 778/ 687.
Certifying certificates
7.298 Regardless of the technical meaning of the term ‘non- repudiation’, there are a 
number of problems that affect the reliability of systems that are used to affix digital 
signatures to an electronic communication:
(1) A confusing design on the screen, which can lead a user to activate the signing 
function without knowing the significance others attach to the signature.
(2) The software application may be set up to send a receipt, but this does not 
necessarily indicate to the recipient that the sender sent the receipt. This also 
raises the question as to whether the receipt is authentic.
(3) A design flaw in the public key infrastructure.
(4) The open nature of the Internet, which means hackers could insert malicious 
software into computers that can be designed to steal private keys or replay the 
keystrokes of the user, thereby obtaining the passwords used to obtain access to 
a private key.
7.299 The general rule with respect to signed documents is this: a person is normally 
bound by their signature to a document, even if they fail to read and understand the 
content. Where a party relies on a signed document and wishes to enforce it against 
the signing party, the relying party must prove the signature is that of the signing party, 
or that the signing party authorized the document. This is so where the signing party 
claims they did not sign the document, or if they did sign the document, that they did 
so under duress or because of the fraud of a third party. It is not for the signing party 
to prove that they did not authorize the document or sign it.
7.300 A person has a defence where they have been misled into signing a document 
that is essentially different to that which they intended to sign, a state of affairs that 
has usually, but not always, been induced by a fraud perpetrated upon the party signing 
the document.1 However, this does not mean that a person should fail to exercise care 
when they affix their signature to a document in the absence of a fundamental mistake 
as to the content of the document. This occurred in Saunders v Anglia Building Society,2 
where Mrs Gallie signed what she understood was a deed of gift of her house to her 
nephew, but it was, in fact, a deed of assignment to a third party. Mrs Gallie raised 
the defence that she thought the effect of the document was to give her house to her 









of the House of Lords agreed that the identity of the person to whom the house 
was assigned did not make the deed totally different in character to the document 
Mrs Gallie intended to sign, and her defence failed. Lord Hodson offered the following 
observations at 1019(E) respecting the use of a signature:
Want of care on the part of the person who signs a document which he afterwards 
seeks to disown is relevant. The burden of proving non est factum is on the party 
disowning his signature; this includes proof that he or she took care. There is no 
burden on the opposite party to prove want of care. The word ‘negligence’ in this 
connection does not involve the proposition that want of care is irrelevant unless 
there can be found a specific duty to the opposite party to take care.
1 In United Dominions Trust Ltd v Western [1976] QB 513, [1976] 2 WLR 64, [1975] 3 All ER 1017, 
[1975] 10 WLUK 88, (1975) 119 SJ 792, Times, 28 October 1975, [1976] CLY 339 a party signed a blank 
hire- purchase proposal form, and the dealer inserted incorrect figures before sending it to the finance 
company.
2 [1971] AC 1004, [1970] 3 WLR 1078, [1970] 3 All ER 961, [1970] 11 WLUK 45, (1971) 22 P & CR 
300, (1970) 114 SJ 885, Times, 10 November 1970, [1971] CLY 1805.
7.301 In his judgment, Viscount Dilhorne agreed with the comments made by Lord 
Hodson, and commented, at 1023(E):
In every case the person who signs the document must exercise reasonable 
care, and what amounts to reasonable care will depend on the circumstances 
of the case and the nature of the document which it is thought is being signed. 
It is reasonable to expect that more care should be exercised if the document is 
thought to be of an important character than if it is not.
The burden of proof
7.302 A person has total control over the use of their manuscript signature, and the 
legal rules that apply to manuscript signatures reflect this physical reality. However, 
once the accepted form of the signature changes, it may be considered appropriate, 
depending on the nature of the transaction, for the legal rules that apply to the new 
form of signature to reflect the different range of risks associated with the new 
manifestation of signature. Consider the example of Charles Goodman, the solicitor 
who used a rubber stamp to sign a letter that accompanied his bill of costs.1 Although 
the control of the rubber stamp was not the subject of judicial comment, Evershed MR 
noted at 554, that Mr Goodman ‘kept the stamp locked up in his own room so as to 
be available only for his own use’. Although neither Mr Goodman’s actions nor the 
comment by Evershed MR make an explicit point about taking reasonable care of the 
rubber stamp, nevertheless the implication that the rubber stamp should be kept safe 
is obvious. It is clear that Mr Goodman took reasonable care to ensure only he had 
access to the rubber stamp, and the observation by Evershed MR implied that this made 
the use of the rubber stamp acceptable as a method of authenticating documents. If 
Evershed MR had considered the matter further, he might have reached the conclusion 
that there is a reasonable expectation in circumstances where a person decides to use 
a rubber stamp as a form of signature that they can be expected, as a rule of law, to 
provide for the security of the use of the signature, and to take appropriate steps to 
guard against its use by unauthorized persons.
1 Goodman v J Eban Limited [1954] 1 QB 550, [1954] 2 WLR 581, [1954] 1 All ER 763, [1954] 3 
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7.303 Williams J discussed this point in the case of Robb v The Pennsylvania Co. for 
Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities,1 discussed below. The matter of the security 
of a rubber stamp was also mentioned briefly in British Estate Investment Society 
Ltd v Jackson (H M Inspector of Taxes),2 where an Additional Commissioner regularly 
used a rubber stamp to sign significant volumes of documents. In his judgment, 
Danckwerts J mentioned the measures taken in the office to provide for the prevention 
of unauthorized use of the rubber stamp.3 Once again, there is no explicit mention of 
the need for a signing party to provide for the security of the rubber stamp and to 
protect it against misuse. However, the action of the signing party in providing for 
the security of the rubber stamp suggests that, even without a rule of law requiring 
them to take steps to secure the rubber stamp, they took such precautions because 
the nature of the instrument thus created permits others to use a recognized means of 
identifying and authenticating a document:
(1) The evidence from Charles Goodman in Goodman v J Eban Limited and of the 
Additional Commissioner in British Estate Investment Society Ltd v Jackson (H M 
Inspector of Taxes) demonstrates that when the signing party acquired a rubber 
stamp as a means of affixing their signature to a document, they took appropriate 
precautions to safeguard it from misuse and theft.
(2) The comments by Evershed MR4 and Danckwerts J5 imply that the authorized 
use of the rubber stamp rested on the care the signing party took of the item, and 
because the security of the rubber stamp was assured, the signature affixed to 
the document by the rubber stamp was authentic and therefore valid.
(3) In the event the recipient doubts the authenticity of the signature, they can 
undertake their own form of due diligence to verify its authenticity and validity. 
This point was made by Romer LJ at 564 in Goodman v J Eban Limited, where he 
pointed out that ‘If in fact his clients entertained any doubt as to the authenticity 
of the letter, nothing could be easier than to ask him, by telephone or letter, to 
confirm it’. While the point made by Romer LJ is an explicit instruction as to what 
action the recipient could take, the comment was not necessarily meant to form 
a legal rule.
1 40 W.N.C. 129, 3 Pa.Super. 254, 1897 WL 3989 (Pa.Super. 1897), affirmed by186 Pa. 456, 40 A. 969, 
for dissenting opinion, see 186 Pa. 456, 41 A. 49.
2 (1954– 1958) 37 Tax Cas 79, [1956] TR 397, 35 ATC 413, 50 R & IT 33.
3 (1954– 1958) 37 Tax Cas 79 at 87.
4 Goodman v J Eban Limited [1954] 1 QB 550 at 554.
5 British Estate Investment Society Ltd v Jackson (H M Inspector of Taxes) (1954– 1958) 37 Tax Cas 79 
at 87.
7.304 Although none of the comments made by the judges in these two cases are 
sufficient to form a rule of law in relation to such matters, nevertheless they recognized 
that where technology is used to provide a substitute for so physical an act as the 
affixing of a manuscript signature to a document, new considerations relating to the 
presumptions that should apply to alternative methods of applying a signature must 
be considered.
7.305 In light of the decision of Waller J in Standard Bank London Ltd v Bank of 
Tokyo Ltd,1 it appears that this train of thought may have already been adopted in 
England and Wales. In this case, the Bank of Tokyo in Kuala Lumpur arranged for 
three tested telexes to be sent to Standard, containing a secret code confirming and 












of US$19.8 million, and confirming that the Bank of Tokyo accepted all responsibilities 
and liabilities under those letters of credit. Evidence was adduced to indicate that 
banks not only used this system with confidence, but also used it to avoid arguments 
about authority. In this instance, the tested telexes were sent fraudulently.
1 [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 169, [1995] 3 WLUK 182, [1995] CLC 496, [1998] Mason’s CLR Rep 126, 
Times, 15 April 1995, [1995] CLY 397.
7.306 The main thrust of the Bank of Tokyo’s case was this: because they could 
establish that a thief must have been working in their tested telex department, 
Standard could only rely upon the apparent authority of the tested telexes. As a result, 
it argued that there was a lower test to establish the lack of apparent authority. Waller J 
disagreed with this argument at 502C, because the issue was not reliance on apparent 
authority:
Standard rely first on a general representation by BOT that if a telex comes by 
tested telex that telex will be duly authorised by BOT (that representation on any 
view is authorised);
second they rely on the use of the tested telex mechanism itself as representing 
that the telex is authorised as the previous representation stated that it would 
be; and
thirdly they rely on the statement in the telex as being the authorised statement 
of BOT.
7.307 The Bank of Tokyo was found liable for negligent misrepresentation because 
the tested telexes could not have been sent without negligence on the bank’s part. 
Whether Standard had a duty to inquire into the authenticity of the tested telexes 
depended on the circumstances of each case.1 Tested telexes contain codes or tests 
which are secret between the sender and the recipient. This allows the recipient to 
accept without question that the telex was sent by and with the authority of the sender. 
The tested telexes in this instance were sent through other banks, because the Bank 
of Tokyo in Kuala Lumpur did not have a means of directly authenticating telexes 
between itself and Standard. By sending tested telexes, banks intend the receiving 
bank to act on the content without further instructions. This means the receiving bank 
requires the sending bank to confirm the person signing the document is an authorized 
signatory, verify the signatory is authorized to sign the particular document, and 
provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the recipient that the sending bank authorized 
the sending of the telex.
1 [1995] CLC 496 at 501H.
7.308 Superficially, there is a similarity between the circumstances of this case and 
the public key infrastructure, where the authentication process has to go through 
so many channels.1 However, there is a distinction between a tested telex produced 
in a bank and the public key infrastructure. The authority of a telex is reliant upon 
internal systems within the bank.2 No third party is involved in identifying the sender 
of the telex or authenticating the codes or text sent. In addition, the tested telex is sent 
through other banks over apparently secure lines of communication. Conversely, the 
public key infrastructure operates over the Internet, which was designed to be open 
and is, therefore, insecure. The link between the identity and authentication of a user 
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banks. There are significantly more links, which neither party has control over, in the 
chain between the sending party and receiving party of an electronic signature. As a 
result, it can be argued that there is a distinction between what can be termed a ‘secure 
or closed communication system’ and an ‘open communications system’. Clearly the 
burden of proving that an electronic signature was used without authority must be 
borne by either the user or the relying party. In this instance, Waller J took the view 
that the sender was in full control of the environment in which the tested telex was 
sent, and decided that the burden should fall on the sender.
1 See also Jean- François Blanchette, Burdens of Proof: Cryptographic Culture and Evidence Law in 
the Age of Electronic Documents (MIT Press 2012) – ‘This book is not about the burden of proof or the 
law relating to electronic evidence. The reader must look to legal text books on electronic evidence to 
understand burdens of proof and the law relating to electronic evidence. However, it is a useful text in 
discussing the technical issues and policy decisions behind the use of technology that has an effect on 
electronic evidence.’ Book Report, (2012) 9 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 181; 
for a similar broad introduction by the same author, see ‘The digital signature dilemma’, Annales des 
Télécommunications (May/ June 2006), 908.
2 A message using an authentication code sent through the SWIFT system has the legal effect 
of binding the sender bank according to its contents: Industrial & Commercial Bank Ltd v Banco 
Ambrosiano Veneto SpA [2003] 1 SLR 221.
7.309 In the context of an open insecure network, however, different criteria, based 
upon the protection of the consumer, might be applied by the courts.
The recipient’s procedural and due diligence burden
7.310 Whether it is for the user of an electronic signature to bear such a burden is 
debatable. If it is accepted that the recipient is required to establish whether they can 
rely on the certificate in all the circumstances, they may be required to provide any or 
all of the evidence discussed above in relation to verifying the integrity of a certificate, 
depending on the nature of the challenge. Providing the recipient has carried out all 
the relevant checks required, it is possible to argue that it has discharged what can be 
described as a procedural and due diligence burden and has become a verifying party.
The sending party: the burden of proof of security and integrity
7.311 Once the recipient, if required so to do, has satisfied a judge that it has 
discharged the procedural and due diligence burden, the user will need to address the 
issue of the security and integrity of their computer or system, among other topics of 
relevance in the circumstances. This can be described as the burden of proof of security 
and integrity, which comprises both a persuasive burden (or burden of proof on the 
pleadings) and the evidential burden of adducing evidence. In discussing this aspect, it 
is useful to compare identical problems that have exercised the minds of people in the 
past, and what mechanisms were put in place to provide for the integrity of the method 
of proving intent.
7.312 The use of a seal became so common by the fourteenth century in England 
that consideration had to be given to provide for additional evidence, other than the 
impression of a seal affixed to the document, that the seal impression was not a forgery 
or added without authority. The sovereign might have a number of seals for different 







and the Chancellor; the great seal, controlled by the Chancellor to authenticate the most 
formal of acts; and a finger ring, later called a privy signet, for the personal affairs of the 
monarch.1 Care was taken to destroy seal matrices in a public ceremony, as occurred 
when Edward III ascended the throne and had the great seal used by his father and 
grandfather broken into tiny pieces in his presence.2 However, the physical object of 
the impression of a seal can be undermined, just as any other form of authentication. 
For instance, the seal itself might be forged,3 or the seal of a dead person used, as in 
the case of Hannibal when he forged letters in the name of the dead Roman consul 
Marcellus after removing the signet ring from his body.4 In England, it was an offence 
to forge the royal seal. By the Statute of Edward III, counterfeiting the great and privy 
seals were treasonable offences, and one man who forged the seal of Henry II was 
only saved from being hanged by the king’s mercy.5 At common law it was a felony and 
regarded as a capital offence, and there are three medieval cases of this nature.
1 Patricia M. Barnes and L. C. Hector, Guide to Seals in the Public Record Office (2nd edn, HMSO 1968), 
8; P. Chaplais, English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages (Hambledon and London 2003), 97– 98.
2 P. D. A. Harvey and Andrew McGuinness, A Guide to British Medieval Seals (University of Toronto 
Press 1996), 34.
3 T. F. Tout, ‘Mediæval forgers and forgeries’ (1919) Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 208 
describes how a medieval forger might be clever enough to cut the wax or lead of a seal into two thin 
slices, introduce a new attachment of parchment, silk or leather, and affix it to a new document, then 
heat the sides to fasten the seal together for a second time.
4 Chaplais, English Diplomatic Practice, 6.
5 Harvey and McGuinness, A Guide to British Medieval Seals, 33, 98– 99.
7.313 A person could challenge a document where the incorrect seal had been used, 
or the right seal was attached to the wrong document. As seals became more common, 
the other issue was the degree of forgery for ordinary seals.1 There is evidence 
illustrating that people took their seal very seriously. In 1190, for instance, Adam, son 
of Peter de Birkin, broke his seal and replaced it. He went to the length of repeating a 
grant he had previously made to the abbey of Rievaulx.2 There then developed a means 
of countersigning the main seal with the use of a secret seal as a counter- seal to one 
of the great seals. The great seal would be in the possession and under the control of 
the officer of state, and the secret seal in the possession of the owner, thus providing 
a double- check to the authenticity of the document, because the second seal may 
be imprinted on to the great seal, providing two seal impressions on the same seal. 
The concerns for the security of the seal were sometimes carried to what seems like 
extraordinary lengths, but were probably routine. In 1214 the chapter seal of Salisbury 
cathedral was in the care of two cannons, but by 1353 it was kept in a chest with three 
locks, and was only used in the presence of all three cannons, each of whom held a key. 
By the Statute of Acton Burnell in 1283, debts could be registered before the mayor, 
who issued a recognisance with a special seal supplied by the crown. However, in 1285 
the Statute of Merchants amended the previous statute and ordered that the seal must 
be contained in two parts, the larger to be retained by the mayor and the smaller to be 
retained by the clerk – indicating, in the opinion of one scholar, that there had probably 
been a scandal.3 In the late thirteenth century, the seal of the corporation of Winchester 
was placed in a box with three locks and the keys retained by two counsellors and one 
ordinary person, and this box in turn was itself kept in a chest with two keys, held by 
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1 For an example of a Chinese seal in the context of documentary letters of credit, see Deutsche Bank 
AG, London Branch v CIMB Bank Berhad [2017] EWHC 3380 (Comm), [2018] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 510, [2017] 
12 WLUK 407, [2019] CLY 631.
2 Barnes and Hector, Guide to Seals in the Public Record Office, 29– 30.
3 T. F. T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I (Clarendon 1949), 140, quoted in Harvey and McGuinness, 
A Guide to British medieval Seals, 111.
4 Harvey and McGuinness, A Guide to British Medieval Seals, 58– 62, 98– 99.
7.314 Conceptually, there is little difference between the seal matrix and a rubber 
stamp, and the nature of the security in place to prevent unauthorized use is identical. 
In this respect, the 1897 Pennsylvania case of Robb v The Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance 
on Lives and Granting Annuities1 is highly instructive. This case predates the use of 
electronic signatures in any form by 100 years, yet the difference in time does not 
diminish the issues, even if they were articulated with different concepts and language 
by the judges at the time. In this case, money had been paid out on two cheques signed 
with the facsimile signature of the bank depositor by means of a rubber stamp. Mr Robb 
did not authorize either cheque.
1 40 W.N.C. 129, 3 Pa.Super. 254, 1897 WL 3989 (Pa.Super. 1897), affirmed by 186 Pa. 456, 40 A. 
969; for a dissenting opinion, see 186 Pa. 456, 41 A. 49.
7.315 In 1893 Mr Robb, as the president of a commercial corporation, had occasion 
to send out a large number of invitations to a banquet. To save himself the trouble of 
signing each invitation, he had a rubber stamp made with a facsimile of his signature. 
After retiring, he rented a private office, and with the rent came the services of an 
office boy. He employed the boy on various errands, including sending him to the bank 
to draw money on cheques. It can be inferred from the report that he used the rubber 
stamp to sign cheques. He kept the rubber stamp in a compartment inside a fireproof 
safe. He locked the compartment and put the key to the compartment in a drawer in 
the safe, behind some papers, and covered it up. He then locked the drawer, and placed 
the key into an unlocked drawer in the safe. He then locked the safe, and put the key 
in a little box, which he put in a wooden drawer or box, and this was kept on top of 
another safe. The plaintiff surmised that the office boy had watched his moves at some 
time in the past. The majority of the judges found that Mr Robb was not negligent in 
the use of the rubber stamp. The basis of their decision centred on whether he was 
negligent in failing to exercise care in preventing the rubber stamp from falling into 
the wrong hands. Rice PJ rejected the proposition that Mr Robb was bound to keep 
the stamp in a place that prevented any person from obtaining it without authority. 
However, no attempt was made by the majority judges to explain how the bank was 
in a position to challenge the signature, given that the signature was identical each 
time the rubber stamp was used, with the exception that the impression will vary in 
quality depending on the amount of ink used and the pressure applied to the stamp as 
the signature is affixed to the cheque. The majority held that the bank was liable for 
the cheques. Williams J wrote an elegant dissenting judgment that raises the modern 
issues, using different language, but germane nevertheless, with which Sterrett CJ 
concurred. Williams J argued that it was for the bank, relying on the signature, to prove 
it was genuine. The image of the signature was genuine, but Mr Robb had neither 
applied it nor authorized the signature to be applied to the cheque. In this respect, it 
was a forgery, and in the words of Wills J in The Staple of England v The Governor and 








A forgery can give no title, and those that rely upon it must be able to shew some 
extraneous ground – such as that of estoppel – why they should be entitled to act 
upon it.1
1 (1887) 21 QBD 160 at 166.
7.316 In The Staple of England, the bank was held liable for failing to make proper 
enquiries as to title where the company gave the safekeeping of the Company seal to 
their clerk (a solicitor), and the clerk, without authority, affixed the seal to a power of 
attorney that enabled him to sell funds of the Company for his own benefit. The seal 
and the rubber stamp have the same problem: the need to prevent unauthorized use. 
Although the use of rubber stamps was not new at the time of this case, nevertheless 
Mr Robb failed to notify the bank that he was using a mechanical reproduction of his 
manuscript signature. Arguably, if the bank had been made aware of this practice, as 
suggested by Williams J, it might have refused to honour such cheques, or if it accepted 
them, the bank might have taken additional care to ensure with each cheque that he 
had affixed the signature with the intention of signing it.
7.317 There is a difference of degree between securing a physical object such as a 
rubber stamp and a digital signature, but in the event of a dispute, it follows that it is 
the holder of the certificate and private key who is in the best position to prove that 
the security in place was adequate, such that the certificate and private key could not 
be used improperly.
7.318 If the user wishes to argue their security was so poor that an unauthorized third 
party could have gained access to the system to send an electronic communication 
with an electronic signature attached without authority, the user will undoubtedly be 
admitting breach of contract with the vendor from whom they obtained the certifying 
certificate. They are also probably admitting they were negligent. This is the central 
conundrum any user of a digital signature faces.
7.319 The flexible nature of the need to implement suitable precautions relating to 
securing a seal was recognized by Wills J, and in a prescient comment in The Staple of 
England, he indicated at 168 that:
The precautions which appear to be natural in one century may appear pedantic 
and unnecessary in another … there can be no inflexible and unvarying rule of 
law as to that which is essentially a mixed question of fact and law.
Burden of proof – the jitsuin
7.320 Since the eighth century, a similar system of authentication to that of the 
electronic signature has existed in the physical world, by which a signing party deposits 
an imprint of their mark with a trusted third party, and relying parties can rest assured 
that when the mark is used, they can rely on the authentication of the person by 
the mark. This is the jitsuin (original seal) of Japan. Other seals include the ginko- in 
(bank seal) for banking purposes, and mitome- in (approval seal) for use in everyday 
circumstances, such as signing for a delivery of post. The seal is called an insho, and 
the word inkan describes the impression of the seal. The purpose of a name seal is to 
confirm a person’s intention to enter a transaction and to act as a form of identification. 
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they are permitted in some situations to use a manuscript signature instead of a name 
seal, are advised to obtain such a seal if they are going to remain in the country for any 
length of time.1
1 For a further explanation, see G. P. McAlinn (ed), Japanese Business Law (Wolters Kluwer 2007), 
202– 204.
7.321 Jitsuin are used instead of manuscript signatures to execute important 
documents. For instance, the Jitsuin Seal Registration Certificate is required as an 
attachment to the document of application for the transfer of registration in the real 
property registry at the Legal Affairs Bureau. The importance attached to the Jitsuin 
Seal Registration Certificate under Japanese Law is such that the transfer of the 
registration is essential for the perfection of the transfer of title of a real property. The 
jitsuin is endowed with a legal presumption that is founded partly on the common 
understanding that a name seal either cannot be forged, or is difficult to forge, and 
partly on a very long history of use.
Registering a jitsuin
7.322 Jitsuin are required to conform to specific criteria:
(1) The name on the seal must conform to the registered name; the seal must 
have a border surrounding the name (and the border must not be missing or 
chipped); machine- made, mass- produced seals are not acceptable; the seal must 
be made of a material that cannot be altered easily, and the diameter must be 
greater than 8 mm square but smaller than 25 mm square.
(2) Only the owner of a seal or a representative can apply to register a jitsuin, and 
the applicant has to be over the age of 15 years.
(3) A jitsuin must be registered at the offices of the local government, whether 
village, town or city.
7.323 Upon application for a registered seal (jitsuin) and Seal Registration Certificate 
(inkan toroku shomeisho), some local offices will send the applicant a letter of verification 
for the purpose of confirming the identity of the person applying. Alternatively, the 
usual range of documents will be required to be produced when the applicant attends 
the office. The registration takes place when the applicant attends the office with their 
seal, during which their identity is checked. Where a representative registers the seal, 
they will be required to provide a Letter of Attorney or a Letter of Advice Giving Right 
of Representation, which must be signed and sealed by the owner of the seal. After 
registering the seal, the applicant is given a Seal Registration Card (inkan torokusho, a 
plastic card) rather than a Seal Registration Certificate.
The Seal Registration Certificate
7.324 The Seal Registration Certificate includes the following information: an 
impression of the registered seal; the name of the seal holder; the date of birth of the 
seal holder; the gender of the seal holder; the address of the seal holder. The registration 
of the jitsuin is tied to a particular geographical locality, so if the seal holder moves to 
another part of Japan or leaves Japan for good, the seal registration becomes null and 
void, and a new registration process must be undertaken at the new location. Where 






Certificate and initiate the procedure to delete the registration. There is no procedure 
to notify relying parties that the jitsuin has been stolen or lost.
The legal presumption of the Seal Registration Certificate
7.325 A Seal Registration Certificate proves the seal holder has adopted the 
impression of the seal that is recorded in the Certificate. The Civil Procedure Law 
provides for a legal presumption relating to the authenticity of a private document, 
as follows: ‘A private document shall be presumed to be authentically executed if it 
bears the signature or seal of the principal or his representative.’1 It appears that 
this presumption is rebuttable and the following discussion is restricted to private 
documents, and does not include government documents.2 For this presumption to 
operate, the party bearing the burden of proof is required to prove that the registered 
owner of the seal intended to affix an impression of their seal on the document. This 
intention may itself be presumed if the relying party proves that the seal impressed on 
the document and the impression of the adopted seal held by the owner is the same. 
However, the relying party must also prove that the signing party has in fact adopted 
the seal. This fact is proved by using the Seal Registration Certificate, because the Seal 
Registration Certificate bears the adopted seal and the name of the signing party, thus 
it is easy for the relying party to prove that the signing party adopted the seal.3 Once 
it is established that the signing party intended to affix an impression of their seal by 
operation of this presumption, the presumption under the Civil Procedure Law takes 
effect, and the document in question is presumed to be authentically executed.
1 Civil Procedure Law (Law No 109 of 1998) article 228(4).
2 Civil Procedure Law (Law No 109 of 1998) article 228, 228(2) and 228(3).
3 This chain of presumption is reinforced by the provisions of Civil Procedure Law (Law No 109 of 
1998) article 229, which states: ‘The authenticity of execution of documents may also be proved by a 
comparison of a specimen of handwriting or seal impression’.
7.326 This explanation demonstrates that there are two levels of presumption, a 
process known as the ‘Two Phase Presumption’. It involves the following steps.
If the impression of the seal and the adopted seal held by the signing party are 
the same, then it is presumed that:
The signing party intended to affix the seal impression, which in turn creates the 
presumption that:
The document bearing the seal impression was authentically executed.
7.327 It is to be noted that there is no statutory requirement of due diligence in order 
to utilize this presumption.
Rebutting the presumption
7.328 The owner of the seal can rebut these presumptions. However, it is difficult 
to effectively prove that the document was not authentically executed, which is 
tantamount to trying to prove a negative. Recently, this presumption has been found to 
pose problems in an age when it is very easy to forge name seals with the availability 
of advanced technology. This problem reached national importance following a series 
of thefts from deposit accounts held in banks using forged or stolen seals. The problem 
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Door- picking artist quietly breaks and enters victim’s house and nicks bank 
account passbook. The passbook, especially old ones, usually carries the seal 
image on the first page. The joker scans this image and prints it on the withdrawal 
slip with color printer. The bank teller accepts this slip and passbook as authentic, 
and victim’s account will be emptied. Sometimes, the scanned digital image goes 
to hanko carving machine, too.
The real cause of trouble: It’s the stamped image of one’s hanko that is stored in 
the databases of government offices, banks and other public institutions. Not the 
particulars of physical hanko itself! And any image can be flawlessly reproduced 
in this era of digital processing. QED.1
1 Obtaining information about this problem in the English language is difficult; but see Mayumi 
Negishi, ‘Security concerns jeopardize future of age- old tradition of “hanko” seals’, The Japan Times, 
undated, https:// www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/ 2004/ 01/ 14/ business/ security- concerns- jeopardize- 
future- of- age- old- tradition- of- hanko- seals/ #.XrFKZhOYWSy. The most recent news item is Terrie 
Lloyd, ‘Huge local fraud case, ebiz in Japan’, 20 April 2010, Japan.Inc, https:// www.japaninc.com/ 
tt562_ huge- local- fraud- case.
7.329 The jitsuin and the Seal Registration Certificate have been a very effective 
method of providing for the authenticity and intention of a person when entering into 
a legally binding agreement as a trusted third party undertakes to certify the nexus 
between the applicant and the jitsuin. The presumption worked well in a society where 
the accurate copying of name seals was difficult for the would- be thief.1 However, with 
the advent of modern means of duplication, a tension has arisen between the assurance 
that an individual can prove their identity and thereby authenticate a document with 
the use of a Seal Registration Certificate in combination with a jitsuin, and the failure 
to require the relying party to take steps to authenticate the identity of the person 
who claims the name seal is their adopted jitsuin. The Seal Registration Certificate 
proves the seal holder has adopted the impression of the seal that is recorded in the 
Certificate. In modern Japan, the failure to balance the presumption that accompanies 
the use of a jitsuin with an accompanying duty to take steps to require the person using 
the name seal to provide the certificate of authenticity has meant ordinary consumers 
suffer the loss. This is an example where advances in technology have caused problems 
in a system of authentication that has worked well over an extended period of time in 
Japanese history. While a change to the law will not follow immediately, when a change 
does occur, a cultural shift will also have to take place, in which the relying party will 
have to take reasonable steps to verify the signing party.
1 Noriko Kawawa, ‘The Japanese law on unauthorized on- line credit card and banking transactions: 
are current legal principles with respect to unauthorized transactions adequate to protect consumers 
against information technology crimes in contemporary society?’ (2013) 10 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 71, for a general overview of the position in Japan.
Burden of proof – summary
7.330 In the context of electronic signatures, and digital signatures in particular, there 
is a clear lesson to be understood. In the physical world where the signature- creation 
device is difficult to replicate accurately, a tri- part method of providing assurance can 
be very effective. The owner of the Japanese seal provides evidence of their identity to 
satisfy a nominated authority sufficiently for the authority to create a certificate to link 







party can rest assured that the person with the seal, if authenticated with a certificate, 
is who they say they are. The flaw in this model, in an age when a name seal is easy to 
duplicate, is that it fails to impose a duty on the relying party to undertake sufficient 
due diligence to satisfy themselves that the holder of the seal is the person whose 
name seal is registered.
7.331 The use of a rubber stamp as a form of signature has similar properties to the 
name seal, but without the properties of the jitsuin. In the cases of Goodman v J Eban 
Limited1 and British Estate Investment Society Ltd v Jackson (H M Inspector of Taxes),2 the 
respective recipients of the stamped documents did not question the authenticity of the 
stamped signature but sought to challenge the form of the signature. The underlying 
assumptions about the security of a rubber stamp were not fully articulated; that is, 
the owner of such a stamp is expected to keep it secure and prevent any unauthorized 
use. If the recipient was in any doubt as to the authenticity of the document signed with 
a rubber stamp, they could always take steps to verify the integrity of the document. 
While observations about security were made by the judges in passing and did not 
lay down a rule of law, nevertheless they represent underlying assumptions about the 
risks to be attached to the use of a means of providing authentication to a document 
which may not always be under the control of the owner, at least in cases where the 
means in question are adopted for the convenience and advantage of the user rather 
than the recipient.
1 [1954] 1 QB 550, [1954] 2 WLR 581, [1954] 1 All ER 763, [1954] 3 WLUK 22, (1954) 98 SJ 214, 
[1954] CLY 3173.
2 (1954– 1958) 37 Tax Cas 79, [1956] TR 397, 35 ATC 413, 50 R & IT 33.
7.332 The risks for the participants when using electronic signatures is, to a certain 
extent, similar to that of the jitsuin and rubber stamp, depending on the type of 
electronic signature used. In the context of the digital signature, the trusted third party 
allocates the risks and responsibilities. In general, a subscribing party or receiving 
party that relies on such technology is either fully aware of the limitations associated 
with the use of a digital signature, or they have no concept of the issues, and they use 
a digital signature in ignorance of the risks they may face if their reliance were to be 
tested. Statute provides that where a trusted third party with a contractual relationship 
with its customer (a bank) debits the account of a customer with the payment of a 
cheque the customer did not sign, the bank has no authority to take the money and 
therefore must credit the account with the amount charged.1 The allocation of risk 
with the jitsuin is under threat because of the ease by which a name seal can now be 
forged.
1 Bills of Exchange Act 1882 s 24; Directive 2007/ 64/ EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/ 
7/ EC, 2002/ 65/ EC, 2005/ 60/ EC and 2006/ 48/ EC and repealing Directive 97/ 5/ EC (Text with EEA 
relevance) OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, 1– 36, implemented by The Payment Services Regulations 2009 (SI 
209/ 2009) as amended by The Payment Services (Amendment) Regulations 2009 (SI 2475/ 2009).
7.333 It was judges during the nineteenth century who created the protection for 
those customers who affixed their manuscript signature to a cheque and politicians 
codified this rule.1 While it will be important to take into account the suggestion made 
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with a rubber stamp can take action to authenticate the document, the action and 
effort required to check that the writer of a letter intended to affix their signature by 
means of a rubber stamp is far less than the magnitude of the task facing a recipient 
of, in particular, a digital signature. The terms and content of the certification practice 
policies of the certification authorities demonstrate the complexity of the task faced by 
a recipient if they are expected to verify a digital signature.
1 Nicholas Bohm, Ian Brown and Brian Gladman, ‘Electronic commerce: who carries the risk of 
fraud?’ (2000) 3 Journal of Information, Law and Technology, paragraph 2, https:// warwick.ac.uk/ fac/ 
soc/ law/ elj/ jilt/ 2000_ 3/ bohm.





Alisdair Gillespie, Jessica Shurson and Stephen Mason
8.1 Any discussion about electronic evidence in the digital era must now include 
reference to encryption. This is an increasingly important issue for law enforcement 
authorities where criminals use strong encryption to thwart the legitimate investigation 
of officers.1 It is important to note at the outset that encryption itself is neutral. It is 
used for legitimate as well as prohibited reasons. Indeed, e- commerce as we know 
it could not exist without encryption, since it is encryption that makes purchasing 
on the Internet or a mobile device safe, without fear that our payment details can 
be intercepted during transmission. However, in this chapter we will be primarily 
concerned with those who use encryption to hide material.
1 Although it is difficult to identify how widespread the use is. Within England and Wales, it seems 
relatively uncommon, with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner reporting only 66 approvals for 
a notice under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, s 49 being granted in 2018: 
Annual Report of the Investigatory Powers Act 2018 HC 67 (2000), 81.
Encryption
8.2 Encryption is a form of cryptography. It is about disguising the contents of a 
message or file. Encryption (or enciphering) is the process by which a plaintext (or 
cleartext) message is disguised sufficiently to hide the substance of the content. As 
well as ordinary text, a plaintext message can be a stream of binary digits, a text file, 
a bitmap, a recording of sound in digital form, audio images of a video or film, or any 
other information. When a message has been encrypted, it is known as ciphertext. 
The opposite procedure – that of turning the ciphertext back into plaintext – is called 
decryption (or deciphering). An encryption scheme usually uses a ‘key’ to encrypt 
and decrypt the message. Data that is encrypted properly can be virtually impossible 
to decrypt. It is an art that has been practised for thousands of years,1 but digital 
technology has revolutionized it. By way of example, consider the message ‘The Eagle 
is Alive’. The difficulty with transmitting a message in plaintext is that anybody who 
sees the message knows its content. They may not, of course, know its meaning, but 
often the actual content of the message is problematic (for instance if the message 
is a photograph, then you may not want people to see the image). Encryption turns 
the message into a code that hides the meaning. So, for example, the message ‘The 
Eagle is Alive’ may be shown as ‘WEK85%LSc43*4lzqnc782’. If someone obtains that 
message, she will have no idea what this means. Indeed, she will not even know how 
many characters are in the original message. As digital media, including pictures and 
sound files, are simply binary data, it means that anything can be encrypted, with the 
encrypted binary file appearing to have completely random data. A more detailed 
technical description of encryption is provided in Chapter 1.
1 A useful history can be found in Donald Davies ‘A brief history of cryptography’ (1997) 2(2) 
Information Security Technical Report 14.
Alisdair Gillespie, Jessica Shurson and Stephen Mason, ‘Encrypted data’, in Stephen Mason and Daniel 
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Methods to obtain encrypted data
8.3 As noted, to decrypt encrypted text and render it into plaintext requires a key. In 
complex environments this could be an algorithm, complex data, a dongle (a physical 
device with a computer chip contained within it) or even biometric measurements,1 
but in most instances it is a code or password. All forms of keys are recognized in the 
statute that regulates the exercise of investigatory powers to acquire the means by 
which encrypted electronic data may be decrypted or opened.2 For the purposes of this 
chapter, we will be restricting our analysis to passwords, because they are the most 
common key used in personal encryption.
1 Biometric measurements may be secure in many instances, but they are spectacularly unhelpful 
when information is being hidden from law enforcement authorities, because the police will have 
the power to take photographs and potentially pictures of one’s iris, for example. For the position in 
Norway, see Ingvild Bruce, ‘Forced biometric authentication – on a recent amendment in the Norwegian 
Code of Criminal Procedure’ (2017) 14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 26.
2 RIPA 2000, s 56(1).
Breaking the encryption without obtaining the key
8.4 It is not always necessary to use the key to convert the encrypted material into 
plaintext. Some examples include:
(1) Exploit a known flaw in the encryption scheme.1 This is also known as a 
‘vulnerability attack’, where the implementation of the encryption or password 
protection used is flawed and susceptible to programmatic compromise.2
(2) Obtain access to the plaintext when in use. Some law enforcement authorities 
have been known to gain rapid entry into a suspect’s house when they know that 
the device is being used, because the contents of the device will be in an unlocked 
state as plaintext. Providing the device is not allowed to go into sleep mode or 
lock, then the contents can be freely viewed and copied.
(3) Use covertly installed keylogging software to record the suspect entering the 
password into the computer.3
(4) Locate a separate plaintext version of the encrypted data.4
1 Derek Kortepeter, ‘Modern cryptographic methods: their flaws, their subsequent solutions, and 
their outside threats’ TechGenix, 27 June 2016, http:// techgenix.com/ modern- cryptography- methods/ ; 
Casey Chin, ‘13- year- old encryption bugs still haunt apps and IoT’ Wired, 8 July 2019, https:// www.
wired.com/ story/ rsa- encryption- signature- validation- flaws/ .
2 In R v Kelly (Lee Paul) [2013] EWCA Crim 1893, [2018] 7 WLUK 478, the Court of Appeal upheld 
the decision of a judge to withhold the technique used to circumvent encryption on a mobile telephone. 
While the court noted that there must always be a fair trial, it also stated that ‘there is an important 
public interest in not disclosing information which would jeopardize the effective prevention and 
detection of crime’, at [33].
3 U.S. v Scarfo 180 F.Supp.2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001). While this may not tell you who depressed the keys 
(thus proving who had control), it would provide access to the encrypted material, which, by itself, is 
likely to assist the wider investigation. See also Giuseppe Vaciago and David Silva Ramalho, ‘Online 
searches and online surveillance: the use of Trojans and other types of malware as means of obtaining 
evidence in criminal proceedings’ (2016) 13 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 88.
4 Officials were able to examine draft copies of a ransom note automatically saved by word 
processing software on the suspect’s computer in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Copenhefer, 526 Pa. 
555, 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1991), abrogated on sentence by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Rizzuto, 777 
















8.5 Most encryption programs are extensively tested, which means that 
vulnerabilities are rare. Installing keylogging software is difficult in the era of multiple 
devices, high- quality firewalls and anti- virus software; the installation of such software 
by authorities may itself also be illegal. The era of solid- state memory and cloud storage 
means that encryption can be near- instantaneous. While entering a house requires 
a legal warrant, it is also high- risk because if a drive is removed, or a connection to 
the cloud is broken, the plaintext contents can be programmed to be immediately 
encrypted. Thus, in many instances there is insufficient time to gain entry before the 
suspect can do any of these things.
Obtaining the key
8.6 A more productive way of breaking the encryption is to identify the key. Let us 
assume that the police wish to obtain the key from a person they suspect of committing 
a crime, whose documents are protected by encryption. The police could obtain it in 
the following ways:
(1) The suspect could voluntarily provide the password.
(2) The password might be written down. People frequently write down 
passwords (so they do not forget), which is remarkably helpful for those trying 
to find them.
(3) It is possible to use intelligence, including profiling, to guess what the 
password is, operating on the basis that the password may be something 
memorable about that person, such as a name or date of birth.1
(4) The use of decryption tools to break the encryption, including brute- force 
attacks. Software will allow, for example, every word in the dictionary to be tried 
as the password. A ‘brute- force attack’ will use powerful computers to try every 
possible combination of a key.2 The difficulty with this method is that complex 
keys and long keys are almost impossible to break in this way.
(5) The suspect may be compelled to surrender the key.
1 For instance, United States border agents successfully guessed that Michelle Lopez used her date 
of birth as a password: in United States v Lopez, 2016 WL 7370030 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2016). In Rollo 
(William) v HM Advocate 1997 JC 23, 1997 SLT 958, 1996 SCCR 874, [1996] 9 WLUK 194, [1997] CLY 
5753, the police succeeded in gaining access to an encrypted part of a Memomaster notebook by trying 
a number of combinations, one of which – the appellant’s date of birth – was successful. See Ian Grigg 
and Peter Gutmann, ‘The curse of cryptography numerology’ (2011) 9(3) IEEE Security & Privacy 70 
for a brief foray into the failure of everything but the cryptography.
2 In R v ADJ [2005] VSCA 102 the defendant claimed that he could not recall the password, and 
suggested possible alternatives, none of which were correct, so the police used password- cracking 
software that took over four months to identify the password. The encrypted partition revealed a large 
quantity of abusive images of children.
8.7 The fifth option – compulsion – has two possible alternatives. The first is 
torture, which is illegal in most countries, or the second is through a legal requirement 
to comply. Usually, this is backed by penal sanction. It is this latter method which has 
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Compelling disclosure in England and Wales
8.8 England and Wales became one of the first jurisdictions to (controversially) 
introduce specific powers to allow the police to compel the disclosure of a password. 
The powers are set out in Part III of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(RIPA). Alongside RIPA, a Code of Practice is issued under the authority of the Act.1 The 
latest version was published in 2018.2 The Code expands on the rules and procedures 
set out in RIPA 2000, providing greater certainty to investigators, judges and suspects 
in understanding how the disclosure powers under the Act will be exercised.
1 RIPA 2000, s 71(4). The Codes of Practice are released as statutory instruments and, therefore, 
have the force of secondary legislation.
2 Investigation of Protected Electronic Information: Revised Code of Practice (Home Office 2018).
Protected information
8.9 At the heart of the RIPA provisions is the concept of ‘protected information’. 
This is defined in s 56(1) as:
any electronic data which, without the key to the data– 
(a) cannot, or cannot readily be accessed; or
(b) cannot, or cannot readily be put into an intelligible form.
8.10 Encrypted data would be the most obvious example of ‘protected information’, 
although the provisions in RIPA are wider than this.1 There are three powers contained 
in RIPA 2000 that relate to protected information:
1. The power to require disclosure of protected information in an intelligible 
form.2
2. The power to require disclosure of the means to either obtain access to 
protected information, or render the protected information into plaintext.3
3. The power to attach a secrecy provision to any disclosure requirement (a 
‘tipping off’ provision).4
1 In R v Spencer (Jeffrey) [2019] EWCA Crim 2240, [2019] 12 WLUK 246, the appellant had been 
convicted under RIPA s 53 for not providing the PIN to unlock two mobile telephones in his possession. 
A disclosure notice under s 49 had been presented to the appellant, who declined to provide the codes.
2 RIPA 2000, s 49.
3 RIPA 2000, s 49 when read in conjunction with s 50(3).
4 RIPA 2000, s 54.
8.11 These powers are considered below. While the first two will lead to the 
disclosure of information in an intelligible form, the first differs in that it does not 
technically require the surrendering of the key. It suffices that the person produces 
the data in an intelligible form. Thus, for example, if there were other documents that 
were encrypted that were not relevant to the crime, the police would not see them. 
However, in many instances it is unlikely that the police would be content with an 
assurance that other documents are not relevant and, instead, they will require the 
key to be disclosed, which will either provide access or allow the encrypted material 
to be rendered intelligible. In essence, the difference is who does the decryption. In the 
first scenario it is the suspect, whereas in the second scenario it will be the relevant 

















8.12 Where a suspect does not voluntarily provide her key, or where the police are 
unable to identify the key using the techniques discussed above, they may seek to serve 
a notice requiring disclosure of either the information sought or the key. The police can 
only do so with the permission of the National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC).1 
NTAC is a government unit that became part of GCHQ (Government Communications 
Headquarters) in 2006, and has specialist officers dedicated to decrypting ciphertext, 
including through brute- force attacks and other technical solutions. NTAC will 
determine whether the encryption is known to NTAC and can be circumvented without 
the need to invoke RIPA 2000. Where they cannot, NTAC will determine whether the 
case is appropriate for application for a notice under s 49.
1 Investigation of Protected Electronic Information: Revised Code of Practice, [3.9].
8.13 The power to require disclosure applies where protected electronic information 
comes into the possession of an officer1 as a result of exercising a statutory power2 or 
by other lawful means.3 In order to serve such a notice, s 49(2) provides that a person 
who has been authorized to give permission must have reasonable grounds to believe:
(1) the suspect has the protected information in his possession;
(2) the imposition is necessary for a specified purpose;
(3) the imposition is proportionate; and
(4) it is not reasonably practicable to obtain the information in any other way.
1 A police officer, an officer of Customs and Excise or a member of the intelligence services.
2 For example, the police have the right to search any premises occupied or controlled by a person 
who has been arrested for an indictable offence (Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, s 18).
3 For example, a constable has exercised a search warrant: PACE 1984, s 8.
8.14 The person who is authorized to give permission is a circuit judge or a 
district judge (Magistrates’ Court).1 Judicial permission recognizes the sensitivities 
of compelling the disclosure of protected information and provides reassurance that 
there is independent scrutiny on the grounds set out above. However, it should be 
remembered that the judge need only have reasonable grounds to believe the criteria 
is met, and this is a relatively low threshold.2 The purposes mentioned above include 
the interests of national security, the purpose of preventing or detecting crime and 
the interests of the economic well- being of the United Kingdom.3 It is notable that 
it is crime, and not serious crime, which is a threshold required for some types of 
investigatory powers.4
1 RIPA 2000, Schedule 2, paragraph 1(1).
2 It is less than the civil and criminal standards of proof. It requires that there is some evidential 
basis to believe that something might be true, as distinct from more likely than not to be true (civil 
standard) or sure to be true (criminal standard).
3 RIPA 2000, s 49(3).
4 Intrusive surveillance (surveillance that takes place in residential premises or a private vehicle) 
will only be authorized if, among other things, it is for the prevention or detection of serious crime – see 
RIPA 2000, s 32(3)(b).
8.15 Proportionality is a concept that is now well understood by the courts. 
Proportionality is best thought of as requiring ‘reasonableness between the objective 
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ensuring that a measure is not disproportionate to the aim. It requires an examination 
of alternatives, but does not necessarily require that the least intrusive method always 
be chosen.2 The Code of Practice suggests several aspects of proportionality that the 
judge should consider:
• The extent of the proposed interference with privacy against what is sought 
to be achieved;
• How and why the methods to be adopted will cause the least possible 
interference to the subject and others;
• Whether the activity is an appropriate use of the legislation and is a 
reasonable way, having considered all reasonable alternatives, of obtaining 
the necessary result;
• What other methods, as appropriate, were either not implemented or have 
been employed but which were assessed as insufficient to fulfil operational 
objectives without the use of the proposed conduct.3
1 Halsbury’s Laws (5th edn, 2018), vol 61A, para 17.
2 R (on the application of Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 
60, [2009] 1 AC 756, [2008] 3 WLR 568, [2008] 4 All ER 927, [2008] 7 WLUK 921, [2008] Lloyd’s Rep 
FC 537, [2009] Crim LR 46, (2008) 158 NLJ 1149, (2008) 152(32) SJLB 29, Times, 31 July 2008, [2008] 
CLY 1661.
3 Investigation of Protected Electronic Information: Revised Code of Practice, [3.41], bullet points in 
the original.
8.16 The last bullet point realistically does not add much more than the final 
requirement contained in the Act – that it is not reasonably practicable to obtain the 
information by other means. It is somewhat strange that it is included on the face 
of the legislation given that the consideration of alternatives is an important part 
of proportionality. However, its inclusion perhaps reflects the view that Parliament 
expects the alternatives to be seriously considered, with a s 49 notice being issued only 
where there is no real alternative.
Possession of a key
8.17 A person having possession of information or a key to protected information, is 
defined in s 56(2), RIPA 2000, as follows:
References in this Part to a person’s having information (including a key to 
protected information) in his possession include references– 
(a) to its being in the possession of a person who is under his control so far as 
that information is concerned;
(b) to his having an immediate right of access to it, or an immediate right to have 
it transmitted or otherwise supplied to him; and
(c) to its being, or being contained in, anything which he or a person under his 
control is entitled, in exercise of any statutory power and without otherwise 
taking possession of it, to detain, inspect or search.
8.18 Three different scenarios exist under this definition:
(i) a person may possess a key if it is under his control, or
(ii) if he has an immediate right of access to it, or an immediate right to have it 








(iii) if he (or a person under his control) is entitled, in exercise of any statutory 
power and without taking possession of it, to detain, inspect or search the thing 
which contains the key.
8.19 In the second and third scenarios, a person may be deemed to have a key, 
although he does not have the key himself. This is a fairly important provision, because 
the managerial officers of an organization, whatever the legal form the organization 
takes, are the ones responsible for the proper management of the private key, rather 
than the operational staff members.1 Where the relevant ciphertext is to be found 
on a company’s device, it would therefore make sense to serve the s 49 notice on an 
officer or senior manager of the organization, because she will have the power to order 
compliance by another.
1 Ross Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems (2nd 
edn, John Wiley & Sons 2008) para 3.7.4 for a discussion on the principles involved in this process. 
(Professor Anderson was updating his book as this text was being updated. Some of his book will be 
available as open source at https:// www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ ~rja14/ book.html for a short period before the 
text is published. The entire book will be made available again as open source in 2023.)
Form of the notice
8.20 The form a disclosure notice is set out in s 49(4), RIPA 2000. It must, among 
other things, describe the protected information to which the notice relates;1 specify 
the grounds upon which the disclosure is believed to be necessary;2 specify the time 
by which the notice is to be complied with,3 which must allow a reasonable period for 
compliance, depending on the circumstances of the case;4 and specify the disclosure 
required and the form and manner in which it is to be made.5 Where there is a cost 
to complying with a s 49 notice, s 52 provides for the Secretary of State to make an 
appropriate contribution towards such costs, although it is the investigating authority 
that ultimately bears the burden of paying these.6
1 RIPA 2000, s 49(4)(b).
2 RIPA 2000, s 49(4)(c).
3 RIPA 2000, s 49(4)(f).
4 RIPA 2000, s 49(4) proviso.
5 RIPA 2000, s 49(4)(g).
6 Investigation of Protected Electronic Information: Revised Code of Practice, 4.4.
Disclosure of protected information and keys
8.21 Where a person is served with a s 49 notice requiring the disclosure of 
protected information in an intelligible form, she may ether provide the key or use 
it to render the encrypted material into an intelligible form,1 unless the notice states 
that she must surrender the key. The Code of Practice specifically notes that rendering 
into an intelligible form means returning the data to the state that it was in before 
encryption was applied, even if this means that there is other protection that might 
prevent someone from reading it immediately.2 Consider an example:
S has a Word Document that is protected by a password. To further enhance 
security, S uses encryption technology on the document. The police secure 
permission from a judge to serve a s 49 notice. S can either remove the 
encryption, or supply the key to do so. However, the s 49 notice may not require 
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1 RIPA 2000, s 50(1).
2 Investigation of Protected Electronic Information: Revised Code of Practice, [3.16].
3 Other legal powers may do so, but in any event, computer forensic programs may be able to read 
the data in such a file once it has ceased to be encrypted. This will depend on the version of the Word 
Document (which use different types of password protections) and the complexity of the password 
used.
8.22 There may be times when the person to whom the notice is directed does not 
have the key, or cannot gain access to the key. In such instances, she must give up what 
keys she actually has, although she does not have to disclose every key she has in her 
possession.1 It follows that where a notice is to be served on a body corporate or a 
firm and it is obvious that more than one person may be in possession of the key, the 
notice should be directed to a senior officer, partner or senior employee.2 However, 
where it is considered that the circumstances are such that the purpose of the notice 
would be defeated if it were to be served on the most appropriate person (for instance, 
she may be the subject of an investigation), then the notice may be served on another 
individual.3
1 RIPA 2000, s 50(3) and the effects of s 50(4), (5) and (6). See also s 50(7) and (8).
2 RIPA 2000, s 49(5) and (6).
3 RIPA 2000, s 49(7).
8.23 An exception is created as regards the disclosure of keys that are used for 
generating electronic signatures. Section 56(1) RIPA 2000 defines an ‘electronic 
signature’ as:
anything in electronic form which
(a) is incorporated into or logically associated with, any electronic communication 
or other data;
(b) is generated by the signatory or other source of the communication or 
data; and
(c) is used for the purpose of facilitating, by means of a link between the 
signatory or other source and the communication or data, the establishment of 
the authenticity of the communication or data, the establishment of its integrity, 
or both.
8.24 Where a key is used only for this purpose, it does not have to be disclosed in 
response to a notice, provided it has in fact not been used for any other purpose.1 It 
might be useful to recall that a key pair has more than the single function of producing 
an electronic signature. The same key pair can be used to encrypt a message, depending 
on the algorithm used.
1 RIPA 2000, s 49(9).
8.25 However, this exemption may be narrower than it seems. In a commercial 
context, where more than one person may properly have access to a key, the person 
served with the notice may not be able to be sure that a key, despite being intended 
for signature purposes, has never been used to decrypt a message encrypted with the 
corresponding public key (there is no disclosure obligation if the key ‘has not in fact 
been used for any … purpose [other than that of generating electronic signatures]’).1 














purpose (that does not involve generating electronic signatures and is therefore 
subject to seizure), the mere assertion of this fact by the person demanding access to 
the key would place the recipient of the notice in a difficult position to prove a negative 
in resisting the demand.
1 RIPA 2000, s 49(9)(b).
Failure to comply with a notice
8.26 Where a person knowingly fails to make the disclosure required by the notice, 
he commits a criminal offence.1 Section 53(2) sets out an important presumption of 
possession of the key:
In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section, if it is shown 
that that person was in possession of a key to any protected information at any 
time before the time of the giving of the section 49 notice, that person shall be 
taken for the purposes of those proceedings to have continued to be in possession 
of that key at all subsequent times, unless it is shown that the key was not in his 
possession after the giving of the notice and before the time by which he was 
required to disclose it.
1 RIPA 2000, s 53(1).
8.27 An evidential burden is placed on the recipient. This requires her to adduce 
‘sufficient evidence of the fact … to raise an issue’.1 This does not mean she needs to prove 
that it was not in her possession. Instead, she must adduce some evidence (including 
through cross- examination) to show that it is not just a hypothetical argument.2 Once 
such evidence is adduced, the prosecution must disprove the assertion beyond all 
reasonable doubt.3
1 RIPA 2000, s 53(3)(a).
2 Ultimately it is for a judge to decide, as a matter of law, whether sufficient evidence has been 
adduced: see, by implication, Bratty v Attorney- General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, [1961] 3 
WLR 965, [1961] 3 All ER 523, [1961] 10 WLUK 5, (1962) 46 Cr App R 1 (1961) 105 SJ 865, [1961] CLY 
1839.
3 RIPA 2000, s 53(3)(b).
8.28 A defence exists where a person can show that ‘it was not reasonably practicable 
for him to make the disclosure required by virtue of the giving of the section 49 notice 
before the time by which she was required, in accordance with that notice, to make it’ 
but only if ‘[he] did make the disclosure as soon after that time as it was reasonably 
practicable for him to do’.1 Unlike the presumption of possession of the key, this 
imposes a legal burden on the defence. Thus, the defendant must prove, on the balance 
of probabilities, that it was not reasonably practicable to disclose the key or data in the 
time frame required. It only applies if she subsequently makes disclosure and that this 
was when it was reasonably practicable to do. Accordingly, it would not assist those 
who continue to refuse to disclose the key.
1 RIPA 2000, s 53(4).
8.29 A person who honestly does not know the key, or cannot remember it, would 
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not remember the key, then she cannot surrender it. Whether it is credible that she 
has forgotten it is a matter of fact for the jury. In many instances, forensic data will be 
important here. While forensic software cannot say what is in an encrypted file, they 
can often tell when it was last viewed. If a person has been viewing the encrypted data 
just before the notice under s 49 is served, it is unlikely that a jury would consider it 
feasible that she has now forgotten the key.
Sentencing
8.30 The offence under s 53 is triable either in the Magistrates’ Court or the Crown 
Court. The penalty depends on what it is believed the encrypted data contains. Where it 
is a case of ‘national security’ or ‘child indecency’, the maximum penalty on conviction 
is five years’ imprisonment;1 otherwise it is two years’ imprisonment.2 A case is a 
‘national security case’ if the application made under s 49 stated that the case was ‘in 
the interests of national security’.3 Similarly, a case is a ‘child indecency case’ if it was 
stated in the s 49 application that the applicant believed the suspect was involved in 
the taking, making, distribution or possession of indecent photographs of a child.4
1 RIPA 2000, s 53(5), s 53(5A)(a).
2 RIPA 2000, s 53(5), s 53(5A)(b).
3 RIPA 2000, s 53(5B).
4 RIPA 2000, s 53(6), (7).
8.31 It should be remembered that the threshold for applications under s 49 is 
reasonable belief. Accordingly, a suspect is at risk of the higher sentence purely because 
a judge is satisfied that there is reasonable belief that the encrypted material poses a 
threat to national security or consists of indecent photographs of children. Reasonable 
belief is a low threshold and is significantly below the standard of proof ordinarily 
required for higher sentences. For example, where there is a dispute between the 
prosecution and defence over the circumstances of a guilty plea, the matter is normally 
resolved in a ‘Newton Hearing’,1 where the prosecution must prove its version of the 
facts to the ordinary criminal standard.2
1 R. v Newton (Robert John) [1982] 12 WLUK 57, (1983) 77 Cr App R 13, (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 388, 
[1983] Crim LR 198, [1983] CLY 815.
2 R. v Ahmed (Nabil) [1984] 12 WLUK 43, (1985) 80 Cr App R 295, (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 391, [1985] 
Crim LR 250, [1985] CLY 828.
8.32 At issue might be whether the lower threshold can be justified. At first sight 
it would seem difficult to do so. However, the point of s 53 is that the police cannot 
decrypt data without the cooperation of the defendant. If they could prove, to the 
criminal standard, that the encrypted folder contained, for example, indecent images of 
children, then they would not need to serve a s 49 notice in the first place. While it may 
be difficult to justify the full criminal standard, it might be possible for the prosecution 
to prove a lower standard, for example on the balance of probabilities, through, for 
example, circumstantial evidence (email messages, IP traces etc.) that indicates the 
contents of the encrypted material.1 Presumably, the higher penalty can only be used 
where it is not known what the contents are. Consider an example:
The police believe that S is storing indecent photographs of children on an 
















with. After proceedings under s 53 have begun, NTAC manages to gain access to 
the memory stick and discover that it does contain pornographic pictures, but 
of adults.
1 The facts of Greater Manchester Police v Andrews [2011] EWHC 1966 (Admin), [2011] 5 WLUK 614, 
[2012] ACD 18, which will be examined later, would be a good example of this. Indecent photographs of 
a child were found on an unencrypted laptop. Two encrypted memory sticks were discovered alongside 
the computer. It could be argued that it is more likely than not (civil burden) that these sticks contained 
more illegal images.
8.33 The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) may still wish to proceed with the 
prosecution under s 53 because the suspect has failed to comply with the s 49 notice. 
A literal reading of s 53 would mean that S is liable for up to five years’ imprisonment, 
because the grounds for seeking the notice will have included reasonable grounds for 
believing that S was hiding indecent photographs of children. As this is now known not 
to be true, S can only be sentenced to a maximum of two years’ imprisonment. For this 
reason, the courts adopt a strict approach to s 53 cases. In R. v Cutler (Barry George)1 
the Court of Appeal held:
[A s 53 offence is] a very serious offence because it interferes with the 
administration of justice and it prevents the prosecuting authorities and the 
police finding out what offences someone has committed.2
1 [2011] EWCA Crim 2781, [2011] 10 WLUK 732.
2 [2011] EWCA Crim 2781 at [35].
8.34 This is an important point. Encryption puts evidence beyond the reach of law 
enforcement authorities and prosecutors. It means the full extent of the criminality 
cannot be ascertained, and the courts must consider this seriously. If s 53 is proven, 
it is a deliberate attempt to try and conceal evidence from the competent authorities, 
and this must merit harsh sanctions.
8.35 The seriousness of the offence is perhaps reflected in the comments of the 
Court of Appeal in R v Padellec (Pierre).1 The appellant entered a plea of guilty to an 
offence under s 53. He came to the attention of the police as a possible acquaintance 
of a person known to be involved in the trafficking of children. His computer (which 
included an encrypted folder) was recovered, and while no indecent images of children 
were found, search terms relating to indecent photographs were found. The appellant 
alleged that he purchased the encrypted device in Belgium and had no knowledge of 
the key. Following negotiations, a basis for the plea was tendered and accepted by the 
Crown. This was as follows:
1. The defendant accepts that he did not provide passwords as requested.
2. He did not do so because he knew he had used wiping software to remove 
evidence of a small number of images, which he accepts were indecent.
3. The defendant had accessed these images during the currency of internet 
browsing. The defendant will assert that the content of these images did not 
depict images of very young children. He cannot state the ages. The images did 
not contain scenes of sexual or any other type of violence to children. 2
1 [2012] EWCA Crim 1956, [2012] 6 WLUK 651.
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8.36 The importance of the third basis of plea is that it states the defendant did 
not obtain access to the images of the very worst forms of indecent photographs of 
children, and which would lead to more severe sentencing.1 The judge accepted the 
plea, but suggested that he did so with reluctance. The Court of Appeal was scathing 
about the basis of plea. In giving judgment, Collins J said:
It seems to us that in a case such as this, it is entirely wrong for a basis of plea to 
be accepted, either by the prosecution or ultimately by the judge. What it does 
is to enable the defendant in question to identify, to his advantage, what was or 
was not on the computer and to get a lesser sentence than otherwise might be 
appropriate. That is to enable him to dictate, wrongly, what the situation is. The 
whole point of requiring access is so that it can be seen what was, in fact, there. 
We express hope that in a situation that arose in this case, there will never again 
be a basis of plea accepted which is based on keeping the contents secret and the 
defendant saying, to his advantage, what was or was not contained.2
1 At the time of this decision, the sentencing for possession of indecent photographs was subject 
to the definitive sentencing guideline of 2007. This created five categories of seriousness. The basis of 
plea would ensure that it did not fall within the highest category or contain any aggravating factors. 
The guideline was replaced in 2013, but the changes are irrelevant to this decision.
2 [2012] EWCA Crim 1956 at [11].
8.37 If the defendant had not viewed, or stored, images that constituted the most 
serious examples of indecent photographs of children, then he could have proved this 
by allowing access to the device. Instead, the prosecution (and the judge) decided 
that the defendant could admit that he had looked at illegal content but could also 
keep the details of this illegality secret. The Court of Appeal, quite rightly, considered 
this an affront to justice. They stated, correctly, that in the absence of an explanation, 
an assumption of the worst- case basis should be made and the person be sentenced 
accordingly. To avoid this, the defendant could simply provide access to the images to 
allow their proper classification. This does not breach the presumption of innocence 
as the offence itself relates solely to the provision of indecent photographs of children. 
The defendant conceded this. Sentencing is separate to ascertaining guilt, and it must 
be right that it is appropriate for the court to take into consideration the refusal to 
show the images to the court.
Obligations of secrecy and tipping off
8.38 There is a power to attach a secrecy provision to any disclosure requirement.1 
This will require the person to whom the notice is given, and every other person 
who becomes aware of its contents, to keep the giving of the notice, its contents and 
the things undertaken in responding to it, a secret.2 Breach of this requirement is 
punishable by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment,3 which is a heavier sentence 
than that which can be imposed on someone under s 53, save where it is a national 
security or child indecency case. Several defences exist to this offence, including:
(1) the disclosure was effected entirely by the operation of software designed to 
indicate when a key to protected information has ceased to be secure, and it was 
not reasonably practicable to prevent this;4
(2) that the disclosure was made by or to a professional legal adviser as part of 
giving legal advice as to the provisions of Part III of RIPA. The disclosure must 












(3) that the disclosure was made by a legal adviser in contemplation of any legal 
proceedings;6
(4) that the disclosure was made to a judicial commissioner, or someone 
authorized by a commissioner;7
(5) that the recipient neither knew, nor had reasonable grounds to suspect, that 
the notice contained a secrecy requirement.8
1 RIPA 2000, s 54.
2 RIPA 2000, s 54(1).
3 RIPA 2000, s 54(4).
4 RIPA 2000, s 54(5).
5 RIPA 2000, s 54(6).
6 RIPA 2000, s 54(7).
7 RIPA 2000, s 54(9).
8 RIPA 2000, s 54(10).
8.39 In all cases, a legal burden is placed on the defence: it must prove the salient 
facts on the balance of probabilities. Where the defence is that a disclosure has been 
made to, or by, a professional legal adviser, the defence does not apply where the 
purpose of the disclosure is to further any criminal purpose.1
1 RIPA 2000, s 54(8).
8.40 It should be noted, however, that the effectiveness of the ‘tipping off’ offence is 
debatable. It might be possible for a person to sign off her email correspondence with a 
disclaimer, such as ‘I will always explain why I revoke a key, unless the UK government 
prevents me using the RIP Act 2000’. Using this qualification, let us assume that a 
correspondent revokes a key. If the correspondent is asked for the reason and she 
replies that she cannot give one, it is doubtful if she can be convicted of the offence 
of tipping off, though this is exactly what she has done. There is no suggestion that a 
disclosed key cannot lawfully be revoked.
Circumventing the procedure
8.41 It has been held, albeit in a first- instance Magistrates’ Court decision, that 
RIPA 2000 is the only way that the authorities can compel access to encrypted data. 
Lauri Love is a UK citizen who was a member of the Anonymous hacker collective.1 He 
was accused of hacking into US government sites and stealing information.2 The US 
government requested his extradition and the National Crime Agency (NCA) arrested 
him, exercising a warrant to seize his computers. The computers were found to be 
encrypted, and a notice under RIPA 2000 s 49 was served, requiring him to disclose 
either the key or render the information intelligible. He declined to do so. The USA 
sought his extradition, but this was ultimately refused by the English courts, in part 
because of his mental health, but also because he could be tried for the offences in 
England and Wales.3 To date, no criminal proceedings have been brought against him.
1 An interesting discussion about Anonymous is to be found in Gabriella Coleman, Hacker, Hoaxer, 
Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous (Verso Books 2015).
2 Love v United States [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin), [2018] 1 WLR 2889, [2018] 2 All ER 911, [2018] 
2 WLUK 89, [2018] Lloyd’s Rep FC 217, [2018] ACD 33, [2018] CLY 988.
3 The Computer Misuse Act 1990 allows a person to be tried for hacking where the victim was 
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8.42 Love applied to the Magistrates’ Court to have his computer equipment 
returned.1 The court declined to order its return unless he provided a detailed list 
of the contents of the computer, something he has refused to do. The NCA made an 
application that Love be directed to provide the keys to the encryption.2 The district 
judge, however, held that this was not a proper use of the court’s jurisdiction. The judge 
held that RIPA 2000 provided the statutory procedure to secure access to encrypted 
data. The decision of the district judge was undoubtedly the correct one. In essence, the 
NCA was seeking to use civil proceedings to gain access to the key, rather than rely on 
RIPA 2000. Had the application succeeded, the NCA could have sought to use contempt 
of court proceedings to require compliance with the direction, which could ultimately 
have led to the imprisonment of Love. However, as the judge noted, the correct avenue 
to enforce s 49 is to bring a prosecution for non- compliance under s 53.
1 Police (Property) Act 1897, s 1.
2 The application being made in pursuance of the Magistrates’ Court Rules 1981/ 552, r 3A(2) and 
the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2016/ 120.
8.43 While Love defeated the application, a strange impasse now exists, because 
his application under the Police (Property) Act 1897 was also rejected. He refused to 
discuss what was encrypted, hence the district judge held that its continued seizure 
was required. The police have the right to retain seized material to prevent it from 
being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.1 Not unreasonably, it was thought 
there was reason to believe that Love may seek to destroy any incriminating evidence 
contained on the machine should it be returned to him.
1 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s 56.
8.44 The reluctance to prosecute Love is somewhat puzzling since, on the face of it, 
it appears that Love did breach s 49. For whatever reason, the NCA has chosen not to 
prosecute. As Love refuses to comply, the NCA are left with computers that they cannot 
obtain access to (although presumably NTAC is trying to override the encryption) and 
Love is allowed to ignore the requirement to surrender the encrypted information. This 
demonstrates that while it is often said that RIPA compels the disclosure of encryption 
keys, technically it does not. Ultimately, all the legislation can do is to ensure that those 
who refuse to disclose the key or render information intelligible can be punished. The 
encrypted material, however, remains beyond reach.
The privilege against self- incrimination
8.45 Compelling someone to provide a key has proven to be controversial. In most 
cases, the key is a password, and this password might have been thought of by the 
suspect, although random password generators are also used. It has been suggested that 
compelling the disclosure of the key infringes the common law privilege that someone 
cannot be compelled to incriminate herself. It is the fact that the password is the product 
of one’s mind, and can only be released through testimony, that raises this argument. 
A key could be something physical, including another piece of code, a biometric 
measurement or, for example, a dongle (a piece of technology usually including a chip). 
Requiring a person to hand over, for example, a dongle to unlock the encryption would 










password. The remainder of this chapter will explore how compelling the production of 
the key interferes with the privilege of self- incrimination in three jurisdictions: England 
and Wales, the USA2 and Belgium.3 The position in Canada is considered in brief.
1 It would be an object that was created independently and is not the testimony of an individual: 
see Saunders v United Kingdom [1996] 12 WLUK 363, [1997] BCC 872, [1998] 1 BCLC 362, (1997) 23 
EHRR 213, Times, 18 December 1996, Independent, 14 January 1997, [1997] CLY 2816.
2 For these purposes, federal law will be considered.
3 For France, see Décision n° 2018- 696 QPC du 30 mars 2018, Le Conseil constitutionnel 
(Constitutional Court). Translated by Pauline Martin (2018) 15 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 92.
England and Wales
8.46 While the privilege of self- incrimination has long been a creature of the 
common law,1 it is also considered to be a fundamental part of article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).2 The Human Rights Act 1998 requires public 
authorities, including the police and the judiciary, to act in a way compatible with the 
ECHR,3 and the courts must take account of the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights.4
1 An excellent history of the privilege is found in Andrew Choo, The Privilege against Self- 
Incrimination and Criminal Justice (Hart Publishing 2014).
2 Funke v France (A/ 256- A) [1993] 2 WLUK 374, [1993] 1 CML 897, (1993) 16 EHRR 297, [1994] 
CLY 2431; Saunders v United Kingdom [1996] 12 WLUK 363, [1997] BCC 872, [1998] 1 BCLC 362, 
(1997) 23 EHRR 213, Times, 18 December 1996, Independent, 14 January 1997, [1997] CLY 2816.
3 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(1).
4 Human Rights Act 1998, s 2(1); Rosemary Pattenden, ‘Privilege against self- incrimination’ (2009) 
13(1) E. & P. 69.
8.47 The first case to challenge the compatibility of Part III of RIPA was R v S (F) and 
A (S).1 A third party (H) was made the subject of a control order under the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005. S, A and H conspired to circumvent this control order by 
allowing H to move houses. This occurred, but shortly afterwards the police detected 
his presence. When the police arrived, H and S were in different rooms. S was alone 
in a room with a laptop. The password to an encrypted file was partly entered. S was 
arrested, and his premises searched, but nothing that contravened terrorism laws was 
found. However, the police could not examine the laptop due to the encryption. Later, 
A was arrested and a laptop was seized from him. Again, there was an encrypted folder 
on it, and the police were unable to gain access to the laptop.
1 [2008] EWCA Crim 2177, [2009] 1 WLR 1489, [2009] 1 All ER 716, [2008] 10 WLUK 197, [2009] 
1 Cr App R 18, [2009] Crim LR 191, (2008) 158 NLJ 1459, Times, 15 October 2008, [2008] CLY 711.
8.48 Neither A nor S made any comments during their interviews and did not 
voluntarily disclose the passwords that would unlock the encryption. Both were served 
with a notice under s 49 of RIPA 2000. Neither complied, and they were prosecuted 
under s 53. They both entered a plea of not guilty and sought a stay of prosecution, 
alleging that the notices themselves were incompatible with the privilege against self- 
incrimination and article 6 of the ECHR. The judge at first instance refused the stay, 
and A and S appealed to the Court of Appeal.
8.49 The members of the Court of Appeal noted that the submissions of all parties 
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laptops were examined without encryption.1 There was no evidence of this, but the 
appellants conceded that incriminating material may be discovered. The members 
of the Court of Appeal noted that under both domestic and European jurisprudence, 
the privilege against self- incrimination was not absolute, and that there were several 
statutory provisions that overrode it. Thus, the first question was whether the 
privilege applied in these circumstances. It was held by the judge at first instance that 
the key was something held independent of the will of the suspect. If that was true, 
then the privilege against self- incrimination would ordinarily not apply.2 The Court of 
Appeal held:
On analysis, the key which provides access to protected data, like the data 
itself, exists separately from each defendant’s ‘will’. Even if it is true that each 
created his own key, once created the key to the data remains independent of the 
defendant’s ‘will’ even when it is retained only in his memory, at any rate until it 
is changed.3
1 [2008] EWCA Crim 2177 at [14].
2 [2008] EWCA Crim 2177 at [18].
3 [2008] EWCA Crim 2177 at [20].
8.50 The logic behind this argument is that while the password may initially 
have been the product of the defendant’s mind, it has an independent status once 
used. If the password was guessed or identified, then the encryption would unlock 
irrespective of whether the defendant willed it or not. They also noted that the key 
is neutral. It is not by itself either exculpatory or incriminating – it is simply a piece 
of information. However, if the contents are incriminating, then knowledge of the key 
could in itself be incriminating. The court provided the example of an encrypted folder 
containing indecent photographs of children.1 The fact that a person knows the key 
– and this would be shown through complying with the s 49 notice – could be used 
by the prosecution to show that the offender was in possession of the photographs.2 
Of course, that depends on the facts. Where the substantive offence does not rely on 
control, then the possession of the key may not be incriminating.
1 [2008] EWCA Crim 2177 at [21].
2 Possession in the context of indecent photographs of children includes showing that the offender 
is in control of the material: see R. v Porter (Ross Warwick) [2006] EWCA Crim 560, [2006] 1 WLR 2633, 
[2007] 2 All ER 625, [2006] 3 WLUK 471, [2006] 2 Cr App R 25, [2006] Crim LR 748, (2006) 103(4) 
LSG 28, Times, 21 June 2006, [2006] CLY 858). Having the ability to unlock the encrypted folder is 
unquestionably control.
8.51 Ultimately, the Court of Appeal conceded that s 49 could interfere with the 
privilege of self- incrimination, but noted that it would only do so if the evidence that 
is being shielded by encryption is itself incriminating. However, the court opined that 
material unquestionably exists independent of the will of the individual and, therefore, 
there is no question of it being protected by the privilege. Thus, the only argument that 
could be put forward is that it is unfair for that evidence to be put before the court due 
to the circumstances in which it was found (through complying with s 49).1 That being 
the case, the Court of Appeal held that such matters could be dealt by the trial judge 
under the discretionary power to exclude prosecution evidence.2
1 R v S (F) and A (S) [2008] EWCA Crim 2177 at [24].
















8.52 The decision in S and A has not been universally welcomed. This is partly 
because the logic of the Court of Appeal stretches credibility. Roberts in the Criminal 
Law Review observed that an encryption key, unless documented, is an ‘intangible 
“psychological fact”, that is to say, it is information which exists only in the suspect’s 
memory and that of any other person who might “know” it’.1 The Court of Appeal would 
argue that this is not true because the key does exist – it is recorded and used within 
the encryption algorithm that is unlocked by the password. However, for all practical 
purposes, it is not. There is a very small chance that the password can be discovered 
by any other means. Indeed, if the police were able to identify the password other 
than through compelling the suspect to testify, there would be no need to issue a s 49 
notice. As was noted above, it is almost impossible to guess a key when encryption is 
used properly due to the potentially vast number of possible combinations. Therefore, 
while in theory the key is independent of the will of the accused, it is, for all practical 
purposes, a psychological fact and, therefore, probably within the privilege. However, 
Roberts’ later point is perhaps the more salient. He notes that it does not matter 
whether privilege was or was not engaged because, following Brown v Stott,2 English 
law recognizes the privilege can be set aside by statute where it is proportionate to 
do so.3 Given the facts of the case, the national security implications would inevitably 
mean that displacement was undoubtedly proportionate.
1 Andrew J. Roberts, ‘Evidence: privilege against self- incrimination – key to encrypted material’ 
[2009] Crim LR 191, 192. In 1993, Professor Tapper observed that the increased use of computers will 
lead to the position that we recess ‘to the earlier period where information reposed only in the brains 
of those who were party to it, and had no material form’: Colin Tapper, ‘Evanescent evidence’ (1993) 
1(1) Intl J L & Info Tech 35, 40.
2 [2003] 1 AC 681, [2001] 2 WLR 817, [2001] 2 All ER 97, 2001 SC (PC) 43, 2001 SLT 59, 2001 SCCR 
62, [2000] 12 WLUK 108, [2001] RTR 11, [2001] HRLR 9, 11 BHRC 179, (2001) 3 LGLR 24, (2001) 145 
SJLB 100, 2000 GWD 40- 1513, Times, 6 December 2000, Independent, 7 February 2001, [2001] CLY 
6319; Roisin Pillay, ‘Self- incrimination and Article 6: the decision of the Privy Council in Procurator 
Fiscal v. Brown’ (2001) 1 EHRLR 78; Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into 
account: developing a “municipal law of human rights” under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 54(4) ICLQ 
907– 1; Mark Berger, ‘Compelled self- reporting and the principle against compelled self incrimination: 
some comparative perspectives’ (2006) 1 EHLR 25; John Jackson, ‘Re- conceptualizing the right 
of silence as an effective fair trial standard’ (2009) 58(4) ICLQ 835; Hamish Stewart, ‘The privilege 
against self- incrimination: reconsidering Redmayne’s rethinking’ (2016) 20(2) E & P 95.
3 The leading examination on the application of the privilege of self- incrimination is Choo, The 
Privilege against Self- Incrimination and Criminal Justice.
8.53 The issues were further rehearsed in Greater Manchester Police v Andrews.1 
Rather than proceedings under s 53, this was an appeal from the refusal of the circuit 
judge to authorize a s 49 notice being served. Andrews had previous convictions for 
the sexual abuse of children, and was the subject of a Sexual Offences Prevention Order. 
Police arrested him on suspicion of breaching this order, and seized a computer and 
two memory sticks. Indecent photographs of children were found on the computer, but 
the memory sticks were encrypted. This meant that they could not be viewed. Andrews 
refused to provide the passwords or software used to encrypt the devices. The police 
applied for permission to serve a s 49 notice, but this was refused. The judge stated that 
requiring Andrews to reveal the key infringed his privilege against self- incrimination, 
because there was no independent evidence to show that he knew what the key was.2 
The judge sought to use these facts to distinguish this case from R v S (F) and A (S).3 










414 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
the devices were unquestionably found in his possession, that it was not unreasonable 
to believe that he might know of the existence of the encryption and its key.4 The court 
did not disagree that the privilege might be invoked, and noted once more that the 
privilege applied only in a limited way (repeating that the key was, in essence, neutral 
and it simply provided access to non- privileged material that was itself incriminating), 
and that English law allowed it to be displaced where it was proportionate to do so.5
1 [2011] EWHC 1966 (Admin), [2011] 5 WLUK 614, [2012] ACD 18.
2 [2011] EWHC 1966 (Admin) at [18]– [19].
3 [2008] EWCA Crim 2177, [2009] 1 WLR 1489, [2009] 1 All ER 716, [2008] 10 WLUK 197, [2009] 
1 Cr App R 18, [2009] Crim LR 191, (2008) 158 NLJ 1459, Times, 15 October 2008, [2008] CLY 711.
4 Greater Manchester Police v Andrews [2011] EWHC 1966 (Admin) at [21].
5 [2011] EWHC 1966 (Admin) at [27].
8.54 Section 49 has not been challenged again, and so the legal position now seems 
relatively settled. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the power is not exercised 
particularly frequently. This suggests that the police are only using it where they 
suspect that encryption is shielding serious criminality. That being the case, it is likely 
the courts would consider it proportionate that the privilege against self- incrimination 
is set aside, as they did in R v S and F.
The USA
8.55 The position in England and Wales can be usefully contrasted with the 
approach taken in the USA, where the Fifth Amendment protects the privilege against 
self- incrimination.
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination
8.56 One of the first cases in the USA to deal with this issue was also cited in R v S 
(F) and A (S)1 to illustrate the point that knowledge of the password might be relevant 
to the privilege against self- incrimination. The case of In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
to Sebastien Boucher2 involved facts arising out of the search of a laptop at the US 
border with Canada. On 17 December 2006, Boucher and his father entered the US 
from Canada. A customs and border protection officer found a laptop computer in the 
vehicle they were travelling in. He opened the computer and switched it on without 
entering a password. He searched the various files in the computer and discovered 
approximately 40,000 images, some of which appeared to be pornographic, based on 
the names of the files. Boucher was asked if any of the files contained abusive images 
of children, to which he responded that he was not certain. The officer continued to 
search the files and noticed some files with names that suggested images of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. He then requested the help of another officer, 
who determined that a number of files contained abusive images of children. Boucher 
was then read his Miranda rights. He told the second officer that he downloaded 
pornographic files and indicated that he did not intentionally download images of 
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and deleted any such images when he 
came across them. Boucher was given access to the laptop and navigated to the Z drive, 
to which he obtained access by inserting a password. The second officer did not see 
Boucher do this. Boucher was subsequently arrested and his laptop was seized. After 













and the investigating authorities could not open the Z drive. A grand jury subpoena 
was issued for Boucher, directing him to ‘provide all documents, whether in electronic 
or paper form, reflecting any passwords used or associated with’ his seized computer.3
1 R v S (F) and A (S) [2008] EWCA Crim 2177, [2009] 1 WLR 1489, [2009] 1 All ER 716, [2008] 10 
WLUK 197, [2009] 1 Cr App R 18, [2009] Crim LR 191, (2008) 158 NLJ 1459, Times, 15 October 2008, 
[2008] CLY 711.
2 2009 WL 424718 (D.Vt.), reversing and remanding 2007 WL 4246473 (Maj. Ct. D.Vt.).
3 2007 WL 4246473 (D.Vt.) at [2] .
8.57 Boucher moved to quash the subpoena because, he alleged, it violated his right 
not to incriminate himself under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment. Whether the 
privilege against self- incrimination applied in this instance depended on whether the 
subpoena sought testimonial communication. Both parties agreed that the contents 
of the laptop computer were not covered by the Fifth Amendment because they 
were voluntarily prepared and not testimonial in nature. The magistrate court held 
that requiring Boucher to enter the password would disclose both that he knew the 
password and that he had control over the files on the encrypted drive.1 The magistrate 
therefore concluded that the Fifth Amendment prevented the government from 
compelling Boucher to provide the password on the basis that it would compel him 
to display the contents of his mind and thereby incriminate himself.2 The government 
appealed this decision,3 arguing that it was already aware of the existence and location 
of the information during the border examination (when the officer viewed the 
contents of some of the Z drive files, and ascertained that they could consist of images 
or videos of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct). On appeal, the district court 
agreed. The court held that requiring Boucher to ‘provid[e] access to the unencrypted 
Z drive “adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information” about 
the existence and location of files that may contain incriminating information’, and 
therefore this did not constitute ‘compelled testimonial communication’ and did not 
breach Boucher’s Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination.4
1 2007 WL 4246473 (D.Vt.) at [3] .
2 2007 WL 4246473 (D.Vt.) at [6] .
3 In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebatien Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 (D.Vt.).
4 In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher, 2009 WL 424718 (D.Vt.) at [2] – [3]. For more discussion 
in the US context and reference to other articles, see Aaron M. Clemens, ‘No computer exception to the 
constitution: the Fifth Amendment protects against compelled production of an encrypted document or 
private key’ (2004) 8(1) UCLA Journal of Law and Technology 1; Andrew J. Ungberg, ‘Protecting privacy 
through a responsible decryption policy’ (2009) 22(2) Harv J L & Tech 537; John Duong, ‘The intersection 
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in the context of encrypted personal data at the border’ (2009) 2(1) 
Drexel Law Review 313; David Colarusso, ‘Heads in the cloud, A coming storm: the interplay of cloud 
computing, encryption, and the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self- incrimination’ (2011) 17(1) 
Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 69; Adam M. Gershowitz, ‘Password protected? 
Can a password save your cell phone from a search incident to arrest?’ (2011) 96(4) Iowa L Rev 1125; Susan 
W. Brenner, ‘The Fifth Amendment, cell phones and search incident: a response to password protected?’ 
(2011) 96 Iowa L Rev Bulletin 78; Michael Wachtel, ‘Give me your password because Congress can say 
so: an analysis of Fifth Amendment protection afforded individuals regarding compelled production of 
encrypted data and possible solutions to the problem of getting data from someone’s mind’ (2013) 14 
U Pitt J Tech & Policy 44; Andrew T. Winkler, ‘Password protection and self- incrimination: applying the 
Fifth Amendment privilege in the technological era’ (2013) 39(2) Rutgers Computer & Tech LJ 194; David 
Rassoul Rangaviz, ‘Compelled decryption & state constitutional protection against self- incrimination’ 
(2020) 57(1) American Criminal Law Review 157; Rafita Ahlam, ‘Apple, the government, and you: security 
and privacy implications of the global encryption debate’ (2021) 44(3) Fordham Int’l LJ 771; Orin S. Kerr, 













416 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
8.58 The Boucher case is illustrative of compelled decryption cases in the US. 
A defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination is implicated when 
the police require a suspect to enter a passcode to unlock an encrypted device, such 
as a telephone or computer. United States courts tend to agree that the act of entering 
a passcode is testimonial, which activates the privilege against self- incrimination; 
however, this privilege is not available if the police can show that the testimony would 
be considered a ‘foregone conclusion’.
8.59 This rule is based on the ‘act of production’ doctrine from Fisher v United States,1 
which was developed in the context of producing documents pursuant to a subpoena. 
The Supreme Court in Fisher held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- 
incrimination was implicated when the government compelled a suspect to produce 
documents when the act is both testimonial and incriminating.2 The act of production 
is neither testimonial nor incriminating, however, when it ‘adds little or nothing to the 
sum total of the Government’s information’ and is therefore a ‘foregone conclusion’.3
1 425 U.S. 391 (1976), 96 S.Ct. 1569 (1976).
2 425 U.S. 391 (1976) at 409– 410.
3 425 U.S. 391 (1976) at 411.
8.60 Courts have adopted and applied the act of production doctrine and its foregone 
conclusion exception to cases of compelled decryption. Courts differ, however, on how 
the foregone conclusion exception should be applied on two primary fronts. First, 
courts differ on whether the police must show that they already have knowledge that 
the suspect knows his passcode, or whether the police must show that they already 
have knowledge of the encrypted content of the device.1 In other words, courts differ 
on what constitutes the ‘testimony’ that must be a foregone conclusion. Second, 
courts differ on the burden of proof of this foregone conclusion: some courts have 
required the police to show clear and convincing evidence,2 some have required proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt,3 some have required a showing of facts with reasonable 
particularity,4 and still others seem to gloss over the standard required entirely. This 
section will survey some of the more influential cases, noting that these jurisprudential 
splits can only be resolved by the US Supreme Court.
1 Compare United States v Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir. 2017) (in dicta clarifies 
that the government must only show that they have knowledge that the suspect knows the passcode or 
owns the device) to In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (requires the government to show that they have knowledge of the encrypted content of the 
device).
2 United States v Spencer, 2018 WL 1964588 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
3 Commonwealth v Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. 2019), 481 Mass. 540 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 2019). It is 
worth noting that this court found that the Massachusetts State Constitution required a showing of 
the foregone conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. State courts in the US may interpret their state 
constitutions to be more protective of individual rights than the federal US Constitution. The US 
Constitution is considered to guarantee the minimum amount of rights protection, which the states 
may strengthen through their own constitutions. Further, the court in Commonwealth v Jones does not 
bind any courts outside the State of Massachusetts.
4 In the Matter of the Search of a Residence in Aptos, California 95003, 2018 WL 1400401 (N.D. Cal. 
2018). This Magistrate Judge’s decision was overturned by the District Court in United States v Spencer, 
2018 WL 1964588 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The Spencer Court clarified that the reasonable particularity 
standard was a substantive standard that ‘helps to ensure that any testimony at issue really is a 
“foregone conclusion” ’. In the case of a determination concerning whether a suspect is capable of 
















must be described by the government with reasonable particularity. Therefore, the correct evidentiary 
standard is clear and convincing evidence. See also In the Matter of the Decryption of a Seized Data 
Storage System, 2013 WL 12327372 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (holding that the government must show the 
foregone conclusion with reasonable particularity). Arguably, the reasonable particularity standard 
only makes sense when the government must show its knowledge of the contents of a device, which is 
why it was also used by the court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 
F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
8.61 In the case of In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011,1 law 
enforcement agents began an investigation in March 2010 of an individual suspected 
of using a YouTube.com account for sharing explicit materials involving underage girls. 
During the course of their investigation, officers obtained several Internet protocol 
(IP) addresses from which the individual had obtained access to the Internet. Three of 
the addresses were subsequently traced to hotels. A review of the register in each hotel 
revealed a common name registered at the hotel at the relevant time, being that of one 
Doe. Doe was found at a hotel in California, and the police applied for and obtained a 
warrant to search his room. Seven items were seized, including two laptops and five 
external hard drives. Examiners from the Federal Bureau of Investigation analysed the 
digital media but could not obtain access to some parts of the hard drives because they 
were encrypted with a software program called TrueCrypt.
1 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
8.62 Doe refused to provide the passwords to enable the government to open and 
view the encrypted data, and he also refused to decrypt the data. As a result, he was 
served with a subpoena duces tecum, requiring him to appear before a grand jury and 
produce the plaintext of the encrypted files located on the hard drives of his laptop 
computers and the five external hard drives. Federal prosecutors offered him immunity 
for the act of decrypting the computer but reserved the right to use any evidence it found 
on the computer against him.1 When he appeared before the grand Jury, Doe invoked 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination to not reveal the plaintext. 
During the hearing, the forensic examiner testified that he could obtain access to some 
parts of the hard drives, but he could not know for certain whether there might be 
data on the encrypted part of the hard drive – indeed, he accepted there might not be 
any data in the encrypted part of the drives. The district court determined that Doe’s 
failure to decrypt the relevant parts of the hard drives amounted to contempt of court 
and committed him to custody.
1 670 F.3d 1335 at 1350.
8.63 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court 
decision and held that the decryption and production of the hard drives was a 
testimonial act, and thus the defendant could assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self- incrimination. The court reasoned:
the decryption and production of the hard drives would require the use of the 
contents of Doe’s mind and could not be fairly characterized as a physical act 
that would be nontestimonial in nature. We conclude that the decryption and 
production would be tantamount to testimony by Doe of his knowledge of 
the existence and location of potentially incriminating files; of his possession, 
control, and access to the encrypted portions of the drives; and of his capability 
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We are unpersuaded by the Government’s derivation of the key/ combination 
analogy in arguing that Doe’s production of the unencrypted files would be 
nothing more than a physical nontestimonial transfer. The Government attempts 
to avoid the analogy by arguing that it does not seek the combination or the key, 
but rather the contents. This argument badly misses the mark.’ 1
1 670 F.3d 1335 at 1346.
8.64 Further, the ‘foregone conclusion’ exception was not available to the government 
because it failed to show that it had knowledge of the contents of the defendant’s 
device. The court noted that:
nothing in the record before us reveals that the Government knows whether 
any files existed and are located on the hard drives; what’s more, nothing in the 
record illustrates that the Government knows with reasonable particularity that 
Doe is even capable of accessing the encrypted portions of the drives.1
1 670 F.3d 1335 at 1346.
8.65 In this regard, In re Grand Jury is distinguishable from Boucher in that the 
government was aware of what was on Boucher’s computer because of his own actions 
in displaying them to the officers.1
1 For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Hanni Fakhoury, Esq., ‘A combination or a key? The 
Fifth Amendment and privilege against compelled decryption’ (2012) 9 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 81.
8.66 While there is wide agreement that the act of production doctrine and foregone 
conclusion exception apply to cases of compelled decryption, courts differ on what 
constitutes the testimony that must be a foregone conclusion. The In re Grand Jury 
court required the government to show that the contents of the suspect’s device 
would be a foregone conclusion. Interestingly, the Boucher court, while not explicit in 
its analysis about what testimony must be proven, found that the government knew 
both the contents of the device and that the suspect could decrypt the device. The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered a similar case, although it would go on to 
provide detailed guidance of what type of testimony must be shown to be a foregone 
conclusion – and in so doing, diverged from the Eleventh Circuit in this regard.
8.67 In 2017, the Third Circuit considered the case of United States of America v 
Apple MacPro Computer1 in which the suspect Doe refused to decrypt hard drives that 
were obtained by police pursuant to a valid search warrant. Along with the hard drives, 
police also seized a mobile telephone and a MacPro computer. The police were able 
to bypass the encryption on the MacPro computer and found evidence that Doe had 
downloaded photographic files constituting images of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct. The police suspected that the files themselves were stored on the 
separate encrypted hard drives that Doe refused to decrypt. Doe argued that the act of 
decryption would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination.
1 851 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir. 2017).
8.68 The Third Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit’s legal reasoning that the act 
of production and foregone conclusion rules applied to the compelled decryption of 










Circuit found that the testimony sought by the government from Doe was a foregone 
conclusion. The court reasoned: ‘the Government has provided evidence to show both 
that files exist on the encrypted portions of the devices and that Doe can access them.’1 
Among other reasons, the evidence to support this assertion was: the encrypted devices 
were found at Doe’s residence and he did not dispute his ownership of them, analysts 
found evidence on the MacPro computer that the user had visited groups that had titles 
used in child exploitation and had downloaded images known through hashing to be 
images of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and Doe’s sister had witnessed 
Doe unlock the hard drives to view images and videos of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.2 Based on these and similar facts, the magistrate had found that the 
testimony would be a foregone conclusion. The district court and the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals both affirmed that conclusion.
1 851 F.3d 238 at 248.
2 851 F.3d 238 at 248.
8.69 Due to the overwhelming amount of proof against Doe, it could be difficult to 
ascertain whether the Third Circuit requirement that the testimony must be shown 
to be a foregone conclusion is simply the passcode or ownership of the devices, or the 
contents of the device. The Third Circuit had evidence in that case that Doe owned 
the devices and had decrypted the devices previously, and that the government 
knew the contents of the devices, all of which qualified as a foregone conclusion. 
Helpfully, the court added a footnote, that although dictum, is persuasive authority 
for future cases in the Third Circuit:
It is important to note that we are not concluding that the Government’s 
knowledge of the content of the devices is necessarily the correct focus of the 
‘foregone conclusion’ inquiry in the context of a compelled decryption order. 
Instead, a very sound argument can be made that the foregone conclusion doctrine 
properly focuses on whether the Government already knows the testimony that 
is implicit in the act of production. In this case, the fact known to the government 
that is implicit in the act of providing the password for the devices is ‘I, John Doe, 
know the password for these devices’. Based upon the testimony presented at 
the contempt proceeding, that fact is a foregone conclusion. However, because 
our review is limited to plain error, and no plain error was committed by the 
District Court in finding that the Government established that the contents of the 
encrypted hard drives are known to it, we need not decide here that the inquiry 
can be limited to the question of whether Doe’s knowledge of the password itself 
is sufficient to support application of the foregone conclusion doctrine.1
1 851 F.3d 238 at 248, n 7.
8.70 Other cases have cited this dictum by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Apple MacPro Computer to hold that the government need only show that the suspect’s 
knowledge of the passcode is a foregone conclusion.1 This is consistent with an 
unpublished opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States of America v 
Gavegnano,2 in which the appellant was convicted of receipt and possession of abusive 
images of children stored on a laptop computer owned by the government and issued 
to him for the purposes of his work. One of the grounds of appeal was based on the Fifth 
Amendment, in that he gave the password of the laptop computer to the prosecuting 
authorities after meeting with his lawyer. The Fourth Circuit rejected his claim, on the 
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password was already a “foregone conclusion” because the Government independently 
proved that Gavegnano was the sole user and possessor of the computer’.3
1 State of Oregon v Pittman, 452 P.3d 1011 (Or.App. 2020); Commonwealth v Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702 
(Mass. 2019), 481 Mass. 540 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 2019); State of Missouri v Johnson, 576 S.W.3d 205 (Mo.App. 
W.D. 2019); State of New Jersey v Andrews, 197 A.3d 200 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2018); United States v Spencer, 
2018 WL 1964588 (N.D. Cal. 2018); State of Florida v Stahl, 206 So.3d 124 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 2016) at 
136; U.S. v Fricosu, 841 F.Supp.2d 1232 (D.Colo. 2012).
2 305 Fed.Appx. 954 (4th Cir. 2009), 2009 WL 106370.
3 305 Fed.Appx. 954 (4th Cir. 2009) at 956.
8.71 Nonetheless, other courts have chosen to follow the approach set out by the 
Eleventh Circuit that requires the government to show, with reasonable particularity, 
that the contents of the device are a foregone conclusion.1 In adopting this approach, 
the district court In the Matter of the Search of a Residence in Oakland, California 
explicitly rejected the notion that an encrypted device, in this case a telephone, was 
akin to a safe and that the government’s demand for a passcode is merely the same 
as compelling a suspect to enter a passcode to open a safe, much like the use of a key.2 
The court reasoned that ‘[t] oday’s mobile phones are not comparable to other storage 
equipment, be it physical or digital, and are entitled to greater privacy protection’. 
Quoting the US Supreme Court’s opinion in Riley v California, the District Court 
considered that a search of a telephone ‘would typically expose to the government far 
more than the most exhaustive search of a house’.3 Given the primary split between 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, it is possible that the US Supreme Court will, at some time in the future, be 
asked to clarify the scope of the act of production doctrine and the foregone conclusion 
exception in the context of compelled decryption of devices by the use of passcodes.4 
Likewise, courts seem to be split on the issue of whether a forced use of biometric 
measurements constitutes ‘testimony’ such that the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self- incrimination will apply.
1 In the Matter of the Search of a Residence in Oakland, California, 354 F.Supp.3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 
2019); Seo v State, 109 N.E.3d 418 (Ind.App. 2018), transfer granted and opinion vacated on other 
grounds, see Eunjoo Seo v State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (2019); Securities and Exchange Commission v Huang, 
2015 WL 5611644 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
2 354 F.Supp.3d 1010 at 1017.
3 354 F.Supp.3d 1010 (quoting Riley v California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)).
4 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the correct approach. For a thorough exploration 
of these issues, consult Orin Kerr, ‘Compelled decryption and the privilege against self- incrimination’ 
(2018) 97 Texas L Rev 767, and Laurent Sacharoff, ‘What am I really saying when I open my smartphone? 
A response to Orin S. Kerr’ (2019) 97 Texas L Rev Online 63.
8.72 There are several Federal District Courts1 and at least one State Supreme Court2 
that have found that compelling the suspect to unlock a device, usually a telephone, 
with a biometric measurement such as a fingerprint or face, does not constitute 
testimony such that the privilege against self- incrimination is implicated. As the 
District Court of Idaho reasoned in the case of In the Matter of the Search of: a White 
Google Pixel 3 XL Cellphone in a black incipio case, ‘the Government agents will pick 
the fingers to be pressed on the Touch ID sensor, [and so] there is no need to engage 
in the thought process of the subject at all in effectuating the seizure’.3 The court in 
that case compared this act to other compelled displays of physical features that have 
















fits the defendant; providing a blood sample to test for alcohol content; submitting to 
the taking of fingerprints or photographs; providing a voice exemplar; and providing a 
handwriting exemplar’.4
1 In the Matter of the Search Warrant Application for the Cellular Telephone in United States v Barrera, 
415 F.Supp.3d 832 (N.D.Ill. 2019); In the Matter of the Search of: a White Google Pixel 3 XL Cellphone 
in a Black Incipio Case, 398 F.Supp.3d 785 (D.Idaho 2019); Matter of Search of [Redacted] Washington, 
District of Columbia, 317 F.Supp.3d 523 (D.D.C. 2018).
2 State of Minnesota v Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 2018).
3 398 F.Supp.3d 785 at [13]; for Illinois, see In the Matter of the Search Warrant Application for the 
cellular telephone in United States v Barrera, 415 F.Supp.3d 832 (N.D.Ill. 2019).
4 398 F.Supp.3d 785 at [10– 12] (internal citations omitted).
8.73 Other courts disagree, however. In United States v Wright, a federal district 
court in Nevada held:
First, a biometric feature is functionally the same as a passcode, and because 
telling a law enforcement officer your passcode would be testimonial, so too 
must the compelled use of your biometric feature to unlock a device. Second, 
unlocking a phone with your face equates to testimony that you have unlocked 
the phone before, and thus you have some level of control over the phone.1
1 431 F.Supp.3d 1175 (D.Nev. 2020) (citing In the Matter of the Search of a Residence in Oakland, 
California, 354 F.Supp.3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019)) (internal citations omitted).
8.74 Another Federal District Court in Illinois agreed, and cited the Eleventh Circuit 
opinion in the case of In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 
to support its holding that ‘the connection of a fingerprint to the electronic sources 
that may hold contraband … does explicitly or implicitly relate a factual assertion 
or disclose information’.1 The court rejected the government’s claim that the Fifth 
Amendment does not apply to the compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, stating:
We do not believe that a simple analogy that equates the limited protection 
afforded a fingerprint for identification purposes to forced fingerprinting to 
unlock an Apple electronic device that potentially contains some of the most 
intimate details of an individual’s life (and potentially provides direct access to 
contraband) is supported by Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.2
1 In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F.Supp.3d 1066 (N.D.Ill. 2017) at 1073.
2 236 F.Supp.3d 1066 at 1073– 1074.
8.75 Similar to the issue of forced decryption through use of passcodes, the testimonial 
nature of biometric features used for decryption needs clarification from a higher court.
Bypassing the Fifth Amendment by compelling the assistance of third 
parties
8.76 Given the limitations of the cases noted above regarding compelled decryption by 
suspects, governments increasingly seek to compel third party intermediaries, usually 
technology companies or communications service providers, to provide plaintext data to 
law enforcement authorities. Perhaps the most famous example of the US government 
attempting to compel a third party intermediary to decrypt a device is the litigation 
over an Apple iPhone seized by the FBI in Government’s ex parte application for order 
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District of California. The US government seized an iPhone 5C believed to have belonged 
to Syed Rizwan Farook, an alleged terrorist who perpetrated an attack which killed 14 
people and injured 22 others in San Bernandino, California. The iPhone was protected by 
a passcode. Later generation iPhones have their contents encrypted by default, and the 
passcode acts as the password. Thus, without the password, the FBI was unable to obtain 
access to the contents of the device. It is also possible to set the iPhone to auto- erase the 
contents of the telephone if a set number of incorrect passcodes is entered.
1 In the Matter of the Search of an Apple Iphone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a 
Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. 16 February 2016).
8.77 Given these obstacles, the government sought an order under the All Writs 
Act1 requiring Apple to assist the FBI in circumventing the encryption.2 Contrary 
to what was reported in most media, the order did not require Apple to break the 
encryption, but rather Apple was ordered to provide reasonable technical assistance 
in bypassing or disabling the auto- erase function, enabling the FBI to submit 
unlimited passcodes to the device for electronic testing and ensuring that the device 
would not purposefully introduce any additional delay between passcode attempts, 
essentially enabling a brute- force attack.3 Apple resisted the imposition of the 
order, arguing that to do so would hand unparalleled powers to the government, 
which would render data privacy laws meaningless. They argued that any process 
they put in place could be exploited by others, which meant that the privacy of all 
its customers would be put at risk.4 Ultimately, the FBI were able to obtain access 
to the device with the help of an unnamed third party, and the litigation was 
discontinued.5
1 28 U.S. Code § 1651.
2 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. 16 February 2016).
3 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. 16 February 2016), Order 2.
4 Tim Cook, ‘A message to our customers’ (Apple, Inc, 16 February 2016), http:// www.apple.com/ 
customer- letter/ .
5 Rob Crilly, ‘FBI finds method to hack gunman’s iPhone without Apple’s help’, http:// www.telegraph.
co.uk/ technology/ 2016/ 03/ 29/ fbi- finds- method- to- hack- gunmans- iphone- without- apples- help0/ .
8.78 In a similar case,1 the government sought an order before a New York court 
requiring Apple to bypass the passcode security on an Apple device on the basis that such 
an order would assist in the execution of a search warrant previously issued by the court. 
The court denied the government’s motion, on the basis that the government had failed 
to establish that the All Writs Act permitted the relief it sought, partly because Congress 
had considered legislation that would achieve the same result but had not adopted it. The 
judge also noted that a court, when deciding whether to take such discretionary action, 
was required to consider three additional factors:
1. the closeness of the relationship between the person or entity to whom the 
proposed writ is directed and the matter over which the court has jurisdiction;
2. the reasonableness of the burden to be imposed on the writ’s subject; and
3. the necessity of the requested writ to aid the court’s jurisdiction (which does 
replicate the second statutory element, despite the overlapping language).2
1 In re Order requiring Apple, Inc, to assist in the execution of a search warrant issued by this Court, 
2015 WL 5920207 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Apple, Inc., 149 F.Supp.3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
















8.79 The court said that even if the statute did apply, all three discretionary factors 
weighed against the issuing of the requested writ, and that the application would be 
denied as a matter of discretion, even if it is available as a matter of law.
8.80 These cases brought renewed attention to the encryption debates between law 
enforcement authorities who seek lawful access to plaintext data and the information and 
communication technology (ICT) companies who implement encryption by default for 
security purposes. In addition to security concerns, these companies also benefit from 
encryption by shifting control to the user, which limits the abilities of the companies 
to cooperate with the government. ICT companies can also benefit from appearing to 
champion user privacy, especially after the Snowden revelations in 2013.1 After these 
revelations, both Apple and Google announced they would begin encrypting devices 
by default.2 Around the same time, James Comey, then Director of the FBI, articulated 
concerns about the growing use of encryption:
Unfortunately, the law hasn’t kept pace with technology, and this disconnect 
has created a significant public safety problem. We call it ‘Going Dark’, and 
what it means is this: Those charged with protecting our people aren’t always 
able to access the evidence we need to prosecute crime and prevent terrorism 
even with lawful authority. We have the legal authority to intercept and access 
communications and information pursuant to court order, but we often lack the 
technical ability to do so.3
1 https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Edward_ Snowden.
2 ‘Don’t panic: making progress on the going dark debate’ (Berkman Center for Internet & Society, 
Harvard University 2016) 10, https:// cyber.harvard.edu/ pubrelease/ dont- panic/ Dont_ Panic_ Making_ 
Progress_ on_ Going_ Dark_ Debate.pdf.
3 James B. Comey, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director, ‘Going dark: are technology, privacy, and 
public safety on a collision course?’, speech delivered to the Brookings Institution (2014), https:// www.
fbi.gov/ news/ speeches/ going- dark- are- technology- privacy- and- public- safety- on- a- collision- course.
8.81 To solve this ‘going dark’ problem, Reitinger argues that ‘permitting law 
enforcement to compel the production of keys when necessary, with judicial supervision 
as appropriate, is a minimal accommodation to the need for public security in a world 
in which criminals have an increasing array of sophisticated tools at their disposal’.1 It 
is difficult to think of any other aspect of evidence where a suspect is allowed to wilfully 
hide evidence of his criminality from law enforcement and for this to be condoned by 
the criminal justice system. Using encryption, a person can hide thousands of abusive 
images of children on a device. They could obtain access to them every day but, if 
they took appropriate precautions,2 law enforcement authorities would find it almost 
impossible to prove that the offence has taken place.3 That is not in the interest of 
society. This is a point made by Orenstein MJ of New York in his concluding remarks in 
one of the cases involving Apple:
How best to balance those interests is a matter of critical importance to our 
society, and the need for an answer becomes more pressing daily, as the tide of 
technological advance flows ever farther past the boundaries of what seemed 
possible even a few decades ago. But that debate must happen today, and it must 
take place among legislators who are equipped to consider the technological and 
cultural realities of a world their predecessors could not begin to conceive.4
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2 Deleting caches, recent document lists, etc.
3 Keylogging software would only work if a single device was used to obtain access to the material 
(or the software would be required to be placed on each device) and if a regular Internet connection 
was used. Covert surveillance (cameras) could be installed to show the material being viewed, but 
law enforcement authorities would need to know which room the device was located in, and it could 
be difficult to obtain authorization to do so, depending on the level of intrusion this could cause 
(for example, if it was on a tablet, it may be necessary to have devices in each room, which could be 
construed a gross invasion of privacy).
4 In re Apple, Inc., 149 F.Supp.3d 341, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) at 376.
8.82 Jim Baker, former general counsel for the FBI, was responsible for leading the 
government efforts to compel Apple to decrypt the iPhone in the San Bernandino case 
in 2016.1 In 2019 Baker wrote that his opinion on encryption had changed in light of 
the serious cybersecurity threats facing the US:
All public safety officials should think of the protecting of the cybersecurity of the 
United States as an essential part of their core mission to protect the American 
people and uphold the Constitution. And they should be doing so even if there 
will be real and painful costs associated with such a cybersecurity- forward 
orientation. The stakes are too high and our current cybersecurity situation too 
grave to adopt a different approach.
…
In light of the serious nature of this profound and overarching [cybersecurity] 
threat, and in order to execute fully their responsibility to protect the nation 
from catastrophic attack and ensure the continuing operation of basic societal 
institutions, public safety officials should embrace encryption.2
1 The telephone was eventually ‘unlocked’ by the Australian company Azimuth: Ellen Nakashima 
and Reed Albergotti, ‘The FBI wanted to unlock the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone. It turned to a 
little- known Australian firm’ The Washington Post, 14 April 2021, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/ 
technology/ 2021/ 04/ 14/ azimuth- san- bernardino- apple- iphone- fbi/ .
2 Jim Baker, ‘Rethinking encryption’ Lawfare (22 October 2019), https:// www.lawfareblog.com/ 
rethinking- encryption (original emphasis).
8.83 Baker’s remarks illustrate how the encryption debate has turned in recent 
years from the ‘false dichotomy’ between security and privacy to a discussion of 
competing security interests.1 ICT companies and computer scientists argue that 
encryption is necessary to protect users from criminals, while law enforcement 
authorities argue that encryption protects criminals from detection and prosecution. 
In reality, encryption does both. Privacy advocates and computer scientists argue that 
criminals will always find a way to communicate anonymously and that measures 
designed to allow governments to have access to keys or back doors will do more harm 
to regular users of these technologies.2 Computer scientists in particular have raised 
alarms that any government proposals for ‘exceptional access’ to encrypted systems 
are ‘unworkable in practice, raise enormous legal and ethical questions, and would 
undo progress on security at a time when Internet vulnerabilities are causing extreme 
economic harm’.3 These same computer scientists concluded a report analysing law 
enforcement proposals for exceptional access with the following observations:
This report’s analysis of law enforcement demands for exceptional access to 
private communications and data shows that such access will open doors through 
which criminals and malicious nation- states can attack the very individuals law 
enforcement seeks to defend. The costs would be substantial, the damage to 













1 Professor Susan Landau sets out the arguments about encryption very clearly in her book: 
Listening In: Cybersecurity in an Insecure Age (Yale University Press 2017); Encryption Working Group, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for Information on Technology Policy, Princeton 
University, ‘Moving the encryption policy conversation forward’ (September 2019) 3, https:// 
carnegieendowment.org/ files/ EWG_ _ Encryption_ Policy.pdf.
2 For more on this debate, see the essay series at Daniel J. Weitzner, ‘Perspectives on encryption and 
surveillance’, Lawfare, 29 November 2018, https:// www.lawfareblog.com/ perspectives- encryption- 
and- surveillance; for a historical perspective, see Danielle Kehl, Andi Wilson and Kevin Bankston, 
‘Doomed to repeat history? Lessons from the crypto wars of the 1990s’ (2015), https:// static.
newamerica.org/ attachments/ 3407- doomed- to- repeat- history- lessons- from- the- crypto- wars- of- the- 
1990s/ Crypto%20Wars_ ReDo.7cb491837ac541709797bdf868d37f52.pdf.
3 Harold Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, 
John Gilmore, Matthew Green, Susan Landau, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffrey I. Schiller, 
Bruce Schneier, Michael A. Specter and Daniel J. Weitzner, ‘Keys under doormats: mandating insecurity 
by requiring government access to all data and communications’ [2015] Journal of Cybersecurity 1, 
https:// academic.oup.com/ cybersecurity/ article- lookup/ doi/ 10.1093/ cybsec/ tyv009.
4 Abelson and others, ‘Keys under doormats’, 24– 25.
8.84 However, the Encryption Working Group, funded by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace and comprising former government officials, business 
representatives, privacy advocates, law enforcement authorities and computer 
scientists in the US, believe that ‘more common ground is attainable’ if the discussion 
between participants focuses on the individual ‘component parts’ within the larger 
umbrella of encryption policy.1 For example, while encryption for data in transit may 
raise many of the issues that concerned the computer scientists cited above, ‘some 
forms of access to encrypted information, such as access to data at rest on mobile 
phones’ may be possible.2 By debating specific types of encryption, data and devices, 
it may be possible to find a sensible middle ground approach which allows for law 
enforcement authorities to obtain access to decrypted data without endangering 
cybersecurity or privacy.3
1 Encryption Working Group, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for Information 
on Technology Policy, Princeton University, ‘Moving the encryption policy conversation forward’ 
(September 2019) 4, https:// carnegieendowment.org/ files/ EWG_ _ Encryption_ Policy.pdf.
2 Encryption Working Group, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Moving the encryption 
policy conversation forward’, 17.
3 Similarly, UK officials at GCHQ have advocated for cooperation and collaboration given the lack 
of straightforward solutions in the security versus security debate. Ian Levy and Crispin Robinson, 
‘Principles for a more informed exceptional access debate’, Lawfare, 29 November 2018, https:// www.
lawfareblog.com/ principles- more- informed- exceptional- access- debate.
Canada
8.85 Another perspective to this debate is added by the decision of the Canadian 
court in R. v Beauchamp.1 In this case, an unusual application was brought. Rather than 
the law enforcement agency seeking access to encrypted data, the defence sought an 
order to require the Crown to disclose a copy of encrypted files located on a hard drive 
that had been seized by the police. The Crown had not been able to decrypt the files, 
and as a result had no knowledge of the data that was encrypted. It was agreed that the 
encrypted information was both potentially inculpatory and potentially exculpatory 
for the accused parties. The Crown submitted that the encrypted information was 
beyond its control, and although it was arguably in its possession, it was not in a format 
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possession and control of the hard drives, but it had no knowledge of the information 
in the encrypted files. Smith J analysed the position as follows:
The seizure by the police of the hard drives containing encrypted information is 
similar to the seizure of a locked safe which the police cannot open, containing 
documents which include both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. The police 
or Crown would clearly be in possession or control of the safe, but if they did not 
have the key or combination and were unable to break the safe open, then they 
would not have knowledge of the contents of the safe. In this case, the Crown’s 
control of the contents of the safe, which are known to one accused but not to the 
Crown, is not complete, as the Crown needs the key or combination, or in this case 
the password, in order to access the documents in the safe. The unique feature 
of this case is that the accused … has the key or password, which is necessary to 
complete the possession or control of the information in the safe.2
1 2008 CarswellOnt 2756, [2008] OJ No 1347, 171 CRR (2d) 358, 58 CR (6th) 177, 77 WCB (2d) 
177; for further cases in Canada, see R. v Burke 2013 CarswellOnt 8417, 2013 ONCA 424, [2013] OJ No 
2920, 107 WCB (2d) 662, 285 CRR (2d) 6, 298 CCC (3d) 396, 307 OAC 171; R. v M. 2012 CarswellMan 
256, 2012 MBQB 141, [2012] MJ No 174, 101 WCB (2d) 168, 279 Man R (2d) 80, 93 CR (6th) 155; R. v 
Stemberger 2012 CarswellOnt 492, 2012 ONCJ 31, [2012] OJ No 221, 100 WCB (2d) 20, 254 CRR (2d) 
1; see also Lex Gill, ‘Law, metaphor, and the encrypted machine’ (2018) 55 Osgoode Hall LJ 440; Steven 
Penney and Dylan Gibbs, ‘Law enforcement access to encrypted data: legislative responses and the 
Charter’ (2017) 63 McGill LJ 201 (2017).
2 2008 CarswellOnt 2756 at [40].
8.86 For these reasons, the application for disclosure of a copy of the encrypted files 
in the hard drives was refused, although the judge indicated that the applicants could, 
at their option, obtain disclosure of the contents if they provided the password or key 
to the Crown, and the Crown would then review the material. Had the application been 
allowed, it would have created an untenable situation. The state would have provided 
a file that only one party (the defence) could view. The defence would presumably 
extract the exculpatory evidence without giving the Crown sight of the inculpatory 
evidence. It is suggested that this decision struck the correct balance, which is to enable 
the defence to disclose the key so that both parties will have access to the plaintext 
material.
Belgium
8.87 The Court of Cassation in Belgium1 has held that Belgian law can require a criminal 
suspect to disclose their mobile telephone passcode without violating their right to 
remain silent and to not incriminate oneself, provided the investigating authority can 
show that the mobile telephone was detected without coercion and that the suspect 
knows the passcode ‘without reasonable doubt’.2 The Belgian Court interpreted the 
right to not incriminate oneself as guaranteed by the ECHR, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and Directive (EU) 2016/ 343 of 9 March 2016 on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be 
present at the trial in criminal proceedings.3 The court found that the qualified right 
against self- incrimination would not prevent authorities from gathering evidence that 
exists ‘independently of the will of the person who has knowledge of’ the passcode.4 
It held that ‘the main purpose of the right not to incriminate oneself is to safeguard 
the right to a fair trial by excluding false statements made under duress’.5 Because 
the passcode remains unchanged regardless of whether it is communicated, the court 












1 The authors thank Professor Dr Joachim Meese, Faculty of Law, Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium 
and lawyer at the bar of Ghent, Belgium for his review of this section on Belgium.
2 Attorney General at the Court of Appeal of Ghent v M A, 4 februari 2020 P.19.1086.N, Hof van 
Cassatie, tweede kamer (Court of Cassation, second chamber), English translation in (2020) 17 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 94. For comments on this decision, see C. Conings 
and R. De Keersmaecker, ‘To save but not too safe: hoogste Belgische rechters zien geen graten in het 
decryptiebevel voor de verdachte’ (2020) 3 Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht 163 and F. Koning, ‘Droit au 
silence et à ne pas s’incriminer: Quo Vadis?’ (2020) 6807 Journal des Tribunaux 204.
3 OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, 1.
4 Attorney General v M A, 4 februari 2020 P.19.1086.N, Hof van Cassatie, tweede kamer (Court of 
Cassation, second chamber), English translation in (2020) 17 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature 
Law Review, 95– 96.
5 Attorney General v M A, 4 februari 2020 P.19.1086.N, Hof van Cassatie, 3.
6 Attorney General v M A, 4 februari 2020 P.19.1086.N, Hof van Cassatie, 3.
8.88 The court found that the passcode is thus akin to the communication of 
biometric data, which is a permissible derogation from the right to not incriminate 
oneself. Even if the passcode reveals information that is subjected to substantial 
criminal sanctions, the communication of the passcode itself only relates to accessing 
an ‘already discovered IT system’.1 Thus, the compelled decryption of a telephone 
passcode did not violate the suspect’s right to remain silent.
1 Attorney General v M A, 4 februari 2020 P.19.1086.N, Hof van Cassatie, 3.
Concluding observations
8.89 Encryption is a fundamental part of modern cybersecurity. Good quality encryption 
provides reassurance to users that sensitive information can be securely stored. However, 
it is obvious that a criminal can also use encryption to hide his actions. More than this, 
encryption allows material to be hidden from everyone else, but remain accessible to 
the possessor of the cryptographic key. Throughout history, people have hidden files or 
objects that they do not want law enforcement authorities to find. However, that invariably 
affects the ability of the owner to use the files or objects. For example, a person could send 
photographs or physical records out of the jurisdiction where no mutual legal assistance 
treaty exists. This will keep the data away from investigators, but the owners will not be 
able to view the photographs or records themselves. Encryption, however, means that the 
possessor of the key can easily open a file and, for example, look at illegal material at will, 
while preventing law enforcement authorities from knowing what is being looked at.
8.90 The philosophical basis around the right to self- incrimination is of fundamental 
importance in any criminal justice system. The difficulty is in establishing a balance 
between the right not to incriminate oneself when accused by the state, and the rights of 
victims and society to liberty and security. This is a difficult balance to achieve,1 and in this 
chapter we have described how various jurisdictions have approached this problem.
1 For a different perspective, see Phillip Rogaway, ‘The moral character of cryptographic work’, 
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/ 1162, http:// web.cs.ucdavis.edu/ ~rogaway/ papers/ moral.
html.
8.91 The balance between the competing security interests implicated by encryption 
will require continued scrutiny from courts and lawmakers as encryption technologies 
advance.1 These issues will continue to affect criminal investigations into a wide variety 
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offences concerning child sexual abuse materials, law enforcement authorities need 
to obtain access to encrypted evidence in offences ranging from cybercrime and 
organized crime to routine investigations into theft, assault and homicide. Thus, we 
can expect the law concerning access to encrypted data to continue to develop and 
evolve.
1 Quantum cryptography and computing are expected to revolutionize encryption in the coming 
decades. This may result in unbreakable encryption and likewise the capability to break all existing 
encryption keys. See Ian Walden, ‘ “The sky is falling!” – responses to the “going dark” problem’ (2018) 
34 Computer Law & Security Review 901, 906.
2 Support for end- to- end encryption increases if child safety can be protected. While this is useful 
for privacy, it also presents risks to child safety and means abuse can go unnoticed online. The 
following papers set out new research and analysis about the implications of end- to- end encryption 
for child protection: National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, ‘End- to- end encryption: 
understanding the impacts for child safety online (April 2021); National Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Children, ‘Private messaging and the rollout of end- to- end encryption: the implications 
for child protection’ (April 2021), both at https:// www.nspcc.org.uk/ about- us/ news- opinion/ 2021/ 
adults- support- encryption- if- children- safety- protected/ ; also see Derek Johnson, Erin Faulkner, 
Georgia Meredith and Tim J. Wilson, ‘Police functional adaptation to the digital or post digital age: 
discussions with cybercrime experts’ (2020) 84(5) Journal of Criminal Law 427; Tim J. Wilson, 
‘Collaborative justice and harm reduction in cyberspace: policing indecent child images’ (2020) 84(5) 





Proof: the technical collection and  
examination of electronic evidence
Nigel Wilson, Andrew Sheldon, Hein Dries,  
Burkhard Schafer and Stephen Mason
9.1 This chapter addresses the challenges and methodologies associated with 
proving a fact with electronic evidence, and considers the measures relating to the 
accreditation of those performing a digital forensic analysis, together with the 
validation of the technologies, systems and methodologies used. It looks at how 
and why the correct handling, preserving and analysing of electronic evidence are 
critical steps in an investigation process to ensure reliability of proof. It explains how 
the probative value of the evidence can be affected and its reliability compromised 
when critical procedures or measures are not followed. It further describes the use of 
automation and technology solutions to enhance the efficiency of investigations, and 
the controls used to ensure the accuracy and forensic reliability of such investigations.
9.2 All electronic evidence exists, at its most basic level, in binary form. The Binary 
Digit (‘bit’), which represents a logical state with one of two possible digits, is typically 
represented as a single digit in a binary number as either 0 or 1. These bits are in turn 
organized in a larger group of 8 bits called a byte. A byte can be used to represent 
letters of the alphabet and other characters. For example, the byte comprising the 
8- bit sequence 01000001 may represent the letter ‘A’ in a word processing system, 
but could represent something entirely different in a video processing application. 
Interpretation is, therefore, relative to context and determined by the software used 
to interpret it. Such representation and interpretation is achieved by using multiple 
processing and storage layers within a digital system such as a computer, mobile 
telephone, GPS device or media player, etc. These processing layers include hardware 
such as processing chips, digital cameras and networks, operating systems such as 
Windows, Linux, iOS and Android, application software such as word processors, 
email, web browsers, messaging clients and media players, and data storage such as 
hard disks, memory cards and cloud environments.
9.3 Thus, when proving a fact using electronic evidence, what an individual may 
witness on the output such as the screen is the result of multiple phases of digital 
processing and interpretation performed by software. The risk is that any processing 
phase may be subject to error. Similarly, when specialist digital forensic software is 
used to preserve and present electronic evidence, it does so using a programmatic 
interpretation of the bits and bytes it finds, and this also may be subject to error or 
wrongful assumptions about the meaning of the data.
9.4 For these reasons, proof, as it applies to electronic evidence, requires more 
than simple reproduction of data. The process of adducing evidence and determining 
Nigel Wilson, Andrew Sheldon, Hein Dries, Burkhard Schafer and Stephen Mason, ‘Proof: the 
technical collection and examination of electronic evidence’, in Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng (eds.), 
Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures (5th edn, University of London 2021) 429–487.
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proof relies on the systems used and the training and experience of the people creating 
and using them. Both people and systems need to meet significant accreditation 
and demanding validation to demonstrate that all such interpretations of data have 
been performed accurately. This is partly because of the unique nature of electronic 
evidence: it is extremely volatile and subject to being altered with ease, even by the 
simple act of switching a computer on or off.1
1 Graeme B. Bell and Richard Boddington, ‘Solid state drives: the beginning of the end for current 
practice in digital forensic recovery?’ (2010) 5(3) Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law 1; 
Michael Wei, Laura M. Grupp, Frederick E. Spada and Steven Swanson, ‘Reliability erasing data from 
flash- based solid state drives’, Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies 
(USENIX Association Berkeley, CA, 2011).
Accreditation of the digital forensics discipline
9.5 By their nature, investigations and examinations of electronic evidence are 
relatively new compared to other more established forms of forensic analysis such as 
fingerprinting, DNA analysis, toxicology and ballistics. Broadly speaking, electronic 
or digital (the terms are used interchangeably) investigations are concerned with the 
gathering, preservation and analysis of relevant digital data to provide both evidence 
and intelligence to assist with criminal investigations1 and prosecutions, and with civil 
and regulatory matters and proceedings.
1 The evidence of digital systems can also help reconstruct what happened in an incident, for which 
see Mario Piccinelli and Paolo Gubian, ‘Modern ships Voyage Data Recorders: a forensics perspective 
on the Costa Concordia shipwreck’ (2013) 10 Digital Investigation S41.
9.6 Forensic analysis of electronic evidence draws from diverse disciplines such 
as electrical and electronic engineering and computer science, and includes sub- 
disciplines such as computer forensics, network forensics, cloud forensics, data 
analysis, audio and video analysis and analysis of mobile devices. Accreditation has 
been strongly supported from within the diverse digital forensics discipline. In the 
USA, the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/ Laboratory Accreditation 
Board (ASCLD/ LAB) formally accredited digital forensics as a discipline in 2003 
together with four sub- disciplines: computer forensics, audio analysis, video analysis 
and image analysis. In 2016 the ASCLD/ LAB was acquired by the American National 
Standards Institute- American Society for Quality (ANSI- ASQ) National Accreditation 
Board (ANAB) and the four sub- disciplines were merged into a single discipline 
known as digital evidence forensics.1 There are similar specialist advisory groups in 
Australia and New Zealand.2 In the United Kingdom, the Forensic Science Regulator 
was established in 2008, and included digital forensics as a specialist group. In April 
2020 the Forensic Science Regulator produced updated Codes of Practice and Conduct 
(issue 5) across the entire forensic industry, including for digital forensics.3
1 https:// anab.ansi.org/ about- anab; Hong Guo and Junlei Huo, ‘Review of the accreditation of 
digital forensics in China’ (2018) 3 Forensic Sciences Research 194, who note that over 70 forensic 
inspection and laboratories in the US are ANAB accredited. Fred Cohen, Digital Forensic Evidence 
Examination (4th edn, Fred Cohen & Associates 2012); Eoghan Casey, Digital Evidence and Computer 
Crime Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet (3rd edn, Academic Press 2011) 1; Alastair Irons 
and Anastasia Konstadopoulou, ‘Professionalism in digital forensics’ (2007) 4 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 45; Simson Garfinkel, Paul Farrell, Vassil Roussev and George Dinolt, 
‘Bringing science to digital forensics with standardized forensic corpora’ (2009) 6 Digital Investigation 
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tools— Searching Function’ (2009) 6 Digital Investigation S12; Simson L. Garfinkel ‘Digital forensics 
research: the next 10 years’ (2010) 7 Digital Investigation S64; Jason Beckett and Jill Slay, ‘Scientific 
underpinnings and background to standards and accreditation in digital forensics’ (2011) 8 Digital 
Investigation 114.
2 Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency, http:// www.anzpaa.org.au/ forensic- science/ 
forensic- sciences/ forensic- groups; Australian Forensic Science Society, http:// anzfss.org/ about/ ; 
National Association of Testing Authorities, https:// www.nata.com.au/ .
3 The Forensic Science Regulator, Codes of Practice and Conduct (FSR- C- 100, Issue 5, 2020), 
https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ 
file/ 880708/ Codes_ of_ Practice_ and_ Conduct_ - _ Issue_ 5.pdf; the Nederlands Register Gerechtelijk 
Deskundigen (Netherlands Register of Court Experts) undertook a similar process in 2018, see https:// 
lrgd.nl.
9.7 Although formal academic certification of practitioners in various disciplines 
and accreditation of digital forensic processes are relatively common among the 
digital forensic community, there is, at the time of writing, a noticeable absence of 
such accreditation for the process of ‘cloud forensics’ and other evidence obtained 
online or through, for example, social media. In this regard, rather than qualifications 
to use commercial tools, academic qualifications that teach fundamental principles 
of preservation, continuity, critical thinking and verification can be applied to 
‘cloud’ forensics. However, there are a number of significant and unique challenges 
when dealing with data obtained online, not least of which is the fact that potential 
evidence held by a service provider may not be preserved in the normal manner when 
creating an image or snapshot of the target storage or computer platform. To this end, 
frameworks1 are being developed for cloud forensics evidence collection and analysis 
using security information and event management that draw upon research by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),2 specifically the NIST Cloud 
Computing Forensic Science Working Group.
1 Muhammad Irfan, Haider Abbas, Yunchuan Sun, Anam Sajid and Maruf Pasha, ‘A framework for 
cloud forensics evidence collection and analysis using security information and event management’, 
Security Comm. Networks (2016), 9:3790- 3807, https:// onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/ pdf/ 10.1002/ 
sec.1538; https:// doi.org/ 10.1002/ sec.1538.
2 Martin Herman, Michaela Iorga, Ahsen Michael Salim, Robert H. Jackson, Mark R. Hurst, Ross Leo, 
Richard Lee, Nancy M. Landreville, Anand Kumar Mishra, Yien Wang and Rodrigo Sardinas, NIST Cloud 
Computing Forensic Science Challenges (NISTIR 8006, August 2020), https:doi.org/10.6028/NIST.
IR.8006.
Guidelines for handling digital evidence
9.8 Along with the benefits of consistency and uniformity arising from accreditation, 
numerous guidelines have been produced, premised on uniformity and standardization 
of procedures that are relevant to the collection and handling of electronic evidence. In 
1995 the International Organization on Computer Evidence was established to provide 
international law enforcement authorities with a forum to facilitate the exchange of 
information relating to computer crime investigations and other issues relating to digital 
forensic investigations.1 This organization, together with several other UK authorities, 
including the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the National High- Tech 
Crime Unit, have produced a number of guidelines for the investigation and examination 
of electronic evidence within a criminal context. Although various sets of guidelines 
have, in the main, been produced specifically for criminal investigations, nevertheless 
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1 See also N. Dudley- Gough, ‘Digital forensic certification board’ (2006) 3(1) Digital Investigation 7; 
Amber Schroader and N. Dudley- Gough, ‘The Institute of Computer Forensic Professionals’ (2006) 3(1) 
Digital Investigation 9; note also the European Informatics Data Exchange Framework for Court and 
Evidence, a project running for 32 months (March 2014– October 2016), http:// www.evidenceproject.eu.
2 Casey, Digital Evidence, 230, indicates that the most mature and practical guidelines are those 
produced by ACPO.
9.9 In April 2020 the UK Forensic Science Regulator published an informational 
guidance document entitled Legal Obligations Issue 8.1 This provides a relatively high- 
level overview of the obligations placed on expert witnesses in the Criminal Justice 
System in England and Wales. Contemporary guidelines include documents from 
Australia and New Zealand,2 the United Kingdom,3 the USA,4 Europe,5 Asia6 and ISO/ 
IEC Standards.7 Likewise, INTERPOL has also established the Global Guidelines in 
relation to Digital Forensics Laboratories.8
1 Forensic Science Regulator Legal Obligations (FSR- I- 400, Issue 8, 2020), https:// www.gov.uk/ 
government/ publications/ legal- obligations- issue- 8.
2 Australia and New Zealand Guidelines for Digital Imaging Processes (2013, ANZPAA), https:// 
www.anzpaa.org.au/ ArticleDocuments/ 180/ 2013%20Australia%20and%20New%20Zealand%20
Guidelines%20for%20Digital%20Imaging%20Processes.pdf.aspx.
3 UK ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence, https:// www.digital- detective.net/ digital- 
forensics- documents/ ACPO_ Good_ Practice_ Guide_ for_ Digital_ Evidence_ v5.pdf.
4 National Institute of Justice, Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for Law 
Enforcement, US Department of Justice, 2004, https:// www.ncjrs.gov/ pdffiles1/ nij/ 199408.pdf.
5 European Union, European Anti- Fraud Office, Guidelines on Digital Forensic Procedures for OLAF 
Staff, 2016, https:// ec.europa.eu/ anti- fraud/ sites/ antifraud/ files/ guidelines_ en.pdf.
6 For example, see China – Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China (2019) Rules 
on Collection of Electronic Data by Public Security Bureau when Handling Criminal Cases and (2016) 
Rules on Electronic Data Collection, Extraction and Review in Criminal Cases.
7 ISO/ IEC 27037:2012 [ISO/ IEC 27037:2012] ‘Information technology — Security techniques — 
Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence’ (confirmed in 
2018), https:// www.iso.org/ standard/ 44381.html.
8 INTERPOL, 2019 Global Guidelines by INTERPOL for Digital Forensics Laboratories, https:// 
www.interpol.int/ content/ download/ 13501/ file/ INTERPOL_ DFL_ GlobalGuidelinesDigitalForensics 
Laboratory.pdf.
Handling electronic evidence
9.10 As with any other form of evidence, there are a number of discrete elements 
that accompany the collection and handling of digital evidence. It is suggested that 
a digital evidence professional should, ideally, undertake her duties against the 
highest standards that are propounded by her peers, regardless of whether she is 
assisting in a criminal or civil matter. In Bilta (UK) Limited (in Liquidation) v Nazir,1 
Lewison J indicated that he did not consider it an automatic requirement that parties 
to civil proceedings have to subject hard drives to forensic discovery techniques. It is 
debatable whether it is wise not to subject hard drives to forensic search techniques, 
as demonstrated in the case of In the matter of Stanford International Bank Limited 
(in liquidation), Fundora v Hamilton- Smith.2 This was an application for the discharge 
of the appointed Joint Official Liquidators of Stanford International Bank Limited and 
other parties on the basis that, among other reasons, they destroyed digital data and 
employed improper practices in relation to computer and electronic data.3 The precise 
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The matters which tell [sic] to be considered can be narrowed down to the 
following: (a) three servers at the Montreal office of SIB were not imaged and not 
copied, (b) four desktops and laptops were not imaged but were securely erased, 
(c) the email servers and Blackberry enterprise servers were not imaged; (d) the 
IT specialists did not appear to have been instructed by the Liquidators to search 
for, collect and image the Blackberrys and data sticks.4
1 [2010] EWHC 1086 (Ch), [2010] Bus LR 1634, [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 29, [2010] 5 WLUK 368, 
[2010] CLY 420.
2 2– 3 March and 8 June 2010, Claim Number ANUHCV2009/ 0149 Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court 
in the High Court of Justice Antigua and Barbuda; the judgment is available at http:// www.eccourts.
org/ wp- content/ files_ mf/ 1358795765_ magicfields_ pdf_ file_ upload_ 1_ 1.pdf and the Court of Appeal 
decision is available at http:// www.eccourts.org/ wp- content/ files_ mf/ 1358779099_ magicfields_ pdf_ 
file_ upload_ 1_ 1.pdf; see also Stanford International Bank Ltd (In Receivership), Re [2010] EWCA Civ 
137, [2011] Ch 33, [2010] 3 WLR 941, [2010] Bus LR 1270, [2010] 2 WLUK 712, [2011] BCC 211, 
[2010] Lloyd’s Rep FC 357, [2010] BPIR 679, [2010] CLY 1873, also known as Serious Fraud Office v 
Wastell, Janvey v Wastell, Stanford International Bank Ltd v Director of the Serious Fraud Office.
3 Discussed at [44]– [115] of the judgment.
4 At [50] of the judgment.
9.11 After considering the relevant ACPO guidelines at the material time, Thomas 
J decided that the action of the Joint Official Liquidators was not in accordance with 
standard forensic practice, and in so doing, they acted improperly. To this extent, the 
various guidelines put forward as best practices provide sound advice and guidance 
when dealing with electronic evidence, and if followed, they can serve to counter 
allegations that the evidence has not been gathered or dealt with properly.
9.12 In Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v Russia,1 a case before the European Court of 
Human Rights, the defence raised a number of important issues challenging the 
electronic evidence sought to be admitted that related to the volatile and mutable 
nature of such evidence. It alleged, among other things, that the hard drives that were 
seized had not been properly packed and sealed, so it was possible to add information 
to them while the drives were in the possession of the General Prosecutor of the 
Russian Federation,2 as the investigators discovered more files on the drives than there 
were on the same drives when examined by the experts,3 that the drives and the list of 
files discovered by the prosecution were not attached by the General Prosecutor to the 
case materials, and that there was no evidence that documented the continuity of the 
evidence.4 In concluding that these deficiencies were not relevant, the court said:
Possible discrepancies in the documents describing the amount of data contained 
on the hard drives, inaccuracies as to the exact location of the computer servers, 
and other defects complained of may have various explanations. The Court 
cannot detect any manifest flaw in the process of seizing and examining the hard 
drives which would make the information obtained from them unfit for use at 
the trial.5
1 11082/ 06 and 13772/ 05 – [2013] ECHR 747 (25 July 2013).
2 11082/ 06 and 13772/ 05 – [2013] ECHR 747 (25 July 2013) at [72]. When examining the hard 
drives seized during the searches of 9 October 2003, the investigators discovered 4,939 more files on 
the drives than those examined by the experts: 11082/ 06 and 13772/ 05 – [2013] ECHR 747 (25 July 
2013) at [181].
3 11082/ 06 and 13772/ 05 – [2013] ECHR 747 (25 July 2013) at [679].
4 11082/ 06 and 13772/ 05 – [2013] ECHR 747 (25 July 2013) at [678].
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9.13 In our opinion, this decision fails to emphasize the importance of professional 
digital forensics when seizing data in digital form. From a technical perspective, a hash 
value, calculated on site upon taking a forensic image of the hard drives that have been 
seized (or, if this is impossible, shortly thereafter), could have easily served as proof 
of the evidence having been untouched since it was first acquired (provided that the 
hash was kept securely or communicated to the defence or suspect at an early stage). 
However, there was no indication that the court relied upon, or the defence proffered, 
such evidence in support of such a conclusion.
9.14 Notwithstanding the preference for an original forensic image, or a 
demonstration of full and complete provenance, together with contemporaneous 
notes beginning from the source of the evidence, it may still be possible to prove the 
authenticity of certain types of digital evidence beyond doubt. One example of such a 
method is the examination of email messages which are downloaded to a USB drive. 
In such circumstances, it may not be possible to establish direct continuity from the 
computer or server on which the original email messages were created or transmitted 
before they were downloaded to the USB drive. Neither is it possible to obtain a 
forensic image of the senders’ or receivers’ computers. Therefore, the authenticity of 
the email messages and any attachments may be called into question. However, if an 
email message contains a DKIM1 (Domain Keys Identified Mail) signature, it is possible 
to establish beyond doubt that the message and any attachment is authentic and has 
not been modified since it was sent, regardless of how it has been handled since.2 This 
is because DKIM is one of the authentication methods used by mailbox providers to 
determine that an email was sent from a particular email account.3
1 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 6376 – Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM), https:// 
tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc6376. Updated by RFCs 8301, 8463, 8553 and 8616.
2 Organizations wishing to sign mail by way of DKIM will first generate two cryptographic keys. One 
of the keys is kept private and available to the sending server for the signing of mail, and the other is 
made public in the DNS (Domain Name System) for use by receiving domains in attempts to validate 
the signature. By using this cryptographic key exchange and the same validation mechanisms used 
by the original sender’s domain, it is possible to revalidate the content of the email message using 
the original sender domain cryptographic DKIM keys to recalculate the DKIM signature. If the DKIM 
signature can be reverified, not only is the content of the email message submitted for examination 
identical to the original message sent, including any attachments, but it also confirms the date and time 
of transmission, the subject line and the sender and recipient email addresses. An email message with a 
successfully revalidated DKIM signature can be considered to have similar veracity to a forensic image 
of the message.
3 Even this need not be true. It depends very much on how users and senders are authenticated and 
how relaying is allowed on the system involved. DKIM is merely a pipeline: everything that goes in one 
end comes out the other signed.
9.15 However, in other cases the application of cryptographic hashing or other 
cryptographically sound acquisition techniques is difficult, if not impossible. 
Increasingly, evidence procured from large computing platforms and cloud services 
will require testing by digital evidence professionals.1 Another way to prove the data is 
to rely on a third party – such as the service provider – that controls the storage of data. 
This means that rather than relying on an operating procedure for acquiring evidence, 
the provenance and trustworthiness of the provider become relevant.
1 An example is a case where Facebook was asked to provide the IP address of the poster of 
what is called ‘revenge porn’ (sexually explicit material typically posted after a break- up or end of 
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publisher’, The Guardian, 26 June 2015, https:// www.theguardian.com/ technology/ 2015/ jun/ 26/ 
facebook- ordered- by- dutch- court- to- identify- revenge- porn- publisher and ‘Facebook to give access 
to two revenge porn investigators’, NL Times, 6 November 2015, https:// nltimes.nl/ 2015/ 11/ 06/ 
facebook- give- access- two- revenge- porn- investigators.
Identifying electronic evidence
9.16 The first sign that something is wrong may be in the form of electronic evidence. 
For instance, a security administrator in a bank might consider an investigation necessary 
when the intrusion detection system sets off an alarm, or where the email logs indicate 
that a particular member of staff is receiving an excessive number of emails during the 
course of a day or over an extended period. The case of Miseroy v Barclays Bank plc1 is 
illustrative. In July 2002 a formal investigation was initiated because an employee of 
Barclaycard appeared to be receiving a disproportionate number of emails during the 
day. The audit of the emails sent and received by three employees showed that one 
Mr Miseroy, who was with the Fraud Prevention Department, had sent a significant 
number of emails. As a result, he was also included in the investigation. After a series of 
investigatory meetings, it was concluded that Mr Miseroy had abused the email facilities 
by sending out an unwarranted number of personal emails, in breach of the Group IT 
Security Policies regarding the use of corporate email facilities. Some of the emails he 
sent out included content that was derogatory, offensive and sexist, which Mr Miseroy 
admitted was not appropriate. The investigations also showed emails exchanged between 
him and a manager in a different department, in which Mr Miseroy had arranged to pass 
cannabis to that manager. It was also determined that Mr Miseroy disclosed confidential 
information regarding Barclay’s operations and customers. Mr Miseroy was summarily 
dismissed for gross misconduct, and the members of the tribunal accepted that his 
dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer in 
relation to the circumstances of the case.
1 (Case No 1201894/ 2002) (18 March 2003, unreported) Bedford employment tribunal.
9.17 Such a case, where the source and reliability of evidence that something is 
wrong needs to be assessed, will require an investigation into the facts. At such an early 
stage, the actions of the investigator may inadvertently change the electronic evidence 
itself. For instance, in the case of Aston Investments Limited v OJSC Russian Aluminium 
(Rusal),1 the actions of the IT administrators caused important files and information 
to be removed, and subsequent forensic examination ran into difficulties because 
of the unintended changes made to the system. This is why it is essential to have an 
appropriate procedure in place to deal with the way an investigation is initiated and 
conducted, whether by way of civil proceedings, where there is an obligation for each 
party to disclose documents relating to matters in question under the Civil Procedure 
Rules,2 or in criminal matters, where the relevant investigating authorities have both 
common law and statutory powers to search and seize evidence. In the criminal 
context, investigating police officers will be expected to have conducted themselves 
in accordance with recognized guides for their jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom, 
ACPO3 has produced the ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence (ACPO Guide).4 
The ACPO Guide sets out the four main phases for handling electronic evidence – 
collection, examination, analysis and reporting – and concentrates on the collection 
phase. A digital evidence professional should consider adopting the practices for the 
four phases of his investigations. With the advent of forensic triage techniques, these 
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1 [2006] EWHC 2545 (Comm), [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 857, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 311, [2006] 10 
WLUK 470, [2006] 2 CLC 739, [2006] Info TLR 269, Times, 31 October 2006, [2007] CLY 684.
2 For a discussion of some flaws in the legal and forensic process, see Vlasti Broucek, Paul Turner 
and Sandra Frings, ‘Music piracy, universities and the Australian Federal Court: Issues for forensic 
computing specialists’ (2005) 21(1) Computer Law & Security Report 30.
3 ACPO was replaced in 2015 by a new body, the National Police Chiefs’ Council. This was set up 
under a police collaboration agreement under the provisions of s 22A of the Police Act 1996. The 
acronym ACPO will continue to be used in this chapter, because the current version of the guidelines 
predated the formation of the National Police Chiefs’ Council.
4 (March 2012, v5), http:// library.college.police.uk/ docs/ acpo/ digital- evidence- 2012.pdf.
9.18 While the following discussion concentrates on matters relating to electronic 
evidence in the context of a criminal investigation, the reader will readily acknowledge 
the relevance of the discussion in the context of a civil matter when undertaking work 
in the disclosure phase of a civil action.1
1 The tension between forensics and investigations is discussed, among other things, in Monique 
Mattei Ferraro and Andrew Russell, ‘Current issues confronting well- established computer- assisted 
child exploitation and computer crime task forces’ (2004) 1(1) Digital Investigation 7.
Gathering electronic evidence
9.19 Once it has been established that it is necessary to seize or gather evidence in 
digital form, a further set of procedures should be in place to guide the digital evidence 
professional with respect to the scene or information itself, including the identification 
and seizure or acquisition of the evidence as necessary.1 Where a physical crime scene 
is involved, it is now a well- established practice that the scene should be photographed, 
or even recorded by video, and the layout of the hardware recorded in relation to the 
scene. The investigator then needs to determine what, if any, physical evidence, such 
as computers, printers, computer mice or facsimile machines, should be retained 
(the ACPO Guide provides a list of the types of hardware and storage devices that are 
susceptible to being retained).2 It is important to not permit anybody to disturb the 
hardware or the network, or work on any computer. It is also advisable that the police 
officers engaged in searching for digital evidence be properly trained.3
1 For a brief discussion about gathering evidence and issues surrounding personal privacy, see 
María Verónica Péez Asinari, ‘Legal constraints for the protection of privacy and personal data in 
electronic evidence handling’ (2004) 18(2) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 231.
2 Brian Carrier and Eugene H. Spafford, ‘Getting physical with the digital evidence process’ (2003) 
2(2) International Journal of Digital Evidence.
3 Although Harvey J in the District Court, Manakau in Canada, ruled that digital evidence was not 
necessarily rendered inadmissible because the accuracy of the data might have been jeopardized where 
a police officer, with full knowledge of the relevant guidelines, chose to ignore them. In this instance, 
during the search of premises a police officer switched on a computer and took 45 minutes to search 
various files stored on it: R v Good [2005] DCR 804. For problems when investigating mainframes 
and very large systems, see Matthew Pemble, ‘Investigating around mainframes and other high- end 
systems: the revenge of big iron’ (2004) 1(2) Digital Investigation 90.
9.20 The problem with digital evidence is the ease by which the data can be altered 
or destroyed. Digital devices are volatile instruments. For instance, the random access 
memory in a computer will contain a great deal of information relating to the state 
of the computer, such as the processes that are running, whether the computer is 
connected to the Internet and what file systems are being used. When a computer 
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lost. Depending on the circumstances of the case being investigated, it may be very 
important to retain such data before the computer is switched off or simply unplugged 
from the electricity supply. This question is becoming increasingly important because 
of the ready availability of encryption utilities that are easy to use, and the increasing 
availability of low- cost hard disks that include whole disk encryption as a matter of 
course. The preservation of a forensic copy of a computer system’s RAM may be the only 
way of gaining investigative access to the contents of a target device whose content is 
encrypted with complex keys.1 Indeed, there may be occasions when great care should 
be taken when arresting suspects physically at a computer, because it is possible that 
they might switch off the computer and disrupt or delete any incriminating files before 
any preventative action can be taken, as in the case of Aleksei Kostap. He was arrested by 
members of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, who attached handcuffs to him, 
but with his hands in front of his body. According to a press report, he managed to take 
action that caused certain databases to be deleted. It was thought the databases might 
have contained records of the gang’s activities. Apparently, while handcuffed, Kostap 
also acted to initiate the use of intricate layers of encryption on various computer 
systems, which experts were not able to decrypt.2 In addition, new developments in 
the methods used to store data on storage devices may cause problems in the future. 
Graeme B. Bell and Richard Boddington have demonstrated that:
Evidence stored on modern internal primary storage devices can be subject to a 
process we label ‘self- corrosion’. What is meant by this is that even in the absence 
of computer instructions, a modern solid- state storage device can permanently 
destroy evidence to a quite remarkable degree, during a short space of time, in 
a manner that a magnetic hard drive would not. Here, the phenomenon of solid- 
state drive (SSD) self- corrosion is proven to exist through experimentation using 
real world consumer hardware in an experimentally reproducible environment.3
1 Casey, Digital Evidence, 478.
2 Tom Espiner, ‘Jailed ID thieves thwart cops with crypto’, ZEDNet UK (19 December 2006).
3 ‘Solid state drives’; Ravi Kant Chaurasia and Priyanka Sharma, ‘Solid state drive (SSD) forensics 
analysis: a new challenge’ (2017) 2(6) International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science, 
Engineering and Information Technology 1; Ravi Kant Chaurasia and Priyanka Sharma, ‘Solid state 
drive (SSD) forensics analysis: a new challenge’ (2017) 2(6) International Journal of Scientific Research 
in Computer Science, Engineering and Information Technology 1081; Shiva Sai Ram Marupudi, ‘Solid 
state drive: new challenge for forensic investigation’ (2017) 30 Culminating Projects in Information 
Assurance, https:// repository.stcloudstate.edu/ msia_ etds/ 30.
9.21 The authors provide the observations in this chapter for the guidance and 
assistance of professionals involved in facilitating the proof of digital evidence.
9.22 While it may be convenient to consider preservation of ‘cloud storage’ as 
analogous to preservation of data on a hard disk in a computer, this is not the case. 
Cloud service providers make computing infrastructure available as virtualized 
components that can be connected using virtualized networking infrastructure. It is 
usually possible, given enough privileges, to quickly preserve the state and contents 
of a virtual machine, its volatile memory and any block storage attached to it. But that 
is not the whole picture. In such virtualized environments, data of material relevance 
such as access and event logs may be available only to the members of staff of the 
service provider. Therefore, identifying and preserving the contents of volatile data 
and attached storage accessible to the victim(s) or suspect(s) but failing to have the 
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the most important facts about the evidence and thus potentially undermine the ability 
to prove the case.
Gathering of data following legal retention or reporting 
obligations
9.23 In other cases, metadata and logs are retained by service providers who 
follow a legal requirement. This is often the case for identifying information such 
as IP addresses, telephone numbers and related subscriber information, and in the 
UK this was extended to data on sites visited on the Internet.1 Where such legal 
obligations exist, other safeguards will typically apply, and an assumption can be 
made about the accuracy of the data that is provided by a service provider. Such data, 
and the process of access and acquisition or reporting, are often subject to different 
legislative requirements such as privacy legislation, safeguards and obligations set 
out in telecommunications legislation or data retention regimes.2 In such cases, the 
probative value and admissibility will increasingly depend on the reliability of the 
service provider. In some cases, special accreditations or security checks are required 
for members of staff who work with this data or analyse it. In other cases, the related 
infrastructure is subject to audit requirements.
1 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 62(7) reads: ‘In this Act “internet connection record” means 
communications data which – (a) may be used to identify, or assist in identifying, a telecommunications 
service to which a communication is transmitted by means of a telecommunication system for the 
purpose of obtaining access to, or running, a computer file or computer program, and (b) comprises 
data generated or processed by a telecommunications operator in the process of supplying the 
telecommunications service to the sender of the communication (whether or not a person)’.
2 The legal basis of data retention can affect an investigation, in particular the attribution of an IP 
address. It appears that the Court of Justice of the European Union understands this position, but up to 
this point in time has invalidated a number of data protection regimes, which has caused considerable 
uncertainty for investigators, for which see Joined Cases C- 203/ 15, Tele2 Sverige, and C- 698/ 15, Tom 
Watson and Others; as well as currently pending cases: C- 623/ 17 – A request for a preliminary ruling by 
the Investigatory Powers Tribunal of the UK concerning data retention in terrorism cases. C- 520/ 18, a 
request for a preliminary ruling by the Belgian Constitutional Court concerns the questions concerning 
the admissibility of a general data retention scheme; and lastly Cases C- 511/ 18 and C- 512/ 18, both 
requests for a preliminary ruling of the French Conseil d’Etat which concern the legal framework for 
data retention for criminal investigations and for data retention for intelligence services.
Internet of Things data and sensors
9.24 A wide variety of sensors can be found at crime scenes, depending on how 
many devices are connected to the Internet. Due to the increasing number of sensors, 
a wide array of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is becoming available and may contain 
evidence which can assist in the proof of a crime. The analysis of this data, which is 
sometimes also present at service providers (located ‘in the cloud’), can present a 
unique set of problems.
9.25 Location data, health data and other types of sensor may not be easy to 
interpret and will often require contextual analysis and interpretation. For example, 
location data may be important in the investigation of a murder that is alleged to have 
occurred in a park at a certain hour. The presence of data recorded within a personal 
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ten minutes of each other, may, at first sight, be indicative of a suspect’s presence 
at the crime scene. However, it may also be indicative of a loved one slowly driving 
around half the park by car, in ten minutes, to see if the victim is to be found. The 
accuracy, measurement interval and behaviour of the services involved (which may, for 
example, store the closest destination, such as the park entrance gates) and evidence 
from other sensors (such as the connections to the car radio and navigation by way of 
wireless technologies like Bluetooth) may serve as corroborating evidence of such a 
defence.1 Each of the available sensors in modern- day IoT devices has its own accuracy, 
measurement interval and data storage mechanisms, and, therefore, evidential value. 
A detailed knowledge of and access to significant testing facilities is needed to stay 
abreast of developments in this field and in order to understand the behaviour of 
devices in the IoT ecosystem.2
1 By way of example relating to the accuracy of mobile telephone locations, see Matthew Tart, Iain 
Brodie, Nicholas Gleed and James Matthews, ‘Historic cell site analysis – overview of principles and 
survey methodologies’ (2012) 8(3– 4) Digital Investigation 185; R. P. Coutts and H. Selby, ‘Problems 
with cell phone evidence tendered to “prove” the location of a person at a point in time’ (2016) 13 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 76; Reg Coutts and Hugh Selby, ‘ “Mobile ping 
data” – metadata for tracking’ (2017) 14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 22; 
Matthew Tart, Sue Pope, David Baldwin and Robert Bird, ‘Cell site analysis: roles and interpretation’ 
(2019) 59(5) Science & Justice 558; Matthew Tart, ‘Opinion evidence in cell site analysis’ (2020) 60(4) 
Science & Justice 363; in R. v Turner (Andrew Neil) [2020] EWCA Crim 1241, [2020] 9 WLUK 308, 
where a mobile telephone analyst provided evidence that was tantamount to expert evidence in which 
the members of a jury were presented with the appearance of cell site analysis, and then invited to infer 
facts without any knowledge of the technical knowledge required to substantiate any conclusions – this 
was wrongly upheld by the Court of Appeal. On similar facts, a differently composed Court of Appeal 
determined the position correctly in R. v Calland (Sean Thomas) [2017] EWCA Crim 2308, [2017] 12 
WLUK 706.
2 Compare, for example: M. J. Sorell and K. Hovhannisyan, ‘Arkangel: investigation of children’s 
tracking smartwatch ecosystem. Forensic value and privacy implications’, in Proceedings of the 4th 
Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Workshop 2018, Tallinn University of Technology, 60– 62; M. DeVries 
and M. J. Sorell, ‘Biometric profiling of wearable devices for medical monitoring and authentication’ in 
Proceedings of the 4th Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Workshop 2018, Tallinn University of Technology, 
46– 48; Ibrahim Baggili, Jeff Oduru, Kyle Anthony, Frank Breitinger and Glenn Mcgee, ‘Watch what 
you wear: preliminary forensic analysis of smart watches’, 2015 10th International Conference on 
Availability, Reliability and Security, IEEE Explore (2015) 10.1109/ ARES.2015.39.
Gathering data through network searches
9.26 The initiation of advanced encryption has significantly decreased the value 
of evidence gathered from traditional police powers, such as lawfully authorized 
interception. The advent of end- to- end encryption has led to the introduction, 
in many countries, of the power to conduct remote searches. These include the 
use – or exploitation – of software vulnerabilities in order to gain access to the systems 
involved. The evidence obtained through this method is difficult to evaluate, because 
it is typically obtained in an end user device without the user being aware of the fact 
that the device was deliberately being made use of. While it may be assumed that law 
enforcement authorities may be the only parties with legitimate access to a device, 
other third parties may also have authorized access. Attribution of any data and 
evidence found on the device is therefore more difficult, due to the existence of such 
an exploitable vulnerability. The value of this type of evidence can be improved where 
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Copying electronic evidence
9.27 The process of acquiring, copying and handling electronic evidence should be 
carried out to the highest standards, regardless of whether the source is a hard disk, 
mobile device or cloud- based resources. Several commonly applied best practices and 
principles are relevant to this process and the four principles of handling computer- 
based electronic evidence as set out in the ACPO Guide illustrate the importance of the 
data collection phase of this process:1
Principle 1: No action taken by law enforcement agencies, persons employed 
within those agencies or their agents should change data which may subsequently 
be relied upon in court.
Principle 2: In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original 
data, that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence 
explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions.
Principle 3: An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to digital 
evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third party should 
be able to examine those processes and achieve the same result.
Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility 
for ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered to.
1 See Casey, Digital Evidence, 471 for a further discussion of documentation and a sample 
preservation form.
9.28 The problem of what types of electronic evidence and hardware to seize and 
retain can be compounded where a computer or an entire system of computers 
is linked to a network, and the sources of electronic evidence exist in a number of 
separate geographical locations. In such circumstances, and before taking any action, 
it will be necessary to ascertain whether it is possible or feasible to shut the network 
down. In most instances, this will not be an option. The investigators will need to be 
aware of the range of original data that might be required, should they be presented 
with such a situation. This will include establishing the topology of the network that is 
to be investigated for the data, especially if a system administrator will not cooperate. 
For instance, it will probably be necessary to establish the number of computers on a 
network, and the various types of network connection such as the Internet, cellular 
data networks and wireless connections that are available on the network. In the 
case of cloud- based resources where the user is not cooperative or unaware of the 
investigation, it will be necessary to engage with the cloud service provider’s team to 
obtain the required information and, with the appropriate authorities, gain access to 
the data of interest.
9.29 Professor Casey posits two empirical laws of electronic evidence collection that 
ought to be high on the agenda:
Empirical Law of Digital Evidence Collection and Preservation 1: If you only make 
one copy of digital evidence, that evidence will be damaged or completely lost.
Empirical Law of Digital Evidence Collection and Preservation 2: A forensic 
acquisition should contain at least the data that is accessible to a regular user of 
the computer.1






Proof: the technical collection and examination of electronic evidence 441
9.30 To ensure a complete copy of a disk is obtained, Professor Casey recommends 
taking a bitstream copy of the electronic evidence.1 As a result, the copy will include 
information that will normally enable a digital evidence professional to reconstruct 
deleted files, depending on the storage technology that was used. In circumstances 
where the volume of digital data is so large or its storage is so complex that copying it 
in its entirety is not possible,2 it is generally accepted that copies of selected data may 
be made, provided the data that is copied can be shown to be an accurate and an exact 
duplicate of the data that is the subject of copying, frequently referred to as ‘first in 
time evidence’. Many methods exist for achieving this, including the use of proprietary 
‘logical evidence file formats’ of common forensic tools.
1 Casey, Digital Evidence, 482. A bitstream copy or image is a ‘sector- by- sector’ or ‘bit- by- bit’ copy of 
a computer’s hard drive. In non- technical terms, a bitstream image is a set of files which also preserves 
latent data. The image can be used to create an exact copy of a hard drive. A bitstream image is readable 
by most tools that the digital forensics professional will use.
2 This is reflected in the Supplementary Attorney General’s Guidelines On Disclosure: Digitally Stored 
Material (14 July 2011), para 12.
9.31 In addition to Professor Casey’s empirical laws of electronic evidence collection, 
there are two fundamental principles to be observed by a digital evidence professional 
when copying electronic evidence:
(i) The process of making the image should not alter the first in time evidence. 
This means that appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that the process 
used to take the image should not write any data to the original medium.
(ii) The process of copying data should produce an exact copy of the first in time 
evidence. Such a reproduction should allow the specialist to investigate the files 
in the way that they existed on the original medium.1
1 Troy Larson, ‘The other side of civil discovery: disclosure and production of electronic records’, 
in Eoghan Casey (ed), Handbook of Computer Crime Investigation: Forensic Tools and Technology 
(Academic 2007), 35.
9.32 To ensure the first in time evidence and the copy are the same, the data should 
undergo a hashing process, described below. The reason for establishing hash values 
for data, including the time and date stamps of each file, is that this information will 
serve as a reference for checking the authenticity or veracity of the files after they have 
been copied.
9.33 The quality of digital files that are copied can be crucial. In the case of The Gates 
Rubber Company v Bando Chemical Industries Limited,1 Schlatter MJ commented on the 
evidence of two digital evidence experts. The judge was impressed by the ‘credentials, 
experience and knowledge’ of Bando’s expert Wedig, and indicated in his decision that 
he relied on his opinions. As Gates failed to obtain an expert in a timely fashion, much 
less weight was placed on its expert.2 Gates’ expert Voorhees also failed to undertake 
appropriate measures to secure the first in time evidence. Schlatter MJ’s judgment is 
quoted more fully to illustrate this point:
Gates argued that Voorhees did an adequate job of copying the Denver computer. 
Wedig persuaded me, however, that Voorhees lost, or failed to capture, important 
information because of an inadequate effort. In using Norton’s Unerase, Voorhees 
unnecessarily copied this program onto the Denver computer first, and thereby 
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Wedig noted that information which is introduced into a computer is distributed, 
in a random manner, to space which is not being used, or to space which contains 
a deleted file and is therefore available for use. To use Norton’s Unerase, it was 
unnecessary for Voorhees to copy it onto the hard drive of the Denver computer. 
By doing so, however, the program obliterated, at random, 7 to 8 percent of the 
information which would otherwise have been available. No one can ever know 
what items were overwritten by the Unerase program.
Additionally, Voorhees did not obtain the creation dates of certain of the 
files which overwrote deleted files. This information would have assisted in 
determining the deletion date of some files. If a deleted file has been overwritten 
by a file which was created prior to the Gates litigation, for example, Bando 
would be relieved of suspicion as to that file. Thus, failure to obtain the creation 
dates of files represented a failure to preserve evidence which would have been 
important to Bando in its efforts to resist Gates’ motions for default judgment.
Wedig pointed out that Voorhees should have done an ‘image backup’ of the hard 
drive, which would have collected every piece of information on the hard drive, 
whether the information was allocated as a file or not. Instead, Voorhees did a 
‘file by file’ backup, which copies only existing, nondeleted files on the hard drive. 
The technology for an image backup was available at the time of these events, 
though rarely used by anyone. Wedig testified that Gates was collecting evidence 
for judicial purposes; therefore, Gates had a duty to utilize the method which 
would yield the most complete and accurate results. I agree with Wedig. In these 
circumstances, Gates failed to preserve evidence in the most appropriate manner. 
Gates’ failure to obtain an image backup of the computer is a factor which I have 
weighed against Gates as I considered a number of the claims which Gates has 
asserted.3
1 167 F.R.D. 90 (D.Colo. 1996).
2 167 F.R.D. 90 (D.Colo. 1996) at 111(a).
3 167 F.R.D. 90 (D.Colo. 1996) at 112(a) and (b).
9.34 Although the tools and techniques used by digital evidence professionals are 
constantly changing and improving, the comments made by the judge in this case 
illustrate a very clear point: when electronic evidence is copied, the techniques that 
are used ought to comply with the highest possible standards for the evidence to 
have any probative value in legal proceedings. However, it must be emphasized that 
there will be occasions when the investigator is faced with a unique situation such 
that she can only apply her knowledge to the best of her ability in seizing data in as 
forensic a way as possible. One example would be a live banking system. The system 
might be stored on hundreds of servers in a data centre that is the size of a football 
field, and the data will be changing every second. No existing guidelines cover such an 
eventuality, which is why the investigator must make decisions based on principles of 
good practice.1
1 For a sample imaging procedure, see Larson, ‘The other side of civil discovery’, 36– 37; Barbara 
Guttman, James R. Lyle and Richard Ayers, ‘Ten years of computer forensic tool testing’ (2011) 8 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 139.
9.35 An examination of the surrounding area of the scene, including any materials 
that are likely to be relevant to disclosure or a criminal investigation, is also important. 
For instance, in the case of R. v Pecciarich1 the police seized a number of documents, 
catalogues and a scrapbook of newspaper articles concerning trials of sexual assault 








Proof: the technical collection and examination of electronic evidence 443
material constituted real evidence. It was also considered, as Sparrow J determined, 
to be circumstantial evidence to support the allegations that Pecciarich distributed 
abusive digital images of children, which were found on his computer and hardware 
devices. The relevance of materials found at the scene, including fingerprints and DNA 
samples taken directly from hardware devices, may become more obvious once the 
digital evidence professional has examined the electronic evidence in detail.
1 1995 CarswellOnt 504, [1995] OJ No 2238, 22 OR (3d) 748, 26 WCB (2d) 603.
Forensic triage
9.36 Preceding the investigation and examination of electronic evidence by 
digital evidence professionals is a technique known as ‘forensic triage’,1 which has 
received considerable attention within the forensic practitioner and law enforcement 
communities. Digital forensic triage is the term used to cover a range of processes, 
methodologies, software and hardware that can be used to enable people to prioritize 
their digital forensic investigations more effectively. Forensic triage is not suitable for 
every case. Users with appropriate training must use it in conjunction with appropriate 
risk assessment. Indeed, there are direct comparisons to be drawn in this regard with 
law enforcement processes and the medical profession. Applying the triage process, a 
police officer, trained in the use of a breath test meter, can use such a device to make 
informed decisions about a driver suspected of being intoxicated. The officer does not 
need to be an expert in the science embodied in the device but, instead, simply needs 
to be appropriately trained to configure, use and interpret the results it provides, and 
decide how best to take the investigation forward.
1 Marcus K. Rogers, James Goldman, Rick Mislan, Timothy Wedge and Steve Debrota, ‘Computer 
forensics field triage process model’ (2006) 1(2) Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law 19.
9.37 The UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory has reviewed various 
digital forensic triage methods: software, hardware and processes. These evaluations, 
although often focused on establishing if individual tools meet the claims made by the 
publishers, also test the effectiveness of the technology to preserve the integrity of 
the target media, to correctly identify specific digital artefacts and to produce results 
using other forensic techniques that would withstand scrutiny. The outcomes of these 
independent tests are made available to police and other authorities under various 
classification restrictions, allowing them to form opinions about the suitability of each 
tool for the given scenarios.
9.38 Digital forensic triage technologies and methods are in their infancy,1 and must 
take account of the need for appropriate training and accreditation. Similarly, suitable 
risk assessment is required in order to minimize the omission of relevant data. It could 
be argued that by not performing a full forensic examination of every piece of digital 
media found, vital evidence may be lost. An important consideration when employing 
digital triage techniques is the need to balance the rapid identification of material of 
interest and the consequence of stopping further analysis, in the knowledge that such 
a process may fail to identify exculpatory material or material of more significance.2 
Through the use of manual and automated techniques, digital forensics triage 
techniques have the potential for beneficial or non- degrading applications in a wide 
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abusive images of children (from which the digital triage process originated)3 through 
to copyright matters.4
1 Dr Faye Mitchell, ‘The use of artificial intelligence in digital forensics: an introduction’ (2010) 7 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 35.
2 Vacius Jusas, Darius Birvinskas and Elvar Gahramanov, ‘Methods and tools of digital triage in 
forensic context: survey and future directions’ (2017) 9(4) Symmetry 1, 49.
3 Jusas, Birvinskas and Gahramanov, ‘Methods and tools of digital triage in forensic context: survey 
and future directions’, 51.
4 David McLelland and Fabio Marturana, ‘A digital forensics triage methodology based on feature 
manipulation techniques’, 1st IEEE International Workshop on Secure Networking and Forensic 
Computing (SNFC2014), ICC2014, Sydney, Australia.
9.39 In the context of cloud computing, forensic triage techniques may be highly 
effective and appropriate, and can use the functionality of the cloud environment to 
standardize and automate a method of deployment. For instance, Amazon Web Services1 
suggest a programmatic use of triage as part of an automated incident response 
methodology. The inclusion of forensic controls such as hashing and comprehensive 
audit logging are available as standard options when such tasks are performed. Once 
such techniques and capabilities have been provisioned by practitioners with the 
appropriate skills and knowledge, any user with appropriate credentials can use them.
1 AWS Security Incident Response Guide published June 2020 by Amazon Web Services, https:// 
d1.awsstatic.com/ whitepapers/ aws_ security_ incident_ response.pdf.
Preserving electronic evidence
Validating digital data
9.40 Electronic evidence in particular needs to be validated if it is to have any 
probative value. A digital evidence professional will typically need to copy the contents 
from a number of disks or storage devices. To prove that the electronic evidence has not 
been altered from its source copy, it is necessary to put in place checks and balances to 
prove that the duplicate evidence is identical to its source. A method used to prove the 
integrity of source data at the time the evidence was collected is known as electronic 
fingerprinting or ‘hashing’.1 The electronic fingerprint uses a cryptographic technique 
that is capable of being associated with a single file, a floppy disk or the entire contents 
of a hard drive. A digital evidence professional should use software tools that are 
relevant to the task.2 Such software tools will invariably incorporate a program that 
causes a checksum operation called a hash function to be applied to the source file or 
disk that is being copied. When a hash function is applied to digital data, the result is 
called a hash value as it is calculated against the content of the data. The hash function 
is a one- way function, and is the mathematical equivalent of a secret trapdoor. For 
the purposes of understanding the concept, this algorithm is easy to compute in one 
direction and difficult to compute in the opposite direction.3 The hash function is used 
to verify that a source file or the copy of a file has not changed. If the file has been 
altered in any way, their hash values will not be the same, and the investigator will be 
alerted to the discrepancy.
1 Ovie Carroll and Mark Krotoski, ‘Using “digital fingerprints” (or hash values) for investigations and 
cases involving electronic evidence’ (2014) 62 US Attorney’s Bulletin 44.
2 This is not what occurred in State of Connecticut v Julie Amero (Docket number CR- 04- 93292; 
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detailed analysis of this case, see Stephen Mason (gen ed), International Electronic Evidence (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008), xxxvi– lxxv; compare with the actions of the 
digital evidence professional David Hendricks in Krause v State, 243 S.W.3d 95 (Tex.App. 2007), 2007 
WL 2004940.
3 It has yet to be proven that a mathematical function can have a one- way function: see Fred Piper, 
Simon Blake- Wilson and John Mitchell, Digital Signatures Security & Controls (Information Systems 
Audit and Control Foundation 1999), 16.
Hash collisions
9.41 There are many possible hashing algorithms that can be used to establish 
forensic veracity. For many years the MD5 (Message Digest 5) algorithm was used, 
but research conducted by Xiaoyun Wang and Hongbo Yu showed that it was possible 
to create two files with different content that produced the same MD5 value.1 The 
implications of this possibility quickly led to some debate in the forensic community. 
One common interpretation was that MD5 could no longer be trusted because an 
analyst might wrongly identify an innocent file as a known file (the identification 
issue) or deliberately modify a file and change its hash value back to the original (the 
verification issue). Another hypothesis was that a suspect could make all his bad 
files have the hash values of known system files, thereby avoiding detection. While 
theoretically possible, it is practically very difficult to achieve an MD5 hash collision, 
and doing so requires considerable computational time for files larger than a few 
hundred bytes. According to Stephens and others:
It is important to note that the hash value shared by the two different files is 
a result of the collision construction process. We cannot target a given hash 
value, and produce a (meaningful) input bit string hashing to that given value. 
In cryptographic terms: our attack is an attack on collision resistance, not on 
preimage or second preimage resistance. This implies that both colliding files 
have to be specially prepared by the attacker … Existing files with a known hash 
that have not been prepared in this way are not vulnerable.2
1 Xiaoyun Wang and Hongbo Yu, ‘How to break MD5 and other hash functions’, http:// merlot.usc.
edu/ csac- f06/ papers/ Wang05a.pdf; Arjen Lenstra, Xiaoyun Wang and Benne de Weger, Colliding X.509 
Certificates (version 1.0, 1 March 2005), http:// eprint.iacr.org/ 2005/ 067.pdf; the earliest research is 
Hans Dobbertin, ‘The status of MD5 after a recent attack’ (1996) 2(2) RSA Laboratories’ CryptoBytes 1, 
3– 6.
2 Marc Stevens, Arjen K. Lenstra and Benne de Weger, ‘Vulnerability of software integrity and code 
signing applications to chosen- prefix collisions for MD5’ (30 November 2007), http:// www.win.tue.nl/ 
hashclash/ SoftIntCodeSign/ .
9.42 In mathematical terms, an MD5 hash is 128 bits wide and therefore the 
probability of two files having the same MD5 value is 2- 128. Put another way, the 
probability of finding two files with the same MD5 value is one in just over 3x10- 39. 
That is once in 340 billion, billion, billion, billion comparisons. By contrast, an SHA- 
1 hash is 160 bits wide and so the probabilities decrease to once in every 6.8x10- 49 
comparisons. In other words, in realistic terms it is very hard to produce a ‘doctored 
copy’ of a larger digital evidence set that has the exact same MD5 or SHA- 1 hash value 
as the ‘original’ while still being ‘believable’. However, it is not impossible, as the 
recent practical technique for generating an SHA- 1 collision for PDF documents has 
demonstrated. It took the equivalent processing power of 6,500 years of single- CPU 
computations and 110 years of single- GPU computations, but resulted in a (believable) 
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1 Marc Stevens, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Ange Albertini and Yarik Markov, ‘The first collision 
for full SHA- 1’ (27 February 2017), https:// shattered.io/ static/ shattered.pdf; John Leyden, Thomas 
Claburn and Chris Williams, ‘ “First ever” SHA- 1 hash collision calculated. All it took were five clever 
brains ... and 6,610 years of processor time’, The Register, 23 February 2017.
9.43 The result of this debate is that, although the chance of an MD5 or SHA- 1 
collision is remote, best practice suggests creating two hash values for every file or 
forensic image when used for comparison. If only a single hash algorithm is used, SHA- 
256 would be better than MD5 or SHA- 1. Using both MD5 and SHA- 1 instead of a single 
SHA- 256 is mathematically more robust. Further logic for this approach is the fact 
that although there are no national or international standards that require SHA- 256 
in digital forensics, its use instead of MD5/ SHA- 1 would immediately render all global 
child sexual exploitation image databases, which use MD5 and SHA- 1 values, unusable. 
Furthermore, MD5 and SHA- 1 are still used and accepted by every law enforcement 
authority worldwide to perform the three essential forensic functions: to identify 
known indecent images, to exclude known files such as those in the National Software 
Reference Library hash keeper list and to verify that files have not been changed. In 
the light of the recent successful collision attack of SHA- 1, this practice may need to be 
reviewed. It is therefore advisable to retain first in time copies of any files that are to be 
identified in order to be able to recalculate hashes as algorithms become deprecated 
and new ones are introduced. For the purpose of detecting changes using digital 
signatures, SHA- 1 and MD5 should be considered unreliable and deprecated as usage 
of SHA- 1 began to be phased out in the technology community in 2017.1 Since digital 
signatures are usually only valid for a limited time period, this is less of a problem, 
although even with MD5, issues have been identified since at least 2004, and they still 
persist.2
1 Google Security Blog, ‘Announcing the first SHA1 collision’, 23 February 2017, https:// security.
googleblog.com/ 2017/ 02/ announcing- first- sha1- collision.html.
2 Xiaoyun Wang, Denggou Feng, Xuejia Lai and Hongbo Yu, ‘Collisions for hash functions MD4, MD5, 
HAVAL- 128 and RIPEMD’, Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2004/ 199, 16 August 2004, Institute of 
Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, https:// eprint.iacr.org/ 2004/ 199.pdf; Fahmida Y. Rashid, 
‘Oracle to Java devs: stop signing JAR files with MD5’, InfoWorld, 19 January 2017, http:// www.
infoworld.com/ article/ 3159186/ security/ oracle- to- java- devs- stop- signing- jar- files- with- md5.html.
Fuzzy logic and uncertainty
9.44 Hashing technology, although useful in cases where absolute certainty is 
required, is not the best way to recognize pre- existing material – especially in relation 
to images, video and sound recordings. Child abuse imagery, for example, is often 
‘marketed’ using different logos present inside the image. While the majority of the 
content is unaltered, the mere addition of a logo will invalidate any hash value that was 
previously calculated. For this reason, numerous technologies exist that do not rely on 
establishing an exact match (by way of a file hash), but rather are capable of comparing 
content to establish the proximity of a file to the content of a known previous copy 
of the material sought. These filtering algorithms usually provide an indication at a 
preset level of certainty, of the fact that material matches a previously observed copy. 
The result is a percentage of likeness, rather than an exact match (which is what is 
achieved by file hashes).1 Note that the results from these algorithms, contrary to 
hashes, are therefore less usable as a single source of evidence. However, due to the 
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1 Well- known technologies include Microsoft’s PhotoDNA, used for identifying altered image 
material, and the Sift algorithm, used, for example, through technology applied by Facebook to filter 
illegal uploads.
2 For example, see articles 15 and 17 of the Directive (EU) 2019/ 790 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and 
amending Directives 96/ 9/ EC and 2001/ 29/ EC OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, 92– 125 requiring such filters for 
copyright purposes on larger sharing platforms.
The continuity of custody
9.45 For those professionals experienced in criminal matters, the concept of the 
continuity of custody (also known as the chain of evidence) is well established. However, 
the continuity of custody, in both civil and criminal matters, should be considered very 
carefully with respect to electronic evidence. The reason for taking particular care 
with electronic evidence is because it is easy to alter. It is necessary to demonstrate 
the integrity of the evidence and to show that it cannot have been tampered with after 
being seized or copied. There is another reason for being meticulous about ensuring 
the continuity of electronic evidence and that its custody is correctly recorded: in a 
case involving a number of items of hardware and more than one computer, it will be 
necessary to ensure that there is a clear link between the hardware and the electronic 
evidence copied from the hardware. In this respect, the record should address such 
issues as who collected the evidence, how and where it was collected, the name of 
the person who took possession of the evidence, how and where it was stored, the 
protection afforded to the evidence while in storage and the names of the people 
who removed the evidence from storage, including the reasons for removing the 
evidence from storage.1 Due to the increased use of online storage and services, access 
and custody of records may also be of relevance in the phases before they become 
evidence in a legal matter or dispute, especially in cases where applying cryptographic 
safeguards is less practical.
1 Warren G. Kruse II and Jay G. Heiser, Computer Forensics Incident Response Essentials (Addison- 
Wesley 2002), 6– 11.
Transporting and storing electronic evidence
9.46 Consideration should be given to the methods by which any hardware and 
digital evidence is transported and stored.1 Computers need to be protected from 
accidentally booting up, and consideration should be taken to ensure that hardware 
is clearly marked to prevent people from using the equipment unwittingly. Loose hard 
drives, modems, keyboards and other such materials should be placed in anti- static 
or aerated bags to prevent them from being damaged or their data being corrupted. 
Storage conditions should be appropriate. Hardware and electronic evidence should 
be protected from dirt, humidity, fluids, extremes of temperature and strong magnetic 
fields. It is possible for data to be rendered unreadable if the storage media upon which 
the electronic evidence is contained are stored in a damp office or overheated vehicle. 
In many forensic storage facilities, special data safes protect evidence from fire risk. 
These safes are designed to withstand heat, and keep digital media at an acceptable 
temperature for longer periods of time during a fire.
1 Philip Turner, ‘Unification of digital evidence from disparate sources (Digital Evidence Bag)’ 
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9.47 More recently, the availability of sophisticated file storage and server systems 
has resulted in systems that can store and manage data as ‘objects’, directed and 
controlled by policies with corresponding automated move, copy, delete and replication 
functions. In many cases these systems are also distributed geographically, providing 
better failover (the ability to automatically switch to a reliable backup system) and 
availability. While these features should not adversely affect the evidential veracity of 
stored data, it is essential for meeting evidential continuity that comprehensive access 
controls and audit logs are maintained at all times. Furthermore, the geographically 
dispersed storage of data may increasingly lead to questions of jurisdiction.
Cloud computing and online services
9.48 In the same vein, evidence is increasingly stored on publicly accessible, network- 
based services. Both cloud computing (the use of, often shared or virtualized, computing 
or storage resources available through the Internet) and the online delivery of services 
(software, infrastructure or platform as a service) are rapidly becoming more popular. 
Forensic investigation of these sources of evidence is inherently complex,1 and is likely 
to force forensic standards involving the concept of ‘original evidence’ or ‘first in time 
evidence’ to become outdated or impracticable. In consequence, cloud forensics is 
emerging as a new aspect of computer forensics.2
1 Eoghan Casey, ‘Cloud computing and digital forensics’ (2012) 9(2) Digital Investigation 69; M. 
Taylor, J. Haggerty, D. Gresty and R. Hegarty, ‘Digital evidence in cloud computing systems’ (2010) 26(3) 
Computer Law & Security Review 304.
2 Stephen Mason and Esther George, ‘Digital evidence and “cloud” computing’ (2011) 27(5) 
Computer Law & Security Review 524; Ian Walden, ‘Law enforcement access in a cloud environment’, 
Legal Studies Research Paper No 74/ 2011, http:// papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1781067; Giuseppe Vaciago, ‘Remote forensics and cloud computing: an Italian and European legal 
overview’ (2011) 8 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 124.
9.49 At the same time, the use of free or low- cost ‘cloud storage’ adds a challenging 
complication to the process of preserving digital evidence. At the heart of this technology 
is the concept that a user can upload and store data and software applications to ‘the 
cloud’, which can then be accessed from anywhere using any device with an Internet 
connection. In reality, such ‘cloud storage’ can consist of many thousands (or tens of 
thousands) of mass storage devices (arrays of high capacity hard disks) located in many 
different physical locations, all connected to a storage management system software 
via the Internet. It is often the case that, in order to ensure that users’ data is available 
at all times and to protect them from loss such as disk failure or interruptions in 
network connectivity, many copies of the users’ data are spread across many redundant 
storage nodes that are physically and geographically separated from one another. 
Furthermore, many unrelated users share the same cloud storage facilities. In these 
‘multi- tenanted’ systems, the management of such data is essentially automatic and 
controlled by the storage management system software rather than human managers. 
The implications for forensic preservation of such data may not be readily apparent.1 It 
follows that because of the geographically distributed nature of such systems, issues of 
legal jurisdiction may also arise when seeking to preserve or obtain the data with the 
cooperation of the cloud operators.
1 For a general overview of some of the issues, see the entire issue of IAnewsletter, (2011) 14(1), 









Proof: the technical collection and examination of electronic evidence 449
9.50 One method of securing access to such data is to request that the user provides 
details of her account to enable suitably authorized investigators to log into the relevant 
account and forensically copy all pertinent data to disk, or, more efficiently, copy from 
the user’s ‘cloud’ to a storage location on a ‘forensic cloud’. The forensic process should 
include the creation of hash values (discussed above) for every file or object and 
the use of automatic or manual logging of each action to create a contemporaneous 
note for all actions undertaken. Additionally, it may be prudent, with the appropriate 
legal authorization, to change the access credentials of the original storage in order 
to prevent any deliberate or inadvertent changes from being made to it.1 In such 
circumstances, principles 2 and 3 of the ACPO should be considered:
Principle 2: In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original 
data, that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence 
explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions.
Principle 3: An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to digital 
evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third party should 
be able to examine those processes and achieve the same result.
1 For example, see the powers of preservation prescribed by the Convention on Cybercrime ETS 
No.185 (Budapest, 23/ 11/ 2001), articles 16 (domestic) and 29 (preservation in view of international 
cooperation).
9.51 Furthermore, reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure that any changes 
are kept to a minimum, the changes are noted and recorded, and the person conducting 
the acquisition process is fully aware of the effect of her actions. For those occasions 
when permission to obtain access to the data from the suspect is not forthcoming, it is 
then essential, if possible, to preserve a copy of the volatile memory in the computer 
(that has access to the data), so that it is possible to search for any remaining data 
relating to the account.
9.52 Data can be deleted on a remote server or cloud storage before it can be 
secured.1 In such complex scenarios as described above, the role of forensic triage 
becomes increasingly important, because it allows the investigators to evaluate the 
scene contemporaneously, and to identify the data, seek the appropriate authority to 
search and seize the data (if such an order or warrant has not been obtained, or if 
the order or warrant under which the search is being conducted does not cover the 
materials that have been found) and secure the online data before anybody who might 
be under suspicion (or their accomplices) gets the opportunity to destroy it remotely. 
It is in such circumstances that conducting a preliminary risk assessment is essential 
to success.
1 For a discussion of the complexities of recovering data from modern operating systems and 
file systems, see Geoff H. Fellows, ‘The joys of complexity and the deleted file’ (2005) 2(2) Digital 
Investigation 89.
9.53 Throughout this phase of any investigation, the emphasis will be on the digital 
evidence professional to make informed decisions as to what data or equipment to 
seize and retain in any given set of circumstances.1 Depending on the circumstances of 
the case, consideration has to be given to the possibility that the person at the centre 
of the investigation might be framed for personal or political reasons.2 It will also be 
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to ensure that the entire procedure is properly documented. The documentation 
relating to electronic evidence is important. Standard operating procedures such as 
those described in the ACPO Guide, as noted above, should be followed. A record should 
be kept of every item seized, every action performed that may affect electronic data on 
every item, and exhibit labels should be attached to every physical item retrieved.
1 The prosecution failed to analyse the evidence from the family computer effectively in the case of 
the death of Casey Marie Anthony in 2011, for which see Craig Wilson, ‘Digital evidence discrepancies 
– Casey Anthony trial, 11 July 2011’, http:// www.digital- detective.net/ digital- evidence- discrepancies- 
casey- anthony- trial/ ; Tony Pipitone, ‘Cops, prosecutors botched Casey Anthony evidence’, Clickorlando.
com, 28 November 2012, http:// www.clickorlando.com/ news/ cops- prosecutors- botched- casey- 
anthony- evidence; Jose Baez and Peter Golenbock, Presumed Guilty: Casey Anthony: The Inside Story 
(BenBella Books, updated edition, 2013), 46, 180– 183, 211, 346– 348, 365, 368– 371, 400, 426– 428; 
Jess Ashton and Lisa Pulitzer, Imperfect Justice: Prosecuting Casey Anthony (William Morrow 2011), 
105, 239, 277, 291– 292, 298, 315.
2 John Leyden, ‘Child abuse frame- up backfires on stalker’, The Register, 6 April 2010, in which Ilkka 
Karttunen broke into the Essex home of a woman he wanted to be with, downloaded abusive images of 
children on to her computer, then stole the hard drive and sent it into the police with a note identifying 
the owner; for a similar example, see ‘Handyman jailed for planting porn on boss’s computer’, BBC 
News London, 23 September 2010.
9.54 There are occasions when the physical hardware cannot be seized, because 
it is too large, it is not physically located in the jurisdiction or even in a single 
jurisdiction, or where seizing it would cause an organization to cease functioning. In 
such circumstances, the electronic evidence will have to be copied. As a result, greater 
care must be exercised when such electronic evidence is retrieved and copied for the 
first time. The range of electronic evidence that might need to be copied will include 
audit trails, data logs (for applications, Internet access1 and firewall traffic, to name 
a few), biometric data, metadata from applications, file systems,2 intrusion detection 
reports and contents of databases and files. Given the nature of the evidence to be 
copied, the integrity of the evidence that is copied and its subsequent history becomes 
paramount.3 Data pertaining to the integrity of these copies and their creation should 
be retained wherever possible.
1 For an interesting discussion, see Dr Richard Clayton, ‘Online traceability: who did that? Technical 
expert report on collecting robust evidence of copyright infringement through peer- to- peer filesharing’ 
(Consumer Focus 2012), http:// www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ ~rnc1/ Online- traceability.pdf.
2 Florian Buchholz and Eugene Spafford, ‘On the role of file system metadata in digital forensics’ 
(2004) 1(4) Digital Investigation 298.
3 The volume of digital evidence is causing problems in respect of the methodologies around the 
collection of evidence, as discussed in the US context by Erin E. Kenneally and Christopher L. T. Brown, 
‘Risk sensitive digital evidence collection’ (2005) 2(2) Digital Investigation 101; Simon Attfield and 
Ann Blandford, ‘E- disclosure viewed as “sensemaking” with computers: the challenge of “frames” ’ 
(2008) 5 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 62; Daniel R. Rizzolo, ‘Legal privilege 
and the high cost of electronic discovery in the United States: should we be thinking like lawyers?’ 
(2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 139.
9.55 Another way of dealing with this challenge is to request the cooperation of the 
service provider to retrieve evidence from its systems. This, however, often leads to 
jurisdictional issues. Thus, the need for better guidance on the issues arising out of 
cloud computing is becoming clearer. The Council of Europe has established a working 
group to address this issue and explore solutions in relation to access for criminal 
justice purposes to evidence stored on servers in the cloud and in foreign jurisdictions, 
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Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime seeks to urgently 
address the need for solutions ‘for a more efficient criminal justice response to 
cybercrime and other crime involving electronic evidence in accordance with data 
protection and other safeguards’.2 The shared nature of many of the services involved 
also creates significant issues surrounding the privacy aspects of the enhanced 
jurisdiction proposed. Furthermore, direct access to such data raises questions 
regarding the safeguards that need to be applied before such access is permitted.3
1 http:// www.coe.int/ en/ web/ cybercrime/ ceg.
2 Chair, Cybercrime Convention (T- CY), Preparation of the 2nd Additional Protocol to the Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime – State of Play, (23 June 2019), 4; first complete draft text of the 2nd 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced cooperation and disclosure of 
electronic evidence (Draft Protocol, v2, 12 April 2021), https:// rm.coe.int/ 2nd- additional- protocol- 
budapest- convention- en/ 1680a2219c.
3 See https:// www.eff.org/ deeplinks/ 2019/ 11/ council- europe- shouldnt- throw- out- our- privacy- 
rights- just- speed- police- access.
Analysis of electronic evidence
9.56 A digital evidence professional is not only required to obtain and copy electronic 
evidence that has a high probative value, but must also provide an analysis of that 
evidence. The analysis of the evidence will involve reviewing the content of the data 
and the attributes of the data. This exercise may also include, but will not be limited to, 
looking for and recovering deleted files and other data that may be hidden on the disk, 
checking logs for activity and checking unallocated and slack space or unallocated 
space1 for residual data. Failure to assess the electronic evidence can lead to false 
assumptions, as in the case of Liser v Smith.2 The facts of the case were not in dispute. 
The victim was shot after leaving work on the night of 5 May 2000. By Monday 8 May, 
it was known that the victim’s bank card had been used to withdraw US$200 from a 
Bank of America branch about 20 minutes after the murder, approximately one mile 
from where the body was found. According to the electronic evidence, the withdrawal 
occurred at 1.47 am on 6 May. The Bank of America ATM also had a video surveillance 
tape, which was subsequently retrieved by the police.
1 Slack space is a part of a block or cluster of a filesystem that is used for another file, but that is not 
entirely overwritten by it. The block may then contain remnants of the file that was previously there. 
Unallocated space consists of blocks or clusters of the filesystem that were once used for a file but, 
upon deletion of that file, are no longer referenced in the filesystem’s allocation table. They will contain 
the original content of the file until they are (fully) overwritten.
2 254 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2003).
9.57 The bank manager informed the police that there would be a discrepancy of up 
to 15 minutes between the time indicated on the surveillance tape and the actual time 
of the withdrawal. When the tape was viewed, there was no ATM activity recorded 
at 1.47 am. The closest transaction that occurred was at 1.52 am, when a black male 
wearing a white t- shirt (the accused Jason Liser) was recorded as standing before the 
machine. While the evidence seemed to lead to the conclusion that Liser as the man 
recorded at 1.52 am was one of the killers, the evidence contained on the surveillance 
video did not warrant such an assumption. Other pictures from the videotape showed 
black males other than Liser using the ATM at 1.56 am and 2.05 am, and a black female 
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of them were grainy and poorly photocopied. However, of relevance was that both of 
the men in question appeared, like Liser, to have been wearing white t- shirts and to be 
relatively young.
9.58 In August 2000, about three months after the murder, the police decided to put 
out a press release and a copy of the photograph of the man recorded as standing at 
the ATM at 1.52 am. Liser was subsequently recognized and arrested for the murder. 
He was held for less than a week, because the police decided, at this late point in time, 
to carry out an experiment at the aforesaid ATM machine and its video surveillance 
facilities. The result of the experiment led the police to conclude that the discrepancy 
was greater than the 15- minute gap the bank had stated. Liser was subsequently 
released. It is instructive to note the comments made in the Memorandum Opinion by 
the judge:
While this issue is a close one, the Court is not ready to conclude that it was 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances of this investigation for the 
police to rely solely on the bank’s representations about the time discrepancy 
without attempting to verify that information by empirical (or other) means. The 
crucial point here is that this was not a fast moving investigation in which the 
officers were called upon to make snap judgments based on limited information. 
Far from it. Detective Smith had the surveillance tapes within a week after the 
murder; at that early date he had been told by the branch manager that the time 
on the tape could be off by up to fifteen minutes … Plaintiff was not, however, 
arrested until August, three months later. During this lengthy interval, neither 
Detective Smith nor anyone on his team made any further attempt to verify the 
estimation about the length of the gap. They had no further contact with anyone 
at Bank of America, especially its security personnel, who might have had more 
accurate information about the camera’s timer … They did not inspect the 
camera itself. Nor did they attempt [to] use the ATM themselves to compare real 
time against tape time.
In short, despite the fact that the tape was their central lead as to the identity 
of the murderer, the investigators did nothing to pin down exactly how far off 
the video clock was, at least not before plaintiff was arrested. [Footnote 3: The 
fact that the police finally sought to verify the information – and quickly and 
readily learned that it was inaccurate – after Liser’s arrest certainly does not 
help their cause. That such an [sic] simple test was not done in the three months 
preceding the arrest, and if done would have cast serious doubt on the propriety 
of that arrest, suggests an investigative sloppiness that at least casts doubt on 
whether the initial arrest was actually supported by probable cause.] Instead, 
Detective Smith and his team chose to rely solely on a single, untested statement 
from the bank manager. Such reliance might well have been unassailable had the 
investigators been making an on- the- spot determination as to whether probable 
cause existed to arrest plaintiff in the first frantic days after the murder. But in 
the circumstances of the deliberate, slowly unfolding investigation that ensued, 
during which the officers should have had ample time to pursue leads and to 
check facts, their failure to verify the length of the gap on the video stands in 
a rather different light. Their conduct appears more sloppy than reasoned, 
the product of carelessness rather than craft. The Court is thus unable to say 
with certainty that this crucial mistake was ultimately a permissible one, or 
that prudent investigators would necessarily have conducted themselves as 
defendants did here.1
1 United States District Court for the District of Columbia No 00- 2325 (ESH) 26 March 2003 before 
Ellen Segal Huvelle DJ, at 11– 12.
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9.59 Compare this case with the murder of Denise Mansfield, who was found bound 
and strangled in her home on 29 June 2002. It was thought that she had been dead 
since 22 June. The police investigation centred on a surveillance camera that recorded 
images of people using an ATM, owned by the Sun Trust Bank. This ATM was used to 
withdraw US$200 from the victim’s bank account at 2.30 pm on 22 June, using her debit 
card. Three women (Virginia Shelton, her daughter Shirley and one of her daughter’s 
friends, Jennifer Starkey) were subsequently arrested. They were identified as using 
the machine between 2.28 pm and 2.33 pm the same day. The women did not dispute 
using this particular ATM. They were subsequently released after three weeks. After 
they were arrested, it came to light that it was assumed the clocks on the transaction 
computer and the ATM were synchronized. This was not correct. The women had used 
the ATM earlier than the time stamp on the video recording. It was reported that police 
officers had these records in their possession on the day they arrested the women, but 
it was not clear if they had examined the records before making the arrests. It was not 
until the father of one of the women obtained a copy of the relevant records that the 
women were released.1
1 Ruben Castaneda, ‘Mistaken arrests leave Pr. George’s murder unsolved’, washingtonpost.com, 22 
June 2003, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/ archive/ politics/ 2003/ 06/ 22/ mistaken- arrests- leave- 
pr- georges- murder- unsolved/ 8e6257de- 22c6- 4e73- 894f- 0e71f7ad9b2c/ .
9.60 Both Liser v Smith and the Mansfield murder cases are good examples of the 
failure to fully test the electronic evidence, in particular, the time. No clock is accurate. 
This can be important in terms of assessing evidence in digital form.1 In the legal context, 
Lord Hoffman observed, in DPP v McKeown (Sharon), DPP v Jones (Christopher)2 that 
‘The clock, although no doubt physically in the same box as the computer, is something 
which supplies information to the computer rather than being part of the processing 
mechanism’.3 It might have been correct that the clock was one hour out because of 
the difference in time zones, but clocks in computers are not always accurate. Clocks 
on facsimile machines may also be far from accurate, and so the following comments 
by Burton J (President) in Woodward v Abbey National plc (No 2), J P Garrett Electrical 
Limited v Cotton4 that imply that the data recorded by the logs at the offices of the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal are accurate as a matter of ‘common sense’ cannot be 
correct:
[I] t must make common sense to accept the accuracy, as I believe there to be, of 
the record of receipt in the fax log of the [Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT)], 
and not to accept either uncertain evidence about the accuracy of the sender’s 
machine or some kind of speculation as to electronic receipt short of the record 
in the EAT fax log.5
1 The first voice in the play Under Milk Wood by Dylan Thomas, referred to ‘slow clocks, quick 
clocks’ at [60], and the narrator in The Time Regulation Institute by Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (Penguin 
Classics 2014), translated by Maureen Freely and Alexander Dawe, [11], tells the reader that ‘Everyone 
knows that a watch or clock is either fast or slow. For timepieces, there is no third state.’ Dr John C. 
Taylor invented, designed and gave the Corpus Chronophage to Corpus Christi College in Cambridge, 
England. It is a mechanical clock designed to demonstrate the principle of relative time, doing the 
unexpected, and is only accurate once every five minutes. The Chief Scientist for Time Services at 
the US Naval Observatory, Dr Demetrios Matsakis, is responsible for precise time determination and 
the management of time dissemination. To achieve this, there is a USNO Master Clock that is in turn 
based on a system of a number of independently operating cesium atomic clocks and hydrogen master 
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about 100 picoseconds (0.000 000 000 1 seconds) per day: https:// www.usno.navy.mil/ USNO/ time/ 
master- clock/ precise- time- and- the- usno- master- clock.
2 [1997] 1 WLR 295, [1997] 1 All ER 737, [1997] 2 WLUK 386, [1997] 2 Cr App R 155 (HL), (1997) 
161 JP 356, [1997] RTR 162, [1997] Crim LR 522, (1997) 161 JPN 482, (1997) 147 NLJ 289, Times, 21 
February 1997, Independent, 7 March 1997, [1997] CLY 1093.
3 [1997] 1 All ER 737 at 754d.
4 [2005] 4 All ER 1346, [2005] 7 WLUK 814, [2005] ICR 1702, [2005] IRLR 782, [2005] CLY 1244.
5 [2005] IRLR 782, [14]. See his further comment on both cases in Woodward v Abbey National 
plc, J P Garrett Electrical Limited v Cotton (26 July 2005, unreported) (UKEATPA/ 0534/ 05/ SM and 
UKEATPA/ 0030/ 05/ DZM), and similar comments on the same point in Clark v Midland Packaging 
Limited [2005] 2 All ER 266, [2005] 2 WLUK 317, [2014] CLY 1057, also known as Midland Packaging 
Limited v Clark. In R v Good [2005] DCR 804 the clock in the computer was running 42 minutes and 30 
seconds behind the actual time.
9.61 A more realistic comment on the accuracy or otherwise of clocks was made by 
Smart AJ in the case of R v Ross Magoulias,1 where the identity of the appellant centred 
on the recordings made by an ATM and a security video:
It is a notorious matter of fact that reliable clocks or timing devices may show 
slightly different times. A clock may gain or lose ever so slightly, and it may be 
some days before the difference becomes noticeable. When setting a clock or 
timing device there might be a very small error. Perhaps the clock from which the 
timing device is set is slightly astray. It is exceedingly well known that the timing 
of differing clocks needs to be synchronised if pinpoint accuracy is required. It is 
beyond argument that both [the victim] and the appellant attended the service 
station on 7 July 2001. She can be seen on the video tape for about three minutes 
(18.37.18 to 18.40.25 according to the video tape timing device). That cannot 
be disputed. Nor can it be disputed that the appellant attended at the ATM and 
withdrew $50 (18.40.59 according to the ATM timing device). As earlier pointed 
out there was no direct evidence available to the jury that the timing mechanisms 
were not synchronised. If there had been the video tape would have recorded a 
person (the appellant) withdrawing $50 from the appellant’s account at 18.40.59 
(bank record time). The video does not show anybody near the ATM at that time. 
Thus there was no room for any presumption to operate in any useful way.2
1 [2003] NSWCCA 143, 2003 WL 21208345.
2 [2003] NSWCCA 143 at [41].
9.62 A clock can also help reveal the truth when somebody attempts to alter 
electronic evidence. In the case of Shaun Richards, who was caught speeding on 1 June 
2009, Richards attempted to prove his innocence by driving the same route (without 
speeding) in January 2010 and used his satellite navigation data (whose date he had 
doctored on his computer to 1 June 2009) as proof of his innocence. However, he had 
forgotten about the clock change from British Summer Time to Greenwich Mean Time, 
which meant that there was a one hour difference in the time for the doctored data. 
After this was discovered, Richards was imprisoned for four months for perverting the 
course of justice.1
1 ‘Devon driving instructor jailed for sat- nav speed fraud’ BBC News Devon, 13 January 2011.
9.63 There may be occasions where, in the absence of proof, an intelligent 
assumption that comments recorded on a document have a certain meaning might be 
accepted by an adjudicator, even when it is possible that the comments are capable of 
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meaning of the content of a digital document submitted in evidence may lead to a 
finding against the party adducing the evidence, as in Hedrich v Standard Bank London 
Limited.1 The case concerned a wasted costs order, which was based on breach of the 
duty owed by a solicitor to the court to perform his duty as an officer of the court in 
promoting the cause of justice. Ward LJ took particular care in assessing the conflicting 
evidence, because of the complexity of the facts. The bank sought to have its costs paid 
by the claimants’ solicitors, Messrs Zimmers. The bank was required to establish a 
strong prima facie case to succeed, and as part of its case, it sought to prove Zimmers 
were in receipt of an email on a date before Zimmers claimed that they had actual sight 
of the evidence. The bank relied on the following relevant text of that email:
No virus found in this incoming message.
Checked by AVG Free Edition.
Version: 7.1.362/ Virus Database: 267.12.8/ 162- Release Date: 05/ 11/ 2005.2
1 [2008] EWCA Civ 905, [2008] 7 WLUK 916, [2009] PNLR 3, [2009] CLY 386.
2 [2008] EWCA Civ 905 at [70].
9.64 In the absence of evidence from a digital evidence professional, the inference 
the bank sought to draw from this information was that Zimmers received notification 
of this particular email in May 2005, to counter the claim that Zimmers did not see it 
until the trial was under way in December 2005. This was highly relevant, because the 
bank was asking the court to order Zimmers to pay costs of £342,917.08. In meeting 
this argument, the barrister for Zimmers, Graeme McPherson QC, conducted some 
research on the Internet for an alternative explanation for the printed date of 11 May 
2005. Ward LJ accepted the following offered explanation, although there was no 
evidence of the truth of it:
Mr McPherson’s researches [sic] on the internet gave him an alternative 
explanation. He told us that the first line showed, as it states, that no virus had 
been detected. The second line indicates that the means of checking was by the 
AVG Free Edition, which is a free virus detection software programme marketed 
as AVG. The third line identifies the version of AVG’s software and the crucial date 
upon which the Bank relies is simply, as is stated on the e- mail, the date of the 
release of that particular version of the software. We have no evidence that this is 
the true explanation: we only have Mr McPherson’s word that his researches [sic] 
on the internet produced that answer. It may have been a moment of inspiration 
by counsel but for my part it has a compelling ring of truth and I have no reason 
to think that it is unreliable. It destroys that part of the Bank’s case.’ 1
1 [2008] EWCA Civ 905 at [71].
9.65 It would have been wise of the bank to establish the meaning of this information, 
because of the evidential hurdle required to prove its case. It would not have taken a 
digital evidence professional long to have established whether the information proved 
the date was the date of the release of that particular version of the software or not. It 
might have been for the court to ask the parties to seek an opinion on this issue before 
reaching a conclusion, but given the nature of the proceedings, in particular the rule 
that where there is room for doubt, the respondent lawyers are entitled to the benefit 
of it, it is not surprising that the court did not let the matter continue any further, and 
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1 There was a similar point raised in State of Connecticut v Julie Amero, but the digital evidence 
professional for the prosecution failed to even consider looking for malicious software: Stephen Mason, 
International Electronic Evidence, xxxvi– lxxv.
9.66 A further observation of relevance is that, in itself, the electronic evidence may 
not be conclusive. The case of Mogford v Secretary of State for Education and Skills1 
illustrates this point. Mr Mogford appealed against a decision of the Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills to include his name in the list maintained under the 
provisions of the Education (Restriction of Employment) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/ 
2419) that prevented him from being employed as a teacher under the provisions 
of regulation 5(1)(c). The Secretary of State made this decision because abusive 
images of children, text files, emails relating to this material and bookmarks with 
links to websites containing abusive images of children had been found on Mogford’s 
computer. Mogford denied that he was responsible for this material. The members 
of the Tribunal were satisfied that the Secretary of State proved on a balance of 
probabilities that either Mogford was solely responsible for the materials found on 
the computer, or that he participated with others in obtaining this material, and he 
knew that it was on his machine. The reasons given included:
(1) Inconsistencies in Mogford’s evidence. He frequently changed his story. 
He told the interview team that he was visiting his girlfriend on the weekend 
25– 27 April 1997, then changed his story before the members of the Tribunal, 
indicating that three people had stayed at his house that weekend. Mogford also 
said in the interview that one RS had helped set up his Internet link. In evidence 
to the Tribunal, RS denied this. And Mogford gave evidence to the effect that one 
P set up the Internet for him.
(2) There was no attempt to find P, or indeed either of the other two friends whom 
Mogford claimed were with him that weekend. That he failed to take steps to ask 
his friends to corroborate his story was held by the members of the Tribunal as 
being consistent with the fact that his version of events was not credible.
1 [2002] EWCST 11(PC) (26 June 2002).
9.67 Consideration was also given to the timing of the file system activity, especially 
those that occurred close to midnight of 27 April 1997 that showed access to a series 
of websites depicting abusive images of children, and the members of the Tribunal 
carefully examined the evidence presented by the digital evidence professional who 
sought to link access to such websites to Mogford. The electronic evidence showed 
that Mogford had created a spreadsheet that contained details of earnings from private 
lessons, and this spreadsheet was closed down at 00.28 on 27 April 1997. Mogford 
denied that he had closed down this spreadsheet, claiming that he had opened his 
spreadsheet at some other time earlier, had failed to close it down, and someone else 
had shut down his computer, thereby closing the spreadsheet in the process. The 
members of the Tribunal articulated the importance of this item of evidence and the 
explanation offered by Mogford as follows:
It is our interpretation of the evidence that Mr M must have been using the 
computer at this time, either alone or with someone else, surfing the net and 
finding child pornography sites and text messages, and therefore when closing 
down the computer his spreadsheet would have been closed. The spreadsheet 
would have been of no interest to his friends, and he himself said in evidence that 
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of days. We can only infer that he was working on the spreadsheet earlier that 
evening or the previous day.1
1 [2002] EWCST 11(PC) (26 June 2002) at [25].
9.68 The observations noted above illustrate the importance of understanding the 
nature of digital data.1 The aim should be to test the accuracy of the evidence and to 
ask if the conclusions are correct, rather than making decisions based on an imperfect 
analysis of the available evidence. It should never be assumed that because evidence is 
in electronic form, that it must therefore be correct and impervious to being tested to 
prove whether it is accurate or false. The important point to note is that questions of 
the accuracy and quality, together with the nature and quantum, of electronic evidence 
are contextual.
1 The British Computer Society Expert Panels: Legal Affairs Expert Panel Submission to the 
Criminal Courts Review (March 2000), http:// www.computerevidence.co.uk/ Papers/ LJAuld/ 
BCSComputerEvidenceSubmission.htm.
Tools
9.69 A digital evidence professional will not only, ideally, require an in- depth 
knowledge of the operating system she is to investigate, but will also need to use a 
number of proprietary tools in the performance of the investigation and analysis of 
digital evidence. The types of tool to be used will depend on the operating system 
being examined and whether the investigation is of networks, hand- held devices, 
embedded systems or wireless networks.1 Due to their technicality, the reader is 
encouraged to become familiar with the technology and techniques by referring to 
appropriate practitioner texts,2 including those discussing their limitations.3 The tools 
used can, naturally, be the subject of cross- examination, and the underlying scientific 
methodology and structure of such tools can also be questioned.4 In this section, the 
aim is to illustrate why and how tools are used in the context of the Windows operating 
system, partly because it is so widely used.
1 W. Jansen and R. Ayers, ‘An overview and analysis of PDA forensic tools’ (2005) 2(2) Digital 
Investigation 120.
2 Brian Carrier, ‘Defining digital forensic examination and analysis tools using abstraction layers’ 
and James R. Lyle, ‘NIST CFTT: testing disk imaging tools’ (2003) 1(4) International Journal of Digital 
Evidence; A. D. Irons, P. Stephens and R. I. Ferguson, ‘Digital investigation as a distinct discipline: a 
pedagogic perspective’ (2009) 6(1– 2) Digital Investigation 82; Bradley Schatz, Digital Evidence: 
Representation and Assurance, PhD submitted to the Information Security Institute, Faculty of 
Information Technology, Queensland University of Technology (October 2007), http:// eprints.qut.edu.
au/ 16507/ 1/ Bradley_ Schatz_ Thesis.pdf.
3 For instance, see SWGDE (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence), Establishing Confidence 
in Digital Forensic Results by Error Mitigation Analysis (1.5, 5 February 2015).
4 Erin Kenneally, ‘Gatekeeping out of the box: open source software as a mechanism to assess 
reliability for digital evidence’ (2001) 6 (13) Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 1; Eric Van 
Buskirk and Vincent T. Liu, ‘Digital evidence: challenging the presumption of reliability’ (2006) 1 
Journal of Digital Forensic Practice 19; Lei Pan and Lynn M. Batten, ‘Robust performance testing for 
digital forensic tools’ (2009) 6(1– 2) Digital Investigation 71; SWGDE Recommended Guidelines for 
Validation Testing, Version 1.1 (January 2009); Fred Cohen, Julie Lowrie and Charles Preston, ‘The state 
of the science of digital evidence examination’, in Gilbert Peterson and Sujeet Shenoi (eds) Advances in 
Digital Forensics VII, 7th IFIP WG 11.9 International Conference on Digital Forensics, Orlando, FL, USA, 
31 January– 2 February 2011 (Springer 2011); Computer Forensic Tool Testing Handbook (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology 2012); Jeremy Leighton John, Digital Forensics and Preservation 
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9.70 Automated tools are necessary to perform a forensic examination of a 
computer economically. However, the digital evidence professional should understand 
the process used by the tool to perform the relevant tasks. This is because it may 
be necessary to explain the process to a court, or the specialist may be required to 
carry out the analysis without the aid of a tool, because the use of a tool in any given 
situation may not be appropriate. These are issues that lawyers may well need to take 
cognizance of in the future.1 For instance, it is not clear that practitioners themselves 
are familiar with some tools, and may question the worth of early versions.2 This is 
because it seems that such tools are tested informally, rather than formally proven to 
be correct. It has therefore been suggested that such tools should be tested formally.3 In 
an effort to enhance the veracity of evidence adduced from a forensic examination, it is 
becoming common practice within forensic laboratories to use what is known as ‘dual 
tool’ verification techniques. Simply put, an analyst will perform an examination using 
one piece of forensic software and, where data of potential relevance is identified, will 
use a second tool, produced by a different vendor, to perform the same examination 
and compare the results. If they match, more weight can be given to the accuracy of the 
data. However, it must be emphasized that such techniques are not a replacement for 
critical thinking or experimentation.4
1 For an example of where tools were the topic of judicial scrutiny in Australia, see Bevan v The State 
of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 101, (2010) 202 A Crim R 27 and Bevan v The State of Western 
Australia [2012] WASCA 153, 2012 WL 3298167. These cases are discussed in more detail in Chapter 
5 on the presumption that computers are ‘reliable’.
2 Eoghan Casey, ‘Network traffic as a source of evidence: tool strengths, weaknesses, and future 
needs’ (2004) 1(1) Digital Investigation 28.
3 Lyle, ‘NIST CFTT: testing disk imaging tools’; Matthew Gerber and John Leeson, ‘Formalization 
of computer input and output: the Hadley model’ (2004) 1(2) Digital Investigation 214; Ibrahim M. 
Baggili and Richard Mislan, ‘Mobile phone forensics tool testing: a database driven approach’ (2007) 
6(2) International Journal of Digital Evidence; David Byers and Nahid Shahmehri, ‘A systematic 
evaluation of disk imaging in EnCase 6.8 and Li En 6.1’ (2009) 6(1– 2) Digital Investigation 61; SWGDE 
Recommended Guidelines for Validation Testing, Version 2.0 (5 September 2014).
4 See also Eoghan Casey, ‘The increasing need for automation and validation in digital forensics’ 
(2011) 7(3– 4) Digital Investigation 103; Joshua I. James and Pavel Gladyshev, Challenges with 
Automation in Digital Forensic Investigations (Digital Forensic Investigation Research Group University 
College Dublin), http:// arxiv.org/ pdf/ 1303.4498.pdf; mistakes were made in the case of Casey Marie 
Anthony in 2011, and one tool that was used did not give correct results, although once the designer was 
aware of the error, he informed the police immediately: Craig Wilson, ‘Digital evidence discrepancies – 
Casey Anthony trial, 11 July 2011’; Pipitone, ‘Cops, prosecutors botched Casey Anthony evidence’; Baez 
and Golenbock, Presumed Guilty; Ashton and Pulitzer, Imperfect Justice; Ivar Friheim, ‘Practical use of a 
dual tool verification in computer forensics’, 2016, UCD Dublin (minor thesis).
9.71 It should also be noted that software in forensic tools is far from impartial or 
infallible.1 Indeed, the users of forensic tools may themselves not be aware that some 
tools do not carry out as detailed an examination as they think. Jonathan Zdziarsk 
commented on a problem encountered with forensic tools in his 2014 blog post ‘An 
example of forensic science at its worst: US v. Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Sinclair’:
I worked from a physical image dump created by a commercial forensics tool, 
and three reports from various tools which, as it would turn out, appeared to 
be misreporting (or at best ‘under explaining’) at least some of data that the 
case would later hinge on. What the tools didn’t report turned out to be much 
more interesting than what they did … As my findings would later reflect, the 
commercial tools that had been used to initially evaluate the evidence on the 
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entirely … All you need to know from a technical perspective is right here: some 
of the types of information that these commercial tools were (and likely still 
are) misreporting is significant. Evidence and timestamps of a device erasure 
event. Evidence of a backup restore event. Application usage dates. Application 
deletion events and timestamps. File access times. This, and many other types of 
artifacts are often either completely overlooked by numerous commercially sold, 
expensive- as- hell tools, or in the case of at least one tool – seemingly made up 
data. All of these came into play in this case.2
1 Stephanie J. Lacambra, Jeanna Matthews and Kit Walsh, ‘Opening the black box: defendant’s 
right to confront forensic software’ (2018) Champion 28, https:// www.eff.org/ files/ 2018/ 07/ 30/ 
champion_ article_ - _ lacambra_ forensic_ software_ may_ 2018_ 07102018.pdf.
2 https:// www.zdziarski.com/ blog/ ?p=3717. This remains the case in 2021, and is one reason to 
undertake verification with more than one tool – but it is also true that most commercial telephone 
tools do not identify or under- report data present on the device.
Copying the hard drive
9.72 Before obtaining access to a computer, it is essential that the investigator 
is familiar with the underlying operating systems, file systems and applications. By 
understanding the file systems, the digital evidence professional will be aware of how 
information is arranged, which in turn enables her to determine where information 
can be hidden, and how such information can be recovered and analysed. In order to 
establish answers to questions such as ‘Who might have had access to a computer or 
system?’, ‘Which files would they have been able to look at?’ and ‘Was it possible for an 
unauthorized outsider to obtain access to the computer from the Internet?’, the digital 
evidence professional should understand the nature of user accounts and profiles, and 
the control mechanism that determines which files a user is permitted to access upon 
logging into a system.
9.73 To acquire the data on a hard disk installed in a computer, an investigator will, 
in most cases, prefer to remove the hard disk from the computer and attach it to a 
specialist ‘write- protected’ interface that is attached, in turn, to an ‘imaging’ device 
capable of copying the forensic image stored on the media on to a previously cleaned 
(and verified as clean) storage device. Such interfaces are commonly referred to as 
‘write blockers’, and the imaging capability may be performed by specifically designed 
imaging hardware or by a standard computer running imaging software. However, in 
some circumstances removal of the hard disk from a computer may not be possible 
or advisable, in which case it is common to leave the hard disk installed in the host 
computer and obtain access to it using the procedures described in the following 
paragraphs.
9.74 To avoid altering any evidence on a computer, it is necessary to bypass the 
operating system. When the power supply is switched on, the basic input and output 
system (BIOS) will carry out a power- on self- test (POST) before looking for the 
operating system. After the BIOS is activated and before the POST test has completed 
its cycle, it is possible to interrupt the process. Most computers are programmed to 
expect the operating system to be found on a floppy disk, hard disk, compact disc or 
a device attached to the Universal Serial Bus (USB). As a result, the system looks at 
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Oxide Silicon (CMOS) configuration tool. The CMOS chip retains the date, time, hard 
drive parameters and other details relating to configuration while the main power is 
switched off. By looking at the CMOS tool between the POST test and the computer 
being fully powered up, the digital evidence professional is able to determine where 
the computer will look for the operating system: for instance, a floppy disk, a hard 
disk or a compact disc. With this knowledge, the investigator is able to pre- empt the 
search for the operating system on the computer and provide an alternate operating 
system from another disk. It is common for this alternative operating system to be 
a variant of the Linux operating system that is designed to allow storage devices to 
be viewed in ‘Read Only’ mode. By interrupting the normal boot- up process in this 
way, the evidence on the hard drive remains intact and unaltered, thereby permitting 
the content to be copied in the state it was in when the computer was switched off. 
Various techniques and tools (such as an evidence acquisition boot disk) can be used 
to intercept this process, and the precise technique depends on the circumstances of 
each case.
9.75 Once the computer is booted from a suitable tool, the program can then do a 
sector- by- sector copy of the electronic evidence. Some tools will acquire the data and 
undertake an integrity check at regular intervals. There is some technical discussion 
about whether the tools that undertake these tasks do take an exact copy of the disk, 
even though all of the information is copied from the disk. One of the reasons for this is 
that data may be arranged in a different manner in a proprietary file format. Professor 
Casey suggests this is not as important as ensuring that the integrity of the evidence 
is maintained, which must be correct. In addition, he also suggests that at least two 
copies be made with different tools.1 From a practical point of view, this may not 
always be possible because of time constraints and the absence of storage media.
1 Casey, Digital Evidence, 480.
9.76 A number of the forensic imaging tools, such as Encase and FTK, have used 
the expression ‘Logical Evidence Files’ which, instead of being an image of an entire 
hard disk, are copies of specific data accessible in the devices’ file systems (that is, 
the contents of a specific directory or directories). This technique has significant 
advantages where it is impractical to image an entire drive due to the amount of 
data required to be copied or because of time constraints. It should be noted that file 
hashing and image hashing techniques are still used to ensure the integrity of the data 
that is collected.1
1 Michael Cohen, Simson Garfinkel and Bradley Schatz, ‘Extending the advanced forensic format to 
accommodate multiple data sources, logical evidence, arbitrary information and forensic workflow’ 
(2009) 6(1) Digital Investigation S57; Da- Yu Kao, Shiuh- Jeng Wang and Frank Fu- Yuan Huang, ‘SoTE: 
strategy of Triple- E on solving Trojan defense in cyber- crime cases’ (2010) 26(1) Computer Law & 
Security Review 52.
Viewing the data
9.77 When the electronic evidence has been copied, the data can be viewed in raw 
format (examining the contents of the file in binary, hexadecimal or another format 
that displays the literal file contents as expressed in bits) or logically (using a viewer 
or program suitable for processing the file at hand). It is usually necessary to view 
the data through a tool; human beings need the binary code, which resides on a disk 
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in a sensible manner. In many tools for viewing raw data, the data can be viewed in 
hexadecimal form on one side of the screen and in plaintext (ASCII or Unicode) on the 
other side of the screen. Depending on the tool used, the data can be examined and 
analysed. For instance, a tool can recover slack space and compare files to determine if 
there are any differences to be observed.1 Viewing data in logical view enables the user 
to examine it as represented by the file system. This way of looking at the data permits 
the user to analyse it in a different way, but it does not show the underlying information 
that is visible when using the physical method. Both forms of viewing data have their 
limitations, and it is also important to be aware that data can be misinterpreted. There 
is some debate about the best way of examining digital evidence, but the emphasis 
should be on verifying the accuracy of the evidence by using different tools.
1 Note also that the volume of images that need to be reviewed and searched are increasing, and 
tools are being developed for this purpose: Paul Sanderson, ‘Mass image classification’ (2006) 3(4) 
Digital Investigation 190.
Recovering data
9.78 An increasing number of people delete the content of their hard drives in 
computers in anticipation of legal action or after legal action has begun.1 For instance, 
in the case of L C Services Limited v Brown,2 Andrew Brown, the sales director of LC 
Services, was found to have broken the fiduciary duty he owed to LC Services. He also 
breached the terms of his services agreement and misused confidential information 
belonging to LC Services. It appeared that Mr Brown altered or re- installed the 
operating system on his computer on 1 October 2003, at the time the claimants were 
pursuing disclosure documents from the defendants. A digital evidence professional 
was subsequently able to retrieve the residue of the text of the relevant database in 
dispute, and the remains of a number of emails sent by Mr Brown. The content of these 
emails showed that he was in breach of his fiduciary duties to LC Services.3
1 Ewa Huebner, Derek Bren and Cheong Kai Wee, ‘Data hiding in the NTFS file system’ (2006) 3(4) 
Digital Investigation 211; Dan H. Willoughby Jr, Rose Hunter Jones and Gregory R. Antine, ‘Sanctions for 
e- discovery violations: by the numbers’ (2010) 60(3) Duke Law Journal 789.
2 [2003] EWHC 3024 (QB), [2003] 12 WLUK 391.
3 Bruce J. Nikkel, ‘Forensic acquisition and analysis of magnetic tapes’ (2005) 2(1) Digital 
Investigation 8; Mayank R. Gupta, Michael D. Hoeschele and Marcus K. Rogers, ‘Hidden disk areas: HPA 
and DCO’ (2006) 5(1) International Journal of Digital Evidence.
9.79 There are several techniques that can be used to recover data that has been 
deleted. This can be done manually or through the use of tools, depending on the 
complexity of the problem faced by the specialist. For instance, some tools use a bit- for- 
bit copy of a disk to reconstruct the file system, including any files marked as deleted in 
the file allocation table, master file table or their equivalents. However, where files are 
fragmented and have been partially overwritten, it may be necessary to recover them 
by hand. A typical technique to recover deleted files (often called ‘carving’) involves 
searching unallocated space and swap files for such information as headers and 
footers. Although there are many types of file that can be recovered (carved) in this 
way with an appropriate tool, such as graphic files, word processing and executable 
files, recovery is limited to those files whose headers have not been deleted.1
1 Paul Alvarez, ‘Using Extended File Information (EXIF) file headers in digital evidence examination’ 
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Passwords and encryption
9.80 A number of tools are available that are capable of removing passwords and 
bypassing or recovering them. Some tools are available for guessing passwords if the 
encryption keys are small enough, and where it is not possible to obtain a password, it 
is sometimes possible to search for unencrypted versions of the data in other areas of 
the hard disk.1 Passwords can be used simply to provide access control to unencrypted 
data, can be the ‘key’ that decrypts encrypted data, and can even be the ‘key’ that 
decrypts the actual key that is used to decrypt encrypted data. The methods used 
to bypass passwords or ‘crack’ the code needed to decrypt encrypted data are many 
and varied, but in general stronger encryption algorithms and larger ‘keys’ mean that 
very long processing times are required to gain access to the data, if indeed they can 
be accessed. Depending on the processing power available, it may be impossible to 
reveal the passphrase or gain access to encrypted materials in a realistic time frame. 
The techniques used to attempt to obtain access to encrypted or password- protected 
data are discussed in Chapter 8 on encrypted data. The increased use of encryption on 
(mobile telephone) file systems poses problems and has led to significant debate and 
developments in the field of police powers.
1 Eoghan Casey, ‘Practical approaches to recovering encrypted digital evidence’ (2002) 1(3) 
International Journal of Digital Evidence; Christopher Hargreaves and Howard Chivers, ‘Recovery 
of encryption keys from memory using a linear scan’, Proceedings of the 2008 Third International 
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, 2008, 1369– 1376; Eoghan Casey, Geoff Fellows, 
Matthew Geiger and Gerasimos Stellatos, ‘The growing impact of full disk encryption on digital 
forensics’ (2011) 8(2) Digital Investigation, 129.
Traces of evidence
Network connections
9.81 One of the most significant difficulties faced by digital evidence professionals 
with computers and devices that are connected to a network such as the Internet, or a 
series of computers or devices that are connected in an organization, is the possibility 
that a hacker or malicious employee might enter the system without authority and 
undertake a series of actions that causes an innocent person to be accused of doing 
something he did not do.1 This is where data logs can help. Two types of log, the 
application log and system event log, contain information about how users have 
used the computer. Scrutinizing these logs, either manually or with a tool, can help 
to obtain a clearer picture about the activities that took place on the system, although 
consideration must be given to the integrity of the logs themselves. Note that logs may 
also be present at other levels in the network, such as on a fileserver, an Internet proxy 
or a firewall. The availability of such logs may, however, vary a great deal. A typical 
problem in this area is the shared use of a single public IP address for Internet traffic by 
many different local users. These users will typically have their own, locally distributed 
(private) IP address. A setup like this is known as NAT (Network Address Translation) 
since it requires translation of the local user’s (private) IP addresses to the public IP 
address and vice versa. Network- based logs only rarely contain enough data to identify 
the individual user, however.2
1 Srinivas Mukkamala and Andrew H. Sung, ‘Identifying significant features for network forensic 
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Bruce J. Nikkel, ‘Domain name forensics: a systematic approach to investigating an internet presence’ 
(2004) 1(4) Digital Investigation 247; Bruce J. Nikkel, ‘Improving evidence acquisition from live 
network sources’ (2006) 3(2) Digital Investigation 89; Eoghan Casey and Aaron Stanley, ‘Tool review 
– remote forensic preservation and examination tools’ (2004) 1(4) Digital Investigation 284; Omer 
Demir, Ping Ji and Jinwoo Kim, ‘Packet marking and auditing for network forensics’ (2007) 6(1) 
International Journal of Digital Evidence.
2 Hein Dries- Ziekenheiner and Iljitsch van Beijnum, ‘Allocation and use of IP addresses’, Study 
for the European Commission (December 2010, SMART 2010/ 14), http:// bookshop.europa.eu/ en/ 
allocation- and- use- of- ip- addresses- pbKK0113063/ .
Logs, files and printing
9.82 In addition, when a user uses his computer, a digital trace is left of the actions 
across a range of data logs and files.1 A data log is capable of containing any type 
of data, depending on what the system is programmed to capture.2 For instance, if 
a file is downloaded from the Internet, a date and time stamp will be added to the 
file to demonstrate when the file was downloaded onto the computer. When the file 
is moved, opened or modified, the time and date stamps will be altered to reflect 
these changes. In addition, the metadata can also help provide more information 
about the file, such as the location where it was stored on the disk, the printer on 
which the file was printed and the time and date the file was created. When a file 
is printed, the computer tends to store the print job in a temporary file before it 
is sent to the printer when the printer has the capacity to print the file. Once the 
command to print has been passed to the temporary store, the user can continue to 
work with the application – for instance, she can continue to type a new document 
while the previous document is waiting to be printed. The temporary print store 
retains valuable information, such as the name of the file to be printed, the type of 
application used, the name of the printer, the purported name of the person whose 
file is to be printed and the data itself. In addition, there is a date and time stamp 
added to the file to show when the file was printed. It should be noted, however, that 
the date and time stamp can be altered, which means it is important to ensure that 
the date and time stamp is corroborated by other methods.3
1 In relation to intrusion detection systems, see Peter Sommer, ‘Intrusion detection systems as 
evidence’ [2002] 3 CTLR 67; Vlasti Broucek and Paul Turner, ‘Intrusion detection: issues and challenges 
in evidence acquisition’ (2004) 18(2) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 149; Jean- 
Marc Dinant, ‘The long way from electronic traces to electronic evidence’ (2004) 18(2) International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology 173.
2 Erin E. Kenneally, ‘Digital logs – proof matters’ (2004) 1(2) Digital Investigation 94.
3 Karen Kent and Murugiah Souppaya, Guide to Computer Security Log Management (2006), 
Special Publication 800- 92 at 2.1.3 fourth bullet point, http:// nvlpubs.nist.gov/ nistpubs/ Legacy/ SP/ 
nistspecialpublication800- 92.pdf.
Use of the Internet
9.83 When a person obtains access to the Internet, a range of data is created and 
retained on a computer or device, including the websites that have been visited, the 
contents a user has viewed and the data sources accessed.1 Some systems, both in 
the network and on customer premises, also include a log of the times and dates 
of the Internet session and details of the device or connection that was used (such 
as the modem, network card or physical network port in the access network). With 
more services available online, it is important to be able to rely on information 
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requests involve IP addresses, subscriber details and possibly payment information. 
Internet access logs may, furthermore, provide information as to where and how 
users were connected to a service, and may identify others involved in the same 
investigation. Finally, it is interesting to observe that CCTV systems are gradually 
being replaced by systems that use Internet Protocol technologies (IP) and wireless 
IP, which will in turn cause additional expense and increase the legal complexity 
(where the camera is capturing images in one country, and these images are being 
recorded or stored in another country) in obtaining access to such systems for the 
purposes of litigation or criminal proceedings.2 The types of information available 
include those noted below.
1 Yeong Zee Kin, ‘Computer misuse, forensics and evidence on the Internet’ (2000) 5(5) 
Communications Law 153; Vivienne Mee, Theodore Tryfonas and Iain Sutherland, ‘The Windows 
Registry as a forensic artefact: illustrating evidence collection for Internet usage’ (2006) 3(3) Digital 
Investigation 166.
2 Fanny Coudert, ‘Towards a new generation of CCTV networks: erosion of data protection 
safeguards?’ (2009) 25(2) Computer Law & Security Review 145.
9.84 Browser cache When viewing a page on the Internet, the browser retains and 
takes copies of all the elements that make up the page, such as graphics and HTML 
text. This copy is called a cache. The computer or device gives the page a date and time 
stamp at the time the page was downloaded. The reason for doing this is that when 
the page is visited again, the cached file is used by the computer or device in place of 
obtaining access to the same page online and the date and time stamp is subsequently 
updated. Another item of information created and logged in some browser history 
databases is the number of times a web page was visited. It must not be assumed, 
however, that just because the computer or device has recorded certain types of web 
page that the user actually viewed such pages. This is because some websites, in 
particular those promoting pornography, will redirect a browser to different websites, 
and may even make unauthorized changes to the computer or device.1 It is possible to 
recover these cached files, even if they are deleted. Recovered files can provide such 
information as when the computer or device was used to obtain access to web- based 
email, when sites were visited and if purchases were made or financial transactions 
undertaken.
1 Daniel Bilar, ‘Known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns: anti- virus issues, 
malicious software and internet attacks for non- technical audiences’ (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review 123.
9.85 Cookies Many websites keep a track of visits by users to their sites by placing 
this information in files on the users’ computers or devices called cookies. If cookies 
have not been disabled, the information in the cookie directory can help with an 
investigation. As for websites included in the temporary cache file, it does not follow 
that just because there is a cookie on the computer or device that a user necessarily 
went to all of the websites included in the cookie directory. Some advertisements on 
a website may place a cookie on the user’s computer or device, even though the user 
did not click on and view the particular website. Further, where the user’s browser has 
been redirected without his permission, cookies can be added to the directory without 
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9.86 Private browsing, VPN proxies and Tor In order to provide Internet users 
with more privacy, several browser manufacturers have introduced ‘incognito modes’ 
or ‘private browsing’ modes in their browser software. In this mode, no Internet history, 
cache entries or cookies (or any other artefacts) remain after the Internet session. 
This means it will be harder (if not impossible) to retrieve a reliable indication of a 
user’s Internet usage and surfing behaviour from the information present in the local 
computer system. In practice, other systems such as access logs at service providers’ 
services or browsed websites may still be able to identify the user by her IP address.1
1 For which see United States v Bandy, Slip Copy, 2021 WL 414830.
9.87 In order to further enhance user privacy and anonymity, services such as Tor 
(The Onion Router) and VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are available that allow 
users to hide the origins of their connection to the services they use. In the case of Tor, 
this is achieved through a network of nodes operated by volunteers who anonymize 
connections to the Internet by providing a route across three or more anonymous nodes 
(including an entry and exit node, as they are called) on behalf of a Tor user. Since no 
logging is kept at any of the intermediary Tor nodes, this assures a relatively high level 
of anonymity. Similarly, VPNs and proxies can be used to connect to the Internet via a 
predetermined ‘hop’ in the network. Provided the VPN origin is not logged, this may 
effectively make tracing users by their network addresses impossible. Note that the 
use of other information and identifiers is still possible, so that various other measures 
may still reveal the users’ actual names, addresses and Internet activities.
9.88 Email and instant messaging Email has become a dominant method of 
communication for the vast majority of organizations, although text- based ‘chat’ is used 
increasingly by individuals, and especially on smartphones. Nevertheless, a great deal 
of evidence can be discovered from email communications. Some software programs 
store email in plaintext files, while others use proprietary formats that will require the 
digital evidence professional to use a number of tools in order to read the messages. 
Other email systems utilize online storage only and leave very little communications 
data on the filesystem of computers or devices. It is sometimes possible to recover email 
messages that have been deleted but have not been removed from the email files.1 Where 
it is impossible or difficult to restore emails from a single computer or device, it might 
be possible to track email traffic through the network it has travelled.2 Organizations 
are beginning to recognize the importance of their email communications, and many 
larger organizations have archives of email communications that can be investigated 
in the event of electronic disclosure or electronic discovery requests.
1 See the criminal case of R. v Khan (Adeel) [2015] EWCA Crim 1816, [2015] 11 WLUK 550, [2016] 
1 Cr App R (S) 47 where the only evidence was of screen shots of email messages, and screen shots of 
email messages were also adduced in Cole v Carpenter [2020] EWHC 3155 (Ch), [2020] 11 WLUK 318 
regarding a dispute over the sale of a work of art by Pablo Picasso, known as ‘Le Sauvetage’ or ‘The 
Rescue’ (this was an application by the defendants for permission to make a contempt application 
against the claimant); see also Vorotyntseva v Money- 4 Ltd (t/ a Nebeus.com) [2018] EWHC 2596 (Ch), 
[2018] 9 WLUK 501.
2 Eoghan Casey, Troy Larson and H. Morrow Long, ‘Network analysis’ in Eoghan Casey (ed) Handbook 
of Computer Crime Investigation Forensic Tools and Technology, 234– 239.
9.89 Instant messaging, in the meantime, has become the default method of 
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only used on local desktop systems (where this technology is increasingly also used in 
business environments), but it has also seen a major surge in use on mobile devices 
in recent years. Due to the Snowden revelations in 2013 of the mass international 
surveillance by the NSA,1 many instant messaging programs currently in widespread 
use have introduced end- to- end encryption, meaning that intermediaries do not have 
access to plaintext messages, but merely to an encrypted version of those messages. 
Each connected device has a unique public key and a private key that is unknown to the 
intermediary. In practice, this means that the only place where such communications 
can be viewed and decrypted to a readable format is at the end user’s device.
1 David Cole, ‘After Snowden: Regulating technology- aided surveillance in the digital age’ (2016) 44 
Capital University Law Review 677.
9.90 Mobile applications that are used for instant messaging typically include the 
ability to send photographs and videos. Social networks and mobile Internet messaging 
have become the default communication method used by children.1 This creates an 
increased workload for investigators of child abuse- related cases, especially where 
they may need to view a home computer, as well as a multitude of other devices, to help 
determine why a child might have left home, or how he or she got into contact with a 
certain adult, for instance.2 Another challenge is that these programs increasingly offer 
features that allow the user to determine a set time and date to destroy any images sent. 
Therefore, images are no longer stored on the filesystem of the device or telephone 
by default, but temporary copies only are displayed for a short period of time, after 
which they are deleted. This leaves fewer artefacts and creates further challenges in 
criminal investigations involving abusive images and children, particularly in relation 
to practices such as sexting, the sending of sexual images and messages, and grooming, 
where adults lure children typically for sexual abuse by acting as persons of the 
same age.
1 Sonia Livingstone, Leslie Haddon, Anke Görzig and Kjartan Ólafsson, ‘Risks and safety on the internet: 
the perspective of European children: full findings and policy implications from the EU Kids Online 
survey of  9– 16 year olds and their parents in 25 countries’, EU Kids Online 2011 (LSE 2012), http:// 
eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 33731/ 1/ Risks%20and%20safety%20on%20the%20internet%28lsero%29.pdf.
2 Harlan Carvey, ‘Instant messaging investigations on a live Windows XP system’, (2004) 1(4) Digital 
Investigation 256; Mike Dickson, ‘An examination into MSN Messenger 7.5 contact identification’ 
(2006) 3(2) Digital Investigation 79; Mike Dickson, ‘An examination into Yahoo Messenger 7.0 contact 
identification’ (2006) 3(3) Digital Investigation 159; Paul Sanderson, ‘Identifying an existing file 
KaZaA artefacts’ (2006) 3(3) Digital Investigation 174; Mike Dickson, ‘An examination into AOL Instant 
Messenger 5.5 contact identification’ (2006) 3(4) Digital Investigation 227; Jessica Reust, ‘Case study: 
AOL instant messenger trace evidence’ (2006) 3(4) Digital Investigation 238.
9.91 Voice over Internet Protocol (known as VoIP) is another computer- to- computer 
technology that has expanded rapidly, and will need to be considered when conducting 
an investigation.1 Contrary to the old telephony system (often referred to as POTS or 
Plain Old Telephone System), Internet- based calls can be made fairly anonymously and 
it is easy to deceive a person into thinking that a telephone number is genuine (called 
‘spoofing’), especially the number of the party initiating the call.2 This makes telephone 
numbers increasingly unreliable as identifiers. The risk of wrongfully attributing 
the source of a telephone call on the basis of its originating telephone number has 
increased greatly, especially since many VoIP providers allow spoofing of outbound 
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calls for various purposes. In most cases the connection will be encrypted, which 
means that the data packets flowing between the caller and the recipient of a VoIP call 
is not in decipherable voice form, and if intercepted midway, cannot be reconstructed 
to meaningful evidence.
1 Xinyuan Wang, Shiping Chen and Sushil Jajodia, ‘Tracking anonymous peer- to- peer VoIP calls 
on the Internet’, Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 
(2005), 81– 91.
2 Richard Clayton, ‘Can CLI be trusted?’ (2007) 12(2) Information Security Technical Report 74, 
https:// www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ ~rnc1/ cli.pdf.
9.92 Digital and online wealth A special category of data is related to financial 
investigations and digital evidence. Once a small field with limited overlap to digital 
forensics, the advent of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, electronic money such as 
PayPal, as well as many other types of digital assets and wealth stored online, have 
increased the need for specialized investigations into electronic evidence pertaining 
to wealth that is accessible through computer systems. It should be noted that, in 
contrast to electronic money, where a database containing a ledger (denominated 
in fiat currency such as pound and euro) is typically stored with a service provider, 
cryptocurrencies make it possible to store values in local wallets that are hosted 
on software present on a computer system or device. A special property of these 
currencies is that the cryptographic values in the wallet can be copied in order to make 
it possible to spend the currency from either one of the copies made. This complicates 
search and seizure for this type of evidence. Digital evidence professionals will need to 
have a good knowledge of the way in which such wallets are stored, as well as the most 
common online services related to the various types of financial activities that can be 
employed online, in order to proficiently and, indeed, forensically conduct financial 
investigations into data. From a legal perspective, it should be noted that the existing 
international standards make frequent use of the reversal of the burden of proof in 
cases of ‘unexplained wealth’. These are cases where a predicate offence can be proven, 
yet significantly more ‘unexplained’ wealth is found to be present following a financial 
investigation. In such cases the burden of proof regarding the title to such wealth can 
be shifted to the suspect.1
1 This is sometimes called ‘extended confiscation’ (if such wealth is seized) and in the UK is 
implemented in the regime for UWO (Unexplained Wealth Orders) in s 6 (which only applies to England 
and Wales) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
Reporting
9.93 The findings, and any conclusions made by the digital evidence professional, 
will be set out in a report. Whether prepared for criminal or civil proceedings, the 
report should include a range of information that is pertinent to the case, including, 
but not limited to:
(1) Notes prepared during the examination phase of the investigation.
(2) Details about the way in which the investigation was conducted.
(3) Details about the continuity of custody.
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(5) Details of what was discovered, including, but not limited to:
(a) Any specific files or data that were directly related to the investigation.
(b) Any further files or data that may support the conclusions reached by 
the specialist. This will include the recovery of any deleted files and the 
analysis of any graphic files.
(c) The types of search conducted, such as key word searches, and the 
programs searched.
(d) Any relevant evidence from the Internet, such as emails and the 
analysis of websites visited and log files.
(e) Indications of names that might demonstrate evidence of ownership 
of software, such as with whom the software was registered.
(f) Whether there was any attempt to hide data in any way, and if so, 
what methods were used.
9.94 Professor Casey refers to the following principles to guide the preparation of 
forensic reports: observation, hypothesis, prediction, experimentation/ testing and 
conclusion.1 Following from these principles, the report needs to reflect how the 
examination was conducted and what data were recovered. It may be that the digital 
evidence professional will have to give evidence about the conduct of the examination 
and the validity of the procedures and tools used. Essential to any report will be the 
conclusions reached by the professional. Where an opinion is offered, the opinion 
should set out the basis of the evidence. Consideration should also be given to rates of 
error, including the origin and timing of events that had been recorded, whether the 
digital evidence professional took care when reaching conclusions where data were 
lost, whether the professional was aware that digital evidence can be fabricated, and 
whether the professional evaluated the evidence based ‘on the reliability of the system 
and processes that generate the records’.2
1 Casey, Digital Evidence, 204.
2 Eoghan Casey, ‘Error, uncertainty, and loss in digital evidence’ (2002) 1(2) International Journal of 
Digital Evidence.
9.95 As pointed out by Professor Sommer, it is important to be aware that digital 
evidence professionals have to use a variety of techniques to cope with the wide 
diversity of hardware and software encountered. Reliability is one factor to take into 
account. Another factor is the degree of reliance on the conclusions reached by a digital 
evidence professional. The digital evidence must be interpreted, and care should be 
taken to ensure the underlying rationale is sustainable.1
1 Peter Sommer, ‘Digital footprints: assessing computer evidence’ [1998] Crim LR Special Edition 65 
and 69.
9.96 Assumptions should not form part of any report (except in Australia1) by a 
digital evidence professional, as occurred in some cases relating to the investigations 
by the UK police under the name Operation Ore. In this case, police forces in the UK 
investigated and prosecuted over 7,000 people for offences relating to the possession 
of abusive images of children and secured over 2,000 convictions.2 This operation 
was instigated after the conviction of Thomas and Janice Reedy (the Landslide trial, 
named after their company) in the United States for operating a website selling access 
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of the payments received by Landslide was shared with a number of police forces 
across the world. This information formed the initial evidence for the purposes of 
the investigations that subsequently took place. There was evidence to suggest that 
stolen credit card numbers were used to steal money by ‘buying’ access to the illegal 
websites hosted by Reedy, who tried to prevent this without success.4 Some of those 
prosecuted claimed that they did not use their credit cards to obtain access to abusive 
images of children, as in the case of Dr Paul Grout. No abusive images of children were 
found on his computers. He produced alibi evidence to demonstrate that at the time 
of the alleged links to the Landslide website, he was not at a computer terminal. The 
case was withdrawn from the jury.5 On occasions, it was also assumed that if a credit 
card number was in the Landslide database, the person whose number it was had 
therefore paid for abusive images of children. Brian Cooper used his credit card to 
buy bicycle parts from a US website. His card details were obtained by Akip Anshori, 
an Indonesian, who successfully subscribed to the Landslide website until Mr Cooper 
alerted his credit card provider to the unauthorized payments. The police failed to find 
any abusive images of children on his computers.6
1 Nigel Wilson, ‘Expert evidence in the Digital Age in Australia’ (2012) 31(2) Civil Justice Quarterly 
216.
2 For an outline (notwithstanding that the content may not be entirely accurate), see https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Operation_ Ore.
3 United States of America v Reedy, 304 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2002), 2002 WL 1966498.
4 Duncan Campbell, ‘Sex, lies and the missing videotape’, PC Pro (June 2007), 18– 21; Supplementary 
memorandum by Mr Jim Gamble dated 1 June 2007 submitted to the Science and Technology Committee 
– Fifth Report (Session 2006– 07, 24 July 2007) (the evidence is published in Vol II (HL Paper 165- II)), 
where Mr Gamble challenges some of the assertions made by Mr Campbell.
5 ‘Invisible predator’, BBC, Inside Out – Yorkshire & Lincolnshire, 4 October 2004.
6 Campbell, ‘Sex, lies and the missing videotape’, 19.
9.97 A similar case involved Jeremy Clifford, who was charged with making and 
being in possession of indecent images of children. The images were found in the 
temporary cache folder with random names such as ‘FX7RA’. Such images generally 
appear as advertisements, and the user will not necessarily have clicked on them, nor 
will she be aware that they are on her machine. At his trial, Clifford was acquitted 
when the prosecution offered no evidence. Although he failed in his first legal action 
for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office,1 his appeal succeeded,2 
and the police were subsequently found liable.3 It transpired that the police and the 
digital evidence professional had made a number of erroneous assumptions about 
the Landslide databases, the evidence of Internet browsing and site visit history on 
Clifford’s machine.4
1 Clifford v The Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Constabulary [2008] EWHC 3154 (QB), [2008] 12 
WLUK 568.
2 Clifford v The Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Constabulary [2009] EWCA Civ 1259, [2009] 12 
WLUK 16.
3 Clifford v The Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Constabulary [2011] EWHC 815 (QB), [2011] 4 
WLUK 7.
4 [2009] EWCA Civ 1259 at [67]– [76].
9.98 Great care must be given to the nature of the technical evidence, as demonstrated 
by the case of R. v O’Shea (Anthony David),1 a case that also centred on the Landslide 
database. The case had been publicized by the media as a public enquiry into the entire 
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by one man on the main ground that new evidence from one Bates, described as a 
computer expert, based on a forensic examination of the Landslide records, suggested 
that a third party had misappropriated the appellant’s identity. The members of the 
Court of Appeal held that there was no evidence to support Bates’ suggestion that the 
Landslide webmaster had access to the appellant’s personal data that were used in 
the transactions, that there was no evidence to prove that the hypothetical fraudulent 
webmaster had obtained access to the Freeserve proxy servers to assume the 
appellant’s identity, and noted the appellant had checked his credit card statements 
regularly and not challenged these transactions (he had challenged the debiting of his 
credit card account in relation to other amounts that were similar to those in question 
in this case).2 Describing this additional evidence as ‘mere assertion, unsupported by 
any published or other material or any reasoning,’3 the members of the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the appellant’s conviction was safe and dismissed the appeal.
1 [2010] EWCA Crim 2879, [2010] 12 WLUK 150; Stephen Mason, ‘Digital evidence: beware of 
assuming too much’ (2011) 22(2) Comps & Law 36.
2 [2010] EWCA Crim 2879 at [50]– [59].
3 [2010] EWCA Crim 2879 at [43].
Analysis of a failure
9.99 A prosecution in Wales in 2015 offers an illustrative case study to demonstrate 
what can go wrong when the police do not conduct a careful investigation, and the 
prosecution’s failure to understand the weakness of the evidence upon which the 
charges are preferred. A number of nurses working at the Princess of Wales Hospital 
in Bridgend were indicted on charges relating to alleged falsification of patient notes 
regarding blood glucose levels. Professor Thimbleby, an expert witness for the defence, 
discussed the evidence in detail1 where he outlined the correct, systematic procedure 
to be observed by the nurses.
1 Harold Thimbleby, ‘Misunderstanding IT: hospital cybersecurity and IT problems reach the courts’ 
(2018) 15 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signatures Law Review 11; Professor Angela Hopkins, 
‘Review of the blood glucometry investigations in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board: 
establishing lessons learned’ (ABM University Health Board, June – September 2016), http:// www.
wales.nhs.uk/ sitesplus/ documents/ 863/ 4.5%20Blood%20Glucometry.pdf.
9.100 The central record system had no records of many of the tests and their results 
the nurses had written on the paper notes for each patient. Because of this discrepancy, 
the police concluded that the nurses had written down fictitious readings and had not 
bothered to do their job. As an aside, nurses could not necessarily undertake the actions 
as set out above, because of problems with the software, and also because sometimes 
it was difficult for the software to read the patient’s identity number. It turned out that 
a practical solution was to type 000 on the glucometer keyboard, or for the nurse to 
scan her own barcode in order for the glucometer to accept the data to be input as a 
valid patient, or to manually type in the name of the patient – but this action would 
not prevent the nurse from misspelling the patient’s name. The glucometer accepted 
both of these methods of getting around the failure of the software code and would 
give a correct blood glucose reading. However, the hospital system rejected this data, 
the consequence of which required manual intervention for the data to be added to the 
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9.101 On analysing the prosecution evidence – which was in the form of a CD of Excel 
spreadsheets and, on a later date, XML files of data logged on blood glucometers – it 
was discovered that the relevant data were not present. The prosecution asserted that 
because data was not present, it followed that the nurses had fabricated doing actual 
tests, because if they had actually done the tests, the data would be present in the 
spreadsheets.
9.102 The prosecution needed to prove that it was the failure of the nurses to 
input data that caused the data to be missing from the central database – that is, the 
absence of data proved fabrication, rather than any other possibility. The police and 
the prosecution lawyers assumed that the glucometers and hospital IT systems were 
reliable, even though they knew the systems required human intervention. The police 
did not question the management of the data, and there was no evidence about the 
day- to- day management of the data. The prosecution also claimed that the devices 
were accurate as blood glucose meters. This was not relevant. The relevant issue was 
whether the glucometers reliably transmitted test data to the hospital’s patient record 
system. It did not appear that the police or the prosecution bothered to research this 
topic – if they had, they would have discovered a number of relevant articles that 
included reference to issues which were noted by Professor Thimbleby regarding the 
practical problems of the device and getting the data to the central computer.1 The 
judge concluded that the prosecution evidence was unreliable and was therefore 
excluded.2 The prosecution response was to offer no evidence.3 In consequence, the 
nurses were acquitted.
1 Ksenia Tonyushkina and James H. Nichols, ‘Glucose meters: a review of technical challenges to 
obtaining accurate results’ (2009) 3(4) Journal of Diabetes Science and Technology 971; Suzanne 
Austin Boren and William L. Clarke, ‘Analytical and clinical performance of blood glucose monitors’ 
(2010) 4(1) Journal of Diabetes Science and Technology 84; James H. Nichols, ‘Blood glucose testing 
in the hospital: error sources and risk management’ (2011) 5(1) Journal of Diabetes Science and 
Technology 173; David C. Klonoff, ‘Point- of- care blood glucose meter accuracy in the hospital setting’ 
(2014) 27(3) Diabetes Spectrum 174.
2 Ruling in R v Cahill; R v Pugh 14 October 2014, Crown Court at Cardiff, T20141094 and T20141061 
before HHJ Crowther QC (2017) 14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 67.
3 ‘Nurses cleared of wilful neglect at Princess of Wales Hospital in Bridgend’ South Wales Evening Post, 
14 October 2015, http:// www.southwales- eveningpost.co.uk/ nurses- cleared- wilful- neglect- princess- 
wales/ story- 27983645- detail/ story.html; ‘Princess of Wales Hospital nurse neglect trial collapses’ 
BBC News, 14 October 2015, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ uk- wales- south- east- wales- 34527845.
Anti- forensics and interpretation of evidence
9.103 As with all fields of forensic analysis, computer forensics is part of a continuous 
race of catch- up between investigators and criminals. Just as criminals quickly started 
to wear gloves once fingerprint evidence had reached the awareness of the wider public, 
computer criminals too began to use tools to hide or alter the traces of their activities. 
Anti- computer forensics has become the term for the possible countermeasures that 
criminals may take to prevent, delay or invalidate computer forensic efforts, a problem 
increasingly recognized by the research community.1 Deletion of data as a classic anti- 
forensic technique may serve as an initial example to illustrate some of the issues 
computer crime investigations are increasingly confronted with. In the early days of 
the Internet, software that securely wiped data from all parts of the computer was the 
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Today, tools that irretrievably delete files are now easily obtainable for free from 
various sources, and can be used quickly and reliably even by comparatively computer- 
illiterate users.2 This example not only illustrates the proliferation of anti- forensic 
tools, it also highlights some of the complexities that are involved. Most anti- forensic 
tools are ‘dual nature’ tools, just as many hacking tools are. They have legitimate uses 
and are often even officially recommended, if not legally mandated, for instance, to 
protect the security and privacy of sensitive data. Computer software is regularly 
‘purpose neutral’. In other words, what works as a protection against criminals trying 
to obtain access to credit card details also works as a protection from the police trying 
to obtain access to private emails; what works for system administrators seeking to 
detect misuse of a computer by an employee also works for criminals obtaining access 
to commercially sensitive secrets. This has implications for the legal responses to 
anti- computer forensics, and also for the probative weight of evidence affected by any 
counter measures that were used by a suspect, and is further discussed below.
1 Chris B. Simmons, Danielle L. Jones and Lakisha L. Simmons, ‘A framework and demo for preventing 
anti- computer forensics’ (2011) 11(1) Issues in Information Systems 366; R. Harris, ‘Arriving at an 
anti- forensics consensus: examining how to define and control the anti- forensics problem’ (2006) 3(S) 
Digital Investigation S44.
2 Andy Jones and Christopher Meyler, ‘What evidence is left after disk cleaners?’, (2004) 1(3) Digital 
Investigation 183; Laurent Simon and Ross Anderson, ‘Security analysis of android factory resets’, 
http:// www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ ~rja14/ Papers/ fr_ most15.pdf.
9.104 As noted above, the social context is a crucial determinant for the interpretation of 
electronic evidence. In the early days of the Internet, finding that a suspect had acquired 
the specialist knowledge necessary to operate (or maybe even write) the software for 
a cleaning tool could be prima facie evidence that he had tried to hide traces of illegal 
activity. This inference is no longer sound, because secure cleaning of deleted data has 
become a standard operating procedure in many organizations to prevent data security 
breaches, and default settings on popular free tools such as CCleaner allow the effortless 
routine destruction of deleted files every time a computer is shut down.
9.105 The legal system and police investigators have reacted in several ways to this 
new reality. One approach is through technology – developing new investigative tools 
that either look for other types of data not yet protected by counter measures or are 
in some other way capable of undoing the damage of anti- forensic tools. However, this 
need to react rapidly to developments in the anti- computer forensic field can cause 
problems for the legal system, where rules on the admissibility of scientific evidence 
often require extensive testing and acceptance in the scientific community, supported 
by publication in peer- reviewed journals, together with robust methods of calibration, 
standardized procedures, accepted minimum criteria for training and proficiency with 
the new tools.1 What is important to note for criminal prosecutions is that electronic 
evidence can serve a dual purpose: it can either directly support the prosecution’s 
case, or it can be indirect evidence that the suspect took actions to hide some form of 
criminal activity – which in turn may also be direct evidence that he committed one 
of the various statutory offences that have been created to prevent the destruction or 
spoliation of data.
1 For the US, see Christopher V. Marsico, ‘Computer evidence v. Daubert: the coming conflict’ (2004) 
CERIAS Tech Report 2005- 17; the issue was also discussed in the context of anti- forensics and the use 
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App. 3 Dist.); Barbara Guttman, James R. Lyle and Richard Ayers, ‘Ten years of computer forensic tool 
testing’ (2011) 8 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 139; Computer Forensics Tool 
Testing (CFTT) Project, https:// www.nist.gov/ content/ computer- forensics- tool- testing- cftt- project; 
DigitalCorpora.org, http:// digitalcorpora.org.
9.106 With all this in mind, the following is an overview of the various approaches 
to anti- computer forensics, and the effects they have on the availability, reliability 
and interpretation of electronic evidence. Anti- computer forensics are understood 
here as any technique, hardware tool or software that prevents or delays the forensic 
analysis of a data carrier, and negatively affects the existence, amount, authenticity 
or quality of evidence from a computer or device. There are at least five different 
subcategories of anti- forensics: data destruction, data tampering, data hiding, trail 
obfuscation and attacks against the computer forensic tools themselves.
Data destruction
9.107 Data destruction is the most obvious and most widely discussed anti- forensics 
measure and has created a considerable legal and technological debate.1 Unlike a 
physical object or piece of paper that can be destroyed effectively, it is much more 
difficult to completely obliterate a document in electronic form. A user simply clicks 
the ‘delete’ icon on a computer, in general terms, to remove the pointer to the data. 
The document or data remains, and it is possible to retrieve this data in certain 
circumstances, even if it is partly overwritten.2 However, disk cleaning utilities that 
overwrite or ‘shred’ data have become increasingly available and easy to use for even 
unsophisticated users. These software- based tools write patterns of pseudo- random 
combinations of 1s and 0s (in other words, meaningless data) on to all of the sectors 
on a hard drive. This also includes a setting to wipe free space or unallocated or ‘slack’ 
space, which is where older ‘deleted’ data often reside. Slack space occurs when data is 
split between clusters on the hard disk. As files only rarely and by chance fill up every 
cluster, some space remains. Cleaning software also deletes much of the metadata that 
accumulates from using the computer – it wipes and cleans old file entries, recently 
used file lists and many other things including custom locations.
1 For an early article on this topic, see Matthew J. Bester, ‘A wreck on the info- bhan: electronic mail 
and the destruction of evidence’ (1998) 6 CommLaw Conspectus 75.
2 Nucleus Information Systems v Palmer [2003] EWHC 2013 (Ch), [2003] 7 WLUK 636, where 
employees used software in an attempt to overwrite the data on computers owned by the company 
before they were returned; R v Smith (Graham Westgarth), R v Jayson (Mike) [2002] EWCA Crim 683, 
[2002] 3 WLUK 178, [2003] 1 Cr App R 13, [2002] Crim LR 659, Times, 23 April 2002, [2002] CLY 819, 
in which Jayson deleted a number of abusive images of children that were subsequently recovered; 
Prest v Marc Rich & Company Investment AG [2006] EWHC 927 (Comm), [2006] 3 WLUK 109, where 
it was alleged the claimant deliberately deleted documents on his laptop computer; R. v Porter (Ross 
Warwick) [2006] EWCA Crim 560, [2006] 1 WLR 2633, [2007] 2 All ER 625, [2006] 3 WLUK 471, 
[2006] 2 Cr App R 25, [2006] Crim LR 748, (2006) 103(4) LSG 28, Times, 21 June 2006, [2006] CLY 
858, where it was held that it is a matter for the members of a jury to determine whether files were in 
the ‘possession’ of the accused, where the accused placed the files in the recycle bin, and the recycle 
bin was then deleted – the files were incapable of being recovered (and thus viewed) without the use 
of specialist forensic techniques and equipment provided by the US Federal Government which was not 
available to the public; R. v Grout (Philip) [2011] EWCA Crim 299, [2011] 3 WLUK 5, [2011] 1 Cr App 
R 38, (2011) 175 JP 209, [2011] Crim LR 584, [2011] CLY 780, where the day before the appellant’s 
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9.108 In practice, a person might delete emails and files as a matter of routine, and the 
organization might fail to realize that it has backup copies of all the relevant data,1 or 
the organization might have backup data to deal with situations where data is deleted, 
whether inadvertently or deliberately. For instance, in Noble Resources SA v Gross,2 Mr 
Gross attempted to delete SMS messages that might have incriminated him. Several 
thousand of these messages were recovered from various places: from backups of his 
personal mobile telephone and the BlackBerry of the person to whom the messages 
were sent. Copies were also found in a backup file on his laptop computer shortly 
before trial; they were also on the forensic image of his laptop taken by his forensic 
experts, and on a CD of his personal files that he only disclosed during the course of 
the trial. Mrs Justice Gloster DBE said: ‘with the assistance of one Jimmy Weston, an IT 
expert, Mr. Gross had deliberately changed the time settings on the laptop to conceal 
the fact that he himself had made the deletions; and that the last recorded logon time 
with his user ID reflected this’.3
1 As in Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm), [2010] 12 WLUK 
346, (2011) 108(3) LSG 17.
2 [2009] EWHC 1435 (Comm), [2009] 6 WLUK 558.
3 [2009] EWHC 1435 (Comm) at [54].
9.109 Data destruction adds a great deal of complexity to both civil litigation and the 
investigation of alleged crimes. On occasions, a party may have a reasonable suspicion 
that the other party might intend to delete files, or has already deleted files, although 
the technical issues relating to such allegations can serve to confuse.1 In United States of 
America v Triumph Capital Group, Inc.,2 McCarthy, the CEO and controlling shareholder 
of Triumph, Spadoni, Triumph’s Vice President and General Counsel, together with 
a number of others, were accused of a variety of offences relating to racketeering, 
including bribery, obstruction of justice and witness tampering. It came to the notice 
of the US government that Spadoni was alleged to have purchased a software program 
to purge his computer of incriminating evidence. Triumph was ordered to deliver up 
the relevant computer for forensic tests. The tests revealed that relevant data had been 
deleted, and the deleted files were recovered. A search of the recovered Internet cache 
files revealed evidence of other offences. This caused the investigator to obtain a further 
warrant to search and seize evidence of the further crimes. In L C Services v Brown3 the 
operating system on Brown’s computer had been changed or re- installed at the time 
the claimants were pursuing disclosure of documents by the defendants, but a digital 
evidence professional was able to recover the remains of email communications. The 
recovered evidence was sufficient to incriminate him, and he was held liable for breach 
of fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs, his ex- employer.
1 The decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware in the case of Genger v TR Investors, LLC, 26 A.3d 
180 (2011), 2011 WL 2802832, upholding a finding of spoliation by the trial judge, was examined in 
detail in Daniel B. Garrie and Bill Spernow, ‘Legally correct but technologically off the mark’ (2010 9(1) 
Northwestern Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property 1, in which the authors took the view that 
the judges failed to understand what had occurred in technical terms.
2 211 F.R.D. 31 (D.Conn. 2002).
3 [2003] EWHC 3024 (QB) at [53] and [54].
9.110 Where there is a reasonable suspicion that a party might delete files, as in the 
proceedings leading up to divorce in the case of Ranta v Ranta,1 it may be possible 
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programs, files or folders.2 Sanctions may follow for deleting files, depending on the 
seriousness of the action, where a party deliberately wipes hard drives after a court 
has ordered their production, as in Electronic Funds Solutions v Murphy.3 Furthermore, 
it is not inconceivable for a court to order a party to search for relevant documents 
in backup tapes and archives and to provide information about data that have been 
deleted.4
1 2004 WL 504588 (Conn.Super.).
2 See Takenaka (UK) Ltd and Corfe v Frankl [2001] EWCA Civ 348, [2001] 3 WLUK 163, [2001] 
EBLR 40, [2001] CLY 1819, where patterns of online behaviour were analysed to establish whether 
it was more likely that defamatory emails were sent to the defendant’s wife, and used to show that 
certain pieces of software were used in close proximity to each other and therefore made it more likely 
that the suspect had sent the emails; L C Services v Brown [2003] EWHC 3024 (QB) at [60] and [68]; 
Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2003] EWHC 55 (Ch), [2003] 1 All ER 1087 (Note), [2003] 1 WLUK 554, 
[2003] EMLR 29, (2003) 100(11) LSG 34, (2003) 153 NLJ 175, Times, 30 January 2003, [2003] CLY 
390; Crown Dilmun v Sutton [2004] EWHC 52 (Ch), [2004] 1 WLUK 467, [2004] 1 BCLC 468, [2004] 
WTLR 497, (2004) 101(7) LSG 34, Times, 5 February 2004, [2004] CLY 456; LTE Scientific Ltd v Thomas 
[2005] EWHC 7 (QB), [2005] 1 WLUK 38; Prest v Marc Rich & Company Investment AG [2006] EWHC 
927 (Comm), [2006] 3 WLUK 109; Sectrack NV v Satamatics Ltd [2007] EWHC 3003 (Comm), [2007] 
12 WLUK 558; Noble Resources SA v Gross [2009] EWHC 1435 (Comm) at [53] and [57]– [58]; First 
Conferences Services Ltd v Bracchi [2009] EWHC 2176 (Ch), [2009] 8 WLUK 249; note also Crowson 
Fabrics Limited v Rider [2007] EWHC 2942 (Ch), [2007] 12 WLUK 602, [2008] IRLR 288, [2008] FSR 17, 
[2008] CLY 1280; Rybak v Langbar International Ltd [2010] EWHC 2015 (Ch), [2010] 7 WLUK 288. For 
the USA, see Shira A. Scheindlin and Kanchana Wangkeo, ‘Electronic discovery sanctions in the twenty- 
first century’ (2004) 11(1) Mich Telecomm Tech L Rev 71; Arista Records, L.L.C. v Tschirhart, 241 F.R.D. 
462 (2006), 2006 WL 2728927; Willoughby and others, ‘Sanctions for e- discovery violations; Charles 
W. Adams, ‘Spoliation of electronic evidence: sanctions versus advocacy’ (2011) 8(1) Mich Telecomm 
Tech L Rev 1.
3 134 Cal.App.4th 1161 (2005), 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
4 Zhou v Pittsburg State University, 2003 WL 1905988 (D.Kan.); in relation to digital audio files 
(including case law), see Alan F. Blakley, ‘Digital audio files in litigation’ (2007) 2(1) Journal of Legal 
Technology Risk Management 1.
9.111 As indicated above, the use of these tools has been the result of legal 
requirements to ensure data security and privacy protection, which means that 
increasingly they come with official guarantees that promise that the wiped data cannot 
be reconstructed by criminals1 – and as a side effect, the police cannot reconstruct 
the data either. For instance, to provide legal entities with the assurance that they 
comply with the law, such programs typically allow default settings that erase data 
automatically every time a computer is shut down, or every time someone tries to 
obtain access to a file without the password. This makes it increasingly problematic to 
infer criminal intent to hide data when evidence of disk cleaning is found.
1 For instance, Richard Kissel, Andrew Regenscheid, Matthew Scholl and Kevin Stine, Guidelines for 
Media Sanitization (NIST Special Publication 800- 88, Revision 1, December 2014), http:// nvlpubs.nist.
gov/ nistpubs/ SpecialPublications/ NIST.SP.800- 88r1.pdf.
9.112 The physical destruction of a computer, including the hard drive, will ensure 
the data (without investing in costly reconstruction and recovery services) is lost, as in 
Strasser v Yalamanchi.1 In this case, it was claimed that a hard drive containing relevant 
data had been severely damaged by lightning, and an employee saw fit to dispose of 
the computer as a result. In response to the extensive pre- trial actions and the failure 
to provide an adequate reason for the destruction of the computer while litigation was 











476 Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures
negligent destruction of evidence might be inferred from the failure of the appellant to 
preserve and maintain evidence. The appeal court subsequently upheld the decision.
1 783 So.2d 1087 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 2001), 2001 WL 195056.
9.113 Generally speaking, the most secure way to prevent computer forensics is the 
physical destruction of the hard drive, or short of that, degaussing in a strong magnetic 
field. Degaussing with an approved degausser is, for some highly sensitive military or 
national security applications, the required method of data destruction.1 As discussed 
above, in comparison to the deliberate attempt at destruction to prevent others from 
obtaining evidence, paper copy files of underlying source documents may be destroyed 
for perfectly legitimate reasons, and reliance might subsequently be made on the 
version held in electronic form. This tends to occur when organizations attempt to 
reduce the cost of storage of paper documents but fail to consider the cost of electronic 
storage and the need to deal with old data when a system is upgraded. In the case of 
Heveafil Sdn. Bdh. v United States,2 the US Department of Commerce refused to accept 
a copy of a database containing a bill of materials stored on a computer diskette as a 
means of verifying the cost information in an investigation into anti- dumping extruded 
rubber. Heveafil claimed that the database held on the diskette had been taken from the 
mainframe, that it used the previous version in the course of normal business and that 
the database on the diskette contained an exact duplicate of the database developed 
on the mainframe computer. In an appeal from the US Court of International Trade, 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit accepted the argument by the Department 
of Commerce that it could reject the data on the diskette as not having been properly 
authenticated, and a finding of adverse inference was admissible in the circumstances. 
The assertions by Heveafil were not sufficient, because it failed to provide evidence of 
the veracity of the contents of the diskette, such as explanations of how the copy was 
made. The company merely copied data from the mainframe and then deleted the first 
in time data as well as the underlying paper versions. In doing so, it failed to provide a 
trail of evidence to demonstrate the procedures undertaken to provide for the veracity 
of the diskette copy.
1 https:// www.nsa.gov/ Portals/ 70/ documents/ resources/ everyone/ media- destruction/ 
NSAEPLMagneticDegaussers%20June2019.pdf?ver=2019- 07- 03- 090458- 077.
2 58 Fed.Appx. 843, 2003 WL 1466193 (Fed.Cir.); 25 ITRD 1128.
9.114 As mentioned above, the social context can be crucial in interpreting electronic 
evidence. While clicking on the delete icon is not a way actually to destroy evidence, 
and can furthermore be seen as an intentional attempt to destroy evidence and pervert 
the course of justice, the opposite question also arises: under what circumstances can 
the law interpret a user’s failed attempt to destroy a file as a sign that he wanted to rid 
himself of possession of an illegal item? An innocent user who accidentally downloads 
an illegal picture, or finds one on a second- hand computer, may think that by deleting 
the item he has successfully rid himself of it. The law on possession of illegal material 
may or may not take the same view, if, for an average user, it is very easy to recover the 
item in question, and it is thus possible to use the ‘paper bin’ as a convenient hidden 
storage space.
9.115 All the methods of data deletion described above have been developed for data 
stored on traditional magnetic media. But increasingly, new storage media look set 






Proof: the technical collection and examination of electronic evidence 477
traditional magnetic storage media, ‘bad sectors’ can create inaccessible parts of the 
hard drive that are ‘accidentally’ protected from many cleaning utilities. Solid- state 
drives (SSDs), unlike traditional magnetic discs such as hard disk drives, do not have any 
moving mechanical components but use integrated circuits to store data persistently. 
Solid-state drives pose new problems for the recovery of data, because they store data 
in ways that are much more non- linear and complex than that of traditional hard disk 
drives.1 However, programs such as Parted Magic claim to provide safe data cleaning 
for SSDs.
1 Bell and Boddington, ‘Solid state drives’.
9.116 Several new filing systems increase data permanence either by design – to 
prevent accidental data loss – or by accident. For instance, journaling file systems record 
write operations in a number of different locations, which means data ‘leftovers’ may 
exist in places ‘outside’ the nominal file storage location. RAID and anti- fragmentation 
techniques may also result in file data being written to multiple locations. In SSDs, for 
instance, if the same part of the drive is written over and over again, this will have the 
effect of ‘wearing it out’ prematurely. To counteract that, technologies are built into 
SSDs called ‘wear levelling’, which relocates blocks of data between the time when they 
are originally written and the time when they are overwritten. This has the effect of 
preventing the ‘true’ erasure of data.
9.117 From a legal and evidential perspective, it is necessary to have some knowledge 
of the differences these storage media entail for data deletion and data retrieval to 
interpret correctly the findings of the digital evidence professional. The easier it is to 
securely delete data with off- the- shelf, easily customizable tools, the less convincing 
is the inference of an intentional attempt to hide evidence. Finding evidence for the 
deletion of data from traditional hard drives is therefore different from evidence of 
deletion from new and more advanced storage systems, where data erasure requires 
specialist knowledge and considerable efforts.
9.118 The question that remains is what inferences, if any, can be drawn from the 
absence of evidence if data have been successfully deleted. A defence lawyer may want 
to argue that according to the prosecution case, some traces of illegal activity ought 
to have been found on his client’s computer, using the absence of such evidence as an 
argument to undermine the prosecution case. How convincing the argument is may well 
depend on the type of storage medium used and the nature of file systems employed. 
As noted with wear levelling, there are also increasingly automated ‘housekeeping 
operations’ being carried out by computers on files. In the past, finding that an illegal 
file, say of images of child sexual abuse, had been moved and copied to several places 
of a hard drive would have been evidence that the suspect knew of, and knowingly 
handled, the file in question. Increasingly, this inference depends on the storage 
medium, and if a number of copies at different parts of the drive existed, it is possible 
that these could have been the result of automated actions by the computer. Finally, 
for several legal purposes, a party may have to prove that it either took all reasonable 
steps to delete certain files, for instance in an action for damages after a data security 
breach, or that it took every reasonable effort to produce data, for instance, in response 
to a court order as part of the disclosure or discovery process. The type of evidence 
required to document that all reasonable steps were taken to either securely delete the 
data, or to recover lost data, will depend on the precise nature of the storage medium.
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9.119 A separate way of destroying data at the filesystem level is by the deletion of 
filesystem- wide encryption keys. Mobile telephones and several desktop operating 
systems increasingly feature encrypted filesystems that use a private key for unlocking 
the data in the filesystem. This key has to be unlocked and made available for encryption 
and de cryption each time the computer or telephone is booted, turned on after a longer 
delay, or after the key memory- retention period has expired. Data that is written to the 
persistent filesystem is encrypted using a unique (system specific, locally generated) 
private key, which is then secured (and unlocked upon demand) using a PIN, swipe 
pattern or fingerprint. Upon unlocking the telephone, this key is decrypted to enable full 
access. Destroying the private key, however, makes it virtually impossible to retrieve the 
data on the telephone, provided the cryptography and the implementation of this feature 
is done to exacting security standards. A modern smartphone may then destroy all data 
if a certain number of attempts are made to unlock the private key with a wrong or false 
fingerprint or access code.1
1 A good example is the implementation of this system in iOS for Apple smartphones. It is described 
extensively in the iOS 9.3 or later security guide (May 2016), https:// www.apple.com/ business/ docs/ 
iOS_ Security_ Guide.pdf.
Falsifying data
9.120 Tampering with electronic evidence is not new. An early example of erasing part 
of a tape recording and re- recording part of a conversation occurred in the UK in 1955.1 
In R v Sinha (Arun Kumar),2 medical data recorded on a computer was altered after the 
death of a patient, giving rise to a charge of perverting the course of justice. In the 
case of Freemont (Denbigh) Ltd v Knight Frank LLP,3 one witness concocted evidence 
by creating documents in the form of a series of notes of discussions, which included 
statements that had not been made during the course of the discussions,4 and to avoid 
detection, had the hard drives of older computers destroyed when the firm upgraded 
its computer systems.5 Attempts to adduce fraudulent evidence before a court are 
rare, but increasing.6 For instance, Bruce Hyman, who had been a prominent British 
television and radio producer before qualifying as a barrister later in life, created a 
false judgment for a friend. His deception was uncovered and he was subsequently 
convicted for perverting the course of justice and sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
of twelve months and ordered to pay £3,000 to his victim in compensation and Crown 
expenses of £3,745 – the first barrister to be so convicted, and he was subsequently 
disbarred by the Bar Standards Board.7 In another case in Japan, a prosecutor altered 
electronic evidence in a case he was investigating, and was subsequently convicted and 
imprisoned for 18 months.8
1 ‘Recording as testimony to truth’ [1955] Crim LR 2, [1954] SJ 98, 794.
2 [1994] 7 WLUK 34, [1998] Masons CLR 35, [1995] Crim LR 68 (CA), Times, 13 July 1994, 
Independent, 1 August 1994, [1994] CLY 1137.
3 [2014] EWHC 3347 (Ch), [2014] 10 WLUK 398, [2015] PNLR 4, [2015] CLY 1796.
4 Although the judge did not have to determine precisely how the evidence was concocted, and he 
considered the possibility of amended computer files at [56], he concluded on other evidence that the 
evidence was concocted, for which see [116], [123] and [140].
5 At [56]– [60].
6 Premier Homes and Land Corporation v Cheswell, Inc., 240 F.Supp.2d 97 (D.Mass. 2002), 2002 WL 
31907329 for fabrication of an email; People v Superior Court of Sacramento County, 2004 WL 1468698 
(Cal.App. 3 Dist.) for fabrication of letters on a computer after the event; ISTIL Group Inc v Zahoor 
[2003] EWHC 165 (Ch), [2003] 2 All ER 252, [2003] 2 WLUK 476, [2003] CP Rep 39, Independent, 
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[2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm), [2010] 12 WLUK 346, (2011) 108(3) LSG 17 for a forged and backdated 
agreement and employment contract; for forged emails, Apex Global Management Ltd v FI Call Ltd 
[2015] EWHC 3269 (Ch), [2015] 11 WLUK 248; in a criminal context, see R v Brooker [2014] EWCA 
Crim 1998, also cited as AG’s Ref: 071 of 2014, R v B (R C A) (2014) (available in the LexisNexis electronic 
database), where Brooker sent text messages from a second mobile telephone in her possession, 
claiming that her boyfriend sent them.
7 Angella Johnson, ‘How my barrister forged evidence against my husband – and now faces jail’ The 
Mail, 8 September 2007; Steven Morris, ‘Barrister becomes first to be jailed for perverting justice’ The 
Guardian, 20 September 2007; Simon de Bruxelles, ‘Barrister jailed for trying to frame man with fake 
e- mail’ Timesonline, 20 September 2007.
8 Hironao Kaneko, case translation and commentary in ‘Heisei 22 Nen (Wa) 5356 Gou’ (2012) 9 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 109.
9.121 However, it is conceivable, given the ease with which electronic data is so easily 
manipulated and altered, that attempts will be made in the future to falsify and alter 
documents even before a trial ever takes place, or to create vast swathes of ‘evidence’ 
of a complete set of legal proceedings. This happened in Islamic Investment Company 
of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems NV.1 As explained the in judgment of 
Hamblen J:2
From the end of October 2010 until December 2013 [the lawyer] conducted 
fictitious litigation for RM. That litigation involved fictitious hearings before the 
Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal; purported judgments of those courts; 
purported sealed court orders; a purported hearing transcript; purported 
skeleton arguments; purported correspondence with court officials and the 
Claimant’s solicitors, Norton Rose; the fictitious instruction and engagement of 
various counsel, and telephone conferences involving the impersonation of his 
senior partner and of leading counsel. None of this reflected reality. Throughout 
that period there was in fact no contact with Norton Rose or the court.
1 [2014] EWHC 3777 (Comm), [2014] 11 WLUK 521.
2 [2014] EWHC 3777 (Comm) at [4] .
9.122 Even such mundane matters such as proof of parking violations have been 
subject to the alteration of electronic evidence. In the case of Kevin Maguire, he had 
parked his car in Market Place in Bury town centre, Greater Manchester at 7.15 am on 
31 August 2003. He returned at 5 pm to find he had been given a parking ticket at 9.15 
am. Normally there were no restrictions on a Sunday, and when he parked his car, there 
were no signs to indicate there were any temporary restrictions in place. There were 
no signs because the NCP staff did not put them up on the previous night as there was a 
high likelihood that the signs could be pulled down or damaged by revellers overnight. 
In fact, the signs were put up after Mr Maguire had parked his car. When Mr Maguire 
complained to the NCP, it was asserted that he had parked illegally and he was sent a 
photograph of his parked car, which was dated 30 August 2003. Mr Maguire appealed 
against the parking fine. It transpired that one Gavin Moses, a member of the NCP staff, 
had altered the date on the digital photograph from 31 August to 30 August, so that 
it appeared that Mr Maguire had parked illegally. Mr Maguire was cleared of illegal 
parking and was awarded costs. Gavin Moses subsequently entered a plea of guilty 
when he was prosecuted for perverting the course of justice, and was sentenced to 150 
hours of community service.1
1 BBC News online news item, ‘ “Fit up” parking warden sentenced’, 28 January 2005, http:// news.
bbc.co.uk/ 1/ hi/ england/ manchester/ 4216539.stm. A further article was published by a Manchester 
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9.123 In Singapore, for use in salary negotiations with his prospective employer, a 
solicitor Ruddy Lim altered the monthly salary on his payslip from DLA Piper Singapore 
Pte Ltd to read $65,000, rather than $25,000. The description of his method is set out 
in the judgment:1
‘The Accused testified that he first created Exhibit P2 in his laptop computer 
some time between 12 and 14 November 2006. He was travelling in Jakarta at 
the time, and carried a soft copy of the DLA Piper logo in his laptop for preparing 
marketing materials. He created a document in the word- processing programme, 
Word, by typing out the text and numbers of the false payslip. He cut and pasted 
the DLA Piper logo onto the Word document. He then copied the image of the 
company stamp (with the office manager’s signature) from his original payslip … 
using software from Adobe, and electronically affixed the image onto the Word 
document. During this time, the Word document existed only in soft copy. When 
he returned to Singapore, he printed out the Word document on 14 November 
2006, then scanned it into the Xerox machine so that a “pdf” version of the false 
payslip would be created. He wanted to convert it from Word document format 
into “pdf” because the former was “editable”, while the latter was a “fixed format”. 
He then emailed the resulting document … to [his prospective employer].’
1 PP v Rudy Lim [2010] SGDC 174 at [17].
9.124 Considerably more attention will have to be paid to demonstrate the integrity 
of electronic data in the future, which in turn will help substantiate the claim for 
authenticity to reflect the reliability of the data.1 In all of these cases, the changes to the 
data were carried out manually. Anti- computer forensics increasingly provides tools to 
alter data automatically, and in particular the crucial metadata, thus diminishing the 
evidential value of the data that can be recovered. ‘Backtrack’ or ‘Transmogrify’, for 
instance, can change the extension of files by turning .exe (application) files into .docx 
(Word document) files, thereby hiding their malicious character. ‘Timestomp’ can 
change the timestamps of files, the metadata that records the creation and alteration 
of a file.2 Randomizers can automatically generate random file names, and criminals 
can use tools that replace Roman letters with identical- looking Cyrillic ones. Both 
approaches defeat data- mining techniques that look for ‘known bad files’ or signatures 
of known illegal images. Software developers who wanted to test the reliability of 
common forensic tools such as Encase developed many of these tools. Vincent Lui, 
one of the most prolific developers of tools with anti- forensic implications, concludes 
that the ‘unfortunate truth’ is that the presumption of reliability is ‘unjustified’ and the 
justice system is ‘not sufficiently sceptical of that which is offered up as proof.’3
1 According to the conclusions on page 56 of Report of Digital Forensic Analysis (26 March 2012) by 
Stroz Friedberg and submitted as evidence in the case of Paul D. Ceglia v Mark Zuckerberg, Individually, 
and Facebook, Inc., 600 Fed.Appx. 34 (2015), Stroz Friedberg determined that it had ‘found direct and 
compelling digital forensic evidence that the documents relied upon by Mr. Ceglia to support his claim 
were forged’, http:// cdn.arstechnica.net/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2014/ 08/ strozreport.pdf.
2 Hamid Jahankhani and Elidon Beqiri, ‘Digital evidence manipulation using anti- forensic tools and 
techniques’ in Hamid Jahankhani, David Lilburn Watson and Gianluigi Me (eds) Handbook of Electronic 
Security and Digital Forensics (World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd 2010), 411– 427.
3 Van Buskirk and Liu, ‘Digital evidence’, 25.
9.125 Other tools have legitimate objectives such as privacy protection. For instance, 
to prevent companies from obtaining data about individual behaviour when using a 
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create random noise.1 A record of keyword searches can also have evidential value in a 
criminal trial. Thus to establish the interest of the suspect in certain poisons or drugs, 
these tools can be used to cast doubt on the reliability of the log data that documents 
the searches carried out on a suspect’s computer. Since the search terms had been 
automatically generated, any inference that the user of the machine intentionally 
searched for a specific term becomes problematic.
1 Ye Shaozhi, Felix Wu, Raju Pandey and Hao Chen, ‘Noise injection for search privacy protection’ 
(2009) UC Davis Postprints, http:// escholarship.org/ uc/ item/ 08k1004m.
9.126 Lastly, a specific type of falsification should be given consideration. In many 
countries around the world state security and intelligence services operate malware 
(see also the paragraph on the use of legal intrusion, which is increasingly used as a 
police power) which is capable, not only of surveillance of their targets, but, with a 
simple addition, could be used to plant falsified data. The presence, use, or even the 
evidence of existence of the use of such tools creates significant technical challenges.1 
In cases where unscrupulous people acting on behalf of a government have the political 
motive to use such tools, consideration should be given to the possibility that such 
falsifications may have been used.
1 See, for example, the case of Hacking Team, an Italian supplier of such capabilities that was found 
to have made a long list of rather ‘unethical’ and often illegal sales to governments: Andy Greenberg, 
‘Hacking Team breach shows a global spying firm run amok’, Wired, 7 June 2015, https:// www.wired.
com/ 2015/ 07/ hacking- team- breach- shows- global- spying- firm- run- amok/ ; Patrick Howell O’Neill, 
‘The fall and rise of a spyware empire’, MIT Technology Review, 29 November 2019, https:// www.
technologyreview.com/ 2019/ 11/ 29/ 131803/ the- fall- and- rise- of- a- spyware- empire/ ; for another 
example of such software, see the Israeli-made Pegasus malware, traced by the Toronto- based citizen 
lab (at the Munk School of the University of Toronto): Bill Marczak, John Scott- Railton, Sarah McKune, 
Bahr Abdul Razzak and Ron Deibert, ‘HIDE AND SEEK tracking NSO group’s Pegasus spyware to 
operations in 45 countries’, 18 September 2018, https:// citizenlab.ca/ 2018/ 09/ hide- and- seek- 
tracking- nso- groups- pegasus- spyware- to- operations- in- 45- countries/ .
Hiding data
9.127 Tampering with and destroying data works best when the criminal no longer 
needs the data. For possession crimes such as the possession of illegal images, this is 
not possible. Hiding the data rather than destroying or altering it therefore becomes an 
important objective. Cryptography is the best known anti- forensic method to hide data 
from third parties. Due to its importance as a dual use technology with important roles 
for privacy and data security, and also because of the complex legal issues involved 
with cryptography, this is considered in the chapter on encrypted data.
9.128 Another well- known method of hiding data is steganography. Steganography is 
the method of hiding a message inside a digital object, which may be a graphic, a picture, 
a film or a sound clip. The sender is able to hide a message in a seemingly innocuous 
file, and the recipient can retrieve the message upon receipt. Other methods used to 
hide data include writing data to slack space or space that has not been allocated for 
use, hiding data on a hard drive in a secret partition, and the transmission of data under 
the cover of transmission protocols. Various types of commercial and free software 
are available to perform steganography on data. It can be relatively difficult to detect 
hidden data within a file, and the communication can be even more difficult to uncover 
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At present, it is unlikely that many investigators will undertake a routine examination 
for hidden data.1
1 Brent T. McBride, Gilbert L. Peterson and Steven C. Gustafson, ‘A new blind method for detecting 
novel steganography’ (2005) 2(1) Digital Investigation 50; a wide range of references on this topic 
is provided in Gary C. Kessler, ‘An overview of steganography for the computer forensics examiner’ 
(2004) 6(3) Forensic Science Communications– for an update of this article to February 2015, see 
http:// www.garykessler.net/ library/ fsc_ stego.html; Rachel Zax and Frank Adelstein, ‘FAUST: forensic 
artifacts of uninstalled steganography tools’ (2009) 6(1– 2) Digital Investigation 25.
9.129 There are now various tools available that facilitate the hiding of data in places 
on the hard drive that are less likely to be inspected. In this sense, they are the mirror 
images of the deletion tools discussed above. Deletion tools aim to securely delete 
any trace of an incriminating file, regardless of where on the computer a copy may 
be hiding. Conversely, ‘Slacker’ breaks up a file and stores individual pieces of it in the 
slack space left at the end of files, making it look like random noise to forensic tools – 
imagine just two digits each of a stolen credit card number stored in the unused part 
of a legitimate file. Slacker then enables the data to be reassembled as required.1 One 
of the problems with these tools is that they develop faster than it is possible to train 
digital evidence professionals, and even more importantly, faster than the development 
of sound, tested and agreed standards. This not only makes the detection of evidence 
more difficult; it also raises issues about the admissibility of the opinion evidence of 
forensic experts.
1 Hal Berghel, ‘Hiding data, forensics, and anti- forensics’ (2007) 50(4) Communications of the ACM 
15.
Attacks against computer forensics
9.130 Arguably, the latest addition to the inventory of anti- computer forensics is 
attacks against the investigator’s tools. As noted above, digital forensics is highly 
dependent on software tools. To create evidence that is admissible, these tools have 
to be evaluated and tested, and the results ideally published in openly available, peer- 
reviewed scientific publications. Indeed, some of the most popular tools are open 
source: that is, their source code is freely available. One of the benefits of this approach 
is not only a high degree of transparency when it comes to assessing the reliability of 
data generated by these tools, but also the ability for security professionals to improve 
them and to adapt them to local situations.1 However, it also enables criminals to 
develop tools that interfere directly with the evidence collection process and infiltrate 
the software that tries to analyse a suspect’s computer. This can either be done by 
undermining the integrity of the data that is collected, for instance by changing the 
hash value of the bit copy that the software creates (thus violating the continuity of 
evidence by casting reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the copy) or by forcing the 
analysis tool to either overlook incriminating data, or to report misleading information 
about it.2 In doing so, it cannot be right to equate such a tool with, say, a photocopier.3
1 Kenneally, ‘Gatekeeping out of the box’.
2 Chris K. Ridder, ‘Evidentiary implications of potential security weaknesses in forensic software’ 
(2009) 1(3) International Journal of Digital Crime and Forensics 80.
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Trail obfuscation
9.131 Trail obfuscation combines the deliberate attempt at tampering, deleting and 
hiding data with the taking of measures to frustrate investigations, conceal identities 
and evade enforcement actions.1 In many investigations, the data held on the suspect’s 
computer or device is only one part of the prosecution’s case. The other, equally 
important, set of data will come from the Internet and relate to the suspect’s browsing 
behaviour, or the victim’s computer or device in the case of a hacking offence: the origin 
of the data, the websites visited, and the activities undertaken. Obfuscating the trail 
that such activities leave behind on the Internet is therefore an important aspect of 
anti- computer forensics. It includes various anonymity- protection tools such as VPNs 
or anonymous remailers to hide browsing activity, or the use of spoofed or zombified 
accounts when sending malicious emails or spam, or the launch of a denial of service 
attack. ‘Zombified accounts’, as discussed in more detail below, demonstrate a specific 
side effect of anti- computer forensics. One way for a criminal to hide illegal activities is 
to take over the computer of a third party, for instance, after inserting a Trojan horse 
program, discussed in more detail below, and using this third party machine to carry 
out illegal activities. This not only hides the true perpetrator from the investigators, it 
also creates data that can falsely incriminate an innocent party.2
1 In the civil context, see EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), 
[2013] Bus LR 884, [2013] 2 WLUK 812, [2013] ECDR 8, [2013] Info TLR 133, [2013] FSR 31, Times, 
23 April 2013, [2013] CLY 1752.
2 Mukkamala and Sung, ‘Identifying significant features for network forensic analysis’; Nikkel, 
‘Domain name forensics’; Nikkel, ‘Improving evidence acquisition from live network sources’; Casey 
and Stanley, ‘Tool review – remote forensic preservation and examination tools’; Demir and others, 
‘Packet marking and auditing for network forensics’.
9.132 The range of tasks performed by such malicious software is probably only 
restricted by the imagination of the person who creates the program. A number of 
cases in the criminal courts where people have been accused of being in possession 
of abusive images of children on their computers have used the defence that some 
form of malicious software caused data to be downloaded to their computers or 
enabled a third party to obtain access to their computers without the permission of the 
computers’ owners.1 In the case of R v Caffrey,2 the defendant was charged with causing 
unauthorized modification of computer material under s 3(1) of the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990. The prosecution alleged that the defendant sent a deluge of electronic data 
from his computer to a computer server operated in the Port of Houston, Texas, USA, 
the effect of which was to cause the computer at the Port of Houston to shut down. 
The defendant claimed, in his defence, that unknown hackers obtained control of his 
computer and then launched a number of programs to attack the computer at the Port 
of Houston. The forensic examiner for the prosecution could not find any evidence of a 
Trojan horse on the computer. The defence claimed that it was impossible for every file 
to have been tested, and that the Trojan horse file might have had a facility to destroy 
itself, leaving no traces of having resided on his computer. The forensic examiner for 
the prosecution disputed that, stating that a Trojan horse would leave a trace on the 
computer. The jury acquitted Mr Caffrey.3
1 R v Schofield (April 2003, unreported), Reading Crown Court, and R v Green (October 2003, 
unreported), Exeter Crown Court.
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3 Esther George, ‘Casenote’ (2004) 1(2) Digital Investigation 89; Susan Brenner, Brian Carrier and 
Jef Henninger, ‘The Trojan horse defense in cybercrime cases’ (2004) 21 Santa Clara High Tech LJ 
1; the first Trojan horse case in the People’ Republic of China was prosecuted in 2009: Jihong Chen, 
‘The first “Trojan horse” case prosecuted in China’ (2010) 7 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature 
Law Review 107; Alex Xia and Julia Peng, ‘First “Trojan horse” case prosecuted for illegal invasion of 
computer systems in China’ (2009) 25 Computer Law & Security Review 298.
9.133 It should be noted that just because an individual may have such materials on 
his computer, it does not follow that he was responsible for downloading them. It is 
important for any digital evidence professional to report on findings within the context 
of what the technology is capable of doing. For instance, it is possible to introduce 
malicious software through web pages without the permission of the website owner. 
When a person visits a website, software could redirect the computer to undesirable 
websites, and the computer will automatically download unwanted material onto the 
temporary cache file of the computer without the user’s permission or knowledge.1
1 For which, see Bilar, ‘Known knowns’ (in which the author illustrates the ease by which third 
parties can obtain control of computers without the authority of the owner or user); Megan Carney 
and Marc Rogers, ‘The Trojan made me do it: a first step in statistical based computer forensics event 
reconstruction’ (2004) 2(4) International Journal of Digital Evidence.
9.134 A Trojan horse is a malicious software program containing hidden code that 
is designed to conceal itself in a computer as if it were legitimate software. When 
activated, the software will perform an operation that is not authorized by the user, 
such as the destruction of data (including the entire hard drive), the collection of data 
on a computer and transmission to a third party without the user being aware of what 
is happening, the counteraction of security measures installed on a computer, and the 
instruction of the computer to perform tasks such as to take part in a denial of service 
attack, or permit the creator of the program to obtain access to the computer. Just like 
the other large group of malware, viruses, Trojan horses pose a Janus- face conundrum 
for computer forensics. Finding a virus or a Trojan infection can be direct evidence 
amounting to an unauthorized modification of computer systems. At the same time, 
this can also be indirect evidence that the computer at the centre of an investigation 
has been tampered with and that the crime scene is ‘contaminated’.
9.135 The dual use nature of many of the tools used for anti- computer forensics has 
been noted above. On the one hand, these tools protect our privacy against criminals, but 
they also protect the privacy of criminals from police investigations. A similar analysis 
applies to spyware such as Trojan horses. On the one hand, they allow criminals to 
obtain access to credit card details or passwords. On the other, they have the potential 
to allow the police to obtain access to the activities of criminals – that is, if the police 
succeed in planting such a program on the suspect’s computer. Attempts to use 
malware for investigative purposes have caused legal controversy in some countries. 
In Germany, the Constitutional Court ruled against such clandestine surveillance 
after prosecutors applied for warrants to permit their use. In the discussion before 
the court, evidence was also given from computer specialists about the security and 
evidential implications of these ‘Federal Trojans’. To work efficiently, they must not 
be detected by commercial anti- virus software. This can only be achieved either by 
the tacit collaboration of the anti- virus software vendors, or by using the ingenuity of 
programmers employed by the police. In either case, the result will be malware that 
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turn hijack the code for this ‘official’ malware once it was planted on their machines, 
which would give them in effect a ‘master key’ for all computer systems. In such an 
event, it would become much easier for the defence to mount ‘Caffrey style’ arguments, 
and all computers could become crime scenes with compromised integrity.1
1 Wiebke Abel and Burkhard Schafer, ‘The German Constitutional Court on the right in confidentiality 
and integrity of information technology systems – a case report on BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822’ (2009) 6(1) 
SCRIPT- ed 106.
9.136 A final complication is created by the desire to protect users against malware. 
The use of Trojans lies at the heart of distributed denial of service attacks, a significant 
threat to the functioning of the Internet. Preventing malware has therefore become a 
high priority for police and commerce. Ordinary users, who often fail to take appropriate 
steps to protect their computers and devices against interference by criminals, are the 
weakest link. The Trusted Computing Initiative is one possible answer to this problem. 
It would allow a coalition of software and hardware developers much more direct 
access to computers, ensuring that all their defence mechanisms work as specified, and 
that no unauthorized program is run on them. While this approach is promising in its 
potential to reduce computer criminality, for the interpretation of electronic evidence, 
it carries several challenges. Since computer forensic tools too are essentially a form 
of ‘spyware’, common forensic applications may not work any longer in a trusted 
computing environment. Even worse, the philosophy of trusted computing is premised 
on belief that to protect the user against criminal activities, the security and control 
of the computer or device is improved if it is determined by not just the user but also 
by organizations. This means that the number of people and organizations that at any 
given time would have access to users’ computers and the data held therein would 
increase considerably, especially if the keys to users’ computers and their devices are 
compromised. This could in turn cast doubt on the reliability and authenticity of the 
data found on a computer or device during a criminal investigation. At the moment, 
lawyers assume, often naively, that data found on a suspect’s computer or device 
must have been put there by the person in physical control of the machine (typically, 
the owner); this inference would look increasingly doubtful in a trusted computer 
environment.1
1 Yianna Danidou and Burkhard Schafer, ‘Trusted computing and the digital crime scene’ (2011) 8 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 111.
An intellectual framework for analysing electronic 
evidence
9.137 However, as we have seen, despite these differences, evidence in digital form 
shares important features with other types of evidence. Eyewitness evidence, forensic 
trace evidence such as DNA and proof by document can all provide the basis for 
analogical reasoning to determine the evidentiary value of an item of digital evidence, 
if we are aware of the limitations of this analogy. The digital evidence professional, 
however, has a different job from that of a DNA analyst or a forensic entomologist 
and, in particular, deals with mathematical abstractions rather than empirical objects. 
Therefore, findings will not normally be in the form of matching probabilities or 
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regrettably either rare, or too abstract to be of much practical value. However, the 
‘hierarchy of propositions’ promoted by the Forensic Science Service in the UK has 
the potential to provide such a framework, which can also help to illuminate further 
the distinguishing features of electronic evidence and what they mean for practice. 
To interpret evidence, the digital evidence professional (or the judge) has to consider 
propositions that represent respectively the prosecution or defence, or the pursuer 
or defendant. Evidential weight can only be ascertained if the propositions from both 
sides are considered, and the increase or decrease in likelihood for both is considered. 
Several studies have shown, with examples, how a hierarchical analysis can help in 
the evaluation of heterogeneous evidence, from eyewitnesses to DNA.2 The nature 
of electronic evidence is such that on a like- by- like comparison and allowing for the 
machine- mediated nature of electronic evidence, the evidence will be several steps 
further removed from the reasoning associated with traditional evidence. All these 
steps have to be explored and the counterfactuals examined before electronic evidence 
can be said to be proved.
1 A potential problem for jurisdictions that follow the US decision in Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), 113 S.Ct. 2786 that requires that experts report confidence 
values and error rates, something that rarely applies in computer forensics.
2 I. W. Evett, G. Jackson and J. Lambert, ‘More on the hierarchy of propositions: exploring the 
distinction between explanations and propositions’ (2000) 40(1) Science & Justice 3.
Conclusions and future considerations
9.138 The widespread use of computers, the Internet, mobile telephones and 
smartphones means that most lawyers now have to deal with electronic evidence.1 
Increased use of specialized law enforcement capacities, the more traditional criminal 
justice system and advanced security and intelligence capabilities has created a field 
that is in constant flux. The weighing of the probative value of the evidence, can be 
straightforward only in simple cases, for which ample precedent and standards 
exist, but not otherwise where the parties challenge the data or new and innovative 
methods are in play. In these cases, the court often has to rely upon digital evidence 
professionals. This implies the need for a thorough analysis of the merits of each piece 
of data given in evidence. For this reason, lawyers must familiarize themselves with 
electronic evidence and understand not only the need to scrutinize the qualifications 
and conclusions of digital evidence professionals, but also the need to scrutinize the 
very evidence that they present and the manner in which it was obtained.
1 Graeme Horsman and Lynne R. Conniss, ‘Investigating evidence of mobile phone usage by drivers 
in road traffic accidents’ (2015) 12 Digital Investigation S30.
9.139 Cloud computing and trusted computing affect the way digital evidence 
professionals obtain evidence, which means that great care must be taken over 
how such evidence is obtained, which will doubtless be the subject of careful cross- 
examination.1 In addition, the methods used by attackers in the digital environment 
will mean it is increasingly necessary to take into consideration the use of rarer 
techniques to obtain evidence in the future.2
1 Stephen Mason, ‘Trusted computing and forensic investigations’ (2005) 2(3) Digital Investigation 
189: this article is merely an introduction to the topic that includes relevant references, and see 
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with a number of additional references; see also a thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Masters in Forensic Information Technology submitted to the graduate faculty of 
Computing and Mathematical Sciences at Auckland University of Technology by Michael E. Spence, 
‘Factors influencing digital evidence transfer across international borders: a case study’ (2010), http:// 
aut.researchgateway.ac.nz/ handle/ 10292/ 1187; Ian Walden, ‘Law enforcement access in a cloud 
environment’ (Legal Studies Research Paper No 74/ 2011), http:// papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.
cfm?abstract_ id=1781067; Josiah Dykstra and Alan T. Sherman, ‘Acquiring forensic evidence from 
infrastructure- as- a- service cloud computing: exploring and evaluating tools, trust, and techniques’ 
(2012) 9 Digital Investigation S90.
2 Kris Harms, ‘Forensic analysis of System Restore points in Microsoft Windows XP’ (2006) 3(3) 
Digital Investigation 151.
9.140 In response to these developments, anti- computer forensics has emerged over 
the last decade as a significant challenge to the investigation of crimes involving the 
use of computers and computer- like devices. The arms race between criminals and 
investigators on the one hand, and the dual use nature of the tools that permit and 
prevent digital investigations on the other, have created a highly complex interaction 
that requires careful reflection on the nature of electronic evidence in any individual 
case, a reflection that has to be constantly updated as new tools emerge. While this 
chapter posits various principles and standards for handling and analysing electronic 
evidence, technological advancements will undoubtedly create new challenges and 
conflicts for the process of collecting, evaluating and examining electronic evidence in 





Stephen Mason and Lynne Townley
The need for witnesses
10.1 Concern is sometimes expressed over the competence, knowledge and 
qualifications of the witness giving evidence as to the trustworthiness of digital data 
as evidence. In Wood (Stanley William), the Lord Chief Justice explained this as follows:
This computer was rightly described as a calculating tool. It did not contribute its 
own knowledge. It merely did a sophisticated calculation which could have been 
done manually by the chemist and was in fact done by the chemists using the 
computer programmed by Mr. Kellie whom the Crown called as a witness. The 
fact that the efficiency of a device is dependent on more than one person does not 
make any difference in kind. Virtually every device will involve the persons who 
made it, the persons who calibrated, programmed or set it up (for example with a 
clock the person who set it to the right time in the first place) and the person who 
uses or observes the device. In each particular case how many of these people 
it is appropriate to call must depend on the facts of, and the issues raised and 
concessions made in that case.1
1 (1983) 76 Cr App R 23 at 27.
10.2 The complexity of a computer, whatever the nature of the device (whether a 
hand- held device or a mainframe computer), will give rise to issues of authentication, 
but a wider range of challenges may also be raised:
1. There may be a question about the accuracy or otherwise of the human 
input. Where the accuracy of the information is challenged, two factors will be 
pertinent: whether the human beings responsible for inputting the information 
entered the correct information; and, regardless of the conclusions reached in 
answering the first point, whether the software harboured an error or a malicious 
code that acted to change the information that was entered by humans. In the 
first instance, evidence from those that were responsible for entering the data, if 
they can be found, will need to be called. In the second instance, the evidence of 
a suitably knowledgeable digital evidence professional or a suitable technician 
who is highly familiar with the system will be necessary.
2. The ‘reliability’ of the underlying operating system and application software 
may be at issue. This is a separate question to the first type of challenge, and 
will require a witness with different skills to the witnesses required in the first 
example. Here, it may be necessary to call the manufacturer of the hardware, or 
the developer of the operating system or application, or failing that, an expert in 
the specific operating or application software.
3. The mechanisms developed to ensure a system operates properly and 
efficiently may be at issue. A good example is that of bank ATMs. It is a notorious 
fact that attacks on ATMs are successful without the use of the card issued to 
Stephen Mason and Lynne Townley, ‘Competence of witnesses’, in Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng 
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the customer. Because these systems are subject to outward- facing threats, the 
range of experts will be wider when challenges of this nature are made, and will 
include experts who work in a bank as well as experts who are familiar with the 
weaknesses of bank ATM systems.
10.3 The precise nature of the evidence to be given will be governed by the nature of 
the challenge by the defence in any one case. The observations made by the Lord Chief 
Justice in Wood (Stanley William) were later elaborated by Steyn J, as he then was, in R 
v Minors, specifically including an observation underlying the rationale for admitting 
such evidence without adding to the burden of the prosecution:
The law of evidence must be adapted to the realities of contemporary business 
practice. Mainframe computers, minicomputers and microcomputers play 
a pervasive role in our society. Often the only record of a transaction, which 
nobody can be expected to remember, will be in the memory of a computer. The 
versatility, power and frequency of use of computers will increase. If computer 
output cannot relatively readily be used as evidence in criminal cases, much 
crime (and notably offences involving dishonesty) will in practice be immune 
from prosecution. On the other hand, computers are not infallible. They do 
occasionally malfunction. Software systems often have ‘bugs’. Unauthorised 
alteration of information stored on a computer is possible. The phenomenon 
of a ‘virus’ attacking computer systems is also well established. Realistically, 
therefore, computers must be regarded as imperfect devices.1
1 R v Minors (Craig), R v Harper (Giselle Gaile) [1989] 1 WLR 441 at 443.
Separating data reliability from computer reliability
10.4 In the case of R v Minors, the appellant tendered a passbook with false entries 
purporting to show there was more money held in the account than the £1 that was 
actually recorded. An auditor, a member of the audit investigation department of 
the Alliance and Leicester Building Society who had 14 years’ relevant experience 
and regularly worked with the particular computer, produced the computer record 
of the complete history of the appellant’s account. The last four (forged) entries in 
the account book were not recorded in the computer printout. The evidence of the 
computer printout was relevant to the question whether there was, in fact, a balance of 
only £1 in the account. For technical reasons that no longer apply, it was held that the 
evidence of the building society auditor was wrongly admitted under the provisions of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 that prevailed at the time.
10.5 In this case, it is pertinent to note that the auditor was properly qualified to 
testify as to the ‘reliability’ of the computer. However, it is suggested that the ‘reliability’ 
of the computer was not in issue in this case. The issue was whether the information 
entered into the computer was accurate, and if so, how the accuracy or otherwise of 
the information could be proved. The ‘reliability’ of the computer was a separate issue. 
All the auditor would be doing in such circumstances was to provide evidence as to 
how the information was transcribed from the passbook to the computer, and whether 
the methods used by the building society were capable of providing the assurance that 
the information was accurate.
10.6 In the case of R v Harper,1 it was alleged that the appellant presented a stolen 
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events were as follows. In February 1985 a batch of cards were stolen at Alexandra 
Palace railway station; appropriate entries were made by an employee in the ‘Lost 
Book’ at the station; the relevant entries were transferred to a computer belonging to 
British Rail at King’s Cross railway station, and the entries were further transferred 
from this computer to a computer at Waterloo railway station owned by London 
Regional Transport. At trial, the prosecution relied on a computer printout from the 
Waterloo computer to show that the card was stolen. The printout was produced by a 
revenue protection official who worked at Baker Street station. The judge admitted the 
evidence, but it was held on appeal that it was incorrect to do so because the witness 
could not, from her own knowledge, testify to the ‘reliability’ of the computer, and also 
that the requirements of s 68 of PACE 1984 had not been satisfied.2
1 R v Minors (Craig), R v Harper (Giselle Gaile) [1989] 1 WLR 441, [1989] 1 All ER 208, [1988] 12 
WLUK 161, (1989) 89 Cr App R 102, [1989] Crim LR 360, (1989) 133 SJ 420, [1989] CLY 546.
2 Section 68 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was repealed by the Criminal Justice Act 
1988, Schedule 16.
10.7 This decision must be right. However, it is suggested that the ‘reliability’ of the 
computer was not relevant given this set of facts. The fatal problem in this instance 
was a break in the continuity of evidence, because the ‘Lost Book’ held at Alexandra 
Palace railway station was missing at the time of the trial. The witness may have been 
competent to give evidence of the procedures used to register and disseminate the 
knowledge of the loss of Capital Cards. However, on these facts, because there were 
so many separate connections in the chain, the prosecution ought to have obtained 
evidence from each person responsible for the process by which lost or stolen cards 
were brought to the attention of the relevant authority, and how the information was 
disseminated.1
1 See ‘Evidence obtained from a computer’ (1992) 56 Journal of Criminal Law 44 for a comparison 
between Minors and Shephard and ‘touching wood’; Colin Tapper, ‘Reform on the law of evidence in 
relation to the output from computers’ (1995) 3(1) Intl J L & Info Tech 85. In Odex Pte. Ltd. v Pacific 
Internet Ltd [2007] SGDC, rev’d on other grounds, [2008] SGHC 35, [2008] 3 SLR 18, the lawyers could 
not even identify the correct person to prepare a witness statement; George Wei, ‘Pre- commencement 
discovery and the Odex litigation: copyright versus confidentiality or is it privacy?’ (2008) 20 SAcLJ 
591; and Daniel Seng, ‘Evidential issues from pre- action discoveries: Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd’ 
(2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 25.
Lay experts as witnesses
10.8 In the case of R v Spiby (John Eric),1 the defence argued, unsuccessfully, that the 
sub- manager of a hotel could not discharge the burden under s 69 of PACE 1984 to 
show that the computer was working ‘properly’. It was submitted that only a service 
engineer or an expert on the use of the particular computer system would have been 
able to say whether the machine was working ‘correctly’.2 Taylor LJ agreed with the 
decision of the trial judge, and considered that the positive evidence of the sub- 
manager that the device was working was sufficient in this instance. This cannot be 
correct. Only a service engineer or a suitably qualified professional with knowledge 
of the particular computer system would be in a position to determine whether the 
device was working ‘properly’. The sub- manager was only competent to give evidence 
of his reliance on the output of the device for the purpose of submitting a record of 
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machine – that is, for the purpose of billing customers for the calls made. An assertion 
that the output is considered reliable because the hotel relies on the output of the 
device does not prove the device is ‘reliable’. These are separate questions.
1 [1990] 3 WLUK 150, (1990) 91 Cr App R 186, Times, 16 March 1990, Independent, 2 April 1990, 
Daily Telegraph, 30 March 1990, [1990] CLY 785. See Solomon E. Salako ‘R v Spiby Revisited’ (1991) 
1(1) LTJ 29.
2 Colin Tapper, ‘Evidence from computers’ (1974) 8 Georgia Law Review 562, 595. Professor Tapper 
noted, at fn 193, 596, that ‘An interesting trial dilemma regarding foundation testimony is that too 
much of a showing of error control may cause a jury to find the system so fraught with error that the 
system would be presumed to be unreliable, while too little testimony on that matter would cause a 
similar result’. Unfortunately, it does not follow that the latter result occurs.
10.9 Compare this case with the decision in United States of America v Linn.1 
A computer printout of telephone calls was admitted into evidence. The appellant 
argued that the printout was not admissible because it was an untrustworthy record 
generated by a computer. The appellant suggested that the Director of Communications 
of the Sheraton hotel ‘did not understand the distinctions between “menus”, “data 
bases”, and computer “code”, she was “confused and inadequately trained”, and 
thus without personal knowledge of the way in which the computer printout was 
generated’.2
1 880 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1989).
2 880 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1989) at 216.
10.10 No evidence was offered to indicate why the content of the printout was 
considered to be unreliable or why it was relevant that the witness failed to understand 
how the printout was generated. Beezer CJ rejected the submission as frivolous. He 
pointed out that the telephone record was generated automatically and it was retained 
in the ordinary course of business; thus such records were considered business records 
under the relevant Federal Rules of Evidence.
10.11 In this case, two separate issues were conflated: first, the witness was not 
an expert witness and therefore not qualified to give the evidence, and second, the 
witness failed to understand the underlying working of the computer that produced 
the printout. If the ‘reliability’ of the computer was in issue, the appellant ought to 
have alleged the content of the printout could not be trusted, and have given sufficient 
reasons for the burden to fall to the prosecution to demonstrate the computer was 
working correctly.
10.12 It was not considered necessary for a computer expert to provide evidence that 
a till roll connected to a computer was ‘working properly’ in R v Shephard (Hilda)1 
under the provisions of s 69 of PACE 1984. The oral evidence of a store detective, who 
demonstrated how the prices of goods were added to the till roll, was considered 
sufficient by the members of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. It should 
be noted that the store detective was only capable of demonstrating the method by 
which the prices of goods were added to the till, not whether the software accurately 
replicated the list of goods purchased. In giving judgment in the Court of Appeal, Lloyd J 
said of the evidence given by the store detective:
On the evidence in the court below in the present case, there was no doubt about 
the functioning of the computer. Mrs. McNicholas who gave detailed evidence as 
to how the cash tills worked, and explained the link with the central computer, 
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‘Q. And what about the master computer? Did that malfunction?
A. Touch wood, no. I have never known it break down since we have had it.’
She was not cross- examined on the point. In addition, she has spent, as we have 
said, many hours examining the particular till rolls. She would have been the 
first to notice if there had been any internal evidence of malfunction. In those 
circumstances it was legitimate for the court to infer that the computer was 
operating properly.2
1 [1993] AC 380, [1993] 2 WLR 102, [1993] 1 All ER 225, [1992] 12 WLUK 273, (1993) 96 Cr App 
R 345, (1993) 157 JP 145, [1993] Crim LR 295, (1993) 143 NLJ 127, (1993) 137 SJLB 12, Times, 17 
December 1992, Independent, 21 January 1993, [1993] CLY 636 (spelt ‘Shepherd’ in All ER and Crim 
LR); but see the highly relevant comments in ‘Evidence obtained from a computer’ (1992) 56 Journal 
of Criminal Law 44 in comparing the decision in this case against the decision in R v Minors (Craig), R 
v Harper (Giselle Gaile) [1989] 1 WLR 441; ‘Admissibility of computer print- outs’ (1993) 57(3) Journal 
of Criminal Law 277.
2 R v Shephard (1991) 93 Cr App R 139 at 143.
10.13 In rejecting the need for a computer expert to sign a certificate where oral 
evidence has been given that was open to cross- examination, Lord Griffiths offered the 
following comments in the House of Lords:
Documents produced by computers are an increasingly common feature of all 
business and more and more people are becoming familiar with their uses and 
operation. Computers vary immensely in their complexity and in the operations 
they perform. The nature of the evidence to discharge the burden of showing 
that there has been no improper use of the computer and that it was operating 
properly will inevitably vary from case to case. The evidence must be tailored to 
suit the needs of the case. I suspect that it will very rarely be necessary to call an 
expert and that in the vast majority of cases it will be possible to discharge the 
burden by calling a witness who is familiar with the operation of the computer in 
the sense of knowing what the computer is required to do and who can say that 
it is doing it properly.1
1 [1993] AC 380 at 387 B– D; followed in Public Prosecution Service v McGowan [2008] NICA 13, 
[2009] NI 1.
10.14 Lord Griffiths went on to say:
The computer in this case was of the simplest kind printing limited basic 
information on each till roll. The store detective was able to describe how the 
tills were operated, what the computer did, that there had been no trouble with 
the computer and how she had also examined all the till rolls which showed no 
evidence of malfunction either by the tills or by the central computer.1
1 [1993] AC 380 at 387E; the Crown Prosecution Service cites this decision by the House of Lords 
as if a lay person has any knowledge of the complexities of a computer system: ‘The House of Lords 
has held that a store detective is competent to produce till rolls produced by a store’s computer 
where the store detective was familiar with the operation of the tills and can say that the store had 
no difficulties caused by the operation of the computer’, https:// www.cps.gov.uk/ legal- guidance/ 
computer- records- evidence.
10.15 Dr Stephen Castell was engaged as an expert witness in litigation regarding a 
major electronic point of sale computer system for a national retailer in 1994, and he 
remarked that a centralized computer connected to remote tills in store branches is far 
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1 ‘Letter to the Editor’, Computer Law and Security Report (May– June 1994), 158.
10.16 At the same time as this case was being heard in England, the Court of Appeals 
of Nebraska heard an appeal in the case of State of Nebraska v Ford.1 The appellant was 
convicted of theft from hotel rooms. The hotel used a system controlled by a computer, 
by which both those staying at the hotel and members of staff gained entry to a room 
by way of a card with machine- readable code. A number of thefts from rooms were 
linked to the recorded use of a card issued to Ford. When challenged, Ford admitted 
to being in the rooms at the time, but not to theft. The prosecution adduced the 
business records under the hearsay exception, which provides that the evidence can 
be admitted if the activity recorded is of a type that regularly occurs in the course of 
the day- to- day activity of the business; and the record was made at or near the time 
of the events recorded, and the record is authenticated by a qualified witness. The 
defence challenged the qualifications of the witness, Glenda Willmon, the general 
manager of the hotel, who explained how the system worked. Connolly J, who gave the 
judgment for the court, rejected the submission by the defence that the witness was 
not suitably qualified. The judge said that it did not matter whether the witness could 
discuss the components or engineering principles of the computer.2 This must be right. 
Unless there is a challenge to the accuracy of the evidence tendered that results from a 
computer or computer- like device, it does not necessarily follow that a person familiar 
with a computer system cannot give evidence of the output of the system.
1 501 N.W.2d 318 (Neb.App. 1993).
2 501 N.W.2d 318 at 321.
10.17 The view that an expert is not always required to attest to the proper working 
of a computer was repeated in Darby (Yvonne Beatrice) v DPP.1 In this case, a police 
constable operating a speed- measuring device testified to the proper operation of the 
device, even though the device acted to corroborate his own testimony. In undertaking 
this task, the police constable merely outlined how the device was used, not whether it 
was accurate. Similarly, in R. v Dean (Jeanette), R. v Bolden (Robert Allen),2 Lt Cdr Quigley, 
a Maritime Law Enforcement and Liaison Officer at the Department of State, contacted 
the Coast Guard Command Center at US Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, DC 
to request a search of the vessel Battlestar. A search was made of the Marine Safety 
Information System, which was a database containing information on all US vessels. 
The Command Center also searched the databases of four coast states, and no record 
of this vessel was found. One ground of appeal centred on the submission that there 
was no evidence from the people who carried out the searches and the computers 
were operating properly, and as a result, the evidence was not admissible under 
s 69 of PACE 1984. The members of the Court of Appeal disagreed. It was considered 
that Lt Cdr Quigley could give evidence of the ‘reliability’ of the computers, because 
there were no reported problems with the databases, and searches on three separate 
occasions for the same name failed to bring up the name of the vessel. Dyson J gave 
judgment, and commented that: ‘the fact that searches on three separate occasions 
produced the same result provided strong support for the conclusion that the 
computers were operating properly on each occasion.’3
1 [1994] 10 WLUK 343, [1995] RTR 294, (1995) 159 JP 533 (DC), Times, 4 November 1994, [1994] 
CLY 674.
2 [1998] 2 WLUK 562, (1998) 2 Cr App R 171, [1998] CLY 984.
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10.18 This conclusion ought to be reconsidered: the proposition should be that the 
database was searched on three occasions, and the failure to find an entry for the 
vessel enables the conclusion to be reached that the name of the vessel was not 
on the database.1 This is a different issue to whether the computer was ‘working 
properly’, or in preference, returning verifiably correct results: the computer may 
not have been working completely to the expectation of the user, because it might 
have had any number of problems that did not necessarily affect the effectiveness of 
the search facility. The effectiveness of the search of the database can be independent 
of the ability of the computer to return generally verifiably correct results. If 
the ‘reliability’ of the computer is challenged, it must be necessary to provide a 
reasonable basis upon which the claim is made, and there ought to be some evidence 
proffered to demonstrate that the results produced by the computer might be so 
unreliable as to affect the output used in evidence.
1 R. (on the application of Sedgefield BC) v Dickinson [2009] EWHC 2758 (Admin), [2009] 10 WLUK 
317, where a search of a database failed to reveal evidence of an entry, but this was insufficient to prove 
that the notification of a change of circumstances had not been received.
Qualification of witnesses
10.19 Where there is a reason that the content of the computer printout cannot be 
trusted, then the qualifications of the witness will be relevant, because of the nature 
of the evidence they will be required to give and be cross- examined upon. The degree 
of expertise required from a witness will vary according to the problem encountered. 
In DPP v Barber,1 the first two characters of each line on the printout were missing, 
although the accuracy of the information recorded on the printout was not affected. 
However, the magistrate declined to hear the evidence of a service engineer who was 
able to explain the nature of the problem because he was not a computer expert, and 
the evidence of what he had seen at a later date was not relevant to the state of the 
device at the time the printout was produced. The appeal was allowed because the 
evidence of the service engineer should have been received. This must be right, given 
that an ancillary part of the device was apparently not working properly, and the defect 
did not affect the accuracy of the data.
1 [1998] 5 WLUK 294, (1999) 163 JP 457, [1999] CLY 886; ‘Effect of intoximeter’s defects’ (1999) 
63(6) Journal of Criminal Law 527.
10.20 The two issues are further illustrated in R v Neville,1 where the Crown sought 
to adduce evidence of a computer printout showing telephone calls made on Neville’s 
mobile telephone in connection with the hiring of a tractor unit and the employment of 
a driver to transport a large quantity of stolen hi- fi equipment. The mobile telephone 
was hired from Talkland, a subsidiary of ICL. A different company, Racal, undertook 
the telephone operations. The software in the Racal computer issued instructions to 
record the date, time and duration of each call automatically, and these details were 
passed on to Talkland. The computer belonging to Talkland included software code 
that enabled it to produce an itemized bill for their customers. When the bill was paid, 
the printout was stored on microfiche. The Crown sought to adduce the microfiche 
into evidence (or, presumably, a printout of the contents recorded on the microfiche), 
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an employee of Talkland with no apparent qualifications, to give evidence that she had 
checked all relevant records and had no reason to believe that the telephone bill was 
inaccurate because of any improper use of either of the computers involved, including 
the Racal computer. She also stated that the computer at her place of work was working 
properly so far as her enquiries led. This cannot be correct. The witness might have had 
the competence to give evidence of the procedures within her knowledge to provide 
for the accuracy of billing information at Talkland,2 but was in no position (not being 
competent) to offer evidence of any material substance that the computers at Talkland 
were working properly, and certainly not in a position to offer the same evidence 
relating to the procedures at Racal, nor as to whether the computer belonging to Racal, 
of which she had no knowledge, never mind expert knowledge, was working properly.
1 [1990] 11 WLUK 143, [1991] Crim LR 288, [1991] CLY 623.
2 The evidence can be admitted under the provisions of s 117 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
10.21 Knowledge that is obtained from experience at work in the absence of formal 
qualifications is acceptable.1 However, it is not helpful when a police officer is 
entrusted to conduct a forensic examination of a mobile telephone without the relevant 
knowledge or expertise, as in R v Coultas (Kiera),2 or where a mobile telephone analyst 
provides evidence that is tantamount to expert evidence where the members of a jury 
are presented with the appearance of cell site analysis, and then invited to infer facts 
without any of the technical knowledge required to substantiate any conclusions.3 The 
degree of expertise required of a witness was the subject of the appeal in R. v Stubbs 
(Paul Matthew).4 The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud, in that he was 
involved in fraudulent money transfers from HSBC Bank of around £11.8 million. The 
fraudulent activities were carried out using an online banking system called Hexagon. 
The appellant was a member of the password reset team, responsible for resetting 
customer passwords. The prosecution called Mr Richard Roddy, an employee of HSBC, 
to give evidence of the Hexagon system. Mr Roddy was not the only witness called to 
provide evidence of an expert nature. The defence objected at trial to the admissibility 
of parts of Mr Roddy’s evidence on the basis that he lacked the expertise and 
independence to give expert opinion on the matters in question. It was accepted that 
he could give evidence about the processes within HSBC and the manner in which the 
system was designed to operate. However, it was contended that his detailed account 
of the actual activity within the system at the material times amounted to inadmissible 
opinion evidence. Following a trial within a trial, the judge ruled Mr Roddy’s evidence 
to be admissible and declined to exclude it under s 78 of PACE 1984 or article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The grounds of objection are set out in the 
judgment of Richards LJ:
48. Of particular importance was Mr Roddy’s evidence that the activity reports 
all related to the same session, which had the reference number ‘CC000051’ and 
had been registered to the staff delegate identification PWRD on the morning 
of 24 July 2002. A session number would be allocated upon a user’s log- on at a 
particular terminal. If all the transactions took place within one continuous session 
and there were legitimate transactions admittedly carried out by the appellant 
during that session just before and just after the illegitimate transactions, the 
prosecution could argue with force that the illegitimate transactions must have 
been carried out from the same terminal; and this also provided strong support 
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49. Mr Winter submitted that Mr Roddy did not have the expertise to give such 
evidence that the activity reports all related to a single session. The fact that 
they had the same number did not mean that it was a single session. There 
was evidence from the admitted expert, Mr Danbury, that concurrent log- ons 
(so as to target and hijack a live session) were not possible; but that left open 
the possibility of non- concurrent log- ons to the system under the same session 
number. This was something that Mr Roddy had not investigated and did not 
have the technical qualifications to investigate or to answer questions about.
50. Among the various points made by Mr Winter were these:
i) The activity reports themselves do not show when log- ons and log- 
offs occurred. For example, they do not show the undoubted log- off by 
the appellant at about 17.20. This leaves open the possibility that he had 
previously logged off at about 17.00, just before the illegitimate activity.
ii) There was no evidence about the appellant’s log- on in the morning. 
Further, although Mr Roddy said that the computer timed out if the 
session was idle for a period, the evidence was not clear as to how long 
it needed before a timed log- off occurred. One would have expected a 
timed log- off when the appellant left the computer at lunchtime, but 
there was nothing to show whether there had been a log- off followed 
by a fresh log- on by the appellant after lunch. In short, there was simply 
no evidence about when or how the appellant’s CC000051 session was 
created.
iii) Mr Roddy gave evidence that, once a session ended, the next session 
would not be given the same number again: the number reverted to 
a pool of numbers available to be allocated by the computer to new 
sessions. He said in cross- examination that there was a 1 in 100,000 
chance of it being reallocated to a different session on the same day. Yet 
there was evidence of three instances the previous day in which session 
numbers had been reallocated to other sessions after discontinuance of 
the session to which they were originally allocated. Mr Roddy was unable 
to say how this could have happened.
iv) There were other pointers to the illegitimate activity having been 
carried out by someone other than the appellant. The illegitimate activity 
involved a random attack on five companies beginning with the letter ‘A’, 
whereas the appellant would have known or could have discovered the 
primary delegate identification for all the companies and would not have 
needed to do things in this way. Moreover, on two occasions in the course 
of the illegitimate activity the user deployed a shortcut that was never 
used by the appellant in the course of his legitimate transactions. The 
vulnerability of the system to attack by members of staff was illustrated 
by the fraud perpetrated by Mr Kareer earlier the same year, involving as 
it did the use of other people’s terminals in their absence.5
1 R. v Oakley (Trevor Alan) [1979] 6 WLUK 43, (1980) 70 Cr App R 7, [1979] RTR 417, [1979] Crim LR 
657, [1979] CLY 458, where a police officer, with 15 years’ experience in the traffic division, attended 
and passed a course as an accident investigator, having attended over 400 fatal road traffic accidents; 
R. v Murphy (William Francis) [1980] 3 WLUK 64, (1980) 71 Cr App R 33, [1980] RTR 145, [1980] Crim 
LR 309, (1980) 124 SJ 189, [1980] CLY 2295, where a police officer offered an opinion as to the nature 
of a collision.
2 [2008] EWCA Crim 3261, [2008] 9 WLUK 352.
3 R. v Turner (Andrew Neil) [2020] EWCA Crim 1241, [2020] 9 WLUK 308. On similar facts, a 
differently composed Court of Appeal determined the position correctly in R. v Calland (Sean Thomas) 
[2017] EWCA Crim 2308, [2017] 12 WLUK 706. (For some inexplicable reason, Calland was not cited 
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‘Historic cell site analysis – overview of principles and survey methodologies’ (2012) 8(3– 4) Digital 
Investigation185; R. P. Coutts and H. Selby, ‘Problems with cell phone evidence tendered to “prove” the 
location of a person at a point in time’ (2016) 13 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 
76; Reg Coutts and Hugh Selby, ‘ “Mobile ping data” – metadata for tracking’ (2017) 14 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review 22; Matthew Tart, Sue Pope, David Baldwin and Robert Bird, 
‘Cell site analysis: roles and interpretation’ (2019) 59(5) Science & Justice 558; Matthew Tart, ‘Opinion 
evidence in cell site analysis’ (2020) 60(4) Science & Justice 363.
4 [2006] EWCA Crim 2312, [2006] 10 WLUK 328.
5 [2006] EWCA Crim 2312 at [48]– [50], original emphasis.
10.22 In reaching the decision to admit the evidence, the trial judge applied the tests 
in R v Bonython.1 Richards LJ agreed that it was not in dispute that the first test was 
satisfied, because the Hexagon system was a subject for expert testimony, and he went 
on to say, of the second question:
In our judgment he was also right to give an affirmative answer to the second 
question, holding that Mr Roddy had acquired sufficient knowledge of the subject 
to render his opinion of value in resolving the issues before the court concerning 
the operation of the Hexagon system. This was an assessment properly made 
after hearing Mr Roddy’s evidence on the voir dire. The extent of Mr Roddy’s 
experience of the Hexagon system, as summarised above, enabled him to give 
valuable assistance on the interpretation of the data taken from the central 
computer and set out in the activity reports. It was accepted that he was not an IT 
specialist in any wider sense and that his technical knowledge of the system was 
limited. But this did not preclude his being regarded as an expert to the extent 
indicated by the judge.2
1 [1984] SASR 45.
2 R. v Stubbs (Paul Matthew) [2006] EWCA Crim 2312 at [55]. For how courts consider the 
qualifications of experts, see Sean E. Goodison, Robert C. Davis and Brian A. Jackson, Digital Evidence and 
the U.S. Criminal Justice System: Identifying Technology and Other Needs to More Effectively Acquire and 
Utilize Digital Evidence (RAND Corporation 2013), 13, and Peter Sommer, ‘Certification, registration, 
assessment of digital forensic experts: the UK experience’ (2011) 2(1) Digital Investigation 98.
10.23 The members of the jury were informed of the limitations in the evidence that 
Mr Roddy was able to give, and it was a matter for them to determine whether they 
should accept and place weight on his evidence. It was submitted that Mr Roddy’s 
evidence went to admissibility because he was an employee of HSBC and represented 
the victim of the fraud, and therefore he was not an independent witness. The court 
rejected this submission. Expertise and independence are separate issues, and it was 
pointed out that although he made a concession to his lack of objectivity, no attention 
was given to any feature of his evidence that would support a case of conscious bias or 
lack of objectivity. Richard LJ indicated:
In any event it was a matter for the jury to determine whether there was any 
conscious or unconscious bias or lack of objectivity that might render his 
evidence unreliable. This was, as the judge said, a matter going to weight rather 
than admissibility. The circumstances did not warrant a refusal by the judge to 
admit the relevant parts of Mr Roddy’s evidence at all.1
1 [2006] EWCA Crim 2312 at [59]. In England and Wales, both the Civil Procedure Rules 2020, part 
35 and the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, part 19 make provision for a single joint expert in certain 
circumstances. Therefore, there is an onus on the parties to agree expert evidence where they can. For 
an analysis of the potential problems with this, see Peter Sommer, ‘Meetings between experts: a route 
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10.24 The technical evidence offered by Mr Roddy was not the only evidence of 
relevance that was led by the prosecution. There was supporting evidence for the 
prosecution case, for instance: the appellant left the building sometime after 17.00 and 
returned at 17.27. He claimed he returned to collect his umbrella and that it had been 
raining, yet the evidence from a CCTV located outside an office a few minutes away 
from the entrance revealed it was bright and sunny at the material time. The appellant 
also failed to produce relevant paperwork authorizing the change in passwords, lied 
during his internal interviews and the evidence he gave to the police when questioned 
was also inconsistent.
10.25 In addition to the evidence of Mr Roddy, the prosecution also called a Mr Alan 
Danbury, a computer expert who had been responsible for introducing the system into 
the UK in the early 1990s, and the manager of the support team until he retired in 
2004. During the trial within a trial, the judge also heard evidence from a witness for 
the defence, a Mr Michael Turner. Mr Turner was not able to provide a report because 
of a lack of information for a variety of reasons, as set out by Richards LJ:
the appellant’s workstation had not been retained or imaged; there was no 
computer running the 2002 version of the Hexagon system which could be 
analysed; he had been provided with no information as to how the HSBC 
computers operated or produced the audit logs relied on by Mr Roddy; and he did 
not have the underlying data from which he could safely reach any conclusion.1
1 [2006] EWCA Crim 2312 at [44].
10.26 These comments highlight the problems faced by the defence in attempting to 
elicit cooperation with the victim when legitimate questions need to be investigated 
to enable the cross- examination of prosecution witnesses to undermine the evidence 
they give. This is a particular problem when challenging a bank, because the defence 
has a legitimate interest in challenging the ability of a particular system to withstand 
an attack or an attempt at subversion. Conversely, the bank cannot, when confronted 
with evidence that fraud may have taken place, suspend the operation of the system 
or disrupt it in such a way as to cause it to stop working, no matter how short a time it 
would take. If a bank were required to pay more attention to the gathering of forensic 
evidence at a sufficient standard to satisfy criminal proceedings, then they, together 
with other organizations that may suffer similar attempts, will either be obliged to 
train employees, or call in suitably qualified experts to conduct an investigation at 
the time the suspicion is raised. Apart from the added cost and the marginal utility 
of taking such steps, the victim must decide at the time suspicion is raised whether 
the integrity of the system will be at issue, which in turn requires the victim to have 
hindsight of the future challenges.
10.27 In this case, a balance had to be struck between adducing evidence of the 
system and how it operated within the knowledge of the person responsible for it at 
the bank, and whether it was necessary to require a more in- depth analysis from a 
person expert in the relevant system. The dividing line between the need for an expert 
in the operation of the computer system to give evidence, and the evidence of someone 
who is familiar with the day- to- day operation of the system is a fine one, and it will 
depend on the nature of the case as to whether one expert is to be preferred over 
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both internal and external, will not be conclusive. The members of the jury can be 
appraised of the conflicting technical evidence, and will then be required to consider 
the technical evidence against the other evidence in reaching their decision. In this 
instance, it can be argued that the technical evidence, which was not conclusive, was 
supported by the inconsistencies in the appellant’s behaviour.
1 In RTA v McNaughton [2006] NSWSC 115, a witness was not permitted or sufficiently expert to 
give evidence of the position a vehicle was in at the material time.
10.28 Arguably, there is a distinction between the competence, knowledge and 
qualifications of a witness tendered to give evidence of the trustworthiness of evidence 
in digital data. If the defence challenges the accuracy of the evidence, it will be necessary 
to call a witness with relevant competence, knowledge and suitable qualifications to 
give evidence. The decision in the case of R v Shephard must be right, but not because 
of the rationale offered by the members of the House of Lords. The defence did not 
challenge the truth of claims made by the witness, only the qualifications of the witness 
to testify. From the law reports, it appeared that the witness had sufficient knowledge 
to offer the evidence he did. Had the defence challenged the system that the till roll was 
connected to, and questioned whether the entire system was trustworthy, including 
what, if any, errors had been found in operating it across a number of shops connected 





Draft Convention on Electronic Evidence
The Draft Convention was published in the Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature 
Law Review (2016) 13 S1– S11 (the online version includes further information relating 
to the process by which it was written).
Summary
The Draft Convention is the first treaty dealing with the status of electronic evidence, 
covering civil and criminal proceedings, the investigation and examination of electronic 
evidence, and general provisions regarding the recognition and admissibility of 
electronic evidence from foreign jurisdictions.
Convention on Electronic Evidence
London,
Preamble
[The States signatory hereto],
Considering that the aim of the Drafting Committee is to encourage judges and lawyers 
to appreciate the concept of evidence in electronic form;
Recognising the value of promoting international co- operation with [the other States 
that are Parties] to this Convention;
Convinced of the need to pursue, as a matter of priority, a common policy on electronic 
evidence;
Conscious that the profound changes brought about by the machine and software 
code (collectively ‘digital systems’) have altered the means by which evidence is 
authenticated, in that the medium and the content are no longer bound together as 
with paper, and that the rules established for paper do not always apply to evidence in 
electronic form;
Concerned by the risk that electronic evidence can be misunderstood and 
misinterpreted;
Recognising that evidence in electronic form has unique characteristics that are 
significantly different to paper and other objects, which raise complex questions about 
the integrity and reliability of data in electronic form;
Recognising the need to facilitate the co- operation between States for the proper 
receipt, handling and authentication of electronic evidence;
Believing that it is in the interests of justice to provide for fairness in legal proceedings;
Have agreed as follows:
Part I – Use of terms
Article 1 – Definitions
For the purposes of this Convention:
‘adjudicator’ means any person that is lawfully appointed as a judge, arbitrator or to 









‘attribution’ means the assigning of responsibility for or tracing the origin of an act 
purported to have been performed or committed using or through a computer device, 
system or network;
‘authentication’ means the process by which any electronic record, document, 
statement or other thing is proven to be what it claims to be;
‘computer’ means any device capable of performing mathematical or logical 
instructions;
‘court’ means any international court, national court, statutory arbitral or other 
tribunal, board or commission according to national law of the contracting state;
‘electronic evidence’ means evidence derived from data contained in or produced 
by any device the functioning of which depends on a software program or from data 
stored on or communicated over a computer system or network;
‘electronic record’ means data that is recorded or stored on any medium in or by a 
device programmed by software code and that can be read or perceived by a person 
or any such device, and includes a display, printout or other output that represents 
the data;
‘device’ means any apparatus or tool operating alone or connected to other apparatus 
or tools, that processes information or data in electronic form;
‘digital’ means anything that relies on technology based on a binary system or any 
future development or replacement technology of the same;
‘digital evidence practitioner’ means a person who is appropriately qualified, and where 
the law requires, authorized, to investigate and examine evidence in electronic form;
‘legal proceeding’ means any formal procedure that takes place before any court, 
national or international, a statutory arbitral or other tribunal, board or commission 
according to national law and charged with legally defined duties and obligations, or 
any other formal legal process;
‘metadata’ means data that describe other data;
‘program’ means any set of instructions stored in a machine- readable format that can 
be used to perform a function in a repeatable and reproducible manner;
‘relevant legal proceedings’ means the legal proceedings for which data in electronic 
form is requested under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty or any other bilateral or 
multilateral instrument;
‘tool’ means any device or software program that can be used to identify, secure, 
examine and analyse electronic evidence.
Part II – Status of electronic evidence
Article 2 – Admissibility of electronic evidence
1. Evidence in electronic form shall be admitted into legal proceedings.
2. Article 2(1) does not modify any existing national rule that applies to the admissibility 
of evidence, except in relation to the rules relating to authenticity and best evidence.
Article 3 – Agreement on the admissibility of electronic evidence
1. Unless otherwise provided in any law operating in the relevant jurisdiction, an 
electronic record or document may be tendered, subject to the discretion and rules of 
the court, if the Parties to the proceedings have expressly agreed to its introduction.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3(1), an agreement between the Parties 
on the admissibility of an electronic record or document does not render the record 
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(a) the accused person or any of the persons accused in the proceeding was not 
represented by a lawyer;
(b) except where the adjudicator finds that admitting the record or document 
into evidence does not prejudice the case for the accused.
Article 4 – Authentication of electronic evidence
1. The party seeking to introduce electronic evidence in any legal proceeding has the 
burden of proving it is what it claims to be.
2. The matters set out below are to be considered when assessing that evidence in 
electronic form is what it claims to be:
(a) The data (both the content and associated metadata) relied upon in any legal 
proceedings can be shown to be an accurate representation of the prevailing and 
existing state of those data at the time relevant to the legal proceedings.
(b) If the data have changed from the moment they were identified (and possibly 
seized) as potential evidence in legal proceedings, there is an accurate and 
reliable method of documenting any such changes, including the reasons for any 
such modifications.
(c) The continuity of the data between the moment in time the data were obtained 
for legal purposes and their submission as an exhibit in legal proceedings can be 
demonstrated.
(d) Any techniques that were used to obtain, secure and process the data can be 
tested and shown to have been appropriate for the purpose for which they were 
applied.
(e) The technical and organizational evidence demonstrates that the integrity 
of the data is trustworthy, and can therefore be considered reliable and 
complete (insofar as the data can be complete), which in turn will depend on 
the circumstances surrounding the data at the time they were identified as being 
potentially relevant in legal proceedings.
Article 5 – Best evidence
1. In any legal proceeding, where any printout, document or other physical 
manifestation of the result or output or appearance of any electronic process, record or 
any other representation of that process or record has been manifestly or consistently 
acted on, relied upon, or used as the record of the information represented by or stored 
on the printout, the printout or other physical manifestation shall be considered the 
best evidence and admitted as evidence subject to satisfactory proof of its integrity.
2. Where the output of a process is relied upon, and it remains in electronic form, the 
best evidence rule remains, subject to the provisions of Article 4(2).
3. Article 5(1) and (2) do not modify any domestic rule that applies to the admission 
of evidence.
Part III – Investigation and examination of digital evidence
Article 6 – Digital evidence practitioner
1. Since digital evidence practitioners are required to make informed judgements 
about the appropriateness of the tools and techniques they use to secure and preserve 
electronic evidence, the Parties shall establish minimum standards for their formal 
education and training.
2. A digital evidence practitioner must be able to provide, in compliance with the 






(a) an analysis of their findings, setting out the scientifically agreed basis upon 
which their judgement is based; and
(b) shall identify and explain any data that appear to be inconsistent with their 
findings.
3. The primary duty of the digital evidence practitioner is to the court.
Article 7 – The use of good practice guidelines for electronic evidence
1. The Parties to the Convention shall establish a Forum for the development of good 
practice and guidelines in the acquisition, handling and otherwise processing of 
electronic evidence in the form of a set of agreed common requirements.
2. The forum shall:
(a) Include participation from at least two thirds of all Parties to the Convention.
(b) Establish its own rules of procedure and may establish subcommittees to 
consider specific issues.
(c) Be funded on a basis to be agreed.
(d) Submit the first edition of its agreed common requirements to the Parties 
within two (2) years of this Convention coming into force for subsequent 
adoption by the Parties.
(e) Produce updates and amendments to the agreed common requirements as 
deemed desirable and necessary by the Forum and in any case every two years, 
or a statement that an update is not currently necessary.
3. Except where incompatible or inconsistent with national legislation, codes 
or procedure, the Parties to this Convention shall implement agreed common 
requirements on the acquisition, obtaining, packaging, processing and examination of 
electronic evidence.
4. The agreed common requirements shall be:
(a) Drafted by reference to the guidelines established by the Forum.
(b) Adopted within [time period to be agreed] of accession to this Convention 
or within [time period to be agreed] of the publication of the first version of the 
agreed common requirements by the Forum, wherever is the sooner.
(c) Implemented by all national and government departments charged with legal 
duties and obligations involving the use, handling or processing of electronic 
evidence.
5. Any authority responsible for investigating a matter involving the criminal law shall 
apply and follow the agreed common requirements unless there are exceptional or 
extenuating circumstances where they cannot be followed.
6. Where, under Article 7(5) above, the agreed common requirements have not been 
complied with for exceptional circumstances, those circumstances and the reasons 
shall be recorded in writing at the time of the departure from the agreed common 
requirements and the written record shall be admissible in legal proceedings.
Part IV – Treatment of electronic evidence upon receipt
Article 8 – The requesting party
1. The provisions of this Article apply where the requesting party makes a request for 
evidence in electronic form to the sending party.
2. When the requesting party makes a request for evidence in electronic form, 
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shall provide a legally binding undertaking in writing to the sending party to include 
the following:
(a) An assurance that the data shall be dealt with in accordance with how evidence 
in legal proceedings is normally dealt with in the requesting parties’ jurisdiction 
under the relevant legislation, procedural rules and rules of professional conduct.
(b) Copies of the data shall only be given to parties authorized to receive the data 
that are part of the relevant legal proceedings.
(c) Data provided under the provisions of Article 8 shall only be used for purposes 
related to the relevant legal proceedings.
(d) The sending party may waive the provisions of Article 8(2)(b). The terms of 
any such waiver shall be decided by the parties in a form and to the extent that 
they determine.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in Article 8(2) above, all data in electronic 
form that is provided to the requesting party shall be the subject of all the relevant laws 
of the requesting party, including, but not limited to, confidentiality, the protection of 
data and the security of data.
4. The assurances provided by the receiving party under the provisions of Article 8(2) 
above may be provided in physical or electronic form as is agreed between the parties.
5. The provisions of Article 8(3) shall also apply to any other receiving party authorised 
to receive the data that are part of the relevant legal proceedings.
Part V – General provisions
Article 9 – Admissibility of electronic evidence from other jurisdictions
1. Where electronic evidence originates in another jurisdiction, its admissibility is 
not impaired if the electronic evidence is proven in accordance with Article 3 or the 
authenticity of the evidence is otherwise demonstrated.
2. The provisions of Article 9 do not modify any domestic rule that applies to evidence 
in electronic form obtained contrary to relevant human rights legislation or data 
protection legislation.
Article 10 – Recognition of foreign electronic evidence and signatures
1. In determining whether or not, or to what extent, data in electronic form are legally 
effective, no regard shall be had to the geographical location where the data were 
created or used or to the place of business of their creation, provided those data are 
located in the domestic jurisdiction.
2. Where the electronic record or document is located in a foreign jurisdiction, Article 
10(1) above does not apply unless – 
(a) the party who adduces evidence of the contents of an electronic record or 
document has, not less than 14 days before the day on which the evidence is 
adduced, served on each other party a copy of the electronic record or document 
proposed to be tendered, except where exceptional, urgent and exigent 
circumstances apply;
(b) the court directs that it is to apply; or
(c) there is an international treaty in effect establishing recognition of electronic 
records or documents or of electronic signatures located in the foreign 
jurisdiction.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 10(2)(a) above, what constitutes 
exceptional, urgent or exigent circumstances for the purposes of this Article is a matter 





4. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 10(2) above, an adjudicator may admit 
data in electronic form that are located in a foreign jurisdiction if domestic law so 
provides.
Article 11 – Interpretation
1. Where the meaning of a word or phrase in this Convention differs from the meaning 
of a word or phrase defined in any information technology literature, the adjudicator 
shall interpret the meaning in accordance with the domestic law on the interpretation 
of words and phrases.
Article 12 – Entering into force
1. The Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of 
deposit with the [name of sponsoring organization].
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the [third] 
instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the 
thirtieth day after the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Explanatory notes to the Draft Convention on Electronic Evidence
1. The main objective is to pursue a common policy towards electronic evidence, taking 
into account the differences in the treatment of evidence in individual jurisdictions. 
This Convention does not seek to harmonize judicial systems. The aim is to encourage 
judges and lawyers to more fully understand the concept of electronic evidence in the 
interests of providing for fairness in legal proceedings; to promote adequate procedures 
in legal proceedings; to implement appropriate legislation where necessary, and to 
promote international co- operation.
2. Part I Article 1 provides a number of definitions. The aim is to provide definitions that 
transcend legal cultures. Although the definition of ‘authentication’ does not include 
reference to relevant international or domestic guidelines and standards, it does not 
preclude the use of such guidelines and standards in demonstrating authenticity. The 
definition of ‘electronic evidence’ is taken to be synonymous with the term ‘digital 
evidence’.
3. Part II considers the status of electronic evidence, covering the admissibility of 
electronic evidence (Article 2 and Article 3), authentication (Article 4) and best 
evidence (Article 5).
4. Article 2 aims to provide minimum rules to the admissibility of electronic evidence. 
The purpose of Article 2(1) is to prevent a party from seeking to exclude evidence 
in electronic form because it is in electronic form. Article 2(2) does not modify any 
domestic rule relating to the admissibility of electronic evidence other than in relation 
to authenticity and best evidence.
5. Article 3, regarding the agreement on admissibility of electronic evidence, is taken 
and adapted from the Commonwealth Draft Model Law on Electronic Evidence and 
Electronic Evidence: Model Policy Guidelines & Legislative Texts (Harmonization of 
ICT Policies, Legislation and Regulatory Procedures in the Caribbean, International 
Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Development Bureau, Geneva, 2013).
6. The provisions of Article 3(1) aim to permit the parties to a legal proceeding to agree 
on the authenticity of the evidence. The purpose of this Article is to simplify the legal 
process by reducing the time that might be spent in authenticating documents and 
records in electronic form that both parties rely on. There is no point in increasing the 
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7. Article 4(1) deals with the process of proving that data in electronic form is what 
it claims to be. The word authenticity is used, even though this may be considered 
to be irrelevant and out- of- date. To establish whether an electronic record, document 
or other thing is proven to be what it claims to be, the tests regarding the integrity, 
reliability and completeness of the data and therefore trustworthiness is more 
important. It is for the adjudicator to assess the evidence before them to determine 
whether the data is what it claims to be. The term ‘authentic’ is used by many 
jurisdictions in other contexts, such as the provision of an ‘authentic’ record. The word 
‘authentication’ remains, but it should not be taken to override the domestic methods 
of determining whether an electronic record, document or other thing is proven to be 
what it claims to be – nor does it refer to the ‘authentic’ record.
8. Article 4(2) was initially taken from Stephen Mason, Electronic Evidence (3rd edn, 
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012), 4.21. Both the Commonwealth Draft Model Law on 
Electronic Evidence and Electronic Evidence: Model Policy Guidelines & Legislative 
Texts (Harmonization of ICT Policies, Legislation and Regulatory Procedures in the 
Caribbean, International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Development 
Bureau, Geneva, 2013) provide for a presumption (the term ‘judicial notice’ is also 
used in some jurisdictions – this term has a similar effect to the presumption) that 
electronic evidence is ‘reliable’ or that a computer system or other similar device was 
‘operating properly’. No lawyer or judicial authority has put any evidence forward to 
establish what ‘reliability’ means in relation to computers and computer like devices, 
or what ‘operating properly’ means. Because a minority of jurisdictions adopt this 
presumption in the absence of any evidence that such a presumption is justified, it is 
considered more appropriate to refrain from including such a presumption in the Draft 
Convention.
9. The provisions of Article 4(2) operate to require a party to demonstrate whether the 
data in electronic form is what it claims to be, and conversely, for the challenging party 
to cross examine to establish that the data is not an accurate presentation of what it 
claims to be.
10. Article 5 specifically refers to the common law concept of best evidence. The 
term ‘original’ has deliberately not been included in this Draft Convention. This is 
because the word ‘original’ has different meanings for lawyers and notaries, and also 
in different jurisdictions. The term ‘original’ is not helpful when analysing evidence in 
electronic form. This is because every item of data in electronic form is a copy. There 
can be no original.
11. Part III deals with the investigation and examination of electronic evidence in 
Articles 6 and 7.
12. Article 6 provides for the formal education and training of digital evidence 
practitioners. People that investigate, seize and analyse evidence in electronic form 
ought to be educated and trained through a formal process. This is in the interests of 
justice and fairness between the parties, and because evidence in electronic form is 
now ubiquitous and an every- day part of legal proceedings.
13. Article 7 provides for the creation of a Forum to develop appropriate guidelines 
or standards for the process of investigating evidence in electronic form. A number 
of guidelines exist at present. It is in the interests of justice that such guidelines are 
not only publicly available, but are developed by representatives from internationally 
respected bodies. By developing a set of internationally recognized guidelines, 
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adjudicators will be better informed when assessing evidence in electronic form. The 
development of common guidelines or standards will also promote confidence in and 
acceptance of the quality of evidence especially where obtained in another jurisdiction.
14. Part IV provides for the transmission of data in electronic form between jurisdictions. 
The terms of Article 8 do not affect the provision of any Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 
bilateral or multilateral instrument, or of any other method of requesting evidence 
from a foreign jurisdiction. The purpose of this provision is to reassure the sending 
party that the evidence sent will be dealt with appropriately and in accordance with 
the norms of the receiving jurisdiction relating to evidence in legal proceedings. Some 
jurisdictions are wary of sending evidence without suitable provision for the security 
and the protection of the people mentioned in the data.
15. Part V deals with general provisions. In particular, Article 9 on the admissibility of 
electronic evidence from other jurisdictions attempts to deal with the difficult question 
of which set of legal requirements apply to evidence in electronic form – whether it is 
of the State in which the evidence is geographically located, or the State in which the 
evidence is to be submitted in a legal proceeding. Article 9(1) seeks to indicate that 
if the evidence is proven in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, the matter 
of the geographical location is irrelevant. Alternatively, an adjudicator can admit the 
evidence as being authentic where the authenticity of the evidence is demonstrated in 
some other manner that is accepted by the adjudicator.
16. Article 10 provides that evidence in electronic form that ostensibly originates in a 
foreign jurisdiction can be admitted, notwithstanding that it was not actually located 
in the domestic jurisdiction. The aim is to enable the admission into a legal proceeding 
of electronic evidence and electronic signatures that might otherwise not be admitted 
because of lack of formalities.
17. Although the provisions of Article 11(1) may appear to be open to interpretation, 
the clause mirrors many such clauses in legislation relating to electronic commerce 
and communications across the world. Article 11(2) deals with the inevitable 
disagreement between the meaning of words in a technical sense and a legal sense. 
When this occurs, it is for the adjudicator to determine the meaning in accordance with 
the relevant provisions in domestic law on interpretation. There has been no attempt 
to incorporate technical definitions into the Convention, because doing so might cause 
greater uncertainty than is intended.
Appendix 2
Cumulative vignettes
Each of the vignettes appearing in the first three editions are set out below.
First edition, 2007
The abacus
‘Your honour, I seek to exhibit the abacus.’
The judge looked over his spectacles ‘Which form of abacus is it?’
The barrister looked perplexed and turned to his solicitor and whispered ‘Which 
form of abacus? How do I know? Are there different types of abacus?’
‘Oh yes’, whispered the solicitor, ‘it’s a Chinese abacus.’ ‘Oh, right. Thanks.’ ‘It’s a 
Chinese abacus, your honour.’
‘Thank you, Mr Puffington. And what is the purpose of exhibiting the abacus?’
‘Well, your honour, it’s the item upon which the calculations were made to 
perpetrate the alleged fraud.’
‘Indeed, but that does not mean the abacus ought to be exhibited. Have you a 
submission on this matter Miss Jawleyford?’
Miss Jawleyford stood as Mr Puffington sat down.
‘Well, your honour, the defence does not seek to argue about an inanimate object.’
‘Quite.’
‘But what we must look to, in my submission, is the reason for admitting the abacus 
as an exhibit, your honour.’
‘Indeed.’
‘We have already had the opportunity of viewing the abacus, and take no point 
on the object itself. It is admitted that the defendant used the device. As a material 
object, it can be admitted into evidence. But the question is, what purpose is served 
in admitting the device. It is my submission that the presence of the abacus serves 
no purpose, because the device is merely a device. There is no record of what, if any, 
calculations might have been made on the device.’
Miss Jawleyford sat down. Mr Puffington stood.
‘Your honour, in our submission, it’s important to exhibit the abacus, because it will 
serve to make the members of the jury ask themselves why the defendant, a finance 
director earning over a million- pound salary a year, deliberately used such a device. It 
is our case that he used the abacus to avoid the creation of records that would implicate 








‘The problem with the email submitted by the witness, madam, is that the signature 
cannot be trusted. For this reason, the evidence cannot be admitted.’
Mr Tulkinghorn sat down. Mr Tangle stood up.
‘With the deepest possible respect, madam, my learned friend has let his usual 
penetrating insight into the analysis of evidence fail him. If this was a letter, for 
instance, the first question will be “Is the letter genuine?” If the letter is a forgery, then 
the signature matters not – unless it is genuine and intended to deceive the recipient. 
If the letter is genuine, then the question arises as to whether the signature is a forgery. 
Thus it must be with the email. If my learned friend claims that the email is a forgery, 
the status of the signature is irrelevant. Is my learned friend suggesting that the email 
is a forgery?’
Mr Tangle sat down.
Her Honour Judge Flite QC looked at Mr Tulkinghorn. ‘Well? It strikes me that this 
must be correct. Are you suggesting the email is a forgery?’
Mr Tulkinghorn stood up.
‘In this instance, my learned friend has indicated an error of logic on my part, which 
I concede. The point is, anybody can forge an email and write any name as an electronic 
signature. If we cannot trust the signature, then we cannot trust the email.’
Her Honour Judge Flite QC continued the questioning, ‘But the authenticity of the 
email must come before the verification of the signature? Mr Tangle?’
Mr Tulkinghorn sat down. Mr Tangle stood up.
‘Where the authenticity of a document is challenged, a wide range of tests can be 
made to determine whether it is a forgery. I acknowledge that the contents can help 
determine whether it is a forgery. But if it was a letter, the paper, ink, and the type 
face might all be the subject of tests. In the case of an email, the technical information 
relating to the status of the document is of the utmost relevance. In my submission, 
determining whether to trust the signature can only follow after it has been established 
whether the email is genuine or a forgery.’
Third edition, 2012
The ‘competent’ witness
‘My learned friend for the prosecution has established that you are the sub- manager 
of the hotel, that you are familiar with the functions of the machine that controls the 
telephone system, and that you know how it works and what it is supposed to do?’
‘Yes.’
‘And the printouts you have brought to court purport to indicate when the 
telephone was used in room 2820?’
‘Yes.’
‘For this reason, my learned friend considers your evidence is all that is needed 
to establish the reliability of the telephone system. Let me ask you this, how does the 
direct inward system access work?’
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‘You don’t know what happens, or you don’t know what the direct inward system 
access is?’
‘I don’t know what it is.’
‘So, by implication, you don’t know what the password is?’
‘No.’
‘By implication, you won’t know if thieves have used the password to route 
telephone calls through the hotel telephone system?’
‘No.’
‘Can you tell me the purpose of the latest software update, whether it included a 
security fix, and when it was downloaded?’
‘Er, no, I don’t know any of that.’
‘Why do you not know?’
‘Well, because the IT people do all of that stuff.’
‘So you are asserting, by bringing along the printouts of the telephone calls, that 
these telephone calls were actually made, and they were made from room 2820.’
‘Well, yes, if you say so.’
‘I do not say so, you do. You also claim that because none of your customers have 
ever complained about their bills, it follows that the telephone system is reliable and 
therefore trustworthy?’
‘Well, I wouldn’t put it quite like that.’
‘Thank you, Mr Prunsquallor.’
Judge Sepulchrave turned to prosecuting counsel, ‘Unless you have any questions 
in re- examination Mrs Groan?’
Mrs Groan stood up. ‘Your honour, no,’ and sat down.
‘Very well, you may leave the witness stand, Mr Prunsquallor. Yes, Mr Rottcodd?’
‘Thank you, your honour. My learned friend for the prosecution would have us 
believe that because the information printed on the piece of paper apparently looks 
sensible, it therefore follows that the contents must not only be reliable, but represent 
the truth. My learned friend also suggests that because Mr Prunsquallor uses the hotel’s 
telephone system in the performance of his duties, this is a sufficient foundation as a 




Judge Nuri Efendi looked over his spectacles. ‘Now we have covered the main matters 
to be dealt with in this case management conference, you may address the business 
records point, Mr Ayarcı.’
Mr Halit Ayarcı stood up. ‘Your honour, thank you. My learned friend intends to 
submit a number of spreadsheets into evidence. There are problems with this. The 
first of which is that he only intends to submit printouts of the spreadsheet application 
or program, whatever our technical friends consider a spreadsheet to be. My learned 
friend has declined to provide copies to the defence in electronic form. My application 
is for the prosecution to provide copies of the relevant spreadsheets in electronic form.’







‘Your honour, I must protest. A printout is real evidence, and is to be received as 
prima facie evidence of the entries. The defence is attempting to add to the costs in this 
case by making an unreasonable request.’
Judge Nuri Efendi interjected. ‘Mr Ayarcı, please elaborate your point.’
Mr Hayri İrdal sat down. Mr Halit Ayarcı stood up.
‘My submission is that the technical literature clearly demonstrates that all 
spreadsheets have significant error rates, and it is our contention that it is obvious 
that there must be some errors in the documents that affect the figures that my learned 
friend wishes to have admitted. Indeed, as I have made it clear to my learned friend, the 
collapse of the banking system in Jamaica in the late 1990s was partly due to the use of 
spreadsheets and the failure to manage and control them. On this issue alone, I submit 
that it cannot be right to admit these documents under the bankers’ books exception 
without the electronic versions of the files being subject to analysis by appropriately 
qualified digital evidence professionals.’
Mr Halit Ayarcı sat down. Mr Hayri İrdal stood up.
‘Your honour, as my learned friend is only too well aware, the evidence also benefits 
from the presumption that mechanical instruments were in order at the material 
time – a presumption which, I do not need to remind your honour, intentionally 
included computers. I most strongly resist this potentially expensive and unnecessary 
challenge regarding the authenticity of the spreadsheets on the basis that this 
presumption applies.’
Mr Hayri İrdal sat down.
Judge Nuri Efendi considered the submission. ‘Mr Ayarcı, notwithstanding the 
legislative provisions governing business records, the presumption of equipment being 
properly constructed and operating correctly must be strong, and it is a particularly 
strong presumption in the case of equipment within the control of the party. Please 
address this particular issue.’
Mr Halit Ayarcı stood up.
‘I appreciate the nature of the presumption, your honour. The exception permits 
records to be adduced because, in the past, employees entered information into 
physical books by hand, and this meant they could be relied upon as a record made 
at that point in time, and one could ascertain at a glance whether somebody tried to 
change the entries. The justification was that such records were more reliable than 
the memory of a witness. This might have been so, but records in electronic form are 
notorious for being inaccurate for a variety of reasons, and it must be common sense 
that this rule cannot be relied upon in the twenty- first century.
Let me ask my learned friend what he means that computers are reliable. For 
instance:
Does my learned friend mean that the spreadsheets are authentic, in that they are 
the right ones, and they have not been tampered with?
Does he mean that the spreadsheets are valid, in that they contain the information 
that is claimed of them?
Perhaps he means that the spreadsheets are internally valid, in that the 
spreadsheets work? If this is the case, what evidence is there that the users of the 
spreadsheet application checked that the algorithms were correct? My learned friend 
might also like to confirm if the presumption that computers are reliable includes the 
maintenance of the spreadsheets and who wrote them, and what qualifications they 
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But perhaps he means that the software code of the operating system is reliable? 
How does he know? How many updates have there been since the spreadsheets began 
to operate? Were all updates applied? When updates occurred, how did they affect the 
application software? What is his measure of reliability?
Does he mean that there are no errors of logic that can lead to an incorrect result? 
What evidence does he have of this, taking into account the number of software code 
updates to the spreadsheets? Perhaps my learned friend can kindly indicate the 
number and purpose of each software update since its inception.
Perhaps he means that the employees who input the figures are always accurate? 
And I presume the system is so reliable that inaccurate inputs are recognized and 
corrected, and that these corrections are recorded?
No doubt my learned friend can also confirm, because the spreadsheet programs 
are deemed to be reliable, that there are no errors of omission where the formula is 
wrong because one or more of its input cells is blank or otherwise incorrect such as 
referring to the wrong cells?
I ask my learned friend, which part of this process is reliable? All of it? Parts of it? If 
part of it, which part and for what reason?
But let me finish with another question on the basis that your honour is against my 
request for electronic versions of the spreadsheets – perhaps my learned friend can 
assure the court, if only paper versions of the record are to be admitted, that the full 
information will be provided. That is, he will provide the respective algorithms that 
undertake the calculations – after all, one does not admit the body of a motor vehicle 
on its own into evidence to demonstrate the cause of a collision where it is claimed 
that the brakes failed – one needs to know how the brakes worked and to view the 
evidence of the braking system. But that is exactly what my learned friend is asking the 
court to admit: the unsupported assertions of the truth of the contents of spreadsheet 
programs in the absence of the mechanism by which the data was created.
Finally, before my learned friend responds, we have to consider the requirement 
that the book is in the custody or control of the bank. This is a significant issue, because, 
as we now understand it, the spreadsheets in question are maintained in the cloud …’
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assert without evidence 6.17
authenticity 6.18, 6.67, 
6.91, 6.110
cloud 6.91 and following
formats, verifying 6.110













































object, originally linked to 6.2, 6.3
Open Archival Information 
System 6.78
original see Original
organizational criteria 6.60, 6.90
photograph 6.21
physical document 6.9 fn 1, 6.11 fn 1
preservation 6.101 and following, 
9.5, 9.29















system 6.79, 6.88, 6.91, 6.133
traditional 6.107
presumption of authenticity 6.55, 
6.84, 6.98
printouts 5.210, 6.17, 6.21, 6.28, 
6.115 fn 1
probative value 2.76, 4.33, 9.40 
proof see Proof
provenance 5.192, 5.210, 6.60, 6.129
public documents 6.42, 6.61
qualifications of witnesses 6.28
records management 6.47, 6.52, 6.53, 
6.54, 6.133
reliability 6.5, 6.17, 6.36, 6.44, 6.46, 
6.58, 6.59




integrity not reliability 6.50
presumption 6.55
first in time version 9.30, 9.31, 9.31, 
9.33, 9.43, 9.48, 9.113 see also 
first instantiation
foundational requirements 6.29
forgery 6.32, 6.123, 6.124
format 6.13, 6.35 fn 1, 6.143










Council of Europe 6.9, 6.10
judicial 6.28
hash digest 6.66, 6.86, 6.87, 6.89
ignorance of lawyers 1.1
incorrect assumptions 6.72, 6.74
indirect evidence 2.2
insufficient foundation 6.29, 6.131
instant message communications  
6.28
instantiation 6.36, 6.102, 6.132
integrity 6.1, 6.16, 6.37, 6.38, 6.44, 
6.109, 6.134
Internet, pages from 6.124
Internet of Things 6.99, 6.100
InterPARES 6.80
Judicial see also Presumption of 
reliability
approaches 6.28, 6.31
notice 6.71, 6.72, 6.73, 6.74





system authentication 6.62, 6.63 
metadata 2.8, 6.81, 6.82, 6.83, 
6.84, 6.108
migration 6.80, 6.82, 6.88, 6.109, 
6.110, 6.111, 6.134
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civil proceedings 2.46, 2.59, 
2.60, 2.64
criminal proceedings 2.46, 2.63, 
2.64, 2.65




original 2.44, 6.33, 6.34, 6.36, 
5.190, 6.32




proof of integrity 6.51
relevancy 2.42, 2.46, 2.60
rule 2.43, 2.44, 6.131
secondary evidence 2.44, 2.45
signature, forgery 7.202
statutory version 2.60
trial by charter 6.32
oral testimony permissible 2.45
Biodynamic version of a manuscript 
signature, as electronic signature 
7.196, 7.197, 7.198, 7.199, 7.200, 
7.201, 7.202
Blackberry 1.92, 6.17 fn 1, 9.10, 9.108
Blockchain 1.25, 6.87, 6.88, 6.89, 6.90
Boilerplate contractual terms 
amending in light of electronic 
signatures 7.151
use of electronic signature, 
ease of amending contract 
unwittingly 7.152
usual provision for signature 7.150
Breath alcohol devices 
clock 2.38, 2.38 fn 3, 5.224, 5.229
evidence rejected 5.22
oral testimony 2.34
presumed reliable 5.31, 5.32
printout 2.22, 2.34, 2.35, 2.38, 2.60, 
2.67, 3.33 fn 1
Browse wrap, as electronic signature 
7.98, 7.99, 7.100
Bugs, definition of 5.78
Burden of proof 2.72, 5.3, 5.259 fn 2
quality 6.50
system, of a 6.47, 6.62
upload of records 6.90






social media 6.17, 6.21, 6.68, 
6.69, 6.74
standards 6.1, 6.8, 6.46, 6.47, 6.48, 
6.49, 6.51, 6.52, 6.62, 6.90, 
6.97, 6.133
system authentication 6.62
system integrity 6.49, 6.50, 6.54, 
6.93, 6.95, 6.107, 6.131, 
6.133, 6.135
tape recordings 5.190, 5.191
tests, authenticity 6.24 fn 4, 6.31
threshold for authentication 6.21
time stamps 6.60
Trusted Digital Repositories 6.77
Trusted Third Party Repository 
6.78, 6.79
trustworthiness 1.93, 5.22, 5.61, 
5.213, 6.37, 6.77, 6.79, 6.101, 
10.9, 10.28, Appendix 1
verifying claims 6.60
weight of evidence 6.15, 6.17, 6.22, 
6.24, 6.27, 6.28, 6.67
witness 
authenticity first challenged 6.16
original, attest 6.32
Banking systems, security protocol, 
failure 5.111
Bankers’ books 
Bankers’ books rule 6.113
copies of entries 6.115
exception 7.107
microfilm 6.118, 6.119, 6.120
Best evidence 2.41, 6.5, 6.32
application 2.49


























































Cache files, legal consequences 9.109
Cell site analysis 1.45 fn 1, 1.123, 4.28 fn 
2, 9.25 fn 1, 10.21, 10.21 fn 3
Chain of evidence 6.40, 9.45 see also 
continuity of custody; continuity of 
evidence
Chat room 3.20 fn 3
Characteristics of electronic evidence 
contamination 1.119
definition 1.110, 1.113
dependency on machinery and 
software 1.117
distinction between paper and 
electronic data 1.116





machinery, dependency on 1.117
mediation of technology 1.118
metadata 1.119, 6.81, 6.82
misleading impression between 





social context 1.78, 1.84
speed of change 1.121





Circumstantial evidence 2.2, 5.3, 5.5, 
6.17, 6.68, 9.35
abusive images of children 9.35
authenticate digital evidence 
6.69, 6.125
cloud, stored in 6.98
bank, PIN 7.107
browse wrap 7.100
electronic signature, power of 
minister 7.72
electronic signatures 7.61, 7.67, 
7.302, 7.330
email address, forgery 7.190
encryption foregone  
conclusion 8.60
evidence electronic signature 7.93
jitsuin 7.320, 7.325




relying party 7.107 fn 1
reversed 5.169, 5.222 fn 3, 6.73
security and integrity 7.311
sending party 7.311
unexplained wealth 9.92
without authority, used 7.36, 7.108
Business records 
accurate, should be 6.122
admissible 6.21, 6.114
authenticity 6.123, 6.126, 6.127, 
6.128, 6.129, 6.130
Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 
2.67 fn 4, 6.113 fn 1, 6.115, 6.116, 
6.119, 6.118, 6.119, 6.120
blockchain 6.87
cloud 6.98 fn 1
computer business records 
trustworthy, assertion 5.128
computer systems exception 6.19
database 2.31
electronic, can be manipulated 6.123
exception to the hearsay rule 6.42, 
6.62, 6.112, 6.113, 6.114, 10.16
hotel cards with machine readable 
code 10.16
inaccuracies, Princess of Wales 
Hospital, prosecution of nurses 
6.57, 9.99, 9.100, 9.101, 9.102
manipulation, subject to 6.122





































































Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures518
civil proceedings 2.87
criminal proceedings 2.89, 2.94




legal issues 1.104 fn 1
prejudicial effect 2.90, 2.92, 2.93
presenting evidence, methods 1.94, 
106 fn 1, fn 3
probative value 2.93
safeguards 2.82
‘seeing is believing’ tendency 2.85
special care warranted 2.85
testimonial evidence 2.85 
Constant proportion debt obligations 
(CPDOs), risk assessment of 5.148
Continuity of custody 6.2, 6.40, 6.60, 
9.45, 9.33
Continuity of evidence 5.34, 6.31 fn 2, 




data to be copied 9.54
number of removes 6.24
secondary evidence 6.32, 6.115
Corpus Chronophage 9.60




virtual private network 1.49
Dangerous driving and text 
messages 5.227
Data destruction 
deletion 1.91, 1.129, 9.103, 9.117, 
9.119, 9.129
deletion tools 9.129
physical destruction 9.112, 9.113
obfuscation 1.95, 9.106, 9.131
re- installation 9.109 




proof of identity 6.7
Click wrap, as electronic signature 7.90, 
7.91, 7.92, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95
Clock 
accuracy 1.19, 2.38, 4.11, 5.6 fn 1, 
7.247, 9.60, 9.61
altering 1.19, 1.21
component of a digital device 1.18
correctness 5.21 fn 1 
facsimile machines, not accurate as a 
matter of ‘common sense’ 9.60
false assumptions, ATM 5.74 
functions 1.18, 1.19
inaccuracy 5.229, 9.60 fn 5
malfunction 5.212
real- time clock 1.18, 1.19, 1.70
system clock 1.20, 1.21
time zones 1.70, 9.62
USNO Master Clock 9.60 fn 1





Council of Europe 9.55
deleted 9.52









Collection of evidence, Chapter 9 
generally, see Forensic investigation 
Computer- generated animations and 
simulations 2.83
admissibility 2.85, 2.92, 2.94
advantageous 2.97
assumptions and premises 2.86, 2.92 
fn 1, 2.95, 2.97
authenticity 1.106

























































embedded devices in biological 
bodies 1.11 
erasable programmable read- only 
memory 1.22 
memory 1.7, 1.22, 1.26
mobile devices 1.7
processors 1.6
central processing unit 1.6
graphical processing unit 1.6
network interface controller 1.6
trusted platform module 1.6
random access memory 1.22, 1.23 
read- only memory 1.22 
secondary storage 1.23
starting a device 1.29
Digital forensics 
imaging 1.85, 6.60, 9.73, 9.76
judicial failure to understand 9.13
Digital signature 7.203 and following
algorithms and keys 7.204
asymmetric cryptographic systems 










Certificate Authority 7.119, 7.245




certificate revocation list 7.255
certifying 7.298
duties of a user 7.250
individual identity certificate 
7.219, 7.220, 7.279 fn 1
internal management 7.251












juror perception influenced 1.106
Decryption see Encrypted data
Deep web 1.48






reasonable suspicion 9.109, 9.110
reconstruct 9.30
recover 1.9, 9.56, 9.79, 9.93, 9.109





Digital evidence, see Electronic  
evidence
Digital evidence professional 
analysis 9.56, 9.93, 9.133
assumptions 9.96, 9.97
careless 1.70
civil proceedings, whether to use 
in 9.10
device, relevant knowledge 1.122
distortion, prevent 1.120
informed decisions 9.53
interpretation 9.95, 9.117, 9.137
investigation, conduct 9.94
investigation, method used 1.93, 
9.17, 9.19, 9.35, 9.72
principles, fundamental 9.31
quality of evidence from 9.10
tools, use of 9.40, 9.69, 9.70, 9.88
Digital devices 1.4
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difficulties 7.222
recipient, procedural and due 
diligence 7.311
revocation 7.246
certificate revocation list 7.221, 
7.247, 7.252, 7.255, 7.256, 
7.281, 7.282
reasons for revoking 7.246
risks, imposter 7.254
sending party, security and integrity 
7.311 and following






Digital visual evidence presentation 
systems 2.83
Direct evidence 2.2, 2.8, 2.17, 2.45, 4.35, 
6.68, 9.105, 9.134
Disclosure of digital data 2.26 
audio tapes, discoverable 2.28
document, meaning 2.26 fn 1
procedure, proposed approach 5.264




audio tape, discoverable 2.28
authentication 2.36, 2.61
computer database 2.31
current account ledger 2.31
data in digital form 2.8, 2.16
definition 2.32
definition, statutory 2.27
digital, primary evidence 2.53, 
2.55, 2.56
facsimile transmissions 2.28
information recorded in an electronic 
medium 2.31
integrity 6.4, 6.41
medium upon which information is 
stored 2.32
original 2.42, 2.43, 2.44, 2.45, 2.47, 
2.50, 6.36, 6.41
managing 7.238, 7.250, 7.272
revocation of certificate 7.246
disguising the message 7.206
duties of user 7.250
evidence 7.278 and following
generally 7.30










expiry of keys 7.249
generation of key pair 7.243
managing 7.79, 7.238, 7.272
private 7.65, 7.77, 7.213, 7.214, 
7.224, 7.259, 7.262
private key, example 7.270
secure 7.203, 7.269
validating path 7.281
validating public key 7.244
weakest link 7.265
liability, monetary value 7.237 fn 2
‘non- repudiation’ 
analysis 7.292, 7.293, 
7.294, 7.295
burden of proof 7.296
cryptographic 7.297
danger 7.286
engineers use of term 7.290




by- passing 7.273, 7.274




















































geolocation data 1.12, 1.13
guidelines 
Council of Europe 6.9, 6.10
judicial 6.28
hiding data 9.127, 9.128, 9.131
human readable 1.87, 1.117, 1.118, 
2.5, 2.8, 2.55
identifying 9.16
integrity 2.36, 2.66, 4.33, 5.242, 
5.243, 6.1, 6.16, 6.37, 6.38, 6.109, 
6.134, 9.13, 9.40, 9.45, 9.76, 9.81, 
9.124, 9.130, 9.134, 9.135, 10.26
interpretation 9.103, 9.106, 9.136
investigation see Investigation and 
Chapter 9 generally
not conclusive 9.66, 10.27
original 2.52, 2.54, 2.58, 6.36
probative value 2.76, 9.1, 9.23, 9.34, 
9.40, 9.56, 9.138
provenance 1.116, 2.66, 3.28, 5.191, 
5.196 fn 2, 5.210, 6.60, 6.76, 
6.129, 7.7, 9.14, 9.15
quality 9.33, 9.68, 9.106
solid- state drives 1.7, 1.23, 8.5, 9.20
storing 9.46, 9.47
tools 9.69
trail obfuscation 9.106, 9.131
transporting 9.46, 9.47
understanding digital data, need 
to 9.68
unreliability 5.235, 5.236, 5.251
validating digital data 9.40
video surveillance footage 2.90
volatile evidence 9.12, 9.20, 
9.22, 9.51
Electronic signature, Chapter 7 generally 
abstract reliability test 7.201
Australia 
abstract reliability test 7.201
case law see individual forms of 
electronic signature
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) 
7.155, 7.156
authenticate and adopt 7.1, 7.3, 7.15, 









Documentary evidence 2.12 fn 3, 2.34, 
2.60, 6.48, 6.76, 6.80, 6.102, 6.106, 
6.107, 6.108, 6.110, 6.112
Electronic evidence 
ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital 
Evidence 9.9 fn 3, 9.17
analysis 1.123, 3.23, 4.33, 4.37, 5.25, 
5.61, 5.252, 6.19 fn 1, 6.124, 9.1, 
9.56, 9.68
authenticity 2.66
changes to evidence by IT 
administrators 9.17, 9.101
characteristics, Chapter 1 generally 
challenging 4.37
circumstantial 6.98, 6.100, 
6.125, 6.135, 9.35 see also 
Circumstantial evidence
classification 4.9, 4.15, 4.16, 4.18, 
4.20, 4.27, 4.29
continuity of custody 3.60 fn 1, 
5.243, 6.31 fn 2, 6.40, 6.60, 6.66, 
6.67, 6.107, 6.131, 9.12, 9.14, 
9.45, 9.130, 10.7
copies, probative value 9.34




analogue evidence 6.9, 6.14 
real evidence and hearsay 2.13
digital form 2.16
evaluating 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13
examination 4.1, 4.24, Chapter 9 
generally
files 1.66
first in time evidence  9.30, 9.31, 

























































Electronic Evidence and Electronic Signatures522
Ceremony, importance of 
signing 7.229
China 
name in email, electronic 
signature 7.115 fn 1
text message, signature in of loan 
of money 7.115 fn 1, 7.120






email 7.115 fn 1
dissolution, request for, 
sufficiency of electronic 
signature 7.114 fn 2




partial document 7.48, 7.49
Scotland, position in 7.49
separate signature page 
7.48, 7.49




electronic signature, see 
individual entries  
burden of proof see Burden 
of proof
Electronic Communications Act 
2000 7.51, 7.175
amended 7.51
certification 7.62, 7.65, 7.66
commencement of 7.51
definition of electronic 
communication 7.55
definition of electronic 
signature 7.9 7.59, 7.75
disclosure of key, 
see Regulation of 











without authority 7.22 fn 1, 
7.36, 7.318
witness statement, denied 7.38 
fn 1
automatic inclusion of signature 7.40
email 7.43 and following
facsimile transmission 7.41
SWIFT communications 7.46
Belgium, case law 7.192 fn 1
Bolero 7.237
burden of proof 
allocation of liability 
bank 7.107
browse wrap 7.100
certification service provider, 
burden reversed 7.67
Electronic Communications Act 
2000 7.61
Ministers to determine 7.72
digital signature 7.302, 7.330
due diligence, recipient 7.310
private key, denies 
using 7.296
relying party 7.107 fn 1
sending party, security and 
integrity of 7.311







PIN, asserted reversal, incorrect 
7.261 fn 1
rubber stamp 7.302













































typing a name into an electronic 
document 7.114
France, case law 7.115 fn 1, 7.195
function of signature 




primary evidential function 7.12
protective function 7.17




email 7.115 fn 1
password 7.102
PIN 7.108
qualified electronic signature, 
monetary limit 7.237 fn 2
Greece 
name in email address 7.168 fn 1, 
7.190 fn 1
PIN falling into wrong hands 
7.108 fn 7
holograph 7.140, 7.140 fn 2, 7.293
IdenTrust 7.237





objective test 7.177, 7.178
organizations 7.45
physical position, signature 7.165
pre- printed letterhead 7.180
printed words 7.168
singing party 7.30, 7.66
statement made over telephone 
7.86 fn 3, 7.88
subjective test 7.178
technology 7.180
United State of America 
7.82. 7.85
Israel 
elements of electronic 
signature 7.58, 7.59
general power 7.69
liability of a certification 
service provider 7.67
limitation of powers 7.70
modification of legislation 
7.71
qualified electronic signature 
7.51
Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 
definition of electronic 
signature for the purposes 
of the Act 
disclosure of key 7.76
exclusion of electronic 
signatures 7.80
key 7.76
possession of a key 7.78
s 49 notice 7.76, 7.77, 
7.79, 7.250
signature, statutory definition 
7.9, 7.10
forged 7.20, 7.20 fn 1, 7.22, 
7.35, 7.227
burden of proof 7.24
certificate revocation list 7.255
digital signature, should not be 
capable of being 7.227
electronic signature 7.37
facsimile transmission 7.22 fn 1
jitsuin 7.321, 7.328, 7.332
seal 7.312
forms of electronic signature 7.30 see 






name in an email address 7.154
number 7.132
password 7.111
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Russian Federation, banking use of 
digital signatures 7.291 fn 2
Scotland 
document, separate signature 
pages 7.49
electronic facsimile 7.136 fn 1
exchange of emails 7.128 
police force, electronic signature 
7.134, 7.135
Singapore 
name in email address 7.161, 
7.173, 7.178, 7.183
SWIFT 7.46
Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT) 7.46, 7.230 fn 3
South Africa 
electronic will 7.140 fn 4
name typed in email 7.129, 7.130
objective test 7.178
Statute of Frauds 
Canada, electronic 
signature 7.137




Statute of Frauds 1677 7.137 and 





Turkey, PIN 7.107 fn 2
UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce 7.11 fn 1
Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures 7.11 fn 1,  
7.30 fn 1,  fn 3
United States of America 
‘browse wrap’ method 7.95, 7.98 
fn 1
‘click’ method 7.90 fn 3
Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act 
legal fees arrangement 7.182
name in email address 7.126
Italy 
European Arrest Warrant 7.132
name in email 7.115 fn 1
summary proceedings 7.190 fn 1
Japan 
jitsuin 7.320





admissibility of electronic 
signature 7.68
authenticate 7.177
‘click wrap’ 7.92, 7.173
intent, objective test 
proposed 7.177
Lithuania, PIN 7.103 fn2
meaning 7.3





Netherlands, The, DigiNotar 7.254
New Zealand 
email, first name typed, evidence 
of intent to sign 7.38, 7.131
email, name typed at 
bottom 7.117
facsimile transmission 7.41
use of electronic without 
authority 7.33
Nigeria 7.108
Norway, PIN 7.107 fn 2
notary 7.20, 7.222
number, electronic signature 
European Arrest Warrant 7.132
unique 7.109
whether signature 7.96, 7.97
Papua New Guinea 7.108
position of name 7.165





















































encryption explained 1.95, 8.2
failure to comply with a notice 8.26
key 
the human mind 8.45, 8.50, 8.57, 
8.57 fn 4, 8.63
intangible psychological fact 8.52
legal burden, defence 8.27, 
8.28, 8.39
possession 8.17, 8.22
presumption of possession 8.28
surrender, compelled 8.6
methods to obtain decrypted data 8.3
National Technical Assistance 
Centre 8.12
notice 
application refused 8.41, 8.42, 
8.43, 8.44
requiring disclosure 8.12










requirement to describe 8.20
suspect 8.13
secrecy 8.10, 8.38
self- incrimination, privilege against 
8.45 and following, 8.48, 8.52 
fn 2, 8.90
sentencing 8.30 and following
standard of proof 8.31
tipping off 8.10, 8.38, 8.40




PIN 7.103 fn 1, 7.108 fn 1
proof, importance of 7.93
Uniform Electronic Transactions 
Act, intent 7.85
Electronic sound, electronic signature 
7.82, 7.83, 7.84, 7.85, 7.86, 7.87, 
7.88, 7.89
Email 
authenticity 6.6, 6.7, 6.13, 6.17, 
6.123, 6.124
circumstantial evidence 6.70
common network application 1.53
forged email 2.30 fn 3, 9.120 fn 6
integrity 6.6
truth of content 7.66, 7.285, 9.64
embedded devices 1.10
emojis 1.118
Encrypted data, Chapter 8 generally 
Belgium, suspect required to disclose 
passcode 8.87
brute- force attack 8.6, 8.12, 8.77
burden of proof, not in possession of 
key 8.39
bypass encryption 8.67




circumventing encryption 8.4 fn 
2, 8.77
circumventing a notice 8.41
cleartext 8.2
Court of Appeal, wrong basis for plea 
of guilty 8.35, 8.36
disclosure 8.8, 8.11, 8.13, 8.14
compel 8.44, 8.45
defence 8.28
exception 8.23, 8.24, 8.25
form 8.20
notice 8.12
protected information and 
keys 8.21
secrecy and tipping off 8.38, 8.39
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handling 9.10
HASH collisions 9.41, 9.42, 9.43
image 6.38, 6.60
interpretation 9.2, 9.3, 9.25, 9.103, 
9.106, 9.136, 10.22
Principle of Identifiable 
Interference 6.39
Principle of Non- interference 6.39
record actions, video 9.19
reporting 9.93
social context 9.104
standards 9.6, 9.9, 9.48, 9.140
tools 9.129
Forensic Science Regulator 9.6, 9.9





Gathering electronic evidence 9.19
Garbage- in- garbage- out 5.91, 5.246
Handling digital evidence 9.8
copying electronic evidence 9.27
empirical laws 9.29
forensic copy 6.38, 6.39, 6.57
forensic triage 
ACPO Good Practice Guide for 
Digital Evidence 9.8
Council of Europe 6.9
guidelines 9.9
gathering 9.19
International Organization on 
Computer Evidence 9.8
principles 9.7, 9.27, 9.31, 9.34, 9.50, 
9.94, 9.140
tools 9.69 fn 4
Hash 
blockchain 6.86, 6.89
collisions 9.41, 9.42, 9.43
computed 6.86 fn 1




United States of America, position 
in, see United States of America, 
encrypted data
vulnerability attack 8.4
Enhanced digital imagery 2.77
European Court of Human Rights, 
extraordinary conclusion 9.12, 9.13
Event data recorder 4.27
Evidence, contamination 1.119
Expert evidence by lay person 9.25 fn 1










secure private key 7.269
undermined 7.233
Firmware 1.14, 1.15, 4.37, 5.24, 5.65, 
5.126, 5.134 fn 1, 5.183 fn 3, 5.186
Forensic investigation 
access controls 9.47
analysis, judicial failure to 
understand 1.123
analysis, reliance on complex 
statistics software 1.100
changes, prevent 9.50
collection of evidence 










copy 6.57, 9.27, 9.34








































































implied assertions 3.27, 3.28, 3.35
indirect assertions 3.67
intention to communicate 3.44, 3.45
justification 3.4, 3.5, 3.7
Law Commission 3.47, 3.65, 4.31, 
4.32, 4.25, 4.30
multiple hearsay 3.30, 3.33, 3.60
‘negative hearsay’ 3.32
non- testimonial 3.8, 3.22, 3.23, 
3.24, 3.68
notice, requirement to give 3.30 
out of court statements 6.112
photographs 3.17
presumption of reliability 3.20
printout, whether hearsay 2.23, 3.47, 
4.23, 4.32, 4.33, 4.34
qualifying hearsay statement 3.44
rationale 3.2
recording of a fact 2.23
reliability 3.5, 3.10, 3.64, 3.24, 
3.25, 3.29
reliability of the maker of a 
statement 3.63
representation of fact 3.37, 3.59
right to confront 3.6, 3.7
rule of hearsay exclusion 3.2
second- hand evidence 3.4
testability 3.24
testimonial evidence 3.13, 3.14, 3.18, 
3.21, 3.22, 3.23, 3.24, 3.68
traditional definition 3.2
type of device 3.12
use made of the device 3.13 
unintended assertions 3.45
United States, waning support 3.8
Video recordings 3.17
weakness of the rule 3.45









MD5 6.66, 9.41, 9.42, 9.43
National Software Reference 
Library 9.43
one- way 9.40
purpose, investigations 9.32, 9.50
SHA- 1 6.66, 9.42, 9.43
SHA- 256 9.43
tools 9.130
Health records 5.164 fn 5
Hearsay see Chapter 3 generally
allocates risk of error 3.9
application 3.17, 3.45
arbitrary nature of distinction 3.38, 
3.40, 3.45
assertions 2.13, 3.26, 3.43, 3.44
auto- lab data analyser 4.33
automatic number plate 
recognition 3.17
blood sample 1.222, 4.33, 5.41, 5.222
business records 3.8
Category 1 3.12, 3.14, 3.15, 3.18, 4.20
Category 2 3.12, 3.16, 3.18, 3.19, 
3.22, 3.24, 4.27
Category 3 3.12, 3.18, 3.21, 3.22, 
3.26, 4.29
characterizing the evidence 
chromotograph 3.23
civil proceedings 3.30, 3.31
computer as a tool 3.22
computer systems and devices as a 
witness 3.26
confrontation, right to 3.6
criminal proceedings 3.33, 3.34, 3.35
digital data non- testimonial 3.11
direct assertions 3.67
discretion to exclude 3.64, 3.7
exceptions 3.7, 3.8, 3.31, 3.34
exclude 3.64, 3.65
express assertions 3.34
European Convention of Human 
Rights 3.7
generally inadmissible 2.11
head of a pin 3.43
hearsay statement and evidence 
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artificial intelligence 1.98











naivety of lawyers 1.123
proprietary tools 9.69
reliability of proof 9.1
reporting 9.93
uncover failure 5.87
Judicial notice 5.1, 5.2, 5.11, 5.14, 
5.20, 6.71
accuracy cannot be questioned 5.17
amphometer 5.27
breath analysis devices 5.22, 5.22 fn 3





location of cell phone 5.26 fn 1
maintenance 5.238
manner of programming 5.238
notorious or well- known technology 
5.216, 6.71




social media, incorrect 
generalization 6.74
threshold 5.54, 5.15
Lawyers, requirement to keep up- to- date 
with technology 1.1
Logs 
access logs 6.63, 6.95, 9.22, 9.83, 9.86
faults of omission 5.98
garbage- in- garbage- out 5.91
guileless faults 5.98
input data flaws 6.69
malicious faults 5.98
mistakes 4.14, 5.21 fn 1, 5.74
operational errors 5.92
poor decisions 5.98
user interface errors 5.92
‘I accept’, as electronic signature 
7.101, 7.201
Identification evidence 









Interactive virtual simulations 1.94
authenticity 1.106
juror perception influenced 1.106
seeing is believing 2.85
sway juries 2.97
Internet of Bodies 1.11
Internet of Things 1.10, 1.47, 6.99, 6.100
Intoximeter 
accuracy 5.218 fn 1
approval 5.219
clock 2.38, 5.212, 5.229
defects, effect 10.19 fn 1
evidence of police officer 2.34, 2.35
presumption in working order 
5.31, 5.32
printout 
accuracy 5.229 fn 1
admissibility 2.22, 2.24, 2.60
real evidence 2.12, 2.17, 2.22
reliability, challenge 5.224
statutory presumption 5.240, 5.251
Investigation 1.1 fn 1, 1.28, 1.93  
Chapter 9 generally 












































































direct evidence 2.8 










integrity metadata 6.81, 6.82
integrity, demonstrating 6.81, 6.82, 
6.83, 6.84 
interpretation 1.70











absence switched on 6.18 fn 4
accuracy of location 9.25 fn 1




records admitted 3.29 fn 3
SIM 4.28
telephone, SIM, records, proof of 
location 1.43, 4.28, 5.26 fn 1
text messages, false claim 2.30 fn 3, 
9.120 fn 6
text messages, proof of sending 5.227
Name in an email address, as electronic 
signature 7.154 and following, 7.182 
and following
activity, recording 1.32, 1.33, 4.27
application log 9.81
audit logs 6.63, 6.95, 9.47, 10.25
authentication, purpose 6.63
change logs 5.35, 5.263
data logs 9.54, 9.81, 9.82
email logs 1.55, 9.16
error logs, known 5.264
event logs 1.20, 9.22
integrity 9.81
network- based logs 9.81
program logs 1.86
purposes 1.42, 6.134, 9.23, 9.56
search logs 6.134
server logs 1.30, 1.55
stored logs 1.39
system logs 1.86, 9.22, 9.81
transaction logs 6.63, 6.108
web logs 1.62, 6.63
wireless networks 1.41
Lost data, recover 9.118
Machine learning 1.98, 1.101
transparency and 
explainability 1.107
Malfunction, relevance 2.38, 5.56
Malware for investigative purposes 
German Constitutional Court 9.135 
fn 1
protect users 9.136
Medical devices, Princess of Wales 
Hospital, prosecution of nurses 9.99
Memomaster 2.32, 8.6 fn 1
Memory 1.22, 1.26, 1.29, 190
Metadata 
altering 1.119, 2.56
anti- computer forensics 9.103
application metadata 1.28
archival systems 6.76
authentication 6.81, 6.82, 6.83, 6.84, 
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burden of proof 7.107, 7.108
concept, as signature 7.106
function, banking context 7.103, 
7.104, 7.105
Photograph 6.21




computer- generated graphical 
reconstructions 2.90, 2.92, 2.93
Preservation, methods 6.79, 6.80, 6.91, 
6.101, 6.107, 6.133
Presumption see Reliability, common 
law presumption of and Reliability, 









breath alcohol printout 2.22
disclosure of digital data 2.7
documentary evidence 2.24
evidence to prove a thing was 
done 2.21 
evidence to prove something was 












continuity of evidence 6.131
diplomatics 6.5
inconsistent positive 6.19
integrity of a system 6.51
address 7.168 fn 2, 7.172
automatic inclusion of signature 7.42
identification 7.174
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) 
7.155, 7.156
Statute of Frauds 7.157 and following








corporate intranets 1.40 
intranet 1.40
Internet 1.31
Internet protocol address 1.33
wireless networking 1.41
Number, as electronic signature 7.132, 
7.133, 7.134
Official websites, reliability of 2.26 fn 2








electronic data, concept of original 
6.33, 6.34, 6.35, 6.36, 6.41, 
6.60, 6.132
England and Wales Civil Evidence Act 
1995 6.24
first in time version 9.30, 9.32, 9.34, 
9.33, 9.43, 9.48, 9.113
integrity 6.36, 6.37, 6.38
multiple 6.4, 6.93, 6.132
secondary evidence 6.32
Password, as electronic signature 7.111, 
7.112, 7.113 































































anemometer 5.6 fn 1, 5.21 fn 1
aneroid 5.21 fn 1
assumptions, failure to substantiate 
5.181, 5.126, 5.231, 5.242 fn 1
aura of infallibility 5.37
authentication 6.84, 6.98
autopilot 5.143
basic fact, perquisite 5.213, 5.30, 
5.23, 5.3
basic fact fails 5.243 fn 3
blood sample testing device 5.41
breath analysis devices 5.22, 
5.22 fn 2, 5.125, 5.222, 5.224, 
5.226, 5.229
burden of proof, allocation 5.3, 
5.226, 5.227
burden of proof, reversed 5.169, 
5.222 fn 3, 6.73
Canada, judicial notice 5.14, 
5.15, 5.19
challenging 5.132 and following; 
5.226 and following
audits 5.123, 5.124, 5.171, 5.255, 
5.132, 5.262
bar for raising 5.254
disclosure of the software code 
5.249, 5.259, 5.262
distinguish software and 
device 5.138
evidential burden 5.230, 
5.243, 5.244
lack of foundation 5.228
legal burden 5.226, 5.243
persuasive burden 5.230
reliable enough 5.99
trial within a trial 5.189
well- known software not 
reliable 5.133
working properly 5.2, 5.7 fn 4, 
5.37, 5.50, 5.86 fn 2, 5.130, 
5.132, 5.218, 5.232, 5.233, 
5.235, 5.242, 5.242 fn 1, 
5.245, 5.246, 5.249, 10.12
circumstantial evidence, application 
of 5.3, 5.5
classification of software errors 5.78
judicial assumptions criticized 6.73








validity of information 6.29
Real evidence 





difference between real evidence and 
hearsay 2.13
material objects 2.12
perception by the court 2.12
printout 2.17, 2.20, 2.21, 2.22, 2.23, 
2.24 fn 2
printout, record of a fact 2.24
recording of credits and debits 2.25
things 2.12
Records see Business records
Recognition evidence. 2.75 
number plate 1.103 fn 3, 3.17
voice 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.81
Reliability, common law presumption of 
accuracy, common experience 5.41
accuracy, condition to be fulfilled 5.43
accuracy, presumptions items 
accurate without evidence 5.9
accuracy of presumption never 
correctly tested 5.3, 5.5, 5.6 fn 1 
accuracy, never tested 5.7
accuracy, operator of device 
sufficient to prove 5.46, 5.61
accuracy, scientific instruments 5.21, 
fn 1
accuracy, testing 5.42
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common knowledge 5.11, 5.27, 
5.28, 5.29, 5.30, 5.40, 5.261




general experience, asserted 5.51
general experience, dubious 
intellectual claim 5.22 fn 2
generally accepted, belief in 
5.27, 5.28
generally accepted by 
experts 5.43 
judicial notice 5.11 and following
‘notorious’ class 5.20 and 
following






operating correctly, assertion 
without evidence 5.33, 
5.34, 5.70
ordinary experience 5.3, 5.4
properly constructed 5.33, 5.34, 
5.40, 5.70
reliable 5.2, 5.8, 5.26, 5.50
failure to distinguish 
5.137, 5.138
failure to establish accuracy 
of assertion 5.248
lawyer, lack of 
knowledge 5.249
meaning, failure of judiciary 
to define 5.235
reliable, asserted without 
evidence 5.41
reliable, explicit 5.169
reliable, failure to provide 
meaning 5.36
failure of specification 5.83
human errors and biases 5.80






common law 5.1, 5.33, 5.48, 5.211, 
5.222, 5.239, 5.247
computers reliable erroneous 5.238
confusion between common law and 
statutory presumption 5.220 fn 2
correct articulation 5.35
demonstrably incorrect 5.2 fn 1, 
5.132, 5.142 fn 1, 5.165 fn 2, 
5.212 fn 1
devices not permitted to be tested 
5.22 fn 6
expediency 5.4
evidential foundation 5.35 and 
following
blood sample testing device 5.41
conditions that must be fulfilled 
5.43, 5.48, 5.49, 5.50
‘correctness’ of the software 
program 5.42
errors immediately detectable 5.181 
and following
failure 
‘bug’ 5.78, 5.79, 5.118, 5.153
hardware 5.8, 5.107, 5.108, 
5.126, 5.134 fn 1, 5.229
hardware assumed to be at 
fault 5.181
not understood 5.108
software code 5.65, 5.76, 5.77
specification 5.79, 8.83




accuracy of, no knowledge 
required 5.48, 5.51, 5.52, 5.61












































reliance on presumption 
5.29, 5.32
miscarriage of justice, reliance 
on reliability of computer 
systems 5.169
mobile telephone calls 6.17 fn 1
no requirement to understand 
software 5.52
pedometer 5.21 fn 1
presumption of innocence, 
undermined 5.222 fn 3, 5.234
proof of reliability 5.42, 5.241
purpose 5.3
reintroduction 5.221
rationale 5.3, 5.4, 5.222, 5.249,  
5.261
reliable, a delusion 5.213
reliable, failure of judicial 
explanation 5.235
reliance of presumption 5.39
satellite navigation system 5.26
scales 5.9
scientific evidence, lack of 5.4
scientific instruments 5.6, 5.21, 5.43, 
5.44, 5.59, 6.72
SMS messages 6.17 fn 1







well- known not reliable 5.133
speed measuring devices 5.7, 5.215, 
5.222, 10.17
statutory presumption 5.219 and 
following
stopwatch 
accuracy 5.7, 5.7 fn 5, 5.8 fn 2, 
5.21 fn 1
opinion evidence, whether 5.6
symmetries 5,128
testing 5.7 fn 1
truth 5.6
reliance without mentioning 
word 5.165 fn 2
software 5.117, 5.252, 5.261
trust experience, judges 
5.140, 5.142




substantial correctness 5.3, 5.4
universally used and 
accepted 5.140
used correctly 5.8
well known, accuracy of 
computer devices 5.27, 5.41, 
5.61, 5.154, 5.216
working properly 5.2, 5.37, 5.50, 
5.130, 5.132, 5.218, 5.232, 
5.233, 5.235, 5.242, 5.245, 
5.246, 5.249
working order 5.27, 5.29, 
5.30, 5.23, 5.33, 5.34, 5.35, 
5.39, 5.229
Law Commission 
common law presumption 5.1, 
5.2, 5.211, 5.214, 5.228, 
5.232, 5.224
influence beyond England and 
Wales 5.1 fn 1
justification 5.212, 5.213
presumption demonstrated to be 
incorrect, 5.2 fn 1, 5.142 fn 1, 
5.212 fn 1 
loadometer 5.21
mechanical instruments 5.2, 5.2, 5.6, 
5.11, 5.65, 5.216
accuracy 5.5




in order at material time 5.4
justification 5.4
lack of evidence to justify 5.213
maintenance, lack of concern by 
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assumptions and premises 2.86, 2.92 
fn 1, 2.95, 2.97
authenticity 1.106
juror perception influenced 1.106
seeing is believing 2.85
testimonial evidence 2.85 
Software 
application software 1.17
assumption software cannot 
fail 5.181
backward compatible or ‘downward 
compatible’ 1.121, 6.62
firmware 1.15
forensic, no error rate 5.63
standards 
Common Criteria for Information 
Technology Security 
Evaluation 5.121, 5.123
Common Methodology for 
Information Security 
Evaluation 5.123 
DO- 178B, Software 
Considerations in Airborne 
Systems and Equipment 
Certification 5.125
FIPS- 140 Information Technology 
Security Evaluation 
Criteria 5.121
ISO 13485:2016 Medical devices 
– Quality management 





anti- virus software, limitations 5.114
‘automatic’ correspondence not 
automatic 4.26
challenging 4.37
changes, affecting code 5.83, 5.102, 
5.106, 5.175, 5.215, 5.134 fn 1
components 5.85, 5.87, 5.116
GNU Bash 5.105 fn 1
Heartbleed 5.105
operating system 5.65, 
5.106, 5.237
thermometer 4.12, 4.14, 5.6 fn 1, 
5.21 fn 1, 5.22 fn 2
The Science of Judicial Proof 5.58
traffic lights 5.154
trained operator, considered 
sufficient 5.55
trial by machine 5.36
tyres, pressure 5.8
user sufficient to establish 
reliability 5.48
watch 5.5, 5.7
weighbridge, accuracy of 
readings 5.3
Wigmore on Evidence 5.44, 5.59
‘working properly’ 5.232
Reliability, statutory presumption 
of 5.219
breathalyser devices 5.129, 5.221
confusion with common law 
presumption 5.220 fn 2
fingerprints, Livescan 5.222, 5.223
satellite navigation system 1.33 fn 1, 
5.17, 5.26, 6.16, 7.91, 9.62
scanned manuscript signature, as 
electronic signature 7.191 and 
following
Secondary evidence 
best evidence 2.42, 2.44, 2.46, 6.32
civil proceedings, admissibility 
2.59, 2.61











Signature, what it cannot do 7.259
Silk Road 1.50





















































security vulnerabilities 5.109, 5.111, 
5.112, 5.113, 5.264
software updates 5.243, 5.110
source code 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7
standards 5.121
testing 
inadequate to uncover errors 
5.83 fn 3, 5.116
no comprehensive test 5.83 fn 3
solutions 5.94, 5.116
truth, challenging 4.37, 5.24
unreliable, continue to be 
5.129, 5.138
user, instructions 7.238
verifiably correct results 5.107, 5.246
vulnerabilities 5.109
well- known not reliable 5.133
witness, as the Chapter 4 generally 
zero day exploits 5.109, 5.112
Software errors 5.66 and following
bug 5.78, 5.79
‘bug’ bounty programme 5.118















Post Office Horizon scandal 5.165 
and following, 6.55, 6.56
power outage 5.87
stockbrokers 5.151
errors 5.2, 5.23, 5.24, 5.38, 5.64, 







content written by one or more 
people 3.14, 4.19, 4.20, 4.23
records generated by the 
software that have not had 
any input from a human 3.16, 
4.19, 4.27
records comprising a mix of 
human input and calculations 
generated by software 3.21, 
4.19, 4.29 
comments by programmer 4.8
complex software systems 5.99
correct service 5.73
development 5.93, 5.95  and following 
errors 5.66 and following
errors, classification 5.78
failure of software, reasons 5.76 and 
following
fit for purpose, incorrect judicial 
pronouncement 5.103, 5.104
free of faults 5.120




inherent design faults 5.138




‘correctness’ of the software 
program 5.21 fn 1, 5.41
fail to distinguish 5.40
limitations 5.67, 5.68
maintenance of software 5.93
modification of software 5.102
nature of software 4.5
nuclear industry, safety and 
security 5.112
operation of software 5.93
quality control 5.34 fn 1, 5.96
raw data, hearsay 4.31
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baggage handling systems 5.77 
death, causing 5.53 fn 1, 5.77, 
5.77 fn 7, 5.94 fn 3, 5.155, 
5.157, 5.158, 5.259, 5.160 fn 
1, 5.181, 5.187
dispensing more cash 5.77
incorrect records 5.77
imprisonment 5.165 fn 2
injury, causing 5.77, 5.94, 5.157, 
5.160 fn 1, 5.181, 5.187, 5.259
miscalculating assets 5.77
nuclear war averted twice 5.89
overtime incorrect 5.100
unintended acceleration 5.94, 
5.155, 5.158 fn 1, fn 2, 5.181, 
5.183, 5.259 fn 2, fn 3
defective seismic programs 5.181
Failure Prediction 5.107
interactions between individual 
components 5.19, 5.79, 
5.85, 5.145
machine- learning systems 5.90
probability of failure 5.102, 
5.107, 5.138
proprietary software code 
5.96, 5.104
reasons 5.77
security protocol, failure 5.111
Software programmers 
amateurs 5.99
lack of knowledge 5.96
programmer errors, causation 5.72
Spreadsheet program 
financial sector 4.29
human and software input 4.29
missing data 9.101
Spyware 9.126 fn 1, 9.135, 9.136
Standard of proof, documents 
best evidence civil proceedings 2.64
best evidence, criminal 
proceedings 2.64
Starting a computer 1.29, 1.119
Storage 
blockchain 1.25




described as deviation 5.73
human 5.80
human factors 5.57 
immediately detectable 5.181
increasing the risk 5.102
input data flaws 5.91
interface 5.164
industry knows software is not 





programme 5.95 fn 1
programmers 5.107
specification, failure of 5.83
standards 5.125





flaw 5.78, 5.79, 5.104, 5.105, 5.107, 
5.164 see also errors
functional fault 5.78
immediately detectable 5.181, 
5.212, 5.233
inherent problems 5.100
‘legacy’ systems 5.88, 5.173
manipulation 5.154, 5.159 
mistake 5.77, 5.79, 5.98, 5.116
modifications 5.93, 5.102
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 5.80 fn 1, 5.183
nature 5.66
personal use assumes reliability 5.99
quality control 5.96
reliability asserted without proof 
5.116 fn 1
result from input errors 5.181
specification, failure 5.79, 5.83
Software failure 
consequences 















































filesystem encryption keys 9.119
free 9.140





necessary to investigate devices 9.77
passwords 9.80
privacy protection 9.125
question underlying scientific 
methodology 9.69
recovering data 9.52 fn 1, 9.78
relevant 9.40
reliability challenged 5.48 and 
following
software based 9.107
software program, analysis irrelevant 
in legal 5.52 and following
tested 9.70
training 9.105
viewing the data 9.77
XRY 5.48
Traces of evidence 
browser cache 9.84, 9.109
cookies 9.85, 9.86
email 9.10, 9.14, 9.16, 9.88
files 9.82
instant messaging 9.89, 9.90
Internet 9.20, 9.23, 9.28, 9.49, 9.54, 
9.81, 9.83, 9.87, 9.90, 9.93, 9.97, 
9.131, 9.136, 9.138
logs see Logs






VPN proxies 9.86, 9.87, 9.131
Traffic information tickets 2.6
Trail obfuscation 9.106, 9.131
Trial within a trial 
authenticity, prima facie  
case 5.193
primary 1.22, 1.23, 1.29
secondary 1.22, 1.23, 1.29
Tachographs 3.57
Tanpınar, Ahmet Hamdi 9.60 fn 1





calibrated machine 3.22, 3.23




machine testimony 4.1 fn 1, 5.245




photograph 2.67 fn 1
perceptions 2.33
recording erased 2.45
satellite system, accuracy 5.26
video recording 2.76
Testimonial evidence 2.45, 2.60, 2.64, 
2.73, 3.6, 3.8, 3.13
Text message, driver causing death 5.227
Thomas, Dylan 9.60 fn 1
Time stamps 1.18, 1.20, 1.57, 6.60, 7.276
Tools, forensic 
alter data 9.124






copying the hard drive 9.75
criminals using 9.103
cross- examine 9.69
delete data 9.117, 9.129
dual use nature 9.135
encryption 9.20, 9.26, 9.80, 9.89
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compelled 8.57




testimony from the defendant 
8.45, 8.63, 8.70
Federal Rules of Evidence 5.123, 
6.31, 6.61 fn 2
Manual for Complex  
Litigation 5.213
self- authentication 6.61, fn 2
trade secret privilege 5.200 fn 1
Unintended software interactions 
5.79, 5.85
Video evidence 
admissible 2.67, 2.68, 5.194
analysis 9.6
body- worn video camera 1.103, 
3.52, 3.55
Category 2 device 3.16, 3.17
clips 1.62
clock gap between ATM 9.58
facial mapping 2.76
general 1.12, 1.222, 2.75
store video recorded, erased 2.45
surveillance footage 2.90, 9.56, 9.57, 
9.58, 9.61
testimonial, in lieu 2.73
time stamp 9.59
wills 7.148 fn 2 
Virtual reality 1.104
authenticity 1.106
juror perception influenced 1.106
sway juries 2.97
Weight 
criminal trial, directions of 
judge 2.72
no fixed rules 2.71
Wigmore, John Henry, hostility to trade 
secret privilege 5.200 fn 1
balance of probabilities 5.192, 5.193
beyond reasonable proof 5.192 fn 1 
challenging authenticity 5.189
rare 5.205
scope, judge to set out 5.207
standard of proof 5.193, 5.197 
Trojan horse 5.68, 5.113, 9.131, 9.132, 
9.134, 9.135
Trusted Computing 9.136, 9.139
Typing a name into an electronic 
document, as electronic signature 
7.114 and following





Statute of Frauds 7.137, 7.138
text message 7.120
wills 7.139 and following
United States of America 
Manual for Complex Litigation  
5.213
encrypted data 8.55 and following
assist in circumventing 
encryption 8.77
biometric measurement 8.72
compelled testimonial 8.57, 8.57 
fn 4, 8.58
decryption, compelled 8.59, 8.60, 
8.66, 8.68, 8.71, 8.71 fn 1, 
8.76, 8.81 fn 1, 8.88
Fifth Amendment 8.56, 8.62, 
8.63, 8.67, 8.71
forgone conclusion 8.48, 8.60, 
8.66, 8.68, 8.69
iPhone protected by passcode 
8.76, 8.82
nontestimonial 8.63
privilege against self- incrimination  






















































knowledge with experience 10.21
knowledge, without 6.55, 6.64, 10.1, 
10.20, 10.21
lay ‘expert’ 10.8, 10.14
not qualified 9.25 fn 1, 10.20, 10.21
not working properly, declined to 
hear evidence 10.19
original, attest 6.32
qualifications 6.28, 10.19 and 
following
qualified without knowledge of 
software code 5.47
reliability, no knowledge to 
testify 10.6
reliance on output of computer 
system 10.8
relevant knowledge, lack of 10.21
using device sufficient expertise 
5.24, 5.47
working properly, expert not 
necessary 10.12, 10.18, 10.20
Wills 
electronic 4.23
electronic signature 7.139 and 
following
Witnesses see Chapter 10 generally





competence of procedures 
10.7, 10.20
computer malfunction and touching 
wood 10.7 fn 1, 10.12
computer reliability, qualified to 
testify 10.4, 10.4, 10.17
continuity of evidence 10.7
data reliability 1.4
degree of expertise will vary 10.19
forensic examination without 
relevant knowledge or 
expertise 10.21
incorrect witness 10.6 
inadequate 6.30, 10.9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

